• The saga of legislative manipulation of the right to

property began with the First Amendment Act,

1951 by which the Articles 31-A and 31-B were
inserted into the Constitution.
• Article 31-A was introduced by the Constitution
First Amendment Act, 1951 wherein the
Parliament defined ʺEstateʺ and continued by
further amendments to extend its meaning so as
to comprehend practically the entire agricultural
land in the rural area including waste lands, forest
lands, lands for pasture or sites of buildings.
• Under the said amendment, no law providing for
acquisition by the state of an estate so defined or
any rights therein of the extinguishment or
modification of such rights could be questioned on
the ground that it was inconsistent with or took
away or abridged any of the rights conferred by
Articles 14, 19 or 31.
• Article 31-B and Schedule Nine introduced by the
subsequent amendments was another attempt to
usurp judicial power.
• It was an innovation introduced in our Constitution
unheard of in any other part of democratic world.
• The legislature made void laws offending
fundamental rights and they were included in
Schedule Nine and later on the list was extended
from time to time.
• Article 31-B declared that none of the acts or
regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule nor any
of the provisions thereof shall be deemed to be void
on the ground that they are inconsistent with Part III,
notwithstanding any judgments, decree or order of
any court or tribunal to the contrary.
• By further amendment, the list was extended.
• This amendment discloses a suspicious attitude to
the rule of law and the philosophy underlying our
Constitution.
• Autocratic power was sustained by democratic
• Originally 64 laws were added to the Ninth Schedule and
more acts were added by the 4th, 17th and 29th Amendment
Acts ;
• 34th Amendment added 17 more Acts;
• 39 Amendment added 38 Acts;
th

• 42nd Amendment added 64 Acts;

• the 47th Amendment 1984 added 14 more Acts and by the
end of this amendment the number of Acts in the Ninth
Schedule had risen to 202;
• The 66th Amendment added 55 Acts raising the total to 257.
• The 75th Amendment Act, 1994 has been passed by the
parliament, which includes Tamil Nadu Act providing for 69
percent reservation for backward classes under the Ninth
Schedule.
• After the addition of 27 more Acts to the Schedule by the 78th
Amendment Act of 1995 the total number of Acts protected
by the Schedule has risen to 284.
• The saga did not end here, the hornet’s nest had been
stirred up already, the state made a consistent attempt by
the process of amendment to the Constitution to remove the
judicial check on the exercise of its power in a large area,
and to clothe itself with arbitrary power in that regard. The
history of the amendments of Article 31(1) and (2) and the
adding of Articles 31(A) and (B) and the Ninth Schedule
reveal the pattern.
• Article 31 in its first two clauses deals with the deprivation
of property and acquisition of property.
• The Supreme Court held in a series of decisions viz. State of West Bengal vs
Mrs. Bella Banerjee,1 W.B vs Subodh Gopal,2 State of Madras vs
Namasivaya Muralidar,3 that Article 31, clauses (1) and (2) provided for the
doctrine of eminent domain and under clause (2) a person must be deemed
to be deprived of his property if he was “substantially dispossessed” or his
right to use and enjoy the property was “seriously impaired” by the
impugned law.
• According to this interpretation, the two clauses of Article 31
dealt only with acquisition of property in the sense explained
by the court, and that under
• Article 31(1) the state could not make a law depriving a
person of his property without complying with the provisions
of Article 31(2). It is worth mentioning in this context that it
was the decision in the Bella Banerjee’s case, that actually
induced the government to resort to the Fourth Amendment.
• In this case the Apex court through this landmark decision
had insisted for payment of compensation in every case of
compulsory deprivation of property by the state.
• It was held that clause (1) and (2) of Article 31 deal with the
same subject, that is, deprivation of private property.
• Further the court held that the word “compensation” meant
“just compensation” i.e. just equivalent of “what the owner
had been deprived of.”
• It is also worthwhile to note here that this amendment also
amended Article 305 and empowered the state to
nationalise any trade.
•The Supreme Court in P Vajravelu Mudalier vs Special Deputy Collector and
Union of India Vs Metal Corporation of India considered Article 31(2) in the
context of compensation and held that if the compensation fixed was illusory or
the principles prescribed were irrelevant to the value of the property at or about
the time of acquisition, it could be said that the Legislature had committed a
fraud on power and therefore the law was inadequate.
•The Supreme Court in three other decisions confined the bar of Article 31-A only
to agrarian reforms.
•In Kochini case the Court held that requirement of Article 31-A bars an attack on
the ground of infringement of fundamental right only in the case of agrarian
reforms, pertaining to an estate.
•In Ranjith Singh vs State of Punjab, it was held that the expression ʺagrarian
reformʺ was wide enough to take in consolidation of holdings as it was nothing
more than a proper planning of rural areas.
•In Vajravelu decision the Supreme Court explained that there is no conflict
between the said two decisions and pointed out that the latter decision includes
in the expression of agrarian reforms, the slum clearance and other beneficial
utilisation of vacant and waste lands.
Conclusion:
(1) Every citizen has a fundamental right to acquire, hold and dispose of the
property.
(2) The state can make a law imposing reasonable restrictions on the said right in
public interest.
(3) The said restrictions, under certain circumstances, may amount to deprivation of
the said right.
(4) Whether a restriction imposed by law on a fundamental right is reasonable and in
public interest or not, is a justifiable issue.
(5) The state can by law, deprive a person of his property if the said law of
deprivation amounts to reasonable restriction in public interest within the meaning
of Article 19(5).
(6) The state can acquire or requisition the property of a person for a public purpose
after paying compensation.
(7) The adequacy of the compensation is not justifiable.
(8) If the compensation fixed by law is illusory or is contrary to the principles relevant
to the fixation of compensation, it would be a fraud on power and therefore the
validity of such a law becomes justifiable.