Attacker Techniques and Motivation
Attacker Techniques and Motivation
(Antiforensics)
Proxy
• hxxp://thesafety.us
• hxxp://5socks.net
• hxxp://vpn-service.us
• Attackers may prefer proxy services advertised on hacking forums because they are less responsive to
abuse requests. For example, commercial proxy services like FindNot keep logs of their users for a
maximum of five days to protect the system from being used for abusive purposes, while many of those
services advertised on hacking forums do not keep any logs.
• Operating proxy services is not illegal because it has legitimate purposes related to anonymity for users
Detecting use of proxies
Detecting proxies is difficult and not always reliable.
1. Malicious code authors install custom proxies and use encrypted or custom protocols
2. Port scanning on corporate networks can identify proxies that listen on default ports.
3. Organizations should also monitor changes to proxy configuration because such changes could indicate that
an attacker compromised a host.
4. IDS (Intrusion Detection System) use blacklist from domain name system blacklist (DNSBL) to block URLs
5. Certain proxies do not proxy all traffic.
For instance, a Web application can force users to perform unique DNS requests with subdomains (see Exhibit
2-3). The application links the DNS request to the user’s IP address and verifies that the HTTP request
originates from the same IP address. If they are not the same, indicating the use of a proxy, the application can
determine that the proxy IP address made the HTTP request and that the user’s actual IP address made the DNS
request.
• There are various port scanning tools available, such as Nmap, Masscan, and Netcat. For this example, let's use Nmap, which is one of the most popular and
versatile port scanning tools.
• Run the Port Scan: Open a terminal or command prompt and type the following command to scan the target system (192.168.1.100) using Nmap:
• nmap 192.168.1.100
• This command will perform a basic scan of the target system, scanning the most common 1,000 TCP ports.
• View Scan Results: After the scan completes, Nmap will display the results, showing which ports are open, closed, or filtered on the target system. For example:
• In this example, Nmap found that ports 22 (SSH), 80 (HTTP), and 443 (HTTPS) are open on the target system.
• Interpret the Results:
• Open Ports: These are ports that responded to the scan, indicating that there is an active service listening on those ports. Attackers often target open ports to
exploit vulnerabilities or gain unauthorized access.
• Closed Ports: These are ports that did not respond to the scan, indicating that there is no active service listening on those ports. Closed ports are generally
considered less vulnerable to attacks.
• Filtered Ports: These are ports that did not respond to the scan, either due to firewall rules, packet filtering, or other security measures in place on the target
system.
• Advanced Scanning Techniques: Nmap offers various advanced scanning techniques, such as SYN scanning (-sS), TCP connect scanning (-sT), and UDP
scanning (-sU), which can provide more detailed information about the target system's network configuration and security posture.
• Metasploit has even provided an application programming interface
(API) for website owners to determine the true IP addresses of their
visitors. iDefense configured a browser to use a proxy and showed that
the Flash test correctly identified the real IP address because Flash
does not use Internet Explorer proxy settings.
Tunnelling Techniques
Most enterprise security controls include strong firewalls, intrusion detection systems (IDSs), and
user policies, such as proxies and time-of-day rules that limit the amount and type of traffic
generated on user networks. Tunneling data through other protocols often bypasses these controls
and may allow sensitive data to exit the network and unwanted data to enter. It is even possible to
extend all networks through these means without ever triggering an alert or log entry.
Difference between tunnel and proxy
Aspect Tunnel Proxy
Tunnels are primarily used to establish a secure, private communication Proxies act as intermediaries between clients (such as web browsers) and
channel between two endpoints over an untrusted network, such as the destination servers (such as websites). They receive requests from clients,
internet. They provide a way to encapsulate and protect data as it travels forward them to the destination servers, and return the responses to the
Purpose
between the endpoints. Tunnels are commonly used for purposes like clients. Proxies are often used for purposes like anonymizing internet
connecting remote offices in a corporate network, accessing private traffic, accessing geo-restricted content, caching web content to improve
resources securely over the internet, or establishing VPN connections. performance, or filtering content for security or compliance reasons.
https://youtu.be/wJQndtydiB0
open source software already exist, all of which allow tunneling through
well-known protocols, which attackers can use out of the box or with
some simple tweaking to defeat most firewalls’ rules, proxies, and other
administrative access controls quickly. By writing custom applications
that act as the client and server for other protocols in a given
environment, malicious code can hide its activities and gain unfettered
access to and from any network.
HTTP Proxy
HTTP Tunnel - HTTP tunneling is the process in which communications are encapsulated by
using HTTP protocol. HTTP tunneling is used to bypass firewalls and other network
restrictions and an HTTP tunnel is used to create a direct network link between two locations.
The most common form of HTTP tunneling is the standardized HTTP CONNECT method.
• As one can see, the protocol allows, in essence, unlimited space for
content (or payload) in the request or reply message in addition to other
open areas, such as the headers, whether this content includes arbitrary
custom headers or inappropriate data in valid headers.
• This makes it convenient to transfer arbitrary data to and from an HTTP
server. All one needs to tunnel the traffic is software that can pretend to
talk to the protocol but in reality can transfer data for some other
(perhaps nefarious) purpose.
• A tunneling Web server or a tunneling Web application running on a
legitimate Web server will work. Both types of solutions are readily
available as open source software. Since tunneled traffic looks and acts
like HTTP, application proxies are not a viable defence, as malicious
users or software will simply use the proxies as their administrators
intended: to transmit HTTP message through a control point.
Connect method to establish http tunnel
• The most common form of HTTP tunneling is the
standardized HTTP CONNECT method. In this mechanism, the
client asks an HTTP proxy server to forward
the TCP connection to the desired destination. The server then
proceeds to make the connection on behalf of the client. Once
the connection has been established by the server, the proxy
server continues to proxy the TCP stream to and from the client.
Only the initial connection request is HTTP - after that, the
server simply proxies the established TCP connection.
Steganography
• Steganography is the practice of hiding messages and data in content that is not
readily apparent and is a form of security through obscurity. For example,
steganographic software and tools can encode messages and data into images21 so
that only users who know where the data exists can retrieve it. Tunnels that use
intermediaries for data exchange can deposit payloads that are steganographically
encoded to make it harder to detect the covert communication.
Many phishing attacks against mobile devices use short message service (SMS, or smishing) and
voice-over Internet protocol (VoIP, or vishing) to distribute lures and collect personal information.
Attackers often send fraudulent SMS messages containing a URL or phone number using
traditional phishing themes. Responders either enter their personal information into a fraudulent
website, as with traditional e-mail phishing, or, if calling phone numbers, may even provide their
information directly to other people.
To limit exposure to these growing threats, organizations should not send contact information to
users via SMS but instead should be sure phone numbers are readily available on their websites. In
addition, financial institutions should carefully consider using mobile devices as two-factor
authentication devices, given that customers may use the same mobile device to access the online
banking system.
Phishing against Mobile Devices
• Most instances of SMS phishing (smishing) target banks or financial institutions by sending a phone number
that the victim calls after receiving the message, resulting in a vishing attack
Is it Phishing, Vishing or Smishing?
Phishing
Vishing
Phishing
Smishing
Smishing
• SMS gateway providers have
Mobile Phishing attack responded to abuse by rejecting
excessive numbers of messages or
fraudulent messages. This is
dependent upon the cooperation of the
Internet service providers (ISPs)
themselves, rather than defensive tools
on a mobile device. Uncooperative or
unwilling ISPs could cause this type of
filtering to fail.
Mobile SMS Phishing is difficult to detect
than email phishing
• Smishing and vishing are serious problems.
• Anti phishing products are designed to filter e-mails, but mobile phishing is more difficult to filter
for both users and automatic products. SMS messages contain much less tracking information;
therefore, recipients will not be able to determine from where they originate.
• Mobile phone browsers and SMS programs also lack integrated phishing defences built into
today’s e-mail clients and browsers. Most mobile browsers lack support for protections normally
available on desktop systems such as URL filtering, phishing toolbars, and extended validation
(EV) SSL certificates.
• Smishers also often spoof the source address and use a large number of different phone numbers
to perform vishing.
• Mobile browsers also make it difficult to determine the legitimacy of a URL. The small-form
factor and limited display are incapable of displaying full URLs, and it can take as many as ten
clicks to access the security information of a site.
• Based upon these concerns, it seems likely that users of mobile devices have an increased risk of
falling victim to a phishing attack when they surf with mobile browsers or receive fraudulent
SMS messages.
Mobile Malicious Code
Although rare and only a more recent occurrence, SMS messages sent to mobile devices may
also attempt to convince users to install a mobile malicious code. On or before February 4,
2009, Chinese mobile phone users began reporting a new virus that affects Symbian S60.25 A
signature is required on all code that runs on the S60 third edition, and this virus is no
exception; it uses a certificate from Symbian licensed to “ShenZhen ChenGuangWuXian.”
After the user installs the program, it spreads to other users by sending SMS messages that
contain URLs, such as the following, for users to download and install the code:
hxxp://www.wwqx-mot.com/game
hxxp://www.wwqx-cyw.com/game
hxxp://www.wwqx-sun.com/game
Rogue antivirus
• During the past year, fake antivirus programs have become dramatically more prevalent and are now a major
threat to enterprises and home users. Moreover, attackers often bundle this software with stealthier malicious
programs. Fortunately, in attackers’ attempts to get users’ attention, rogue antivirus software also alerts
administrators to system compromises and inadvertently exposes other malicious software.
• Attackers aggressively target users with Trojan applications that claim to be antivirus programs. These
rogue antivirus applications, once installed, falsely report security issues to mislead victims into purchasing
a purported “full” version, which can cost each victim up to US$89.95. Victims have had little success when
contacting the payment providers for refund and removal.
• rogue antivirus application often changes a user’s background, displays pop-up windows, modifies search
behaviour, and displays fake windows and security center messages, it often makes its presence repeatedly
visible to users. This can be a benefit, if system administrators aggressively audit infected computers for
other malicious programs with which it is bundled.
• Attackers that install rogue antivirus applications often use social-engineering techniques to trick victims.
To spread, some variants are bundled with mass-mailing capabilities to send URL links or attachments
through e-mail messages.
Following the Money: Payments
• Most of the rogue antivirus incidents that iDefense investigated use third-party
payment organizations. These organizations accept credit card payments and
create a layer of protection and security for attackers who use them. These
payment processors typically use legitimate SSL certificates and claim to handle
fraud requests and operate on a permanent 24/7 basis. The payment processors’
connection with rogue antivirus vendors is not exclusive; therefore, law
enforcement cannot always shut them down immediately.
• In many instances that iDefense investigated, several similar payment providers
exist on the same IP address. The payment providers are highly suspicious
because they use multiple registration names, domains, and contact addresses and
countries, despite their singular purpose to accept money for rogue antivirus
payments.
• Several of the payment provider sites do not list a phone number unless replying
to an authorized customer. They also list in their terms of service that they avoid
taking responsibility for customer content.
Click Fraud
• The Web is interactive tool and allows advertisers to know exactly how many
potential customers viewed an ad and how many clicked the ad.
• This knowledge leads to an advertising model known as pay-per-click (PPC), in
which advertisers pay ad publishers each time a potential customer clicks an ad on
the publisher’s website.
• This direct relation-ship between the number of clicks and the amount of money
earned by the publisher has resulted in a form of fraud best known as click fraud.
Anchor Intelligence reports that in the second quarter of 2009, 22.9 percent of ad
clicks are attempts at click fraud.
Pay-per-click
• Click fraud occurs when an ad network charges an advertiser for a click when there was no opportunity for a
legitimate conversion.
• There are many possible motivations for a person to click an advertisement without any intention to purchase a
product or service. Publishers perform the most obvious and common form of click fraud. Clicking an ad on one’s
own website directly generates revenue for the publisher. Clicking the ad fifty times generates even more revenue.
• Could just as easily ask friends to click the ads. For instance, a blogger who wants to increase revenue might make a
post simply asking his or her readers to click every ad on his or her website each time they visit. While they are
legitimate users, these clicks will not result in a conversion for the advertiser.
• If each click costs the Acme Corp. money, Acme’s chief rival might click the ad a few hundred times a day to cost
them as much money as possible. In this case, the publisher benefits from the fraudulent clicks, but the motivation
is merely to harm the advertiser.
• Competing publishers might also be motivated to commit click fraud. A competing publisher can click ads on a
competitor’s website to frame them for click fraud. Once detected, the ad network may ban the competitor, which
will result in an increased share of the advertising revenue for the actual click fraudster.
• Nonfinancial motivations might also cause a person to commit click fraud. If a person disagrees with how Acme
Corp. treats its workers, they might click Acme ads to cost the company additional money. As in the case of clicks
from a competitor, the intent is to harm the advertisers, but the outcome also benefits the publisher.
Click Fraud Tactics and Detections
• The simplest form of click fraud involves manually clicking advertisements through the browser.
Botnets