Media and Politics

The role of the mass media in modern democracy is one of the most
controversial
topics in politics. Politicians are usually locked in a ‘love–hate’ relationship with
the political media, and the media seem to play an ever-larger part in political
life. Political scientists dispute whether the mass media are powerful or not,
and
whether their impact on politics is good or bad for democracy:
• On the one hand, the mass media are supposed to play a crucial role in
supplying citizens with a full and fair account of the news and a wide range of
political opinion about it.
• On the other hand, the media are often criticised for being systematically
biased politically, and for their growing but unaccountable power.

In theory, a free press and television should be the watchdogs of democratic

politics; in practice, some analysts believe, they are as much a threat to
democratic government as a protector of it.
The media and political
leadership
Apart from its impact (for good or ill) on democracy, the prominence of the mass media
in an ‘information age’ has affected the processes of governance (see p. 74) through
the transformation of political leadership.
The chief way in which the media has transformed political leadership is through
growing interest in the personal lives and private conduct of senior political figures, at
the expense of serious and ‘sober’ policy and ideological debate. This, in part, stems
from the media’s, and particularly television’s, obsession with image rather than issues,
and with personality
rather than policies. In the UK and other parliamentary systems, it is evident in a
tendency towards the ‘presidentialization’, or ‘Americanization’, of politics. Such
trends reflect not so much conscious bias on the part of the media, as an attempt to
‘sell’ politics to a mass audience that is deemed to be little interested in issues and
policies. This also accounts for the tendency to treat elections as ‘horse races’, the
public’s attention being focused less on the policy significance of the outcome and more
on who is going to win. These two
tendencies invariably coincide, turning elections into ‘beauty contests’ between
leading politicians, each of whom serves as the ‘brand image’ of their party. Leaders are
therefore judged largely on the basis of their ‘televisual’ skills (relaxed manner, sense of
humour, ability to demonstrate the ‘popular touch’, and so on), rather than their
mastery of political issues and capacity for serious political debate.
 Comparing Media
Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and
Politics (2004), by Daniel C. Hallin and Paolo Mancini,
is a seminal study in the field of international
comparative media system research. The study compares
media systems of 18 Western democracies including nine
Northern European countries
(Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland), five
Southern European countries (France, Greece, Italy,
Portugal, and Spain) and four Atlantic countries (Canada,
Great Britain, Ireland, and the United States).
The conceptual framework developed in this study turned
out to be an important contribution to the field of the
comparative media systems research because it provides
a systematic and applicable approach to analyze
differences and similarities of the relationships
between media and politics.
 Comparing Media
 Framework for comparing media systems, proposed by Hallin
in four major dimensions according to which media systems
in Western Europe and North America can usefully be
compared:
 (1) the development of media markets, with particular
emphasis on the strong or weak development of a mass
circulation press;
 (2) political parallelism; that is, the degree and nature of the
links between the media and political parties or, more
broadly, the extent to which the media system reflects the
major political divisions in society;
 (3) the development of journalistic professionalism;
 (4) the degree and nature of state intervention in the media
system.
 Comparing Media
 Authors identify three basic models of the relationship between media
and political systems.
 The “Polarized Pluralist Model,” found in the Mediterranean area of
Southern Europe (France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain), is
characterized by low levels of newspaper circulation and journalistic
professionalization, as well as by high levels of political parallelism and
state intervention.
 The “Democratic Corporatist Model” of Central and Northern Europe
(Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Norway,
Sweden, and Switzerland) is characterized by high levels of the four
dimensions (newspaper circulation, parallelism, professionalization, and
state intervention).
 Finally, Hallin and Mancini identify the “Liberal Model” of the North
Atlantic region (Britain, Canada, Ireland, and United States), which
presents medium levels of newspaper circulation, strong
professionalization, and low levels of parallelism (with the exception of
Britain) and state intervention
 Development of Media Markets
 One of the most obvious differences among media systems has to do with
the development of the mass circulation press. In some countries mass
circulation newspapers developed in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century. In others they did not. That historical difference is
reflected today in sharply different rates of newspaper circulation, from a
high of 720 per thousand adult population in Norway to a low of 78 per
thousand in Greece. High rates of newspaper circulation are characteristic
of Scandinavia and other parts of Northern Europe, and low rates
characteristic of Southern Europe.
The distinction here is not only one of quantity. The newspapers of
Southern Europe are addressed to a small elite – mainly urban, well-
educated, and politically active. They are both sophisticated and
politicized in their content, and can be said to be involved in a horizontal
process of debate and negotiation among elite factions. The newspapers
of Northern Europe and North America, by contrast, tend to be addressed
to a mass public not necessarily engaged in the political world.
They are, in this sense, involved in a vertical process of communication,
mediating between political elites and the ordinary citizen, though they
may at the same time play a role in the horizontal process of interelite
 Development of Media Markets

 The newspapers of Southern

Europe, with their relatively low
circulations, have not historically
been profitable business
enterprises, and have often been
subsidized by political actors, a
fact that has important
implications for the degree of
political parallelism and of
journalistic professionalism.
Proportion of Public Watching or Reading News Every Day

 The relative importance of

newspapers and television as
sources of news (notice that
the audience for television
varies much less than the
audience for newspapers).
The distinction between media systems characterized by a clear
separation between a sensationalist mass press and “quality”
papers addressed to an elite readership (Britain is the strongest
example) and those that lack such stratification of the
newspaper market, either because they lack a mass circulation
press altogether or because they are dominated by newspapers
that serve elite and mass readerships simultaneously. Newspaper
markets also vary in the balance of local, regional, and national
newspapers. Some (Britain, Austria, Italy, Spain) are dominated
by a national or super-regional press, some by local papers (the
United States, Canada, Switzerland) and some (Germany, France,
Scandinavia) have a combination of both. National newspaper
markets, tend to produce a more politically differentiated press.
Some media markets are simply bigger than others, which can
have important implications for the number of media outlets.
 Political Parallelism
 Political Parallelism refers to media content – the extent to
which the different media reflect distinct political orientations in
their news and current affairs reporting, and sometimes also
their entertainment content.
 Political parallelism is also often manifested in the partisanship
of media audiences, with supporters of different parties or
tendencies buying different newspapers or watching different
TV channels.
Moreover, it is manifested in journalistic role orientations and
practices. Journalists in some systems, and some historical
periods, retain more of the “publicist” role that once prevailed
in political journalism – that is, an orientation toward
influencing public opinion.
 POLITICAL PARALLELISM IN BROADCAST GOVERNANCE
AND REGULATION

 Because they are public bodies, public broadcasting systems and the
regulatory agencies responsible for supervising commercial broadcasting
obviously have a significant relationship to the political system. Four basic
models can be distinguished for the governance of public broadcasting, and
in most countries regulatory authorities tend to follow fairly similar patterns:
(1) The government model in which public broadcasting – which in this case
approaches state broadcasting – is controlled directly by the government or
by the political majority. The classic case of this form is French broadcasting
under DeGaulle, which fell under the control of the Ministry of Information
formally until 1964. Many European countries approached this model in an
early phase of the history of broadcasting, but most eventually developed
alternative institutional forms that would insulate public service
broadcasting to a substantial degree from control by the political majority. It
does still exist in more or less modified form, however, in the newest
democracies of Western Europe, Greece, Portugal, and Spain. In the latter
case, directors of public broadcasting are appointed by Parliament, not
directly by the government, but this in the end gives the majority party
effective control.
 POLITICAL PARALLELISM IN BROADCAST GOVERNANCE
AND REGULATION

 (2) The professional model is exemplified above all by the BBC, where a
strong tradition developed that broadcasting should be largely insulated
from political control and run by broadcasting professionals. This model
is also characteristic of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC),
Irish public broadcasting, some Scandinavian countries, and public
broadcasting in the United States.
 (3) In the parliamentary or proportional representation model control
over public broadcasting is divided among the political parties by
proportional representation, as part of what is known in Italy as the
lottizzazione or in German-speaking countries as the proporz principle.
The classic example here would be Radiotelevisione Italiana (RAI) in the
1980s, where not only was the board of directors appointed by
proportional representation, but the three channels were also divided
among the parties: RAI 1 under the control of the Christian Democrats,
RAI 2 under the control of the “secular” parties, and RAI 3 under the
control of the Communist Party.
 Professionalization

 In the case of journalism the norms of professionalization can include ethical

principles such as the obligation to protect confidential sources or to maintain a
separation between advertising and editorial content, as well as practical routines –
common standards of “newsworthiness,” for example – and criteria for judging
excellence in professional practice and allocating professional prestige. Journalism is
likely to be manifested in criteria of newsworthiness on which journalists will agree
regardless of their political orientations, as well as a tendency for journalists to
define their standing in the field in terms of the opinions of fellow journalists, rather
than those of outsiders – political party leaders, for example, or stockholders.
 There is considerable debate about the relation between commercialization of the
media and professionalization. Some see them as essentially in harmony, arguing
that commercialization undercuts political instrumentalization. We will generally take
the view that professionalization can be threatened either by political
instrumentalization or by commercialization, and indeed in many cases by both at
once.
 Where political parallelism is very high, with media organizations strongly tied to
political organizations, and journalists deeply involved in party politics,
professionalization is indeed likely to be low: journalists are likely to lack autonomy,
except to the extent that
they enjoy it due to high political positions, and journalism is likely to lack a distinct
common culture and distinct sense of social purpose, apart from the purposes of the
 Nature of State Intervention in the Media System.

 The state plays a significant role in shaping the media system in any society.
But there are considerable differences in the extent of state intervention as
well as in the forms it takes. The most important form of state intervention is
surely public service broadcasting, which has been present in every country
in Western Europe and North America, and in most countries has until
recently been the only or the primary form of broadcasting. There has, of
course, been a strong shift toward commercial broadcasting in recent years,
but public service broadcasting remains quite significant in most of the
countries.
 Public broadcasting has been the most important form of state ownership of
media. However, in many countries the state has also owned news
agencies, newspapers, or other media-related enterprises, either directly or
through state-owned enterprises. Press subsidies have also been present in
most of countries covered here, and have played an important role in many.
These can be direct or indirect (e.g., reduced postal, telecommunication, or
VAT rates), and can be directed either at news organizations or at individual
journalists. The state, and in many cases state-owned enterprises, are also
advertisers, in many cases very important ones. Subsidies for the film
industry are also very common.
 Nature of State Intervention in the Media System.

Other forms of state intervention include:

 Libel, defamation, privacy, and right-of-reply laws;
 Hate speech laws;
 Professional secrecy laws for journalists (protecting the
confidentiality of sources) and “conscience laws” (protecting
journalists when the political line of their paper changes);
 Laws regulating access to government information
 Laws regulating media concentration, ownership, and competition
 Laws regulating political communication, particularly during election
campaigns;
 Broadcast licensing laws and laws regulating broadcasting content,
including those dealing with political pluralism, language, and
domestic content.
 Nature of State Intervention in the Media System.

In the broadest terms, a distinction can be made between relatively

liberal media systems, in which state intervention is limited and the
media are left primarily to market forces, and systems in which social
democratic or dirigiste traditions are manifested in a larger state role in
the ownership, funding, and regulation of media. The extreme case of a
liberal system is of course the United States, where the unique legal
priority of the First Amendment limits many of the forms of media
regulation that are common in Europe – though the state’s role in the
United States is quite important in its own way.
Apart from issues of media ownership, funding, and regulation, the state
always plays an important role as a source of information and “primary
definer” of news, with enormous influence on the agenda and framing
of public issues. These two roles are not necessarily correlated – that is,
it is not clear that the state is less a “primary definer” in systems with
liberal media policy than in systems with a stronger state intervention in
media ownership, funding, and regulation.