INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

PREPARED BY
PROFESSOR (Dr.) SYED IRFAN ALI
2022
Classification of Statutes

Codified statutory law can be categorized as follows-

Codifying statutes

The purpose of this kind of statute is to give an authoritative statement of the rules of the law on a
particular subject, which is customary laws.
For example The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and The Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
Consolidating statutes

This kind of statute covers and combines all law on a

particular subject at one place which was scattered
and lying at different places.

Here, the entire law is constituted in one place.

For example Indian Penal Code or Code of Criminal
Procedure.
Declaratory statutes

This kind of statute does an act of removing doubts,

clarifying and improving the law based on the
interpretation given by the court, which might not be
suitable from the point of view of the parliament.

For example the definition of house property has been

amended under the Income Tax (Amendment) Act,
1985 through the judgement of the Supreme Court.
Remedial statutes

Granting of new remedies for enforcing one’s rights

can be done through the remedial statutes. The
purpose of these kinds of statutes is to promote the
general welfare for bringing social reforms through
the system. These statutes have liberal interpretation
and thus, are not interpreted through strict means.

For example The Maternity Benefits Act, 1961,

The Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 etc.
Enabling statutes

The purpose of this statute is to enlarge a particular

common law. For example Land Acquisition Act,
enables the Government to acquire the public
property for the purpose of the public, which is
otherwise not permissible.

Disabling statutes

It is the opposite of what is provided under the

enabling statute. Here the rights conferred by
common law are being cut down and are being
restrained.

Penal statutes

The offences for various types of offences are

provided through these statutes, and these provisions
have to be imposed strictly.

For example,
Indian Penal Code, 1860.
Taxing statutes

Tax is a form of revenue which is to be paid to the

government. It can either be on income that an
individual earns or on any other transaction.
A taxing statute thus, levies taxes on all such
transactions. There can be income tax, wealth tax, sales
tax, gift tax, etc.

Therefore, a tax can be levied only when it has been

specifically expressed and provided by any statute.
Explanatory statutes

The term explanatory itself indicates that this type of

statute explains the law and rectifies any omission left
earlier in the enactment of the statutes.

Further, ambiguities in the text are also clarified and

checked upon the previous statutes.
Amending statutes

The statutes which operate to make changes in the

provisions of the enactment to change the original
law for making an improvement therein and for
carrying out the provisions effectively for which the
original law was passed are referred to as amending
statutes.

For example Code of Criminal Procedure 1973

amended the code of 1898.
Repealing statutes

A repealing statute is one which terminates an earlier

statute and may be done in the express or explicit
language of the statute. For example Competition Act,
2002 repealed the MRTP Act.

Curative or repealing statutes

Through these statutes, certain acts which would

otherwise be illegal are validated by curing the illegality
and enables a particular line of action.
Rules of Interpretation
>Literal or grammatical rule

>The rule of strict interpretation

>The golden rule of interpretation

>The mischief rule of interpretation

>The doctrine of harmonious construction

 Literal or grammatical rule

The rule can be understood by considering the

followings.

-Nature and grammatical meaning,

-Explanation,

-Exact meaning, preferred to loose meaning,

-Technical words in technical sense.

Nature and grammatical meaning (ejusdem
generis)

The words used in this text are to be given or

interpreted in their natural or ordinary meaning.

In the absence of any material, a different meaning

cannot be ascribed by tracing history of the
legislation and attributing object and legislative
intendment which suits court’s own mind set. There
is a line of control which separates adjudication from
legislation.
It is the first rule of interpretation.

Swedish Match AB v. Securities and Exchange Board,

India (2004)

According to this rule, the words used in this text are

to be given or interpreted in their natural or ordinary
meaning. After the interpretation, if the meaning is
completely clear and unambiguous then the effect
shall be given to a provision of a statute regardless of
what may be the consequences. The basic rule
is that whatever the intention legislature had
while making any provision it has been
expressed through words and thus, are to be
interpreted according to the rules of grammar.

It is the safest rule of interpretation of statutes

because the intention of the legislature is
deduced from the words and the language used.
Maqbool Hussain v. State of Bombay
In this case, the appellant, a citizen of India after arriving at the
airport did not declare that he was carrying gold with him. During his
search was carried on, gold was found in his possession as it was
against the notification of the government and was confiscated
under section 167(8) of Sea Customs Act.
Later on, he was also charged under section 8 of the Foreign Exchange
Regulations Act, 1947. The appellant challenged this trial to be
violative under Article 20(2) of the Indian Constitution. According to
this article, no person shall be punished or prosecuted more than once
for the same offence. This is considered as double jeopardy.
It was held by the court that the Seas Act neither a court nor any
judicial tribunal. Thus, accordingly, he was not prosecuted earlier.
Hence, his trial was held to be valid.
State of Kerala v. Mathai Verghese and others (1987)

In this case a person was caught along with the

counterfeit currency “dollars” and he was charged
under section 120B, 489A, 489C and 420 read with
section 511 and 34 of Indian Penal Code for
possessing counterfeit currency. The accused
contended before the court that a charge under
section 489A and 489B of Indian Penal Code can
only be levied in the case of counterfeiting of Indian
currency notes and not in the case of counterfeiting
of foreign currency notes.
The court held that the word currency notes or bank note
cannot be prefixed. The person was held liable to be
charge-sheeted.

Sanjay Kumar Munjal v. Chairman, UPSC (2006)

Only when literal construction results in some absurdity or
anamaly, other principles of interpretation may be applied.

Raghunath Rai Bareja v. PNB (2007)

Ordinarily, the court of law should not depart from literal

rule as that would really be amending the law in the garb
of interpretation, which is not possible
(exception of depending upon the context, subject
matter and legislative intent).

This rule of interpretation does not restrict the

court to this rule only but the court must
carefully consider the context, subject matter and
the legislative intent as well.
ut res magis valeat quam pereat

The maxim ‘ut res magis valeat quam pereat’ is an

important principle of interpretation of statutes which
literally means: “It may rather become operative than
null”.

The effect of this maxim is that an enacting provision

or a statute has to be so construed to make it effective
and operative.
Edited or modified form of the principle of
grammatical interpretation is called as

‘GOLDEN RULE OF INTERPRETATION’.

Sussex Peerage case (1844)

The only rule for the construction of Acts of

Parliament is, that they should be construed
according to the intent of the Parliament which passed
the Act.
The golden rule of interpretation is that unless
literal meaning given to a document leads to
anomaly or absurdity, the principles of literal
interpretation should be adhered to.

A statute cannot be looked at with a coloured

glass.
The provisions of a statute have to considered as
the legislative thought subject to Constitutional
and other limitation.
Belarpur Industries v. Union of India (1997)

Delhi Court Stated that the language used in the

statute should firstly have literal or grammatical
interpretation to materialize the intention of the
Legislature. But, if difficulties are arising in doing so.
The circumstances prevailing at the time of making
the statute should be considered to remove those
difficulties.

This is the Golden Rule of Interpretation.

In fact, the main purpose of the Golden rule of
Interpretation is also the same as that Statutes should
be interpreted in such a way that the intention of the
legislature is known and ambiguity, unclarity,
inconsistency, hardship, injustice, etc., arising from
language is removed.
The advantages of the literal rule

-The literal rule enables the common man to

understand the statue.

-The intent of the legislature is simple and clear.

-The literal rule respects the parliamentary

supremacy in administration of justice.

-Under literal rule the law is quite predictable.

Explanation of the Rule (noscitur a socii)

It simply means what is stated in the statute leads to presumption

and anything that is not referred to shall be excluded.
Apex Court in the case
Comm. Sales Tax, M.P v J.S.C. Singh (1965)
Coal in a Sales Act applied the popular meaning tax. What would
be the meaning which persons dealing with coal and consumers
purchasing it as fuel would give to the word. The court held that
coal will include charcoal as well not only coal obtained as a
mineral.
In Colliery Control Order it was said that the
word coal will be understood in its technical or
scientific sense and will include a mineral
product but not charcoal.

Therefore, it was held that as the Collieries

Control Order deals with collieries the term coal
as used there includes coal as a mineral product
but in the context of Sales Tax Act, coal will
include in the natural, ordinary, popular sense
the coal used as a fuel.
Oswal Agro Mills Ltd. v. Collector, Central Excise (1993)

It is no doubt true that the doctrine of noscitur a socii,

meaning thereby, that it is a legitimate rule of
construction to construe words in an Act of Parliament
with reference to words found in immediate connection
with them i.e. when two or more words which are
susceptible of analogous
meaning are clubbed together, they are
understood to be used in their cognate sense.

They take, as it were, their colour from each

other, the meaning of the more general is
restricted to a sense analogous to a less general.
Difference between (noscitur a socii) & (ejusdem
generis)

Example, “tomato, potato, onion and garlic,” it is an

indication of tomato being treated as a vegetable; but
when the same tomato is read along with “papaya,
apples, bananas, and melon,” it makes it clear that it
is to be taken as a fruit. The rule of noscitur a
socii applies in cases where there is an ambiguity in
the understanding of any word and hence has to be
understood in the context of the associated words.
The rule of ejusdem generis however is applicable
in similar context, but only when that context
consists of a category or class of items.

Another point of differentiation between the two

rules is the fact that the rule of ejusdem generis is
applicable only when certain conditions are
fulfilled, thereby restricting the scope of the rule
even further.
These conditions are

(1) the statute contains an enumeration of specific

words,
(2) the subjects of enumeration constitute a category,
(3) that class or category is not exhausted by the
enumeration,
(4) the general terms follow the enumeration, and
(5) there is no indication of a different legislative
intent.
Exact meaning, preferred to loose meaning

Exact meaning is preferred to loose meaning in an Act of Parliament.

Since every word has a secondary meaning too, one should be careful not to mix up
secondary meaning with the loose meaning.

Prithipal Singh v. Union of India (1990)

It was held that there is a presumption that the words are used in an Act of
Parliament correctly and exactly and not loosely and inexactly.
Every word has a secondary meaning too. Therefore, in
applying the above stated rule one should be careful not to
mix up the secondary meaning with the loose meaning.
Loose meaning should not defeat the secondary meaning 'of a
word. Wherever the secondary meaning points to that
meaning which statute meant, preference should be given to
that secondary meaning. But preference to secondary
meaning does not offend the rule that preference should not
be given to lose meaning. Example can be taken of the word
'obtain'.
‘Obtain’ in its primary sense requires some
request or effort to acquire or get something but
in its secondary meaning it means to acquire or
get without any qualification and if in a statute
the secondary meaning is preferred, it cannot be
said that preference has been given to lose
meaning.
Technical words in technical sense

The fourth important point regarding the rule of literal construction is that technical words are understood in the
technical sense only. Few relevant points regarding this are following

Union of India v. Ganvare Nylons Ltd (1996)

It was held that as a necessary consequence of the principle that words are understood in their ordinary or natural
meaning in relation to the subject-matter,
in legislation relating a particular trade,
business, profession art or Science, words having
a special meaning in that context are understood
in that sense.

Such a special meaning is called the technical

meaning in order to distinguish it from the more
common meaning that the word may have.
Ashwini v. Arabinda Bose And Another (1952)

In construing the word 'practice' in Supreme

Court Advocates (Practice in High Court) Act,
1951, Court observed;

'The practice of law in this country generally

involves the exercise of both the functions of
acting and pleading on behalf of a litigant party,
accordingly when the legislature confers upon an
advocate 'the right to practice' in a court, it is
legitimate to understand that expression as
authorizing him to appear and plead as well as to
act on behalf of suitors in that Court.
The Mischief Rule

Mischief Rule was originated in Heydon’s case in 1584. It is

the rule of purposive construction because the purpose of this
statute is most important while applying this rule. It is known
as Heydon’s rule because it was given by Lord Poke in
Heydon’s case in 1584.

It is called as mischief rule because the focus is on curing the

mischief.
In Heydon’s case, it was held that four things have to be
followed for true and sure interpretation of all the
statutes in general, which are as follows

-What was the common law before the making of an act?

-What was the mischief for which the present statute was
enacted?
-What remedy did the Parliament sought or had
resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the
commonwealth.
-The true reason of the remedy.
Therefore, the purpose of this rule is to suppress the mischief and advance the
remedy.

Smith v. Huge (1960)

Is a good example in this context. It is based on the ‘Street Offence Act’. It
provides for the prohibition of inducement by prostitutes over roads to the
passing public. This act was interpreted in such a way as to misuse it by not
including the inducement by prostitutes from the windows and balconies of
their houses.
But Court said while rejecting this agreement
that the inducement by prostitutes from the
windows and balconies of their houses is also
prohibited under this act because the purpose of
this act is to prevent prostitution, that is, protect
the on goes from the effect of a prostitute’.
Two important formulas related to mischief rule are as
follows:

(Maxims)

1)Pro-private commando
Pro-private commando means for private benefit.

2)Pro-bona publico
Pro-bona publico means for the public good.
Both these formula means that the Courts should
construe the statute in such a manner as to suppress
the mischief and encourage the remedy.

Simultaneously, further mischief could be prevented

from finding out the intention of the legislature.
It should be encouraged in such a way that the
intention of the legislature is achieved.

The application of this rule gives the judge more

discretion than the literal and the golden rule as it
allows him to effectively decide on Parliament’s
intent.
Ohison v. Hylton (1975)

The facts, briefly, were a carpenter was on his way

home from work. He boarded a train which was
crowded. Another passenger objected and
subsequently both finished up on the platform. The
defendant, the carpenter, took one of his tools of his
trade, a hammer, from his briefcase and struck the
other man with it. He was charged under
the Prevention of Crime Act 1953.
Lord Widgery, CJ, said, inter alia (among others)

This is a case in which the mischief at which the

statute is aimed appears to me to be very clear.
Immediately prior to the passing of the 1953 Act the
criminal law was adequate to deal with the actual use
of weapons in the course of a criminal assault.

Where it was lacking, however, was that the mere

carrying of offensive weapons was not an offence. The
long title of the Act reads as follows
An Act to prohibit the carrying of offensive
weapons in public places without lawful authority
or reasonable excuse’.

Parliament is there recognizing the need for

preventive justice where, by preventing the
carriage of offensive weapons in a public place, it
reduced the opportunity for the use of such
weapons.
If, however, the prosecutor is right, the scope goes far beyond
the mischief aimed at, and in every case where an assault is
committed with a weapon and in a public place an offence
under the 1953 Act can be charged in addition to the charge of
assault.

Held

The conviction under the 1953 Act was quashed.

The Alamgir v. State of Bihar (1959)
Appellant charged under sec 498 of Indian Penal
Code, 1860. A married woman was living with the
appellant of her own will. The Appellant argued that
he does not fall within the limits of sec 498. But
Supreme Court said while rejecting this argument,
that sec 498 contains words ‘taking’ or ‘enticing’ or
‘concealment’ or ‘detained. The Appellants case falls
within the last word ‘detained’ because the intention
of the legislature is to avoid the mischief of
preventing the husband from having intercourse with
his wife.
Bengal Immunity Co. v. St. of Bihar (1995)

In order to cure the mischief of multiple taxation and

to preserve the free flow of inert-State trade or
commerce in the Union of India regarded as one
economic unit without any provincial barrier that the
Constitution makers adopted the art. 286(restriction
as to imposition of tax on the sale or purchase of
goods) of the Constitution of India.
Badshah v. Sou. Urmila Badshah Godse (2014)

The court held that while interpreting a statute

the court may not only take into consideration
the purpose for which the statute was enacted but
also the mischief it seeks to suppress. While
entertaining the case under section 125 of Cr.P.C
1973, the court is also dealing with marginalized
sections of the society. The purpose is to achieve
social justice.
The purpose is to achieve social justice. The
Apex Court also laid down that while dealing
with cases under this provision, drift (to be
carried) in the approach form adversarial
litigation to social context adjudication is the
need of the hour for the society.
Glaxo Laboratories v. The Presiding Officer, Labour
(1983)

The purpose of interpretation by the court of law is to

give effect to the intention underlying the statute and
therefore, unless the grammatical construction leads
to absurdity, impossibility, it has to be given effect to.
If two constructions are possible, that construction
which advances the intention of the legislation and
remedies the mischief should be accepted by the court.
Further held that Industrial Employment
(Standing orders) Act 1946 was enacted for
ameliorating (to make something better) the
condition of the workers.

Therefore, conditions of service prescribed

thereunder must receive such interpretation
which advances the intendment underlying the
Act and defeat the mischief.
Rule of strict interpretation

Strict interpretation means each word in the statute

should be interpreted by the letter and not with respect to
the spirit behind the statute.

A judge has to apply the text only as it is written in the

statute when there is clear meaning of the text there will
be no scope for any further investigation regarding the
same.
This method is important because judges will not make any wrong
inferences from statutes and will not go out from the letter of the law and
the judgment will be purely based on the text of the statute.

This upholds the rule of law by giving importance to the legislature that
passes the laws.
If we take the example when we are dealing with
the taxation provisions we can not vary from the
letter of law as it is universally applicable to all
the people in the Nation.

It is applied as per the text in order to fix the

standard in society and clear all the uncertainties
which may arise in the near future.
Rule of a strict interpretation of penal statutes
manifests itself in the following four ways

(1) Express language is necessary for the creation

of criminal offences; therefore, no action is to be
deemed criminal unless it is clearly made so by
words of the statute concerned. But it is not
necessary that a particular penalty is specified in
order that an act or omission may constitute an
offence.
(2) The words setting out the elements of an offence
are to be strictly construed. If there is any reasonable
doubt or ambiguity it will be resolved in favour of the
person charged.

A reasonable interpretation which will avoid the

penalty must be adopted. If there are two reasonable
constructions the court must give the more lenient
one. The court must always see that the person to be
penalized comes fairly and squarely within the plain
words of the enactment.
(3) Punishments can be imposed only if the
circumstances of the case fall clearly within the
words of the enactment.

(4) Similarly, statutes dealing with jurisdiction

and procedure are, if they relate to the infliction
of penalties, strictly construed.
M.U Joshi v. M. V Shimpi (1961)

The appellant was convicted under section 16 of the

Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954 for selling
adulterated butter. He contended that it was not
buttered within the meaning of the rules made under
the Act because butter means butter made from milk
whereas he had sold butter made from curd.

Further, the Act is a penal statute the word butter had

to be strictly construed in favour of the accused.
State of Jharkhand v. Ambay Cements (2005)

In this case, it was held that the provisions of the

law should be strictly constructed, it should not
be let open for the court to interpret, the court
cannot ignore the conditions prescribed in the
provision.

Wherever there is a mandatory rule it must be

strictly followed, when a statute explicitly
mentions the
performance of a particular act in a specific way and
lays down the consequences to it, that should be
mandatorily followed.

Cardinal rule of interpretation is that when a

particular act should be done in a prescribed manner
the courts cannot interpret that in any way of
performance.
State of Andhra Pradesh v. Nagoti Venkatarma
(1996)

It has been held by the Supreme Court that in

the interpretation of penal provisions, Strict
construction is required to be adopted and if any
real doubt arises, necessarily the reasonable
benefit of the doubt would be extended to the
accused.
Seksaria Cotton Mill Limited Company v. State of
Bombay (1954)

As per a notification issued under the Essential

Supplies Act 1946, every manufacturer was required
to submit true and accurate information about his
dealings; and delivery was defined to mean actual
physical delivery. The appellant, who had sold some
bales to the purchaser who did not take delivery
because of some dispute with the appellant, asked his
agent to keep the bales in godowns pending
settlement.
The appellant entered those bales as delivered in
his return book. The appellant was convicted by
the High Court for not giving actual physical
delivery. Allowing the appeal, the Supreme said
that when two reasonable interpretations are
possible of a penal statute, that which favours
the accused should be accepted. It was held that
since the goods were actually delivered to the
agent, the requirements under the Act were
fulfilled without straining the language.
Chinubhai v. State of Bombay (1960)

In this case, several workers in a factory died by

inhaling poisonous gas when they entered into a
pit in the factory premises to stop the leakage of
the gas from a machine. The question was whether
the employer violated section 3 of the Factories
Act, which says that no person in any factory shall
be permitted to enter any confined space in which
dangerous fumes are likely to be present
The Supreme Court, while construing the
provision strictly, held that the section does not
impose an absolute duty on the employer to
prevent workers from going into such area. It
further observed that the fact that some workers
were present in the confined space does not prove
that the employer permitted them to go there.
The prosecution must first prove that the
workers were permitted to enter the space to
convict the accused.
Harmonious Construction

The principle of harmonious construction is that the

legislature never wish to contradict itself by
providing two repugnant provisions in the same
statute.

Harmonious construction is a principle of statutory

interpretation used in the Indian legal system. It
holds that when two provisions of a legal text seem to
conflict, they should be interpreted so that each has a
separate effect and neither is redundant.
The courts must interpret them in such a manner
that both the opposing provisions are given effect
as much as possible. The Act has to read as a
whole and its provisions have to be harmonized
giving to all of them.

The rule of harmonious construction is the

thumb rule to interpretation of any statute. An
interpretation which makes the enactment a
consistent whole, should be the aim of the Courts
and a construction which avoids inconsistency or
repugnancy between the various sections or
parts of the statute should be adopted.

The doctrine of harmonious construction came

into existence as a result of many varied court
interpretations of different statutes in a variety
of cases.
From time to time, the judiciary decided matters that
involved opposition between two distinct provisions.
This doctrine came cloaked as the rule of conciliation
first in the case of

Central Province and Berar Act (1939)

Where the involved court resolved the inconsistency

between an entry of List I and an entry of List II in
the Constitution of India and interpreted them
harmoniously.
The doctrine’s conception can be tracked all the
way back to the first amendment to
the Constitution of India1951, in the landmark
judgement of

Sri. Shankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India

(1951)
The disagreement between the the Fundamental
Rights (Part III) and the Directive Principle
(Part IV) of the Constitution of India was the
subject
of the case. Constitutional law is mainly
concerned with the creation of the three great
organs and the distribution of Governmental
powers among them, that is the executive, the
legislature and the judiciary.
The Apex Court, in this case, made use of the
rule of harmonious construction and held that
Fundamental Rights are granted against the
State and they may be revoked only under
certain circumstances and even modified by the
Parliament to comply with the constitutional
provisions.
The Supreme Court gave preference to both and
said that the Fundamental Rights and Directive
Principles of State Policy are two sides of the
same coin, and it is beneficial that they must
work together. The Supreme Court further held
that the Fundamental Rights enforce limitation
over both the legislature and executive power.
They are not sacrosanct and the Parliament can
amend them to bring them in conformity with the
Directive Principles.
The Supreme Court articulated the doctrine of
harmonious construction in the case

Re Kerala Education Bill Case (1957)

The court added that there was no inherent

conflict between the Fundamental Rights and the
Directive Principles of the State Policy and they
together constitute an integrated scheme and a
comprehensive administrative and social
programme for a modern democratic state.
The court called them supplementary and
complementary to each other. Therefore, effort
should be put to construe them harmoniously, so
that the courts avoid any conflict among the
Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles.
They basically run parallel to each other and
neither one is subordinate to the other.
Commissioner of Income Tax v. M/S Hindustan
Bulk Carriers (2000)

A landmark case where the Supreme Court laid

down five main principles that govern the rule of
harmonious construction which are as follows:

> The provision of one section cannot be used to

overthrow the provision covered in another
section unless the court is unable to find a way to
settle their differences despite all its effort.
>In the situation when the court finds it impossible to
entirely reconcile the differences in inconsistent
provisions, the courts must interpret them such that
effect is given to both the provisions as far as possible.

>Courts must also take into account that the

interpretation that makes one provision redundant
and useless is against the essence of harmonious
construction.
>Harmonizing two contradicting provisions means not to destroy any
statutory provision or to render it ineffective.

Unni Krishnan, J.P., etc. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others (1993)

Article 21 guarantees every citizen a right to education. On the issue of

the prevalence of Fundamental Rights over Directive Principles of State
Policy (DPSP), the Court said that the provisions
of Part Three and Part Four are supplementary
and complementary to each other and that the
Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles
should be interpreted harmoniously as they form
the social conscience of the Indian Constitution.
Beneficent Construction

When a statute is interpreted liberally to give the

widest possible meaning to it, it is called
beneficent construction. Beneficial construction
is an interpretation to secure remedy to the
victim who is unjustly denied of relief.
Beneficial construction means an interpretation
to promote public good and prevent misuse of
power.
If in a legislation, the general object of which is
to benefit a particular class of persons, any
provision is to benefit a particular class of
persons, any provision is ambiguous so that it is
capable of two meaning, one of which would
preserve the benefit and another would take it
away, the meanings which preserve it should be
adopted.
B. Shah v. Presiding Officer (1978)
Section 5 of Maternity Benefits Act, 1961 was in
question, where an expectant mother could take
12 weeks of maternity leave on full salary. In this
case, a woman who used to work 6 days a week
was paid for only 6×12=72 days instead of
7×12=84 days. SC held that the words 12 weeks
were capable of two meanings and one meaning
was beneficial to the woman. Since it is a
beneficial legislation, the meaning that gives
more benefit to the woman must be used.
It is important to note that omissions will not be
supplied by the court. Only when multiple
meanings are possible, can the court pick the
beneficial one.

Thus, where the court has to choose between a

wider meaning that carries out the objective of
the legislature better and a narrow meaning, then
it usually chooses the former.
Similarly, when the language used by the legislature
fails to achieve the objective of a statute, an extended
meaning could be given to it to achieve that objective,
if the language is fairly susceptible to the extended
meaning.
It is said by MAXWELL, that Beneficial Construction
is a tendency and not a rule. The reason is that this
principle is based on the human tendency to be fair,
accommodating, and just. Instead of restricting the
people from getting the benefit of the statute, Court
tends to include as many classes as it can while
remaining faithful to the wordings of the statute.
Alembic Chemical Works v. Workmen (1961)

Industrial tribunal awarded more paid leaves to

the workers than what Section 79(1) of Factories
Act recommended. This was challenged by the
appellant. SC held that the enactment being
welfare legislation for the workers, it had to be
beneficially constructed in the favor of workers,
and thus if the words are capable of two meanings,
the one that gives benefit to the workers must be
used.
U Unichoyi v. State of Kerala (1963)

The question was whether the setting of a

minimum wage through the Minimum Wages
Act, 1948 is violative of Article 19 (1) (g) of the
constitution because the act did not define what
is minimum wage and did not take into account
the capacity of the employer to pay. It was held
that the act is beneficial legislation and it must be
construed in favor of the worker.
In an underdeveloped country where unemployment
is rampant, it is possible that workers may become
ready to work for extremely low wages but that
should not happen.

Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand (2005)

The Court looked into the object of the act,
which is to provide for the care, protection
treatment, development and rehabilitation of
neglected and delinquent juveniles. Further the
acts were passed in discharge of obligation to
follow the United Nations Minimum Rules for the
Administration of Juvenile justice.

Since the acts were remedial in nature, beneficial

construction was given to promote the beneficent
object behind them.
To ensure justice to all the concept of canons of
interpretation was expounded. These are the rules which are
evolved for determining the real intention of the legislature.

It is not necessary that the words used in a statute are

always clear, explicit and unambiguous and thus, in such
cases, courts need to determine a clear and explicit meaning
of the words or phrases used by the legislature and at the
same time remove all the doubts if any.
Hence, all the above-mentioned rules are the rules of
Interpretation and are important for providing
justice.

“The essence of law lies in the spirit, not its letter, for
the letter is significant only as being the external
manifestation of the intention that underlies it.”
(SALMOND)
One of the most substantial and the principal
duty which are vested on the judiciary is the
interpretation of the statutes or law which are in
force. When the courts deliver justice in a legal
dispute, they strictly abide with the boundaries
framed by the legal frameworks which
encompasses certain laws, statutes, The
Constitution and delegated legislations.
The legal framework of a democratic country
like India includes a plethora of legislations and
regulations. The Legislature with the compliance
of the procedural Parliamentary rules,
formulates and drafts certain written statutes
and legislations. The courts deliver justice in a
legal matter by interpreting the underlying
principles in these legislations.
Every nation has its own judicial system, the
purpose of which to grant justice to all. The court
aims to interpret the law in such a manner that
every citizen is ensured justice to all. To ensure
justice to all the concept of canons of
interpretation was expounded. These are the
rules which are evolved for determining the real
intention of the legislature.
It is not necessary that the words used in a
statute are always clear, explicit and
unambiguous and thus, in such cases it is very
essential for courts to determine a clear and
explicit meaning of the words or phrases used by
the legislature and at the same time remove all
the doubts if any. Hence, all the rules mentioned
in the article are important for providing justice.
Thanks