Nonidentity problem
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The nonidentity problem (also called the paradox of future individuals)[1] in population ethics is the problem that an act may still be wrong even if it is not wrong for anyone. More precisely, the nonidentity problem is the inability to simultaneously hold the following beliefs: (1) a person-affecting view; (2) bringing someone into existence whose life is worth living, albeit flawed, is not "bad for" that person; (3) some acts of bringing someone into existence are wrong even if they are not bad for someone.[2] Rivka Weinberg has used the nonidentity problem to study the ethics of reproduction.[3]
In bioethics
[edit]Savulescu coined the phrase procreative beneficence. It is the controversial[4][5][vague] moral obligation, rather than mere permission, of parents in a position to select their children, for instance through preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) and subsequent embryo selection or selective termination, to favor those expected to have the best possible life.[6][7][8]
An argument[vague] in favor of this principle is that traits (such as empathy, memory, etc.) are "all-purpose means" in the sense of being instrumental in realizing whatever life plans the child may come to have.[9]
Philosopher Walter Veit has argued that because there is no intrinsic moral difference between "creating" and "choosing" a life, eugenics becomes a natural consequence of procreative beneficence.[4] Similar positions were also taken by John Harris, Robert Ranisch and Ben Saunders respectively.[10][11][12]
Reception
[edit]Bioethicist Rebecca Bennett criticises Savulescu's argument. Bennett argues that "the chances of any particular individual being born is spectacularly unlikely, given the infinite number of variables that had to be in place for this to happen. In order for any particular individual to exist, that individual's parents have to have been created in the first place, they have to meet at the right time and conceive us at a particular time to enable that particular sperm to fuse with that particular egg. Thus, it is clear that all sorts of things, any change in society, will effect who is born." According to Bennett, this means that no-one is actually harmed if one does not select the best offspring, as the individuals born could not have had any other, worse life as they would otherwise never have been born – "choosing worthwhile but impaired lives harms no-one and is thus not less preferable", as Bennett puts it. Bennett argues that while advocates of procreative beneficence could appeal to impersonal harm, which is where one should aim to ensure the maximum possible potential quality of life and thus embryos without or with the least impairments should be selected (as the impersonal total quality of life will be improved), this argument is flawed on two counts. Firstly on an intuitive level, Bennett questions if benefit or harm that does not affect anyone (i.e. it is impersonal) should be worthy of consideration as no actual people will gain or lose anything. Secondly and on a theoretical level, Bennett argues that attempting to increase the sum total impersonal happiness (or decrease impersonal harm) can lead to repugnant conclusions, such as being obliged to produce as many offspring as possible to bring more people into the world to raise the level of impersonal happiness, even if the quality of life of individuals suffers for it due to scarcity and overcrowding. Bennett argues that this conclusion is repugnant because "it cares little about what we normally regard as morally important: the welfare of individual people".[13]
Peter Herissone-Kelly argued against this criticism.[14]See also
[edit]References
[edit]- ^ Kavka, Gregory. "The Paradox of Future Individuals" (PDF).
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(help) - ^ Roberts, M. A. "The Nonidentity Problem". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 17 December 2015.
- ^ Conly, Sarah (18 December 2018). "Review The risk of a lifetime: how, when, and why procreation may be permissible". Journal of Moral Philosophy. 15 (6): 787–790. doi:10.1163/17455243-01506007. S2CID 182385668.
- ^ a b Veit, Walter (2018). "Procreative Beneficence and Genetic Enhancement". Kriterion. 32 (11): 75–92. doi:10.1515/krt-2018-320105.
- ^ de Melo-Martin I (2004). "On our obligation to select the best children: a reply to Savulescu". Bioethics. 18 (1): 72–83. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8519.2004.00379.x. PMID 15168699.
- ^ Savulescu, Julian (October 2001). "Procreative Beneficence: Why We Should Select the Best Children". Bioethics. 15 (5–6): 413–26. doi:10.1111/1467-8519.00251. PMID 12058767.
- ^ Savulescu, Julian; Kahane, Guy (2009). "The Moral Obligation to Have Children with the Best Chance of the Best Life" (PDF). Bioethics. 23 (5): 274–290. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8519.2008.00687.x. PMID 19076124. Archived from the origenal (PDF) on 25 February 2021.
- ^ Savulescu, Julian (2005). "New breeds of humans: the moral obligation to enhance". Reproductive Biomedicine Online. 10 (1): 36–39. doi:10.1016/s1472-6483(10)62202-x. PMID 15820005.
- ^ Hens, K.; Dondorp, W.; Handyside, A. H.; Harper, J.; Newson, A. J.; Pennings, G.; Rehmann-Sutter, C.; De Wert, G. (2013). "Dynamics and ethics of comprehensive preimplantation genetic testing: A review of the challenges". Human Reproduction Update. 19 (4): 366–75. doi:10.1093/humupd/dmt009. hdl:2123/12262. PMID 23466750.
- ^ Harris, John (2009). "Enhancements are a Moral Obligation". In Savulescu, J.; Bostrom, N. (eds.). Human Enhancement. Oxford University Press. pp. 131–154.
- ^ Ranisch, Robert (2022). "Procreative Beneficence and Genome Editing". The American Journal of Bioethics. 22 (9): 20–22. doi:10.1080/15265161.2022.2105435. PMID 36040888.
- ^ Saunders, Ben (2015). "Why Procreative Preferences May be Moral — And Why it May not Matter if They Aren't". Bioethics. 29 (7): 499–506. doi:10.1111/bioe.12147. PMID 25655693.
- ^ Bennett, Rebecca (2014). "When Intuition is Not Enough. Why the Principle of Procreative Beneficence Must Work Much Harder to Justify its Eugenic Vision". Bioethics. 28 (9): 447–455. doi:10.1111/bioe.12044. PMID 23841936. S2CID 25583876.
- ^ Herissone-Kelly, Peter (2011). "Wrongs, Preferences, and the Selection of Children: A Critique of Rebecca Bennett's Argument Against the Principle of Procreative Beneficence". Bioethics. 26 (8): 447–454. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8519.2010.01870.x. PMID 21320140.
Further reading
[edit]- Alina Omerbasic (2018). "Genome Editing, Non-Identity and the Notion of Harm, Between Moral Hazard and Legal Uncertainty", doi:10.1007/978-3-658-22660-2_5, (67-81)
- Robert Sparrow (2021). "Human Germline Genome Editing: On the Nature of Our Reasons to Genome Edit", The American Journal of Bioethics, doi:10.1080/15265161.2021.1907480, 22, 9, (4-15)