ALLSEAS ENGINEERING BV

SHELL E&P IRELAND LIMITED

CORRIB FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (PHASE II)




CONTRACT NO. 101.24.14








DOCUMENT TITLE: ONSHORE PIPELINE QUANTIFIED
RISK ASSESSMENT




ALLSEAS DOCUMENT NUMBER : 368821/D835-01
JPKENNY DOCUMENT NUMBER : 05-2102-02-F-3-835




Rev
.
Dat e Revi si on Det ai l s Or i gi nat or Int er di sc.
Check
Al l seas
Appr oved
Cl i ent
Appr oved
F 22/04/2005 Re-Approved for Design JPK RRi j JavB




Internal Revision Control
Revi si on Dat e Revi si on Det ai l s Revi sed by
0 22/06/01 Draft Issue for Comments JPK
1 20/08/01 Issued for Comment JPK
2 30/10/01 Issued for Approval JPK
3 11/02/02 Approved for Design JPK
4 02/07/02 Re-Approved for Design JPK
5 22/04/05 Major revision following peer revi ew JPK





External Revision Control
Rev. Dat e Revi si on Det ai l s Revi sed by
A 04/07/01 For Client Review GD
B 23/08/01 For Client Review/Comments GD
C 06/11/01 For Client Approval GD
D 15/02/02 Approved for Design GD
E 04/07/02 Re-Approved for Design GD
F 22/04/05 Re- Approved for Design JavB


Copyright Allseas

This document is the property of Allseas and may contain confidential and proprietary information. It may not be used for any
purpose other than that for whi ch i t i s suppl i ed. Thi s document may not be wholly or partly disclosed, copied, duplicated or in
any way made use of without prior written approval of Allseas.




CORRIB FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Onshore Pipeline Quantified Risk Assessment



g:\052377 - enterprisecorrib additional work\ctr 140 - qra update\02-f-3-835- rev 05 - qra.doc Page 2 of 58
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................... 4
1.1 General ..................................................................................................................... 4
1.2 Scope........................................................................................................................ 4
1.3 Purpose .................................................................................................................... 4
1.4 Abbreviations ........................................................................................................... 5
2 SUMMARY........................................................................................................................... 6
3 ONSHORE PIPELINE DESCRIPTION ................................................................................... 9
3.1 General ..................................................................................................................... 9
3.2 Routing ..................................................................................................................... 9
3.3 Operational Parameters............................................................................................ 9
3.4 Well Fluids Analysis............................................................................................... 10
3.5 Design Life.............................................................................................................. 10
3.6 Materials................................................................................................................. 10
3.7 Diameter and Wall Thickness ................................................................................. 10
3.8 Depth of Cover........................................................................................................ 10
3.9 Crossings ............................................................................................................... 10
3.10 Corrosion Allowance .............................................................................................. 11
3.11 Coatings ................................................................................................................. 11
3.12 Inhibitors ................................................................................................................ 11
3.13 Cathodic Protection................................................................................................ 11
3.14 Pigging ................................................................................................................... 11
4 METHODOLOGY................................................................................................................ 12
4.1 General ................................................................................................................... 12
4.2 Hazard Identification............................................................................................... 12
4.3 Risk Assessment .................................................................................................... 12
4.3.1 Qualitative and Quantitative Assessment................................................... 12
4.3.2 Consequence Analysis............................................................................... 12
5 DATA AND ASSUMPTIONS ............................................................................................... 14
5.1 General ................................................................................................................... 14
5.2 Population Density ................................................................................................. 14
5.2.1 Area Classification...................................................................................... 14
5.2.2 Buildings Locations.................................................................................... 14
5.3 Release Frequencies .............................................................................................. 14
5.3.1 Historical Data ............................................................................................ 14
5.3.2 Probabilistic Models................................................................................... 15
5.4 Consequence Assessment ..................................................................................... 15
5.4.1 Release Modelling....................................................................................... 15
5.4.2 Ignition........................................................................................................ 16
5.5 Tolerability of Risk .................................................................................................. 18
5.5.1 Representations of Risk ............................................................................. 18
5.5.2 International Risk Criteria........................................................................... 19
5.5.3 Tolerability of risk ....................................................................................... 23
6 RISK ASSESSMENT .......................................................................................................... 24
6.1 Failure Modes......................................................................................................... 24
6.1.1 General ....................................................................................................... 24
6.1.2 Pressure Considerations ............................................................................ 24
6.1.3 Pressure Cycling ........................................................................................ 24
6.1.4 Pipeline / Umbilical Separation ................................................................... 25
6.1.5 Third Party Interference .............................................................................. 26
6.1.6 Estuary / River Crossings........................................................................... 28

CORRIB FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Onshore Pipeline Quantified Risk Assessment



g:\052377 - enterprisecorrib additional work\ctr 140 - qra update\02-f-3-835- rev 05 - qra.doc Page 3 of 58
6.1.7 Internal Erosion.......................................................................................... 28
6.1.8 Ground Movement ...................................................................................... 28
6.1.9 External Corrosion...................................................................................... 29
6.1.10 Internal Corrosion....................................................................................... 30
6.1.11 Inherent Defects and Construction Defects................................................ 32
6.2 Failure Frequencies................................................................................................ 34
6.3 Failure Consequences............................................................................................ 34
6.3.1 Release Rates............................................................................................. 34
6.3.2 Fire Modelling............................................................................................. 35
6.3.3 Dispersion modelling.................................................................................. 37
6.3.4 Event trees.................................................................................................. 39
6.4 Estimated Risk........................................................................................................ 40
6.4.1 Risk Transects............................................................................................ 40
6.4.2 Individual Risk at the Nearest Building....................................................... 42
7 DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................... 43
7.1 Conclusions............................................................................................................ 43
7.2 Risk Reduction Measures....................................................................................... 43
7.2.1 Fittings........................................................................................................ 43
7.2.2 External Interference .................................................................................. 43
7.2.3 Ground Movement ...................................................................................... 44
7.2.4 Demonstration of ALARP............................................................................ 44
7.3 Design at road crossings........................................................................................ 45
7.4 Recommendations.................................................................................................. 46
7.5 Implied Assumptions.............................................................................................. 47
8 REFERENCES (MAIN TEXT) .............................................................................................. 48

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A PROBABILISTIC MODELS FOR RELEASE FREQUENCY DUE TO EXTERNAL
INTERFERENCE

CORRIB FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Onshore Pipeline Quantified Risk Assessment



g:\052377 - enterprisecorrib additional work\ctr 140 - qra update\02-f-3-835- rev 05 - qra.doc Page 4 of 58
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 General
JP Kenny Ltd. (JPK) have been contracted by Allseas Construction Contractors S.A. to
prepare the detailed design of the pipeline system for the Corrib Field development Project.
The Corrib Field, being developed by Shell E & P Ireland Ltd (SEPIL), (formerly Enterprise
Energy Ireland Ltd), is a Triassic gas field located in 350 m of water some 60 to 65 km off the
County Mayo coastline. Corrib will be developed as a long-range subsea tieback to an
onshore facility. The gas will then be treated to meet the defined gas specification before
onward transportation to the Bord Gais Eireann (BGE) grid via a new cross-country pipeline.
The subsea facilities will consist of a manifold with cluster wells, together with a number of
satellite wells. The pipeline comprises flexible flowlines from the satellite wells to the
manifold, and an export line to shore. This 83km 20-inch subsea pipeline from the manifold
makes a landfall at Broadhaven Bay in County Mayo, and then a further 9 km onshore
pipeline leads to the terminal. An electro-hydraulic umbilical system will run parallel to the
pipeline and a water outfall pipeline will also run from the terminal to a diffuser some distance
offshore.
1.2 Scope
This document presents the Quantified Risk Assessment (QRA) for the onshore section of the
gas pipeline. Revision 05 (JPK) has had extensi ve textual changes from rev 04 to update it in
accordance with the peer review. For clarity, no revision markers are included.
The QRA has assessed the risks associated with the operation of the onshore section of the
pipeline only, i.e. the section of the pipeline between the mean low water mark and the first
isolation valve upstream of the pig receiver in the Bellanaboy Bridge terminal. Risks
associated with the operation of the pig receiver have been assessed in the terminal QRA.
Hazards resulting from failure of the umbilical and the water outfall pipeline have been
examined and are excluded from the analysis (although failure of the umbilical and water
outfall caused by pipeline loss of containment are addressed later in the QRA).
1.3 Purpose
The purpose of this assessment is to predict the individual risk and potential loss of life to
members of the public who might be affected by the operation of the onshore section of the
Corrib gas pipeline. The QRA makes recommendations for risk reduction where appropriate,
and demonstrates that the residual risks associated with the operation of the onshore pipeline
have been reduced to levels which can be considered tolerable when compared with
international standards.
The methodology used in this assessment is generally in accordance with the Project Risk
Assessment Procedure [Ref. 1] in order to be compatible with risk assessment work to be
carried out by other Contractors (e.g. the terminal contractors) and will allow the results to be
incorporated into an overall Project Safety Assessment.

All references and assumptions are stated. All mathematical models and formulae used are
documented.





CORRIB FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Onshore Pipeline Quantified Risk Assessment



g:\052377 - enterprisecorrib additional work\ctr 140 - qra update\02-f-3-835- rev 05 - qra.doc Page 5 of 58
1.4 Abbreviations
ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable
BGE Bord Gais Eireann
CP Cathodic Protection
DOE Department of Environment
E&P Exploration and Production
EGIG European Gas pipeline Incident data Group
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
ESDV Emergency Shut Down Valve
FAR Fatal Accident Rate
FBE Fusion Bonded Epoxy
HAZID Hazard Identification
HSE (UK) Health and Safety Executive
ID Internal Diameter
IR Individual Risk
LFL Lower Flammable Limit
MIACC Major Industrial Accidents Council of Canada
NDT Non Destructive Testing
PARLOC Pipeline and Riser Loss of Containment
QRA Quantified or Quantitative Risk Assessment
SEP Surface Emissive Power
SEPIL Shell Exploration & Production Ireland Ltd
SMYS Specified Minimum Yield Strength
SRB Sulphate Reducing Bacteria
TDU Thermal Dose Unit
UKOPA United Kingdom Onshore Pipeline (Operators) Association
WHSIP Well Head Shut In Pressure

CORRIB FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Onshore Pipeline Quantified Risk Assessment



g:\052377 - enterprisecorrib additional work\ctr 140 - qra update\02-f-3-835- rev 05 - qra.doc Page 6 of 58
2 SUMMARY

The prediction of risks to the public resulting from the operation of the onshore section of the
Corrib gas pipeline indicates that the risks would be tolerable when compared with
international criteria and legislation on risk, for both the initial normal operating pressure of
120 barg as well as the maximum pressure of 345 barg.

For the purposes of this assessment, a fatality is conservatively assumed to result for any
person receiving a "dangerous" thermal dose or worse (where "dangerous" is actually defined
as a 1% risk of fatality). The risk levels have been predicted using data and assumptions
which are considered to be conservative (i.e. to over-estimate rather than under-estimate the
risk level where judgement was required).
Figure 2-1 and Figure 2-2 show the predicted levels of Individual Risk (IR) with increasing
distance from the pipeline for the normal (Fig 2-1) and maximum (Fig 2-2) operating pressure.
The risk is highest immediately above the pipeline. Here the risks are 2.6*10
-7
/yr (1 in 4
million per year) for the normal operating pressure of 120 bar and 5.7*10
-7
/yr (1 in 2 million
per year) for the maximum pressure of 345 bar. The difference in risk level is a result of
consequences of failure spreading over a larger distance, not an increase in failure
probability. See section 6.4.1 for further explanation of the effect of different pressure.


Figure 2-1: Risk Transects for 120 bar operating pressure
1.E-09
1.E-08
1.E-07
1.E-06
0 50 100 150 200 250
Lateral distance (m)
F
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y

p
e
r

y
e
a
r

CORRIB FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Onshore Pipeline Quantified Risk Assessment



g:\052377 - enterprisecorrib additional work\ctr 140 - qra update\02-f-3-835- rev 05 - qra.doc Page 7 of 58
Figure 2-2: Risk transects for pipeline at 345 bar (design pressure)

A pipeline isolation valve (Beach Valve) located at the landfall is included in the design to
allow shutting off the onshore section of the pipeline from the much longer offshore section.
However as casualties are more likely to occur during the early stages of an ignited release
the effect of isolation by the Beach Valve on the overall risk levels is negligible. Closing the
valve in the event of a leak reduces considerably the total duration of the release event (and
the total quantity of gas released), but this does not affect the predicted risk levels.
The current design of the Beach Valve has incorporated all of the recommendations made in
the earlier revisions of this QRA. The valve has been designed as an all-welded assembly,
with no flanged connections or small bore valves or fittings in order to minimise the potential
for leaks at the valve itself.
A fully-welded connection will be used on the pipeline side of the ESDV at the inlet to the
terminal to minimise leak paths at this location.
Pipeline hazards have been included in the assessment of Terminal workers risks performed
in the Terminal QRA.
The following recommendations have been made as a result of the risk assessment process.
These have been added to the overall project hazard register to ensure that they are
addressed and implemented as required.
Plastic warning tapes should be installed in the ground above the pipeline, and pipeli ne
markers should be installed at field boundaries, to deter external interference (Section
6.1.5.3);
The first intelligent pigging run should be performed within 3 years of pipeline start-up.
The timing of subsequent inspections should be based on the results of this initial run
(Section 6.1.9 & 6.1.10.2);
Periodic analysis of the well fluids should be undertaken to determine H
2
S concentration
throughout the field life (Section 6.1.10.1);
1.E-09
1.E-08
1.E-07
1.E-06
0 100 200 300 400
Lateral distance (m)
F
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y

p
e
r

y
e
a
r

CORRIB FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Onshore Pipeline Quantified Risk Assessment



g:\052377 - enterprisecorrib additional work\ctr 140 - qra update\02-f-3-835- rev 05 - qra.doc Page 8 of 58
Corrosion Inhibitor should be continuously injected, and operational safeguards should be
implemented to guarantee high system availability, in order to prevent excessive internal
corrosion (Section 6.1.10.2);
An appropriate corrosion monitoring system should be implemented in order to identify
excessive internal corrosion (Section 6.1.10.2);
Consideration should be given to the means employed for leak detection and the ability to
detect small leaks (Section 6.3.1.1).
A design factor of 0.72, complete with concrete protection slabs, will be used for the road
crossings (section 7.3)


CORRIB FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Onshore Pipeline Quantified Risk Assessment



g:\052377 - enterprisecorrib additional work\ctr 140 - qra update\02-f-3-835- rev 05 - qra.doc Page 9 of 58
3 ONSHORE PIPELINE DESCRIPTION
3.1 General
Generally, the onshore section of the pipeline will be designed, constructed, tested and
commissioned in accordance with BS 8010 [Ref. 2] and the Onshore Design Basis [Ref. 6].
The basis for selection of the onshore design code is described in the Design Code
Comparison [Ref. 3]. The following sections provide an outline of the design features of the
onshore section of the pipeline, in order to provide a background to the discussion of failure
modes contained in Section 6.1.
BS 8010 has now officially been withdrawn and effectively replaced by PD 8010 Pt 1. It is
normal practice in long running project that the original design code and revision continues to
be used in its entirety. PD 8010 maintains the same requirements for this project as BS 8010.
3.2 Routing
The pipeline comes ashore at the Dooncarton landfall in Broadhaven Bay. From the landfall it
travels 0.65km across a small headland until it reaches the Sruwaddacon Bay estuary.
From Ross Port the route heads in a predominantly south-easterly direction along the north
side of Sruwaddacon Bay. The majority of the land in this area is improved or semi-improved
pasture with occasional areas of peat. After a further 5km the route crosses the Glenamoy
River and then heads in a more easterly direction through a densely forested area underlain
with blanket bog until the proposed terminal site, near Bellanaboy Bridge, is reached. The
total length of the onshore section of the pipeline is approximately 9 km.
The following considerations have been taken into account when finalising the route of the
onshore pipeline section:
Increasing separation distances from buildings, developed areas and planned future
developments as far as reasonably practicable;
Minimising road, rail and water crossings and crossings of existing utilities and
services as far as reasonably practicable.
Note that location class is determined, in accordance with BS 8010, in the Population Density
Analysis [Ref. 4].
Special consideration is given in the design to the stabilisation of the pipeline in areas of bog
and marshland, where these cannot be avoided.
Design proposals and construction methods have been checked against geological /
geotechnical data for suitability. A specific study has been performed to consider the effect of
a peat slip or land slide and the analysis shows that the pipeline as designed can withstand
such events without rupture or leakage. [Ref 5]
3.3 Operational Parameters
The following information has been taken from the Design Basis [Ref. 6].

Design Flow Rate: 350 mmscfd
Maximum Flow Rate: 350 mmscfd
Design Pressure: 345 barg
Operating Pressure Range (onshore section): 50 - 140 barg
Normal Operating Pressure (onshore section, at start of field life): 120 barg
Wellhead Shut In Pressure (WHSIP) (at start of field life): 345 bara

CORRIB FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Onshore Pipeline Quantified Risk Assessment



g:\052377 - enterprisecorrib additional work\ctr 140 - qra update\02-f-3-835- rev 05 - qra.doc Page 10 of 58
Wellhead flowing pressure (at start of field life): 272 bara
Maximum Design Temperature: 50C
Minimum Design Temperature: -10 C
3.4 Well Fluids Analysis
The Corrib field contains a wat er saturated sweet gas with an expected condensate yield of
less than 0.5bbls/mmscf [Ref. 6]. For the purposes of the consequence modelling the
following well fluids properties have been assumed, based on well 18/25-1 [Ref. 6].
Table 3-1 Well Fluids Properties and Composition
18/ 25-1
Relative Density (Air=1) 0.587
Average MW (g/mole) 17.0
Composition (mol %)
Methane 94.0
Ethane 3.0
Nitrogen 2.7
Carbon Dioxide 0.3
Hydrogen Sulphide nil
3.5 Design Life
The pipeline and all its attachments have a design life of 30 years.
3.6 Materials
The pipeline will be constructed from Carbon Steel to DNV OS-F101 SAWL 485 (equivalent to
API 5L Grade X 70).
3.7 Diameter and Wall Thickness
The pipeline has a nominal external diameter of 20 (508 mm). Design of pipe wall thickness
is in accordance with BS 8010 [Ref. 2]. This has resulted in a nominal wall thickness of
27.1mm, including corrosion and manufacturing allowances.
3.8 Depth of Cover
Generally, the pipeline will be buried with a minimum depth of cover of 1.2m over the entire
route. This minimum cover is increased at crossings. Where this depth of cover is not
achieved (e.g. at ditch crossings), additional protection is provided over the pipeline.
3.9 Crossings
The route taken by the onshore section of the pipeline includes the following crossings:
6 Track Crossings;
3 Road Crossings (including the Terminal Boundary Road);
3 River Crossings;
33 Ditch Crossings.

Road crossings have been designed in accordance with BS 8010 [Ref. 2]. Special
consideration will be made where pipe in soft ground crosses roads to ensure that stresses

CORRIB FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Onshore Pipeline Quantified Risk Assessment



g:\052377 - enterprisecorrib additional work\ctr 140 - qra update\02-f-3-835- rev 05 - qra.doc Page 11 of 58
cannot be exerted on the pipe due to ground settlement over the life of the pipeline. Concrete
coated pipe is used at river and estuary crossings. Track, road and ditch crossings
incorporate a concrete barrier above the pipeline to protect from third party interference, e.g.
during ditch clearing activities.
Buried utilities, drains, etc. are to be crossed in accordance with the individual owner's
requirements but will follow the convention of crossing beneath existing services with
protection between them unless indicated otherwise.
3.10 Corrosion Allowance
A corrosion allowance of 1.0mm has been included in the wall thickness calculation of the
onshore pipeline section. (section 3.7)
3.11 Coatings
The pipeline is provided with a 2.5 mm thick external polypropylene (3LPP) anti-corrosion
coating on all pipeline sections that are not concrete coated. Concrete coated sections (used
at river and estuary crossings) have asphalt enamel under the concrete coating.
3.12 Inhibitors
Throughout the life of the pipeline, a mixture of methanol, corrosion inhibitor and scale
inhibitor will be injected at the subsea wells in order to prevent internal corrosion, hydrate
formation and scale deposition in the pipeline.
3.13 Cathodic Protection
In addition to the coating system described above, the onshore section of the pipeline will be
fitted with an impressed current cathodic protection system to prevent external corrosion.

The cathodic protection system has been designed in accordance with the requirements of
BS7361 and will comprise a transformer rectifier unit, anode groundbed and test facilities for
system monitoring.

The precise location and configuration of the anode groundbed has been determined
following completion of the soil resistivity survey [ref 19]. Test facilities to enable monitoring
of the level of cathodic protection afforded to the pipeline will be installed at strategic locations
(selected during the resistivity survey), taking due note of any particular corrosion hazards
identified during the survey work.

The interaction of the onshore and offshore CP systems was addressed in the design of the
onshore system to ensure that no undesirable effects occur that could result in under-
protection of either pipeline section. This is described in the Corrosion Protection Design
Report (Ref. 19). No electrical isolation joint is required between the onshore and offshore
pipeline sections.

The onshore pipeline is electrically isolated from the Terminal pipework.
3.14 Pigging
The onshore section of the pipeline has been designed to permit intelligent pigging, and
meets the requirements for the operation of all forms of pigs.


CORRIB FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Onshore Pipeline Quantified Risk Assessment



g:\052377 - enterprisecorrib additional work\ctr 140 - qra update\02-f-3-835- rev 05 - qra.doc Page 12 of 58
4 METHODOLOGY
4.1 General
The risk assessment of the onshore section of the pipeline has generally been conducted in
accordance with the Project Risk Assessment Procedure [Ref. 1] and the following
methodology.
4.2 Hazard Identification
A Hazard Identification (HAZID) exercise has been carried out using a comprehensive generic
HAZID checklist developed specifically for onshore pipelines. This acti vity was conducted to
provide the starting point for the onshore pipeline QRA by identifying those hazards to be
included in the assessment.
The HAZID checklist included hazards applicable to pipelines carrying any product,
constructed from any material, having any diameter and wall thickness, crossing all types of
terrain and exposed to all possible environmental hazards. It therefore included some
hazards that were not judged to be significant as potential causes of failure for the onshore
section of the Corrib pipeline, and others that will be adequately controlled by the design and
construction practices. However, all hazards were discussed and assessed in the Hazard
Review report (Ref. 15) as part of the process.
Hazards that were judged to present a significant risk were carried forward for more detailed
assessment (using qualitative and quantitative methods as appropriate) in the development of
this document. Assessment of these hazards and ways in which the risks could be managed
led to recommendations which have subsequently been incorporated into the pipeline design
in order to ensure that the risks were reduced to a tolerable, or As Low As Reasonably
Practicable (ALARP), level.
4.3 Risk Assessment
4.3.1 Qualitative and Quanti tative Assessment
Qualitative and quantitative risk assessments have been conducted, as appropriate to the
particular risk. Qualitative discussions have been used to reduce the number of failure modes
requiring quantitative assessment. Quantitative risk assessment comprised hazard
consequences and hazard frequency assessments. The QRA has quantified the residual
risk, resulting from the operation of the onshore section of the pipeline, in terms of risk to
members of the public. The results of the assessment have been discussed and
recommendations have been made to reduce risks to levels that are as low as reasonably
practicable.
4.3.2 Consequence Analysis
This part of the analysis involves the following:
Allocation of a release type (vapour, two phase etc) or hazard type (dispersion, fire,
flash fire etc).
Determination of release rate for each scenario. Standard release rate equations with
a coefficient of discharge of 0.8 (typical for gas) were used. For releases through
large holes a pipeline model was used to determine the reducing release rate with
time.
Association of each scenario with the type(s) of hazardous event that could occur
should there be ignition (i.e. jet fire, flash fire etc).

CORRIB FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Onshore Pipeline Quantified Risk Assessment



g:\052377 - enterprisecorrib additional work\ctr 140 - qra update\02-f-3-835- rev 05 - qra.doc Page 13 of 58
Determination of the consequences. Dispersion distances and distances to thermal
radiation levels have been determined using Shell FRED (Fires, Release, Explosion,
Dispersion) Version 4. This is a suite of consequence models based on Shells
involvement over a more than 20 year period in Safety Research and Development.
The models are all validated by large-scale experiments, and published in reputable
scientific literature.
In the determination of the hazardous envelope(s) associated with each scenario,
consequence end points need to be defined for each hazard type. Although at present there
are no published Irish standards for the determination of land use planning advice, it is
understood that statutory criteria are being developed for such advice based on risk. In order
to establish a common basis for sites that present a combination of hazards, the authority will
consider the risks associated with a dangerous dose. A dangerous dose is one which will:
Cause severe distress to almost everyone;
Require a substantial fraction to be given medical attention, with some suffering
irreversible effects;
Cause fatalities in highly susceptible members of the population (the most vulnerable
1%).
For the radiation hazards posed by the proposed pipeline a dangerous dose for radiation to
people (referred to as Thermal Dose Units or TDUs) of 1000(kW/m
2
)
1.3333
s is commonly used.
For an exposure duration of 75 seconds a thermal flux of 7kW/m
2
is approximately 1000TDU
and a thermal flux of 4kW/m
2
is approximately 500TDU. In this report 6kW/m
2
has been used
to represent 1000TDU.
The potential impact of the pipeline on the trees and buildings has been considered using the
thermal radiation frequency contours for 12kW/m
2
for long duration fires and 20kW/m
2
for
short duration fires. The critical heat flux for piloted wood ignition is 13.1kW/m
2
, and 20kW/m
2

would be capable of igniting trees if the exposure duration was more than five minutes,
(Cohen and Butler [Ref 7]). For short duration fires, the distance to the spontaneous ignition
of wood has been used (Bilo and Kinsman[ Ref 8])
Other hazards more commonly associated with petrochemical activities like toxic effects and
explosions have not been considered. Toxic effects are not considered credible scenarios on
the basis of the composition of the Corrib gas. An explosion event is not considered to
represent a credible scenario (by comparison to the fire events that have been modelled) as
there are no areas along the route of the onshore pipeline section in which gas may
accumulate, or where there would be sufficient confinement and congestion to allow
significant explosion overpressures to be generated. Explosion modelling has not, therefore,
been conducted.


CORRIB FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Onshore Pipeline Quantified Risk Assessment



g:\052377 - enterprisecorrib additional work\ctr 140 - qra update\02-f-3-835- rev 05 - qra.doc Page 14 of 58
5 DATA AND ASSUMPTIONS
5.1 General
The quality of the predictions of the QRA depends on the quality and relevance of the data
sources and assumptions used. It is therefore important that appropriate sources of historical
data are used, that the data is correctly applied and that realistic, yet conservative,
assumptions are made based on best practice and experience available from other similar
risk assessments.
The data sources and assumptions used are described in the following sections.
5.2 Population Density
5.2.1 Area Classification
The area classification based on population density has been made in accordance with BS
8010 [Ref. 2] and is reported in the Population Density Analysis [Ref. 9].
The estimated population density, calculated for a corridor 850m either side of the pipeline,
using aerial photographs (taken during 2000), is 0.65 people / hectare, which results in an
area class 1 location. The upper limit for an area to be classified as area Class 1 is 2.5
people / hectare.
Ordnance survey maps (undated) are also available. A comparison of the maps with the
photographs show that in the intervening period some buildings have become redundant and
new buildings have been constructed. However it appears that the overall population density
has not changed significantly.
It is also unlikely that the population density of the area will increase significantly in the near
to medium future. In order to change from a Class 1 to a Class 2 location (i.e. more than 2.5
people / hectare), the population would have to increase by approx 200% in the immediate
vicinity of the pipeline route.
For risk assessment purposes, the population density will be conservatively taken as 0.75
people / hectare to allow for modest growth in population density over the life of the pipeline.
5.2.2 Buildings Locations
The location of buildings along the pipeline route have been investigated using the alignment
sheets (which combine the aerial photographs, vector maps and the proposed pipeline route)
in order to identify the closest building/s and the area with the greatest density of buildings.
The greatest density of buildings exists along the road to the north of the onshore section of
the pipeline, where it runs along the northern edge of Sruwaddacon Bay [Ref. 10].
The closest building to the pipeline route is located approximately 70m from the proposed
route centre-line.
5.3 Release Frequencies
5.3.1 Historical Data
Historical data for releases from valves and flanges has been taken from the E&P Forum
(now called International Association of Oil and Gas Producers) Risk Assessment Data
Directory [Ref. 11 ] and the UK Health and Safety Executive Offshore Hydrocarbon Releases
Statistics, 1999 [Ref. 12].

CORRIB FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Onshore Pipeline Quantified Risk Assessment



g:\052377 - enterprisecorrib additional work\ctr 140 - qra update\02-f-3-835- rev 05 - qra.doc Page 15 of 58
Data from the UK Onshore Pipeline Operators' Association (UKOPA) [Ref.17 ] has been used
for specific onshore pipeline hazards such as external interference and external corrosion and
has also been used for materials defects data. The UKOPA database represents a source of
pipeline fault data which is specific to the UK and based on incidents occurring during over
half a million pipeline operating years (of which over 90% is natural gas pipelines) between
1962 and 1998. The UKOPA data is considered to be more relevant to the onshore section of
the Corrib Pipeline than US or European data.
However, as the gas pipelines in the UKOPA database were transporting sales specification
natural gas (i.e. dry gas) the PARLOC 96 data for offshore pipelines [Ref. 13] has also been
consulted for in relation to failures due to internal corrosion and material defects to determine
which are the most appropriate frequencies to use in this assessment
Although there are later versions of this data now available, the results in them are similar, if
not a reduced incident frequency, therefore the original data has been retained in this revision
of the QRA and adds a slight further conservatism to the failure frequency data.
5.3.2 Probabilistic Models
The UKOPA data shows that external interference to buried onshore pipelines (from
mechanical excavators, etc.) is a major contributor to the overall failure frequency. Two
probabilistic limit state models are available to determine the risk of puncture or rupture due to
this type of external interference, i.e.:
puncture due to penetration of the pipe by an excavator bucket tooth;
a gouge and/or dent in the pipe wall resulting in a leak or rupture.

These models have been developed based on published reference works, and are described
in Appendix A.
For other failure modes, for which probabilistic models are not readily applicable, estimates of
failure frequencies have relied on historical data.
5.4 Consequence Asse ssment
5.4.1 Release Modelling
5.4.1.1 Hole Sizes
The modelling of releases from large pipelines generally only uses two hole sizes to represent
leaks and ruptures. Intermediate hole sizes are not considered as large cracks or punctures
in the walls of pipelines (particularly high pressure gas pipelines) tend to propagate rapidly
into full -bore ruptures.

Leaks have been modelled as having an equivalent hole diameter of 25 mm. This is
equivalent to pipe punctures or cracks. Ruptures have been modelled as having an
equivalent hole diameter equal to the pipe internal diameter. When modelling pipeline
ruptures, the release rate from both sides of the ruptured pipeline were addressed.
5.4.1.2 Release Conditions
All releases were calculated at the normal operating pressure of 120 barg and the design
pressure of 345 barg.
For the 25 mm diameter leak event a rate independent of time was assumed

CORRIB FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Onshore Pipeline Quantified Risk Assessment



g:\052377 - enterprisecorrib additional work\ctr 140 - qra update\02-f-3-835- rev 05 - qra.doc Page 16 of 58
For the rupture event the average release rate over the first 60 seconds was used for the
calculation of dispersion and radiation distances.
All releases were assumed to occur at the ambient temperature of 10
o
C.
5.4.1.3 Release Orientation and Inventory
Leaks
Three different release orientations were used in the gas dispersion modelling of the leaks:
These are vertical, horizontal and buried. The vertical and horizontal releases were modelled
as jets discharging into the air and were not obstructed (for the horizontal release this means
that the sides of the crater were ignored). The buried release was modelled as directly
downwards into the ground underneath the pipeline such that the gas loses all momentum
and then disperses out of the crater in the downwind direction (this ignores any upward
momentum that the gas would obtain by being pushed upwards out of the crater by the gas
escaping from the release). To this extent, all release modelling is considered to be based on
conservative assumptions.
For the leak failure modes, the release orientation is considered to be evenly distributed
around the pipeline circumference, but the releases need to be assigned as either vertical,
horizontal or buried in order to match one of the gas dispersion and fire models. It has been
decided that 50% of the releases should be assigned as buried releases as these will impinge
significantly on the crater sides, causing the jet to lose (some or all of its) momentum. The
remaining releases are divided evenly between vertical and horizontal.
The event tree accounts for all three release directions used in the dispersion modelling. The
proportions assigned to each release direction in the first column of the event tree are the
proportions of un-ignited releases in this direction (i.e. 25% vertical, 25% horizontal and 50%
buried) for the other failure modes.
Ruptures
The directional component of a full bore rupture will be horizontal in the direction along the
pipeline both for dispersing high momentum gas jets and ignited jet fires.
Inventory
The design of the gas production system includes automatic ESD valves at the subsea wells
and at the entrance to the terminal facilities. The length of pipeline between these two points
is approximately 93km, giving a maximum total pipeline inventory (at the initial wellhead shut
in pressure) of approximately 3900 tonnes.
For small leaks in the onshore pipeline section, it has been assumed that these may not be
easily detected (due to the relatively low release rate) and may therefore persist for some
time before detection and closure of the ESD valves.
5.4.1.4 Meteorological Data
Wind statistics (strength and direction) used for the modelling have been provided by Met
Eireann (Belmullet). Information about the wind speed stability combinations is not available,
so it has been assumed that these could be represented by F2 (Pasquill stability F-stable,
wind speed 2m/s) and D5 (Pasquill stability D-neutral, wind speed 5m/s). It has further been
assumed that D5 occurs for 85% of the time and F2 for the remainder. This in line with
common QRA practice.
5.4.2 Ignition
Ignition probabilities have been derived from a number of published data sources. Historical
data is available from hundreds of pipeline release incidents occurring during millions of
km.yrs of pipeline operation and represents the best available estimates of ignition probability.

CORRIB FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Onshore Pipeline Quantified Risk Assessment



g:\052377 - enterprisecorrib additional work\ctr 140 - qra update\02-f-3-835- rev 05 - qra.doc Page 17 of 58
The ignition frequencies used in this revision of the QRA (updated from previous revisions of
the document) are based on data published by EGIG in 2001) and are compared to other
data sources in the table below:
Table 5.1 Historical Ignition probability
Data Source Release Size Ignition Probability
Pinhole-crack (< 2cm) 0.032
Hole (2cm < D
leak
< D
pipe
) 0.021
Rupture (> 16) 0.25
EGIG 2001
All sizes 0.04
UKOPA 2000 [14] All sizes 0.047


The historical databases contain release frequencies for a large number of pipelines with a
range of wall thickness. This includes thin-walled pipelines, which are more susceptible to
puncture by external interference than the thick-walled Corrib pipeline. As release events
caused by external interference have a higher probability of ignition (as a potential source of
ignition is usually present) it is considered that the ignition probabilities derived from these
databases represent conservative estimates for the Corrib onshore pipeline.
The historical databases also include much data for pipelines in urban and suburban areas -
where the ignition probability due to the number of ignition sources available in such locations
would be expected to be much higher than in a rural location such as the Corrib onshore
route. Again, this means that the data presented in the databases is conservative for the
Corrib onshore pipeline.
It has nevertheless been decided to use the historical ignition frequencies as a guide for the
ignition probabilities selected in this study. In general, the following ignition probabilities have
been adopted, and the values used in the event trees have been based on these values.

Table 5.2 Selected Ignition Probability values
Release Size Ignition
Probability
Rupture (> 16) 0.25
Pinhole-crack (< 2cm) 0.032

In order to account for early and late ignition the available historical data for onshore
pipeline releases was reviewed to ascertain whether any distinction was made with regard to
the timing of ignition in pipeline release events. The data search did not, however, yield any
information that could be used to determine the time delay between the onset of an accidental
release and the moment of ignition of the gas. This is probably to be expected because,
while evidence of a gas cloud ignition is all too apparent, there are not usually any signs that
allow accident investigators to determine how long after the initial release the ignition
occurred. While it is possible that this information may be available in a (very) few cases, it is
not normally recorded in historical accident databases.
The overall ignition figure in the EGIG data does not distinguish between early and late
ignitions, but does include ALL ignitions (EGIG Report, 2001, Section 2.2 states that Ignition
yes/no was recorded for ALL pipeline release incidents, but nothing more specific than this).
Vertical leaks will have a very small flammable area at ground level and therefore a very small
probability of early ignition. A probability of 0.002 is assumed (10% of the frequency attributed
to horizontal and buried releases). Late ignition of vertical releases is considered as not
feasible and therefore give a probability of zero. Given that the effect of vertical jet fires from
leaks is much less than that for horizontal or buried leaks, this is a conservative assumption
as the overall ignition frequency remains the same but is spread over the other orientations.

CORRIB FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Onshore Pipeline Quantified Risk Assessment



g:\052377 - enterprisecorrib additional work\ctr 140 - qra update\02-f-3-835- rev 05 - qra.doc Page 18 of 58
For ruptures from external impact, most likely caused by motorised diggers, an early ignition
probability of 0.9 has been assumed.
In the absence of historical data, it was decided that the proportion of early and late
ignitions was to be evenly distributed in the development of the event tree. The area affected
by the late ignited clouds is, in most cases, smaller than the area enveloped by the 6kW/m
2

contour /1000TDU. Therefore this assumption will not affect the result as in the study late
ignited dispersing clouds will flash back to torch fires which is the same outcome from early
ignited dispersing clouds.
5.5 Tolerability of Risk
Tolerability of risk is normally determined by the authorities which authorise developments of
this nature. A discussion on the various risk acceptance criteria found, applicable to pipelines
is presented in the following paragraphs. The most stringent criteria found, applicable to
pipelines, would tolerate a risk contour value below 10
-6
per year (1 in a million chance per
year of a fatality).
5.5.1 Representations of Risk
Quantitative representations of risk are commonly used to describe the risk level to the
workforce and/or members of the public affected by industrial activities. These risk
representations are normally calculated as the potential risk of loss of life, and the resulting
risk levels can then be compared with known fatality statistics.
For pipelines, in general only Risk Contours are used. F/N curves (see 5.5.1.3) are not
usually used as the risk, when depicted in this way, would become dependent on the length of
the pipeline section considered and the location of individuals, all of which change greatly
along the length of the pipeline which makes this figure meaningless. Risk Transects (see
also 6.4.1) show the effect of distance on risk frequency at 90 degrees to any point along the
pipeline and are developed from a section or intersection through Risk Contours.
5.5.1.1 Risk Contours
The Risk Contour is an iso-risk line on the map at which a hypothetical individual staying at
one point on this line unprotected and for 24 hours per day would be subjected to a defined
probability of loss of life due to exposure to hazards induced by the industrial activity. This risk
indicator is most frequently used to quantify the risk to the public around an industrial activity
(in this case the gas pipeline) and is expressed as a risk of fatality on a per year basis.
Each point along the risk contour is specific to a certain point on the ground, and represents
the sum of any risk scenarios which can affect that point. It is sometimes called the Location
Risk. Another way to look at the definition above, is to say that a hypothetical individual is at
the location and exposed whenever any of the risk scenarios manifests itself.
Although the hypothetical individual is exposed when the scenario occurs, it is normal to take
account of human reaction. For example if the individual is in the heat radiation field of a big
flame, then an exposure time is assumed from the time of the event until after the individual
can reasonably be assumed to have taken cover or moved far enough away from the flame
not to be at further risk.
It is possible to take account of the protection offered by buildings, so that the risk contour
level inside a building is lower than outside. However this is not normal practice when
calculating Risk Contours for land-use planning purposes and has not been undertaken for
this analysis.

CORRIB FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Onshore Pipeline Quantified Risk Assessment



g:\052377 - enterprisecorrib additional work\ctr 140 - qra update\02-f-3-835- rev 05 - qra.doc Page 19 of 58
5.5.1.2 Individual Risk
The Individual Risk (IR) level is more specifically defined as the Individual Risk Per Annum
(IRPA), which is the calculated annual risk loading to a specific individual or group of
individuals. Clearly this depends on the amount of time in a year that the individual spends in
different risk areas. The individual risk calculation takes account of the fact that people move
from one place to another.
When calculating individual risk from major accident scenarios, it is normal to take account of
protection by buildings.
Sometimes the individual risk is calculated on the basis of 10
8
exposed hours. This is called
the Fatal Accident Rate (FAR).
5.5.1.3 Societal Risk Curves
Societal Risk is used in Quantified Risk Assessment (QRA) studi es and is depicted on a
cumulative graph called an F/N curve. The horizontal axis is the number of potential fatalities,
N. The vertical axis is the frequency per year that N or more potential fatalities could occur, F.
This risk indicator is used by authorities as a measure for the social disruption in case of large
accidents.
It is normal to take account of protection by buildings, and peoples response. For large toxic
release models, alarm and evacuation can be included. The resulting curve is then the
residual risk should the emergency plans not be effective.
Because it is a cumulative curve, the curve always drops away with increasing N. Normally
the F/N curve has a lower frequency cut-off at one in a billion (1 x10
-9
/yr).
Regulators often split the graph into different regions, so that different actions have to be
undertaken depending on where the F/N curve falls. Sometimes a maximum limit is placed on
N (number of fatalities) possible for any event.
This type of curve is normal for plant type hazardous installations where a large group of
people could be affected and their location is well established (housing estates, schools etc)
relative to the event location (the plant). For pipelines however, because there is no single
location for an event and the population affected varies along the pipeline route, this curve is
not normally generated unless a large group of people can be effected over a reasonable
distance. For the Corrib pipeline, the population is distributed over a long length, part has no
population close to it at all and therefore the calculation for this curve is not really possible
and does not provide a true picture of the societal risk presented by the pipeline.
5.5.2 International Risk Criteria
5.5.2.1 United Kingdom
In the UK the Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH) regulations are in line with the
latest EU Seveso-2 Directive. The regulations do not formally require a quantitative risk
assessment, but the guidance notes make clear that in some circumstances quantification will
help or could be asked for by the UK regulator - the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) - and
this is often done in practice.
To advise planning authorities on developments around industrial installations, the UK HSE
has been developing risk acceptance criteria over the years. A comprehensive treatment of
the subject of tolerability of risk was given in a report titled Reducing Risks Protecting
People [Ref 14 ] . The report repeated the concept and criteria as argued by the Royal
Society in 1983. It accepted t he concept of tolerable Individual Risk as being the dividing line
between what is just tolerable and intolerable and set the upper tolerable limit for workforce
fatalities at 10
-3
/yr ( 1 in a thousand) for workers and 10
-4
/yr ( 1 in 10 thousand) for members

CORRIB FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Onshore Pipeline Quantified Risk Assessment



g:\052377 - enterprisecorrib additional work\ctr 140 - qra update\02-f-3-835- rev 05 - qra.doc Page 20 of 58
of the public. A level at which risks might be broadly acceptable but not altogether negligible
was set at 10
-6
/yr (1 in a million). The region in between would be controlled by the ALARP
concept.
ALARP can be demonstrated in a variety of ways, depending on the severity of the worst
case scenario. These are expressed in HSE guidance to Inspectors Consultation Draft
September 2002. When a QRA is carried out, then the F/N regions are defined as in the
Figure 5.1.
1E-09
1E-08
1E-07
1E-06
1E-05
1E-04
1E-03
1E-02
1 10 100 1000 10000
Number of fatalities
F
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y


p
e
r

y
e
a
r
Unacceptable
Broadly
acceptable
ALARP

Figure 5-1 United Kingdom Societal Risk Guidelines (risk to workforce and public)
Unlike the Netherlands (see below), the potential workforce fatalities are included in the F/N
curve.

5.5.2.2 Canada: Major Industrial Accidents Council of Canada (MIACC).
The MIACC recommend individual risk levels for use in respect to hazardous substances risk
from all sources, i.e. there is no need to distinguish between risk from a fixed facility at which
hazardous substances may be found, or a pipeline or a transportation corridor. The
acceptability levels are equally applicable. With these considerations in mind, the guidelines
for acceptable levels of risk are as follows
Table 5.3 Land use and Industrial Risk according to MIACC
Location (based on risk level) Possible land uses
From risk source to 1 in 10,000
(10
-4
) risk contour:
no other land uses except the source facility, pipeline or
corridor
1 in 10,000 to 1 in 100,000
(10
-4
to 10
-5
) risk contours:
uses involving continuous access and the presence of
limited numbers of people but easy evacuation, e.g. open
space (parks, golf courses, conservation areas, trails,
excluding recreation facilities such as arenas),
warehouses, manufacturing plants
1 in 100,000 to 1 in 1,000,000
(10
-5
to 10
-6
) risk contours
uses involving continuous access but easy evacuation,
e.g., commercial uses, low-density residential areas,
offices
Beyond the 1 in 1,000,000
(10
-6
) risk contour
all other land uses without restriction including institutional
uses, high-density residential areas, etc

It is important to emphasize that these guidelines do not prohibit all activities or structures
within the various risk contours, but rather restrict land use within each zone. As is the case

CORRIB FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Onshore Pipeline Quantified Risk Assessment



g:\052377 - enterprisecorrib additional work\ctr 140 - qra update\02-f-3-835- rev 05 - qra.doc Page 21 of 58
for many other land use questions (e.g. flood plains), the contours are used to define special
restrictions on land uses. This aspect of the guidelines is particularly important since, as
discussed in a subsequent section, land use controls around industrial sites have important
legal and economic implications.
The guidelines are thought to be realistic in terms of existing practices of risk management
and levels of risk. They are also compatible with criteria that have been selected and
implemented in other industries and other count ries. In a practical sense, these criteria can
only achieve authority if they represent a consensus view of Canadian society. They must not
impose unrealistic requirements on industry and should reflect the contemporary standards of
the society to which they are applied.
5.5.2.3 Malaysia
The criteria used by the Department of Environment (DOE) for existing facilities are outlined
below for residential and industrial areas:
Residential 1 x 10
-6
fatalities / person / year
Industrial 1 x 10
-5
fatalities / person / year
In words, the acceptability criteria are as follows: the risk of death to persons in a residential
area must not exceed 1 chance in a million per person per year and the risk of death to
persons in a nearby industrial area must not exceed 1 chance in 100,000 per person per year.
If the quantified individual risk compares favourably with the acceptability criteria, then it is
deemed acceptable. If not, the components of the overall risk are re-examined to determine
where risk mitigation measures can be implemented cost effectively. Risk evaluation must
also be conducted taking into account the fact that hazard analysis and consequence
assessment only gives an estimation of risks from a facility. In many cases the expertise and
the knowledge required to model various failure scenarios do not exist prior to the accident
occurring. For instance, although dispersion models are used in the modelling of the release
of large masses of dense gases (in the 100s of tonnes), there has never been a large scale
experimental release to justify the models used. Only the gross behaviour of the vapour
cloud, i.e. density intrusion-gravity spreading and passive dispersion, can be modelled.
Obstacles and terrain effects cannot be incorporated in present day models, however they
can have substantial effects on the dispersion of the cloud. Therefore, as a safety factor, a
standard quantitative risk assessment technique is always to err on the conservative side in
assumption making.
5.5.2.4 Australia
The Western Australia (WA) Department of Planning has adopted risk criteria for hazardous
installations. They are based on risk contours and can be summarised as follows:
A risk level in residential zones of one in a million per year (1 x 10
-6
/yr) or less, is so
small as to be acceptable to the WA EPA (Environmental Protection Agency);
A risk level in sensitive developments, such as hospitals, schools, child care
facilities and aged care housing developments, of between one half and one in a
million per year (5 x 10
7
and 1 x 10
-6
/yr) is so small as to be acceptable to the WA
EPA;
Risk levels from industrial facilities should not exceed a target of fifty in a million per
year (1 in 20,000) at the site boundary for each individual industry, and the
cumulative risk level imposed upon an industry should not exceed a target of one
hundred in a million per year (1 in 10,000);
A risk for any non-industrial activity, located in buffer zones between industrial and
residential zones, of ten in a million per year or lower is so small as to be acceptable
to the WA EPA;

CORRIB FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Onshore Pipeline Quantified Risk Assessment



g:\052377 - enterprisecorrib additional work\ctr 140 - qra update\02-f-3-835- rev 05 - qra.doc Page 22 of 58
A risk level for commercial developments, including offices, retail centres and
showrooms located in buffer zones between industrial facilities and residential zones,
of five in a million per year or less, is so small as to be acceptable to the WA EPA.
5.5.2.5 The Netherlands
The policy statement approved by the Dutch Parliament states the following criteria for
existing facilities. The risk is unacceptable if the 10
-6
/yr risk contours affect residential areas or
the F/N curve is above 10 fatalities with a frequency of 10
-5
/yr with a slope of -2. This is
illustrated in Figure 5-2:
1E-09
1E-08
1E-07
1E-06
1E-05
1E-04
1E-03
1E-02
1 10 100 1000 10000
Number of fatalities
F
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y


p
e
r

y
e
a
r
advised
limit
ALARP

Figure 5-2 : Netherlands Societal Risk Guidelines (risk to public only)
Below the criteria, the ALARP, As Low As Reasonably Practicable, principle should be used.
All Dutch installations should meet the criteria for new facilities by the year 2005. For the
Societal Risk it should be emphasised that the exposure or presence factor of population
used for calculating the F/N curve during the day is 0.7 and 1 during night. Also the
assumption is made that being indoors gives protection where the fraction of people being
indoors is 0.93 during daytime and 0.99 during night time.

5.5.2.6 Hong Kong Government Criteria
The Hong Kong government has published Interim Risk Guidelines for Potential Hazardous
Installations. The guideline covers new installations and expansion of existing installations
and also controls the development of land around installations. It should be pointed out that
although these are described as guidelines they are very strictly applied in practice. They
are seen as necessary because of the special circumstances of Hong Kong, where there is a
dense population in close proximity to industrial facilities, and are mainly used for land-use
planning decisions. The guidelines set forth two criteria;
A risk contour of 10
-5
/yr for fatality as an upper limit of tolerability.
The maximum F/N curve exceeds the line through the point of 10 fatalities at a
frequency of 10
-4
/yr with a slope of -1. No event at any frequency should take place
which causes more than 1000 deaths.
The societal risk zones are illustrated in Figure 5-3:

CORRIB FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Onshore Pipeline Quantified Risk Assessment



g:\052377 - enterprisecorrib additional work\ctr 140 - qra update\02-f-3-835- rev 05 - qra.doc Page 23 of 58
1E-09
1E-08
1E-07
1E-06
1E-05
1E-04
1E-03
1 10 100 1000 10000
Number of fatalities
F
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y


p
e
r

y
e
a
r
Intolerable
Tolerable
ALARP

Figure 5-3: Hong Kong Societal Risk Guidelines (risk to public only)
The Hong Kong regulators scrutinise each risk assessment closely and insist on the use of
consistent methodology from case to case.

5.5.3 Tolerability of risk
Although there are differences between the legislation adopted in the various countries it is
also clear that there is consensus on the tolerability of risk. The majority of the countries
would accept risk levels for the public around 10
-5
/yr whilst the more stringent countries would
set the tolerability level at 10
-6
/yr.

CORRIB FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Onshore Pipeline Quantified Risk Assessment



g:\052377 - enterprisecorrib additional work\ctr 140 - qra update\02-f-3-835- rev 05 - qra.doc Page 24 of 58
6 RISK ASSESSMENT
6.1 Failure Modes
6.1.1 General
The completed HAZID checklist is included in the HAZID Report [Ref. 15]. Many of the
hazards were considered, based on the experience and judgement of the assembled team, to
present an insignificant risk of pipeline failure. These risks were therefore considered to be
tolerable and are not discussed beyond the HAZID Report. It should, however, be noted that
some recommendations for future project phases (Construction, Operation) are made and
that these should be added to the Overall Project Hazard Register, as applicable.
Those hazards which were considered to present a significant risk are further assessed in the
following sections. As a result of further assessment the hazards are either assigned a
quantitative failure rate (i.e. a frequency of loss of pipeline containment), or are judged to
make a negligible contribution to the overall pipeline failure frequency. In this context a
negligible contribution would be equivalent to a pipeline loss of containment frequency equal
to or less than 1 x 10
-8
per km.yr.
6.1.2 Pressure Considerations
Increasing pressure above normal operating of the onshore pipeline section may occur as a
result of blockage, or during shut-in when the pipeline may reach the initial well-head shut-in
pressure of 345 barg.
The only feasible scenario for blockage of the pipeline is due to hydrate formation. Methanol
will be injected into the well fluids at the subsea wells in order to suppress hydrate formation.
In the event that methanol injection failed or was unavailable for any period of time, hydrates
could form in the pipeline. However, the typical hydrate dissociation temperatures are such
that hydrate formation would be expected to occur in the offshore pipeline section and
therefore the section of pipeline which would be exposed to high pressures from the wells is
the offshore section.
Shut-in at the terminal due to process upset or terminal ESD will lead to higher pressures in
the onshore pipeline unless wellhead valves are closed. However, the entire pipeline is
designed to withstand the well-head shut-in pressure (WHSIP) existing at the start of field life
and failure of the (defect free) pipeline due to pressure higher than normal pressure is not,
therefore, considered to be a credible failure mode. The WHSIP decreases over the field life,
thus further reducing the risk of failure due to internal overpressure.
Prior to start-up the pipeline will be tested to pressures which exceed the design pressure of
345 barg by over 20%. Thus the risks of defects existing in the pipeline that could cause
failure at the WHSIP is considered to be very low.
6.1.3 Pressure Cycling
A pressure cycle is defined by the range of the pressure variation, and the frequency of the
cycle. The range of a variation is defined as the difference between the peak value and lowest
value of the pressure variation and the frequency is defined as the period of time which
elapses between the identical point in two subsequent cycles (e.g. two subsequent peaks).
The pressure cycling constraints for a pipeline are governed by the material fatigue limits and
are dependent on both the range and the frequency of the pressure variations. These factors
are related and vary inversely with one another, i.e. a high cycling frequency would have a
lower permissible range than a lower cycling frequency.
Generally the diurnal range of pressure cycling for the onshore section of the pipeline is small
as the pipeline is not feeding end-users directly but is "buffered" from the effects of the

CORRIB FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Onshore Pipeline Quantified Risk Assessment



g:\052377 - enterprisecorrib additional work\ctr 140 - qra update\02-f-3-835- rev 05 - qra.doc Page 25 of 58
varying end-user demands by the Terminal process and the export pipeline downstream of
the terminal. It is assumed that the Terminal will initially operate at a steady state flow of 350
mmscfd and a steady pressure regime. Any variation in flow would be managed by variation
of the choke valve settings at the subsea production manifold in the field, with the aim to
achieve a set arrival pressure at the Terminal.
The range of pressure cycling is therefore considered to be low. Pressure and stress fatigue
limits are considered to be negligible, and pressure cycling is not considered to represent a
credible cause of pipeline failure.
Pipeline fatigue is addressed in the Mechanical Design Report [Ref. 16]
6.1.4 Pipeline / Umbilical Separation
The scope of this assessment does not include hazards resulting from releases from the
umbilical, except to the extent of assessing whether a fire resulting from the ignition of a
methanol leak from the umbilical may result in a release from the gas pipeline.
The distance between the pipeline and the umbilical of minimum 1m in the onshore sections
is considered to be sufficient to allow access for potential future maintenance of one or the
other without undue risk of damage to the neighbouring line, and the risk of failure to one
caused by the other is considered to be low.
The most hazardous fluid transported in the umbilical is the methanol used for hydrate
inhibition. This is transported in separate lines at a maximum operating pressure in the
onshore section of 345 bar. The onshore sections of the umbilical are housed in conduits.
These provide some additional protection, but are not designed for pressure containment.
The separation distance of the umbilical and the pipeline will be a minimum of 1.0 m except at
river crossings.
The normal flow rate within any of the five methanol lines within the umbilical is only 1m
3
/hr.
Therefore a leak at any significant rate would be very likely to be detected. In the event of
ignition, the methanol would burn as a pool fire at ground level. In pool fire combustion the
vapour burns above the pool (where it can mix with air) and the heat radiated back from the
combustion provides the energy to evaporate more liquid to fuel the fire. The temperature of
the liquid in the pool remains around the boiling point of the liquid, which for methanol (at
atmospheric pressure) is approximately 65
o
C.
The heating effect on a pipeline buried beneath the pool would not, therefore, be sufficient to
present a risk of pipeline failure.
It is concluded, therefore, that the presence of the umbilical does not present a credible risk of
pipeline failure due to umbilical loss of containment.
For the converse, high pressure releases from the gas pipeline will generate significant forces
and create large craters in the ground around the release. Such releases could, therefore,
cause failure of the umbilical even if the pipeline release does not ignite. In the event of an
ignited pipeline release, any exposed umbilical sections would be expected to fail due to the
high thermal radiation.
The additional hazardous consequences of umbilical failure in the proximity of a large pipeline
gas release, are not considered to be signifi cant, i.e. the consequences of the release of
small quantities of methanol are small in comparison to the hazards presented by the pipeline
release itself.
The case of whether the umbilical failure in the event of a gas pipeline failure will increase the
probability of a fire due to the presence of electrical cables in the umbilical has been
addressed. A gas release will only ignite if the correct conditions are present. In the event of
breakage of the cables in the umbilical as a result of a large gas pipeline failure, the area
immediately around the release is too rich in gas for ignition to occur. It is considered that the
ignition probability chosen for this assessment (see section 5.4.2) is appropriate and
conservative for this location and arrangement.

CORRIB FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Onshore Pipeline Quantified Risk Assessment



g:\052377 - enterprisecorrib additional work\ctr 140 - qra update\02-f-3-835- rev 05 - qra.doc Page 26 of 58
The presence of electrical cables in close proximity to the pipeline has been considered in the
design of the Cathodic Protection system and found not to cause any effects on the operation
of the pipeline and its Cathodic Protection system.
All subsea christmas tree and manifold valves are of fail -closed design and will act
automatically to shut off the inventory of the gas reservoir in the event of loss of hydraulic
power or electrical control signals (both channels) through the umbilical.

6.1.5 Third Party Interference
6.1.5.1 Historical Failure Rate
The UKOPA pipeline fault database [Ref. 17] indicates a failure rate (leading to product loss)
due to external interference for the period 19621998 of 5.98x10
-5
per km year (1.00x10
-5
per
km.year for the period 1994-1998). The UKOPA data encompasses failures in a wide variety
of steel pipelines (over 90% of which were gas pipelines) with a range of wall thickness
values.
The UKOPA data also shows that most incidences of external interference have occurred in
rural areas, with semi-rural & suburban areas the next most frequent.
Table 6-1 Product Loss Incidents resulting from External Interference related to Area
Classification
Area Classification Exposures
km.yr
Incidents
Rural 443,447 24
Suburban & Semi-rural 46,060 7
Urban 516 0
Total 490,023
1
31
Note 1. It is noted that the total exposure in this table is less than other UKOPA tables. The reason for this was not
explained in the UKOPA data. It is assumed that t his is because the data for location of the pipelines was
incomplete.

The UKOPA data also shows that the maximum wall thickness for a loss of product incident
resulting from external interference was 12.7mm (whereas the Corrib pipeline wall thickness
i s 27.1 mm). The distribution of failures resulting from external interference for each wall
thickness category is shown in Table 6-2.
Table 6-2 Product Loss Incidents resulting from External Interference related to Wall
Thickness Class
Wall Thickness
mm
Exposures
km.yr
Incidents
< 5 42,222 10
5 - 10 250,030 17
10 - 15 192,558 4
> 15 34,006 0
Total 518,816 31


The trend shown above is to be expected. However, the absence of a failure in the > 15mm
category may be partly due to the low exposure time for this category and it is worth noting
that the exposure time of pipelines with wall thickness in excess of 15mm is relatively low by
comparison to the 10 - 15mm wall thickness category


CORRIB FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Onshore Pipeline Quantified Risk Assessment



g:\052377 - enterprisecorrib additional work\ctr 140 - qra update\02-f-3-835- rev 05 - qra.doc Page 27 of 58
6.1.5.2 Failure Rate Estimated from Limit State Model
For the area in question, the risk of third party (or external) interference from construction
activities, ditch digging, boring, etc. is considered to be low. British Gas Technology [Ref. 18]
indicated a frequency of external interference of 1.86 x 10
-3
per km year as applying to typical
36-inch diameter national transmission system pipelines. Note that this is the risk of some
form of external interference actually making contact with the pipeline but not the risk of
failure of the pipeline.
The onshore section of the Corrib pipeline passes through a fairly remote rural area which
has a low possibility for major construction operations and few public utilities close to the
pipeline. However, there are peat cutting activities and associated drainage works and there
may be some tillage activity. The external interference frequency of 1.86 x 10
-3
per km-year is
therefore conservatively assumed for this location.
Protection from normal farming activities is provided by the pipeline minimum depth of cover
[Ref 2]. However, the pipeline may be exposed to risk where the minimum cover is not
achieved (construction defect) or where it has become eroded due to removal of overburden
(due to flooding, land erosion, or washout from the trench due to drainage patterns). The risk
presented by farming activities is assumed to be included in the above frequency for external
interference.
The probability of failure (leaks and ruptures) resulting from third party interference is
assessed using the limit state models defined in Appendix A. These models were developed
to estimate the probability of failure in the event of external interference by excavation
equipment. It is assumed that the methodology used is also applicable to farming equipment
such as ploughs, and chain type excavators that might be used to create land drains.
The risk of product loss (from leaks and ruptures) is given by the product of the external
interference frequency and the failure probability, as shown in Table 6-3. A pipeline internal
pressure of 345 bar is assumed in the limit state model as, even though this condition would
only exist infrequently, if at all, any unreported damage could lead to failure during shut-in
conditions caused by damage to the pipeline (dent, gouge etc) not reported or detected and
did not cause a leak at the normal operating pressure.
Table 6-3 Risk of Product Loss due to External Interference (assuming WHSIP)
Release Type Frequency of
External Interference
/ km.yr
Probability of
Failure mode /
interference event
(from model)
Risk of Product
Loss / km.yr
Leak (25mm) 1.86 x 10
-3
2.55 x 10
-4
4.74 x 10
-7

Rupture (Full Bore) 1.86 x 10
-3
6.09 x 10
-5
1.13 x 10
-7

Total 5.88 x 10
-7


6.1.5.3 Selection of Representative Failure Rate
The Corrib pipeline has a high wall thickness (27.1 mm), normally referred to as thick wall,
and consequently the failure rate would be expected to be considerably lower than that
presented in the UKOPA data, as this generally reports failures associated with much thinner
walled pipe (the maximum wall thickness for any loss of product incident resulting from
external interference was 12.7mm).
The impact energy required to puncture thick-walled pipe is considerable, and this is reflected
in the results obtained from the limit state model
The failure rate due to external interference for the onshore pipeline section will, therefore, be
assumed to be as presented in Table 6-3.

CORRIB FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Onshore Pipeline Quantified Risk Assessment



g:\052377 - enterprisecorrib additional work\ctr 140 - qra update\02-f-3-835- rev 05 - qra.doc Page 28 of 58
A (small) additional risk reduction can also be achieved by the installation of brightly coloured
plastic warning tapes in the ground above the pipeline. These may warn the excavator
operator of the presence of the pipeline, thereby averting damage. The level of risk reduction
is small, but as the cost of installation is also low, the installation of warning tapes has been
included in the design in accordance with the ALARP principle.

6.1.6 Estuary / River Crossings
There is no significant river traffic in the water over the pipeline crossings. The river channel
is not dredged.
River erosion, which may expose the pipe at river crossings cannot be discounted and the
crossings will therefore be inspected regularly following construction and during operation.
Concrete coated pipe will be used at the river crossings. Primarily this is for stability purposes,
but it will also provide a significant degree of protection from impact. Failure of the onshore
section of the pipeline due to impacts from small boats or their anchors at river crossings is
not, therefore, considered credible.
6.1.7 Internal Erosion
The well fluids are not expected to contain sand. However it is possible that in later field life,
the increasing water content of the fluids from some wells may carry small quantities of sand
through the pipeline.
The flow velocity in the line is lower than the critical velocities required for erosion to occur.
Failure due to internal erosion is therefore not considered to be a credible failure mode for the
onshore section of the pipeline.
6.1.8 Ground Movement
The pipeline is routed through an area of peat bog located on the north and south sides of the
river. Environmental events such as extreme flooding or drought may result in changes in the
ground level in this area, as may human activities resulting in drainage, a change of land use
or increased peat cutting.
Where the ground level in the peat bog changes significantly the pipeline could be stressed at
the point where it crosses from the soft ground to the rocky areas, or where it crosses roads.
In these areas the options for the construction of the onshore section of the pipeline will be
investigated - refer to the Mechanical Design Report [Ref 16 ]. The design takes account of
the geo-technical information available and addresses options such as the use of stone piers
to support the pipeline. If implemented, the separation of the supports will be designed to
account for spanning of the pipeline between supports in the event of ground settlement.
Alternatively, the peat will be excavated down to base rock or alluvial gravels on which the
pipeline will sit without the possibility of further movement.

The UKOPA pipeline fault database [Ref. 17] includes a failure rate for ground movement of
9.6 x 10
-6
per km.yr. Approximately 20% of these failures resulted in full bore ruptures. It is
considered unlikely though that the full bore ruptures involved large diameter thick walled pipe
such as is used for the onshore section of the Corrib pipeline.
A further study [ref 5] has been performed to investigate the integrity risk to the pipeline in the
event of various widths of land slide or land slip in peat areas due to natural conditions or as a
result of the construction works. This has shown that whilst the pipeline does move and bend
under such an event, it remains intact and does not leak or rupture due to the inbuilt strength
of the thick walled pipe.

CORRIB FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Onshore Pipeline Quantified Risk Assessment



g:\052377 - enterprisecorrib additional work\ctr 140 - qra update\02-f-3-835- rev 05 - qra.doc Page 29 of 58
However, as the onshore section passes through a significant area of peat, it will be
conservatively assumed in the risk assessment that this failure rate applies, but 90% will be
apportioned to leaks and 10% to ruptures.
6.1.9 External Corrosion
The onshore pipeline section will be protected against corrosion by means of a three layer
polypropylene (3LPP) coating, except at river crossings where asphalt coating is used under
concrete. In case of damage to the corrosion coating, there will also be an impressed current
cathodic protection (CP) system [Ref. 19]. A CP resistivity survey of the soils along the
onshore pipeline route has been undertaken. The possibility of contaminants (industrial or
farming chemicals, sulphate reducing bacteria (SRBs), etc.) being present that could be
harmful to the pipeline coating has also been considered in the CP design. It is considered
unlikely that any chemicals are present in this area in concentrations that would affect the
coating as it is not characterised by intensive commercial farming activity or previous
industrial history. If any SRBs are present the pipeline CP and coating systems have been
designed to take these into account [Ref. 19].
Provided that the CP system maintains the correct protective potentials at all times and at all
locations, no external corrosion will take place even in the event of damage to the corrosion
coating. It will be possible to check whether protective potentials are being maintained
through regular CP surveys.
Two possible scenarios for external corrosion can be envisaged. Firstly, the CP system would
not be effective if the pipeline were to be above ground, hence corrosion in these areas would
be possible. However, the pipeline in the area covered by this assessment will be buried (with
only the short section inside the Terminal above ground) and thus this scenario is discounted.
The second scenario involves the corrosion of buried pipe under disbonded coatings, as
disbondment causes cathodic protection shielding. The high quality coating should not
become disbonded, and this is considered to represent a low risk of failure,
The pipeline is designed to allow intelligent pigging (online inspection vehicle) to check for
various modes of damage and deterioration including external corrosion. Intelligent pigging
should identify corrosion occurring as a result of disbonded coatings, ineffective CP, etc. It is
recommended that the first intelligent pigging run is performed within 3 years of pipeline start -
up, and that subsequent inspections are based on the results of this initial run. The detailed
requirements for intelligent pigging has been considered in the Corrosion Monitoring Report
[Ref. 20].
The data in the UKOPA pipeline fault database [Ref.17] is considered to be the most
representative for external corrosion of an onshore pipeline. This indicates an average failure
rate (during the period 1962-1998) due to external corrosion of 5.01x10
-5
per km-year. The
database also includes further analysis of the historical data that shows that the majority of
the failures occurred in older pipelines (see Table 6-4).
Table 6-4 Product Loss Incidents resulting from External Corrosion related to year of
construction [Ref.17]
Construction Year Exposures
Km.yr
Incidents
Pre-1964 68,546 16
1964 1973 330,066 10
1974 1983 94,187 0
1984 1993 25,530 0
1994 1998 488 0
Total 518, 816 26

The higher failure rate in older pipelines may be attributable to the advances in coatings
technology, cathodic protection systems and pipe materials quality, etc, which only newer

CORRIB FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Onshore Pipeline Quantified Risk Assessment



g:\052377 - enterprisecorrib additional work\ctr 140 - qra update\02-f-3-835- rev 05 - qra.doc Page 30 of 58
pipelines will have benefited from. This assumption is supported by Table 6-5, which shows
that the failure rate for pipelines provided with modern coatings (e.g. polypropylene, similar in
performance to polythene) is lower than for pipelines provided with other coating types (e.g.
coal tar).
Table 6-5 Product Loss Incidents resulting from External Corrosion related to Coating Type
[Ref.17]
External Coating Exposures
Km.yr
Incidents
Bitumen 20,063 2
Coal Tar 417,077 18
Polyethylene 31,302 1
FBE 27,525 0
Other / not known 22,861 5
Total 518,828 26

Table 6-6 shows that the majority of external corrosion failure incidents in the UKOPA data
involved relatively thin-walled pipelines.
Table 6-6 Product Loss Incidents resulting from External Corrosion related to Wall Thickness
Class [Ref.17]
Wall Thickness Exposures
Km.yr
Incidents
< 5 42,222 15
5 - 10 250,030 11
1- 15 192,558 0
> 15 34,006 0
Total 518,816 26


Based on the above discussion and historical data, it is considered that the frequency of
failure of the Corrib onshore pipeline section (a modern thick-walled, polypropylene coated
pipe with an impressed current cathodic protection system) due to external corrosion would
be negligible.

6.1.10 Internal Corrosion
6.1.10.1 Sulphide Corrosion, Sulphide Stress Cracking and Hydrogen Induced Cracking
Hydrogen sulphide (H
2
S) in the presence of free water may cause general weight loss or
localised corrosion of carbon steel.

Sulphide stress cracking can occur at low partial pressures of H
2
S and may result in sudden
and unpredictable catastrophic failure of the pipeline. At higher partial pressures of H
2
S (and
high temperature) sulphide corrosion can occur resulting in general weight loss. This is
caused by a reaction with the pipeline steel to form sulphide precipitate and scale. The
reaction may be exacerbated by the presence of CO
2
and O
2
.

Hydrogen induced pressure cracking may result from the presence of H
2
S and water over
extended periods of time, however this presents only a negligible risk for high quality steel
pipelines, unless the gas is defined as sour.


CORRIB FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Onshore Pipeline Quantified Risk Assessment



g:\052377 - enterprisecorrib additional work\ctr 140 - qra update\02-f-3-835- rev 05 - qra.doc Page 31 of 58
Any of the above corrosion scenarios could eventually result in leak or rupture. However they
all depend on the presence of H
2
S. The well fluids analysis in Section 3.4 shows that H
2
S is
not expected to be present. The well fluids are water saturated and may contain small
quantities of free water however and so the above corrosion mechanisms could occur in the
event that the quantity of H
2
S increased during later field life.

Corrosion would be controlled by the corrosion inhibitor injected at the subsea wells, however
it is still recommended that periodic analysis of the well fluids is undertaken to verify the
continued absence of H
2
S throughout the field life.

Given that this analysis is undertaken, and H
2
S is not present, loss of containment due to
internal corrosion by these mechanisms is not considered to be a credible failure mode.
6.1.10.2 Carbonic Acid Corrosion
In the presence of free water, CO
2
will dissolve to form carbonic acid. This can result in
general corrosion or pitting at defects.

The expected corrosion rates for carbon steel in the presence of carbon dioxide and free
water have been investigated in the Corrosion Allowance Evaluation [Ref. 21]. The study
used the methodology published by DeWaard, Milliams et al [Refs. 22, 23 and 24] and
confirmed the corrosion allowance (with corrosion inhibition) as 1.0mm for the onshore
pipeline section.

Generally, the corrosion rates are much higher in parts of the offshore pipeline where the
operating temperature is higher. In the pipeline near the subsea wells the predicted total
corrosion can be several times higher than in the onshore pipeline section. Any failure due to
internal corrosion is therefore considered more likely to occur offshore (near the subsea
wells).

The adopted philosophy for protection against internal corrosion is dependent on effective
corrosion inhibition by the injection of a cocktail of methanol and corrosion inhibitor (CI) at the
subsea wells. It is anticipated [Ref. 21] that the pipeline system would be able to tolerate
failure of the Corrosion Inhibition system for periods of up to 4 6 weeks without internal
corrosion increasing at a greater rate than predicted (i.e. a greater rate than is acceptable
with a corrosion allowance of 1.0mm for the 30 yr life). Repair of the system within this time
period would be expected.

Despite the ability of the system to tolerate prolonged unavailability of the corrosion inhibition
system, it is recommended that Corrosion Inhibitor (CI) is continuously injected, and
operational safeguards are implemented to guarantee high system availability, in order to
prevent excessive internal corrosion. It is also recommended that an appropriate corrosion
monitoring system is implemented in order to identify excessive internal corrosion.

Continuous injection of CI will provide protection against changes in well fluid composition
(e.g. increased water cut) throughout all stages of field life. Corrosion monitoring may include
corrosion probes, coupons or other forms of monitoring at a fixed location, or the use of
intelligent pigging. It should be noted that the corrosion rate over the length of a pipeline
system cannot be inferred from measurements of corrosion rate at fixed points (e.g. at the
subsea wells and at the onshore Terminal), as measured by fixed corrosion monitoring
methods. It is therefore recommended that an intelligent pigging run is performed within 3
years of pipeline start-up in order to provide correlation between the actual and predicted
corrosion rate and inhibitor effectiveness. The requirement and schedule for future on-line
inspection of the whole pipeline system is determined based on those findings.

Assuming effective corrosion inhibition (including verification by monitoring), and with the
provided corrosion allowance, the frequency of pipeline failure due to internal corrosion is
considered to be negligible.

CORRIB FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Onshore Pipeline Quantified Risk Assessment



g:\052377 - enterprisecorrib additional work\ctr 140 - qra update\02-f-3-835- rev 05 - qra.doc Page 32 of 58
6.1.10.3 Mercury Corrosion
It is predicted that the well fluids contain trace quantities of mercury. Mercury forms an
amalgam with most metals. Where an amalgam is formed a corrosion cell can be established
resulting in gradual material loss. This process requires the presence of free water as an
electrolyte [Ref. 25].
This mechanism appears to have a more pronounced effect with alloy steels than carbon
steel. The concentration of mercury required to cause corrosion and the precise effect of the
conditions of temperature and pressure on the corrosion rate do not appear to be well
documented. The use of a corrosion inhibitor will, however, control this corrosion mechanism
and failure of a thick walled pipe with a corrosion allowance is not considered to be credible.
6.1.11 Inherent Defects and Construction Defects
Defects from pipe manufacture will be present in the pipe material and the seam weld.
Defects will be present in the girth welds made on site. These defects are generally termed
inherent defects and are always present. Quality control applied during the manufacture and
construction process aims to limit the size of the inherent defects below the critical sizes at
which they might cause failure of the pipeline. Usually pipe lengths or seam welds with
defects which exceed the critical size criteria would be discovered during inspection and
testing at the pipe mill and rejected or repaired. All site welds are inspected during the
construction process. However, there remains a small risk that some defects which exceed
the critical size criteria could remain, or that the pipeline may sustain damage due to impacts
or over-stressing during construction.
Such defects should however be revealed during the system hydro-testing. The hydrostatic
test is based on 90% of the pipeline material SMYS at the highest point in the system, in
accordance with BS 8010 [Ref. 2]. This results in a minimum hydrostatic test pressure of
431.25 bar. This is 86 bar above the design pressure of the pipeline, and approximately 280
bar above the expected normal operating pressure.
Any defects which remain hidden, or those that were initially within acceptable criteria, may
grow during the pipeline life due to fatigue, until eventually they cause pipeline failure. This is,
however, considered to be unlikely for the onshore section of the Corrib pipeline as:
the hydrostatic test should ensure that there is a substantial margin bet ween initial defect
sizes and the sizes that would be critical;
the range of pressure cycling to which the onshore pipeline will be subjected is not
considered significant (with respect to the design pressure) such as it could cause fatigue
growth of defects;
defect growth due to fatigue would require time, and the well-head shut-in pressure
declines during the field life.
The UKOPA pipeline fault database [Ref.17] indicates the following historical failure rates due
to pipe material and welding defects.
Table 6-7 - Number and Frequency of Product Loss Incidents for Pipe Material and Welding
Defects.
Product Loss Cause No. of
Incidents
(1962-1998)
Frequency per
km.yr
(1962-1998)
No. of
Incidents
(1994-1998)
Frequency per
km.yr
(1994-1998)
Girth weld Defect 33 6.36x10
-5
0 0
Pipe Defect 12 2.31x10
-5
0 0
Seam Weld Defect 3 5.80x10
-6
1 1.00x10
-5

Total 48 9.25x10
-5
1 1.00x10
-5



CORRIB FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Onshore Pipeline Quantified Risk Assessment



g:\052377 - enterprisecorrib additional work\ctr 140 - qra update\02-f-3-835- rev 05 - qra.doc Page 33 of 58
Generally, the trend for fewer failures in recent years could be attributed to improvements in
quality control during pipe manufacture and installation. It is considered that, although very
low (due to the reasons discussed above), the potential failure of the onshore section due to
inherent / construction defects cannot be discounted. A failure rate of 50% of the UKOPA
failure rate from 1962 to 1998 will therefore be assumed for the purposes of this assessment,
i.e. 4.625 x 10
-5
per km.year.
In the UKOPA data, all such failures were shown to result in small leaks only.

CORRIB FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Onshore Pipeline Quantified Risk Assessment



g:\052377 - enterprisecorrib additional work\ctr 140 - qra update\02-f-3-835- rev 05 - qra.doc Page 34 of 58
6.2 Failure Frequencies
As a result of the qualitative discussions in Section 6.1 many of the potential failure modes
are considered to be not credible, or to make a negligible contribution to the overall failure
frequency for the onshore section of the Corrib pipeline. Those failure modes which are
considered credible, and for which failure frequencies have been calculated or taken from
reference data, are summarised in Table 6-8.
Table 6-8 Pipeline failure frequencies
The failure modes considered are ranked below in reverse order of their risk contribution.
Failure Mode Leak
Frequency
(per km.yr)
Rupture
Frequency
(per km.yr)
Total
Release
Frequency
(per km.yr)
Third Party Interference 4.74 x 10
-7
1.13 x 10
-7
5.88 x 10
-7

Ground Movement 8.64 x 10
-6
9.6 x 10
-7
9.6 x 10
-6

Inherent Defects and Construction Defects 4.62 x 10
-5
0 4.62x10
-5

Total 5.53 x 10
-5
1.07 x 10
-6
5.64 x 10
-5

6.3 Failure Consequences
6.3.1 Release Rates
6.3.1.1 Leak
An equivalent hole size of 25mm has been selected to represent small leaks such as could
result from small inherent defects, weld failures or punctures due to mechanical impact. At the
maximum initial wellhead shut -in pressure of 345 barg this hole size produces an initial leak
rate of 27.1 kg/s. The initial leak rate for the normal operating pressure of120 bar is 10.5 kg/s.
6.3.1.2 Rupture
When estimating the release rates from ruptures it must be noted that the total release rate
includes the release from both sides of the ruptured pipeline.
The initial release rates from full bore ruptures are extremely high, but decrease rapidly. For
modelling purposes the average of the first minute is used for the calculation of fires and
dispersion. The following Figure 6.1 shows the release rate vs. time. The release rate
decreases as time progresses and is dependant on the location of the leak. For the modelling
the worst case has been assumed which is a location near the beach valve as at this locat ion
gas flows from both the onshore section and the offshore section resulting in the largest
sustained release rates from both sides of the ruptured pipeline.

CORRIB FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Onshore Pipeline Quantified Risk Assessment



g:\052377 - enterprisecorrib additional work\ctr 140 - qra update\02-f-3-835- rev 05 - qra.doc Page 35 of 58
Table 6.9 Mass release vs time for rupture events
Average release rate kg/s Time interval
seconds 120 bar 345 bar
0-60 1443 4239
60-120 739 2251
120-180 440 1348
180-240 311 936
240-300 255 746
300-600 213 600
600-1200 188 530
1200-1800 163 473
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
0 1000 2000 3000 4000
Time seconds
R
e
l
e
a
s
e

r
a
t
e

k
g
/
s
120 bar
345 bar

Figure 6-1: Mass Released as a function of time
6.3.2 Fire Modelling
Radiation levels to 4, 6,12 and 20 kW/m
2
for the following fire events are presented here.
Horizontal jet fires resulting from leaks and ruptures at 120 barg and 345 barg (figures 6.2
& 6.3);
Low momentum fires resulting from buried leaks at 120 barg and 345 barg (figure 6.4);
Vertical jet fires resulting from leaks at 120 barg and 345 barg (figure 6.5);

All views show the plan view (from above) with the heat radiation contours at ground level
(shown in metres).


CORRIB FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Onshore Pipeline Quantified Risk Assessment



g:\052377 - enterprisecorrib additional work\ctr 140 - qra update\02-f-3-835- rev 05 - qra.doc Page 36 of 58
H 25mm 120 bar
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
-40 -20 0 20 40
4 kW/m
6 kW/m
12 kW/m
20 kW/m
H 25mm 345 bar
-20
0
20
40
60
80
-60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60
4 kW/m
6 kW/m
12 kW/m
20 kW/m

Figure 6-2: 25 mm Leak Horizontal Jet Fire Radiation Levels

Full bore 120 bar
-100
0
100
200
300
400
-300 -200 -100 0 100 200 300
4 kW/m
6 kW/m
12 kW/m
20 kW/m
Full bore 345 bar
-200
-100
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
-600 -400 -200 0 200 400 600
4 kW/m
6 kW/m
12 kW/m
20 kW/m

Figure 6-3: Full bore Horizontal Jet Fire Radiation Levels

CORRIB FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Onshore Pipeline Quantified Risk Assessment



g:\052377 - enterprisecorrib additional work\ctr 140 - qra update\02-f-3-835- rev 05 - qra.doc Page 37 of 58
B 25mm 120 bar
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
-100 -50 0 50 100
4 kW/m
6 kW/m
12 kW/m
20 kW/m
B 25mm 345 bar
-100
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
-150 -100 -50 0 50 100 150
4 kW/m
6 kW/m
12 kW/m
20 kW/m

Figure 6-4: 25 mm Leak Radiation Levels for Buried Releases

V 25mm 120 bar
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
-30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30
4 kW/m
6 kW/m
V 25mm 345 bar
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
-40 -20 0 20 40
4 kW/m
6 kW/m

Figure 6-5: 25 mm Leak Radiation Levels for Vertical Releases
6.3.3 Dispersion modelling
Dispersion distances to the Lower Flammable Limit for the following releases are given;
Horizontal plumes resulting from leaks and ruptures at 120 barg and 345 barg (Figure
6.6)

CORRIB FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Onshore Pipeline Quantified Risk Assessment



g:\052377 - enterprisecorrib additional work\ctr 140 - qra update\02-f-3-835- rev 05 - qra.doc Page 38 of 58
Horizontal plumes for low momentum buried leaks at 120 barg. (Figure 6.7)
Dispersion distances for the two assumed sets of meteorological conditions (D5 & F2) are
given. These distances are the maximum distances and for ruptures this distance will reduce
quickly as the release rate falls after 60 seconds.

0
10
20
30
40
50
60
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8
Lateral distance m
D
o
w
n
w
i
n
d

d
i
s
t
a
n
c
e

m
H 25 mm 120 bar F2
H 25 mm 120 bar D5
H 25 mm 345 bar D5
H 25 mm 345 bar F2

Figure 6-6: Dimensions of Dispersing Clouds with Momentum (25mm leaks and full bore
ruptures)
















Figure 6-7: Dimension of dispersing clouds without momentum for buried releases (25 mm
leaks)
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
-60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60
Lateral distance m
D
o
w
n
w
i
n
d

d
i
s
t
a
n
c
e

m
H Full bore 120 bar F2
H Full bore 120 bar D5
H Full bore 345 bar D 5
H Full bore 345 bar F2
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
-6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
Lateral distance m
D
o
w
n
w
i
n
d

d
i
s
t
a
n
c
e

m
B 25 mm 120 bar F2
B 25 mm 120 bar D5
B 25 mm 345 bar F2
B 25 mm 345 bar D5

CORRIB FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Onshore Pipeline Quantified Risk Assessment



g:\052377 - enterprisecorrib additional work\ctr 140 - qra update\02-f-3-835- rev 05 - qra.doc Page 39 of 58

6.3.4 Event trees
Two event trees, one for a leak scenario and one for a rupture scenario have been developed
based on the probability scenarios developed in sections 5 and 6 and are shown below. The
summation of the ignition frequencies matches those in section 5.4.2.

Figure 6.8 Gas pipeline Leak event tree
Table 6.10 Outcome frequencies of leak events
The various outcomes and their frequencies are tabled below
ID Scenario Freq km/year
LVJF Leak Vertical Jet Fire 2.77E-08
LVFFJF Leak Vertical Flash Fire followed by Jet Fire 0.00E+00
LHJF Leak Horizontal Jet Fire 3.18E-07
LHFFJFD5 Leak Horizontal Flash Fire followed by Jet Fire D5 2.64E-07
LHFFJFF2 Leak Horizontal Flash Fire followed by Jet Fire F2 4.66E-08
LBLMF Leak buried Low Momentum Fire 6.36E-07
LBFFLMFD5 Leak Buried Flash Fire followed by Low Momentum Flame D5 5.28E-07
LBFFLMFF2 Leak Buried Flash Fire followed by Low Momentum Flame F2 9.32E-08
LNI Leak No Ignition 5.34E-05

Gas Pipeline Leak Event Tree
Release
Frequency
km/yr
Release
Orientation
Early
Ignition
Late
Ignition
Outcome Frequency ID
0.002 Vertical Jet Fire 2.77E-08 LVJF
Yes
0.25 D5 Flash Fire followed by jet fire D5 0.00E+00 LVFFJF
Vertical 0 0.85
0.998 Yes F2 Flash Fire followed by jet fire F2 0.00E+00 LVFFJF
No 0.15
1 No Ignition 1.38E-05 LNI
No
0.023 Horizontal Jet Fire 3.18E-07 LHJF
5.53E-05 Yes
Leak 0.25 D5 Flash Fire followed by jet fire D5 2.64E-07 LHFFJFD5
Horizontal 0.023 0.85
0.977 Yes F2 Flash Fire followed by jet fire F2 4.66E-08 LHFFJFF2
No 0.15
0.977 No Ignition 1.32E-05 LNI
No
0.023 Low Momentum Fire (Crater) 6.36E-07 LBLMF
Yes
0.5 D5 Flash Fire followed by jet fire D5 5.28E-07 LBFFLMFD5
Buried 0.023 0.85
0.977 Yes F2 Flash Fire followed by jet fire F2 9.32E-08 LBFFLMFF2
No 0.15
0.977 No Ignition 2.64E-05 LNI
No
Checksum 5.53E-05
0.023 Early Late Total Ignited Events
1.78% 1.43% 3.21%
EGIG 3.20%
.
Proportion of Ignited
Events

CORRIB FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Onshore Pipeline Quantified Risk Assessment



g:\052377 - enterprisecorrib additional work\ctr 140 - qra update\02-f-3-835- rev 05 - qra.doc Page 40 of 58


Table 6.11 Outcome frequencies of rupture events
ID Scenario Freq km/year
FBJF Full bore Jet fire 1.97E-07
FBFFJTD5 Full bore Flash Fire followed by Jet Fire D5 7.44E-08
FBFFJTF2 Full bore Flash Fire followed by Jet Fire F2 1.31E-08
FBNI Full bore No Ignition 7.88E-07
6.4 Estimated Risk
6.4.1 Risk Transects
The risk will be highest at a point located immediately above the pipeline. The Risk Transects
show the effect on IR of increasing distance from the pipeline for the 120 bar operating
pressure. The risk for a given location decreases with increasing distance from the pipeline.
This is due to the decreasing ef fective length of the pipeline which (if a leak or rupture
occurred in that length) could affect that location. The highest value is 2.6*10
-7
/yr. This value
would be tolerable in any of the countries that use risk in their legislation and would not
require additional risk reduction measures.
The IR is calculated by summing together all the different scenarios and the effect of those
scenarios, all of which have different distances for a hazardous effect. This generates the
data for the IR transect.
The IR transect for a pipeline is derived by calculating the individual risk as a function of
distance from the pipeline centre-line. The IR is a maximum directly above the pipeline, and
decreases to zero as the distance from the pipeline increases. The risk at any given location
is a function of:

The distance from the pipeline (measured at a right angle);
The risk of a release from the pipeline (usually measured as the frequency of a release
per year per kilometre of pipeline);
Gas PipelineRupture Event Tree
Release
Frequency
km/yr
Failure Mode
Early
Ignition
Late
External
Ignition
Meteo
conditions
Outcome Frequency ID
0.900 Jet fire 1.01E-07 FBJF
Yes
0.105 D5 Flash Fire. burning back to jet fire 9.58E-10 FBFFJTD5
External Impact 0.10 0.85
0.100 Yes F2 Flash Fire. burning back to jet fire 1.69E-10 FBFFJTF2
No 0.15
1.07E-06 0.90 No ignition 1.01E-08 FBNI
Rupture No
0.100 Jet fire 9.60E-08 FB-JF
Yes
0.895 D5 Flash Fire. burning back to jet fire 7.35E-08 FBFFJTD5
Other 0.10 0.85
0.900 Yes F2 Flash Fire. burning back to jet fire 1.30E-08 FBFFJTF2
No 0.15
0.90 No ignition 7.78E-07 FBNI
No
Check sum: 1.07E-06
Total Ignited Events
0.1
18.40% 6.94% 25.34%
EGIG 25%

CORRIB FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Onshore Pipeline Quantified Risk Assessment



g:\052377 - enterprisecorrib additional work\ctr 140 - qra update\02-f-3-835- rev 05 - qra.doc Page 41 of 58
The distance from the release at which an observer at a given location would be affected
by the release (sometimes called the range of hazardous effect).

In the simplest case (where the effect of a pipeline release is experienced equally at all points
around the release, e.g. ignoring directionality and predominant wind effects) an observer
standing on the pipeline can be affected by a release from the pipeline if it occurs anywhere
within the range of hazardous effect distance in either direction along the pipeline. Thus the
length of the pipeline that could affect the observer if a release occurs is twice the range of
hazardous effect distance. This is called the effective length, and will decrease as the
observer moves away from the pipeline.

Effective length is used in the risk calculation to estimate the frequency of releases that
could affect a given point, since pipeline release frequency is expressed as releases per km
per year and so must be multiplied by the effective length to obtain a frequency as
releases per year.

When pipeline internal pressure is higher the range of hazardous effect is greater and (since
this increases effective length) then, in the unlikely event of a release, risk levels near the
pipeline increase for a higher pressure since a given location could be affected by a greater
length of pipeline. The actual likelihood of a release does not increase at higher pressure,
because the pipeline is designed to contain the higher pressures. Figure 6.10 shows the risk
transect for the pipeline at the operating pressure.

1.E-09
1.E-08
1.E-07
1.E-06
0 50 100 150 200 250
Lateral distance (m)
F
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y

p
e
r

y
e
a
r

Figure 6-10: Risk transect for 120 bar operating pressure

This risk increases if the pipeline pressure is assumed to be the design pressure of 345 barg
as shown in Figure 6-. The maximum risk, immediately above the line, increase to 5.7*10
-7
/yr
in this case but is still well below the tolerable risk level as used by any of the countries that
use risk from Major Hazards in their guidelines/legislation.

CORRIB FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Onshore Pipeline Quantified Risk Assessment



g:\052377 - enterprisecorrib additional work\ctr 140 - qra update\02-f-3-835- rev 05 - qra.doc Page 42 of 58
The expectation is that the design pressure will not be reached during the life time of the
development. The high reliability of the terminal, the well shut -in procedures and depleting
wellhead pressure over time all combine to ensure that the occasions on which the pipeline
pressure will increase above the normal operating pressure (120 barg) will be rare.
1.E-09
1.E-08
1.E-07
1.E-06
0 100 200 300 400
Lateral distance (m)
F
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y

p
e
r

y
e
a
r

Figure 6-11: Risk Transects for the design pressure of 345 bar.

6.4.2 Individual Risk at the Nearest Building
The building closest to the pipeline is located approximately 70m away [Ref. 10], measured
from the corner of the building to the nearest point on the pipeline. In estimating the individual
risk at this location, it was assumed that a person would be at the building location for 100%
of the time (i.e. no reduction for time spent at another location,).
The Individual risk (IR) does not make any allowance for the person being inside the building,
or using it for shelter from any event, as would normally be the case, therefore the risk factor
at the nearest building is conservative.
The IR at this location and this distance from the pipeline (70m) is 1 x 10
-7
/yr (1 in 10 million
per year) for a 120 barg operating pressure and 4 x10
-7
/yr ( 1 in 2.5 million per year) for the
worst case 345 barg. Both are well below a risk of 1 x 10
-6
/yr, the more stringent risk
acceptance criteria used worldwide for risk from major hazards.
The dispersion analysis for leaks (Figures 6.6 & 6.7) show that for a leak in any direction, at
any pressure and under any wind conditions does not create a flammable cloud around any
building located near the pipeline even if this building is directly down wind of any leak. This
confirms the assumption noted in section 4.3.2 that explosion events are not acredible
scenario and therefore does not affect the IR at the nearest building.



CORRIB FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Onshore Pipeline Quantified Risk Assessment



g:\052377 - enterprisecorrib additional work\ctr 140 - qra update\02-f-3-835- rev 05 - qra.doc Page 43 of 58
7 DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
7.1 Conclusions
The assessment of risks to the public resulting from the operation of the onshore section of
the Corrib pipeline indicates that the risks would be tolerable in all countries worldwide that
use risk in their legislation/guidance.
The principal hazards to be addressed in the design were identified [Ref 15] and these have
subsequently been addressed in the relevant design reports. Collectively the design reports
produced during the Detail Design phase provide a demonstration that the risk of realisation
of the pipeline hazards has been reduced to as low as reasonably practicable.
The following sections discuss potential risk reducing methods in relation to the main hazards
identified.
7.2 Risk Reduction Measures
7.2.1 Fittings
The design of the Beach Valve has incorporated the earlier recommendations regarding
elimination of flanges and reduction of small bore connections, and will be fully welded and
contain minimal connections or leak paths
7.2.2 External Interference
The most significant risk reduction measure which reduces the effect of external interference
is the high wall thickness which provides mechanical strength to resist excavator bucket teeth
and other such implements. This is accepted in all recognised stress based design codes
which decreases design factor and increase wall thickness in areas deemed to be of higher
risk potential or higher consequential damage. The design of the Corrib pipeline, with its
design pressure, has led to a very thick pipeline when compared to other gas pipelines of a
similar size installed in Ireland, the UK and continental Europe (normally 8 to 12 mm thick
versus 27.1mm for Corrib).
The wall thickness of the Corrib pipeline is such that there is no additional risk reduction in
areas where design factors would normally have been lower, e.g. road crossings. This is
recognised in many design codes where, once the wall thickness reaches 19 mm, there is no
requirement to alter the design factor at crossings or other sensitive locations. The Corrib
pipeline therefore will not gain from any increased wall thickness and may actually suffer due
to increased weight and consequential subsidence effects and difficulty in construction. The
reduction in internal diameter to 384mm from 453mm, resulting from an increase in wall
thickness when the design factor is increased from 0.72 to 0.3, may interfere with the running
of intelli gent inspection pigs, which is not a desirable outcome.

Increasing the depth of cover provided for a pipeline can reduce the likelihood of external
interference damage by reducing the proportion of excavation activities reaching a depth
which could interfere with the pipeline [Ref. 26]. A report by British Gas has analysed the
effect of increasing the depth of cover by studying damage data for the UK Gas Transmission
System. The method used relates the frequency of damage at any depth of cover to the
pipeline length and exposure at that depth, so that comparisons can be made for various
depths. The report concludes that the risk of damage is reduced by a factor of 10 by
increasing the depth of cover from 1.1m to 2.2m.
British Gas also conducted a series of experiments involving a range of excavating machines
and various forms of protection [Ref. 26] which concluded that some credit could be taken in

CORRIB FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Onshore Pipeline Quantified Risk Assessment



g:\052377 - enterprisecorrib additional work\ctr 140 - qra update\02-f-3-835- rev 05 - qra.doc Page 44 of 58
risk assessment work for protective measures such as plastic warning tapes, concrete
barriers and a combination of the two.
However, as external interference is not a major risk contributor for the Corrib pipeline the
beneficial effect of increased depth of cover or additional protective measures is not
considered significant.
For road and ditch crossings, where the risk of excavator activity and other similar activity can
be considered to be higher than for other sections of the pipeline route, the use of 150mm
thick re-inforced concrete slabs, which extend a minimum of 1000mm beyond the road, track
or ditch edge complete with warning tape and marker posts, have been specified on the basis
of the ALARP principle. However, no credit for this has been taken in the risk assessment in
line with the overall conservative approach used.
It is recommended that the use of plastic warning tapes (in the ground above the pipeline)
and pipeline markers (at field boundaries) should be adopted along the entire route due to the
very low cost of their installation. These measures may provide a small reduction in the risk
of external interference (e.g. during peat cutting activities), and therefore be consistent with
the ALARP principle.
Both of these recommendations have been accepted and implemented in the design.
7.2.3 Ground Movement
For the purposes of this assessment a significant proportion of the total pipeline failure rate
has been attributed to ground movement, due to the terrain crossed by the onshore section of
the pipeline. The detailed design has assessed ground movement issues and pipe
settlement, and addresses means by which the risk of pipeline failure due to ground
movement can be reduced in the Onshore Sealine Mechanical Design Report [Ref 18].
The bearing capacity of the soil (peat) along the areas of peat bog along pipeline route has
been examined. Construction plans will involve the use of pillars or islands of stone
(supported on the bed-rock below the peat) at set distances to provide support to the pipeline,
or alternatively the peat will be excavated to a suitable rock or sand / gravel layer. Road
crossings and points where other loads can be placed on the pipeline have been addressed
in the design.
Field tests have demonstrated that the undisturbed peat strata has the load capacity to resist
sinking of the pipeline, even when full of hydrotest water, with settlement limited to the initial
two to three days. These tests included the use of 20" pipe, weighted to be identical to the
Corrib pipeline, when full of water. For most of its life, the weight will be less than that, thus
reducing the propensity for settlement. The Corrib pipeline, unlike many other gas pipelines,
will always be negatively buoyant, due to its weight, even in saturated peat soils.
JPK has studied the effects of a peat slide or land slip across various lengths of the pipeline
[ref 5] from 200 m to 25 m and the results of this analysis show that the pipe may move
downhill with the slide, especially for the larger slides, but that it does not exceed the yield
stress, nor does it buckle, hence the pipeline would not fail in service. This is primarily due to
the thick wall of the pipeline.
The failure rate used in this assessment may, therefore, be over-conservative. However, as
the overall risk estimates indicate a tolerable l evel of risk, this will not be revised.
7.2.4 Demonstration of ALARP
The Corrib pipeline has been designed in accordance with the ALARP principle in relation to
the risks to the public.
The pipeline has the following safety features:
Design pressure of 345 barg versus normal operating pressure of 120 barg

CORRIB FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Onshore Pipeline Quantified Risk Assessment



g:\052377 - enterprisecorrib additional work\ctr 140 - qra update\02-f-3-835- rev 05 - qra.doc Page 45 of 58
Pipeline design pressure is equal to well shut-in pressure at start of production and
therefore cannot be exceeded under any circumstances.
Shut in pressure declines rapidly after initial 3 year operation
Pipeline routing has ensured separation distance to occupied houses is the maximum
practicable
Pipeline is all welded and all construction welds will be examined by NDT methods
Pipeline has been designed to a conventional, well proven design code
Nominal wall thickness of 27.1mm
Depth of cover, minimum of 1.2 m
Pipe joints have been subject to automatic seam weld inspection and manufactured to
modern techniques to minimise the possibility of material defects.

Risk reduction measures which have been incorporated into the design include:
Use of warning tape and marker posts throughout the pipeline route
Use of concrete slabs at ditch and road crossings with warning tape & marker posts
Use of all welded connections at Beach Valve and removal of small bore valves and
fittings
Separation of gas pipeline from umbilical to avoid potential effects from maintenance
activities or damage from one to another

Other measures considered
Use of lower design factor and hence thicker pipeline has been considered, especially in
areas such as road crossings or where proximity to occupied buildings is less than
elsewhere. However, examination of the historical data and logic behind the increase in wall
thickness shows that it is designed to resist third party damage. For the Corrib pipeline,
external interference resulting in a leak or rupture of the pipeline represents a small proportion
of the estimated overall release frequency. The use of lower design factors and hence thicker
wall pipeline cannot be justified in this instance due to the increased cost of materials,
construction and additional risk from handling very heavy pipe.
A similar argument is applicable in terms of additional impact resistance such as concrete
covers, sleeves and other mechanical protection to the pipeline. For these items there would
be a quantifiable reduction in risk, but it is extremely low and therefore the additional cost is
not reasonable compared to the reduction in risk.
Other measures to reduce the risk from third party activity, or to locate any leakage from the
pipeline include enhanced inspection of the pipeline route from the air or countryside and
regular maintenance activities. These activities will be carried out, but as there is no reliable
data on which to quantify any reduction in risk generated from increased levels of surveillance
or inspection, no credit is taken for this in the QRA.
7.3 Design at road crossings
BS 8010, [ref 2], section 2.6.1.4 calls for a design factor of 0.3 for category D substances
(Methane), unless this can be justified to a statutory authority that it may be raised to a
maximum of 0.72 by a risk analysis.



CORRIB FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Onshore Pipeline Quantified Risk Assessment



g:\052377 - enterprisecorrib additional work\ctr 140 - qra update\02-f-3-835- rev 05 - qra.doc Page 46 of 58
Section 7.2 above highlights the possible effects of decreasing the design factor and
increasing the wall thickness of the pipe. The HAZID and QRA have considered all feasible
means of damage to the pipeline and examination of the particular roads that are crossed by
the Corrib pipeline have not identified other reasonable actions. Both roads are minor roads
used mainly by the local population, with very few, if any, large commercial vehicles using
them. They are (in the area of the crossings) both reasonably flat, straight, and reasonably
well maintained similar to many others in the area. There is no identifiable risk that vehicles
could leave the road at that particular point with sufficient energy to cause damage to the
pipeline.
The road crossing design includes for a concrete slab which extends at least 1000 mm further
than the road and in practice will be further as the roads incorporate ditches which also have
slab protection.
Use of a 0.3 design factor increases the wall thickness and for many other pipelines there is a
significant decrease in risk due to this factor at the road crossing area. For the Corrib
pipeline, with a wall thickness of 27.1 mm based on a design factor of 0.72, this decrease in
risk does not occur as there is no historical or theoretical evidence to show that wall thickness
increases above 19.1 mm provide any further resistance to mechanical impact. Given that a
design factor of 0.3 would result in a wall thickness of some 62mm, the additional weight of
pipe, difficulty in welding such a thick pipe in the field, and potential problems of excessive
settlement lead to the conclusion that this additional wall thickness is not justified as a risk
reduction measure and would, if anything, act to increase the overall risk.
The recommendation of this report is that a design factor of 0.72, complete with additional
impact protection from re-inforced concret e slabs, is justified for road crossings for the Corrib
pipeline.
7.4 Recommendations
The following recommendations are made as a result of the risk assessment process. Cross-
reference is made to the section in which each recommendation is first made. These have
been added to the overall project hazard register to ensure that they are addressed and
implemented as required.
Pipeline hazards should be included in the assessment of Terminal workers risks to be
performed in the Terminal QRA;
Plastic warning tapes should be installed in the ground above the pipeline, and pipeline
markers should be installed at field boundaries, to deter external interference (Section
6.1.5.3);
Periodic analysis of the well fluids should be undertaken to verify the continued absence
of H
2
S throughout the field life (Section 6.1.10.1);
Corrosion Inhibitor should be continuously injected, and operational safeguards should be
implemented to guarantee high system availability, in order to prevent excessive internal
corrosion (Section 6.1.10.2);
An appropriate corrosion monitoring system should be implemented in order to identify
excessive internal corrosion (Section 6.1.10.2);
An intelligent pigging run should be performed within 3 years of pipeline start -up, and the
requirement for future on-line inspection of the whole pipeline system should be
determined based on the results (Section 6.1.9 & 6.1.10.2);
Consideration should be given to the means employed for leak detection and the ability to
detect small leaks (Section 6.3.1.1);
A design factor of 0.72, complete with concrete protection slabs, should be used for the
roads crossings (Section 7.3).

CORRIB FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Onshore Pipeline Quantified Risk Assessment



g:\052377 - enterprisecorrib additional work\ctr 140 - qra update\02-f-3-835- rev 05 - qra.doc Page 47 of 58
7.5 Implied Assumptions
The following is a list of implied assumptions that have been used in the qualitative
assessment of risks. In the event that any of these assumptions are not realised in the actual
design or operation of the pipeline, the potential effects on the validity of this assessment
would have to be reviewed.
It is assumed that the Terminal will operate initially on a steady state flow of 350 mmscfd
and a steady pressure regime. Changes to the basis of design during operation will be
subject to a change control procedure which will review the effect of those changes
including the QRA.
The distance between the pipeline and the umbilical should be sufficient to allow access
for potential future maintenance of one or the other without undue risk of damage to the
neighbouring line. The proximity of the pipeline and umbilical at a minimum of 1m (other
than river crossings) has been chosen such that the perceived risk to one from the other
is acceptable.
It will be possible to check whether protective CP potentials are being maintained through
regular CP surveys.

CORRIB FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Onshore Pipeline Quantified Risk Assessment



g:\052377 - enterprisecorrib additional work\ctr 140 - qra update\02-f-3-835- rev 05 - qra.doc Page 48 of 58
8 REFERENCES (MAIN TEXT)

1 Corrib Project Risk Assessment Procedure, EEI Doc. No. COR-15-PR-014-0
2 BS8010 Part II, Design, Construction and Installation of Pipelines On-Land, Section 2.8
Pipelines in Steel for Oil and Gas (1992). (Now replaced by PD 8010 Pt 1)
3 Design Code Comparison, JPK Document No. 05-2102-02-P-3-801.
4 Population Density Analysis, JPK Document No. 05-2102-02-P-3-860.
5 Landslip Analysis, JPK Document No. 05-2377-01-P-3-002
6 Onshore Design Basis, JPK Document No. 05-2102-02-P-3-800.
7 Cohen JD and Butler BW. Modeling Potential Structure Ignitions from Flame Radiation
Exposure with Implications for Wildland /Urban Interface Fire Management. 13th Fire and
Forest Meteorology Conference, Lorne Australia, 1996.
8 Bilo M and Kinsman P. Thermal radiation criteria used in pipeline risk assessment. Pipes and
Pipelines International November-December 1997
9 Population Density Analysis, JPK Document No. 05-2102-02-P-3-860.
10 Corrib Export Pipeline. Alignment Sheet 2 of 6. JPK Document No. 05-2102-02-P-0-805.
11 E&P Forum Risk Assessment Data Directory, October 1996.
12 Offshore Hydrocarbon Releases Statistics, 1999, Offshore Technology Report OTO 1999 079.
13 PARLOC 96: The Update of Loss of Containment Data for Offshore Pipelines, AME 1998.
14 UK Health and Safety Executive: R2P2 Reducing Risks, Protecting People, 2001
15 HAZID for Onshore Section. JPK Document no 05-2102-02-F-3-836
16 Onshore Sealine Mechanical Design Report JPK Document No. 052102-02-M-3-815
17 The UKOPA Pipeline Fault Database, Pipe and Pipelines International Volume 46, No.2, March-
April 2001
18 Example of the Application of Limit State, Reliability and Risk Based Design to the Uprating of
an Onshore Pipeline, A M Edwards, R J Espiner and A Francis, BG Technology, Report No.
R3125, Issue No.1, 6 August 1999, Commercial in confidence to Joint Industry Project
Sponsors
19 Cathodic Protection Design Report. JPK Document No, 05-2102-02-K-3-820
20 Corrosion Monitoring Report, JPK Document No. 05-2102-01-P-3-501.
21 Corrosion Allowance Evaluation, JPK Doc. No. 05-2102-01-P-3-135.
22 De Waard, Lotz and Milliams, Predictive Model for CO
2
Corrosion Engineering in Wet, Natural
Gas Pipelines, Paper 577, NACE Annual Conference, 1991.
23 De Waard and Lotz, Prediction of CO
2
Corrosion of Carbon Steel, Paper 69, NACE Annual
Conference, 1993.
24 DeWaard, Lotz and Degstad, Influence of Liquid Flow Velocity on CO
2
Corrosion: A Semi-
Empirical Model, Paper 128, NACE Annual Conference, 1995.
25 Mercury Corrosion in Liquefied Natural Gas Plants, James E Leeper, Energy Processing /
Canada January/February 1981.
26 I Corder, The Application of Risk Techniques to the Design and Operation of Pipelines, British
Gas, 1995



CORRIB FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Onshore Pipeline Quantified Risk Assessment



g:\052377 - enterprisecorrib additional work\ctr 140 - qra update\02-f-3-835- rev 05 - qra.doc Page 49 of 58









APPENDIX A

PROBABILISTIC MODELS FOR RELEASE
FREQUENCY DUE TO EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE


CORRIB FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Onshore Pipeline Quantified Risk Assessment



g:\052377 - enterprisecorrib additional work\ctr 140 - qra update\02-f-3-835- rev 05 - qra.doc Page 50 of 58
A 1 Limit State Models For External Interference

A 1.1 General
External interference to buried onshore pipelines is most usually caused by mechanical
excavators. In general, the following types of damage may result:
puncture due to penetration of the pipe by an excavator bucket tooth;
a gouge and/or dent in the pipe wall;
Limit state models are described below for the analysis of both the above damage scenarios.

A1.2 Puncture Model

The probability of puncture by an excavator bucket tooth is assessed as follows.
The force applied to the pipeli ne is assumed to be related to the mass of the excavator by an
empirical equation developed by Spiekhout [Ref. 27]:
F = 5.625 M (1)
where M is the total mass of the excavator in tonnes and F is the force applied to the pipeline
in kN.
The force that the pipeline can resist is calculated using the following limit state function given
by Driver and Zimmerman [Ref. 28]

u t t
w w L
w
R
r +
]
]
]

) ( 0058 . 0 17 . 1 (2)
where r = puncture resistance of pipe;
R = pipeline radius;
w = pipeline wall thickness;
L
t
= length of excavator tooth;
w
t
= width of excavator tooth;

u
= ultimate tensile strength of pipe steel.
Equation (2) has been calibrated against tests in a recent joint industry project [Ref. 29]. It
was shown that modelling uncertainty can be taken into account by modifying equation (2) as
follows:
C w w L
w
R
r
u t t
+ +
]
]
]

) ( 0058 . 0 17 . 1 (3)
where C is an additive error term to be described by an appropriate probability distribution.
The limit state function for puncture is then
F-r = 0 (4)
To apply the puncture limit state equation, the following variables require to be described by
probability distributions:
Excavator mass
Modelling uncertainty C
Ultimate tensile strength
Bucket tooth length and width
Pipe radius and wall thickness

CORRIB FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Onshore Pipeline Quantified Risk Assessment



g:\052377 - enterprisecorrib additional work\ctr 140 - qra update\02-f-3-835- rev 05 - qra.doc Page 51 of 58

A1.3 Gouge / Dent Model

Reference 30 indicates that 18% of damage events in Transco transmission pipelines
involved dents containing gouges while 82% were plain gouges.
Gouges situated in dents, or plain gouges, are assessed using a fracture mechanics
approach assuming that the gouge behaves as a crack.
Using the level 2 assessment methodology of PD6493

[Ref. 31], a failure assessment
diagram (FAD) can be developed in terms of the fracture parameters K
r
and S
r
. K
r
is a
measure of how close the pipe is to failure by brittle fracture and S
r
is a measure of how close
the pipe is to failure by plastic collapse. These parameters are defined as follows:

( ) ( ) {
c
b b m m
r
K
a a Y a Y
K
1
+
(5)

,
`

.
|

,
`

.
|

w
a
w M
a
S
y
a
m
f
n
r
1 15 . 1
1

(6)

where a = gouge depth;

m
= membrane stress
=

,
`

.
|

R
D
h
2
8 . 1 1 ; (7)

b
= bending stress
=
R
D
w
R
h
2
2 . 10 ; (8)
R = pipe radius;
D = dent depth;

h
= hoop stress;

m
= membrane stress;
M
a
= Folias factor
=
2
1
2
26 . 0 1

,
`

.
|
]
]
]

+
Rw
L
; (9)
L = defect axial length;
w = pipe wall thickness;
Y
m
= normalised stress intensity factor (pure membrane stress)

CORRIB FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Onshore Pipeline Quantified Risk Assessment



g:\052377 - enterprisecorrib additional work\ctr 140 - qra update\02-f-3-835- rev 05 - qra.doc Page 52 of 58
=
4 3 2
4 . 30 7 . 21 6 . 10 23 . 0 12 . 1

,
`

.
|
+

,
`

.
|

,
`

.
|
+

,
`

.
|

w
a
w
a
w
a
w
a
; (10)
Y
b
= normalised stress intensity factor (pure bending stress)
=
4 3 2
0 . 14 1 . 13 32 . 7 39 . 1 12 . 1

,
`

.
|
+

,
`

.
|

,
`

.
|
+

,
`

.
|

w
a
w
a
w
a
w
a
; (11)
K
1c
= pipe material fracture toughness
= ( )
5 . 0
6 . 17
1000
]
]
]

v
C
A
E
; (12)
A = cross-sectional area of Charpy specimen;
E = Youngs modulus of pipe steel;
C
v
= Charpy energy.

The limiting value for K
r
is
crit
r
K and failure occurs when the following condition is reached


crit
r r
K K (13)

A failure assessment diagram (FAD) can be constructed by plotting
crit
r
K against S
r
(see
Figure 5.1).

2
1
2
2
sec ln
8

]
]
]

,
`

.
|

r r
crit
r
S S K

for S
r
< 1 (14)

0
crit
r
K for S
r
1 (15)

The failure of a gouge within a dent (i.e.
crit
r r
K K ) leads to the creation of a through wall
defect. The resulting through wall defect will result in a failure by either a leak or a rupture,
depending on the length of the gouge. If the length of the through wall defect is greater than a
critical length L
c
given by equation (16) [Ref. 32] then a rupture will occur. If the length is less
than this critical length, the through-wall defect will be stable and the failure will lead to a leak.


,
`

.
|
]
]
]
]

,
`

.
|

4 . 0
1
15 . 1
2
Rw
L
y
h
c

(16)


CORRIB FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Onshore Pipeline Quantified Risk Assessment



g:\052377 - enterprisecorrib additional work\ctr 140 - qra update\02-f-3-835- rev 05 - qra.doc Page 53 of 58
FAIL
SAFE
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2
S
r
K
r
c
r
i
t


Figure A1 - PD6493 Level 2 Failure Assessment Diagram (FAD)

Dent depth cannot be based on historical damage statistics because it is a function of pipeline
geometry, steel properties and operating pressure. The dent depth is therefore derived from
the estimated impact force using the equation given by Corder and Chatain

[Ref. 33] as
follows:


( )
38 . 2
4
1
80
15 . 1
4 . 1
49 . 0

,
`

.
|

,
`

.
|
+

w
R p
w
F
D
y
y
op

(17)

where D = dent depth
F = impact force
w = wall thickness
p
op
= internal pressure
R = mean radius

y
= yield stress

The impact force is estimated using the correlation with excavator mass that was described in
the sub-section relating to punctures.

CORRIB FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Onshore Pipeline Quantified Risk Assessment



g:\052377 - enterprisecorrib additional work\ctr 140 - qra update\02-f-3-835- rev 05 - qra.doc Page 54 of 58
For the dent/gouge limit state function, the following variables need to be described by means
of probability distributions :
Wall thickness
Yield stress
Charpy energy
Gouge depth
Gouge length
Excavator mass
Internal pressure
In addition allowance has to be made for modelling uncertainty. This is done by multiplying
crit
r
K by a factor representing the modelling uncertainty, and this factor is itself described by a
probability distribution developed from test data.

A1.4 Solution of the Limit State Models

For the limit states considered in this report, the reliability calculations have been performed
using the Monte Carlo simulation technique. The method involves sampling at random from
the probability distributions representing the parameters in the limit state function in a large
number of numerical experiments. Each sample is used to check the limit state function. If the
limit state function is violated, the pipeline has failed. The numerical experiment is repeated
many times, each with a randomly chosen set of variables. If N iterations are undertaken and
n is the number of failures, the failure probability per damage event is given by:


N
n
P
f
(18)

The accuracy of the Monte Carlo simulation depends on the number of iterations in the
simulation. The method is rigorous and any desired accuracy can be obtained by performing
enough iterations.
Note that P
f
is the failure probability per damage event. This must then be multiplied by the
probability of the damage event occurring to obtain the overall failure probability (e.g. per km-
year).
For the external interference limit state, the probability of a puncture, or of a dent/gouge that
results in a leak or a rupture, is evaluated as follows:

i
p
p
P
N
n
P (19)


i
l
l
P
N
n
P (20)


i
r
r
P
N
n
P (21)


CORRIB FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Onshore Pipeline Quantified Risk Assessment



g:\052377 - enterprisecorrib additional work\ctr 140 - qra update\02-f-3-835- rev 05 - qra.doc Page 55 of 58
where P
p
= probability of a puncture (per km-year);
P
l
= probability of a gouge/dent resulting in a leak (per km-year);
P
r
= probability of a gouge/dent resulting in a rupture (per km-year);
n
p
= number of iterations resulting in F>r;
n
l
= number of iterations resulting in
crit
r r
K K

and L < L
c
;
n
r
= number of iterations resulting in
crit
r r
K K

and L L
c
;
N = total number of iterations;
P
i
= probability of an external interference incident (per km-year).

A1.5 Distributions used in the Reliability Calculations

Table A1 summarises the probabilistic description of the parameters in the reliability
calculations. The steel properties are typical for modern pipeline steels and have been based
on mill certificates from previous projects.
The gouge lengths and depths are those that have been reported by British Gas Technology
as experienced in damage events to the national gas transmission system. The data indicate
that the depth and the length are uncorrelated and independent of the pipeline properties.
In Ref. 18, British Gas Technology indicated a frequency of external interference events of
1.86 x 10
-3
per km year as applying to typical 36-inch diameter national transmission system
pipelines. This has been conservatively assumed for the study location.
The distribution of excavator weights given in Figure A2 is from North American data [Ref.
34]. This distribution was considered slightly over-conservative for the area in which the
pipeline is located as heavy excavating equipment is unlikely to be used. In the model used,
therefore, the distribution was truncated to impose a maximum limit of 40 tonnes. This is
still considered to be a conservative assumption for the project area.


CORRIB FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Onshore Pipeline Quantified Risk Assessment



g:\052377 - enterprisecorrib additional work\ctr 140 - qra update\02-f-3-835- rev 05 - qra.doc Page 56 of 58
Table A1 - Parameter distributions assumed in the models
Variable Distribution Type Mean COV Reference
Operating
pressure
Constant Design pressure 0
Pipe radius Constant Nominal value 0 Varies little
Wall thickness Normal Nominal (t
nom
) +/- 1.0mm Fab. Tol.
Pipe yield stress Lognormal 1.08 SMYS 0.04 Typical
Pipe ultimate
tensile strength
Normal 1.06 SMTS 0.03 Typical
Pipe Charpy
energy
Lognormal 130 J 0.40 Typical
Excavator tooth
length
Normal 62.5 mm 0.14 Ref. 28
Excavator tooth
width
Normal 4.5 mm 0.167 Ref. 28
Additive puncture
model error
Normal 0.883 kN 30.24 Ref. 29
Gouge depth Weibull Shape parameter = 0.73
Scale parameter = 0.98 mm
Ref. 18
Gouge length Offset logistic Shape parameter = 0.043
Scale parameter = 24.84 mm
Offset parameter = 30.13 mm
Ref. 18
Excavator mass Histogram See Figure B2 Ref. 34
Dent/gouge
multiplicative
model error
Lognormal 1.0 0.30 J P Kenny
assessment
using published
test data


CORRIB FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Onshore Pipeline Quantified Risk Assessment



g:\052377 - enterprisecorrib additional work\ctr 140 - qra update\02-f-3-835- rev 05 - qra.doc Page 57 of 58


Figure A2 - Distribution of excavator weight according to Ref. 34 (US)

A2 References (Appendix A)

27 Spiekhout, J, 1995. A New Design Philosophy for Gas Transmission Pipelines Designing for
Gouge Resistance and Puncture Resistance
28 Driver R G and Zimmerman T J E. A Limit State Approach to the Design of Pipelines for
Mechanical Damage. Proceedings of the 17t h International Offshore and Arctic Engineering
Conference, OMAE 98-1017, Lisbon, Portugal, July 1998
29 Joint Industry Project to Develop Guidance for Limit State, Reliability and Risk Based Design
and Assessment of Onshore Pipelines, C-FER 2000
30 Example of the Application of Limit State, Reliability and Risk Based Design to the Uprating of
an Onshore Pipeline, A M Edwards, R J Espiner and A Francis, BG Technology, Report No.
R3125, Issue No.1, 6 August 1999, Commercial in confidence to Joint Industry Project
Sponsors
31 BSI, PD 6493 : 1991 Guidance on Methods for Assessing the Acceptability of Flaws in
Fusion Welded Structures
32 R J Espiner, British Gas Technology, private communication
33 Corder I and Chatain P, EPRG Recommendations for the Assessment of the Resistance of
Pipelines to External Damage, 1995
34 Reliability Based Planning of Inspection and Maintenance of Pipeline Integrity, Final Report
PR-244-9517, C-FER, published by American Gas Association, 1997

CORRIB FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Onshore Pipeline Quantified Risk Assessment



g:\052377 - enterprisecorrib additional work\ctr 140 - qra update\02-f-3-835- rev 05 - qra.doc Page 58 of 58



This page intentionally left blank