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Plato'sCraftofJustice

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SUNYSeriesinAncientGreekPhilosophy AnthonyPreus,Editor

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Plato'sCraftofJustice
RichardD.Parry
STATEUNIVERSITYOFNEWYORKPRESS

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Publishedby StateUniversityofNewYorkPress,Albany 1996StateUniversityofNewYork Allrightsreserved ProductionbySusanGeraghty MarketingbyBernadetteLaManna PrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica Nopartofthisbookmaybeusedorreproducedinanymannerwhatsoeverwithoutwrittenpermission.Nopartofthisbookmaybestoredinaretrievalsystemor transmittedinanyformorbyanymeansincludingelectronic,electrostatic,magnetictape,mechanical,photocopying,recording,orotherwisewithouttheprior permissioninwritingofthepublisher. Forinformation,addressStateUniversityofNewYorkPress, StateUniversityPlaza,Albany,N.Y.,12246 LibraryofCongressCataloginginPublicationData Parry,RichardD.,1939. Plato'scraftofjustice/RichardD.Parry. p.cm.(SUNYseriesinancientGreekPhilosophy) Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex. ISBN0791427315(HC:alk.paper).ISBN0791427323(PB: alk.paper) 1.PlatoEthics.2.Justice(Virtue)3.Justice(Philosophy) I.Title.II.Series. B398.J87P371996 172'.2dc20 953471 CIP 10987654321

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To SaraDiceyParryandLloydGeorgeParry

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Contents
Introduction Chapter1 CraftofRulinginRepublicIandGorgias Chapter2 TheCraftAnalogyintheEarlyDialoguesandTheCraftofJusticeinRepublicIV Chapter3 TheCraftofJusticeandImitationintheRepublic Chapter4 ImitationandInspirationintheRepublicandtheSymposium Bibliograpy IndexofAuthorsandSubjects IndexLocorum 1

11

75

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179 247 253 265

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Introduction
Therehasbeenmuchinterestlatelyinvirtueethics.Partofthereasonforthisinterestisthenotionthatmodernethicaltheoriesconcentratetoomuchonactions,the rulesthatgovernactions,andtheconsequencesofactions.Bycontrast,virtueethicsconcentratesonthepersonwhoperformstheactionsthefocusofitsmoral assessmentistheagentoftheactionandthedispositionsofthatagent.Inturn,themoralassessmentoftheagentandherdispositionsallowsustomakethevital connectionbetweenmoralityandthequestionofthesortofpersontheagentis.Virtueethicsmakesaclearerlinkbetweentheissueofmoralityandtheissueof leadingasuccessfulhumanlife.Inwhathasturnedouttobealongcareerofteachingbrightandinquiringundergraduatestudents,Ihavenoticedthatthesestudents becomefascinatedwithphilosophywhenitdoeswhatitwasoriginallyintendedtodo.InthecaseoftheRepublic,theyappreciatethistextatthepointwherePlato sayssomethingimportantabouthowtoleadalifethatonewouldwanttocall"worthwhile."Unlikephilosopherswhoseemtobetakenupbyintellectualpuzzles, remotefromthetrialsofnegotiatingagoodlifefromoneendtotheother,Platoseemstobetakenupwiththemostimportantquestion:whatsortofpersonshouldI beorbecome?AsIattemptedtoexplicatethisaspectofhismoraltheory,itbecameincreasinglycleartomethattheanalogybetweencraftandvirtuewasthekeyto understandingwhatPlatowastryingtotellus.Themorallifewas,justasSocrateshadsaid,akindofcraftperformance.Thecraftsmanofthemorallifeknowsthe materialswithwhichheworksheknowshowtoputthesematerialstogethersothattheresulthislifeisnotonlyusefulbutevenelegant.Suchalifeishappy prosperous,fortunate,flourishingbecauseitistheconsciousconstructofsomeonewithacraftlikeknowledge. However,theuseofthenotionofcraftisnotonlyofhistoricalinterestIbelieveitalsoholdsmuchinsightforourownunderstandingofvirtue.Perhapsanotherwayof puttingthelastpoint

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istosaythat,sincePlatofoundthenotionofcraftfruitfulinhisinvestigationsofvirtue,itislikelythatwealsowillfinditso.Virtueethicsispeculiarlyabletolocate moralitywithinthecontextoftheprojectofleadingone'slifeitmakesmoralitypartofthequestionofwhatkindofpersonIwanttobeanditdoessoinawaythat seemsbetterthanthewayinwhichutilitariananddeontologicalmoraltheoriesdo.Thesuperiorityofvirtueethicsisinthewayitcancombineotherregardingandself regardingconcerns.Virtueconsistsofdispositionsthatarevaluableforanindividualtohaveandvaluableforotherswhenthatindividualhasthem.Inturn,ifthe virtuouslifeissomethingliketheprojectofdiscoveringandestablishingdispositionsthatarebothselfregarding,insomesense,andotherregarding,insomesense, wemightwellfindsomeinterestingparallelsincraft.Afterall,thelatterinsomewaysseemstobebothotherregardingandselfregarding.Ahorsetrainerfinds somethingintrinsicallyvaluableforherselfasahorsetrainerinexercisinghercraft,andbydoingsoshetrainsafinehorse.Ofcourse,Platohimselfsubjectsthecraft analogyintheearlydialoguestocriticisms.TomethecriticismsareonlypreparatorytoPlato'spresentationofarefinedcraftanalogy,theonesobeautifullysetforthin BooksIVVIIoftheRepublic.However,somecommentatorstaketheseearlycriticismstobefatalmostothercommentatorsignorethecraftanalogyinPlato's maturemoraltheory.Inspiteofcleartextualevidencetothecontrary,thesecommentators,ineffect,missoneofPlato'smostfruitfulmoralinsights.Morallysuccessful peoplearecraftlikeinarrangingtheirlivestheyseemofteninspiredbyidealsbeyondtheordinary.Theyvaluetheirlivesnotbecausetheyarepleasantbutbecause theyembodytheseideals.Theidealshaveanintrinsicvalue,whichthemorallysuccessfulpersontriestorecreateinacraftlikeway. ThisbookdiffersfromcontemporaryscholarshipinthatitseekstobringtolightthecentralroleofthecraftanalogyinPlato'smaturemoraltheory.Weseethewayin whichthecraftanalogytiestheprojectoftheEuthydemus,Gorgias,Republic,andSymposiumtogetherintoacoherentwhole.InattemptingthisreadingIamnot maintainingthatPlato'sentireprojectcanbereducedtoanexplicationofthecraftanalogy.Indeed,asIsay,thecraftanalogydoesnotevenoccurinanexplicitform inthelatterdialogue.WhatIdomaintainisthatthecraftanalogycanbefoundandconsistentlytraced,andthatitisessentialtounder

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standingPlato'smaturemoraltheory.AnotherwaytoputthisprojectistosaythatthecraftanalogyisoneofthekeysthatPlatoleftforhisintendedaudienceinthese dialogues.OurapproachtoPlato'stheoryofvirtueisthroughthecraftanalogythen.Asweshallsee,Platodevelopsthistheoryinthreestagesorlevels.Inthefirst level,Platoelaboratesandrefinestheanalogybetweencraftandvirtue.Inordertounderstandthecraftanalogy,however,webegin,intheearlierdialogues,withthe craftofrulinganddistinguishthatcraftfromtheanalogybetweencraftandvirtue.Afterdistinguishingthecraftofrulingfromthecraftanalogywearereadytoseethe wayinwhich,inRepublicIV,Platotransformsthecraftanalogyintoarefinedversion.Hedoesthislattertaskbyincorporatingelementsofthecraftofrulingintothe analogy.Onthislevelourchapters1and2weseethatvirtueisacraftofrulingpracticedbyreasoninthesoul.However,thisaccountisnotcompleteuntilForms arebroughtintothepicture.TheintroductionofFormstakesustoanentirelydifferentlevelofPlato'smoraltheory.Onthesecondlevel,then,Platodevelopsthecraft ofrulingasanimitativecraftinwhichtheFormsserveasparadigmsormodels.Thus,inchapter3,weseehowFormsfunctionasparadigmsforthecraftofreason's rulinginthesoul.However,Platoisstillnotfinished.NotonlyareFormsparadigmsforimitation,theyarealsotheinspiration.Thisisthethirdandhighestlevelof Plato'saccountandthesubjectofchapter4.HerewelookattheroleofthehighestFormsthebeautifulitselfandthegooditselfandthewayinwhichtheyinspire onetoleadalifeofvirtue. Thus,whilewewillapproachPlato'stheoryofvirtuethroughtheanalogybetweencraftandvirtue,chapter1beginswithatypeofcraft,notthecraftanalogy.Much attentionhasbeendevotedtotheanalogybetweencraftandvirtuebutthereisanotheruseofthenotionofcraftonethatisoftenconfusedwiththeanalogybetween craftandvirtuethecraftofruling.Intheearlydialoguestherearemanysignificantreferencestothecraftofruling.Forexample,rulingisakindofcraftthat, accordingtothefirstbookoftheRepublic,looksoutforthewelfareoftheruled.ItisacentralthesisofthisbookthatinordertounderstandPlato'smoraltheory,we muststartwith,andcarefullydistinguish,thecraftofrulingfromthecraftanalogy.Putanotherway,someofthefailuretounderstandtheanalogybetweencraftand virtuerestsontheconfusionbetweenthecraftofrulingandthecraft

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analogyintheearlierdialogues.However,thedistinctionbetweenthetwonotionsofcraftispreparatorytoshowingthat,whiletheyaredistinctintheearlierdialogues, intheRepublictheyarecombinedintoanewandpowerfulcraftanalogyananalogybetweenvirtueandthecraftofruling.Inourconsiderationofthiscraftofruling, wewillconcentrateourattentiononRepublicIandGorgias.Inthesedialogues,Socrateshasinmindthecraftwherebyarulermanagesacity.Itisahallmarkofthis craftunlikethecraftanalogythatitmanagesthelivesofothers.Therulercanbeatyrant,anaristocraticruler,anelectedofficialinademocracy,orevensomeone whocanswaythecrowdintheassembly.Eachhasameasureofpoliticalpowereachisarulerofsomesort.Exercisingthatpowersuccessfullyisacraft.Theissueis whatpracticingthatcraftactuallymeans.Tosome,beingacraftsmanofpoliticalpowermeansusingothersforone'sownwelfare.ToSocrates,beingacraftsmanof politicalpowermeanslookingafterthewelfareofothers.AsawayofexplicatingtheSocraticnotionofthecraftofruling,wewilltrytopresentassympatheticallyas possiblethecaseforSocrates'somewhatpuzzlingclaiminRepublicIthatrulingisacraftthatlooksafterthewelfareoftheruled.Whatwewillfindisthatthe Gorgiasattemptstoaddressthatveryclaim.However,thedefenserestsonsomeotherstrangeclaims.Inthislatterdialogue,thecraftofrulingissaidtobeacraft likemedicineitistherapeutic.Whilemedicinelooksafterthebody,rulingtendsthesoulsofthosewhoareruled.Thecraftseeksthewelfareoftheruledby establishingortendingtoanorderandharmonywithinthesoulsofthosewhoareruledthewelfareofthesesoulsturnsouttobethisorderandharmony.Further,ina movefraughtwithsignificance,thedesiresaresaidtobethatinthesoulthatisorderedandharmonizedbythetherapeuticcraftofsoultending.Itcanalreadybeseen thattheSocraticcraftofrulinghasmanycounterintuitivefeatures.Wewillspendmuchofchapter1explicatingthosefeaturesandtestingthem. Inthefirstsectionofthesecondchapter,wewilllookatthecraftanalogyproperlyspeakingtheanalogybetweencraftandvirtue.Wewilllookatitsfirst appearanceintheearlierdialogues,especiallyintheEuthydemus.Inthisdialogue,theanalogyispresentedinitsfullestformvirtueissaidtobeacraftthatmanages one'sownphysicalandspiritualassets.Forinstance,ifonehaswisdom,thenheknowshowtomanagehisbeauty,goodbirth,andwealthsothatheisbenefited,that is,happy.One'sspiritual

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assetsturnouttobesuchqualitiesasmemoryoreventypesofvirtueforexample,courage.AswearetoldintheMenoinapassagecloselyparallelingthatofthe Euthydemuscourage,ifitisnotmanagedbywisdom,isjustakindofoverconfidence.IntheEuthydemus,thecomparisonbetweencraftandvirtueusesthecraft ofcarpentryastheanalogueforvirtue.Thevirtuouspersonknowshisassetsinthewaythatacarpenterknowshistoolsandmaterials.Thecraftanalogydiffersintwo respectsfromtherulingcraft.First,itdoesnotmanagethelivesofothersbutone'sownlifesecond,itdoesnotmanageone'ssoulanditsdesiresbutone'sphysical andspiritualassetsbeauty,goodbirth,andwealthortemperance,justice,andcourage.Herewehaveaverysuggestivenotion.Someonewholeadsasuccessful humanlifemustknowhowtomanageherassetssothattheyactuallyserveherhappiness.Evenifoneiswealthyorbeautiful,itiswellknownthatwealthandbeauty candestroyaseasilyastheycanbenefit.Asuccessfulhumanbeingusestheseassetsinanartfulwayratherthanlettingtheassetsuseher.Sheusesherassetswellthe wayacarpenteruseshismaterialsandtoolswell.Theresultinthefirstcaseisawellmadelifeinthesecondcase,theresultisawellmadetable.Assuggestiveasit is,however,thenotionofvirtueasacraftisproblematic.Againwewillconsidersomeoftheproblemstheanalogypresentsinthisdialogue. Afterdistinguishingandconsideringthetwonotionsofcraftthecraftofrulingandtheanalogybetweencraftandvirtuewearereadytoapproachtheheartofthis interpretation.ItisacentralclaimofthisinterpretationthatthetheoryofvirtuegiveninRepublicIIIVcombinesaspectsofthecraftofrulingandthecraftanalogyat thesametimethatitremediessomeofthedefectsourinvestigationwillhaveturnedup.Thisrefinementofthecraftanalogyissoimportantadeparturefromwhatwent beforethatwewillcallit''thecraftofjustice''theleadingvirtueinRepublicIV.Asweshallseeinchapter2,Plato'smaturedoctrineaboutvirtueholdsthatthecraft ofjusticeisacraftofruling,ratherthanamanualcraftlikecarpentry(441cff.).Butmoreimportantthantheshiftfromcarpentrytorulingistheshiftfromwhat exercisesthecraft.Inthecraftofjustice,reasonisthepractitionerofthecraftreasonrules.Thusthecraftofjusticewillhavesomeofthefeaturesofthecraftofruling foundinRepublicIandtheGorgias.However,thisnewrulingcraftisdifferentfromtherulingcraftintheselatterdialoguesitdoesnottendtothesouls

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ofothersbuttendstooneself.Inthatrespect,itislikethecraftanalogyfoundintheEuthydemus.However,itissomewhatdifferentfromthecraftanalogy,which managesone'sphysicalandspiritualassetsthecraftofjusticemanagesnotone'sassetsbutthenonrationalpartsofone'ssoul.Thecraftofjusticeisarulingcraft practicedbythereasonovertherestofthesoul.Bytendingtoone'sownsoul,thecraftofjusticeprovidesforone'sownbenefitandhappiness.Inordertopresent justiceasacraftofruling,Platomustgiveanaccountofthesoulanditspartsorsubdivisions.Wedonotneedtoelaboratethataccounthere.Anexampleofapart appetitesshouldsufficetoillustratewhatPlatomeansbypartsofthesoul.Inthewellgovernedsoul,then,reasonrulesovertheappetitesratherthantheappetites rulingoverreason.Inthewellgovernedsoul,itisreasonthatmakeschoicesabout,forexample,one'scareerorlifepartner.Suchagovernmentisbetterthanonein whichtheappetiteforfancypastrymakessuchdecisions.Thus,giventhattherearedifferentpartsofone'ssoul,thecraftofjusticefitsthemtogethersothattheydo haveanorder,withonepartdominantandtheotherssubordinate.However,theorderisnotjustforthebenefitofthedominantpartthereisalsoaharmonyofthe partssothateachcanbesaidtoexpressitselfwithintheorder.Thusoneachievesacraftlikeblendingoftheparts. AtthispointwehavefinishedthefirstlevelofPlato'smoraltheory.However,thetheoryofvirtueinBookIVoftheRepublicisnotcomplete,asPlatohimselfnotes. Establishingorderinthepartsofthesoul,undertheguidanceofreason,entailsknowledgeoftheForms.InintroducingtheFormsintohisaccount,Platoentersthe secondlevelofhismoraltheory.Thecraftofreason'srulinginthesoulrequiresknowledgeoftheFormsasdoesthecraftofrulinginthecity.InaddingtheFormsto theaccountofvirtue,Platoisextendingthecraftanalogy.Thecraftofjusticeisnotonlyatherapeuticcraftitisalsoimitative.TheCratylusgivesapictureoftheway inwhichcraftusesaparadigmamodeltowhichthecraftsmanlooksforguidanceinhisproductionof,forexample,aweaver'sshuttle.Thesamenotioncomesoutin RepublicVI,wherethephilosophicalrulerlooksattheFormsofjustice,temperance,andbeautytoestablishvirtueinhisownsoulandinthecitytherulerisexplicitly comparedtoapainterwholooksatamodelinhisproductionofanimage(500cff.).ThissecondlevelofPlato'stheoryisalsothefocusofthethirdchapter.

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ThischaptertakesthenotionofFormsasparadigmsinaliteralsense.Formsexhibit,insomeway,thepropertythephilosophicalruleristoimitatethusFormsare paradigmsofwhichparticularsarecopies.However,itisthethesisofthischapterthatwemustunderstandtherelationbetweenparadigmandcopyintermsofthe ratherdifferentrelationbetweenrealityandappearance.PlatocombinesthesetwodifferentkindsofrelationinBookVIwhere,inordertoimitatetheForm paradigms,thephilosophermustbeabletodistinguishbetweenrealityandappearance(484cd).Whilethecombinationofthesetworelationspresentsnotorious difficulties,wegetatleastsomenewlightonthosedifficultiesinthetreatmentofchapter3,whereFormsarenotonlytheobjectofanepistemologicalquestbutalso theobjectsofcraftlikeimitation.Uptothispoint,thecraftofjusticehasbeenpresentedasimitative.Sofar,theFormsareparadigmsinthesensethattheyare patternsweimitateFormsaresomethinglikeelaborateinstructionsabouthowtobuildalife.However,atthispoint,Plato'scraftofjusticeentersanotherlevel. Besidesbeingpatternsweimitate,Formsalsoinspireimitationtheyaretheobjectsthatmotivateone'sbecomingvirtuous.Unlikeblueprintsorinstructions,theForms notonlydescribewhatistobeinstantiatedinawaytheyprescribeitaswell.TheFormsdonotmodelapsychicstateofaffairsthatweotherwisedesiretheytellus whattodesire.HowFormscanbetheobjectsthatmotivatebecomingvirtuoustakesustothethirdlevelofPlato'saccount. Inchapter4,weexplicatethewayinwhichthehighestFormsinspiretheacquisitionofvirtue.BeginningwiththecentralbooksoftheRepublic,wegiveanaccountof thenotionthattheFormofgoodnessisthefinalcauseforimitatingtheFormofjustice.TheFormofgoodnessisthefinalcauseinthesensethatitistheobjectof desire,love,oradmiration.Thisdesire,love,oradmiration,inturn,motivatesimitationorpropagation.InRepublicVI,Platotouchesonthisissueveryquickly.At 490bc,hecaststhephilosopherasaloverofrealitywhosedesireisfulfilledwhenheattainstheFormsandthusbegets(gennesas)intelligenceandtruth.Later Socratessays,inreferencetothephilosopher'scontemplationoftheFormsoftemperanceandjustice,thatonecannothelpimitatingwhatoneadmires(agamenos), therebybecomingvirtuous(500cd).AnotherkeypassageattheendofBookVIIshowsthattheFormofgood,whosepreeminentroleisintroducedinBookVI, becomestheinspirationforthephilosopher'spursuitofjustice

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inthecity(540ab).ThusthethirdlevelofPlato'saccountshowsthatonedoesnotunderstandhowtheFormofjusticeisaparadigmuntiloneseesitinitsproper relationtotheFormofgood.Inthesequelweexplicatethisimportantrelation.Nevertheless,evenfromthepresentlimitedperspective,onecanbetterunderstandthe importanceofthecraftofjusticeasanimitativecraft.Thecraftofjusticeimitates,inone'ssoulandinthecity,theFormofjustice.Inturn,thelatterisvaluableto imitatebecauseofitsnecessaryrelationtotheFormofgood.Thus,inthisinterpretation,theFormofgooditselfistheultimatejustificationforimitation.Thereisa senseinwhichimitatingthejustitselfisdoneforthesakeofthegooditselfimitatingthejustitselfisawayofdisseminatinggoodnessandgoodnessdeserves,even requires,dissemination.Weusethisaccounttoaddresstheproblemofthereluctantphilosophicalrulerthephilosopherwhoistemptedtowithdrawfrompubliclife inordertocontemplatetheFormofgoodnessimitation,inspiredbytheFormofgoodness,ismotivationenoughforthephilosophertoassumeruleinthecity.Inthese passagestheFormofgoodnesshasbecometheobjectofadmirationandtherebyexertsaquickeningeffectonthephilosopher. However,thisaspectofPlato'smoraltheoryreceivesitsfullesttreatmentintheSymposium.Inthisdialogue,weleavethepublicandpracticalcontextoftheRepublic forthedeeperconcernsofpersonalmotivation.Inthisdialogue,itistheFormofthebeautifulthatistheinspirationfortruevirtuethisaccountintheSymposiumis almostbreathtakinginitsnovelty.Wefindoutthatwithinthesoulthetruemotiveforceforacquiringvirtueiserosthatis,theconsumingandpossessingpassion, whosechiefeffectusuallyistheabandonmentofvirtue,isactuallytobecometheforcethatmovesonetoacquirevirtue.Obviously,tofulfillthisunaccustomedand unexpectedrole,theconceptoferosmustundergoatransformation.IntheSymposiumDiotimatransformstheconceptoferosfromthatofaconsumingand possessingdrivetoacreativeone.Theobjectofloveisto"bringforthinthebeautiful"thephysicalloverbegetschildrenwithawomanandthespiritualloverbegets virtueinthesoulofthebeautifulboy.However,itisnotenoughtohavetransformedtheconceptoferos,Diotimaalsoproposesadisciplinethatwillperfectthe practiceofthisnewconceptoferos.Inhernarrativeofthemysteriesoferos,shetellsSocratesthatonemustgiveuphumanlybeautifulobjectsoflovewomenand beautifulboysinordertolovetheperfect

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object,theFormofthebeautiful.FinallytheloveroftheFormbringsforthnotphysicalchildrennorthemereimageofvirtuebuttruevirtue.InthiswayDiotima perfectserosintoakindoflovewhosehighestexpressionisloveoftheFormofbeautybyinspiringthislove,theFormistheobjectthatmotivatesthelover's becomingvirtuous. InthisaccountthereiscontainedaclaimthatistheburdenofthethirdlevelofPlato'saccount.Inordertoexplainthissomewhatfantastictransformationand perfectionoferos,Diotimausesaproblematicargumentbasedonimmortality.Later,wewillanalyzetheproblemsoftheargumentclosely.Heresufficeittosaythat weresolvetheproblemsbyinterpretingtheargumentasmakingaprofoundpointaboutthemotivationoftheperfectedloveroftheFormofbeauty.Analyzed,the argumentmakesapointsimilartoonemadeintheaccountofthegooditselfasfinalcause,foundintheRepublic.Thetrueloverbringsforthvirtueunderthe inspirationoftheFormofbeautyhepropagatesbeautyinthiscasethebeautyofvirtueoutofloveforthebeautifulitself.Thebeautifulitselfbecomesthefinal causeofhisactionsbecauseitistheobjectbutnottheaimofhisdesire.Inthisway,thephilosophicalloveroftheSymposiumisanalogoustothephilosophical ruleroftheRepublic.Inboth,thefinalcauseistheForminonecasebeautyandintheothergoodness.Imaginetwoseekersaftervirtue.Thefirstbelieveshaving virtueinthesoulisthehighestgoodthatonecanhaveandvaluestheFormasameanstohavingvirtue.Shehasaloftysenseofwhatconstitutesherownwelfarebut, still,itisherownwelfarethatisthesupremegood.TheFormisameanstogainingthatgoodbecauseitisapatternlikeablueprintthatshowsherhowtoobtain whatshealreadydesires.Shealreadyknowswhatthesupremegoodis,shejustwantstoknowhowtoachieveit.ShedoesnotlovetheForminitselfshevaluesitas ameanstohergoal.ThesecondbelievesthattheFormofbeautyisthehighestobjectoflove,thesupremegood.InlovingtheForm,shebecomesvirtuous.Virtueis agreatgoodforheritisafterallhappiness.However,virtueisagreatgoodbecauseofitsrelationtotheFormofbeautyitistheeffectoflovingtheForm.The Form,asitwere,istheultimatesourceofthevalueofvirtue.Virtuemaybevaluableinmanyotherways.Itmaybepleasant.Itmayconstituteone'shappiness.Itmay bethefoundationofgoodnessinthecity.Noneofthosevaluesisinconsiderable.Ultimately,however,virtueisvaluablebecauseofitsrelation

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totheFormofbeauty.Themotivationofthesecondaspirantisdifferentfromthatofthefirstforthesecondaspirant,theFormofbeautyisthefinalcauseforher acquiringvirtueinhersoul. IfirststudiedcloselythemoraltheoryoftheRepublicwithProfessorDavidFalk,attheUniversityofNorthCarolinaatChapelHill,in1965.Throughhisdetailed analysis,Icametoappreciatethatthetext,thoughbriefandcompact,wasrichwithmuchwisdomaboutthemorallife.Later,in1975,Iwasabletoconsiderthesame materialunderthepatientguidanceofProfessorGregoryVlastosinhisSummerSeminarforCollegeTeachers,sponsoredbytheNationalEndowmentforthe Humanities.Iwasfascinatedbywhatwe,inbothseminars,readtogether.Itseemedtomethattherewasatreasuretrovecontainedinthefewpages.But,inthose days,mostpeopleseemedtoreadthemveryquicklyanddismissedthemasquickly.SincethenIhavetaughtmanyundergraduatecourses,twograduatecourses,and fourSummerSeminarsforSchoolTeachers,sponsoredbytheNationalEndowmentfortheHumanities,allofwhichfeaturedPlato'smoraltheory.IneachIhave foundnewinsightsintothedepthandextentoftheroleofthecraftanalogyinthattheory.Thisbookisanattempttoarticulatethoseinsights.Inthislongagon,there areseveralpeoplewhosekindhelphasbeengreatlyprizedandmuchappreciated.Firstofall,mybrightandhardworkingstudentsatAgnesScottCollegehavekept meattentivetotheimportantquestions.TheProfessionalDevelopmentCommitteeatAgnesScottCollege,anditspredecessors,havefundedvariousaspectsofthis projectovertheyears.ThestipendfromthePresident'sAwardforExcellenceinTeachingaffordedoneparticularlydelightfulsummerofwriting.ProfessorGerard Elfstrom,DepartmentofPhilosophyatAuburnUniversity,generouslyreadandcritiquedaearlierversionofthismanuscript.ProfessorAnthonyPreusalsoprovided valuablecriticismsofanearliermanuscript.EarlyonProfessorLouisDuprofYaleUniversityofferedcrucialencouragementforthisproject.IwishtothankJean McDowell,whofixedthebibliographyandnotes,withherusualefficiencyandacuity.Lastofall,SusanMcConnellParrynotonlyinthisprojectbutinthelarger andinfinitelymoreimportantprojecthasbeenbothinspirationandcompanion.

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Chapter1 CraftofRulinginRepublicIandGorgias
Oneofthemostintriguingthemesintheearlydialoguesisthatofcraft(techne).1 Platoeasilyusescraftasawayofexplicatingseveralkindsofendeavor,especially virtue.Forinstance,inBookIoftheRepublicSocratesintroduces,inhisconversationwithPolemarchus,thenotionofcrafttoexplicatethewayinwhichjusticein Polemarchus'senseofthelattertermisuseful(332e).Althoughheinvokesthenotionwithoutanyexplanation,neitherPolemarchusnortheotherlistenersfinds anythingstrangeaboutexplicatingjusticebycitingship'spilots,farmers,andcobblers.Inturn,whenThrasymachusentersintothedialogueitisThrasymachushimself whousescrafttoexplicatehisnotionofjustice,althoughhisuseissignificantlydifferentfromSocrates'(340d).Again,theinterlocutorsfinditnaturaltocomparethe rulertothephysician,thecalculator,andtheschoolmaster,evenwhenThrasymachuscharacterizestheseoccupationswiththegeneraltermcraftsman(demiourgos). Plato'suseofcrafttoillustratevariousaspectsofvirtueisfrequentlycalledthe"craftanalogy."Usuallyananalogycomparestwothingsinthiscaseactivitieson somepointsofsimilarity,eventhoughthetwoareactuallydifferentkindsofactivitiesforexample,ananalogybetweenstocktradingandfootball.Weturntothe craftanalogyproperlyspeakinginthenextchapterwhenwewillconsiderPlato'scraftofjustice.Aspreparation,inthischapter,weinvestigateauseofthenotionof craftthatisclearlynotananalogy. AtthebeginningofthischapterwereferredtotwoinstancesinRepublicIwherecraftwasusedtoexplicatejusticeSocrates'conversationwithPolemarchusand thenhisconversationwithThrasymachus.Infact,onlytheformeristhecraftanalogyinthesenseinwhichcommentatorsusuallyusethephrase.Thelatterisnotan analogyatallbuttheinvestigationoftheconceptofruling

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asacraft.Thisdistinctionbetweenthecraftofrulingandthecraftanalogyiscentraltoourmajorthesis.Itdependsonsomeobviousdifferencesbetweentheway Socratestalksaboutthecraftanalogyandthecraftofruling.Themostimportantdifferenceisintheobjectsofthetwocraftsthatis,whattheyworkon.Asweshall see,whenvirtueiscomparedtocraftitsobjectisthepersonwhopracticesthecraft.Thecraftanalogydependsonone'smanagementofone'sassetsinorderto becomehappy.However,inRepublicIandintheGorgiasSocratesholdsthattherulingcraftlooksafterothers,nottheonewhopracticesthecraft.Indeed,that differenceistheboneofcontentionwithThrasymachusasitiswithCalliclesintheGorgias.Thiscraftofrulingisbuiltuponthenotionofacraftthattakescareof thesoulsorvirtueofothers.IntheApology(20a)SocratespresentsEvenusofParosasmakingsuchclaimsaboutvirtue.IntheCrito,Socrates,assumingtheretobe expertknowledgeofthejustandunjust,thehonorableanddishonorable,andthegoodandthebad,saysthatheandCritoshouldlistentothatexpertratherthanthe multitudelesttheyharmtheirsouls(47d).IntheLachesSocrateshypothesizesacraftknowledgethatlooksafterthesoulsoftheyoung(185e).2 WewillbeginourconsiderationofPlato'smoraltheory,therefore,byinvestigatingthecraftofruling.Inthischapter,firstofall,wewillexploreSocrates'accountof thecraftofrulinginRepublicIandGorgias,aswellassomeoftheproblemsgeneratedbythisaccount,especiallytheclaimthatrulingseeksthewelfareoftheruled. Thenpartofourgoalinthenextchapterwillbetoinvestigatethecraftanalogyasthatphraseisusuallyunderstood,thatis,thewaythat,intheearlydialogues, Socratesusescrafttoexplicatevirtuesforexample,wisdomintheEuthydemusandjusticeinhisconversationwithPolemarchusinRepublicI.Wecallthisuseof craftthe"craftofvirtue."Aswiththecraftofruling,wewillconsidersomeoftheproblemswiththecraftofvirtue.Thisinvestigationofthecraftofrulingandthecraft ofvirtuewillsetthestageforourconsiderationofPlato'stheoryofjusticeinRepublicIIIV.Finally,wewillbeinthepositiontoseethatinthelatterbooksPlato bringstogetherthesetwousesofthenotionofcraftintohismaturetheoryofjusticeandinsodoingaddressessomeoftheproblemsourinvestigationwillhave uncovered.WhatwefindinthischapteristhatthereisinRepublicIandintheGorgiasacraftofruling,althoughitsnatureisnotuncontroversial.3

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UsingRepublicIandGorgiaswewilloutlinePlato'saccountofthiscraftitisarichaccountwithmanyinterestingdetails.Thesalientfeatureofthisaccountisthe claimthattherulingcraftseeksthewelfareoftheruled.InourexpositionwefirstconsideritinRepublicI.IntheGorgiastheclaimismoreelaboratetherewefind thatthewelfaresoughtfortheruledistheperfectionoftheirsouls.4 Moresignificantstill,Socratessaysthatperfectionisdefinedasorderandharmonyamongthe desires. Sincethisorderandharmonyisalsosaidtobevirtue,whatweseehereistheextremelyimportantnotionthatvirtueisanorderamongthedesiresofthesoul.Of course,inGreekthewordthatwetranslateas"virtue"alsomeans"excellence."Socratesisintroducingthefruitfulideathatexcellenceforahumanbeingisacertain orderwithinthesoul,anorderthatincludesthedesires.Ofcourse,thatorderisalsoconnected,inunspecifiedways,towhatwecall"moralvirtue."Buttheideathat excellencehumanperfectionis,oratleastincludes,somesortoforderamongthedesiresisintrinsicallyinteresting.Itisapsychologicalaccountofthegoodfor humanbeings.Insteadofthegoodbeingthepossessionofcertaingoods,oracertainstandingwithinthecity,ortheabilitytoaccomplishcertaingoals,itisshownto befundamentallyastateofthesoul.Plato'saccountofthisorderandharmonyamongthedesiresissomewhatelusive.Usingrecentscholarshipweattemptto reconstructit.Althoughthisreconstructedaccountisnecessarilysomewhatspeculative,itdoesgiveusanideaofthekindofthingPlatohadinmindwhenhetalked aboutorderandharmonyamongthedesiresofthesoul.OrderandharmonyinthesoulisanotionthatwillbeseenagaininRepublicIV,althoughtherePlato'smoral psychologywillhavebecomemorecomplex.Nevertheless,thenotionoforderandharmonyinthesoulwillremainparamount.Itisimportantthentoattemptto understandthispsychicharmony,andthewaytherulingcraftpromotesit,initsfirstappearanceintheGorgias.Wewillthenbebetterabletounderstandhowthe craftofrulingbecomesthecraftofjustice. I IntheearlydialoguesSocratestalksaboutallkindsofcrafts(technia).Heusesthem,ofcourse,toillustratevariousphilosophicalpoints.5 WhatIwishtodohereis todwellonthenotionofcraft

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asitoccursintheseillustrationswithoutconcentratingonthephilosophicalpointsforwhichtheseoccurrencesareillustrations.Intheearlydialogues,then,Socrates mentions,amongothers,horsetraining,medicine,physicaltraining,huntsmanship,farming,shepherding,building,geometry,calculation,andevenshoemaking,working inbrass,woodandwool.6 Infact,onceweseethisprofusion,wemightbetemptedtothinkthatnotalloftheseactivitiesarecrafts.Partofourproblemhastodo withtranslation.TheGreekwordTechnecanbetranslatedascraft,orskill,orarteachwordshowsadifferentemphasis.Tous,contemporaryEnglishspeakers, craftseemstomeanlargelyhandicraftapracticethathasamaterialproduct.Inthissenseofcraftwewouldincludebuilding,shoemaking,andworkinginbrass, wood,andwool.Ontheotherhand,wemightcallgeometryandcalculation"skills,"hopingtomarkthedistinctionthatthesehavenomaterialproduct.Ofcourse,we shouldrecallthatbuildingandshoemaking,workinginbrass,wood,andwoolcanalsobecalled"skills."Again,wemightcallmedicineandhorsetraining"arts," perhapsinanattempttodistinguishtheirgreaterfinesse.Indoingso,perhapswewouldbetradingonanotionoffineartinwhichfinesseismostoftenseen.However, fineartisnotanotionheldbytheancientGreeks.Itisnotthattheylackedpainting,music,andpoetryrather,theydidnothaveaseparateword,orphrase,to distinguishthemfromtheothertechnai.Inwhatfollowswewillcontinuetotranslatetechneas"craft''butwewillstipulatethatcrafthasthefollowingfeatures,found inPlato'searlyandmiddledialogues. Firstofall,thereistheendofthecraft,whatthecraftprovides.TheGreekwordergonisusedtoindicatetheendofthecraftliterallymeaning"work,"ergonharbors theambiguitybetweenfunctionandresult.IntheEuthydemus(291e),medicineprovideshealthandfarmingprovidesfoodfromtheearth.Healthistheergonof medicineinthesensethatprovidinghealthisitsfunctionofcourse,thehealthofthepatientistheergoninthesenseofresult.Foodistheergonoffarminginthesense thatproducingfoodisitsfunctionwhilethefoodisitsproduct.IntheCharmides,Critiasdeniesthatcomputationhasanergoninthewayinwhichahouseisthe productoftheactivityofbuilding.ButthetransitionaldialogueGorgiasshowsthatcomputationhasanergoninsomeothersense(453e).Indeed,itwouldbe impossible

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toconceiveofacraftwithoutsomegoalsincecraftisasystematicandreasonedwayofachievingagoal. Incontrasttocraftslikecalculation,thecraftsPlatomostfrequentlyusedareonesthathaveobjectsonwhichtheywork,onwhichtheycarryouttheirfunction.The objectscanbeeitherinanimateoranimate(Gor.503el504b10).Thisdistinctionamongobjectsallowsadistinctionamongcraftsandtheirfunctionsandgoals.When objectsareinanimate,thefunctionofthecraftistoproducethemanditsgoalisaseparatematerialobject(cf.Charm.165e5166a1,170b12c4Prot.319b5c1 Euthyd.281a14).Whentheobjectsareanimate,thefunctionofthecraftisnottoproducethembuttoimproveorperfectthemthegoal,then,istheimprovedstate oftheobject(cf.Apo.20a6b2Gor.464b3ff.).Thus,whilethegoaloffarmingisfood,thegoalofmedicineishealthfood,asamaterialobject,isclearlyadifferent kindofresultfromhealth.Weshallcalltheformercrafts''productive"andthelatter"therapeutic."Thetherapeuticcraftscareforortendanobjecttheyprovide therapeia,asthefollowingexamplesillustrate.Thephysician,ofcourse,providescareforthebody(Rep.341c).Theshepherdtendsthesheep(Rep.345c).The horsemantendsthehorsesandthehuntsmantendsthedogs(Euthyphro13a).Epiaprepositionmeaning"over,''"for,"or"havingtodowith"isusedtoindicate theobjectsofsuchcrafts.IntheGorgias(464b),thefourcraftsoflegislating,judging,physicaltraining,andmedicine,aredividedintopairs,"thefirstpairhastodo with(isepi)thesoul...theotherpairhastodowith(isepi)thebody."IntheRepublic(345d)referenceismadetoshepherding,whosejobistoprovidethebestfor thatover(epi)whichitisset. Intheearlydialogues,Platotendstousecraft(techne)interchangeablywithknowledge(episteme).7 Theinterchangeabilityimpliesthatcraft,likeallknowledge, reliablyproducesresults.Moreover,knowledgeinthecontextofcraftdoesnotmeanjustknowinghowtoaccomplishthegoalofthecraft,butincludesatheoretical componentaswell.IntheApology(22d),craftsmenaresaidtoknowwhattheydobecausetheycanexplaintheircraftpresumablytheycanexplainwhytheydo whattheydo.IntheGorgias(465a501a),Socratessaysthatcraftcangivearationalaccountofthenatureofwhatitprescribes.Wegetaninsightintothis explanationintheCharmides(165c4el),whereitissaidthateachcrafthasknowledge(episteme)ofthegoalofthecraft.Craftcanexplainitsprocedurebecauseit knowswhatitsgoalis

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andhowtogoaboutaccomplishingit.Thistheoreticalcomponentmayexplainwhat,forPlato,isperhapsthemostsignificantfeatureofcraftitsabilitytoproduce resultswithahighdegreeofreliability.Indeed,inRepublicI,Socrates'argumentat342aseemstoimplythatcraftneverfails,onlythecraftsman.Thisinfallibilityof craftisechoedinotherdialogues.Craftknowledgehassuchahighdegreeofreliabilitypresumablybecauseithasestablishedatheoreticalconnectionbetweenitsgoal anditsprocedure.8 Ofcourse,evenPlatoknewthatacraftdoesnotalwaysproducetheexpectedresults.Physiciansdonotalwaysobtainacure.However,one waytoexplainthisfailureistosaythatthetheoryofthecraftiscorrectandthatitsfailureisduetothevicissitudesofapplyingthetheorytocases.9 Totheusualcrafts ofmedicine,horsetraining,shepherding,farming,andbuilding,Socratesaddsthatofruling.Insomewaysthisadditionseemstobesurprising.Itisnotclearthatruling hasthecharacteristicsofacraft.InRepublicI,SocratesandThrasymachusareatoddspreciselyoverwhatthegoalofrulingis,forinstance.Indeed,itisnotobvious whothepractitionersofthecraftofrulingmightbeorwhereonemightgotolearnthecraft.Nevertheless,Socrates,inRepublicIandinGorgias,treatsrulingasa craft,notjustasananalogueforcraft. WhenThrasymachusintroducestheprecisenotionofaruler(Rep.340e)heusesthegeneralconceptofacraftsmananddeducesfromthatgeneralconcepta conclusionabouttheruler.Inthiscaserulingseemstobeatleastaspeciesofcraft.However,inasubsequentpassage,craftseemstobeaspeciesofruling.When Socratesarguesthattheruler,preciselyspeaking,doesnotseekhisownadvantagebuttheadvantageoftheruled,heusesanelaborateandratherfullargumentin whichhemakesthegeneralizationthatallcraftsrule(archousi)andarestrongerthanthatoverwhichtheyrule.Thenhesaysthatnocraftseekstheadvantageofthe strongerbutthatoftheweakeroverwhichitexercisesrule(342c).Hethenappliesthatgeneralizationsuccessivelytoaseriesofcraftsmen,endingwiththeruler (341c342e).Finally,thegeneralaccountofcraftintheGorgiasdoesnottreatrulingthatis,judgingandlegislatingasanalogoustocraftbutasacraft(Gor. 464b465e). TheclaiminRepublicthatallcraftsruleisalittlepuzzling.Indeed,intheEuthydemus(291e),Socratessaysthatthephysicianisarulerbuthealsosaysthatthe farmerisaruler.Suchanodd

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statementseemstopresupposethatallcraftsrule.Ofcourse,theGreekwordforruling,archein,meanstobeginsomethingAristotlesaysthatrulersareoriginsof movementandchange(MetaphysicsBookV,1013a10).ButPlatoseemstobeusingasenseofrulerthatincludesmorethanbeingtheoriginofchange.Ofcourse, since,intheRepublic,allofhisexamplesareoftherapeuticcrafts,perhapshismeaningthereisthatalltherapeuticcraftsrulethatcertainlyisallthatisneededforhis argumenttowork.Now,itseemsnaturaltothinkoftherapeuticcraftsasexercisingruleovertheirobjects.Afterall,physicians,horsetrainers,andseacaptainsissue ordersandcommands,asdokings,aristocrats,andoligarchs.Moreover,theobjectsofthesecraftsareanimatebeingsoverwhoselivesthecraftsmenexercisesome control.HisuseoftherapeuticcraftsinthiscontextdoesshowapreoccupationofPlato's.Hewishestoassimilatethecraftofrulingtotherapeuticcraft,inorderto makewhathetakestobeavitalpointaboutrulingthatit,liketherapeuticcraft,caresforitsobject.Hewishestomaketheclaimthatruling,liketherapeuticcraft, looksoutafterthewelfareofitsobject. II Havingsaidthismuchbywayofintroduction,wecanturntothesecondpartofourtask.Wecanbegininvestigatingwhatappearstobeahighlyimplausibleclaim abouttherulingcraft.InRepublicISocratesarguesthatcraft,becauseofitsperfection,neverseeksitsownadvantagebutalwaystheadvantage(sympheron)ofthat overwhichitisset(342b).Intheterminologyoftheprevioussection,wecouldsaythat,accordingtoSocrates,rulinghasasitsobjecttheruledthoseoverwhomit issetandasitsend,theirwelfare.Theargumentdependsontheassumptionthatacraftneverseeksitsownadvantagebecauseitdoesnothaveanydefect(342a). Tocontemporaryears,theassumptionsoundsstrange,especiallywhenPlatoillustratesitwiththeexampleofmedicinethecraftofthephysician.Tous,medicineis alwaysinneedofimprovementindeed,scientificexperimentationistheestablishedmethodformedicinetoimproveitsprinciplesandpractice.ForPlato,however,it isasthoughthecraftofmedicinewereperfectandallfaultlieswiththepractitioner(cf.Euthyd.280a).Aswehavejustseen,thereasonforthisviewisthat,atthis point,Plato

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takescrafttobeaknowledge(episteme)asknowledgeitcannotbemistaken.Thus,asacraft,medicine'stheoryiscorrectanyfailurecomesintheapplicationofthe theory.Inanyevent,itisnotnecessaryforourpurposestogointotheintricaciesofthissomewhatobscureargument.10Rather,wewillconcentrateontheclaim, madeintheargument,thatcraftseeksalwaystheadvantageofthatoverwhichitisset.ItisthisclaimtowhichThrasymachusobjectsinhisanswertoSocrates,while heignorestheargumentthatleadstoit.Thisclaimis,ofcourse,attheveryheartofSocrates'disagreementwithThrasymachuswiththisconclusion,Socrateswill maintainthatThrasymachusiswrongwhenheassertsthatjusticeistheadvantageofthestronger.11Andyet,itseemslikesuchaslenderreed. Thrasymachushasjustofferedaviewthatholdsthatthecraftofrulingiscompletelyselfserving.Itisaviewthatcanbecomparedtoviewsofourown contemporariesforexample,theMarxistthesisthatclassruleissimplytherulethatworksonlyfortheadvantageoftheclassinpower.Individingupscarce resourcestherulingclassalwaysgetsmorethanitssharemoreover,itcontrivestowritethelawsandpromulgatethemoralitythatsanctionandmystifythis advantageousposition.12Somefeminists,usingMarxistcategories,havesubstitutedgenderruleforclassruleintheiranalysis,menhavecreatedthelawsand moralitytomask,aslegalandright,whatisreallynothingmorethanmaledomination.Thrasymachus'positionisjustageneralization:whoeverisinpowermen, women,capitalists,orproletariansdefinesjusticeintermsofitsownadvantage.UnlikeMarxists,whoseetheproletarianrevolutionasthepreludetoaclassless (andrepressionless)society,Thrasymachusseemstoseenoendtorepressionandexploitation.13 OnemayshareSocrates'abhorrenceforThrasymachus'ideaofjusticeasamoralandlegalsystemthataimsonlyattheadvantageofthoseinpowerbutonetendsto sympathizewithThrasymachus'impatientobjectiontoSocrates'counterclaimthatthecraftofrulingalwayslooksoutaftertheadvantageoftheruled:
...youthinkthattheshepherdsandthecattleherderslookoutafterthegoodofthesheepandcattleandfattenthemandcareforthemwithanyothergoodinviewthantheir owngoodandtheirmasters'.(343b)

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Here,Thrasymachusismakingthewelfareoftherulerstheendofthecraft,whiletheobjectofthecraftseemstoremaintheruled.Whilethisviewofthecraftofruling goescountertothewaycrafthassofarbeenpresentedinthedialogues,itdoeshavetheringofempiricaltruthtoit.Ontheotherhand,Socratesseemstobeusinga somewhatsentimentaldefinitionofthecraftofrulinginordertoreadoutofcourtThrasymachus'realistic,perhapsevenempirical,claimthatrulersareselfseekingand venal.OneissympatheticwithThrasymachusbecauseSocratesseemsoblivioustoallofthepoliticalchicanerysurroundinghim.Socratessoundslikeacivicsteacher whohasnograspoftherealityofdemocraticpoliticshemightbeonthevergeevenofclaimingthatthosepeoplewhoholdpowerinordertoaggrandizethemselves andtheircohortsarenotreallyrulersatall.14ToThrasymachus,suchaclaimwouldsoundhopelesslynaive. ThetroublewithThrasymachus'objection,however,isthatitseemsnottogettotheheartofthedisagreementbetweenhimselfandSocrates.AnditisSocrates' answertothisobjectionthatgivesusthisimpression:

...butyouthinkthatonewhoshepherdsthesheep,insofarasheisashepherd,doesnotlookoutafterwhatisbestforthesheepbutitisasthoughhewereabanqueterand waslookingforwardtoagoodfeastoragaintosellingthem,asthoughhewereabusinessmanandnotashepherd.Buttherebelongstotheshepherdingcraftnootherconcern thanthewayinwhichitcanprovidethebestforthatoverwhichitisset.(345cd)

AsananswertoThrasymachus'objection,thisargumentmightseemtobeonlyareiterationofSocrates'originalposition,asthoughheweretryingtoget Thrasymachustoseewhathehadfailedtoseebefore.YetSocrates'answerisnotareiteration.TherehasoccurredashiftbetweenSocrates'originalclaimandthis one.Theoriginalclaimsaidthatacraftseekstheadvantage(tosympheron)ofthatoverwhichitissetthepresentclaimsaysthatacraftseekswhatisbest(to beltiston)forthethingoverwhichitisset.Althoughthereisaclearshiftinthetextfromtosympherontotobelitiston,thatfactalonedoesnotmeanthatPlato recognizedashiftinmeaning.However,intendedornot,theshiftdoesstrengthenSocrates'argumentwithThrasymachus,asweshallsee.Moreover,asweshallsee, intheGorgiaswherethesemattersaretakenupagain,tobeltistonplaysanimportantrolein

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theargument.Fornow,letusseewhatdifferencetheshiftmakesinthisargument.Iwillshowthattherecanbeadistinctionbetweentosympheronwhichis translatedinthesepassagesas"advantage"andtobeltistonwhichistranslatedinthesepassagesas"whatisbest."15 Socratesmightbereferringtosomethinglikethefollowingwhenheintroducestobeltistoninplaceoftosympheron.Theshepherdwhosoughttheadvantageorthe welfareofthesheepcoulddosobyseekingtheircontentment.Hewouldseethattheyledlongandlanguidlives,inpastureswithplentyofcloverborderedbyclear coolwater.Thegoalforthisshepherdwouldbetoraisefatsheepwhomatedwithwhomevertheydesiredandwhentheydesired.Forwhateverreason,thesesheep wouldbecomesomethinglikeoutdoorhousepets.Ontheotherhand,theshepherdwhosoughtwhatisbestforthesheepwouldseektomakethesheepthebest sheepaccordingtostandardsforsheepraising.And,asweallknow,whatmakesthemcontentwillnotalwaysbewhatisbestforthesheep.Putanotherway,the shepherdwouldbeseekingtheperfectionofthesheepasagriculturalspecimens.Accordingly,thesesheepwouldbesubjecttoacertainregimen.Theremightbe somekindsofgreenerytheyshouldnoteatiftheirfleeceistoshineinthepreferredwaycertainlytheirbreedinghabitswouldhavetobecontrolledsothelambs wouldhavecertainbodilycharacteristicsthejudgeswouldfindoutstanding. Inusingthisnotionofperfection,Socratesseemstobepointingoutanimportantaspectofcraftsmanship.Thereisamongcraftsmenakindoflikingfortheperfection oftheirobjectsthatisapartoftheirattitudetowardtheircraft.Craftsmentakesatisfactioninandadmireajobwelldonetheytakesatisfaction,then,intheobjectof thecraftbeingputinitsbestpossibleshapebythecraft.16Thisattitudeissometimescalledthe"prideofcraftsmanship."Thisprideispersonalsinceitisprideover one'sownperformance.Butthereisanonpersonalelementinthecraft.Thisnonpersonalelementisseeninacraftsman'sadmirationofanothercraftsman'sjobwell done.Thereisaloveofthewellwroughtwork.Thisloveofthewellwroughtworkdeterminesthegoalofthecraftsinceitisbyseekingtheperfectionoftheobject thattheobjectbecomesthewellwroughtwork.PerhapsthelimitingcaseofthisseekingtheperfectionoftheobjectisgivenintheaccountofHephaestus'making Achilles'armoratIliadXVIII,line462ff.Oneoftheimportantconsequencesofseekingtheper

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fectionoftheobjectisadisinterestedattitudetowardsthepersonalgainofthecraftsmanitprecludesthecraftsmanfromturningoutaninferiorproductjustbecause doingso,forinstance,wouldspeeduphisworkandbringinmoremoneyfromanunsuspectingpublic.Theloveofthewellwroughtworkisnotdisinterested,of course,whenitcomestothesuccessofthecraftitself.Butthecraftsman'spursuingthesuccessofthecraft,orevenpursuinghisownsuccessasacraftsman,justishis pursuingtheperfectionoftheobject.Moreover,thepersonwhodoesnothavethisprideofcraftsmanshipissaidnottohavethatcraftatall:"He'snotasurgeonhe's abutcher." InthepassagefromRepublicI(346e)wehavebeenconsidering,Socratesgivesanegativecharacterizationofthisattitudeofdisinterestedness.Socratessaysthatthe craftofrulingissodisinterestedthatpeoplehavetobepaidtodoit:

Forthesereasons,belovedThrasymachus,asIwasjustnowsaying,noonewillinglychoosestoruleandtotakeintohandothers'problemstosetthemaright.Ratherhedemands areward,becausetheoneintendingtopracticeacraftwellneverdoessoforhisownimprovement(tobeltiston)norwhentakingchargebymeansofthecraft,doeshetake chargeforhisownimprovementbutforthatoftheonewhoisruled.(346e)

Infact,itisthisdisinterestedattitudethatmakesitnecessarytohaveanothercrafttodealwiththewelfareofthecraftsman,thatis,thewageearningcraft.Theruleris sointentonwhatisbest(tobeltiston)forhissubjectsthathewouldgetnorewardforhimselfifhedidnotgetpaid. WhileSocratesdoesnotinthispassageinvokethepositivesenseoftheprideofcraftsmanship,Ibelievethatnotionshedslightontheattitudeofselfdisinterestthathe doesinvoke.Ifweseetheselfdisinterestasaresultofthecraftsman'sseekingtheperfectionofhisobject,wecanunderstandthemotivationofthecraftsmanmuch better.Heismotivatedbyadesiretoseetheobjectofhiscraftputinthebestpossibleshapeasdefinedbyhiscraft.Thisaccountmakestheselfdisinterestedruler seemlesslikeasaintwhosacrificeshimselfforthewelfareofhissubjectsandmorelikeacarpenterorhorsetrainer.Thus,itmakesSocrates'claimsomewhatmore plausible. Moreover,ifthisdisinterestedpursuitofperfectionisadefiningfeatureofcraft,itisharderforThrasymachustoarguethat

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rulingisselfseekinginthewayhemeansforittobe.Evenifrulingwereacraftoflookingoutforone'sownwelfare,thewelfarewouldhavetobeunderstoodtobe one'sownperfectionaccordingtosomestandardofthecraft.GivenThrasymachus'ideasofthevalueofrulingfortheruler,ithardlyseemslikelythatthatvaluewould includeanythingthatmightbethoughtofasperfectionofoneself.17Still,usingthisnotionofcraftitmightnotbeimpossibleforThrasymachustoarguethattheruling craftisselfseeking,eveninhissenseforexample,thatperfectionofselfentailshavingpowerandwealthbutitwouldbeagooddealmoredifficultthanhis previousargument.Aswell,understoodaccordingtothepresentinterpretation,thesecondclaimthatthecraftsmanseekstheperfectionofhisobjectstandsupto Thrasymachus'objectioninawaythatthefirstdoesnot.Usingananalogywithshepherds,Thrasymachusobjectedthattheshepherdsandneatherdshadonlytheir owngoodandthatoftheirmastersinview.Butifacraftseekstheperfectionofanobject,theshepherd,asapractitionerofthecraftoftheshepherd,doesnotseek onlyhisowngoodandthatofhismaster.Heseekstheperfectionofthesheepaccordingtotherulesofshepherding.Thatisacraftandtalentallitsown.The motivationtopursueitishisprideinthequalityofhissheepandashepherdimbuedwiththeloveofhiscraftwouldseekthisqualityinhissheepatconsiderable sacrificetohimself,ifnecessary.Suchacraftsmandoesnotseekonlyhisowngoodbutthegoalsofhiscraft,whichcanbedifferentfromhisowninsomeimportant cases.Forinstance,suchacraftsmanwouldfindimmobilizingsheepinfeedpensabhorrent,evenifitmaximizedprofits.18Similarly,rulerswhoseekonlytheirown welfareignorethedynamicofthecraftofruling,whichseekstomakethesubjectsbetterinsomesense. Perhapswecanseethislatterpointifweusethecontemporarynotionoflegitimacy.Whenselfseekingisseentobetheonlygoalofagroupofrulers,theylose legitimacy.Toloselegitimacyistolosethepositionofbeingarulerinanythingbutnameonlysuchrulersarenotreallyrulers.Indeed,thepointofmuchMarxistand Marxistinspiredanalysisistoshowthattheentiregoalofclassorgenderruleissimpleselfaggrandizementfortheclassorgenderinpower.Suchanexpos automaticallyrobsthatformofruleoflegitimacyatleastintheeyesofthosewhoarenotinpower.Legitimaterulemustseekmorethantheadvantageoftherulers itmustimproveinsomesensethosewhoareruled.Incontem

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poraryparlance,wemightsaythatSocratesisraisingtheissueofthelegitimacyofaruler.WhileThrasymachusissayingthattheonlygoalofarulerisselfadvantage, ifhehadhadtheconcept,Socratescouldhavesaidthatthelegitimacyofarulerisbasedonhisabilitytoexercisethecraftofruling.Inturn,thecraftofrulingisbased ontheabilitytoimprovetheobjectsofthecraft,thatis,thosewhoareruled.Ofcourse,thecontemporarynotionoflegitimacyimpliessomethingabouttheobligation oftheruledtoacceptruleandthelossofobligationwithlossoflegitimacysuchanotionseemsforeigntoSocrates.Nevertheless,withhisaccountofthecraftof ruling,hedoesseemtoberaisingthepossibilitythatsomepeoplewhocallthemselvesrulersarenotreallyrulers.Likeourcontemporaries,Socratesissayingthatif therulersdonotseektoimprovetheruledinsomeway,theyarenotreallyrulersnotsomuchbecausetherulednolongerhaveanobligationtoaccepttheirrule butbecausetherulersarenolongertruepractitionersofthecraftofruling. However,havingarguedthatthereisashiftinSocrates'argumentfromsayingthattherulingcraftseekswelfaretosayingthatitseeksperfection,weshouldnotbe takentomeanthattheshiftistotal.Socratesmeansonlyashiftinemphasisbecausehedoesnotmeantoabandontheclaimthattherulingcraftseeksthewelfareof theruled.Surely,Socratesmeansthatrulingseeksthewelfareoftheruledbyseekingtheirperfection,thattheperfectionsoughtisalsothewelfareoftheruled.Infact, whetherSocrateshasmadesuchashiftinhisargument,andwhatisthenatureoftherelationbetweenperfectionandwelfare,isunclear,inpart,becausewedonot haveanysenseofwhattheperfection(tobeltiston)soughtbycraftmeansinRepublicI.IfweturntotheGorgias,wegetabetterpictureofthatperfectionbrought aboutbycraft,especiallyifthecraftistherapeutic.IntheGorgiasthecraftofrulingispresentedingreaterdetail.19Ofimportanceforourprojectinthischapter,the presentationaddscontenttothenotionoftobeltistonbecauseitdevelopsafullaccountofthewayinwhichacraftseekstoimproveitsobjectandtherebyprovide foritswelfare.Atthispoint,wewillleaveasidethedisputebetweenSocratesandThrasymachus.WedonothavetodecidewhetherSocratesiscorrectinhisclaim thattherulingcraftseeksthewelfareoftheruledforourpurposes.Inthefollowingsectionswewillconcentrateontheway,inSocrates'account,thecraftofruling providesforthatwelfarebyperfectingtheruled.Inpartic

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ular,wewilldeveloptheaccountoftheimprovementorperfectionthattherulingcraftconfersontheruled.Whatwewillseeishowthisperfectionisaimedatthesoul anditsdesires.ItisatthispointthatPlato'saccountbeginstobeamoraltheoryanexplanationofthatperfectionconferredbytherulingcraft,bothasthegoodfor humanbeingsandthesourceofmoralaction. III IntheGorgias,SocratesholdsconversationswiththesophistGorgiasandtwoofhispupils,PolusandCallicles.Oneoftheoverarchingthemesofthedialogueisthe contrastbetweentherhetoricofGorgiasandthephilosophyofSocrates.Platowishestoconveyhowdeleteriousthefirstisandhowsalutarythesecond.Inhis conversationwithPolus,Socratesarguesthatrhetoricisdeleteriousbecauseitisnotacraft(techne).Inthisargument,hepresentsanelaboratetaxonomyof therapeuticcraftsdesignedtoshowwhyrhetoricisnotacraft. At464cintheGorgias,Socratesgiveshisfirstaccountinthedialogueofthesetherapeuticcrafts,anaccountthathewillrepeatinhisconversationwithCallicleslater inthedialogue.Firsttherearecraftsthatcareforthebodyandcraftsthatcareforthesoul.Eachofthesedivisionsissubdividedintoacraftthatcaresforthehealthy andonethatcaresforthediseased.Thus,weobtainthefourtherapeuticcraftsphysicaltraining,medicine,lawmaking,andjudging.Justasphysicaltraininghasas itsobjectthehealthybodyandmedicinethesickbody,lawmakinghasasitsobjectthehealthysoulandjudgingasitsobjectthesicksoul.Thesefourare characterizedas"alwaysprovidingthebest(aeiprostobeltistontherapeuouson[464c4])forthebody,ontheonehand,andthesoul,ontheother."Itisthis seekingtobeltistonofitsobjectsthatsetscraftapartfromroutine(empeiria).Thelatterisapracticaltechniqueforachievinganend,withoutthoughtforthegoodof theobject.Therearefourroutinescookery,cosmetic,sophistry,andrhetoricwhichareparalleltothefourcraftsofmedicine,gymnastic,judging,andlawmaking. Theseroutinesseekafterpleasure,alwayswithoutanythoughtfortobeltistonoftheirobjects.Asanexample,cookeryprovidespleasantlytastydishesthatcan actuallyruinthehealth,whilemedicinecanprescribeastrictdiettomakethebodyhealthy.Soseekingtobeltistonisa

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veryimportantcharacteristicitdistinguishescraftfromroutine.Thesecondcontrastbetweencraftandroutineisthattheformerhasanaccount(logon)togiveofthe natureofwhatitprescribesandthusthereasonsforprescribingit(465a).Thisaccountpresumablyincludesthegoalofthecraftaswellasthemeanstoachieveit thatis,itincludesanotionofwhattheperfectionoftheobjectis. ThedivisionofcraftsintothosedirectedtowardthebodyandthosedirectedtowardthesoulisSocrates'wayofintroducingtheissueoftherulingcraft,sincethe craftsdirectedtowardthesoulareidentifiedwiththerulingcraftoratleasttherulingcraftasitisfoundinademocracylawmakingandjudging.ClearlySocrates hasinmindthepoliticalfunctionsofhiscontemporaryAtheniancitizens.ThebackgroundofthesedistinctionsisSocrates'concernaboutthewaythatsophistsand theirpupilsuserhetoricintheassemblyandlawcourts.Heiscontrastingtheiruseofrhetoricwiththetruecraftofstatesmanship.Sophisticrhetoriciansdonotseekto beltistonforthecitizensbutonlywhatpleasesthemwhattheywanttohear.Inthesequelwewilltracethedevelopmentofthisaccountofthecraftofrulingthrough thedialogue,concentrating(forreasonssoontobeapparent)ontheconversationwithCallicles.Obviously,thedialogueis,likeallthedialoguesofthisperiod,a complextapestryofthemesthethemeofcraftisonlyonestrandofthefabric.However,thisparticularstrandcanbefollowedconsistentlythroughoutthedialogue.As weshallsee,thissomewhattheoreticalaccount(at464aff.andrepeatedinanabbreviatedformat501a)isappliedandillustratedatimportantjuncturesinthe dialogue.ThisaccountoftherapeuticcraftisespeciallyilluminatinginSocrates'andCallicles'discourseontheroleofdesiresinwhatwewouldcall''moral psychology.'' SofirstofallwecannotethatSocratesconnectstobeltistonwiththesoul.Bycontrastwiththeusualrhetorician,thetruestatesmanwhospeaksintheassembly seekstobeltistonofhishearersthewayofaccomplishingthisgoalistoseektomakethesoulsofhisfellowcitizensthebesttheycanbe.Theintroductionofthesoul astheobjectoftherulingcraftisanimportantdifferencebetweenthisaccountofrulingintheGorgiasandthatinRepublicI.Inthelatterdialogue,Socratessaidthat rulersseektheperfectionofthoseoverwhomtheyrule,butthatwhichwastobeperfectedabouttheruledwaspassedoverinsilence.Presumably,theyweretobe perfectedascitizens,butwhatthatkindofperfec

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tionentailedwasnotfurtherdisclosed.IntheGorgias,thislacunaisfilledinitisthesoulthatisthefocusofthepoliticalcraft.Howeverifmakingthesoulthefocusof rulingisanimportantdevelopmentinSocrates'account,italsoraisestoanewleveltheconflictbetweenhimandhisopponents.Wehavealreadynoted,inconsidering RepublicI,thatThrasymachus'viewofrulingseemsoverlycynicalwhileSocrates'viewseemsoverlyidealistic.IntheGorgiasthecontrastbetweenPolusand Callicles,ontheonehand,andSocrates,ontheother,seemsevengreater.Althoughtheydonotexplicitlyarticulateit,PolusandCalliclesseemtoagreewith Thrasymachus'viewofpoliticsasahighly"realistic"gameofpower.Inthecity,therearethosewhowieldpowerfortheirownadvantageandtherearethosewhoare victimsofthispower.Theonlyimportantquestiontheonly"real"questionis:whogetsthepower?Bycontrast,SocratesintheGorgiasseesrulingasacraft wherebytherulersseektoperfectthesoulsoftheruled.Wewilllearnlaterthatsuchperfectionactuallyimpartsmoralvirtue.Legislating,whichisanalogousto gymnastic,buildsupvirtueinhealthysoulsjudging,whichisanalogoustomedicine,curessicksoulsbyrestoringvirtue.Thecontrastbetweenthetwoviewscould hardlybegreater.Socrates'viewofrulingasperfectingsoulsis,tothesecharacters,atbestnaive. IfSocrates'viewiseccentricandnaivetohishearers,tousitseemsslightlysinister.Inourculture,theofficeofbuildingupvirtuewegivetoethicalandreligious teacherstheofficeofcuringsicksoulswegivetocounselors,confessors,psychologists,andpsychiatrists.Allareprofessionalsweconsultvoluntarilyinmostcases atleast.AccordingtoPlato,however,itisthosewhopassthelawswhoaresupposedtobeaimingattheperfectionofthesoulsofthecitizensitisthejudgeswhoare aimingatthehealingofsicksouls.Suchatheoryofpoliticsrunscountertomuchliberaldemocratictheory.Moderndemocraticsocietiesusuallyaimatregulating behaviorthatmightharmotherpeople.Thestatusofthesoulbehindthebehaviorispartoftheprivatelifeofthecitizenandtheoreticallyatleastisnobusinessof thestate.Forinstance,inmodernliberaltheory,thestatehasnointerestinpsychologicalconditionsofevenaselfdestructivenatureaslongasthepersonwiththe conditionharmsnooneelse.Apersonmaydrinkhimselftodeaththestate'sonlyinterestistoseethathedoesnotharmotherpeopleby,forexample,driving, brawling,orstealingtosupporthishabit.Plato,ontheotherhand,wouldhave

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thestatechangethedrunkensoulwhetheritharmedanyoneelseornot. However,initsfirstappearanceintheconversationwithPolus,Socrates'useofthecraftofrulingdoesnotseemsosinister.Inthatconversation,Socratesrefersto judicialpunishmentasawayofcuringthesoulofvice(477eff.).Judicialpunishmentiscomparedtomedicaltreatmentfollowingtheaccountoftherapeuticcraftthe formerremovestheillsofthesoulwhilethelatter,alsopainful,removestheillsofthebody.20Indeed,eveninourpositivisticculture,thereissomesentimentthat judicialpunishmenthassomemoralpurpose.Atleast,itshouldconvincethecriminalnottoengageincrimeinthefuture.Insofarasthespringsofactionareinthesoul, thejudgecanclaimtoremoveevilfromthesoul.Still,Socrates'useoftheaccountoftherapeuticcraftintheconversationwithPolusleavesmanyquestions unanswered.Inparticular,ifthetherapeuticcraftofjudgingremovesevilfromthesoul,wedonotknowhowitdoesso.Wedonotknowwhatinthesoulconstitutes evil,whatinthesouliscomparabletosicknessinthebody.Asweshallseeinthesequel,Socrateseventuallylocatesthesicknessofthesoulwithinthedesires. Disorderofthedesiresisthatwhichmakesthesoulevilthus,thetherapeuticcraftofsicksoulsmustconcentrateitseffortstowardsuchdesires.However,beforethe dialoguearrivesatthatimportantconclusion,itgoesthrougharatherslowandcarefulpreparation.First,intheconversationwithCallicles,Socratesintroducesthe desiresasmorallyproblematic,aspathological.Then,inarepriseoftheaccountoftherapeuticcraft,Socratesmakespathologicaldesirestheobjectofthecraftof ruling.So,beforewecanseehowthetherapeuticcraftofthesoulimprovesthesoul,wemustseethatwhichinthesoulistobeimprovedthatis,thedesiresand theirpathologicalstate. Atthispoint,wecanalreadyappreciatethatSocrateshassetthestageforansweringthequestionabouttherelationbetweentheperfectionandthewelfareofthose whoareruled.Hisargumentcouldbesomethinglikethefollowing:perfectionis,orincludes,one'sdesiresbeinginacertaincondition(tobereportedinthenext section),andthisconditionofone'sdesiresisalsoinone'sbestinterest,isone'swelfare.Finally,therulingcraftbringsthatconditionofone'sdesiresintothesoul. Obviously,then,theconceptofdesiresandtheirpossiblegoodorbadconditionsisvitallyimportantforthisaccountoftherulingcraft.Inthefirst

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place,whatPlatosaysaboutthesedesireshasimplicationsforourunderstandingofthegoalofthecraft.Aswell,thispreliminaryassessmentofdesiresinthemorallife givesussomeinsightintohisideasaboutthegoodhumanlifeandhappiness.Next,itgivesussomeinsightintotherelationbetweenone'sdesiresandvirtue.Inwhat followswewillbeconcentratingonthewaySocratespresents,inhissketchofamoralpsychology,theroleofthedesires.Inthenextthreesectionswewill concentrateontheexchangebetweenSocratesandCalliclesanditsapproachtodesiresasthesourceofbothmoralperfectionandpersonalwelfare.Wewilltryto cometoclosergripswiththewaythatdesiresformthebasisofPlato'saccountoftheperfectionthattherulingcraftconfers.Theaccounthasroughlythreestages,all devotedtodifferentaspectsofdesiresandtheirtreatment.FirstSocratesintroduces,withtheimageoftheleakyjars,thenotionthatdesirescanbemorally problematictheimageportraysdesiresthathavegrowninsatiable.Next,hegivesanotherviewofmorallyproblematicdesiresandahintabouttheirtreatmentinwhat wecallthe"medicalanalogy."Herehesaysforthefirsttimethattreatmentofproblematicdesiresshouldbringaboutorderamongthedesires.Finally,heturnstothe craftofrulingproperthecraftthattreatesdesiresjudging,presumablyinordertotellushowitbringsordertothedesires.Whilehisaccountofthewaythat judgingbringsaboutharmonyofdesiresisdisappointinglythin,ithasasurprisingoutcome.Intalkingabouttherulingcraft,Socratesbetrayshisconvictionthathisown questionandanswertechniquecalled"elenchus"isatypeoftherulingcraft.Thisfascinatingclaimgivesusyetanotherviewofthewaythatdesiresandtheir harmonycontributetotheperfectionofhumanlife. IV WhileSocratesdoesmakethedesiresthefocusofhisinvestigationintoperfectionandwelfare,heaccomplishesthisimportantdepartureinhisinvestigationina somewhatindirectway.Firstofall,heprovokesCalliclesinatypicallySocraticmove.AfterCallicleshasgivenameasuredaccountofthekindoflifethathebelieves worthyofpursuitalifeofpoliticalpowerSocratesaskshimifhewouldalsoincludeselfrule(491d).Inexplaininghismeaning,Socratesaskswhetherapolitical rulershouldbetemperate(soph

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ronaonta),rulingoverhisownpleasuresanddesires(tonhedononkaiepithumionarchontatonenheautoi[491d11e1]).Thequestionseemscalculatedto provokeCalliclestoapassionateoutburstbecauseCalliclesvirtuallyleapsoutofhisseat,todenounceallsuchnonsense.Rather,hesays,
theoneleadingtherightsortoflifeallowshisdesirestogrowasgreataspossibleanddoesnotrestrainthem(mekoladzein)andthenheshouldbeuptothetask,through courageandwisdom,ofsupplyingthesedesires,havinggrownasgreataspossible,andoffillingeachofthemwithwhateveritwants.(491e492a)

Finally,itisluxury,unrestraint(akolasia),andfreedomofaction,backedupbyforce,whicharevirtueandhappiness(492c). ThisoutburstgivesSocratesleavetomakedesiresthefocusoftheirdiscussionandultimatelythefocusofthecraftofruling.Itisworthnotingthatmakingdesires thefocusinitsconsiderationisanimportantdevelopmentinPlato'smoraltheory.Itmaybecommonplaceforustothinkthatmoralwellbeingincludesdesiresthatare themselveswelldisposed.However,itissignificantthattheearlierdialoguesthatdealwiththerulingcraft(andasweshallseethosethatdealwiththeanalogy betweencraftandvirtue)donotseethedesiresastheingredientsofvirtue.Neitherthesoulnoritsdesiresaretheobjectofthesecrafts.ItisthegeniusoftheGorgias andtheProtagorastohavelocatedthediscourseaboutmoralperfectionatthelevelofdesires. SocratesadoptsCallicles'notionofunrestraineddesires(akolastos),buthemakesthemouttobeinsatiableandtiresomeinsteadofgood.InreplyingtoCallicles' notionofthegoodlife,Socratesdrawsananalogybetweendesiresandjars.Somepeople'sdesiresarelikesoundjars:althoughtheliquidsneededtofillthem,for example,honeyandwine,aredifficulttoacquire,oncefilledup,thesejarsremainthatway.Otherpeople'sdesiresarelikeleakyjars:theycanneverbefilledandone mustlabordayandnighttokeepliquidinthem.ItisclearthatSocratesmeanstoidentifythelatterkindsofdesireswithCallicles'notionofunrestraineddesireandthat hemeanstorecommendthelifeinwhichdesiresarelikethesoundjars.Calliclesdoesnotobjecttotheimageoftheleakyjarsprobablybecausehebelievesthat pleasurecomesfromfillingup,thatis,satisfying,thedesires.Calliclesisclaimingthathisherodoesnotseeksatisfactionasthenaturalgoalofdesire.Itisnotsatisfied desirethatheseeksbuttheexpe

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rienceofsatisfyingdesire.Itisnotthatdesiresdonotreachapointofsatisfactionbutthatthepointofsatisfactionisnottheendorgoal.21Rather,satisfactionisbuta pauseintheendlessprocessoffillingthedesires.Treatedinthisway,desiresbecomethevehiclesforattainingpleasure.Thepointofsatisfyingdesiresisnotsatiety thestateofasatisfieddesirebutthepleasureinherentintheprocessofsatisfyingdesires.Ifthisreadingiscorrect,theinsatiabledesiresarebasicallythenormal desiresforfood,drink,andsex.Innormallife,onesatisfiesthemwhileobservingtheusuallimits.Onestopseatingwhenoneisfull,forinstance.IntheCallicleanlife, onedoesnotobservetheusuallimits.Thus,insatiabledesiresarenormaldesiresthatarebeingusedinacertainway.Moreover,thisdistinctionallowsthat,lefton theirown,thesedesiresarebasicallygoodthatis,desiresforthingsthatcontributetoorconstituteone'swelfare.However,whenthesebasicallygooddesires becomevehiclesforpleasureonly,theybecomeproblematic.Theyaredesiresforgoodthingsthathavebeenmadetofunctioninawaythatisnotforthegood. Inthisreading,Calliclesisrecommendinganidealizedsensualstateinwhichthepleasureofreplenishingisthegoalofexistence.22Thecogencyandseductivenessof Callicles'herooftheappetitesreachesusovertheinterveningcenturies.Platohasnotfashionedastrawmanbutastillattractivealternativetoconventionalwisdom. Conventionalwisdomsaysthatonecannotspendallofone'sdaysattendingtoone'sappetites,devotinghistotaleffortstofindingnewandmoreexoticexperiences. Thebusinessoflifeisnotdevisingmoreintenseorgranderpleasuresitismakingaliving,attendingtoone'sfamily,beingagoodcitizen.Ofcourse,onesatisfiesone's desires,butonlyasameanstoachievingtheseothergoalsandthebestevidencethatthisrelationistherightoneisthatthelevelatwhichsatisfactionofthesedesires naturallyoccursisrelatedtotheirfunctionasmeanstotheseothergoals.Forexample,oneeatsinordertohavetheenergytomakealivingthedesireisnaturally satisfiedwhenonehaseatenenoughfoodtorestoreone'senergy.Desiresarenaturallycalibratedtojustthesegoalssatisfyingone'shungerforfoodandsex,upto thenaturalandpracticalpointofsatisfaction,isaptlyfittedtoachievingthesegoals.Callicles'exhortationhintsatanotherpicturealtogether:thelifeofasensualist. Fromthefactthatdesiresdohavethisnatural,practicallimitweshouldnotderiveanynormativeprinciplesabouthowtoliveourlivesorabouthow

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toapproachthesatisfactionofourdesires.Whysubordinatethepleasuresofsatisfyingdesiretothedutytowardfamilyandcity?Whatismoreimportantthanthe experienceofpleasure?Whybetrayone'sappetitesbytreatingthemasthingstobegottenoutoftheway,asthoughtheonlypointistoquietandcalmthem? Inturn,Socrates'imageoftheleakyjarstriestoconvinceusthatdesirestreatedonlyasvehiclesforpleasurerobtheonewhohasthemoftheabilitytobesatisfied.If satisfyingadesireonaparticularoccasionisnotthepoint,thensatisfyingsuchadesireisneverenough.Inaparadoxicalbutalltoorealsense,suchdesirescanbe satisfiedbuttheonewhohasthedesirewillnotbesated.AtthisstageinSocrates'exposition,wemightsaythatthedesiresareinsatiableatleastinthesensethat satisfyingthemisneverenoughfortheonewhohasthem.Socratesisurgingthatitisnotthefillingupthatisthegoaloflifetheprocessofsatisfyingdesire.Rather asSocratessaysat493dthetemperatepersonisadequatelyprovidedforandissatisfiedwithwhathehas(tonkosmioskaitoisaeiparousinhikanoskai ezarchountosechontabion[493c67]).23SocratesseemstobecallingtoCallicles'attentionthevalueofsatiety,thestateofhavingsatisfieddesires.Heis promotingthevalueofsatisfactionasakindofend,incontrasttotreatingsatisfactionasapauseonthewaytomorereplenishmentgeneratedpleasures.Inthis picture,then,SocratesseemstobehintingatsomethinglikeEpicurus'teachingthatthetranquillifeofsatisfieddesiresispreferabletoalifeofexoticpleasures associatedwithreplenishingdesires.Ifthepointistohavesatisfieddesires,thenthekindofdesirestohavearemoderateonesratherthanonesthatrequire extravagantmeansfortheirsatisfaction.24 Epicureansmadeadistinctionbetweenthekineticpleasuresofreplenishmentandthestaticpleasuresofsatiety.Thedistinctionisbetween,forexample,thepleasure ofeatingagourmetmealandthepleasureofsatisfactiononcethemealisover.Theythoughtthelattersuperiortotheformer.Forthem,oneshouldattempttohavea lifeinwhichthepleasuresofsatietyoutweighthepleasuresofreplenishment.Thebestwaytohavesuchalifeistohavedesiresthatcouldbeeasilysatisfied,whose replenishmentwaseasy,andwhosesatietywasvaluedforitself.Onecanseeanentireattitudetowardlifeinthisaccount.Suchalifewouldtreasurewhatsatietyithad atanymomentratherthanbeconstantlyseekingnewandmoreexoticpleasures.Thelatterbringwiththemtoomuchanxietybecausetheyaredifficultofattainment.It isbetter

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tohavealifeofsimplepleasuresthatcanbeattainedwithoutthetroubleandanxietyoftheexoticpleasures.Moreover,oneshouldnotseektohaveonepleasureafter anotheroneshouldsavorthesatisfactionofthepleasuresonehas.Theimageisnotofanasceticlifebutofasimplelife.IfanEpicureanwerearguingwithCallicles, hewouldprobablysaythatCalliclesismistakeninfailingtorecognizethestaticpleasureofsatiety.Thismistake,inturn,leadshimtomakekineticpleasuresthegoal oflife,ratherthanstaticpleasures.However,asweshallsee,Socratescannotmakethiskindofargumentforthegoodofsatiety.So,iftheimageistellingusthat satietyisagood,wearestillunclearwhatthegoodofsatietyis.Theimageismuchbetteratsuggestingthatsomethingiswrongwithinsatiabledesiresthanat suggestingwhatiswrongjustasitisbetteratsuggestingthatsomethingisrightaboutsatietythanatsuggestingwhatisrightaboutit.Atthemost,theimagesuggests thatinsatiabledesiresaremalfunctioning.Theanalogybycomparingdesirestojarsfocusesontheindividualdesireanditsfunction.Thesoundjartheanalogue ofthedesirenotinneedofrestraintisabletofulfillitsfunctionasajarwhereastheleakyjarcannotattainwhatjarsaresupposedtoattainthatis,toholdwhatis valuable.Byanalogy,theinsatiabledesire,whichsubstitutesthepleasureofreplenishmentforsatiety,isincapableoffulfillingitsfunction.Bymakingsatisfactionaway stationintheendlessseekingofpleasure,Callicleshasrobbedthedesireofitsfunction,justasmakingasoundjarintoaleakyjarrobsthejarofitsfunction.25Butif itismalfunctioning,westilldonotknowwhatmalfunctioningamountsto. Asmurkyasthenotionofthefunctionofadesiremightbe,itisonevisitedagainintheRepublic.HereSocratesseemstobestrugglingwiththepossibilitythata desire,consideredinitselfandapartfromitsrelationtootherdesires,mightfunctioncorrectlyorincorrectly,asthoughitwerelikeatool.Ifthatcorrectfunctioning weredistinctfromprovidingthepleasureofreplenishment,thenSocrateshasanargumentagainstCallicles'idealofthesensualistlife.However,atthispointinthe dialogueweshouldnotexpectmorethanapreliminarysuggestionaboutthemalfunctioningofinsatiabledesires.WhatisreallyimportantatthispointisthatSocrates presentsdesiresasmorallyproblematic.Althoughtousitmayseemobviousthatdesiresarethesourceofmoralproblems,tohishearersitwouldhavebeenunusual forSocratestopresentthemassuch.Withthisdevelopmentwehave

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adepartureinPlato'smoraltheory.Accordingtomostcommentators,untilhewrotetheProtagorasandtheGorgias,PlatohadbeenfollowingtheSocraticteaching, fromearlierdialogues,thatdesiresarenotmorallyproblematic.Desiresseekwhatisgoodwhenonedoessomethingthatisnotforthegood,theproblemisnotthat thedesireshavemisledbutthattheyhavethemselvesbeenmisled.However,inallowingthatdesirescansometimesbelikeleakyjars,Platonowseemstobe admittingthatdesiresarenotalwaysforthegood.26Certainly,desiresthemselvesarepresentedasinneedofattentionintheirlackofrestraint,thesedesiresseem tohaveadirectionoftheirown,notalwaysaimedatthegood.Indeed,theverynotionofthecraftofrulingimpliesthatdesirescanbecomeinthemselvesproblematic. InordertounderstandthewaythatdesireshavebecomeproblematicinPlato'saccount,letuslookatthenotionofdesiresintheearlierdialogues.Whatwewillseeis thattherehasbeenasubtle,butnotseismic,shiftinPlato'sconceptionoftherelationbetweendesiresandthegood.First,wewilllookatthesocalledSocratic paradoxestheteachingthatassumesthatdesiresaremorallyunproblematicbecausetheyarealwaysdesiresforthegood.Thenwewillbeabletoseeinwhatway theGorgiasmodifiesthisassumptionwhilethemodificationisnotradical,stilltherelationbetweendesiresandthegoodbecomesproblematic.However,itisthe consequenceofthismodificationthatholdsthemostinterest.Havingmadetherelationbetweendesiresandthegoodproblematic,Socratesmustnowredefinethat relationredefiningthatrelationisthepurposeofthenextsectionofthedialogue. TheteachingfromearlierdialoguesontherelationofdesiresandthegoodissometimesknownastheSocraticparadox.Inoneofitsexpressionstheteachingisthe paradoxicalstatementthatnoonevoluntarilypursuesevil.27Thus,ifanyoneactuallypursueswhatisbadorevil,heorsheiseitherforcedorfooledintopursuingit. Eitherthisevildoingpersonisphysicallyorpsychologicallyforcedtodowhatisevilorthispersonisundertheillusionthatwhatheorsheisdoingisgoodwhen actuallyitisevil.28ItisreallythelatteralternativethatinterestsPlatobecauseSocratesseemedtobelievethattheonlyreasonsomeonedoeswhatisbadorharmfulis thatheorshedoesnotknowthatwhatisbeingdoneisbadorharmful.Heorsheismistakenaboutthegoodnessofwhatisbeingdone.Ifsuchapersonknewthat theactionwerebadorharmful,heorshewouldnotdoitindeed,heorshewouldnot

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evenwanttodoit.Thus,whenapersonpursuesevil,heorshedoessounknowinglyinturn,wewouldsaythatsuchapersonpursuesevilinvoluntarilybecauseheor shewouldnotpursueevilifsheorheknewthatitwasevil. InthisaccountoftheSocraticparadox,thebasicassumptionisthatdesiresarealwaysdesiresforthegood.Thus,desiresarenottheproblemitisnotdesiresthat mislead.Theproblemisinourknowledge.SosomeonelikeSocrates,whowantstohelppeopleavoidevil,shouldworktoovercomeignorance,tohelppeople understandwherethetruegoodlies.Thentheirdesireswillfollowtheleadofsuchknowledgeaboutthegood,justastheyfollowedtheleadofthemistakenbelief aboutthegood.Desiresarenot,then,adragorobstacletheyareunhesitatingintheirpursuitofthegood.Inoneversionofthischarmingviewoflife,aperson's desirefor,forexample,chocolatebrowniesisbasicallythedesireforsomethingthatisgoodforher.Suchapersoneatsbrowniesthinkingofthemassomethinggood forher.If,atsomemoment,herreasondecidedthateatingbrownieswasbadforexample,wasleadingtobeingdangerouslyoverweightshewouldnotonlystop eatingbrowniesshewouldalsostopdesiringtoeatbrownies.Herdesiretoeatchocolatebrownieswouldsimplyceaseafterall,thedesireisbasicallyadesirefor thegoodandbrowniesarenolongerseenaspartoforleadingtothegood. Santasholdsthattherearetwoversionsofthisparadoxtheprudentialandthemoralversions.29Theprudentialversionholdsthatnoonedesireswhatisbadfor oneselfthemoralversionholdsthatnoonevoluntarilydoeswhatisunjustthatis,whatiswronglyharmfultoanother.HearguesthatPlatomakesthelatter dependentontheformerPlatotriestoshowthatwhatisharmfultoothersisharmfultotheonewhoperpetratestheharm.However,wewillconcentrateonthe prudentialparadoxbecauseitexposesanimportantaspectofdesiresinPlato'saccountatthispoint. Inonewayoflookingatittheprudentialparadoxdoesnotseemparadoxicalatall.Afteralltheclaimisnotthatnoonedesireswhatisharmfultooneself.Rather,the Socraticparadoxistheclaimthatnoonedesiresanythingthatoneknowsorbelievesisharmfulforoneself.30Thus,afamousargumentintheMeno(77b)holdsthat noonewishestobeharmedandthusnoonewantstodowhatoneknowsisharmfultooneself.Buttheargumentdoesallowthatsomeonemightdowhatisharmfulin themistakennotionthatwhatonedoesisnotreallyharmful.Butin

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thiscase,onedoesnotknowinglydesirewhatisharmfultooneself.Still,theclaimthatnooneknowinglydesireswhatisharmfulcanstrikeusasparadoxicalwhen wethinkofpeoplewhoeatunhealthyfoodorsmokecigarettes,whentheyknowthatsuchactionsareharmfultothemselves.31Surelyonecanobjectthatinthese cases,thepersonknowsthatsomefoodsareunhealthybutcontinuestodesireandtoeatthesefoods.Theparadoxisthattheclaimthatnooneknowinglydoeswhat isharmfuliscontradictedbytheexampleofthispersonwhoknowsthateatingthefoodisharmfulandstilldesirestoeatit.TheSocraticclaimfliesinthefaceofour experience. Infact,Calliclesseemstopresentjustsuchacase.Accordingtohim,desirescanbemadeintovehiclesforseekingthepleasuresofreplenishmentifthepleasuresof replenishmentarenotthesameasthegoodevenwhen'thegood'meansone'sowngoodthendesiresarenotforthegood.Inthiswaytherearisesthepossibility thatdesirescanbegoodindependent,merelypleasureseekingratherthanseekingone'soverallgood.32Desirescanbemadeintodesiresforpleasuresthatarein factharmfulforoneandonecanknowthatfactandstilldesirethem.Thus,insteadofbeingalliesinseekingthegoodlife,desiresbecomeenemies.Perhapsthisisthe challengethatCalliclesispresentingtheverynotionofthelifeofunrestraineddesireexposesthefactthatdesiresarenotforthegood. Infact,theclaimthatnooneknowinglydesireswhatisharmfultooneselfisambiguous.33Inoneofitsmeanings,itistheuninterestingclaimthatwhateveronedesires onedoessowiththenotionthatitis,insomesense,agood.Thus,eventhepersonwhodesirestoeatunhealthyfoodandwho,insomepartofhermindknowsthatit isunhealthy,seesthehealthyfoodassomethinggood.Perhaps,sheseestheunhealthyfoodaspleasanttastingandjustinsofarasitispleasanttastingsheseesitas good,notasharmfulwhatshedesiresthenisthatgood.Shedoesnotlookuponeating,forexample,thesweetchocolatebrowniethewayshemightlookuponeating abowlofbrokenrazorblades.Thus,inthissenseoftheclaimthatnooneknowinglydesireswhatisharmful,'knowingly'hasaratherweaksensethatmakestheclaim trueinanuninterestingway.Itmightwellbetrueandiscertainlynotobviouslyfalsethatwheneveronedesirestodosomethingonehassomesensethatwhatone isdoingis,insomeway,agood.Butthisclaimdoesnotseemtotellusanythingveryimportant.Inthe

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secondsense,theclaimisstrongerbutitisalsolessclearlytrue.Inthissense,noonedesirestodowhatonerecognizestobeharmfulafterconsideringalltherelevant factors.Inthissense,'knowingly'meansthatonehasconsideredtheproposedactionsandsoberlyassesseditsconsequencesforone'soverallwelfare.Theclaimthen saysthat,aftersuchanassessment,noonewilldesiretodowhatisharmfultoone'soverallwelfare.Inthissense,desireisalwaysforthegood,orforthebestthe latterphrasesimplythattheobjectofdesireisone'sconsideredwelfare.34 NowwecanseewhatisatissuebetweenCalliclesandSocrates.Calliclesissayingthatthepleasureofsatisfyingdesiresisthepointofhavingdesires.Moreover,the pleasureofunrestrainedsatisfactionshouldbetakentobeone'soverallgood,inspiteofwhatSocrates,oranyoneelse,mightcallthe''overallgood.''Ontheother hand,Socratesarguesthatoneshouldnotsubstitutethegoodofpleasurefortheoverallgood.Thus,CalliclesandSocratesarenotarguingabouttheSocratic paradoxaboutwhetherdesiresseekthegoodandfollowtheleadofreasontheyarearguingaboutwhatthegoodis.WhatisatissuebetweenSocratesand Calliclesiswhetherone'soverallgoodisthesameasthepleasureofunrestrainedsatisfactionoftheelementarydesiresforfood,drink,andsex.ForCalliclestheyare thesame(495a)moreover,thisopinionseemstobeareflectiveone.Obviouslyhehasthoughtaboutit.ForSocrates,ontheotherhand,thesepleasuresandthe goodarenotthesame. ThatthedifferencebetweenpleasuresandthegoodistheissuebetweenCalliclesandSocratesisshownbythesequel.AtthispointintheGorgias,Platoisaware thatthedistinctionbetweenthepleasureofsatisfyingdesiresandone'soverallgoodmustbemade.35Aftertheinitialcharacterizationofinsatiabledesiresasleaky jars,SocratesengagesinanextendedtwopartargumentwithCalliclestoshowthatthereisadifferencebetweengoodandpleasure(495aff.).Wewillnotgivethe detailsofthesearguments.Theupshotofthesecondargumentisthat,givenCallicles'identificationbetweenpleasureandthegood,thereisnodifferencebetweenthe cowardandthebravemansincebothexperienceaboutthesameamountofpleasureandpain.SuchaconclusionseemsunacceptabletoCalliclesbecausehewants todistinguishbetweenthecowardandthebraveman.Presumablyeitherhegenuinelybelievesthatthereisadifferencebetweenthecowardandthebravemanorhe isashamedtoadmitthatthereisnodifference

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betweenthecowardandthebraveman.36GiventhewaythatPlatopresentshischaracter,itisprobablytheformerCalliclesseemstothinkofhimselfasabrave manoratleastasaspiringtothestandingofone. Afterarguingthatpleasureandthegoodaredifferent,however,Socratesmakesanimportantconcessionaconcessionthatimpliesanewrelationbetweendesires andthegood.SocratestriestoconvinceCalliclesthatpleasurepursuedforitsownsakeinsomewayrendersthedesirespathological.Socratesdevelopsthisstrategy inwhatwehavealreadycalledthe"medicalanalogy."Hecomparesunrestraineddesirestothedesiresofasickpersonapersonwhosedesiresarepathologicaland inneedofmedicaltreatment.TheunrestraineddesiresofCallicles'accountneedakindoftreatmentthatisanalogoustomedicaltreatmenttheseunrestraineddesires are,morallyspeaking,pathological. Characterizinginsatiabledesiresaspathologicalhastwoconsequencesthataresignificantforunderstandingthenew,problematicrelationbetweendesiresandthe good.Firstofall,desiresarenotnaturallygoodindependentsecond,theycan,nevertheless,becorruptedsothattheybecomegoodindependent.First,theveryidea oftreatinginsatiabledesireslikethedesiresofasickpersonimpliesthatthedesiresarebynaturesound.Theyareperfectlynormaldesiresfor,forexample,food, drink,andsex,thathavebecomepathologicaltheyarenotnaturallypathological.Aswehaveargued,thedesiresforfood,drink,andsexarenotinthemselves desiresforbadthingstheyaremadebadbybeingusedasvehiclesforpleasure.Treatmentisthewayofreturningthemtotheirinherent,properfunctioning.Indeed,in theGorgias,Socratesexplicitlysaysthateveryonedesires(boulesthai)thegood.IntheconversationwithPolus(467cff.),Socratespresentsafullydeveloped argumentthatdependsontheclaimthatpeopledesirethegood,concludesthattheycanbeconfusedaboutwhatthegoodis,andthustheysometimesdesirewhat turnsouttobebad.Second,however,thenotionoftreatmentforinsatiabledesiresalsoimpliesthatsuchdesirescanbecome,inthemselves,impaired.Itisnot sufficientmerelytoshowthepersonwhodoessothatusingdesiresasvehiclesforpleasureiswrongasitpresumablywouldhavebeenintheearlydialogues.The treatmentforinsatiabledesiresisnotsimplyintellectualitisnotdirectedsolelyatwhatonebelieves.Asweshallsee,treatmentmustdisciplinethedesiresby punishment,asthoughthedesiresthemselves

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havebecomecorrupted.Whenthepersonwhowouldusedesiresasvehiclesforpleasuremustberestrainedbyexperiencingpain,wecanconcludethatthelessonis notmerelyintellectual. Itisnotaltogetherclearwhatisgoingonwhenwesaythatdesiresaresomehowinthemselvesimpaired.Wearenotsayingjustthatdesirescanbeusedasvehicles forobtainingpleasurebutthatthisusecanharmthewaythedesiresfunction.Onewaytoputthisharmistosaythatdesiresthatareusedasvehiclesforpleasurecan takeonbadhabits.Theycometofunctioninsuchawaythatpleasuresubstitutesfortheusualendsofdesire.Ifthiswayofputtingitisplausible,thenPlatowouldbe suggestingthatdesirecanhavedispositionsanideathatistohavegreatimportanceinancientmoralphilosophy.Evenifthenaturaldispositionistofunctionwell thatis,forone'soverallgooditispossiblefordesirestotakeonabaddisposition.Incorrectbeliefaboutone'soverallgoodmightbethebeginningofthecorruption ofdesiresbutafterawhilethedesiresmalfunctionontheirownsotospeak.Theybecomeinsatiable. Thus,wecannowseethenew,problematicrelationbetweendesiresandthegood.Whiledesiresarenaturallyforthegood,theycanbecorruptedsothattheydonot seekthegood.Tocorrupteddesires,pleasurebecomesarivalgoaltothegooditsinfluenceismoreinsidiousthanthatofothergoalsthatrivalthegoodbecause, onceinstituted,itsinfluenceisnotsoeasilydissipatedastheinfluenceofawrongbelief.Theupshotofthisnewrelationbetweendesiresandthegoodisveryimportant forPlato'smoraltheory.Uptothispoint,thedialoguessaidthataslongastheywerenotmisledbybelief,thedesiressoughtthegood.However,havingallowedthat desirescanbecorruptedtoseekonlypleasure,Platomustredefinetheirrelationtothegood.Hemustgiveanaccountofthewaythatinsatiabledesiresfailtoobtain thegoodandanaccountofthewaythatmoderatedesirescontributetothegood.Redefiningtherelationbetweendesiresandthegoodistheburdenofthemedical analogy.Itisinordertofulfillthatrolethatharmonyandorderamongdesiresmaketheirdebut. V Inthemedicalanalogy,Platoelaboratesonthepathologyofdesiresandsuggestsawayofunderstandingnonpathological

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desiresthatis,thatconditionofdesiresthatcorrespondstohealthinthebody.Herehepresentsthenotionofharmonyandorderamongthedesires.Thiswayof presentingthegoodconditionofthesoulisimportantforourunderstandingofthewaytherulingcrafttreatsdesiresandforourunderstandingoftherelationbetween desiresandperfection.Moreover,itprefigurestheconceptionofpsychicharmonyinRepublicIV,thereportrayedashealthinthesoul.Socratesbeginshisexplication ofthemedicalanalogyforthetreatmentofunrestraineddesiresbyreiteratingthecomplexanalogy,whichheoriginallyelaboratedforPolus(464aff.),between therapeuticcraftsthatcareforthehealthyandthosethatcareforthesick.Then,bydevelopingthenotionofacraft,hemakesanextremelyimportantadvanceinhis accountoftherulingcraft.Contrastingtheuncraftlikesophisticrhetorician,withthecraftlikegoodman(presumablysomeonespeakingintheassemblyorinthelaw courts)Socratessaysthatthegoodmanhasashiswholeendeavortomakethesoulsofhisfellowcitizensasgoodaspossible(toparaskeuazeinhoposhosbeltistai esontaitonpolitonhaipsychai[503a78]). Invokingthenotionofperfection,tobeltiston(503d),Socratesnextcharacterizesthatperfectioninawaythatwillhaveimportantimplicationsforallofhis subsequentaccountsofthemorallife.Theperfectionthatallcraftsseekisanorderwithintheobjectofthecraft.
...eachsetsintoplacewhateverhesetsintoplaceaccordingtoaparticularorder,andforcesdifferentpartstofittogetherandharmonize(preponteeinaikaiharmottein)until hehascombinedthewholeintoanorderedandarrangedthing(tetagmenontekaikekosmenenonpragma[503e504a]).

Citingtheorderandarrangementofhousesandships,Socratesnextextendsthismotifoforderandarrangementtothebodyandthesoul.Itisthecomparison betweenorderinthebodyandorderinthesoulthatistheimportofthewholepassage.Inthebody,orderandarrangementarehealthinthesoulitislawfulness, justice,andtemperance. Inordertounderstandthiscrucialcomparison,weneedtoelaboratecarefullywhatSocratessaysaboutthebody.Disorderinthebodyissicknessandcallsfor medicaltreatmenttorestoreorder.NowthereseemstobealeapintheprogressofthoughtSocratesseemstobesayingthatrestoringorderinthebodyentails

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restrainingappetitesasthoughthereissomecausalrelationbetweentheappetitesandbodilydisease.Hesaysthatthephysiciansallowthehealthypersontoeatand drinkhisfill(literallytofilluphisdesires)thesickperson,however,theydonotallowtosatisfycompletelyhisappetites(literallytofilluphisdesirescompletely). Aboutthisdiseasedappetite,Socratessaysthatitisnotclearthatfillingitwithalotofdrink,forexample,willprofitthesickpersonandmayevenharmhim(504e). PerhapsSocrateshasinmindpeoplewhoseappetiteshavegrownexcessivebecauseoftheirdiseaseatthesametime,satisfyingtheseexcessiveappetitescontributes tomakingthediseaseworse.Forexample,apersonwithahighfevercanhaveaninsatiablethirst(cf.Philebus45ac).Insuchadisease,thesickpersondrinks waterbeyondthecapacityofthestomachtoholdthewater.Grownpathological,suchadesiredoesnotceaseattheappropriatepointtheappetiteisnotinrelation towhatthebodyneeds.Moreover,theexcessivedrinkingcanmakethepersonevensicker.Thejobofthephysician,then,istomoderatetheappetite.Hedoesnot keepthepatientfromdrinkingatallratherheallowsthepatienttodrinkonlyamoderateamount.Thehealthyperson,bycontrast,canbeallowedtodrinkhisfill becausethelimitoftheappetiteisinrelationtowhatthebodyneeds. Afterthisrathershortreferencetotheroleofappetitesinbodilydisease,Socratesthenturnsto"sick"souls.
Anddoesnotthesametreatmentapplytothesoul,mygoodfriend?Wheneveritisinanevilstate,beingignorant,undisciplined,unjust,andimpious,itisnecessarytorestrain thesoulfromitsdesiresandnottoallowittodoanythingbutwhatwillbeforitsimprovement?(505b)

NowweknowwhySocratesimplicateddesiresinthepathologyofthebodyhewishedtodrawananalogybetweentreatmentofdesiresinbodilydiseaseand treatmentofdesiresinthesoul.Letustry,then,tofillouttheanalogybetweenrestrainedandunrestraineddesiresofthesickpersonandtherestrainedand unrestraineddesiresoftheviciouspersontheignorant,undisciplined,unjust,andimpiousperson.Desiresgrownpathologicalthroughdiseasehavelosttheirnatural limit,thatis,thepointatwhichsatisfactionandthegoodofthebodycoincide.Thejobofthephysicianistosubstituteforandultimatelyreestablishthatlimit.Without itsnaturallimit,theappetitehasadysfunctional

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limitalimitwithnovalueforthebody.37IfwedrawoutSocrates'analogybetweendiseaseandmoralunrestraint,wewouldsaythatappetitesthathavebecome insatiablethroughdiseasearelikeappetitesthathavegrowninsatiablethroughunrestraintthroughignorance,undiscipline,injustice,andimpiety.Thepathologyofthe formerhasrenderedthemwithoutalimitthatisfunctionalforthebody.Desiresgrowninsatiablethroughunrestrainthavelosttheirnaturallimitaswellifonedrawsout theanalogy,theirnaturallimitisdefinedbyitsrelationtothegoodofthesoultheyaredysfunctionalforthesoul.38Presumably,then,apersonwhohasunrestrained orundisciplineddesireswillharmhissoulinsomewayinattemptingtosatisfytheirexcessivedemands. However,Socratesdoesnotgiveusaveryclearorexplicitpictureofwhatharmingthesoulamountstohere.Thus,itisnotclearhowdesirescanbedysfunctionalfor thesoul.39Ofcourse,inintroducingthemedicalanalogySocrateshas,atleast,suggestedawayinwhichunrestraineddesiresaredysfunctional.Socrateshassaid thatthecraftsmanarrangeseverythingaccordingtoacertainorder,andforcesthepartstofittogetherandharmonize,untilhehascombinedthewholeintoawell orderedandwellarrangedproduction.Hehasalsosaidthatthecraftsmanofthesoulwillrestrainthedesiresthathavegrownexcessivethroughvice.Thus,the craftsmanofthesoulwilldoubtlessworkontheexcessivedesiressothattheyfittogetherandformawellorderedandwellarrangedwhole.40Theimplicationisthat thesedesiresarethesourceoflackoforderandarrangement. Socratesdoesnotexplainexactlyhowthesedesirescouldbethesourceofdisorder.Presumablytheywouldcomeintoconflictwithotherpartsofthesoul.But Socratesdoesnotexplicitlyidentifytheotherpartsofthesoulwithwhichinsatiabledesireswouldconflict.Irwinpointsoutthatinsatiabledesiresmightwellbe incompatiblewithothermoremoderatedesires.41Theremaybeotherpossibleconflictsbutforthepurposesofillustrationwewillconcentrateonthisone.This incompatibilitycouldoccurinseveralways.Itcanbeimaginedthataninsatiabledesirecanbeincompatiblewithotherdesiresatthesamelevelthatis,withthesame scopeofactivity.Aninsistentdesireforfood,forexample,willconflictwithadesirewhosesatisfactionisincompatiblewiththeactivityorconsequenceof overeatingforexample,thedesiretofitintoacertainbathingsuit.Aswell,onecanimaginehigher

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orderdesiresforexample,thedesiretobehealthythatmightbeincompatiblewiththeunrestraineddesireforfood.Thedesireforhealthishigherorderbecauseit ismoregeneralthanthedesireforfood,involvingmorefacetsofone'slife.Itis,perhaps,inthissensethatwearetounderstandtheinsatiabledesiretobe dysfunctionalforthesoulitisthesourceofincompatibilityamongthedesires,eitherwithdesiresofthesamelevelorwithhigherorderdesires. Thesortofincompatibilityatissuehereisbetweeninsatiabledesiresandmoderatedesires.Thus,itistheincompatibilitybetweendesiresthatareusedonlytoachieve thepleasuresofsatisfactionanddesiresthatfunctioninthenormalway.Thisincompatibilityorconflictisthepathologicalconditionthatthecraftofrulingmust overcome.Ofcourse,thereareotherincompatibilitiesbetweendesireswithwhichtherulingcraftisnotconcerned.Thereistheincompatibilityofmoderatedesires forexample,thedesiretohearthisonetimeconcertandthedesiretoattendmydaughter'sfifthbirthdayparty,scheduledatthesametime.Thelatterisnot consideredtobepathological.Whytheformerincompatibilityistobeconsideredpathologicalisnotaltogetherclear.42Atleastonereasonsuggestsitself.Moderate desiresmaybeincompatiblewithoneanotherbecauseoftheobjectofthedesiresbothobjectscannotbeattainedatthesametime.Suchincompatibilityisnot systematicsinceitdependsupontheincompatibilityoftheobjectsachangeintheobjectslocationortime,forexamplewouldavoidtheincompatibility.However, whenaninsatiabledesireisincompatiblewithamoderatedesireitisnotbecauseoftheirrespectiveobjects.Theinsatiabledesireisincompatiblewiththemoderate desirebecauseofthewaythatitfunctionsasadesire.Beinginsatiable,itpursuesitsobjectinseasonandoutbeinginsistentandwithoutlimitatleasttheoretically itsimplycrowdsoutthemoderatedesire.Itisforthisreasonthatthelatterkindofincompatibilityseemspathological.Inturn,itlooksmorelikearemediable condition,onethatatherapeuticcraftcouldaddressespeciallyif,whentheinsatiabledesiresarereturnedtonormalfunction,theyceasetobesystematicobstacles toothermoderatedesires.43Theobverseofthispictureofincompatibilityisthatacertainkindofcompatibilityofdesiresisgoodforone'ssoul.Thesortof compatibilitythatdoesnotsystematicallyfrustratethedesiresisgoodforthesoul.Itisonethingtohavefrustrationofincompatibledesiresbecauseoftheirrespective objects

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itisanothertohavethefrustrationofincompatibledesiresbecauseofthewaythatoneofthedesiresfunctions.Attheveryleast,thesoulshouldnotstandintheway ofitself,sotospeak.Notstandinginthewayofitselfisgoodforthesoul. Nowwecanseethenewrelationbetweendesiresandthegood.Formerlydesiresweredesiresforthisorthatobjectthat,whenguidedbyknowledgeortruebelief, contributedtoorconstitutedthegoodalldesiresthusbeingforthegood,theirsystematiccompatibilitywasassumed.Systematicincompatibilitynowbeingpossible, desiresarenotautomaticallyforthegood.Thus,systematiccompatibilityofdesiresbecomesanimportantindicatorofthegooddesiresthatdonotsystematically frustrateoneanotherareeitherameanstothegoodoractuallyconstitutethegood.Certainly,thetextmakescleartheimportanceofcompatibilityofdesires.In Socrates'analogy,thedesires,atsomelevel,shouldfittogetherthewaythepartsoftheshiporofthehousefittogether.Atthislevel,atleast,thesoulshouldhavean integrationofdesires.Thesoulshouldformakosmos,anorderedarrangement(Gor.506e).Thenotionofkosmoswithinthesoulisrepeatedthroughoutthis passage.Itisobviouslyapowerfulidea,capableofevokingstrongassent.Theparticularkosmosofeachthingiswhatmakesitgood,indeedisthevirtueofthething (taxeiaratetagmenonkaikekosmemenonestinhearetehekastou[506e12]).Laterinthesamepassage,kosmosisagaininvokedtocharacterizetheentire schemeofbeing.
Wisemensay,Callicles,thatbothheavenandearthandgodsandhumans,communionholdstogether,andfriendshipandorderliness(kosmioteta)andtemperanceandjustice andbecauseofthesetheycallthewholethingakosmon,myfriend,nota"disorder"noran"undiscipline."(507e)

Heretheentiremoraluniverseisrepresentedasakosmos,abeautifullyorderedwhole.Theproximityofthisimageofthemoraluniversetothepassageinwhich Socratespraisesthekosmosofthesoulcanbenoaccident. Thekosmosofthesoulevokesnolessstronganassent,then.Inturn,thenotionthatthesoul'sdesiresshouldfittogethertoformakosmoshasacertainappeal.The appealprobablyisbestappreciatedfromitsabsence.Alifeoffrustrationoralifedraggedinoppositedirectionsbylargescaleandfundamentaldesiresseemstomost peopletobebad.Ontheotherhand,alifeinwhich

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onedoesnotexperiencesuchfrustrationorsuchcontradictorypullshasanintegritythatmightbecomparabletotheintegrityofawellmadeship.Mostpeoplewould preferalifewithsuchdirectionandintegrity.Certainlymanyofthosewhoarecountedassaintsorheroesandheroinesseemtohavethis"wellfittogether"aspectto theirlives.However,aspowerfulastheimagemaybe,itisonlyanimage.Itdoesnotamounttoatheoryaboutpsychicperfectionandhowtoattainit.Atthispointin thedialoguewehavetheverycompellingnotionthat,inordertohavethegood,onemusthaveacertainorderandharmonyamongthedesires.Exactlywhatthis orderandharmonyareisunclear.Butevenmoreobscureishowtheonepracticingtherulingcraftgoesaboutbringingsuchorderandharmonyintothesoul.Weneed togetbeyondthemedicalanalogytotherulingcraftproper. VI Atbestthen,inthemedicalanalogy,Socrateshasgivenusatypeofpsychicdisharmony.Atbest,hehashintedatatypeofpsychicharmony.Themedicalanalogy hasallthedrawbacksofanalogies,thenbutweshouldnotforgetthatitisusedtointroducethenotionofjudging,aspeciesoftherulingcraftproperlysocalled.The latteristhetherapeuticcraftwhoseobjectissicksouls.Judgingisanalogoustomedicineitwilldoforthesoulwhatmedicinedoesforthebody.Thusitwilldofor morallypathologicaldesireswhatmedicinedoesforbodilypathologicaldesires.InelaboratingPlato'saccountofthisspeciesofthecraftofruling,wewillseethat,in talkingaboutjudging,Socratesdoesnotgreatlyadvanceourunderstandingoforderandharmonyamongdesiresandthemethodforattainingit.However,Socrates' methodofrefutation,bymeansofquestionandanswercalledSocraticelenchusispresentedasatypeoftherulingcraft.Inexploringthisdevelopmentweattain animportantglimpseofonewayinwhichtherulingcraftcanattainharmonyandorderamongdesires. InthefollowingpassagesSocratesgivesusalbeitinanincompleteformanaccountofthemethodthatthecraftsmanofsoulusestorestraindesiresthathavebeen corrupted.Themethodis,inaword,punishment.IntheearlierconversationwithPolus,Socratesidentifiesthejudgeastheonewhotreatsthesouloftheunjust personjustasthemedicaltreatmentforthebodyispainful

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soisthepunishmentinflictedbythejudge(478de).However,whilethispunishmentissaidtocureitsvictimofinjustice,Socratesdoesnotexplainhowpunishment effectsthecurehedoesnottiethepunishmenttothedisciplineofoverweeningdesires.Asweknow,ofcourse,itisonlylater,intheconversationwithCallicles,that Socratesidentifiesthedesiresastheobjectoftreatmentinsicksouls.SointheconversationwithPolus,heisnotinthepositiontomaketheconnection.However, whatSocratessaystoPolusabouttheroleofthejudgeincuringsicknessinthesoulandtoCalliclesaboutthefunctionofthedesiresinthesoul'ssicknesswouldallow ustoconcludethatthepunishmentinflictedbythejudgehastheeffectofdisciplininguncontrolleddesires.Thereareindicationsinthetext,aftertheintroductionof desiresastheobjectsofthetherapeuticcraft,thatjustsuchaconclusionisSocrates'. At507d,SocratesrefersbacktohisconversationwithPolusandtooneofitsmorescandalousparadoxes,thatis,thatthegoodpersonwhohasdoneinjusticeshould turnhimselfovertothejudgestobedisciplined.Clearlyreferringtotheexpectedeffectsofthepunishmenttobemetedoutbythejudge,Socratessays,theunjust personshouldseekpunishment,thereby"notallowinghisdesirestobeunrestrainedand,inattemptingtofillthemanendlessevillivingthelifeofarobber."Inthis passage,Socratesseemstobereferringbacktotheleakyjars,desireswhosefillingareanendlesstask.Thusjudgingmightherebesupposedtorestraintheappetite sothatsatisfieddesireswouldbeitsgoal.Nothingissaidaboutcompatibilityofdesireshowever.Whilethispassagedoesnotrefertocompatibilityofdesires, Socrateshintsatcompatibilitywhenherecountsthemythattheendofthedialogue.ThereSocratesoutlinesatherapeuticcraftexercisedbythegodsofthe underworld.Whenanunjustsoularrivesintheunderworld,itbearsthemarksofitspastlife.Insomecasesthejudgesees"thatbecauseofthepower,thelicense,the wantonviolence,andthelackofselfcontrolofitsactions,thesoulisfilledwithdisproportionandugliness..."(525a).Thejudgesmustdecidewhethersuchasoulis curableornot.Ifsuchasouliscurable,itissubjectedtopunishmentthatwillreturnittohealth.Ifweassumethatitisthedesiresthataredisproportionateandugly, thepunishmentwillreturnproportionandbeautytothedesires.Finally,disproportionamongdesiresmeansthatsomedesiresareoutofproportiontoothersthus disproportionmightwellbea

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formofincompatibilityofdesiresanincompatibilitythatthejudgecures.44 Somehow,then,punishmentwouldrestraintheinsatiableanddisproportionatedesires.However,Socratesdoesnotofferatheorytoexplainwhypunishmenthasthis effect.45Heleavesuswonderingwhatrestrainingthedesirebypunishmentamountstoandwhydoingsoshouldleadtoacure.Presumably,inanytheoryof punishment,oneisexpectedtomakeaconnectionbetweenthecrimeandthepunishment.Inthemostsuperficialoftheories,thecriminalcomestorealizethatbecause hecommitsthecrimehesuffersthepunishment.Hethenhassomemotivationtoavoidcommittingthecrimeinthefuture,providedthatpunishmentreliablyfollowsthe crimeandthepainofthepunishmentoutweighsthepleasureofcommittingthecrime.Ofcourse,itisnaturalforusinthiscenturytothinkofjudiciallyinflicted punishmentinadifferentwayassomethinglikenegativereinforcement.Onthenegativereinforcementmodel,thecriminalissupposedtomakeafurtherconnection betweenthedesiretocommitacrimeandthepainofthepunishment.Thepainofthepunishmentrestrainsthedesirebyestablishinginthemindofthecriminalan associationbetweenthecrimeandthepainofpunishment.Thedesiretocommitthecrimelessensbecausetheprospectofthepleasureofitssatisfactionisdimmedby associationwiththepainofthepunishment.ThetroublewithPlato'saccountsofpunishmentandhistalkofrestrainingdesiresisthatwegetnosuchtheoretical connectionbetweenthepainofpunishmentandtherestrainingofdesires. Whiletheexplicitaccountofjudgingdoesnotadvancethenotionoftherulingcraftverymuch,Socrates'ownpracticeofelenchusinthisdialoguedoes.Asweshall see,notonlydoesSocratespresentelenchusasakindofrulingcraftinparticular,asakindofjudginghedoessoinsuchawayastoaddanewlevelofmeaning tothenotionofrulingcraft.Indeed,towardstheendofthedialogueSocratesmakestheastonishingclaimthatheistheonlytruepractitionerofthecraftofruling (politiketechne)(521e).InclaimingthatheistheonlytruestatesmanexistenttheninAthens,Socratespresentshimselfassomeonewhodoesnotpandertothe desiresofhisaudiencebuttellsthemwhattheyneedtohear.Theimplicationisthatwhathehastosayispainfulbutnecessarytohear.IfwerememberthatSocrates characteristicallydoesnotmakespeechesbutrefuteshisinterlocutorsthroughhis

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methodofquestionandanswerthemethodofelenchusitappearsthatSocratesisbasinghisclaimtosuperiorstatesmanshiptobeabetterpractitionerofthe craftofrulingbecausehepracticeselenchus. ThispassageseemstoinviteustoapplytheaccountoftherapeuticcrafttoSocraticelenchus.Indeed,suchaninvitationisonlytobeexpectedsincethecentral contrastinthewholedialogueisbetweencraftandroutine,betweenSocratesandGorgias.SinceGorgias'rhetoricisroutine,Socrates'philosophythatis, elenchusshouldbecraft.Inturn,ifSocraticelenchuswereatherapeuticcraft,itwillbeatherapeuticcraftofthesoulandonewhichcaresforsicksouls.Itwillbe analogoustomedicine,whichmetesoutpainfultreatmenttothebodyasatherapeuticcraftofthesoul,itwill,likethecraftofjudging,inflictpunishmentinorderto restraindesires.Ofcourse,unlikejudging,whichusescorporalpunishment,elenchususesthepunishmentofcontradiction.Wefindjustsuchapresentationofelenchus throughoutthedialogue. Inthisregard,then,elenchusfitstheaccountofcraftalreadyoutlinedbySocratesearlyinhisconversationwithPolus(464bff.).Elenchusdoeswhatitdoesnotwith theaimofpleasingthosewhoareitsobjects.Likeacraft,then,itaimsatthegoodnotjustatpleasure.Indeed,asweshallsee,Socratesholdsconsistencytobea greatgood.Elenchusmightbesupposedtohavethatgoodasitscraftgoal.Ofcourse,allelenchusdoesistopointupinconsistencyinbeliefs.However,insofaras pointingupinconsistencyleadstooneachievingconsistencyofbeliefs,elenchushasthegoodofitsobjectsinmind.However,acraftissupposedtobeabletogivean accountofitsprocedures,toexplainwhyitprovideswhatitprovides.Hereelenchusdoesnotfittheaccountofcraftsowell.ItisnotclearthatSocrateshasatheory toexplainwhyhedoeswhathedoes.46He,ofcourse,characterizeselenchusinvariouswaysasweshallseebuthedoesnotofferasystematicaccount.He seemstorelyonsuggestionsandhintsabouthispurposesinpracticingelenchus.AtthemostwecansaythatSocratesseeshiscraftasprovidingconsistencyof beliefs,whichhepresentsasagreatgood,asweshallsee.Indeed,throughoutthisdialogue,Socratesdoesseemveryadeptathiscraft.Heseemshighlycapableat ferretingouttheimportantbeliefsofhisinterlocutorsandatshowinganinconsistencyintheirbeliefs.Heisalsoskilledinshowingnotjustanyinconsistencyintheir beliefsbutthekindofconsistencythatcallsintoquestioncentralbeliefs.

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However,whatismissingisthesensethatSocratescangiveatheoreticalaccountofwhatheistryingtoaccomplishbesidesshowinganinconsistency.Heseemsto believethatwhatheistryingtoaccomplishbyhiselenchusisimportantforhisinterlocutors.Hedoesnotseemabletoexplainexactlywhyitisimportant.Ofcourse, givenhisavowalsofignorance,itshouldnotbesurprisingthatSocrateshasnotheorytoexplainhiselenchusindeed,thisSocraticignorancecannotbeovercomeuntil thetheoryofFormsisintroduced.Inanyevent,inthesequel,wewillconcentrateonthosewaysinwhichSocraticelenchusseemstobeatherapeuticcraftofthesoul, admittingthattherearealsowaysinwhichitdoesnotseemtobeacraft. Firstofall,intheconversationwithPolus,aswehavealreadyseen,Socratescharacterizesthejudgeinthecourtasusingpunishmenttorelievethesoulofevilthe judgeislikethephysicianinthatbothmustrequirepainfultreatmentinordertoreturnthepatienttohealth,whetherpsychicorbodilyhealth.Then,Socrates characterizeshimselfassomeoneinacourttryingtogetPolustotestify.Polus,hesays,istheonlywitnessheneedstoestablishhispoint(472bc474b475de). Finally,inaslyselfreference,SocratescompareshisownelenctictreatmentofPolusinthesametermsheusesforthejudgeandthephysician.Atthepointwhere SocratesgetsPolustoadmittoacontradictionofhispreviouslyavowedbelief,hecajoles
Donothesitatetoanswer,Polus.Foryouwon'tbeharmed.Rathersubmitnoblytotheargument,astoaphysician,andanswer,andeitheraffirmornotwhatIask.(475d)

Evidently,beingawitnessforSocratescanalsobeapainfulkindoftreatment. If,inhisconversationwithPolus,Socratesisimplicitlycomparedtoapractitionerofthecraftofruling,inhisconversationwithCallicles,Socratesexplicitlyclaimsto besuch.InthedenouementofthispassageinwhichSocrateshasbadgeredCalliclesintoadmittingthat,inthesicksoul,thedesiresmustberestrained,Socratesnext makesapassingcommentthat,inthefirstplace,characterizesCallicleshimselfbutitalsocharacterizesSocrates'elencticprocedure.Callicles,objectingtothe directionthattheSocraticelenchushastaken,says,''Idonotknowwhatyouaretalkingabout,Socratesaskoneoftheseothers.''Socratesreplies,"Thismanwill notsubmittobeingimprovedandhimselfunder

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goingthetreatmentwehavebeentalkingaboutbeingdisciplined"(505c). ClearlythenSocratesisalsocharacterizinghisownpracticeofelenchus.BringingCalliclestothepointofcontradictinghispreviousstatementsaboutthesuperiorityof undisciplineddesiresis,initself,akindofdiscipline.Thepainofthetreatmentcomesfromhavingtoadmitthecontradiction,ofcourse.SincethestrengthofCallicles' reactionshowsusthatSocrates'elencticconclusionispainfultreatment,Socrateslookslikeajudgemetingoutpunishment.47IfSocrates'elenchusisanexampleof therulingcraft,thepainthatitinflictsoughttobeameansforrestrainingdesiresthatneedrestraint.Indeed,inthispassageSocratesisratherexplicitaboutconnecting hiselenchuswiththetreatmentthatrestrainsdesires.The"treatmentwehavebeentalkingabout"isthetreatmentthatrestrainsdesiresandmakesthesoula harmoniousunity. However,onthesurface,elenchussimplyseemstobeamethodforexposingtheinconsistenciesinthemoralbeliefsofhisinterlocutors.Intheintroductiontohis conversationwithCallicles,hejokesthattheybothlovetwothings:CallicleslovesDemos,thesonofPyrilampes,andtheAtheniandemosthatis,theAthenianmob SocrateslovesAlcibiadesandphilosophy.BecauseCallicleswillnotcontradicthisbelovedAtheniandemos,heinvolveshimselfininconsistency.Socrates'unflattering descriptionofCallicles,however,becomesconsiderablymorepointedwhenhechallengesCalliclestorefutetheclaimthatwrongdoingandnotpayingthepenalty whenonehasdonewrongaretheworstevils.Otherwise,
you,Callicles,willnotbeinagreementwithyourselfbutyouwillbeoutoftuneinyourwholelife.AndIthink,ohmostexcellentone,thatitisbetterformylyre,orachorusthatI sponsor,tobedisharmoniousandoutoftuneormanymentodisagreewithmeandcontradictmethanthatI,beingone,shouldbeoutoftunewithmyselfandcontradict myself.(482bc)

TheaddresstoCalliclesatthebeginningoftheirconversationisclearlymeanttoshowthedirectionthatSocrateswilltrytotake.Consistency,then,isavaluetobe highlyprizedbuttheconsistencyisnotjustaconsistencyofanyopinionswhatsoever.SincetheconsistencyisofvitalimportanceforCallicles'wholelife,surelythe opinionsarefairlyimportant,presumablymoral,

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beliefs.WhatisevenmorearrestingaboutthisaddressisthewaythatSocratesimpliesthatCalliclesalreadyharborsaninconsistencyinhismoralbeliefs.48Socrates saysthatifhecannotrefutetheclaimthatwrongdoingandnotpayingthepenaltywhenonehasdonewrongaretheworstevils,thenhewillbeoutoftunewith himself.SurelySocratesisthenassumingthatCallicleswillbeoutoftunewithhimselfbecausethisopinionisinconsistentwithsomeotherbeliefheholds.So,afew pageslater,whenSocratescatcheshiminaninconsistency,wecanreadhisaddressasprophetic. However,aswehavealreadyseen,attheconclusionoftheelenchusSocratesalsosaysthatexposingthisinconsistencyisawayofdiscipliningCalliclesintheway thatthephysiciandisciplinesthedesiresofthesickperson.Weshouldnotpassoverthisjuncturelightly.Theimplicationisthatexposingacontradictioninone'sbeliefs willhaveaneffectonwhatonedesires.Thereishereanimportantassumptionabouttheconnectionbetweenwhatonebelievesandwhatonedesires,abouttheway oneaffectstheother.Inthisdialogue,atleast,elenchusisnotjustaquestionofpropositionsitisalsoaquestionofattitudes. Recently,commentatorshaveemphasizedthewayinwhichelenchusintheGorgiashaspsychological,aswellaslogical,significance.49Theynotethattheelenchus implicatestheinterlocutor'sdeeplyheldpreferencesordeepestdesires.Thefollowingisanattempttoelaborateonthatinsight.Althoughthecommentatorspointup therelationbetweenbeliefsanddesires,whattheydonottellusisjusthowcontradictingabeliefaffectsadesire.Theanswer,ofcourse,beginswiththefactthat,in theGorgias,thebeliefsthataretheobjectofelenchusarenotmerelynotionalorspeculative.Therenderingofthecharactersmakesitclearthatthesebeliefsare intimatelyrelatedtowhatthecharactersdesirethebeliefsexpresswhatthecharactersdesire.Indeed,thedesiresseemtoberatherlargescaledesiresaboutthe shapeofone'swholelife.Itisthenatureofsuchbeliefsthatwhenoneattacksthebeliefonealsoattacksthedesire.InthecaseofSocrates'elenchusofCallicles,we knowthatCalliclesbelievesthatthelifeofunrestraineddesiresisthebestlife.AsSocratesmakesclearat505bc,itisthisbeliefthatiscontradictedbyhavingto admitthatthesoulwhosedesiresarerestrainedisbetteroffthanthesoulwhosedesiresareunrestrained.Nowifwesupposethatthisfirstbeliefismotivatedby,and expresses,thedesiretoleadsuchalifethenit

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isthisdesirethatisthefocusoftheelencticattack.Socrates'elenchusofCallicles,then,notonlycontradictshisbeliefthatthelifeofunrestraineddesiresisthebest lifeitalsoattackshisdesiretoleadsuchalife.Indeed,insofarasattackingthebeliefrequiresCalliclestogiveupormodifyhisbelief,attackingthisbeliefentailsgiving upormodifyingthedesiretoleadalifeofunrestraineddesire.50 IfSocrates'elenchusrestrainsCallicles'desiretoleadalifeofunrestrainedpleasure,thenasignificantshifthastakenplaceinPlato'saccountoftherulingcraft.The desiresthataretheobjectofelenchusareofadifferentorderfromthedesiresthatwereofconcernintheimageoftheleakyjarsandinthemedicalanalogy.Thelatter werepresentedasinsatiabledesiresbutthedesiretoleadalifeofunrestrainedpleasurethedesirethatistheobjectofelenchusisnotitselfaninsatiabledesire.In thefirstplace,itisnotadesireusedonlyasavehicletoattainthepleasureofsatisfaction.Moreimportantly,however,thedesiretoleadalifeofunrestrainedpleasure issomethinglikeasecondorderdesire.Itismorecomprehensiveand,potentiallyatleast,moreconsideredthananyparticularinsatiabledesire.Aninsatiabledesire can,ofcourse,determinethecourseofone'slifehowever,itmaynotbeadesiretoleadthatkindoflife.Ithasnogoalmorelongrangethanthenextcycleof pleasurablesatisfaction.Thedesiretoleadsuchalife,ontheotherhand,encompassesthatpleasureandallthatfollowandotherconsequencesaswell. Ifelenchusisatypeofrulingcraftandifitworksonthesesecondorderdesires,thentheaccountoftherulingcraftismorecomplexthanitwaspreviously.Notonlyis thelevelofdesiresdifferentbutwhatmakesthemproblematicisdifferent.Thedesiretoleadalifeofunrestrainedpleasureisnotitselfaninsatiabledesireifitis morallyproblematic,itmustbeproblematicforreasonsdifferentfromthosethatmakeinsatiabledesiresproblematic.Moreover,ifthedesiretoleadsuchalifeis problematicbutnotinsatiable,restrainingthatdesireisdifferentfromtherestraintappropriateforinsatiabledesires.Assecondorder,thesedesiresarethesortthatget expressedinbeliefsaboutwhatitisbesttodo.Thatthesekindsofbeliefsaretheobjectofelenchusisnotsurprising,then.Indeed,itisthesesortsofbeliefsthat Socratesreferstoat466eff.,wherehetalksaboutthedistinctionbetweenwhatonethinksbestandwhatonewants(boulesthai).Whatonewantsisthegoodand whatonewantsisnotalwaysthesameaswhatone

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thinksbest.Beliefsaboutwhatonethinksbestcanalsobewithoutintelligencepresumablyitistheirbeingwithoutintelligencethatexplainswhytheycanbeatodds withwhatonewants.Onecanseehereapossibleroleforelenchus.SinceSocratessaysthatthesebeliefsarewithoutintelligence,hemightwellseeelenchus exploitingthatfactinanattempttopointouttheirlackofcorrespondencewithwhatonewants.51 Ifthisaccountofelenchusiscorrectsofar,thenseveralresultsfollowforelenchusasacraftforharmonizingdesires.Elenchusworksprimarilyatthelevelofsecond orderdesires.Socratesseemstoaimatbeliefsthatexpresscertainsecondorderdesiresandattemptstoshowacontradictionbetweenthatbeliefandsomeother belieftheinterlocutorholds.Socratesseemstoassumethatpointingupacontradictionwillforceachoicebetweenbeliefsandthattheinterlocutorwill,oroughtto, giveupthebeliefthatexpressesthetargetedsecondorderdesire.Further,iftheinterlocutorgivesupthebeliefhewillalsogiveupthedesire.Inthiswayelenchus bringsacertainharmonyintobeliefsand,inturn,intosecondorderdesiresexpressedbybeliefs.Itislessclearhowelenchusmightdisciplineinsatiabledesires themselveswhatwemightcall"firstorderdesires."Ofcourse,ifelenchuscausesCallicles,forexample,togiveupthesecondorderdesiretoleadalifeof unrestraineddesires,thenelenchusindirectlyaffectsinsatiabledesires.ItisnotclearthatCallicleshassuchdesiresalreadybutifhedid,thepainofcontradictionmight beakindofpunishmentthatdisciplinedthemanalogoustopunishmentinflictedbythejudge.52Suchaviewmakesthepunishmentinflictedbythecraftofelenchus aninternaloneinsteadofexternal.Ifitwereexternal,Callicleswouldbeshamedbyhavingtoadmit,beforehispeers,toacontradictioninhisbeliefs.Itisnotthat Calliclesisactuallymadeuncomfortablebydiscoveringacontradictionheismadeuncomfortablebyhavingtoadmitinpublictoacontradiction.Ontheotherhand,if thepunishmentofelenchusisactuallyinternal,itworksbymakingCalliclesfacesomethingabouthimselfthatitispainfulforhimtoface.Inthisreading,Calliclesfeels painbecauseheseesacontradictionbetweentwobeliefs,atleastoneofwhichexpresseshowhewantstolive.Sincethecontradictionisofadeeplyheldbelief,one centraltohisconceptionofhislife,Calliclesisforcedtomakeamomentouschoice.Calliclesisbeingmadetofacethefactthathisdesireforacertainkindoflifeisat oddswithsomethingelsehebelieves.Itisinthiswaythatthecraft

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ofelenchusdisciplinesdesiresbypointingupacontradictioninbeliefs. Atthispointwecansummarizethemajorfeaturesfromourinvestigationofthetherapeuticcraftofruling.Whileitisclearthatthedesiresarethefocusofthiscraft,itis notquitesoclearhowthecraftwillapproachthedesiresthatarethoughttoneedtreatment.Firstofall,Calliclespresentedanidealaccountofthedesiresas unrestrainedmeansforenjoyingpleasure.BothSocratesandCalliclestookthisconditiontobeoneofunrestraint.However,Socratescharacterizedlackofrestraintto beinsatiability,aninabilitytoattainthegoalofdesire,satiety.Thecontraryideal,heldupbySocrates,isalifeofmoderatedesires,alifeofsatietyinwhich,itis suggested,eachdesireisabletofulfillitsgoalasadesire.Thereiscontainedinthisidealthenotionofcorrectfunctioningforeachdesire.LaterSocratespresents insatiabilityasapathologicalconditioninneedoftreatment.ThetreatmentSocratesprescribesinthemedicalanalogyisrestraintofinsatiabledesiresbyasortof discipline,likethedisciplineimposedbythephysician.Thelattertreatmentattemptstorenderinsatiabledesirescompatiblewithotherpartsofthesoul,including presumablyotherlessinsistentdesires.Eventhoughthisaccountisatbestsuggestive,itdoesintroduceforthefirsttimethenotionthatthegoodstateforthesoulisan integrationofcertainkindsofdesires.Herethegoalofthecraftofrulingissaidtobeafittingtogetherandharmonizing,byrestrainingthem,ofdesiresgrown excessive.Theidealofpsychicharmonymakesitsfirstappearance. Finally,inelaboratingthetherapeuticcraftofjudging,Socratessaysthatpunishmentisthewaythatthiscraftachievesrestraintofdesires.Althoughhisaccountisnot explicitastohowpunishmentachievesrestraintofdesires,Socratescompareshisownelenchustoatypeofjudicialpunishment.Thepainofthepunishmentisthepain ofcontradictingone'sdeeplyheldbeliefsabouttheconductofone'slife.Socratesseemstoassumethatthecontradictionwilldisciplineandrestraindesires.This developmentsuggeststhatcontradictingbeliefsdisciplinesthedesiresthesebeliefsexpressandthatthedesiresaresecondorderdesiresaboutthekindoflifeone wouldlead.Discipliningthesedesiresaffectsthefirstorderdesiresforexample,theactualorwouldbeinsatiabledesires. Forthepresent,however,wecanatleastseetheoutlinesoftheanswerthattheGorgiasofferstoourquestionabouttheperfec

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tionatwhichthepoliticalcraftaimsanditsrelationtothewelfareoftheruled.Eventhoughmuchaboutthisaccountofperfectionisstillschematicandthus problematic,wecan,nevertheless,seeifonlydimlytherelationofperfectiontowelfareintendedbytheaccount.Theruler,astheshepherdofthepeople,seeks theirperfection(tobeltiston),accordingtoSocratesinRepublicI.Buttheperfection,accordingtotheGorgias,isapsychologicalperfectiontherulerseekstobring thedesiresintoorder.Thegapbetweenperfectionandwelfareseemstohavebeennarrowed.Iftheperfectionsoughtbythecraftofrulingisthemoderationofthe desiresandifthatmoderationproducesacertaincompatibilityofdesires,perfectionisclosertobeingthewelfareofthepersonwhosedesiresareperfected.Thus, Socrates'notionofmoderationinthedesiresseemstohonoragenuinesenseofsubjectivewelfare.53 VII Wecanclosethissectionbylookingatamajorproblemthisaccountofperfectionleavesopen,however.Itisonerelatedtoarecentcontroversyabouttheefficacyof elenchus.GregoryVlastospointedupwhathecalled"theproblemofSocraticelenchus."Ifelenchusonlyshowsacontradictionbetweenbeliefs,itcannotshowwhich oftwobeliefsisthecorrectone.54Vlastos'interpretationmakesSocraticelenchusbothnaiveandindefensible.55Onewaytoputthisproblemistosaythatelenchus itselfjustdoesnotseemeffectiveinthewayinwhichSocratesseemstothinkiteffective.ItdependsonconsistencybutSocratesdoesnotseemawarethatthereis morethanonewaytoachieveconsistencyofbeliefs.Evenifhisinterlocutordoesholdthesecondbeliefthebeliefthatentailsthedenialoftheinterlocutor'soriginal beliefhemaywellbepreparedtogiveupthesecondbeliefratherthanhisoriginalbelief.Infact,thisproblemseemsevenmorepronouncedifwesupposethatthe beliefinquestionisanexpressionofadesiretoleadacertainkindoflife.WhyshouldCalliclesgiveuphisdesiretoleadalifeofunrestraineddesirejustbecausehis beliefthatthislifeisthebestcontradictssomeotherbeliefheholds?Whyshouldthesecondbeliefthatthesoulwithrestraineddesiresisbetterthanthesoulwith unrestraineddesireshavesuchaprofoundeffectonthesoulofCallicles?Ifhisdesiretoleadthelifeofunrestraineddesiresissostrong,whydoeshenotjustgiveup thesec

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ondbelief?Indeed,hemightbeimaginedtobegratefultoSocratesforhavingshownhimthatheholdsanincompatibleandunnecessarybelief. CharlesKahn,oneofthosecommentatorswhoholdthattheelenchushaspsychologicalimplications,comestothedefenseofSocraticelenchus.Heholdsthatthe elenchusexposesnotjustanincompatibilityofbeliefsbutalsoanincompatibilityofdesires.56Accordingtothisinterpretation,besidesthedesirethatSocratesis attemptingtorestrain,thereisanotherdesireoneincompatiblewiththedesiretoberestrained.Referringtothepassageat466e,KahnsaysthatSocraticelenchus assumesthateveryonewantsthegood.Notonlydoeselenchusassumethateveryonewantsthegoodbutitalsoassumesthateveryoneidentifies,atsomelevel,the goodwithvirtue.57Thisinterpretationcanbeincorporatedintoourpreviousaccountofelenchus.Wewouldsaythatthetwocontradictingbeliefs,exposedinthe elenchus,bothexpressdesiresoftheinterlocutor.WehaveassumedthatCallicles'beliefthatthelifeofunrestraineddesireisthebestlifeisanexpressionofhis desiretoleadsuchalife.Wecouldalsoassumethatthesecondbelief,whichelenchusleadsCalliclestoassertandwhichcontradictsthefirstbelief,alsoexpressesa desire.InthecaseofCallicles,hisreluctant,elencticallyproducedadmissionthatthesoulwhosedesiresarerestrainedisbetteroffthanthesoulwhosedesiresare unrestrainedwould,insomeway,expressanother,unconscious,desire.Kahnwouldsaythatthisadmissionexpressestheunsuspecteddesiretoleadalifeof harmoniousandordereddesires.Thus,Calliclesisinthegripofincompatibledesires. However,ifCallicles'situationisstatedinthisway,thisapproachdoesnotreallyescapesomethinganalogoustotheproblemofSocraticelenchus.Evenifwe supposethatthecontradictorybeliefsexposeincompatiblefundamentaldesires,andevenifwesupposethattheexposureispainful,itisnotobviouswhyCallicles shouldchooseonedesireovertheother.Thathemustchooseoneisobviousbutwhyheshouldchoosetheonehechoosesisnotobvious.Elenchusaloneisnomore abletoshowwhichoftwoincompatibledesirestochoosethanitisabletoshowwhichoftwocontradictorybeliefsiscorrect.Justastheefficacyofelenchusasa modeofdemonstrationdependsonanadditionalassumptionaboutwhichofthetwocontradictorybeliefsiscorrect,sotheefficacyofelenchusasadisciplineof desiresdependsonanassumptionaboutwhichoftwoincompatible

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desiresispreferable.Elenchuscannotbeefficaciousbyexposinganincompatibilityofdesiresalone.Inorderforelenchustobeefficaciousindiscipliningvicious desires,onemustassumethatthecomparisonofthetwodesireswillalsoshowthatthedesireforvirtueisone'sstrongest,orauthentic,desire. Indeed,Kahn'sinterpretationanticipatesthisobjection.Socraticelenchusassumesadeterminingrolefortheoverarchingdesireforthegood.Undertheguidanceof elenchus,then,Socrates'interlocutormightcometoseethat,incomparingthelifeofunrestraineddesireswiththelifeofbalancedandharmoniousdesires,thelatter andnottheformerfitswithhisfundamentaldesireforthegood.Whatisassumedisthatthedesireforthegoodhasthisdeterminingforceinhisinterlocutors.58 Indeed,ifweassumeauniversaldesireforthegood,itmakessomesensetosaythatexposingtheincompatibilityofdesiresisawayofmakingtheinterlocutorrealize whichofthetwodesiresheactuallyprefers.Itisbynomeansnecessarybutitisnotunlikelythat,facedwithtwosuchdesires,onewouldachievetherequisiteclarity aboutwhichdesireisone'strueorauthenticdesire.Moreover,Socratesmightplausiblybepresentedasbelievingthatone'sdesireforthegoodplaysthedecisiverole inthisrealization.Itisevenplausibletosaythatthedesireforthegoodwouldinclineonetowardthedesireforvirtue.Kahnwarns,however,thattheprocesswould beprotrepticratherthandeductive.Hisreasonisthatverbsfordesiregovernopaquecontexts.59JustbecauseCalliclesdesiresthegood,itdoesnotfollowthathe desirestheharmonyandbalanceofdesiresevenifthelatterarethegood.Afterall,hemightnotknowthatthegoodistheharmonyandbalanceofdesires.Ifhedid notknowthisvitalfact,thenhecouldnotbeleddeductivelyfromhisdesireforthegoodtoadesireforharmonyandbalanceofdesires.ThemostthatSocratescan hopeisthatelencticquestioningcanbringCalliclestorealizetheidentityofthegoodwithharmonyandbalanceofdesires.Absentsucharealization,Calliclescannot concludefromadesireforthegoodtoadesireforharmonyandbalanceofdesires. Thereisaproblem,however,evenwiththisscenario.Ifweassumeforthemomentthatelenchusisdeductive,itmighthavethefollowingshape.Thedesireforthe goodwouldfunctionasthestandardinacompatibilitytest.Whenelenchusrevealstwocontradictorybeliefs,thesebeliefsexpressincompatibledesires.Socratic elenchuswouldthenbringthedesireforthegoodtothe

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foreandtheresolutioniseffectedbycomparingthetwodesirestothedesireforthegood.Iftheinterlocutorseesthatoneofthetwodesiresisimpliedbythedesire forthegood,thenhecouldseethattheotherdesireisincompatiblewiththedesireforthegood.Sincehedesiresthegood,hewillseewhichdesireispreferable. Thus,whenCalliclesseesthathisdesiretoleadalifeofunrestraineddesireisincompatiblewiththedesireexpressedinhisbeliefthatasoulwithrestraineddesiresis betterthanonewithunrestraineddesires,heisforcedtoseetherelationofthetwodesirestothedesireforthegood.Hethenseesthatthedesireforthegoodimplies adesireforasoulwithrestraineddesiresandthatthedesireforalifeofunrestraineddesireisincompatiblewiththedesireforthegood.Henowknowswhichdesire ispreferable.However,theproblemwiththismodelisthatthedesireforthegooddoesnotseemdeterminantenoughtohavetherequireddeductiveforce.The difficultyisthat,inorderforthedeductivemodeltowork,thedesireforthegoodwouldhavetohaveenoughcontenttomakethedeterminationofimplicationand incompatibilitypossible.Onthesurface,atleast,itdoesnotseemtohavesuchacontent.Thedesireforthegooddoesnotseemtohaveenoughcontenttoimplythe desireforarestrainedandbalancedsoul. NowonderthatSocratesissuchathreateningfigureinthisdialogue,thesubjectofsomuchanger.Helistensintentlytohisinterlocutor,searchingforthebeliefthat betrayswhathebelievestobeamorallycorruptdesire.thenhemovesinwithhiselencticquestioningandshowshowthebeliefcontradictsanotherbeliefthe interlocutorholds.Thefirstbeliefis,however,notjustarandomlychosenbeliefitisthearticulationofadeeplyseatedandcentrallyimportantdesire.Thegeniusof Socrates'elencticmethodisthathecanexposesuchdesires.Suchbehavioristhreatening,ofcourse,becausedeeplyseatedandcentrallyimportantdesires especiallyoneswithbroadimplicationsforone'swholelifeareusuallyguardedclosely.Noonewantsthosedesiresridiculednoonewantsanyonetakingoreven tryingtotakethesedesiresaway.YetthiskindofdiremptionispreciselywhatSocratesseemstoaimfor. Becauseweallhavesuchdeepseatedandimportantdesires,wecanunderstandCallicles'anger.EachofusprobablywouldatleastwonderwhySocratesshouldbe allowedtoprobeourverysouls,seekingoutthosedesireshethinksevil.Wemighteasily

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becomeangrywithhimbecausewemightfindhimtobemeddling.EachofusmightfeelthatSocratesisdealingwiththingsourheart'sdesiresaboutwhichhe cannotpossiblyhaveproperunderstanding.Itseemspresumptuousintheextremeforhimtoexposeandattempttomodifyorextinguishadesiresoimportanttoone's wholelife.But,moretothepoint,whyshouldweallowhimtocharacterizetheexposeddesireasfittobeextirpated?Thereissomethingarbitraryattheveryheartof Socrates'procedure.Theelenchusatmostshowsanincompatibilityofdesiresbuttheelenchusbyitselfcannotshowtheinterlocutorwhichoftheincompatible desiresshouldbeabandoned.NeverthelessSocratesdecideswhichdesireistheculpritandthereforewhichdesireshouldbeabandoned.Wemightwanttoaskwhy hethinksitobviousthat,ifonefeelsthecontradiction,thedesireforthegoodwillleadtotheSocraticallydeterminedoutcome.Indeed,oneofthesalientfeaturesof thisdialogueisthefinaldispositionofthecharacterCallicles.SocrateshasmadelittleprogressinconvincingCalliclesthatalifeofunrestraineddesiresisnotworthyof pursuit.SocratesmaycompareunrestraineddesirestodiseasebutitisnotclearthatCallicleseveragreestothecomparison.Hehasyettorenouncealifeof unrestraineddesiresalifeofthegreatestpossibleinfluxashisidealmerelybecausehisbeliefthatsuchalifeisdesirableseemstorunafoulofotherbeliefsheholds. Ifanything,Calliclesseemsinclinedtomodifytheseotherbeliefsortoseektoevadeinsomeotherwaythecontradiction.Calliclesseemstowanttoclingtotheideal ofalifegivenovertotheendlessfillingofthoseemptyjars. Inonewayoflookingatit,thisproblemcastsdoubtonwhatwesaidpreviouslyabouttherelationbetweenperfectionandwelfare.Attheendofthelastsectionwe saidthatthegapbetweenperfectionandwelfareisnarrowedifperfectionmoderatesdesiressothattheyarecompatibleandifcompatibilityofdesiresconstitutes,or isapartof,one'soverallgood.However,ifthereismorethanonewaytoachievecompatibilityofdesiresby,forexample,givingupthemoderatedesiresthenit ispossiblethatonewouldachievecompatibilityofdesiresbylettingimmoderatedesiredefineanalternativegood.Thus,insatiabledesiresmightcometodefineinthe mindofCalliclesthegoodlifeasthelifegovenovertothepleasuresofreplenishmentaslongasheiswillingtogiveupwhateverbeliefhehasaboutthevalueof bravery.Seenfromthisperspective,thewelfareofthesoulwouldbediffer

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entfromitsperfection,whenthelatterimpliesrestraintandmoderation.Thus,thegapbetweenperfectionandwelfareopensagain. TheseissuesinmoralpsychologyareonesthatmustbeaddressedintheRepublic.Inthelatterdialogue,Platomakessignificantadvancesinmoralpsychology, introducingamorecomplexaccountofthepartsofthesoul.Presumably,thecraftthatordersthesepartsisaccordinglymademorecomplexitmustordermoreand quitedifferentparts.TheseaspectsofthematuremoraltheoryareaddressedinBooksIIIV.Itis,ofcourse,animportantpartofthismorecomplexmoral psychologythatwegetabetterviewofwhatmoderationinthedesiresisandhowtogoaboutachievingit.Atthesametime,welearnthatthereismoretothe politicalcraftofsoultendingthanmerelymoderatingdesires.Theotherpartsofthesoulpresentfurtheraspectsforbalanceandharmony.Itisinthecontextofthis advancedmoralpsychologythatPlatoaddressesanewtheissueoftherelationofdesirestothegoodofthewholesoul.Aswell,theRepublicrevisitstheissueof consistencyofmoralbeliefsandcompatibilityofdesiresasthecontentofthegoodlife.Sincetherearedifferentwaystoachievecompatibility,merecompatibilityof desiresisnotenough.Thereneedstobeastandardwherebyonecanjudgeamongthepossiblewaystomakeone'sdesirescompatible.ThestandardsaretheForms theyarepresentedinBooksVVIoftheRepublicastheguidesthattherulersuseinmakingtheirdecisionsforthecity.Aswell,thesearethestandardsthattherulers useinestablishingandmaintainingthecorrectorderingofsoulsofthecitizens. HavingseenwhatheadwaytheGorgiashasmadeinexplicatingtherelationbetweenperfectioninthesoulandhumanwelfare,weneednowtorecallthatinthis dialogueSocratesalsoidentifiestheperfectionofthesoul,thediscipliningofdesires,asvirtue,arete.Andwhile,inthispassage,areteisfirstofallusedinageneral sensetoapplytoeverykindofexcellence,includingthatofinanimateobjects,whenSocratesturnstohumanareteitisclearthathemeanstheusualpanoplyof virtues,thatis,justice,temperance,bravery,andpiety.WeneedtorememberthatSocratesismakingaratherboldclaim,thatis,thatpsychichealthwillresultina certainkindofbehaviortowardothers.Thepersonwithmoderateddesireswilltreatotherhumansjustly,thegodspiously.Suchapersonwillactcourageouslyin, amongotherthings,the

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affairsofthecity.Therelationbetweenhumanwelfareaspsychichealthandthepracticeofthesevirtuesis,ofcourse,avexedquestionbothintheGorgiasandthe Republic.Foritisnotobviousthatpsychichealthwillautomaticallyresultinthatkindofconductthatweidentifyasvirtuous.Whenweturntothelatterdialogue,we willneedtoseeinwhatwayitallowsustohaveabetterviewofthemostdifficultissue,therelationbetweenpsychichealthandthevirtuestherelationbetween disciplineddesiresandtreatingothersjustly,actingcourageouslyintheaffairsofthecity,treatingthegodspiously. Notes Alltranslations,unlessotherwisenoted,aretheauthor's. 1.WewillfollowtheorderofthedialoguesoutlinedinT.Irwin,Plato'sMoralTheory(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1977),291292.AlthoughIrwindoesnotagree withthosewhotakeRepublicItobeanearlydialogue,wewilltreatitasone.ThedifferenceonthispointisnotsignificantevenIrwinadmitsthatthedialogueis Socraticinthewaythatitpresentsthecraftanalogy(178).WhatwesayaboutRepublicIneedsonlythisconcession. 2.Thisdistinctionbetweenthecraftanalogyandthecraftofrulingisnotoneproperlyunderstoodbymanycommentators.Cf.Plato:Gorgias,T.Irwin,trans.and ed.(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1979),214,n.503deandC.D.C.Reeve,PhilosopherKings(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1988),1920. 3.Cf.MichaelJ.O'Brien,TheSocraticParadoxesandtheGreekMind(ChapelHill:UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress,1967),58ff. 4.Noclaimisbeingmadeabouttherelativedatesofthesetwodialoguesbutonlyabouttherelationofrelativecomplexityofaccountsoftherulingcraft.Suchaclaim isconsistentwiththenotionthatRepublicIisa''Socratic''dialogue,evenifitwaswrittenaftertheGorgias. 5.Cf.DavidL.Roochnik,"Socrates'UseoftheTechneAnalogy,"EssaysonthePhilosophyofSocrates,HughH.Benson,ed.(NewYork:Oxford,1992) Roochnikgivesahelpfullistofcitationsofthecraftanalogy.However,histhesisabouttheimplicationsoftheanalogycontradictstheaimsofthepresentbookIwill addresshisthesisabouttheseimplicationsinthenextchapter. 6.Thefollowingreferencesarebynomeansexhaustive.Horsetraining:Apo.25ac,Rep.342cmedicine:Charm.171a,Euthyd.291e,Euthyphro13d,Gor. 501a,Rep.341ephysicaltraining:Crito47b,Gor.464bhuntsmanship:Euthyphro13efarming:Euthyd.291eshep

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herding:Rep.345dbuilding:Euthyphro13eworkinginbrass,wood,andwool:Charm.173dcalculation:Charm.165e,Gor.453e. 7.Cf.J.Gould,TheDevelopmentofPlato'sEthics(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1955),16ff.J.Lyons,StructuralSemantics(Oxford:Basil Blackwell,1963),139ff.WhileLyonssaysthat"thefieldofepistemeisdividedbythefieldsoftechneandgnosis"(178),itmustberememberedthatheistalking aboutthewholePlatoniccorpusthepresentqualifiedclaimisabouttheearlydialoguesonly.Cf.Charm.165c4elEuthyd.281a1b2. 8.Cf.Aristotle'sMetaphysicsBookI,980b25981b15.SeealsoMarthaNussbaum,TheFragilityofGoodness(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1986), 96andJ.E.Tiles,"TechneandMoralExpertise,"Philosophy59(1984):6061. 9.Cf.D.S.Hutchinson,"DoctrinesoftheMeanandtheDebateConcerningSkillsinFourthCenturyMedicine,RhetoricandEthics,"Apeiron21(1988):3435. 10.Cf.KimonLycos,PlatoonJusticeandPower(Albany:StateUniversityofNewYorkPress,1987),109ff.foranattempttodefendthisargument. 11.ForaveryhelpfuldiscussionofThrasymachus'positionseeP.P.Nicholson,"UnravelingThrasymachus'ArgumentintheRepublic,"Phronesis19(1974):21032. SeealsoF.Sparshott,"AnArgumentforThrasymachus,"Apeiron21(1988):5567. 12.Cf.Lycos,PlatoonJustice,4647. 13.SuchwouldbetheimplicationofNicholson'sanalysisofinjusticein"Unraveling"216:"Whatthenisjusticefortheruler?Sincejusticeistheadvantageofanother, justicefortherulermustbethesubject'sadvantage.Itisbecausethisisso,thatThrasymachusalwaysprefersinjusticetojustice,thatis,prefersthepromotionofone's ownadvantage." 14.Cf.J.R.Bambrough,"Plato'sPoliticalAnalogies,"inPlato:ACollectionofCriticalEssays,vol.2.GregoryVlastos,ed.(GardenCity:Anchor,1971),187 205.BambrougharguesthatPlatoismakingonlyananalogybetweenrulingandcraft.AccordingtoBambroughtheproblemwiththenotionofrulingasacraftisthat craftisnecessarilyinstrumentalitcanhavenointernalstandardforwhatitissupposedtoaccomplish.Thispoint,iftrue,wouldworkagainstSocrates'argumenthere. Socrateswantstoarguethatthecraftofrulingdoeshaveaninternalstandardforwhatitissupposedtoaccomplish,thatis,thegoodoftheruled.Against Bambrough'sposition,Tiles("TechneandMoralExpertise,"4966)holdsthatcraftentailsanunderstanding(episteme)oftheendofthecraft.Inwhatfollows,Iam tryingtoaddplausibilitytothispositionbypointinguptheshiftfromtosympherontotobeltiston.

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Itseemsmorereasonabletothinkofacrafthavinganendiftheendisthoughtofastobeltiston. 15.Thisreadingoftobeltistonisbasedonthefollowingfacts.(a)Tobeltionisformedfromthecomparativeofagathos'good'andmeansliterally'the better.'(b)Inthissense,then,toseek,literallyput,thebetterofanobjectistoseektheimprovementofanobject.(c)Beltistosisthesuperlativeofwhichbeltionis thecomparative.(d)Tobeltistonmeansliterally'thebest.'Therefore,iftoseekthebetterofanobjectistoseekitsimprovement,then,byextension,toseekthebest ofanobjectistoseekitsperfection,itscomingtofullflower. 16.Cf.R.J.R.Kraut,"ReasonandJusticeinPlato'sRepublic,"ExegesisandArgument,Lee,Mourelatos,andRorty,eds.(Assen:vanGorcum,1973),220.

Suppose,however,thattheartisandoeshisjobbecausehelovesit.Hestartslearninghistradeduringchildhoodandbecomesenthusiasticaboutit.Then,havingmastered it,hepursuesitwiththesamesinglemindeddevotionshownbythecarpenterwhorejectslengthymedicaltreatment.Unlikeanartisanwhoisconcernedprimarilywithmaking money,thedevotedcraftsmanwouldgotogreatlengthstomakethebestproducthecan.

17.ForaninterestingattempttountanglethisparticularfeatureofSocrates'argumentagainstThrasymachusseeLycos,JusticeandPower,106119. 18.However,ifthisnewclaimisplausibleandproofagainstThrasymachus'objection,ititselfisopentoanotherobjection.EvenifSocratessubstitutedperfectionfor welfareinhisargument,surelyhedidnotmeantoabandontheclaimthatcraftseeksthewelfareofitsobject.Surelyhemeantsomethingliketheclaimthatcraftseeks thewelfareofitsobjectbyseekingitsperfection.Yet,itisnotsoclearthatjustbecauseacraftseekstheperfectionofitsobjectthatitisthereforealsoseekingthe welfareofitsobject.Afterall,itisnotlogicallyimpossibleatafirstglance,anywaytotry,andsucceed,inmakingaracehorseaperfectracehorseandmakeit diebeforeitstimeorastudentintoanexcellentphilosophymajorandmakeherunhappy,hauntedbytheeternalpuzzlesofphilosophy.Cf.Irwin,Gorgias,134, n.464c.Perhapswecanexplainthisdifferencebetweenperfectionandadvantagebysayingthatperfectionisdefinedintermsoffunction.Therearemanyfunctionsan objectmayfulfillandtherearecraftstoperfectthosefunctions.Butitisclearthatfulfillingandafortioriperfectingatleastsomeofthosefunctionswouldbetothe disadvantageoftheobject.Quiteclearly,ourowncontemporarydebateaboutsocialpoliciesimpingesonthissameissue.Whenwetrytoperfectchildrenintogood citizens,arewemerelydomesticatingthemtothedemandsofadysfunctionaladultworldorratherarewedoingsomegoodforthemashumanbeings?Unlikethe chargeof

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Thrasymachus,thischargedoesnotsaythatanyoneelseisbenefitingfromthisdomestication,onlythatthoseperfectedtofunctionswithintheadultworldarenot benefited. Socrateshasshiftedthegroundofhisargumentfromtheclaimthatrulingseeksthewelfareoftheruledtotheclaimthatrulingseekstheperfectionoftheruled. TherebyhehassidesteppedthegrosserimplicationsofThrasymachus'argumentbuthehasopenedhimselfuptoamoreprofoundobjection.Therulersmightnot beselfservingbuttheymaystillbemakingvictimsoftheirsubjectsby,evenunwittingly,accommodatingthemtoaninhumanfate. 19.Cf.BasilO'Neil,"TheStrugglefortheSoulofThrasymachus,"AncientPhilosophy8(1988):167185.O'NeilalsonotesthevitallinkbetweenrulinginRep.Iand inGor.However,hepresentsthelinkinadifferentorderofdevelopmentthanfromtheonepresentedherebutthenhisfocusisnotsomuchtherulingcraftinthecity asrulingcraftinthesoul.OnthispointheadmitsthatBookIanticipatestherestoftheRepublic. 20.MaryMargaretMackenzie,PlatoonPunishment(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1981)showshowpunishment,forPlato,hastherapyforthecriminal asitsfunction.Althoughanacceptabletheoryofpunishment,shealsoshowsthatitisincompetitionwiththeoriesinwhichthewelfareofthecriminalisnotparamount. 21.Ifpleasurecomesonlyfromsatisfyingdesires,fromfillingthejars,oncethefillingisoversoisthepleasure.Forexample,thepleasureofagoodmealcomesfrom eating,whichsatisfiestheemptinessofhungeroncehungerissatisfiedpleasureceases.Takenliterally,theimageimpliesthatthejarscanbefilleduponceandforall thenthepleasureofthatjar(desire)isoveronceandforallasthoughitwouldbepossibletoeatonemealthatwouldbesufficientfortherestofone'slife.Irwin, Gorgias,196,n.494ab"ButSocrateshasassumedthathappinessconsistsinapermanentstateofbeingfilledifIcoulddesireandgeteverythingIneedallatonce andthenalwaysremainfilled,Iwouldbewelloff."Butwhateverelseshemighthavemeantbyhersolemnvownevertobehungryagain,ScarlettO'Harasurelydid notmeanshewantedtobefinishedwitheatingonceandforall. Ofcourse,itmustbeadmittedthatCalliclesseemstotakeSocratestobeurgingjustsuchalife.Herejectsitbecausesuchalife,havingnoreplenishment,is devoidofpleasureitisthelifeofastone.However,wearenotforcedtoacceptCallicles'understandingoftheimageasauthoritative.Hecaneasilymistake Socrates'meaningthisclaimisnotdiminishedbytheabsenceofSocrates'attempttocorrecthismistake.WeneednotexpectSocratestotakeonthetaskof correctingCallicles'misunderstanding,ifheindeedmisunderstands.Afterall,Socratesseemsintenton

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pushingCalliclestodrawouttheconsequencesoftheCallicleanpositionheneednotpausetoexplicatefullyhisown. Irwin'sreadingisbasedontheassumptionthatfilledjarsaretobeequatedwithdesiresthathavebeensatisfiedonceandforall.Inturn,itwouldfollowthatleaky jars"thatcanneverbefilled"aredesiresthatareneversatisfied.Accordingtothisreading,inSocrates'portrayalofCallicles'ideallife,theintemperateperson neverexperiencessatisfactionofdesire.Suchapersonwouldbehungrynomatterhowmuchheate,thirstynomatterhowmuchhedrank.Thisliteralreadingof theimagecannotberight.ItshouldbeclearthatCallicles'herooftheappetitesdoessatisfyhisdesiresfairlyregularly.EvenSocratesseemstosayasmuchwhen hesaysthat,accordingtoCallicles,thehappypersonissupposedtofillhisdesires,grownasgreataspossible,fromwhateversource(heontadeautashos megistasplerosinautaishamothengepothenhetoimazein[492d67]).Cf.Irwin,Gorgias,195,note493bc,seemstoagreewiththisreading.Ontheother hand,inhiscriticaledition,Plato"Gorgias,"(ClarendonPress:Oxford,1959),304,n.493d5495b9,E.R.Doddsholdsthestronger,andsomewhatstranger, thesisthatCalliclesbelievesthat''withoutaconstantprocessofreplenishment(plerosis)therecanbenopleasure,andwithoutpleasureonemightaswellbea stone."Ifwetake"constant''literally,thepausesdictatedbysatietywouldmakepleasureimpossible.SurelyDoddsmeantacontinualprocessofreplenishment. 22.Itisclear,then,whyCallicleswouldseektoleadthelifeofatyrantonlysuchapersonwouldhavethematerialresourcesandthepowertomaketheprocessof satisfyingdesiresthewholeofhislife.Hecouldallowhissexualappetite,forexample,tobecomeinsistentandincessant.Therewouldbenoneedtorestrainit becauseofthelackofwillingpartners,occasions,settings,oraccouterments.Norwouldheneedtoworryaboutthecensureofthecommunityorlegalsanction.The onlyobstaclestotheconstantpursuitofsexualpleasurewouldbeimaginationandphysicalstrength.Moreover,inordertoavoidbecomingjaded,thetyrantshould followCallicles'adviceandseektomakehisappetitesgrowtopushthelimitsofsatietyfartherandfartherout. 23.Dodds,Gorgias,305,notee46.Doddsseemstoagreewiththisreadinginhistranslationof493e46"'Theoneman,havingoncegothisjarsfilled,conductsno moresuppliestothemnorgivesthemafurtherthoughthismindisatrestsofarastheyareconcerned.'Themiddleplerosamenosisusedwithreferencetotheagent's interest." 24.CertainlythispictureistheonewefindinXenophon'sMemorabilia,I.3.56.Irwin'scommentaryalsosupportsthisEpicureanreadingofSocrates'accountat thispointinthedialogue.Irwin,Gorgias,194,n.492e.

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25.Whatiswrongwiththesecorruptedandthusinneedofrestraintdesires,then,isnottheobjectofthedesire.Rather,thedesireisbadbecauseitseekstohave toomuchofagoodthing.Thedesiresforfood,drink,orsexarenot,inthemselves,badtheyarebadbecausetheylackrestraint.Thesedesiresarenot,then, fundamentallygoodindependenttheyhavebeencorrupted.Bycontrast,Irwin'sdiscussionofthesedesiresleavesonewiththeimpressionthatthereisaclassof desiresthatarebynaturegoodindependent.Thegoodindependentdesiresaredefinedbytheobjectstheyseek.Moreover,someofthesedesiresareactually desiresforthingsthatarebadforthepersonhavingthedesires.Thesedesiresaregoodindependentandbadbecausewhattheydesireisbothindependentofand deleterioustothegoodofthepersonhavingthem.Thus,suchgoodindependentdesiresarenotgooddesiresthathavebeenledastrayorevenpervertedthese goodindependentdesiresaresimplybaddesires,incapableofchangingorbeingchanged,becausetheyaredefinedbytheirobjects,whicharebadfortheperson havingthedesires. 26.Cf.T.Irwin,Plato'sMoralTheory,124. 27.Thisdiscussionreflectsconsiderationsbroughtforwardbythefollowing:J.C.B.Gosling,Plato(London:RoutledgeandKeganPaul,1973)GerasimosSantas, Socrates:PhilosophyinPlato'sEarlyDialogues(London:RoutledgeandKeganPaul,1979)Plato"Gorgias,"T.Irwin,ed.andtrans.T.Penner,"Thoughtand DesireinPlato,"inPlato,G.Vlastos,ed.,96118. 28.NormanGulley,ThePhilosophyofSocrates(London:Macmillan,1968),8793. 29.Santas,Socrates,184ff. 30.Santas,Socrates,185186. 31.Cf.Irwin,Gorgias,143. 32.Cf.Irwin,Gorgias,190191,n.491d4e,usesthenotionofgoodindependentdesires,meaningdesires"whichaimatsomepleasureratherthanattheagent's good,astheagentconceivesit...." 33.Cf.Gosling,Plato,2930. 34.Commentatorsarenotalwaysveryclearaboutthiscondition.Cf.Santas,Socrates,200Irwin,Plato'sMoralTheory,124Penner,"ThoughtandDesire,"101 Irwin,Gorgias,191.Whilethisclaimismoresubstantivethantheprevious,itisalsoatoddswithourexperience.Cf.Dodds,Gorgias,235236,n.467c5468e5. Thepersonwhoeatsthebrowniesmightwellsoberlyconsidertheeffectsonherweightandcholesterollevel,thinkaboutbloodpressureandheartdiseaseyetshe mightgorightaheadandeatthebrownies.Sheseems,onthefaceofit,someonewhoknowinglydecidestodowhatisharmfultoherself.Notonlydoesherdesire remainafterherassessmentofheroverallwelfareitdeterminesherchoiceinthematter.However,aSocraticanswertosuch

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anobjectionistosaythat,inthesecases,onestilldesiresthegoodbutthatone'sknowledgeofthegoodisobscuredforexample,theharmfulconsequencesof satisfyingsuchdesiresaremaskedinsomeway.Inourpreviousexample,wesupposedapersoncontinuingtoeatbrowniesevenaftersherecognizedthateating themwasnotgoodoverall.StilladefenderoftheSocraticclaimthatdesireisforthegoodcouldsaythatthereasonforherbehaviormightbethatshedecidedfor thegoodofpleasure.Twogoodsarepresentedtoherthegoodofhealthandthegoodofthepleasureofeatingthebrownies.Theprospectofthegoodofthe lattercloudshergraspofthegoodoftheformershemistakenlydecidesforthelatter.Still,herdesireisforthegooditisherpoorgraspofthegoodthatisthe probleminthiscase.Shehascometobelievethatthepleasureofeatingthebrownieisthegood.Thus,shedoeswhatshebelievestobegood,althoughherbelief iswrongstill,shedoesnotknowinglydowhatisharmfultoherself.Cf.Penner,"ThoughtandDesire,"99.SeealsoSantas,Socrates,188189. However,itisstillpossibletoholdthateventhismilderclaimiswrong.Somepeopleholdthatsomedesiresarenot,inanysense,aimingatthegood.Touse Irwin'sterminology,wecansaythatsomedesiresaregoodindependent.Agoodindependentdesireissimplyonewhosesatisfactionhasnothingtodowiththe welfareoftheagentandtheagentknowsthatfactclearlyandunequivocally.Inourpreviousexample,weneednotthinkthatthepersonwhoatethebrowniehad finallydecided(evenmistakenly)thatthegoodofpleasurewasbetterthanthegoodofhealthshemightwellhaveunderstoodfullythatthebrowniewasbadwhen shedecidedtoeatit.ThusthestrongcounterclaimagainstSocrates'claim:itispossibleforsomeonetodesiretodowhatisharmfultohimselforherselfeven whenthatpersonisfullyawarethattheactionisharmful.Insuchacasethedesireisnotforthegood,noristhepersonsimplymisledaboutthegood.Indeed,in hiscommentaryontheGorgias,IrwinclaimstofindevidenceinthetextforjustsuchapositionhehintsthatinthisdialoguePlatomayalreadybeabandoningthe Socraticpositionthatdesiresarealwaysforthegood.Cf.Irwin,Gorgias,pp.191and195whereheclaimstofindambiguityonthispoint. 35.Cf.J.C.B.GoslingandC.C.W.Taylor,TheGreeksonPleasure(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1982),6982.TheyarguethatSocrates'counterargumentisnot antihedonistbutratherisonlyanargumentagainsttheshortsightedhedonismofCallicles. 36.Cf.Dodds,Gorgias,314,n.497d8499b3. 37.ItisunclearfromtheexamplewhetherSocratesmeansanappetitethatismerelydysfunctionalbutnotinsatiableoranappetitethatisdysfunctionalbecause insatiable.Ifhemeantforthediseaseddesirestobecomparedtoleakingjars,Socrateswouldbehereassumingthattheir

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beinginsatiablehasmadethemdysfunctionalorpathological.However,Socratesmakesnosuchexplicitcharacterizationofthem. 38.Cf.MaryMargaretMackenzie,PlatoonPunishment,185:
InthediscussionwithCallicles,Socratesreturnstothesubjectofpunishment.At504heistryingtoestablishtheprudenceofhavingawellorderedsoul.Intheprocesshe suggeststhatthesatisfactionofbodilyappetitesisoftenlessusefulthanabstention,particularlywhenabstentionpromoteshealth.Forhealthisdesirablesicknessmakes lifewretched.Soitiswiththesoul,thatwhenitisevil,itsappetitesshouldberestrained,anditshoulddoonlythosethingswhichimproveit.

39.Indeed,theanalogyseemstobreakdownatthispoint.Inthecaseofthebody,thedesiresandthehealthofthebodyareconceptuallyseparatesothatsatisfying thefirstisconceptuallyseparatefromthesecondthuswemakeacausalconnectionbetweenthefirstandthesecond.However,inthecaseofthesoul,desiresare morenearlyconstitutiveofthesoulratherthanbeingseparatethingsthatcanaffectthesoul.Ifdesiresareconstitutiveofthesoulthenwhatcountsasbeing dysfunctionaldesiresisdifferentfromthecaseofthebody.Sincebeingadesireis,bydefinition,beingpartofasoul,thenthedefinitionofthedesireasbeing "dysfunctional"mustbeinrelationtothesoulofwhichitisapart.Thus,beingadysfunctionaldesiremustbedefinedintermsofwhatitistobeapartofawhole. Sincethedesireisconstitutiveofthiswhole,itcannotbedefinedseparatelyfromthiswhole.Thus,wearethrownbackonourconceptofthenatureofdesireandof whatitisforadesiretobefunctionalwithinawholeofwhichitisanessentialconstituent. 40.Thisconcentrationondesiresandtheirsatisfactionraisestheissueofhedonism.InPlato'sMoralTheory,Irwinarguesthat,intheProtagoras,Platoaccepts hedonismasawayofdefendingtheSocraticargumentagainstakrasia(106).ThispositioniscontestedbybothVlastos(forinstanceinhisintroductiontoPlato, Protagoras(Indianapolis,1956)andZeyl"SocratesandHedonism:Protagoras351b358d,"Phronesis25(1980):250269.InhiscommentaryontheGorgias, Irwininclinestowardthenotionthat,whilePlatoacceptedhedonismintheProtagoras,intheGorgiashechangeshismind(205,n.499ab).Still,hebelievesthat Plato"leavesopenthepossibilitythatamoresophisticatedhedonism,withadifferentconceptionofpleasure,mightavoidSocrates'objections..."(197).One possibilityforsuchamoresophisticatedhedonismmightarisefromthenotionofmoderatingexcessivedesires.Whensuchdesiresaremoderated,theycanbemade tofitwithotherdesirestheresultmightbemorepleasantthanindulgingjustone,immoderatedesire.Thus,asophisticatedhedonismmightbethemotivationforthe craftofmakingdesirestofitandharmonizewithoneanother.However,thepresentpassagedoesnotoffersupportforthispositionsinceitisvagueaboutthepartsof thesoulthatwillbemadeto

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fittogether.Notonlymayimmoderatedesiresbemoderatedinordertofitwithother,moderatedesiresitispossiblethatimmoderatedesiresmaybemoderated inordertofitwithotherkindsofpartsinthesoulastheyareinRepublicIV.Inthefollowingdiscussion,weconcentrateondesiresbutweshouldnotforget thatotherpartsofthesoulmaybethesubjectofthecraftofruling. 41.Cf.Irwin,Gorgias,195,n.493a:"ThoughSocratesdoesnotsayso,thesedesiresseemtobeliabletoconflictwithotherdesiresifsomedesiresareinsatiable andothersarenot,conflictisliabletoresult."Seealso220,n.506e507a. 42.Thereisaconceptofpsychichealthatworkinthispassage.HereAnthonyKenny("MentalHealthinPlato'sRepublic"ProceedingsoftheBritishAcademy,55 [1969]:229253)seesonlyanallegoryforpsychichealthfullfledgedtheorycomesintheRepublic(230).Thetheorybuildsonananalogywithhealthinthebody, whichissometimesa"balancedconstitution...ofwet,hot,dry,cold,sour,andsweet,"othertimes"aharmoniousmixtureorblendingofthehumours(phlegm, blood,yellowandblackbile'')(231).JohnAnton(''DialecticandHealthinPlato'sGorgias:PresuppositionsandImplications,"AncientPhilosophy,1[1980]:4960) arguesthattheGorgiasinfacthasatheoryofhealth,tiedupwithitstheoryofdialectic.Formoreonthistopic,seebelow.SeealsoAnthonyPreus,"Socratic Psychotherapy"UniversityofDaytonReview16.1(198283)1523.Althoughhelpful,noneofthesearticlesaddressesdirectlytheroleofdesiresasthesourceof pathologyinthisdialogue. 43.Inanyevent,ouroriginalaccountofthemalfunctioningofunrestraineddesiresseemssomewhatdifferentfromwhatisnowbeingproposedinthisaccountofthe treatmentforpathologicaldesires.Theimageoftheleakyjarsseemedtosuggeststronglythatinsatiabledesiresweremalfunctioningbecausetheycouldnotfulfillthe functionofdesireswithinsatiabledesiresoneneverhassatiety.Accordingtotheimage,thegoodisamoderatelifeinwhichthepleasurethatcomesfromtheprocess ofsatisfyingdesiresisnotthegoaloflifebut,rather,havingsatisfieddesiresisthegoal,thatis,satietyitself.Thismalfunctioningbelongstoindividualdesires.By contrast,theimplicationofthemedicalanalogyisthatthepathologyconsistsinatypeofrelationamongdesiresthatis,thesystematicincompatibilityofinsatiable desireswithothermoderatedesires. Ofcourse,thetwoconceptionsofmalfunctioningarenotinconsistent.Aswehavesaid,havinginsatiabledesiresdesiresthathavebecomemerelyvehiclesfor thepleasuresofreplenishmentmaybeasufficientconditionforhavingincompatibilityamongdesires.Indeed,theimageoftheleakyjarsdoessuggestthe possibilitythatinsatiabledesireswouldmonopolizeone'stimeandenergy,thuskeepingonefrom

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pursuinganyothergoals.Cf.Santas,Socrates,190.Andwhiletheimagedidnotexplicitlyrepresentproblemsofcompatibilityamongdesires,theelenchusthat immediatelyfollowstheimagedoesexploitthenotionthatinsatiabledesireswouldbeincompatiblewithsuchhigherordergoalsasbravery. 44.Theotherpoliticalcraft,lawmaking,restrainsdesiresinanotherway.Evenifitdoesnotinvolvejudicialpunishment,itseemstobesimilarlysevere.Referringto thepoliticalcraft(thatis,thetherapeuticcraftofthesoul)at513d,hesaysthatthosecraftsaimatwhatisbest:"notindulginginpleasurebutbattlingagainstit."At 517c,SocratesroundsouthiscriticismofPericles,Cimon,Themistocles,andMiltiadesbysayingthattheymerelyindulgedthedesiresoftheAthenianpeople,instead ofdoingthejobofarealstatesman,thatis,"givingthosedesiresadifferentdirection..."(metabibadzeintasepithumias).Inthispassage,itisclearthatSocrates believesthatagoodoratorshoulddirectthedesirestowardwhatwillmakehisaudiencebettertowardvirtueinsteadoftowardsuchthingsasships,walls,and arsenals.Ifthenatureofmoderationisunclear,therelationbetweenitandgivingthedesiresadifferentdirectionisalsounclear.Socratesmightmeaneitherredirecting immoderatedesiresorgivingproperdirectionstodesiresnotyetmadeimmoderate.Ifhemeanttheformer,thengiventhatthedesireheistalkingaboutinthis passagewasactuallysatisfiedbybuildings,ships,walls,andarsenalsthisdesire,grownimmoderatebythesepublicdefenseprojects,mighthavebeendisciplined andtherebyredirectedtowardvirtue.Beingsick,thisdesiremustbesubjectedtodrasticandpainfultreatment.Ontheotherhand,ifSocratesmeantthatthese statesmenshouldhavegivenadifferentdirectiontodesirestheyfounduncorrupted,hemightmeanthat,forexample,thehealthydesireforselfdefenseshouldhave beendirectedtoacquiringvirtueratherthanships,walls,andarsenalsperhapsthereisimpliedheretheclaimthatvirtueisabetterdefensethanships,walls,and arsenals.Thus,onlyvirtuewouldtrulysatisfythedesireforselfdefense.Ofcourse,theprecedingisspeculative.SinceSocratestalksmoreaboutrestrainingand discipliningdesiresthanaboutdirectingthemaright,itwillbemorepromisingtoconcentrateontheformertopic. 45.Cf.Mackenzie,PlatoonPunishment,185.InherbookonPlato'stheoryofpunishment,Mackenzieconfinesherselftoasomewhatmoregeneraldescriptionof punishmentanditseffectsthantheoneweareseekinginthischapter.SheholdsthatPlatohasinmindsomecombinationofconditioningandeducation,butshedoes notgomuchfurtherinspecifyingeithernotion.SeealsoDodds,Gorgias,254,n.477e7479e9. 46.ThisissueisalsorelatedtoaproblemaboutSocratesincontemporaryscholarship:theconflictbetweenSocrates'claimofignorance

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aboutvirtueandhisrelianceoncertainpropositionsofmoralityinhiselencticpractice.ThusinSocrates,IronistandMoralPhilosopher(Ithaca:Cornell UniversityPress,1991)Vlastosaddressesthisissuebydistinguishingbetweenknowledgethatentailsinfalliblecertaintyandknowledgethatiselenctically justifiablebutnotinfalliblycertain.Socrates'claimsofmoralknowledgebelongtothelattercategory(32).IntheirbookSocratesonTrial(Princeton:Princeton UniversityPress,1989)BrickhouseandSmithbelievethatSocratesiscertainofthemoralrectitudeofhisDelphicmission,althoughitisnotelencticallyjustifiable thiscertitudetheyattributetodivineorigin(107).Inhisarticle,"SocraticReasonandSocraticRevelation"(JournaloftheHistoryofPhilosophy29[1991]:345 373)McPherranalsoattributesSocraticbeliefstodivineorigin,especiallyhisbeliefinthereliabilityofhisdaimonion,althoughthisbeliefisstilltoadegree rationallyjustifiable(356). InhisbookSocratesintheApology(Indianapolis:Hackett,1989)Reeve'sthoroughaccountofwhathecalls"expertknowledge,"whichheidentifieswithcraft knowledge,isclosertothemark,however(3753).Indeed,Reeveclaimsthatexpertknowledgemusthaveanexplanationofitsproceduresthatiselenchus proof(38).ReevecontraststhiselenchusproofexpertknowledgewiththeknowledgethatSocratesusesinhiselencticpracticeforinstance,thatitisbetterto sufferinjusticethantodoit.Thelatter,althoughitisastrongconviction,isnotexpertknowledgeitlackscertainty,explanatoriness,andteachability(5253). IntheGorgias,thevalueofconsistencymightbeoneofthosemoralbeliefsforwhichSocratescannotgiveanexplanation.Althoughitdoesnotappeartohavea divineorigin,thisbeliefisnotrelevanttoouraccount.ThisaccountfocusesonthebeliefsofSocrates'interlocutors,notonthoseofSocrates.Finally,itis significantforourclaimaboutthedistinctionbetweenthecraftofvirtueandthecraftofrulingthatSocraticignoranceaboutvirtuedoesnotkeephimfromclaiming tobeapractitioneroftherulingcraft. 47.Cf.Irwin,Gorgias,218,note505c,wherehereadsCalllicles'desiresastheobjectofthisrestraint.Mackenzie,(PlatoonPunishment,185)seemstodismiss thisveryimportantselfreferentialpassageasajoke.Whilethepassageisamusing,itisalsomorethanamerejoke. 48.RecentlycommentatorshavelavishedagooddealofattentiononthewaySocraticelenchusbringsabouttheawarenessofthisinconsistency.GregoryVlastos, "TheSocraticElenchus,"2958,andRichardKraut,"CommentsonGregoryVlastos'TheSocraticElenchus',"5970,inOxfordStudiesinAncientPhilosophy,vol. 1,JuliaAnnas,ed.(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1983). 49.Cf.CharlesKahn,"DramaandDialecticinPlato'sGorgias"OxfordStudiesinAncientPhilosophy,vol.1,75121RichardMcKim,"ShameandTruthin Plato'sGorgias"inPlatonicWritings/Platonic

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Readings,CharlesL.Griswold,ed.(London:Routledge,1988),3448JohnAnton,"DialecticandHealth,"especially56. 50.Cf.Irwin,Gorgias,233,n.513c:"ThoughSocrateshaspreviouslysuggestedthatCallicles'desiresmaybedisordered(505c),andmentionsherethemisguided 'love'(erossee481d)thatpreventshimfrombeingconvinced,hestillinsiststhatrationalpersuasioncanmakeCalliclesredirecthisdesires." 51.Recentdiscussionshavecenteredonhowrealthedistinctionbetweenwhatonewantsandwhatseemsbestis.Cf.KevinMcTighe,"SocratesonDesireforthe GoodandtheInvoluntarinessofWrongdoing:Gorgias466a468e,"Phronesis29(1984):193236andNaomiReshotko,"TheSocraticTheoryofMotivation," Apeiron25(1992):145170.Mydiscussiondoesnotturnonwhetherthegoodistheapparentgood(McTighe)ordeterminedobjectively(Reshotko).AlthoughIam moresympatheticwithReshotko's(andPenner's)reading,allmydiscussionneedsisapossiblevariationbetweenwhatonethinksinitiallyaboutwhatisbestandwhat elenchuswillshowoneaboutthecompatibilityofthatinitialbeliefandone'sdesireforthegood. 52.CharlesKahn,"DramaandDialectic,"emphasizesthepsychologicalfunctionofelenchus.

OnceCalliclesadmitsthatsomepleasuresarebetter,someworse(at499b),hehasineffectacceptedboulesthaiorrationalchoiceasthedecisivecriterionofvirtueand happiness,inplaceofepithymiaorsheerdesire.Wethusreturn,immediatelytothenotionofthegoodastheendandgoalofaction(499e500a),andeventuallytothe rationaldesire(boulesthai)forhappiness,whichcanberealizedonlyinthepracticeofthevirtues(507c9ff.).Hence,'noonetrulywants(boulomenos)todoinjustice,butall whoactunjustlydosoinvoluntarily(akon)'(509e57).Asweknow,thisrationaldesireforthegoodmaybepartiallyunconscious,asitclearlywasinCallicles'case.Butitis thefunctionoftheelenchustobringthisdesiretoconsciousness,asCalliclesisreluctantlyobligedtodo.

Cf.McKim,"ShameandTruth.""His[Socrates']methodisthereforepsychological,notlogicalnottoarguethemintobelievingit[theAxiomthatvirtueisalways supremelybeneficialtothemoralagenthimselfaswellastothosetowardwhomheactsvirtuously](35)buttomaneuverthemintoacknowledgingthat,deep down,theyhavebelieveditallalong....Hischiefweaponinthispsychologicalwarfareisnotlogicbutshame"(36).ThispsychologicalwarfarebringsSocrates' interlocutorstorecognizesomethingabouttheirbasicattitudes."Socratesdoesnotdenythatmenofteninfactchooseinjusticeoverjusticethushisargumentis designedtoencouragePolustochoosejusticeinstead.ButthisencouragementconsistsofapsychologicaldemonstrationthatitisalreadythechoicethatPolus andeveryoneelsewouldalwaysmake,

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evenattheexpenseofsufferinginjustice,iftheyfollowedtheirownbetterjudgmentastotheirbestsinterests"(37). 53.Cf.Gor.506eff.,whereorderlinessofsoulleadstotemperanceandjustice,togoodness,todoingwell,andthustohappiness.Aswell,inRepublicISocrates saysthatthereisproper(oikeios)functionforeachthing.Thisisthefunctionthatitalonecanperformorthatitperformsbestofall.Hegoesontoclaimthatthereis suchafunctionforthesoul:tomanage,govern,andrulefinallytolive.Nowfulfillingthatfunctionwellistheproper(oikeios)virtueofthesoul.Fulfillingthatfunction wellisalsosaidtobehappiness.ThisthemeofproperfunctionandpropervirtueisalsofoundintheGorgias.Thecourseoftheargumentat506cff.showsusthat Socratesidentifiedthevirtueofanobjectwithacertainorderofparts.Inturn,thevirtueisthesourceof,orthesameas,whatevergoodtheobjecthas.Finally,its orderisproperandpeculiartoeachobject."Henceacertainorder(kosmos)comingtobeineachthing,whichispropertoeach(hohekastouoikeios),providesthe goodforeach"(506e).Wecansee,then,thatSocrates'positionisthatwhatevergoodanobjecthasisduetoitshavingitsproperorder.Ofcourse,if 'proper'(oikeios)meansonly'whattheobjectoughttohave,'suchapositionwouldbeminimallyinformative.WemighthavefoundoutonlythatSocratesheldthatan objectisgoodbecauseithastheorderitoughttohave.But'proper'doesnotmeanonly'whatitoughttohave.'Italsomeans'belongingtoone,''one'sown,'and 'one'speculiar'that'proper'hasalsothissensecanbeseenfromthenextlineswherethepeculiarityoftheorderisevenmorestronglyemphasized."Sothesoulwhich hastheorderwhichbelongstoitself(kosmonechousatonheautes)isbetterthanonewhichisunordered"(506e).Here,theclaimisbeingmade,first,thatan orderedsoulisbetterthananunorderedoneand,second,thattheorderinquestionisonepeculiartothesoul,isitsown.Moreover,thecontrastseemsto presupposethatthereisnoway,otherthanbyhavingitspeculiarorder,thatasoulcanbeorderedand,thereby,good.Thechoiceisbetweeneitherthesoulandits peculiarorderorthesoulwithoutordersincethethrustoftheargumentistopresenttwoexclusiveandexhaustivealternatives,onlyoneofwhichisthetruegood. 54.ThecontroversysurroundingVlastos'articleon'theproblemoftheelenchus'ispreciselywhetherelenchusachievesanythingmorethanademonstrationof inconsistencyofbeliefs.Socratesseemstoclaimthatelenchusachievesnotonlysuchademonstrationbutalsothefurtherconclusionthatoneoftheinconsistentbeliefs isfalse.SeealsoThomasBrickhouseandNicholasD.Smith,"VlastosontheElenchus,"OxfordStudiesinAncientPhilosophy,vol.2,JuliaAnnas,ed.(Oxford: ClarendonPress,1984),185195,andHughBenson,"TheProblemofElenchusReconsidered,"AncientPhilosophy,7(1987):6785.Thecontroversyabout whetherelenchuscanachieveanythingmorethana

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demonstrationofinconsistencyofbeliefsisaimedatSocrates'claimsforelenchus.Infact,whatevertheresolutionofthatcontroversy,itstillleavesopenthe responseoftheinterlocutors.Socratesmayormaynotbelievethathisinterlocutorhashostagestofortuneamonghismoralbeliefs.Itisanotherquestion altogetherwhetherhisinterlocutoractuallydoeshavejustsuchcompromisingbeliefsand,moreimportantly,whetherheisabletogiveuptheverybeliefthat SocratesbelievesheshouldretainandthusisabletoretaintheverybeliefthatSocratesthinksheshoulddiscard. 55.GregoryVlastos,Socrates,IronistandMoralPhilosopher,113114. 56.Cf.Kahn,"DramaandDialectic,"118:"SobehindtherefutationofCallicleswecatchsightofafundamentaldistinctionbetweentwoconceptionsofdesire,and theinadequacyofoneoftheseconceptionsasthebasisforacoherenttheoryofthegoodlife."SeealsoKim,"ShameandTruth,''39:"WhereasshameisforCallicles anunnaturalfeelingthatinhibitsourrealpreferenceforvice,Socratesbelievestothecontrary,onmyreading,thatourshameaboutviceisanaturalsignthatdeep downwereallyprefervirtue." 57.Kahn,"DramaandDialectic,"113:"Iwanttorecastit[thebasisforSocraticdialectic]intermsofadoctrinethatisexplicitlyattestedinthefirstparadoxofAct Two:theclaimthatallhumanbeingsdesirethegoodandpursueitinalloftheiractions(Grg.468bc,499e:cf.Meno77c78b,Rep.VI.505d11).Inthis perspective,thedepositoftruthonwhichtheelenchusrelieswillbesomerecognitioninallofusofwhatistrulygoodandthetrulygood,fortheGorgias,canbe identifiedwithSocraticarete,themoralandintellectualexcellenceofthesoul."RichardMcKim,("ShameandTruth,"42)expressesasimilarnotion."Indeed,courage isthe"natural"virtuethathe[Callicles]admiresandcovertsmost,anironiccontrasttohisownfearoffranknessindialectic.Thathisthesisshouldcommithimtoa moralequivalencebetweencourageandcowardice,then,isaconsequencethatevenCalliclesfindstoomorallyshamefultostomach.'' 58.Kahn,"DramaandDialectic,"114115:"PerhapsweshouldconstruePlato'suseofsuchanargumentasprotrepticratherthandeductive.Ifyoucometoseethat virtueisgood(andhencegoodforyou),youwilldesireit.Thefunctionoftheelenchus,reinforcedbythepresentationofSocratesastheembodimentofvirtue,isto bringtheinterlocutorandthereadertothepointwheretheyseethis.AndthemotiveforceisnotprovidedbySocrates'dialecticalskillalonebutbyhisabilitytodraw uponthatdeepdesireforthegoodthatmotivateseveryrationalagent,evenwhentheagenthimselfisignorantofthenatureandobjectofthisdesire." 59.Kahn,"DramaandDialectic,"114.

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Chapter2 TheCraftAnalogyintheEarlyDialogues andTheCraftofJusticeinRepublicIV

Atthebeginningofthelastchapterwemadeadistinctionbetweentheuseofthenotionofcrafttoexplicaterulinganditsusetoexplicatevirtuethelatterbeingthe craftanalogyproperlyspeaking.Ourtaskinthelastchapterwastoelaborateanddevelopthecraftofruling.Inthischapterweturntothecraftanalogyproperly speakingthewayinwhichPlatousescrafttoexplicatethenotionofvirtue.Thisuseofthenotionofcraftwewillcallthe"craftofvirtue."1 Aswesaidinthelast chapter,Plato'sfullydevelopedcraftofjusticeinRepublicIVcombinesboththecraftofrulingandthecraftofvirtuefromtheearlierdialogues.Sowewantto investigatethecraftofvirtueinordertoseethosefeaturesthatbecomepartofthefullydevelopedcraftofjustice.Aswell,inlookingatthecraftofvirtue,wewill exposesomeoftheproblemsthenotionraises.RaisingtheseproblemsisalsopreparatorytoourexplicationofthewaythatPlatocombinesthecraftofrulingandthe craftofvirtueintothecraftofjustice.Presumably,Platowilladdresstheseproblemsinhisnewcraftofjustice. IntheearlydialoguesandintheGorgiasandtheProtagoras,virtueiscomparedtocraftinanumberofways.Inmanyofthesecomparisonsthenotionofcraftis usedtoillustratesomeonepointaboutvirtue.Forinstance,intheCharmides,theyoungmanCharmidessaysthattemperanceisquietness.Socratessubjectsthe claimtoelenchusbypointingoutthatplayingthelyre,wrestling,boxing,andthepancrationarebestdonequickly,notquietly.Again,hesaysthatlearningwritingor musicisbetterdone

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quicklythanquietly(159c160b).Thus,temperancecannotbequietness.Charmidesthenoffersthedefinitionoftemperanceproposedbyhisfriend,Critias,thatis, thattemperanceisdoingone'sown.InrefutingthisstatementSocratescitestheschoolmaster,thephysician,thebuilder,andtheweaver,allofwhomdonotdoonly theirown(161d162a).Thus,temperancecannotbedoingone'sown.Inamoregeneralvein,at165cSocratescomparestemperancetomedicineandarchitecture. Sinceeachofthelatterhasaspecificgoal,Socrateswantstoknowwhatisthegoaloftemperance,whichCritiasnowsaysistheknowledgeofone'sself.These comparisonsarecharacteristicofearlydialoguesinwhichvirtueiscomparedtocraftonsomeonepoint.Thepurposeofsuchcomparisonsistoestablishastepinan elenchus. IntheEuthyphro,atonepointEuthyphrosaysthatpietyisthatpartofjusticethathastodowithserviceorcare(therapeia)ofthegods(13a).Inordertorefutethis claim,Socratesattemptstoestablishthekindofcaremeantbylistingthosecraftsthatrendercarethecraftthattakescareofhorses,theonethattakescareofdogs, andfinallytheonethattakescareofcattle.ThecomparisonproducesaresultthatEuthyphrodoesnotaccept.Again,referringtowhatmedicineproduces,towhat shipbuildingproduces,towhathousebuildingproduces,towhatgeneralshipproduces,andfinallytowhatfarmingproduces,SocratesasksEuthyhprotocharacterize theresultproducedbypiety(13d).Thesecasesseemtomakeonlytheonepointofcomparisonbetweenpietyandcrafttheonepointispartofthelargerelenchus. BothofthesedialoguesarerepresentativeofthewaySocratesusesthecraftanalogyinanelenchus.Theassumptionseemstobethatvirtueisanalogoustocraftin someway.However,theanalogyseemssuperficialbecauseitisfocusedononlyonepointofcomparisonandthatpointisusedprimarilytoestablishwhatvirtueis not.Itisnotclearwhetherthecomparisonallowsustosaywhatvirtueis.Arewetodrawoutimplicationsfromthecomparisons?FromtheCharmides,wemight conclude,forinstance,thattemperanceisquickanddecisivelikewrestlingandboxing.Wemightconcludethattemperanceisnotjustdoingone'sownbutperhaps involvescaringforothersoreventhebodypolitic.FromtheEuthyphro,wemightconcludethatpietyprovidesaservicetothegods,evenifitisnotliketheservice renderedtoanimals.Wemightconcludethatpietyproducesagood,evenifitisnotlikethe

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goodoffarmingandgeneralship.However,evenifwecandrawoutsuchimplications,itisnotclearthatweoughtto. Atotherpointsintheearlydialogues,Socratesseemstobesayingsomethingmoresubstantiveaboutvirtuewhenheusestheanalogywithcraft.IntheCharmides,for instance,SocratesfinallydrawsoutCritiasonthetopicoftemperanceasknowledgeofself.Theknowledgeofselfbecomesknowledgeofknowledge(164dff.). Socratesdevelopsthisnotion,inturn,sothatitbecomesawayofknowingwhetheroneknowssomethingaboutatopic.Theusefulnessofthisknowledgeof knowledgeisthatitkeepsonefrombelievingthatheknowswhenhedoesnot.Armedwithsuchknowledge,wecouldkeepourselvesfromactinginthoseareasin whichwedonothaveknowledge(171e).Theresultwouldseemtobebeneficial."Ourhealthwillbebetterthannowwewillbesavedfromdangersatseaandin battleallattire,garments,andshoes,andallimplements,willbemadeskillfullyforus,andwewilldomanyotherthingsthroughgenuinecraftsmen"(173c).However, evenregulatedinthisfashion,wewillnotnecessarilybehappy.Presumablythereasonisthathappinessisnotthesameashealth,safetyinbattle,andskillfullymade coats,shoes,andtools.SocratesthenpushesCritiastoredefinethisoverarchingknowledge.Finally,hesaysthattheknowledgethatpresidesovertheseotherswill havetobetheknowledgewithwhichwediscerngoodandevil(174c).Atthispointthedialogueendsinaporiabecausetheycannotdiscoverthisknowledgeofgood andevil.Evenwiththisdisappointingresult,thereaderhasasensethatsomethingimportantandpositivehasbeensaidaboutvirtue.Temperanceispresentedasa kindofcraftknowledgeofgoodandevil,whichwillguidetheothercraftssothattheywillprovideadvantage.Herewedonothavevirtuecomparedtocraftonsome onepointbutthereisadumbratedamorecomplicatedcomparisonbetweencraftandvirtue.Likecraft,virtuewillhaveagoalgoodandeviloradvantageand disadvantageandlikecraft,itwillhaveanobjectuponwhichitworks,theothercraftsthataresubordinatedtoit. WefindthesamepatternintheLaches.Therearesuperficialcomparisonsbetweencraftandvirtue.Forinstance,intryingtodecidewhethercourageisendurance, SocratesasksLachesaboutaphysicianwhoperseveresinthepainfultreatmentofhisreluctantpatientevenwhenthepatientishisson.Eventhoughthephysician perseveresasaphysicianoughtheisnotthereby

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courageous.However,towardstheendofthedialogue,Niciassaysthatthecourageousmanistheone"whohasmastery(epistemoni)ofthethingstobefearedand nottobefeared"(194d9).ThisknowledgeNiciasdifferentiatesfromthespecializedknowledgeof,forinstance,thephysician,whomayknowhowtocurebutdoes notknowwhetherbeingcuredisalwaysbetterforsomeone.Socratessubjectsthisnotionofcouragetoelenchusbyarguingthatwhatistobefearedandnotfeared hastodoonlywithwhatwillhappeninthefuture.However,acraftmustknowaboutpast,present,andfuture.Theconclusionisthatcouragemustbeconcernednot onlywiththefuturebutwiththepastandpresent(199c).However,thencouragebecomesthewholeofvirtueandnotjustapartofit(199e).Atthispoint,the dialogueendsinaporia.Still,thereaderhasthesensethatsomethingsubstantivehasbeensaidaboutvirtue.AsintheCharmides,itisacraftknowledgeofgoodand evil.Moreover,itissuperiortotheothercraftsbecauseitcanachievehumanadvantage,althoughSocratesdoesnotsaythatitguidesorgovernstheseothercrafts.In fact,theaporiaattheendoftheLachesdoesnotshowthecraftknowledgeofgoodandeviltobeaproblematicconcepttheproblemisthatitcannotbecourage andcouragewasthevirtuetheysetouttounderstand. Nevertheless,itisprobablybecauseofthesecharacterizationsofvirtueasacraftknowledgeofgoodandevilthatmanypeoplearetemptedtobelievethatthecraft analogyhasapositiveside,thatitisnotusedjusttomakedialecticalpointsaboutvirtue.2 Themattermighthavetobeleftindeterminateiftherewerenotafuller positivestatementofthecraftanalogy.Iftherewere,ontheotherhand,suchapositivestatementoftheanalogywewouldbewarrantedtothinkthatthese implicationswerepartofanaccountofvirtuethatfoundthecomparisonwithcraftfruitfulbecauseittoldussomethingsubstantiveaboutvirtue.Infact,thereisjust suchapositivestatementinthedialogueEuthydemus,astatementechoedintheMeno(87cff.). I Indeed,theclearestandbestexampleofwhatwearecallingthe"craftofvirtue"isintheSocraticdialogueEuthydemus.Anothercontrastivedialogue,likethe Gorgias,butalessseriousone,it

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contraststhemethodofSocratesandthemethodofEuthydemusandDionysiodorus.Thelatterpracticeeristic,aformofverbalcombatwhosegoalisnottodiscover truthbuttowinarguments.Thus,theyareshownasrecklessandambitiousyoungmenwhohavegonefromaprofessionofphysicalcombattooneofverbalcombat. Theyenmeshtheiropponentincontrivedandsuperficialcontradictionsbytradingonambiguitiesinmeaningsofwords.Theyseemtomostreaderstobethoroughly repellentcharacters,especiallyintheirtreatmentoftheyoungCleinias.Thedialogueitselfisprotreptic,designedtoconvincereadersandatleastsomeofthe charactersthatoneoughttopursuewisdom.Ifweunderstandphilosophyinitsliteralsenseloveofwisdomsuchadialogueurgesonetobecomeaphilosopher. However,aprotrepticdialoguedoesnotalsotelltheinterlocutorsexactlywhatthewisdomtheyoughttopursueis.InhistwoexchangeswithCleinias,Socratesisthe spokesmanforpursuingwisdom.However,Socratesachievesthistaskinanuncharacteristiccapacity.AttemptingtodefendCleiniasfromtheverbalattacksof EuthydemusandDionysiodorus,Socratesuseshisquestionandanswermethod,atfirstatleast,notinanelencticbutactuallyinapositiveway.Indeed,underthe coverofquestionandanswer,Socrateslaysoutanaccountoftherelationbetweenvirtueandthegoodlife,whichbecomesasweshallseeanimportantpartof Plato'saccountinRepublicIV.InwhatfollowswewillconcentrateonthetwoexchangesbetweenSocratesandCleiniasthetwoprotrepticinterludesandwill leavetheeristicexercisesaside. At279aSocratesbeginsbyaskingCleiniaswhetherallmenwishtodowell(euprattein).ThelatterphraseinGreekisambiguous:todowellinthesenseof prosperingortodowellinthesenseofactingwellorcompetently?3 Inthefirstsense,todowellmeanstobesuccessful,tobehappy,andthiscanmean,anddoes meanformanypeople,materialsuccessmoneyandpossessions.Infact,SocratesbeginsbyhavingCleiniaslistallthosethingswhosepossessionmostpeoplecount asdoingwell:riches,health,beauty,goodbirth,talents,andhonors.However,SocratesdoesnotstopwiththesegoodsbuthasCleiniasincludetheusualvirtues: temperance,justice,bravery,andwisdom(sophia).4 Finally,SocrateshasCleiniasaddgoodfortune(eutuchia)tothelistindeed,hesaysthatitisthegreatestofthe goodthings.Sofarthelistseemsstandardenough.Socrateshasincludedtheusualworldlygoods,rangingfromwealthtostandinginone'scommu

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nity.Tothislistheaddstheusualvirtues,justasaparentmighthopeforachildtohavematerialsuccessandagoodcharacter.Thesearegoodsofdifferent categories,ofcoursebutmostreflectivepeoplewantbothmaterialsuccessandintegrityofcharacter,aslongastheydonothavetochoosebetweenthetwo. However,goodfortuneseemsanotherkindofgoodaltogether.Firstofall,tohavematerialsuccessfrequentlyrequiresgoodfortune.Acquiringwealthorkeepingor enhancingthewealthoneisgiven(cf.CephalusinRep.I)mayrequiresomegoodfortuneorluck.Businessaffairsmaydependgreatlyonone'sacumenbutnot entirely.Physicalbeautyandevenitsmaintenancedependongoodfortune.Theroleofgoodfortuneinacquiringandmaintainingmoralvirtueislessclearbutis neverthelessreal.Ifoneistobebornwithvirtue,thenoneisobviouslyatthemercyofgoodfortune.Ifvirtueistaughtoracquiredbytraining,onedependsupongood fortuneforgettingtherightteachersortrainers. AtthispointSocratesdoessomethingunexpected.Hesaysthattheyhavebeenfoolishinaddinggoodfortunetotheirlist.Theyhavealreadycounteditoncewhen theylistedwisdom.Hesaysthatwisdom(sophia)isgoodfortune(eutuchia)(279d6).Giventhatwisdomwaspreviouslylistedamongthevirtues,Socratesmeansto saythatthevirtueofwisdomisgoodfortune.Buthisargumentforthisclaimdependsonthecraftanalogy.Socratesoffersaninductiveargument(epagoge)to establishtheclaimthatwisdomisgoodfortunebycitingaseriesofcraftsmen:fluteplayers,grammarteachers,seacaptains,generals,andphysicians.Eachiswise (sophos)inhissubjectinturn,onehasgoodfortunewhendealingwiththewisepractitionerratherthanwiththeignorant.Theargumentsetsthestageforthecentral useofthecraftanalogy.Itassumes,firstofall,thatwecangeneralizefromthecasesofwisecraftsmentoaqualitytheyallpossess,wisdom.Sofarwisdomseemsto besomethingcommontoallthecraftknowledgespracticedbyallthesecraftsmen.Socratesdevelopsthiscommoncharacteristiclaterintheargument.Atthispoint,it isalsoclearthatthiscommoncharacteristicismeanttothrowlightonthemoralvirtueofwisdom.Socratesdoesnothesitatetotalkasthoughthiscommon characteristicof"craft"shouldbecalledbythesamenameasthemoralvirtueof"wisdom"sincehebacksuptheclaimthatthevirtueofwisdomisgoodfortuneby citingcasesofcraftsmen,whoarebydefinitionwise(sophos).Exactlywhatlightthiscommoncharacteristicdoesthrow,wesee

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later.ForthepresentSocratesconcentratesoncraftitself.Craftknowledgeprovidessomegoodresultanditdoessoinaregularanddependableway.Atleastthat seemstobewhatliesbehindtheextraordinaryclaimthatwisdomisgoodfortune. Nowthereisanambiguityinthenotionofgoodfortuneinthispassage.5 Goodfortunecanmeanthechanceoccurrencethatresultsinsomethinggoodhappeningto oneitcanalsomeanthegoodresultitself.Thus,winningthelotteryisgoodfortune,inonesense,becauseitprovideswealthinanothersense,thewinnermightcall thewealthitself"goodfortune."Tosaythatwisdomisgoodfortune(279d)meanssomethinglikewisdomunderstoodasthecommoncharacteristicofcraft knowledgeisequivalent,inoneimportantrespecttogoodfortunewisdom,likegoodfortune,providesonewithagoodresult.Whatonecanobtainbygood fortunecanbeobtainedbywisdom.Whatthelotteryputsinone'slapcanbegottenbythecraftofmoneymaking.Ontheotherhand,Socratesalsosaysthatwisdom alwaysmakesmentoenjoygoodfortune.(280a)Here,goodfortuneisaresultbutinsteadofbeingtheresultofchance,itistheresultofcraft.6 Thereasoningseems tobesomethinglike:whenonegoestothecraftsman,thingsturnoutwellwhenthingsturnoutwell,onehasgoodfortunesowhenonegoestothecraftsmanonehas goodfortune.However,theintenthereseemsthesamewithwisdomunderstoodasageneralwayofreferringtoallthecraftsonecanobtainthesameresultsas withluckinthesecases,atleast,onedoesnothavetodependonluck.7 However,at280b,Socratesputshisconclusioninanevenstrongerform:thepersonwhohaswisdomdoesnotalsoneedgoodfortune.Ifgoodfortunemeansthe chanceoccurrencethatprovidesgoodthings,thenhemeansthatwisdomprovidesallthegoodthingsthatchanceoccurrencecan.Socratesbacksupthis extraordinaryclaimbyarguingthatwisdomalwayssucceeds,alwaysleadstodoingwellandhavingagoodresultotherwiseitisnotwisdom.(280a)Wehaveseen thisnotionoftheinfallibilityofcraftbefore,inRepublicI(342a).8 Inthepresentcase,itisdifficulttoseehowthisclaimcanalwaysbetrue,givenhisownlistof goodsforexample,health,beautyorgoodbirth.Ontheonehand,goodfortunecouldprovideonewithahealthyconstitution,freeofcongenitaldefectsgood fortunecouldkeeponefromgettingtheplague.Socratesseemstobesayingthat,insomeidealstate,aphysicianwouldbesoskilledthathecouldachievebythe

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craftofmedicineanyofthesethingsthatgoodfortunecouldbringabout.Ontheotherhand,goodfortunecouldgiveonethebeautyofanAlcibiadesorofaHelen.Is thereacraftthatcouldgiveonesuchbeauty?IsthereacraftthatcouldgiveonethegoodbirthofaPlato? Inanyevent,itisobviousthatSocratesisdependingonanimportantcharacteristicofcraftitsinfallibilityinordertoarriveatwhatisasignificantstepinhis argument.Inthenextsectionofhisargument,hecontinuestodevelopthisnotionofwisdom,understoodascraftknowledge.Inordertodowell,onemustbenefit fromthegoodsonehasandmerelyhavinggoodsisnotenoughinordertobenefitfromthem.Onemustusethesegoods.Clearlyreturningtohispreviousaccountof wisdom,Socratesillustratesthispointwithinstancesofcrafts.Ifcraftsmen(demiourgoi)possesswhattheyneedfortheircraftsbutdonotusethosethings,canthey dowell?Thecarpenter(tekton),forinstance,who,havinggottenallhistoolsandsufficientwood,didnotusethemtobuildanything,wouldnotbenefitfromthemere possessionofthesethings.Soitfollowsthatonemustnotmerelypossessallofthegoodsjustmentionedonemustusethem.Nobenefitisgainedfrommere possessionofriches,health,beauty,goodbirth.Infact,Socratessaysthatinordertobehappy,onemustusethesegoodthings.Then,inaveryimportantstepinhis argument,Socratesmakestheconnectionbetweenthecommoncharacteristicofcraftknowledgesandthevirtueofwisdom.Theuseofthesegoodthingsisnot enoughtheirusemustberightuse,otherwisetheywillresultinharm.Moreoverdrawingonthecraftanalogyhesaysthatrightuseisbroughtaboutbyknowledge. 9 Inthecaseofcarpentry,whataccomplishesrightuse(orthoschresthai)istheknowledge(episteme)ofcarpentry(281a34).Thus,intherightuseoftheother goodsforexample,health,wealth,andbeautyitwasknowledgethatguidedandruledover(hegoumenekaikatorthousa)theiruse.Soitisknowledgethat providesrightuse(eupragian)andgoodfortune(eutuchian)inallpossessionsandpractices.Socratesthenconnectsknowledgewiththemoralvirtueofwisdomby concludingthatonecangainnobenefitfrompossessionswithoutunderstanding(phroneseos)andwisdom(sophias)(281b16).10 Theaccountisrichinpossibilities.Agoodcarpenterknowsabouttools,thedifferenceamongtools,thetaskeachismadeforhealsohas"afeelfor"tools,howto handlethem,whatamount

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ofpressureisappropriate.Agoodcarpenteralsoknowsaboutmaterialsthedifferentkindsofwoodsandtheirdifferentuses.Ofcourse,healsohasadetailednotion ofhowthetoolsandmaterialsgotogethertoproduceatableorahouseinfact,allofhisknowledgepointstowardsuchagoal.Itisapeculiarkindofknowledge, whichdiscountspropertiesandfactsnotrelevanttotheendinviewandfastensonpropertiesthatarerelevant.Ifweturnbacktothelistofgoodsthatoriginally constituteddoingwell,wecanseetheappealofthisanalogy.Mostpeopleagreethatmerepossessionofwealth,orbeauty,orgoodbirthisnotenough.Ifonehas thatkindofinsight,shewouldnotbetemptedtotreathealth,wealth,andgoodlooksasendsshewouldbeinterestedintheminsofarastheycouldcontributetoa moregeneralgoalofherlife.Thisnotionofmerepossessionbeinginadequatehasapeculiarlycontemporaryringtoit.Inaconsumersociety,therecertainlyare peoplewhoseemtobelievethatmerepossessionofmaterialgoodsmakesonehappy.Spirituallypovertystricken,theydonotseemtoknowwhatelsetodowith theirpossessionsthantositamongthemtheyhavemissedthepointthattheymustalsohavethewittousethemwellinordertoderiverealbenefitfromthem.Worse still,sometimespeoplewhoaredeceivedintobelievingthatmerepossessionishappinessbecomesomethingliketheservantsoftheirpossessions.Wehavetothink onlyofthefurniturethatcanneverbeused,butonlycleaned,polished,andprotectedtheownershavebecometheservantsofthefurniture. Moreover,theonewhocouldidentifyagoalotherthanmerepossessionmightwellseethatthesepossessionsmustbeusedwelltoachievethatgoal.InPlato's analogy,shewouldneedacraftknowledgethatwouldguideheruseofthemsothatshewouldactwiththedeftnessthatagoodcarpentershowsinhisuseoftools andwood.Withunderstandingandwisdomthegoodpersonwillknowhowtouseassetsofbodyandofsoulsothattheyarebeneficialandnotharmful.Thefactthat theseassetscanbeharmfulgivesusalittlebettersenseofwhatrightusemightbethen.Thegoodpersonhasanunderstandingofhertruewelfareandofthewayto useherassetstoachievethatwelfare.Nomatterhowvariedtheattractionsthattheusesof,forexample,wealthmaypresent,thegoodpersoncandiscernthe differencebetweentheusesthatareharmfulandthosethatarebeneficial.Notonlyissheskilledatdiscerningthedifference,sheisalsoskilledinmakingthemeans achievethepreferredend.

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Indeed,wecanallunderstandhowthematerialgoodscanbemisused.Wealthisthemostobviousexamplenewsstoriesandmoviesarefilledwithaccountsof peoplewhonotonlyspendmoneyunwisely,inthesensethattheygetnothingimportantinreturn,butwhospendmoneyforthingsthatactuallyhurtthem.The NationalEnquirertellsusallthetimeaboutthewaysthatbeautifulpeoplearemadeunhappypreciselybecauseoftheirbeauty.Thesamesortofthingcanbesaidfor goodbirthhereperhapsthejournalofrecordisParisMatch,inwhichthevicissitudesofEuropeannobilityarechronicled.Ontheotherhand,thereareexamplesof wealthypeoplewhousetheirwealthwisely.Theybuythingsthattheyreallyneedtheydonotbuythingsthatharmthem.Theirbeingabletodosodependsapparently ontheirunderstandingtheirrealneeds.Perhaps,forinstance,theyprizetheirowncharactersandusetheirwealthinaccordancewiththeirconceptionofthat character.Perhapstheyusetheirwealthforphilanthropicpurposes,thinkingthatgenerosityisanimportantvirtue.Ingeneral,then,theyacquirepossessionsthatserve theirreflectiveconceptionofthegoodlifeinsteadofbecomingtheappendageofpossessionsthatimposeanunconsideredandharmfulstyleofliving.Aswell,there aremoviestarswhoarenotabsorbedordestroyedbytheirownphysicalbeautyrathertheyuseittoservetheirvariousprojectsaswellroundedpersons.11 Mostpeoplecanseetheneedforasenseofthetruevalueofourassetswhatevertheymightbeforlivingahappyandfulfilledlife.Thereissomethingcompelling, then,abouthavingsuchaclearsenseofthedirectionofone'slifethatonecanmakewhatevermaterialpossessionsorwhateverphysicalormentaltalentsonehasfit intoapatternthatwillreflectone'sconceptionofthegoodlife.Wecanalladmirethewellmadecabinet,runourhandsalongitssurfaces,andadmiretheskilland intelligencethatbroughtalltheseelementstogether.Itisnotwithoutitsseductivenesstothinkthatone'sownlifecouldhavethesameaspectofawellmadeproject. Unfortunately,inthispassagewefindlittleelsebesidesthistemptingprospect.Whilewisdomandcarpentryhavebeencomparedwithrespecttomaterials,tools, knowledgeofrightuse,anddoingwell,nothingverydetailedhasbeensaidabouttheproductofwisdom,otherthanthatitishappinessoradvantage.Theproductof carpentryis,ofcourse,somethinglikeatableorahouse.IfSocrateshadbeenabletocompletethecomparison,hecouldeasilyhavesaidthathappinessorwelfare was

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somethinglikeatableorahouse,thatis,anidentifiableproductseparatefromtheexerciseofthecraft.Thenhecouldhavegoneontospecifythenatureofthe happinessthatistheproductofwisdom.Pleasure,forexample,mightbesuchaproductthewiseman,then,wouldusehealth,wealth,andgoodlookssothathe wouldhavethegreatestpleasure,perhapsinthefashionofanEpicurean.However,Socratesdidnotdrawouttheanalogybyspecifyingthegoalofthecraftinthisor inanyotherway.12 Inpassing,itisworthpointingoutthedifferencebetweenthisaccountofthevirtueofwisdomandtheaccountofvirtueintheGorgias.IntheEuthydemusthevirtue ofwisdomisacraftofmanagingone'smaterialandspiritualassetsintheGorgiasvirtue,theproductofthecraftofruling,isnotitselfacraftbutacharacteristicofthe soulconsistingofaharmonyofdesires,perhapsofotherpartsofthesoul.IntheEuthydemuswearetoldthathappinessconsistsinoristheresultofthis managementhowever,wearenottoldhowtomanagethoseassetssothatwewillbehappy.Thereisagapintheaccountaboutthenatureofthegoalandaboutthe meanstoattainit.IntheGorgias,ontheotherhand,thegoalofthecraftofrulingandhowtoattainitareatleastsketchedin.Thegoalisapsychicharmony,including desiresascomponents,andthemeansisadiscipliningofthedesires. Infact,anotherversionofthisproblemofspecifyingthegoalofthecraftofwisdomistakenupinasubsequentpassageoftheEuthydemus.At288d,Socratesbegins thesecondprotrepticinterludewithCleiniastheyaretotakeupwheretheyleftoff,thatis,whereCleiniasbecameconvincedbytheprotrepticargumentthatone oughttoseekwisdom.At289b,Socratessaysthattheyarelookingforacraftknowledge(episteme)thatmakesbutalsoknowshowtousewhatitmakes.Itisnot likeharpmaking,whichcanonlymakebutnotusewhatitmakes.Thesubsequentdiscussionbecomesanextendedsearchtofindanycraftthatbothmakesanduses itsproduct.Ineachcase,thecandidatecraftonlymakessomethingitturnsoverwhatitmakestoanothercrafttobeusedforexample,huntingturnsoveritscatch tothecook.Afterascendingahierarchyofsuchcrafts,theyfindthatthekinglycraftalsosaidtobethecraftofrulingistheonlycraftthatdoesnotdeferto anothercraftbutuseswhattheothercraftsmake. However,thecrafttheyareseekingmustnotonlyusewhatothersmake.Itmustusewhatitmakes.Soat291e,Socratessays

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thattheystartedtolookforwhatitisthatthecraftofrulingmakes.Atthispointtheargumentbecomesrathercomplicatedthroughtheuseofpreviousassumptions, suppressedpremissesandtruncatedarguments.13Itisagreedthatwhatthecraftofrulingmakesmustbebeneficialthattheonlycandidateforsuchbenefitis knowledgeclearlyunderstoodtobeacraftknowledgeofsomesortthattheonlycandidateforsuchcraftknowledgeisakindofcraftknowledgethatisalways beneficial.Theconclusionis,then,thatthecraftofrulingmustimpartitself.Thereasoningforthisproblematicconclusionseemstobethatalltheothercraft knowledgescaneitherbenefitorharm(292d).Itisbecausetheycaneitherbenefitorharmthatwhattheymakeisturnedovertoanothercrafttobeusedforbenefit. Thetopofthehierarchy,thecraftthatdoesnotturnoverwhatitmakestoanotherhighercraft,istherulingcraft.Atthispoint,theconclusionseemstobethatonlythe rulingcraftisinvariablybeneficialbecauseonlyituseswhattheothercraftsprovidewithoutturningovertoahighercraft.Thus,iftherulingcraftconferssomecraft knowledgeontheruledthatisalwaysbeneficial,itcanonlyconferitselfonthem.14Letus,forthesakeofillustration,takethebroadhinttotheeffectthattheruling craftjustiswisdom.Theconclusionofthisargumentsaysthattherulingcraftwillconferwisdomontheruleditwillmakethemwise.Inturn,therulingcraftwilluse whatitmakes,thatis,thewisecitizens.Butthisconclusiononlypostponestheimportantquestion.Sincewedonotknowthecontent,asitwere,oftherulingcraft itselfwehavenoaccountofitswisdomwedonotknowwhatitconfersontheruled.Therulingcraftwillconfersomethingthatbenefitstheruled,makesthem betterinsomeway.Butinwhatwaywilltheybemadebetter?Usingthepreviousconclusion,wecansupposethattheyaremadebetterbyreceivingacraft knowledgethatofrulingthatallowsthoseuponwhomitisconferredtoconferthatsamecraftknowledgeonothers(292e).Ifwedonotknowinthefirstinstance inwhatwaythecraftknowledgeofrulingisabenefit,thebenefitconferredseemstorecede,likeaninfiniteregress.Thusthesearchforwhattherulingcraftmakes, thatis,theknowledgeinculcatedintheruled,andhowthatwillmaketheruledbetter,istheproblemthatfinallyendstheinvestigationonanaporeticnote. Inthissearch,then,happinessseemslikeagoaleverrecedingbeforethesuccessionofcraftsexactlylikethelarkbeingchasedbychildren(291b).Theinabilityto bridgethegapbetweencraft

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andgoalcanonlyleaveuswiththeconclusionthatSocratescannotspecifythenatureofthehappinessthatisthegoalofwisdomaswell,andperhapsforthisreason, hecannotspecifytheknowledgewherebywisdomwillattainthisgoal.15Socratesdoesnotprovideforwisdomanunderstandingofhumanadvantageandtheway toattainitthatiscomparabletotheunderstandingacarpenterhasofhousesandhowtobuildthemoraphysicianhasofhealthandhowtoattainit.Thecraftanalogy intheEuthydemusisincomplete,then,onthesetwocounts.Theeffectofthisaccountistwofold.Firstofall,weareattractedbythepromisethatthereissucha knowledgethatwillgiveusthissenseofthetruevalueofourphysicalandspiritualassetsandofthewaytousethemsothattheywillserveourtrueadvantage.The secondeffectisincontrasttothefirstwearedisappointedbySocrates'inabilitytotellusexactlywhatthiswisdomis,tofillinthedetailssothatwemaybegintolive justsuchalifeasthewisepersonofhisaccount.SofarwearelefttosupposethatSocratesdoesnotcompletetheaccountbecausehecannotdoso.Beingunableto dosopresentsaproblemforthecraftanalogy.Moreover,theproblemposesanobstacleforourinterpretationofthemoraltheoryoftheRepublic.Presumably,ifwe aretointerpretthecraftofjusticeasacombinationofthecraftofvirtueandtherulingcraft,thensomehowthisproblemoffillingouttheaccountofthecraftanalogy mustbeaddressed.Beforeproceeding,letuslookmorecloselyattheproblem. Wecanbeginouranalysisoftheproblemwithapriorquestionthatgeneratestheproblem:whetherornotcraftisonlyinstrumental.16Itsbeinginstrumentalmeans thatcraftonlyknowshowtoproducearesultwithoutknowingwhethertheresultisgoodorbadanideawehavealreadyseenintheEuthydemus.Thus,inthe Laches(195c),Niciassaysthatthephysicianknowsabouthealthanddiseasebutdoesnotknowwhetherbeinghealthyisbetterthanbeingdiseasedtheremaybe casesinwhichitwouldbebettertodiethantolive.17ThesameideacomesupintheCharmides(173d),whereSocratessaysthatevenifexpertsineachkindof craftknowledgeforexample,medicine,militarystrategy,andtailoringtookcareofus,itwouldnotfollowthatweactedwellorwerehappy.Bothofthese dialoguesendproblematicallytheybothsuggestthatwhatisneededisageneralsortofknowledgeofgoodandevil(La.199dCharm.174b).Theinstrumentalityof craftseemstobeconnectedtosomethingelseoddthatSocratessaysaboutcraft.IntheLesserHippias,Socrates

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arguesthattheskilledpersonistheonewhocanvoluntarilyproduceharmthephysicianwhocanvoluntarilyproduceharmforthebodyknowsmoreofthehealingart thantheonewhocannot(375b).InRepublicI,theonewhoknowshowtoguardagainstdisease,scil.,thephysician,istheonewhocanmostskillfullyinflictit (333e).Ifcraftisinstrumentalthenonecanexplainthisoddfactaboutitspractitioners.Sincewhatthecraftproducesis,initself,neithergoodnorbad,itisopentothe craftsmanthentousethecrafttoproducewhatisbad. Theseargumentspointupaflawwiththecraftanalogy,ofcourse.Ifvirtueisacraftandifitisinstrumentalinthisway,thenitsgoalcouldbeamatterofindifferenceto itspractitioner.Itwouldbepossible,then,forthevirtuouspersontodoevilvoluntarily.Indeed,thatstrangeconclusionistheoneSocratesdrawsinbothofthese passages.Ofcourse,suchaconclusioncontradictsSocrates'centralthesisthatavirtuouspersonnevervoluntarilydoesevil.Moreover,suchaconclusionwould doomanyattempttointerpretthemoraltheoryoftheRepublicasacraftofjustice.Ifcraftintheearlydialoguesisnecessarilyinstrumental,thenthereisnowayto salvagethatnotionofcraftforfurtherdevelopmentinPlato'smaturemoraltheory.Wewillendthissectionbylookingcloselyatthisissue. Firstofall,theclaimthatcraftisnecessarilyinstrumentalseemstoconflictwithanotherfeatureofcraft.Intheearlydialogues,therapeuticcraftsinparticulararesaidto providealwaysgoodthings.IntheEuthyphro(13aff.),Socratessaysthatthecareprovidedbythetherapeuticcraftsofhorsemanandhuntsmanareforthegoodand welfareoftheircharges.IntheLysis(217aff.),hesaysthatmedicineisafriendtothesickpersonbecauseitisusefulandgoodinprovidinghealth,somethinggood forthesickperson.EveninthepassagefromtheCharmideshesaysthatwhatthephysician,general,andtailorprovideisgood.Finally,intheGorgias,craftis virtuallydefinedasalwaysseekingwhatisbestforitsobject(Gor.464c).Howcanacraft,whosegoalistoprovidegoodforitsobject,beinstrumentaltowardan endthatisneithergoodnorbadinitself?Theanswerseemstoinvolvesomethinglikethenotionofcontext.Thegoodofhealth,whichthecraftofmedicineexiststo provide,isnotnecessarily,orbyitself,goodwhenitisconsideredinthecontextofone'swholelifethegoodofhealthisqualifiedbythelargercontext.Evengoodsof thesoul,suchascourageandtemperance,mustbejudgedfromthatlarger

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context.(Indeed,itisatleastpossiblethatthelargercontextmightincludemorethanjustthelifeoftheindividualinquestion.)Medicineprovideshealth,whichisgood fromthepointofviewofone'sbodybutfromthepointofviewoftheprojectofone'sentirelife,healthmightnotalwaysbegood.Suppose,forinstance,thatthe physicianrestoresonetohealthonlysothatone'storturemaybecompleted.Again,justbyitself,healthmightnotbegood.Supposethatoneuseshealthtoruinher soul.Thereisalargercontextinwhichthegoodofhealthmustbejudged. Craftslikemedicineareinstrumental,then,inaqualifiedsense.Suchcrafts,inthemselves,alwaysseekthegoodoftheirobjects.However,thegoodthattheyseekis restrictedtothecontextofeachcraft,isrestrictedtothespecifickindofgoodthatthecraftcanprovide.Suchcraftsareinstrumentalinthesensethatthegoodthat theyprovideisnotnecessarilygoodifonetakesalargerperspective.18Theproblemoftheevilcraftsmanshouldbereadinthisway,then.Craftitselfdoesnot indifferentlyproducegoodorbad.Itisthecraftsmanwhodoesso.Ifthecraftsmanweretoworkwithinthecontextofthecraft,sotospeakifheacceptedthegoals ofthecraftashisownhewouldalwaysprovidethegoodofthatcraft.Inthecaseofmedicine,thephysicianwhoworkedwithinthatcontextwouldalwaysheal patients.However,itispossibleforthephysiciantoworkoutsidethecontextofmedicinethenhecanharmpatients.Heisabletodosobecause,outsidethecontext ofmedicine,hecanadoptanothergoalbesideshealth,therebypervertingthecraft. Thus,itistheproblemofinstrumentalitythatleadstothepositingofaverygeneralknowledgeofgoodandevilintheLachesandCharmides.Suchknowledgeisan attempttocapturethislargercontext,asisthedistinctionbetweencraftsthatproduceandthosethatusewhatisproduced.19Wehaveseenthelatternotionalready intheEuthydemusbutitisalsofoundintheCratylus(388cff.)andinRepublicX(601cff.).Inthesetwodialogues,thelattercraftinstructstheformersothatwhat itproducesisusefulandgoodtheusingcrafthasanotionofwhattheproductistobeusedfor.IntheEuthydemus,Socratesdoesnotsaythattheusingcraft instructstheproducingcrafthesimplysaysthattheusingcraftuseswhattheproducingcraftsproduceinordertoprovidebenefit.Obviously,thenotionoftheusing craftisanattempttoaddressaproblem,toovercometheinstrumentalityoftheproducingcrafts.

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Wenowcanstatetheproblemofthecraftanalogy.Ifcraftisnecessarilyinstrumental,itwouldfollowthattherewillnotbeausingcrafttheknowledgeofgoodand evilwhichovercomestheinstrumentalityofcraft.Thisproblempresentsacruxbecausedifferentcommentatorstakedifferentpathsatthispoint.Someholdthat, indeed,Platocametoseethatallcraftsareinstrumentalandconcludedthatvirtuecannotbeacraft.20OthersholdthatPlatosawthispropertybelongedtosome craftsbutconcludedthattherewouldbeatleastonecraftthatisnotjustinstrumental.21TheEuthydemuscanbeseenasillustratingthiscrux.Inthefirstprotreptic interludeSocratespresentsafullaccountofwisdomasakindofcraft.However,Socratesdoesnotspecifywhatthegoalofthatcraftis,otherthantosaythatthe craftmakesonehappy.Socratesdoesnotelaborateinwhatthishappinessconsists.Accordingtoonelineofinterpretation,thetroubleisthatacraftcannotgivethe kindofaccountneededatthispoint.Likecarpentry,thewisdomthatismodeledoncraftcanprovideaproductitcannottellwhattheproductisgoodfor.Thus, accordingtothisline,thefailurerecordedinthesecondprotrepticinterludeisnotanaccidentitpointsupafatalweaknessinthecraftanalogy.22Socratesintroduces thecraftthatbothproducesanduseswhatitproducesasaconsciousattempttoovercometheshortcomingofthecraftanalogythatis,thefactthatcraftis instrumental.However,theeverrecedinggoalofthatcraftshowsthatitisnotpossibletoovercometheshortcoming.Ontheotherhand,ourlineofinterpretation holdsthattheproblemposedforthecraftanalogyinthesecondprotrepticinterludeisonethatPlatoplanstosolve.Moreover,itholdsthatthesolutionwillkeepwhat isvaluableinthecraftanalogyby,finally,introducingacraftthatisnotinstrumental,acraftthatbothproducesanduseswhatitproduces.Thisnotionofcraftwillalso modifytheanalogybymakingthecraftofvirtueintoatypeofrulingcraft,thatasweshallseeinchapters3and4isalsotheknowledgeofgoodandevil.23 II Itisnowtimeforustopresentthecraftofjustice.Aswehavealreadysaid,thisnewanalogybetweencraftandjusticeinBookIVoftheRepubliccombineselements fromthecraftofrulingand

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thecraftofvirtue.Sothebestwaytoexplicatethisnewcraftanalogyistobeginbycontrastingthetwousesofthenotionofcraftwehavesofarseen,thecraftof rulingandthecraftofvirtue.Thecraftofrulinghasasitsobjectthatis,whatitworksonthesouloftheruled.24IntheGorgias,thisobjectwasshowntohave parts,forexample,thedesiresthesebecametheeffectiveobjectofthecraftofruling.Ingeneral,itsgoalistoinstillvirtueinthesouloftheruledintheGorgias, virtueisidentifiedwithrestraineddesires,orwithdesiresalreadymoderate.ThecraftofvirtueintheEuthydemus,ontheotherhand,hasasitsobjecttheassetsof bodyandsoultheseassetsbelongtotheonewhohasthecraftofvirtue.Thecraftofvirtuemakesthepersonwhohasitcapableofusingtheseassetsforherown advantage.Thecraftofrulingandthecraftofvirtuebothhaveastheirgoalthehappinessoftheoneonwhomtheywork.Thevirtueconferredbytherulingcraftis explicitlyidentifiedwithhappinesstheadvantageconferredbythecraftofvirtueisalsohappiness.25 Severalimportantpointsmustbemade.First,thepersonwhoexercisesthecraftofrulingexercisesitonanotherperson.Sothiscraftisdistinctfromthecraftofvirtue, inthatthelatterisdirectedtowardsone'sownselforassets.Second,theobjectsonwhichthetwocraftsworkaredifferent:thesoulanditsdesires,whicharethe objectofthecraftofruling,areadifferentsetofthingsfromtheassetsofthebodyandsoul,whicharetheobjectofthecraftofvirtue.Whiledesiresandtheassetsof soularebothpsychologicalitems,theyaredistinctlydifferentkindsofpsychologicalitemstheassetsofsoularevirtues,suchascourageandtemperance.Third,the craftofrulingissaidtoproducevirtuewhilethecraftofvirtueisnotsaidtoproducevirtue.Fourth,aswehavenotedalready,thecraftofruling,asitispresentedin theGorgias,seemsclosertodefiningitsgoalthanisthecraftofvirtue,asitispresentedintheEuthydemus.Intheformerdialogue,Socratesmakessomeheadwayin definingthevirtuethecraftofrulingissupposedtoconferonitsobjectvirtueis,inthispreliminaryaccount,anorderingandrestrainingofdesires.However,inthe Euthydemus,wherethegoalofthecraftofvirtueis''doingwell''or"happiness,"wedonothaveaclearsenseofthecontentofdoingwellorhappiness. NowwecanturntoPlato'sreconstructionofthecraftanalogy.InBookIVoftheRepublichecombinesthecraftofrulingwiththecraftofvirtueintoonecraft, therebycreatinganewver

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sionofthecraftanalogy.Asweshallsee,thisnewcraftistherapeuticandnotproductiveitislikemedicineandnotlikecarpentry.26Infact,itissaidtobeakindof rulinganotherspeciesofthetherapeuticcraft.Thus,itislikethecraftofrulingintheGorgias.However,itsobjectisthesouloftheonewhoisalsopracticingthe craftinthatitisdirectedtowardsoneself,thiscraftislikethecraftofvirtueintheEuthydemus.Still,eventhoughthiscraftisselfdirected,itsobjectisnotone's materialandspiritualassetsbutthepartsofone'ssoul.Inthatitisdirectedtowardthepartsofthesoul,itislikethecraftofrulingintheGorgias.Insum,thenewcraft ofvirtuewhatwewillnowcallthe"craftofjustice"isacraftofselfrulewithinone'sownsoul.ItshouldnotbesurprisingthatPlatowouldmakejusticeacraftof rulinginone'sownsoul.Hewantstomakeitcontinuouswiththecraftofrulingpracticedbytherulerguardiansofthecity.ThelatterisclearlypresentedinBookIV asakindofcraftknowledge.27Indeed,asweshallseeinsubsequentbooksoftheRepublic,thecraftofrulinginthecityandrulinginone'sownsoularedescribed intermsthatmakethemseemevenmorethesamecraft,motivatedbythesameideals,thatis,theForms.LittleelsecouldbeexpectedfromthecarewithwhichPlato createsasimilarstructurebetweenthecityandthesoul.Inthecity,therulerseesthatallofthepartsarebroughtintoharmonyandbalance,thateachgetsitsdue.So, inthesoul,ananalogoustaskissetfortherulerinthatinteriorcity.28 OurprimarysourceforthisaccountofthecraftofjusticeistheverycompactsectionattheendofBookIVoftheRepublicwhereSocratescomestotheendofhis expositionofthevalueofjusticeinthesoul(435b448e).HereSocratesbelieveshehasatlastbroughttothefirststageofcompletiontheextremelydifficulttaskset himbyGlauconandAdeimantusatthebeginningofBookII.Hewastoshowthatjusticeisvaluableinitselfandinitsconsequences,apartfromtheconsequencesof beingknowntobejust.Ineffect,heisaskedtoshowwhatvaluejusticehasinthesoul,apartfromitsvalueinthesocialcontext.Afteralongdetourthroughhistheory oftheidealcity,Socratesreturnstothesoul.Heportraysthesoulashavingthesamepartsasthecity,thesamestructure,andthesamevirtues.Apersonwithhissoul soarrangedwouldhaveeveryreason,accordingtoSocratesandhishearers,tovaluejusticeinhissoulasintrinsicallygood,indeedasidenticalwithhappiness.Letus turntothisaccountofvirtueinthesoul.

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InanextendedargumentatRepublic435c441d,Platotellsusthatthesoulhasthreeparts.Wewillnotattempttodisentangletheargumentitselfbutwillsimplyuse theresultsthatis,theaccountofthepartsofthesoul.Unfortunately,eventhatmodestplanisnotaltogetheruncomplicatedsinceitisnotclearexactlywhatthe resultsare.29Althoughwearetoldthatthepartsarereason,appetite,andspiritedpart,muchcontroversyexistsaboutthenatureoftheseparts.Forourpresent, somewhatpreliminarypurposeswewillsaythatthepartsaredistinguishablefunctionswithinthesoulandthateachfunctionhasadualaspect.Platoseemstowantto attributebothsomecognitiveabilityandsomedesiringmotivationtoeachpartofthesoul.Inthecaseofreason,thecognitiveabilityisfairlyclearforexample,it discoversthetruth,generallyconceived.Ontheotherhand,reasonalsoseemstobemotivatedbyadesiretolearnthetruth.Inturn,appetiteofcoursedesiresits objectappetiteobviouslyhasamotivation,then.However,appetitealsohasaprimitivelycognitivegraspofitsobjectithasaconceptionofwhatitwants.30 Platoestablishesthedistinctionbetweendifferentfunctionsbyshowingaconflictbetweenthem.InPlato'sinventoryofpsychologicalfunctions,thereisfirstofall reason,whichcalculatesconsequencesandtakesforethoughtforthewholesoul.Itfrequentlyfindsitselfatoddswiththesecondpartofthesoulthedesires. ThoughtbyPlatotoconsistprimarilyofthedesiresforfood,drink,andsex,theyseekimmediatefulfillmentwhilereasonhasthejoboflookingoutforconsequences. Itseemsfairlyobvioushowthesetwofunctionswouldconflict.Whenoneisthirsty,one'sdesirefordrinksimplywantstohavesomethingtodrink,withoutany considerationofconsequencesotherthanquenchingthethirst.Itisreasonthatcalculatestheremoteconsequencessuchastheeffectonone'shealthofdrinkingthis drink.Thedesirewantsimmediategratificationandthereasonthinksaboutlongrangeconsequencesthatis,one'soverallgood.Theconflictbetweenthetwois classicandisoneofthefundamentalissuesofmoralthoughtforPlato.TheresolutionoftheconflictisoneoftheresultsPlatowishestoprovidewiththisaccountof virtue. Nevertheless,insettinguptheoppositionbetweenreasonanddesires,Platomakesasignificantdeparturefromhispreviousunderstandingoftherelationbetween desireandthegood.Inanextendedargument(Rep.437e439b),Socratesexplainsthatthedesirefordrink,ofitself,isnotdesireforgooddrink.31Ofitself,

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desireisneitherforgoodnorbaddrink.Ifgooddrinkisdrinkthatisgoodforoneinthelongrun,thenthedesirefordrinkisnot,initself,desirefordrinkthatisgood foroneinthelongrun.Presumably,Plato'sreasonforsoarguingisthatitisthejobofreasontolookoutforgoodandbaditisthejobofdesiretoseekdrink. However,thisdifferentiationoffunctionsmeansthatdesiredoesnotofitselfseekthegoodineachcategory.However,thischaracterizationofdesiredoesnotmean thatdesiresaregoodindependent.Desiresarenotsaidtobedesiresforwhatispleasantasopposedtowhatisgoodthedefinitionofgoodindependent.Indeed, thesimpledesirefordrinkisnomoreforpleasantdrinkthanitisforgooddrink.Plato'spointisthatdesire,initself,isnotcalculativeitis,letussay,goodindifferent. Itisthejobofreasontocalculate.Thus,desireinitselfneitherabetsnorhindersreasoninitsjob.Itsimplywantswhatitwants.Thejobofreasonistoguidethat want. Thethirdpartofthesoulislessfamiliaranotiontothemodernreaderthantotheancient.Itiscalled"thymos,"or"thymoeides,"andisusuallytranslated"thespirited part.''ThymosisacharacterofGreekwarriorsanaggressiveprincipleimpellingonetoadventureacrosstheforbiddingseas,tojoininawfulbattle.Platomakesit anallyofreasoninitsconflictwiththeappetites.Inthispassageitisexpressedastheselfdirectedangeronefeelswhenonewronglygivesintoanappetite. Plato'stripartitesoulcanbeseenasaninventoryofpsychologicalfunctions.Eachpersonmusthavethesethreefunctionsforlivingalife:(1)reasongivesusthelong viewaboutcoursesofaction(2)thymoscarriesoutourconceptionofthebestcourseofactionand(3)thedesiresaremotiveswhosesatisfactionmakespossible thebodilyexistence.Butthethreealsoentailthreedistinctkindsofneeds.Giventhatwehavethesethreefunctions,ourlifeisalsocharacterizedbythreekindsof emotionalneedsandtheircorrespondingsatisfactions.PlatointroducesthisnotionlaterinBookIXoftheRepublic,wherehesaysthateachofthethreepartsofthe soulhasitspeculiardesireandpleasure(580d).Tobeginwiththeappetites,itisobviousthatweneedthesatisfactionsaffordedbyfulfillingourdesiresforfood,drink, andsex.(Platoallows,inthebestkindoflife,forwhattouswouldappeartobethesublimationofthelatter.)Aswell,weneedalifethathasthesatisfactionsof thymosonethatenjoysadventure,aggressiveplay,andrisks.Finally,ourlivesneedthesatisfactionofreason

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itsdesiretodiscover,solve,resolve,andcontemplate.Alifewithoutoneofthesethreekindsofsatisfactionsismuchpoorerthanalifewithallthree.Platoseemswise inrecommendingallthreeheonlyseemsunwisewhenwestoptothinkwhathasbeenleftout.Muchoftheplausibilityofthepositiondependsonhisabilitytoadapt thistripartitedivisiontoincludeotherneeds,notablypersonalaffection. Havingdistinguishedthethreepartsofthesoul,Platoisnowreadytogivehisaccountofthefourvirtues:justice,wisdom,courage,andtemperance.Inthispassage, justiceisthefoundationofalltheotherthreevirtues.Analogoustojusticeinthecity,justiceinthesouliseachpartofthesouldoingitsownjoborfunction(tahautou hekastontonenautoiprattei[441e12]).Thus,justicemeansreasonfulfillingitsjobofrulinginthesoul,exercisingforethought,endowedwiththeknowledgeof whatisgoodforeachofthepartsandforthewholeformedbythethreepartstheknowledgeamountstowisdom(Rep.441e442c).Aswell,justiceimpliesthatthe spiritedpartfulfillsitsfunctionbyfollowingtheleadofreasoninfearingwhatoughttobefearedthatis,thespiritedparthascourage(Rep.442c).Thislattermeans assistingthereasoninkeepingthedesiresinline,especiallykeepingthemfromtryingtobecomerulersinthesoul.Thus,eachfulfillsitspeculiarfunctioninthesoul.In fact,theintegrityoffunctionsisthebasisforthevirtueoftemperance(sophrosune).Temperanceistheagreementamongthepartsofthesoultherulerandthe ruledthatreasonoughttoruleandtheotherpartsdonotraiserevoltagainsttheruleofreason(442d).Inthiswaythetemperatesoulisaharmonyoffunctions undertheleadofreason.Whileearlierinthispassagereasonandthespiritedparttreattheappetitesasthoughtheyareuntrustworthy,inthisparttheappetitesseemto betamed,agreeingtotheruleofreason. NextSocratessaysthatthisarrangementofthepartsofthesoulisthesourceofourtreatingothersjustly.Heliststhewaysinwhichapersonmaycommitinjustice nicelycataloguedbyVlastosundertheheadingsofvanity,cupidity,andsensuality.32Theperson,inwhosesoulreasonruleswithwisdom(thespiritedpartfollows reason,andthedesiresaresubjecttothesetwo)willnotsteal,robtemples,breakoaths,commitadultery,orbetraycomrades.Thereason,Socratessays,isthat "eachofthepartswithinhimdoesitsown(job)withrespecttorulingandbeingruled"(443b).

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Nowwecanseehowthecraftanalogypervadesthisaccount.Tobeginwith,reason'srulinginthesoulisanadaptationofthecraftofruling.Itscraftofrulingis identifiedwiththevirtueofwisdom.Inthegoodperson,reasonrules,beingwise(sophos)andexercisingforethoughtforthewholesoul(441e46).IntheGorgias (464b7),thecraftofrulinghasthesamefunctionexceptthatthereitwasforthesoulsofothers.Theparalleltothiscraftinthesoulisthewisdomexercisedbyrulers inthecity,which,inturn,isidentifiedwithgoodcounsel(euboulia)(428b).Butacityiswellcounseledbecauseitsrulershaveacertainkindofknowledge (episteme).Thisknowledgeisdifferentfromtheknowledge(episteme)ofthecarpenter,thefarmer,andthesmithbecause,initsrelationswithitselfandwithother cities,itlooksoutforwhatisbestforthecityasawhole.Thecontextclearlymakesthisknowledgeacraftknowledgemoreover,itsanalogueinthesoulwisdom isalsosaidtobetheknowledge(episteme)ofwhatisbeneficialforeachpartandforthewhole(442a58). Whenreasonisendowedwithwisdomandfollowedbythespiritedpart,itiscapableofworkingonthedesires.Thelatteristhelargestpartofthesoulandthepart thatbecomesthemostinsatiable(aplestotaton)becauseofpossessions.

Reasonanditsallywillwatchoverthedesireslesttheybecomefilled(pimplasthai)withtoomuchofthebodilypleasuresandgrowsostrongastonolongerfulfilltheirproper functionbut,rather,toattempttooverthrowandtorulethosepartsforwhichitisnotfitandoverturntheentirelifeofall.(442ab)

Ofcourse,inthisdescriptionoftheworkofreasonandthespiritedpart,theonetakingcounselandtheotherexecutingthatcounsel,itiseasytoseethecraftofruling intheGorgias.Reasonanditsally,thymos,nowdoforthesoulwhatthegoodmanwhospokeintheassemblyorlawcourtdidforthesoulsofothersinthelatter dialoguetheyrestrainitandbringitbacktoproperfunctioning.Thechiefdifferenceisthatnowthepartsofthesoularemorecomplex.IntheGorgias,thegood speakerworkedonthedesiresonly,restrainingthemwhentheyhadgrowninsatiable.Inourconsiderationofthatdialogue,wespeculatedthatthisworkofrestraint wasaimedatbringingthedesires,growninsatiable,intocompatibilitywiththeothermoderatedesiresofthesoul.InRepublicIV,theworkofreasonseemstobe preventiveitseekstokeepthedesiresfrombecominginsatiableand,thereby,usurpthefunctions

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oftheotherparts.Yetthethemesaresimilar.InRepublicIV,desiresaretobewatchedsothattheyremaincompatiblewiththeotherpartsofthesoulthedesires mustnotattempttodothejoboftheotherparts.Herecompatibilityandproperfunctionseemtobenecessaryandsufficientconditionsofoneanother.Whenapart ofthesouldoesnotfulfillitsproperfunction,itusurpsthatofanotherwhenapartfulfillsitsproperfunction,itdoesnotusurpthatofanother.Clearly,whenonepart usurpsthefunctionofanother,thetwofunctionsareincompatible. Then,inakindofpaeantojustice,Socratessumsuphisaccount.Justiceisreallyaninternalarrangement.Thejustpersondoesnotallowanyofthepartswithintodo alienthings,topursuepromiscuouslythetasksofotherpartsinthesoul,butdisposeswell(euthemenon)whatistrulyhisown,rulinghimself,bringingorder (kosmesanta),beingafriendtohimself,andharmonizing(sunarmosanta)thethreeparts,likethreenotes,thelowest,thehighest,andthemiddle.Theuseoftithemi, kosmeo,andharmozoshowsthatjusticeisbeingcomparedtoacraftaswell.Indeed,thesesamewordsortheirderivativesareusedintheGorgias(503e5504a4) todescribewhatallcraftsmendoitcanhardlybeacoincidencethatPlatousedthesamewordsinthisextremelyimportantpassage,thedenouementofhisaccountof justiceinthesoul.Finally,Socratesalludestotherelationbetweenjusticeandwisdomattheendofhispaeanwhenhesaysthatjustandfineaction(praxin)isany actionthatpreservesandhelpsfinish(sunapergazetai)theorder,33wisdombeingthecraftknowledge(epistemen)setover(epistatousan)thisaction.Wisdom maintainsitsassociationwiththerulingcraftwhilesunapergazetaiisclearlyacraftword. Whatkindofharmonywillthecraftofjusticeachieveamongtheparts?Thesepartsrepresentdirectionsforthesoultopursue,differentkindsoflifethatcouldbe realized.Besidesthebynowfamiliarlifeofsensuality,therearethelifeofseekinghonorandpoliticalstandingandthelifeofseekingknowledgeandunderstanding.All threedirectionsareinherentinone'ssoulreason,armedwithwisdom,mustcombinethesethreeintoaharmony.Wecanappreciatewhatthisharmonymightmeanif webeginbyconsideringthedifferentvarietiesofdisharmonyandimbalance.SocratesoutlinessuchlivesinBookVIIIoftheRepublic.Inthebestlife,reasonrulesin thesoul.Sinceitknowswhatisbestforthethreepartsandforthewhole,suchalifehasbalanceandhar

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mony.Intheotherkindsoflives,otherpartsofthesouldominate.Thefirstisthelifeinwhichthespiritedpartdominatesthegoalofthislifeisthechiefvaluefor spirithonororstandinginthecity(Rep.548cff.).Suchapersoniscalled"timocratic"anamebasedontheGreekwordforhonor(time).Thisisapersonwho wouldvaluestandingintheeyesofothersasthehighestvalue. Inthetimocraticperson,sensualitywouldbesubordinatedtoseekinghonor,ofcourse.Indeed,sensuality,ifitisnotcloselyguarded,cancauseonetolosehonorone maydomanydishonorable,inthesenseofcowardly,deedsatthebiddingofone'sdesires.ButinSocrates'reckoningitisreasonthatisneglectedinthetimocratic life.Alifegivenovertohonorhasnotimeforthepursuitofknowledge.ItisnotoriousthattheSpartanslackedtheinstinctfortheAtticpursuitoftruth.Neither speculativenorinterestedinspeculation,theystucktotheirmilitarylife.WhilePlatoseemstohavefoundsomethingadmirableaboutthem,theirlackofintellectual distinctionwasnotpartofit.Betterthansensualistsbecauseseekinghonorisbetterthansensualitytheystilllackedanessentialcomponentoflife. Finally,therearethreekindsoflifeinwhichdesiresdominate.Firstistheoligarchic,whichisbasedonthedesireformoneythisdesiresubordinatestheotherdesires (Rep.553bff.).Themiserwhosedesireformoneymakeshimneglectotherdesiresisagoodexampleoftheoligarchicperson.Thenthereisthedemocraticlife,in whichalldesiresaregivenequalaccesstosatisfaction(Rep.558dff.).Socratespresentsthispersonasacomicfigurewhoseemstotryeverything.Thetyrannicallife isoneinwhichsomeonegranddesirebecomesdominantthisdesireissooverweeningitsubordinatesallotherstoitself(Rep.571aff.).Whatiscommontothese threekindsoflivesistheirneglectbothofhonorandofreason.Ofcourse,onewhosechiefaimismoney,orthesatisfactionofmultipledesireorjustonemagnificent desire,islikelytobecowardly,tosacrificehishonortothesedesires.IntheGorgias,forinstance,SocratesmadeCalliclesfacethefactthatsensualitymilitates againsthonor.Again,thelifeofpleasuremeansthatreasoncannotpursueitsowngoal.Itcertainlycannotruleinthesoulitbecomessubordinatetowhateverdesireis incharge,littlebetterthanaprocurer. Bycontrast,thewisepersonwillcombineallthreedirections,withappropriaterespectforeach.Itisthelifeofreasonthatgivestheknowledgeneededtomakethe combinationwork.34With

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suchalifethereis,ofcourse,justiceinthesoulinthePlatonicsensethateachofthepartsofthesoulfulfillsitspeculiarfunction.Butsuchalifealsohasjusticeinthe soulinamoreordinarysense:eachpartofthesoulreceivesitsdue.Eachpartisdevelopedtothedegreeandreceivessatisfactionintheamountappropriatetoit.The desiresarenotsuppressedtheyaresatisfiedbutnottothepointthattheybecomerulersinthesoul,insatiableandoverweening.Thespiritedpartisnotsuppressed itisallowedtoexerciseandsatisfyitsaggressiveness.Butitdoessoinsuchawayastorespectthefunctionsofthereasonandtheappetitestheyarenot subordinatedtoseekinghonor.Finally,reasondoesnotbecomeoverbearingitsrulerecognizesthelegitimateclaimsoftheothertwopartsofthesoul.Reason,guided bywisdom,doesnot,throughcontemplation,renderthesouleitherasceticorcowardly. Thispictureofthevirtuoussoulisverycompellinginmanyways.Ifweacceptthenotionthatthesethreepartsofthesoularethecompleteinventoryofour psychologicalcapacities,inPlato'sarrangementwehavethebestmeansforrealizingeachofthecapacitiestothefullestextentactuallyneededforthegoodofthat capacity(reasonknowswhatisforthegoodofeach)andtothefullestextentcompatiblewithfulfillingtheneedsoftheothers(reasonknowswhatisforthegoodof thewholeformedbythethree).Itseemssomewhatpale,butneverthelesscorrect,tosaythatsuchanarrangementimpliesawellroundedpersonality.Suchaperson willdevelopherintellectualcapacities,herspiritedaggressivecapacities,andherappetitivecapacities.Firstofall,shewillhavealifeinwhichhermindisdevelopedin allthewaysthatthepursuitoftruthpromises,butonlytotheextentthatthemindreallyneedssuchpursuit.Atthesametime,thepursuitoftruthwillnotderogatefrom thedevelopmentoftheothertwoparts.Second,shewillhavealifeinwhichaggressivenessandadventurewillhaveaproperplacebutthespiritedpartisfulfilled neitherbeyondwhatisgoodforitnorinsuchawayastoimpedetheothertwopartsofthesoul.Finally,herdesiresforfood,drink,andsexwillbefulfilled,butnot beyondthepointatwhichtheythemselvesneedfulfillment.Theappetitesthemselvesdonotknowwhenthispointhasbeenreached,buttheycanfollowtheleadof reasonhere.Inturn,thispointcoincideswiththepointatwhichthedevelopmentoftheothertwopartsisrespected.Andifwesupposethatthesethreeexhaustthe soul'scapacities,suchalifeseemstolacknothing.

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AtthispointwecannowseethecongruencebetweenthisnotionofjusticeinthesoulandthevirtuoussouloftheGorgias.Aswehavealreadynoted,thewordsfor "disposing,""ordering,"and"harmonizing"arethesameasorderivativesofthecraftwordsusedatGorgias503e5504a4todescribethemethodofallcraftsmen, butespeciallythatofthegoodmanwhospeaksintheassemblyorinthelawcourt,whoperfectsthesoulsofothers.InourinterpretationoftheGorgias,thetaskof thegoodoratorwastoharmonizethepartsofthesoul,whichwereidentifiedasthedesires.Hisjobincludedrestraininganydesiresthathadbecomeinsatiable.Such desireswere,presumably,incompatiblewiththeothermoderatedesires.Thejobofharmonizing,then,entailedmakingincompatibledesirescompatiblebyrestraining theimmoderateorinsatiableones.ThissomewhatspeculativereadingoftheGorgiasisperhapsnowjustifiedbywhatwefindintheRepublic.Therulerinthesoul, reason,seemstobedoingthesamesortofjobharmonizingandmakingcompatiblethepartsofthesoul.However,intheRepublic,thistaskhasbecomesomewhat morecomplicated.Thepartsarenolongersimplythedesires,atleastasthesewereunderstoodintheGorgias.Aswehavejustseen,Platohasnowidentifiedtwo otherpartstothesoul,otherdirectionsforthesoultopursue.IntheRepublic,then,weseeafulfillmentofsomeideasthatwerejustbeingdevelopedintheGorgias. ThetentativeandslightlyprimitivemoralpsychologyofthelatterdialogueisnowcompletedinthetripartitesouloftheRepublic.Thejobofthegoodoratorisnow takenoveranddevelopedbyreasonseasonedwithwisdom. IfRepublicIVdevelopssomeoftheunderdevelopednotionssurroundingthecraftofrulingintheGorgias,italsofillsinsomeofthedetailsofthecraftofvirtueinthe Euthydemus.Inthelatterdialogue,wisdomissupposedtobeacraftknowledgethatusestheassetsofbodyandsoulinordertoprovideadvantageforitspossessor. Unfortunately,Socratescouldnottellhisinterlocutorswhatthatcraftknowledgewasnor,inturn,exactlywhattheadvantagetobeprovidedbyitwastobe.We knewthatthisadvantagewouldbethesameashappinesshowever,wewerestillleftwithpuzzlesaboutwhatthishappinesswouldbe.IntheRepublicwehavea clearerideaoftheadvantagetobeprovidedbywisdom.Thegoalofwisdomisspecifiedasthehealthofthesoul,understoodasakindoforder(444a13e2). Further,theorder,orhealth,ofthesoulisalsothehappinessoradvantageof

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thesoul.Finally,Socrates'suggestion,inthesecondprotrepticinterlude,thatthecraftknowledgeofwisdomwouldbethecraftofrulinghasbeenshowntobe correct.IntheRepublic,wisdomisacraftknowledgeofruling,bothinthesoulandinthecity.Inthefollowingsectionswewilldevelopindetailthenatureofthe happinessbestowedbythecraftofwisdom. III ItwillhelpustoseetheintricaciesofthiscompactcraftanalogyifwelookatitinthecontextofTerenceIrwin'sclaimthatPlato,infact,rejectedthecraftanalogyin theRepublic.OneofhischiefargumentsisthatPlatorejectsthecraftanalogybecausecraftisonlyinstrumentaltoitsgoal.35Ifcraftisonlyinstrumental,thennoone hasanyreasontodesirethecraftofvirtueforitsownsake.ButPlatoarguesthatvirtueisdesirableforitsownsakeinfact,showingthatvirtueisdesirableforitsown sakeisthepointoftheargumentendingwiththepassagesinBookIVwithwhichwehavejustdealt.So,accordingtoIrwin,Platorejectsthecraftanalogyatthe beginningofBookII,wheretheargumentbegins.36 SuchaconclusionwouldflyinthefaceoftheclearevidenceinthetextthatPlatocontinuestousethelanguageofcraftintalkingaboutbothwisdomandjustice. However,thereismorethanthetextualevidencetodealwith.OurinterpretationofthecraftanalogyinBookIValsoshowsthatjustice,eventhoughitisconstruedas acraft,isnotthereforemerelyinstrumentaltoitsgoal.OurargumentforthisclaimusesthetwocharacterizationsgiveninBookIVofjusticeinthesoul.Oneofthese characterizationsismadewithoutcomparingjusticetocraftitisthePlatonicdefinitionofjusticeinthesoulthatis,eachpartdoingitspeculiarjob.Theotherusesthe languageofcrafttocharacterizejustice.Whatwewillseeisthatthecraftcharacterizationofjusticedoesnotportrayacraftthatisinstrumentaltoitsgoalbut,rather, thischaracterizationportraysthesamethingthatischaracterizedbythePlatonicdefinitionofjustice.Asweshallsee,thecraftcharacterizationisnomoreinstrumental thanthePlatonicdefinitionofjustice. Thecharacterizationsofjusticerelevantforthisargumentare:
(A)justiceiseachpartdoingitsownfunctionwithregardtorulingandbeingruled(443b)

Page102 (B)justiceconcernsdoingone'sowninternally,thejustmannotallowinganyofthepartswithintodoalienthingsortopursuepromiscuouslythetasksofotherparts,but disposeswellwhatistrulyhisown,rulinghimself,bringingorder,beingafriendtohimself,andharmonizingthethreeparts(443de).37

Characterization(B)isthebasisfortheclaimthatjusticeisacraft.Inwhatfollows,weshallrefertojusticecharacterizedinthiswayasthecraftofjustice.''Platonic justice"shallrefertowhat(A)describes.Wecanseethatwhat(B)describesisthesamethingaswhat(A)describes.Indoingso,wewillseethat(B)thecraftof justiceisnomoreinstrumentalthanis(A)thePlatonicdefinitionofjustice. First,wecanseethat(A)and(B)describethesamething.Whenoneispracticingthecraftofjustice,oneisnotallowingthepartsofone'ssoultoengageinalien thingsnortoundertakepromiscuouslythetasksbelongingtootherpartsofthesoul,butisdisposingwellwhatistrulypropertoeach,rulingoneself,bringingorder, andharmonizingtheparts.ThenonehasPlatonicjusticeeachpartisdoingitsownfunctionwithregardtorulingandbeingruledthatis,onefallsunder(A).The inhibitingactivitiesofthecraftofjustice"notallowing"meanthatthelowerpartsarenotusurpingtheruleofreason.Whilealltheseinhibitingactivitiesareattributed tothejustman,surelytheyareonlytheoutwardsignsofreason'srulinginthesoul,withitsunderstandingofwhatisbeneficialforeachpartandforthewhole. Thus,thecraftofjusticeisnotjustinstrumentaltojustice,itisjustice.Indeed,thestrongesttextualevidenceforthisclaimisthefactthatboth(A)and(B)arecalled "justice"(dikaiosune).In(B),justice(dikaiosune)issaidtobeconcernedwithdoingone'sowninternally.Therefollowsinappositiontothis"doingofone'sown internally"thatlistofactivitieswehavecalledthe"craftofjustice."38Thefactthatdikaiosunerefersbothtoeachpart'sdoingitsownandtothoseactivitieslisted underthecraftofjusticeshowsthateachpart'sdoingitsownsimplyis,inpartatleast,doingthatlistofactivitiescalledthe"craftofjustice."Platoisexplicatingjustice bylistingtheseactivities,whichhedescribesusingcraftwordshehasusedbeforeinasignificantpassageoftheGorgias. AnotherwaytoputthispointistosaythatthecraftofjusticeinstantiatesPlatonicjustice.ThecraftofjusticesimplyisPlatonic

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justice.Andalittlereflectionwillshowthatthisresultisnotthatsurprising.Thecraftofjusticeamountstoreasonrulinginthesoul,withwisdomasitsguide,butthe ruleofreasoninthesoulisalsoajustrule.Sincereasonknowswhatisforthegoodofeachandforthegoodofthewholeformedbythethree,itisreasonthatsees thateachperformsitsownfunctionanddoesnotoverstepitsbounds.Reason'sruleisjustintwoways,then.Firstofall,knowingwhatisgoodforeach,reasonsees thateachpartreceiveswhatitneedstofulfillitsfunctionthissortofjusticeispositive.Second,sincetheassumptionseemstobethatifeachreceivespreciselywhatit needstofulfillitsownfunction,itwillnotimpingeonthefunctionsoftheotherpartsthissortofjusticeisnegative.Inthisway,eachpartalsoreceivesitsdue.Inturn, dispensingjusticesothateachperformsitsownfunctionentailsnotallowinganyofthepartswithintodoalienthings,topursuepromiscuouslythetasksofotherparts, disposingwelltheseparts(euthemenon),bringingorder(kosmesanta),andharmonizingthethreeparts(sunarmosanta).Inaddition,reason'srulingjustlymeans that,inpursuingbusinessorpoliticalactivities,onestillpreservesandperfectsthatorderthatisitselfjusticeinthesoul. Insuchanarrangement,reasonpracticesthecraftofjusticeinthesoulbygoverningandmoderatingtheothersparts.Onewaytoexplicatethisnotionistoseereason asbuildingupdispositionswithintheotherparts.Reasonwouldoverseeandtraintheappetites,forexample.Overseeingtheappetiteswouldentailwatchingthem closelysothattheydonotoversteptheirbounds.Reasonmightkeepawatchonthedesireforfood,forexample,sothatitdoesnottakeonadispositionto overindulgenceandthusbecometherulingdesireofone'slife.Oversightisnegative,ofcourseitwatchesoutforwarningsignsandreactsaccordingly.Nevertheless, indoingsoitcanintroducedispositionsintoappetites.Perhapsmoreeffectiveispositivelytrainingtheappetitessothateachfunctionsinamoderateway.Reason mightworkontheappetiteforfoodsothatitissatisfiedwithmoderateamountsbycontrollingeatingsothatoneenjoysandsavorswhatoneeatsinsteadofrushing throughamealinordertoeatasmuchaspossible.Additionally,reasonmightbuildupmoderationbyconcentrationonthepleasuresofsatietyortheintegrationof eatingwithotherpleasures.Whetherthroughoversightortraining,certaindispositionswouldbuildupintheappetites.

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Thisoverseeingandtrainingtheappetitessothattheyfunctioninacertainwayisanobviouswayforreasontopracticethecraftofrulingjustlyinthesoul.Inbuilding upthesedispositions,reasonisprovidingforthegoodofeachappetite,assumingthathavingthedispositiontofunctionmoderatelyisgoodforanappetite.Insofaras havingsuchdispositionsmakesitpossibletointegratetheappetitesintotheoverallfunctioningofthesoul,buildingupthesedispositionsprovidesforthegoodofthe wholeaswell.AtRep.442d,Socratessaysthattemperanceiseachpartofthesoul,rulerorruled,agreeingthatreasonshouldruleandtherulednotraisingfaction againstit.Theagreementonthepartofspiritandappetitesmightwellbeadispositiontofollowreason.Indeed,Platohintsatsucharegimenforthespiritwhenhe saysthatmusicandgymnastictrainthespiritedpartandreason.Thetrainingseemstoinstilldispositionstobehaveincertainways.Music,forinstance,moderatesthe spiritedpart,reducingitstendencytomoreexcessiveformsofbehavior(Rep.410cff.).Presumablyreasoncoulduseotherkindsoftrainingtointroduceadisposition thatwouldavoidtheexcessesofthespiritedpartandmakeitareliableallyofreason,readytofollowreason'slead.Reasontoowillneedanothereducationbesides musicandgymnasticsomewhatmoretheoreticalbutnotlessmotivatingasweshallsee. Inthisinterpretation,thecraftofjusticeisnotinstrumentalbecauseitturnsouttobeaselftendingcraft,acraftthatbuildsitselfup.Eachexerciseofjusticeisan instantiationofjusticemoreover,eachexerciseofitproducesjustice.Exercisingjusticeinthesoulisaninstanceofjusticeinthesoulbecauseexercisingitmeans performingsomeactionthatisitselfaninstanceofjustactionforexample,adecisionthatevincesthejusticealreadybuiltupasadispositioninthesoul.Exercising justicealsocontinuesthebuildingupofthisdispositionofjustice.39Thejustdecision,forexample,buildsupthedispositiontojusticewithinthesoulbyreinforcing thehabitsofobediencewithintheotherparts.Becausethecraftofjusticeinthesoulisanexerciseofjustice,italsocausesjusticeinthesoul.Thus,eventhoughitisa craft,itisnotinstrumental.Finally,then,justiceisthecraftwhichuseswhatitmakes. IV SofarwehavearguedfortheplaceofthecraftanalogyinthemoralphilosophyofBookIV.Theargumentisnowcompleteand,

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ifitissuccessful,theplaceofthecraftanalogyissecure.Whatfollowsisanattemptspeculativeinparttodrawouttheconsequencesofthisinterpretationthat bearonthenotionofhappiness.ThedistinctionsatthebeginningofBookIIprovideabeginningforthispartofourinvestigation.Thereitissaidthatjusticeisgood ordesirableinitselfandforitsconsequences.Justice'sbeinggoodinitselfisintimatelyconnectedtoitsbeinghappinesstoshowthatjusticeisgoodinitselfisto showinwhatwayitishappiness.InwhatfollowswewillshowwhatismeantinBookIIwhenitissaidthatjusticeisgoodinitselfandthenshowinaspeculative waythatexploitsthecraftanalogyhowjusticeinBookIVisgoodinitselfandthusisatleastapartofhappiness.40 AtthebeginningofBookII(357b4d2),Platodistinguishesamong(1)thingsgoodordesirableinthemselves(autohautouhenekaaspasomenoi),(2)thingsgood ordesirableinthemselvesandintheirconsequences(hoautotehautoucharinagapomenkaitonapautougignomenon),and(3)thingsinthemselveslaborious andgoodordesirableonlyintheirrewardsandothersuchconsequences(autamenheautonhenekaoukandexaimethaechein,tondemisthontecharinkaiton allonhosagignetaiap'auton).Weshallconcentrateonthedistinctionbetweensecondandthirdcategories,withspecialattentiontotheexamples.Theexamples fromthesecondcategoryareseeing(horan),understanding(phronein),andbeinghealthy(hygiainein).Theseexamplesarelateraugmentedbythecaseofhearing (akouein)andanepithetisaddedtothewholegroup.Theyaregoodsthatareproductivebytheirownnatureandnotbyopinion(367c7d2).Wemaysaythatthey havegoodinherentconsequences.41However,thesefourcapacitiesarealsosaidtobegoodinthemselves.Iftheyaregoodinthemselves,theyoughttobegood apartfrominherentconsequencesthatis,theyoughttobe,letussay,intrinsicallygood.Whatexactlytheintrinsicgoodoftheseactivitiesintheexamplescanbe, apartfromtheirinherentconsequences,isnotaltogetherunproblematic.42However,whatisimportantforthenotionofhappinessisthatthedistinctionbetween intrinsicgoodandinherentconsequencecanbeshowntoholdforjustice. Now,wecancontrastgoodsofthesecondcategorywithgoodsofthethirdcategory.Thelatterareinthemselvesdifficultandaredoneforthesakeoftheirrewards (misthoi)andothersuchthingsasfollowfromthem.Theexamplesarephysicalexer

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cise(gymnazesthai),undergoingmedicaltreatment(iatreuesthai)andpracticingmedicine(iatreusis)(357c5d2).Therearetwopartstothiscontrast.Thefirstis basedonthefactthattheactivitiesinthethirdcategoryunlikethoseinthesecondareinthemselveslaboriousandundesirable.Itiseasytoseehowtheexamples areinthemselveslaboriousbutvaluableintheirconsequences.However,thereisanotherparttothecontrastanditisbasedonadifferencebetweenthewaythatthe consequencesofthetwocategoriesarebroughtabout.Aswehaveseen,theconsequencesofthesecondcategoryfollownaturallyandnotbyopinion.Butthe consequencesofthethirdcategoryarefurthercharacterizedinthissamepassageasbeingdoneforthesakeofrewardsandthefameofopinion(358a46).Byadding thenotionoffameconferredbyopinion,Socrateshasaddedanewdimensiontothenotionofreward.Asonecommentatorhaspointedout,rewardsaredifferent fromtheinherentconsequencesofactivitiesinthesecondcategory.43Rewardsarelikefameinthattheyareconferredbyconventionandnotbynature.Thereward forpracticingmedicineisconferrednotbynaturebutbyconvention,forexample.ThisdifferenceisveryimportantforwhatfollowsinBookIIhowever,eventhough itisaddedasalmostamatterofcourseintheelaborationofthethirdcategory,itdoesnotfitverywellwiththeexamplescited. Ifwetakerewardstobelikefame,agoodconferredbyconvention,theonlyexamplethateasilyfitsthisdescriptionispracticingmedicine,wheretherewardsare presumablythefeesearned.However,whilephysicalexerciseandundergoingmedicaltreatmentarelaboriousinthemselves,itishardtoseehowtheirconsequences comeaboutthroughopinion.Iftheconsequencesofphysicalexercisearehealthorathleticprowess,theconsequencesseeminherent.Ontheotherhand,ifthe consequencesarethoughttobethepraisethatattendsuponphysicalbeautyoruponwinningacompetition,thensuchconsequencesdofitthedescriptionofrewards conferredbyopinion.However,itisaltogetherimpossibletoseehowtheconsequencesofmedicaltreatmentcouldbethoughttobearewardconferredbyopinion. Inanyevent,eveniftherearetwopartstothecontrastbetweensecondandthirdcategorygoods,itisthedistinctionbasedonthedifferencebetweeninherent consequences,ontheonehand,andrewardsorconventionalconsequences,ontheother,thatisimportantforthedistinctionbetweensecondandthirdcategory goods.

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ItisthisdistinctionthatisclearlyemphasizedbyGlauconandAdeimantusthroughouttherestofthesepassages.However,sincethedistinctionbetweenfirstand secondcategorygoodsisbasedonthedifferencebetweenintrinsicgoodandinherentgoodconsequences,weactuallyhavethreedifferentkindsofgood:intrinsic good,inherentgoodconsequences,andconventionalgoodconsequences.44Thisshiftingindistinctionsisperhapssymptomaticofsomeconfusion,buttheconfusion isnotfataltoPlato'sargument.Thus,inthesubsequentpassagesofAdeimantus'andGlaucon'sspeeches,Socratesisurgedtoshowthatjusticedoesnotbelongtothe thirdcategory.Theyinvitehimtoconcentrateonwhatjusticeisinitselfasthisisunderstoodinthethirdcategory,thatis,apartfromitsrewardsandgoodreputation (358b47366d7e9367c5d5367e15).However,whatjusticeisinitselfwhenthecontrastisbetweensecondandthirdcategoriesisdifferentfromwhatjusticeis initselfinthecontrastbetweenthefirstandsecond.Inthecontrastbetweenthesecondandthirdcategories,justiceinitselfisdistinguishedfromitsconventional consequencesinthecontrastbetweenfirstandsecond,justiceinitselfisdistinguishedfromitsinherentconsequences.ThroughoutvirtuallyallofthebeginningofBook II,theonlyoperativedistinctionisbetweenthesecondandthirdcategories.Thus,whenGlauconandAdeimantusaskSocratestopraisejusticeinitself,apartfromthe rewardsofbeingknowntobejust,theyarereferringindifferentlytotheintrinsicgoodandtotheinherentconsequencesofjusticeinthesoulwhenthecontrastis betweensecondandthirdcategorygoods,then,justiceinitselfincludesbothitsintrinsicgoodanditsinherentgoodconsequences.Still,thereisadistinctionbetween theintrinsicgoodofjusticeinthesoulanditsinherentgoodconsequences.Moreover,thatdistinctionisimportantforunderstandingthenotionofhappinessinthis accountbecausehappinessistiedtotheintrinsicgoodofjusticeinthesoul.Ifwecanunderstandinwhatwayjusticeisgoodinitselfintrinsicallygoodaparteven fromitsinherentgoodconsequenceswecanunderstandhowitisalsohappiness. HavingestablishedthatPlatodistinguishesjusticeasdesirableorgoodinitselfapartevenfromitsinherentconsequences,wecannowseebyexploitingthecraft analogyhowjusticeisintrinsicallygoodand,thus,howitis,atleastinpart,happiness.Therearetwoaspectsofthecraftofjusticerelevantforsuchanundertaking. Thejustpersonis,inexercisinghisvirtue,(a)onethepartsofwhosesoularefunctioningcorrectlythatis,

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dominatingandsubordinateaccordingtonatureand(b)onewhoatthesametimeknowsthathissoulisfunctioningcorrectly.Whatisdescribedby(a)and(b)are nottwoseparatefactsaboutthecraftofjusticebuttwofacetsofthesamefact.Whenthejustsoulisexercisingitsjustice,reasonisrulingthesoulbymonitoringthe functioningoftheparts.Themonitoringisanecessaryconditionforthesoul'scorrectfunctioningandnotaseparateoccurrencefromthecorrectfunctioningnota thrillorareflectivesenseofwellbeing,althoughitmaybeaccompaniedbysuchanexperience.45Themonitoringisanintegratedpartofthecorrectfunctioning.The mattercanbesummarized:(a)impliesthat(1)reasondominates,(2)theotherpartsaresubmissive,(3)allpartsarereceivingwhatisgoodforthemandareeoipso flourishing(1)meansthat(2)and(3)areknowntothejustperson,thatis,(1)implies(b).Finally,theintrinsicgoodofjusticeistheoccurrentstatedescribedin(a) and(b).Accordingtothisinterpretation,then,thevirtuousperson,forexample,makesdecisionsaboutlongtermpoliciesandshorttermchoices.Indoingso,her reasonfunctionswellinitsjobofdiscerningwhereliesthegoodforthepartsandforthewhole.Inconcert,theotherpartsworkwellinmakingtheirappropriate contributionstothecarryingoutofthesepoliciesandchoicesundertheguidanceofreason.Thevirtuousperson'sselfcontrolisalsoherknowledgeofhersoul's capacitiesandabilitiesworkingwell.Theoccurrenceofcorrectfunctioning,includingtheknowledgeofcorrectfunctioning,ispart,atleast,ofhappinessforthe virtuousperson.46 Inthisaccount,wemakeadistinctionbetweentheprocessandproductofdecisions.Wecanillustratethedistinctionbymeansofthefollowingcontrast.Tobetter understandtheprocess,thinkofsomeonemakingadecisionthatisimpeccablefromthepointofprocedurealltherelevantevidenceisgathered,properweightis giventothisevidence,theconclusionisdrawninatimelyandnuancedmanner.Finally,suchapersoncancarryoutthedecision,insofarasdoingsodependsonher willandtalents.Nevertheless,thisprocessisstilldistinctfromtheproductwhatactuallyhappenswhenonefollowsoutthedecision.Thus,forreasonsnotunderthe controlofthepersonmakingthedecision,theintendedoutcomecanfailtoberealized.Bycontrast,sometimestheoutcomeofadecisioniscorrect,inthesensethat theconclusionisdrawnthatwillbeborneoutbythefactsnevertheless,onemighthavearrivedatthatdecisionbyaflawedprocess,payinglittle

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attentiontoevidenceornotweighingtheevidenceproperly.Whileitistruethatgooddecisions,inthefirstsenseofprocess,usuallyleadtogooddecisions,inthe secondsenseofproduct,thedistinctionwehavedrawnbetweenthetwoisilluminatingforourpurposes.Thepersonwithjusticeinhersoulmakesgooddecisionsin thefirstsense,andiseoipsoawareofmakingsuchdecisions.Itisthisprocessthatistheintrinsicgoodofjusticeinthesoul.Inturn,happinessisbeingawarethat one'ssoulisfunctioningatitsbestlevelofperformanceinthattaskforwhichthesoulispeculiarlysuitedmakingpoliciesanddecisionsaboutthesoulitselfand executingthosedecisionsandpolicieswithefficiencyanddispatch. Anappropriateanalogy,perhaps,isthatofthetrainedgymnast.WhileSocratessaysthatexercisingcanbelaborious,presumablyhemeansthatitissofortheperson whoisinpoorcondition.However,forthepersonwhoisingoodconditionalready,exercisingisdesirableinitself.Onehasasenseofherbody'swellfunctioning,of thecoordinationandstrengththatpreviousexercisehasworkedintohermuscles.Shereliesonherwellworkingcapacitiesinthecorrectplacementofhands,arms, andlegsaswellasinthecontroloverthewholebodyasitdescribesarcs,poises,anddropstotheintendedspot.Thissenseofcontrolisnotanaccompanying feelingitistheawarenessthatguidesheraction.Theroleofthissenseofwellfunctioningismoreimportantingymnasticsthanin,forexample,crosscountryrunning perhaps.Butsurelythewelltrainedgymnast,ishappywithherselfasagymnast.47ThisanalysisdoesnotexhaustthePlatonicconceptofhappiness.Itdoes, however,presentanimportantcomponentofthatconcept,andonethatisnotnotedinotherplacesthewayinwhichtheintrinsicgoodofjusticeisalso happiness.48Ifapersonhasasheruniquefunctionafunctionthatalsoservestoachievehernaturalperfection,thereissomereasontothinkofherasfortunate.She isfortunatebycontrasttotheentitywhoseperfectiondependsonanotherentityorwhosefunctionservestheperfectionofanotherentity.Itisevenbetterforherifher uniquefunctionisafunctionwhoseexercisebothservesthisperfectionandistheexerciseoftheperfection.Finally,sincehumanbeingsfunctionsothatthepresence ofthatwellfunctioningisknowninthefunctioningitself,shemightwellbecalled''happyandblessed."

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V AtthispointitwouldbehelpfultoseewhatadvancethecraftanalogyintheRepublichasmadeoverthecraftofrulingasweelaborateditintheGorgias.Alreadywe havenoticedthatthestructureofPlato'smoralpsychologyhasbecomemorecomplicatedintheRepublicwiththepartsofthesoulnowincludingthespiritedpartand reason,whileintheGorgiastheonlypartsmentionedwerethedesiresalone.Theadditionoftheothertwopartsnaturallygivesadifferentsensetothewaythatthe craftsmanofthesoul,therulerinthesoul,ordersandharmonizestheparts.However,nowitistimetopaycloserattentiontotheadvancesthatPlatohasmadeover themoralpsychologyandmoraltheoryoftheGorgias.Ourapproachwillbetoreviewthetherapeuticcraftofsoultending,especiallythewayitsoughtanorderand arrangementofthesoul. WebeginwiththecontrastbetweenSocrates'lifeofrestraineddesiresandCallicles'lifeofunrestraineddesires.WesaidthatCallicleswasrecommendingalifein whichthedesiresarenotrecognizedashavingnaturallimitsbutareusedonlyasinstrumentsforpleasure.SincethelatteristhoughtbyCalliclestobethefillingupof emptydesires,thenthepointofsuchalifeistohavedesiresthatareaslargeaspossibleandtobeabletofillthemupasmuchandasoftenaspossible.Accordingto Socrates,suchdesiresbecomeinsatiableinoppositiontosuchdesiresSocratesposestreatingdesiresnotasvehiclesforseekingpleasurebutashaving,astheir naturallimits,satiety.Suchdesiresareadequatelyprovidedforandaresatisfiedwithwhattheyhave.Inthesequel,Socratesdoesnotexploitthisaccount,however. Rather,inthemedicalanalogy,heintroducesthenotionthatinsatiabledesiresleadtoanincompatibilityofdesirestheinsatiabledesirebecomesincompatiblewith otherdesires.Itisthejobofthephysicianofthesoultoreducetheincompatibility.Finally,Socratessaysthatthephysicianofthesoulisthejudge,whosetreatment forsuchdesiresispunishment.However,thebestexampleofthesoultendingcraftisSocraticelenchus,whosepunishmentconsistsofshowingthepatientan inconsistencyinhismoralbeliefs.Socratespresentselenchusasawayofdiscipliningdesiresthatgiverisetofaultymoralbeliefs.Itisaninstanceofthecraftofsoul tending,whichbringsharmonyandorderintothesoul.

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WesawthattheproblemwiththisaccountisthatelenchusisnotaspowerfulanotionasSocratesseemstothink.Itisunclearwhetherexposingincompatible desiresbywayofexposinginconsistentbeliefsisenoughtoshowwhichdesireshouldbepreferred.Evenifdesireforthegoodissupposedtobethearbiter betweentheincompatibledesires,sofaritisnotclearthatdesireforthegoodhasenoughcontenttofulfillthatfunction.Ifdesireforthegoodlackssuchcontent,then itisnotclearthatthedesireforthegoodimpliesthedesireforabalancedandvirtuouslife.Thus,itispossibletoattaincompatibilityofdesiresbygivingupthedesire toleadabalancedandvirtuouslife.Suppose,forinstance,thathavingunrestraineddesiresisincompatiblewithbeingbrave.Ifonewantstobeasensualist,hemight identifydesireforthegoodwiththedesiretobeasensualistthenhecouldachievecompatibilityofdesiresbygivingupbravery.Onesimplybecomesacowardfor sensuality'ssake.NothinginSocrates'elenchusseemscapableofpreventingsuchachoice. NowwecanseethatpartofwhatiscausingtheproblemsintheGorgiasisthelackofafullydevelopedmoralpsychology.Withoutsuchanaccount,Socratescannot adequatelydefendhisclaimaboutcompatibilityofdesiresinthesoul.However,intheRepublic,wefindatheoreticalaccountofthepartsofthesoulandoftherole thatappetitesplayinthesoul.ThisaccountallowsPlatotoarguethatinsatiabledesiresaredysfunctionalbecausetheyareincompatiblewiththeotherpartsofthesoul. Inessence,Platohasreplacedtheinchoatenotionofcompatibilityofdesireswiththemorecomplexaccountofthefunctionsofthepartsofthesoulandofthewayin whichthesefunctionsfitandharmonizewithoneanother.IntheaccountfromBookIV,eachofthepartshasafunctiontoperformandthosefunctionsaredefinedin termsofthelargerwholeofwhichtheyareapart.Platotellsusexplicitlywhatthefunctionsofreasonandthespiritedpartare.Theyarelikethefunctionsofrulerand auxiliaryinthecityreasonrulesandspiritedpartcarriesouttherule,inrelationtotheappetitesforfood,drink,andsex.Wearenottoldexplicitlywhatthefunctionof theappetitesconceivedaspartsofalargerwholemightbe.Ofcourse,inonewaythefunctionseemsobvious.Thedesiresforfoodanddrink,forexample,keep thebodyaliveandthuskeepthesoulengagedinitsearthlyenterprise.Thefunctionofsexislessclear,onthismodel.Whileitsjobistocontinuethespecies,thatjob doesnotseemtobeonethatcontributestothecommon

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wealthofanindividualsoul.Itsfunctionintheindividualsoul,therefore,islessclearthanthatoftheothertwodesires.Infact,wearenotgivenapositivedefinitionof thefunctionsoftheappetitesinthesamewayinwhichwearegivenapositivedefinitionofthefunctionsoftheothertwoparts.Rather,thedefinitionofthefunctionof theappetitesisanegativeone.Theappetitesaredysfunctionalwhentheyimpedethefunctionoftheothertwoparts,whentheytrytoruleinthesoulthus,weareleft toconcludethatthefunctionoftheappetitesistoberuledbyreasonandthespiritedpart. Thisaccountofcorrectfunctionandofdysfunctionis,then,addedtothenotionofinsatiabledesires.InapassageinRepublicIV(442ab),whichisclearlymeantto recallthediscussionofinsatiabledesiresintheGorgias,Socratessaysthatreasonandthespiritedpartwatchovertheappetitessothattheydonotgrowinsatiable andstrong.Sofarwecanrecognizethedescriptionofdesiresfromtheearlierdialogue.Next,Socratesaddswhatgrowinginsatiableandstrongmeansforthefunction oftheappetitestheydonotkeeptotheirownfunctionbutattempttoenslavetheothers,toexerciserulethemselves,andthusoverturnthelifeofthecommonwealth ofthesoul.Inthisaccount,then,iftheappetitesbecomesostrongthattheyattempttorule,theyhavebecomedysfunctionalforthesoul.Inthisnotionweseethatthe successortothenotionofcompatibilityofdesiresistheharmonyoffunctions.Thebasicideaisthateachparthasafunctiontoplayinthecommonwealthofthesoul. Conflictwithinthesoulariseswhenoneofthepartsattemptstoassumethefunctionofanotherpart.Theappetitesarethemostpronetousurpanother'sfunction becausedesirescangrowinsatiableand,thus,overweening.Suchappetiteswillnotbefunctionalbecausetheappetitessimplydonothavewhatittakestoruleinthe soul.Theycannot,forinstance,exerciseforesightforthewholesoul.Appetitesarenotoriouslyshortsightedtheyseektheimmediatesatisfactioninfrontofthem, withoutanythoughtforthelongerrangeconsequences.Theycannotseebeyondtheirimmediategratificationtowhatisreallygoodforthewholecommonwealthof thesoul.Onlyreasonhasthatcapacityreasoncancalculatewhatthelongerrangeconsequencesofsatisfyingaparticularappetitewillbe.49Forinstance,mydesire foradrinkurgesmetohavethatnextglassofwineofferedtomebyanoverlysolicitoushost.Thedesireismonomaniacalitwantsonlyonething.Thus,itdoesnot look

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intothefutureverywell,thatis,beyonditsownsatisfaction.Itcannotappreciatethewayinwhichmyconversationwillbecomelessfocused,orthewayinwhichIwill becomemoreeasilyirritatedbythecommentsofothers.Further,itdoesnothaveamemoryoftheheadachethemorningafterthelasttimeIhadjustonemoreglass ofwine.Theexplanationfortheappetite'sfailurehereisthatitdoesnothavethefunctionofexercisingforesightitcannotcalculateconsequences. Reason,ontheotherhand,cancalculateconsequences.Moreover,itisendowedwithwisdomsothatitknowswhatisgoodforthewholesoulandforitsparts.Just lookatthewayawisesoulworks.Iftheappetiteshavebeenwelltrainedtodefertotheruleofreason,reasoncanmakeitsvoiceheardabovethatoftheoverly solicitoushost.Weshouldhererememberthatatemperatesoulisoneinwhichtheappetitesagreetoreason'sruling.Ifreasoninvokesitsstatusasrulerinthesoul, presumablyappetiteiswelltrainedenoughtoobeyreason'sruling.Thus,reasonmightbeimaginedtoprompt,''Youdonotrememberlasttime,ohdesireforwine, whathappened.NotonlywasIunabletofollowthatilluminatingconversationaboutfairness,butweallalsohadaterrible,daylongheadachethenextdaynoneofus coulddomuchofanything.Wedonotreallywantthattohappenagain.Itisabetterplantobesatisfiedwithwhatwealreadyhaveenoughsociableinebriationtobe acharming,buteffective,participantinthisimportantconversationalinvestigation.Thatwayweallgetsomethingwewant."Nowifdesirewerealwaysforthegood, asSocratesissupposedtohaveheld,thenatthispointappetitewouldnotonlyagreewithreason,itwouldstartdesiringwhatreasonholdsupasdesirable.Being basicallyadesirefortheoverallgood,thedesireforwinewouldstopwantingthisglassofwineandwouldwantnofurther.However,appetiteinRepublicIVhasnot beenpresentedassorationalatmostitcanbecometrainedsothatitagreesthatreasonknowsbest,aswehavesaid.Thus,thewelltrainedappetitecanbeimagined toreplyatthispoint,"Youaredoubtlessright,ohreason,aboutthisissue.Icannotgraspthesecomplicatedmattershowever,Idograspthatyouknowwhatisbest forusallandIwillhappilyfollowyourlead."Ofcourse,intheinterchangereasonhastalkedonlyaboutwhatisgoodforthewholesoulbutnotaboutwhatisgoodfor theappetiteinparticular.Supposetheappetiteweretoreplyinsteadthat,whilerestraintmightbegoodforthewholesoul,itstilldidnot

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givetheappetitewhatitwantedandthuswasnotgoodforit.Tobeabletoanswertheappetite,wisereasonshouldhaveinsightintotheneedsoftheappetitesothat itcanclaimthatrestraintisgoodforappetiteaswell.Forinstance,inknowingthegoodofappetite,reasonshouldknowwhatistheproperlevelofsatisfactionfor eachoftheappetites.Backatthedinnerparty,thedesireforwinedoesnotknowthateveninitself,itdoesnotreallywantanotherglassofwine.Itcannotremember howoverindulgencecaneasilyturnintorevulsionforwinenorcanitdrawtheproperconclusionfromthatfact.Reasonmustremindit."Youdonotremember,oh desireforwineandherepleasepaycloseattentionthatlasttimeyouyourselfdidnotevenfindthatlastglassofwineallthatsatisfying.Infact,ohdesireforwine, halfwaythroughthatlastglassofwineyouyourselfturnedintorevulsionforwine.Itseemedeventoyouthatthetastewastooharsh,thattheexhilarationofthe alcoholwasgivingwaytoaslightdepression.Itjustwasnotgood,evenforyou."Thusadmonished,thewelltraineddesireforwinewouldthenreply,"Ofcourse, you'reright.Ijusthaveahardtimerememberingsometimes.I'llsavorwhatIhave,insteadofruiningitbytryingforthenextlevel(right,rightitisillusory)of exhilaration." Withthisaccountofcorrectfunctioninganddysfunctioningoftheappetites,wehaveperhapsananswertotheproblemsraisedbythenotionofcompatibilityof desiresintheGorgias.IfhewereconfrontedwiththeaccountoftheRepublic,Calliclescouldnotnowanswerbysuggestingthatonesimplygiveupmoderatedesires infavorofanimmoderateone.IntheRepublictheissuehasbecomeoneofharmonyoffunctions.Insatiableappetiteentailsadisharmonyoffunctions.Inparticular, insatiableappetiteattemptstodisruptthefunctionofreasonthefunctionofrulinginthesoul.Now,Calliclescannotovercomethisincompatibilitybetweeninsatiable appetiteandtheruleofreasonbyproposingthatonegiveupreasonitisimpossibletogiveupthefunctionofreason.Itwouldseem,then,thatthemoralpsychology oftheRepublicoughttosilenceCallicles.Hewillnotbeabletomaintainnowthatindividualappetiteshavetheirownwelfare,apartfromthatofthewholesoul. However,adeterminedCalliclesstillhassomethingtosay.InanswertotheaccountinRepublicIV,Calliclesmightsaythatallofthistalkofcorrectfunctioningand dysfunction,whilemorecomplexandsophisticated,hasdonenothingtoaddressthebasicissueofcontentionbetweenhimand

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Socrates.Calliclesmightarguethat,inthepresentdialogue,Platohasgivenatheoreticalaccountofwhatreallyamountstotheclaimthatoneshouldtrytobringone's soulintoharmonybutnowtheharmonymustincludereasonandthespiritedpart.Still,thefactremainsthatharmonyrequiresappetite,indeferencetotheclaimof reasontorule,togiveupsomeofwhatitcouldgetifitwereinsistent.Itistheusualtacticofprudentreasontotryandmakethisgreatcompromiseseemthebest possiblesolutiontothefactthatsatisfyingourappetitescomesintoconflictwithothergoals,especiallythoseofreasonitself.Itistypicalofacompromisedevisedby reasonthatitwouldentailmoderatingappetitessothattheybecomedociletotheruleofreasoneventothepointofagreeingtoreason'sversionofwhatisgoodfor them.However,adeterminedCalliclesmightofferanotherwaytoachievecompromise.Incompatibilitycomesfromthefactthatreason'sneedtoruleisinconsistent withimmoderateappetite'sneedtobetheleadingdirectioninthesoul.NowCallicleswould,presumably,notsuggestthatonegetridofreasonasoneofthepartsof thesoulsuchasuggestionisimpossible.Ratherhecouldsuggestthatonesubordinatereasontotheimmoderateappetite.EvenifCalliclesconcedestheneedfor harmonyoffunctions,hecouldstillachievetheharmonywithinthesoulbythesimpleexpedientofclaimingthatreason'sfunctionistocalculateconsequences,notto rule.Thus,onecanachievecompatibilitybymakingtheimmoderateappetitetherulerinthesoulandreasonitsauxiliary.Indeed,inthatway,onecanavoidtheworst delapidationsofimmoderateappetiteonecanthenbecomecannyabouthowtoleadalifeofenormouspleasure,aidedbythefarsightedreason.So,withoutgivingin toSocrates'plansforrestrainingimmoderateappetite,Calliclescouldpresentanalternativewaytoharmonizeimmoderateappetiteandreason.Afterall,whyshould onehavetofollowonlyonepatterninestablishingharmonybetweentheappetitesandtheotherpartsofthesoul? Atthispoint,Platohasgivenusaverycompellingaccountofwhatthewellfunctioningsoulwillbelike.Theaccountiscompellingbecauseitissoreasonable.Each partofthesoulisgivenafunctionandeachofthefunctionsisfulfilleditseemsaneconomicalandevenelegantdistributionoftasks.OurimaginaryCallicles,however, hasintroduceddoubtaboutwhethertheseallegedfunctionsarereallytheproperfunctionsoftheparts.TheCallicleanarrangementofthesoulwouldcontradictthe claimthatrea

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sonshouldrule.Nowwecanseethattheplausibilityofthisclaimdependsonthepriorclaimthat,bywisdom,reasonknowswhatisbestforeachpartofthesouland forthewhole.Ifthislatterclaimweretrue,itwouldmakesensetoclaimthatreasonshouldruleinthesoulandforappetitetodefertoreason.Inparticular,appetite shoulddefertoreason'srulebecause,bydoingso,appetitewouldreceivewhatisgoodforit.TheproblemisthatPlatohasnotdoneenoughtoshowthatthis arrangementisalsowhatisgoodforeachofthepartsandforthewhole.Wedonotyethaveajustificationfortheclaimthatreasonknowswhatisgoodforeachpart andforthewhole.Evenifthisarrangementseemstobegoodforthepartsandforthewholesoul,itisnotclearthatitisreallygoodforthepartsandforthewhole soul. Craftentailsakindofknowledgeaboutthegoalsofthecraft.Medicine,forexample,entailsknowledgeabouthealthandhowtoprovideit.However,craftalso entailscertainattitudesaboutthedesirabilityofachievingthegoalsofthecraft.Theeducationofaphysicianmakeshimprizethehealthofhispatientsitispartofthe dynamicofhiscrafttolovehealth.Knowledgetellsonethegoalofthecraftknowledgealsoaffectsthemotivationtoachievethegoalofthecraftbecauseitreveals thegoaltobegood.Inchapter1,wehavereferredtothemotivationalelement.Therewetalkedabouttheprideofcraftsmanshipthedesiretoseetheobjectofthe craftperfected.Commentatorsfrequentlyoverlookthisfeatureofcraft,makingcraftlittledifferentfromtheoreticalknowledge.Thelatterispresumablyanobjective, nonvalueladenview,withnopowertomovetheknowertoactioncraftknowledge,however,isalwaysvalueladen.Thegoalofthecraftisseenassomethingthatis desirabletoachievebecauseitispresentedassomethinggood.Inthenexttwochapterswewillcompletetheaccountofthecraftofjusticebylookingatbothofthese featuresofthecraft.WewillseethatthetheoryofFormsaddressesbothofthesefeatures.Formsareintroducedasparadigmsforthephilosophicalrulersoftheideal city.WithouttheFormsforjustice,temperance,andgoodness,therulerswillnothavetheknowledgenecessarytoberulersoreventobevirtuousindividuals.As wewillseeinBooksV,VI,andVII,SocratespresentstheFormsasmodelsforimitation.However,thesebooksalsohintattheroleofFormsasmotivationfor establishingjusticeinthecityandinoneselfbecausetheyalsoshowwhatisgoodforthecityandthesoul.Inthelastchapter,weconsidertheSymposiumandrecon

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sidertheRepublicinordertoseemoreclearlythewayinwhichgoodnessinspiresimitationoftheForms. Notes 1.Fordiscussionsofthecraftanalogycf.Irwin,Plato'sMoralTheory,O'BrienTheSocraticParadoxesandtheGreekMindRenSchaerer,EPISTHMHet TEXNH(Macon:ProtatFrres,1930)RosamondKentSprague,Plato'sPhilosopherKing(Columbia:UniversityofSouthCarolinaPress,1976).Cf.J.Gould, TheDevelopmentofPlato'sEthics(Cambridge:UniversityPress,1955),16ff.J.Lyons,StructuralSemantics,139ff.DavidL.Roochnik,"Socrates'Useofthe TechneAnalogy." 2.In"Socrates'UseoftheTechneAnalogy,"Roochnikclaimsthattheuseoftheanalogyimpliesnotheoryofmoralitynotheorytotheeffectthatvirtueis,insome sense,atypeofcraftknowledge:"...thepurposeoftheanalogyisnottoestablishatheoreticalmodelofmoralknowledge"(190).Rather,hesays,theanalogyis useddialectically,toexhortortorefute.Theargumentofthearticleissomewhatsketchy,ofcourse,astowhatismeantbyadialecticaluseitwouldappearthat Roochnikmeansthatthecraftanalogyisusedinthecontextoflargerdialogicalargumentinordertomakeapointinthatlargerargument.Thepointdoesnotrequire theretobeatheoreticalaccounttotheeffectthatvirtueisatypeofcraftknowledge.Accordingtothisview,thecraftanalogyissomethinglikeanundeveloped notion,usefulonlyforcomparison.Itisdifficult,however,tomaintainsuchapositioninthefaceofthegreatdetailandcarewithwhichSocrateselaboratesthis comparisonbetweenwisdomandcraftintheEuthydemus.Indeed,Roochnikadmitsthepresenceofthecraftanalogyin"TheSeriousPlayofPlato'sEuthydemus," Interpretation18(199091):211232:''InthispassageSocratesreliesexclusivelyontechneforhismodelofwisdom,soontobedefinedasthatknowledgeofthe correctuseofneutralitemswhichbringsitspossessorhappiness."However,Roochnikdoesnottakethispassageliterallybutwarnsthatit"shouldbereadwithan eyetowardsthepossibilityofirony"(219).Evenifthepassageisironic,thepassagecertainlylookslikeatheoreticalmodelforvirtuealbeitonethatshouldnotbe accepted.Ontheissueofirony,seenote8.SeealsoPaulWoodruff,''Plato'sEarlyTheoryofKnowledge"inEssaysonthePhilosophyofSocrates,HughH. Benson,ed.(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1992).Inhisthoroughaccountofcraft,Woodruffgivesthetheoreticalbasisforthecraftanalogy.Yet,following Roochnik,hedemurs:"Socrates'theoryofexpertknowledgeiscertainlynottheexpressedviewofanyofhisinterlocutorsnoneofthemproposesit,andscarcelyany

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showsthatheunderstandsit.Moreover,Socratesdoesnotadjusthisviewofexpertknowledgetomeettheneedofeachargumenthisviewismuchthesame,no matterwhosecaseitisusedagainst.Nevertheless,wewouldbenaivetoconcludethatthissimplyisSocrates'analysisofwhatitistobeanexpert.Heusesit dialectically,especiallywhenheappliesittomoralexpertise.ItissafertosaySocratessuppliesthisviewofexpertknowledgeasnecessaryinhisviewtosupport theclaimsmadebyhispartners"(92).Here,withoutmuchexplanation,WoodruffdisclaimsSocrates'ownershipofthenotionofexpertknowledge.However, afterreadingthearticle,onemightwonderwhySocrateswouldhavedevelopedanaccountofexpertknowledge,whichhehimselfdoesnothold,onlyinorderto correctthethinkingofhisinterlocutors,whodonotreallyunderstandit.Inanyevent,noneofthiskeepsSocratesfromusingthecraftanalogyasatheoretical model. 3.ThusGiffordandHawtrey.Cf.Plato'sEuthydemus,E.H.Gifford,ed.(NewYork:ArnoPress,1973),20,n.278e3andR.S.W.Hawtrey,Commentaryon Plato'sEuthydemus(Philadelphia:AmericanPhilosophicalSociety,1981),7778,n.278e1.Spraguebelievestheambiguityisbetweenprosperingandacting rightlythelatterinamoralsense.Cf.RosamondKentSprague,Plato'sUseofFallacy(NewYork:BarnesandNoble,1962),10. 4.Itispuzzlingtoincludevirtues,especiallywisdom,amongthepreviouslymentionedinstrumentalgoods.Butinthesequel,Socratesincludesonlythephysicalassets astheinstrumentalgoodstobeusedbywisdom.Cf.Meno88a6c4wheretheothervirtuesarenotreallyvirtuesunlesstheyareguidedbywisdom. 5.Chancehasathoroughdiscussionofthispassage,inwhichhemakesthedistinctionIamhereexploiting.Cf.ThomasH.Chance,Plato'sEuthydemus(Berkeley: UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1992),5765. 6.Cf.Gifford,Euthydemus,2122,n.279d6andHawtrey,Commentary,80,n.279e1.M.A.Stewart,"Plato'sSophistry"AristotelianSociety[Supplementary Volume]51(1977):23,saysthattheargumentisdisastrous. 7.Cf.MarthaNussbaum,TheFragilityofGoodness(9599)whereshearguesthattechne,inonesenseatleast,isseenasastrategytoovercomeluck,tuche. 8.Cf.Hawtrey,Commentary,8182,n.280a7ff.In"TheSeriousPlayofPlato'sEuthydemus"RoochnikseesthisargumentasironicSocratesissuggestingthat wisdomisnotbestmodeledbytechne(219).Inthefirstplace,whatmakestheargumentsuspicioushasnothingtodowiththevirtueofwisdomwhatmakesthe argumentsuspiciousisafeatureofSocrates'notionofcraftthatis,itsinfallibility.Evenifhehadthecomparisonbetweenthevirtueofwisdomandcraftinmind, surely

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heisnotbeingironicaboutcomparingcraftandthevirtueofcraftontheissueofinfallibilitysurelyhebelievesthatbothareinfallible.Second,Socrates,duringthe restofthepassage,developsthecraftanalogyingreatdetail.Itishardtoseehowhemeanstobeironicaboutthecraftanalogyatthispointifhecontinuesto pursuetheanalogy.Afterall,ironycanbecomedeceit,andSocratescanbecomeasophist. 9.Roochnikfindsthisstepproblematicbecauseitimpliesthatthereisanobjectiveknowledgeofcorrectuse(220221).Itisnotthattheremightnotbesuch objectiveknowledgebutthatnoteveryonewouldagreetotherebeingsuchobjectiveknowledge.Thus,accordingtoRoochnik,theargumentfailsasaprotreptic argument.Itwouldappealonlytopeople,presumablylikeCleiniasbutnotlikeEuthydemusandDionysiodorus,whobelievethatthereisanobjectiveknowledgeof correctuse.Inthefirstplace,theargumentisdirectedtoCleiniasandnottoEuthydemusandDionysiodorus(wearealwaysbeingurgedtopayattentiontowhom argumentsaredirected).Inthesecondplace,Roochnik'sobjectionwouldbemoreconvincingifthisprotrepticargumentcouldbeshowntobesignificantlyweaker thananyotherprotrepticargument.Doesaprotrepticargumenthavetoforcesomeonedeductivelytopursuephilosophyordoesitratherhaveonlytointroduce reasonableenoughsoundingpremissestoconvincesomeonethatitisworthittopursuephilosophy?Isubmitthattheclaimthatthereisknowledgeofcorrectuseof one'smaterialandspiritualassetssoundsreasonableenoughtoconvinceaninterlocutortopursuephilosophy. 10.Thesignificanceofthisargumentisthewayinwhichwisdomissystematicallycomparedtocraft.ThereisaparalleltothispartoftheargumentintheMeno(87e5 ff.).Cf.Hawtrey,Commentary,77.Beginningat87c,Socratesmakesanargumenttotheeffectthatvirtue(arete)isthesamethingasknowledge(episteme).He listsasetofgoodssimilartothelisteducedfromCleiniashealth,wealth,strength,andbeautyofthebody.However,hearguesthateachofthesecanbeharmfulas wellasgoodthedifferenceisrightuse(orthechresis).Inturn,thesecretofrightuseisunderstanding(phronesis).Withunderstanding,eachoftheseattributesofthe bodyaswellasthoseofthesoul(temperance,justice,courage,intelligence,memory,andlargenessofsoul)willbeusedtotheadvantage(ophelima)oftheonewho possessesitwithoutunderstanding,theattributecanbeharmful.Inthispassage,understanding(phronesis)servesintheplaceheldbywisdom(sophia)inthe Euthydemus.AlthoughSocratesdoesnotuseanyexamplesofcrafttoillustratethisknowledgeofrightuse,stillitseemstobelikeakindofcraftknowledge,like wisdom.WhathesaysaboutitinthispassageisthesameaswhathesaysaboutwisdomintheEuthydemus.Understanding,likewisdom,resultsintherightuseof thesamesetofassetsasintheEuthydemusinordertoprovidehappiness.PaulWoodruffseesknowledgeas

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techneinthispassage,"TheoryofKnowledge,"103104:"Thethesisthattherecanbeknowledgewithoutteaching,virtuallyexplicitin85c,isresistedinthe balanceofthedialogue.Socratesinfersthatwhatisnotteachableisnotknowledge(99ab)onthebasisofahypothesisrepeatedat87cand89d.Thesepassages representthepre Menotheoryofknowledgeastechne." 11.Itisalittlelessclearhowonemightmisusevirtue,especiallygiventhefactthatSocratesusuallyidentifiesvirtuewiththegood.Supposingonetobecourageous, themisuseofthatcouragewouldseemnottobecourage.Toillustratethisparadoxicalsaying,imagineasoliderinbattle:ifitwerepossibletomisusecourage, presumablyitsmisusewouldleadtoeitherdishonorordeath.Ifthesoldiersuffersdishonor,surelyitisbecauseheisnotcourageousthereforehehasnotmisused courage.Ifhesuffersdeath,eitherdeathoccursthroughcourageorfoolhardiness.Neitherisamisuseofcourage.Foolhardinessisnotthemisuseofcouragebutits absence.Inhisargument,Socratestouchesonbutglossesoverthisproblembysayingthatcouragewithoutunderstanding(phronesis)isakindofboldness(Meno 88B). 12.OnlyintheProtagorasinthedialoguesunderconsideration,ishappinessexplicitlyidentifiedwithpleasure.ButthisisnotSocrates'position(cf.Plato's Protagoras,G.Vlastos,ed.,[NewYork:BobbsMerrill,1956],x1,n.50.)Ifthiswere,moreover,Socrates'realposition,itsdiscoverywouldbeabreakthroughin theelaborationofthecraftanalogy.Yetpleasureisnotthegoalofvirtueinthecraftanalogyinanyotherdialogueunderconsideration. 13.Cf.Sprague,PhilosopherKing,5253. 14.Ihavenotfoundthisreadingofthispassageinanyothercommentators.SpragueinPlato'sUseofFallacysaysthattheconclusionofthisargumentis"thatthe kinglyorpoliticalartpossessesthespecialcharacterofhavingonlyitselfassubjectmatteris,Ithink,meanttoimplythatitisidenticalwithknowledgeinitselfandthat itreallyistheartforwhichheandCleiniashavebeenseeking"(22).Hawtreyalsoseesreflexivityherebecauseheseesareferencetotheknowledgeofknowledgein theCharmides(137138,n.292d1ff.).However,thisconclusionisbasedonthepremissthattherulingcraftconfersonlytheknowledgeofitself.Thetextdoesnot saythattherulingcraftconfersknowledgeofitselfitsaysthattherulingcraftconfersitself(292d34).Cf.Chance,Plato'sEuthydemus,126. Inaddition,onemightobjectthat,sinceSocrates'projectistofindasuccessfulcandidateforwisdomconsideredasacraft,hisargumentherecontradictsmy claimthatthecraftofvirtueandthecraftofrulingaredistinct.Theansweris,first,thatthegropingforacraftknowledgewhichuseswhatitmakeshasledtoa suggestionthatwisdommightbethecraftofrulingwhichisproblematic.Theargument,infact,shows

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theproblemofidentifyingtwocraftswhicharedistinct.Second,thesequelarguesthatitisthegoalofRepublicIVtoanswerthisproblem. 15.Roochnik,inhisarticleontheEuthydemus,atfirstsaysthattheconclusionofthisargumentisthat"knowledgeofaretecannotbecompletelyanalogoustoan ordinarytechne"(227).By"ordinarytechne,"hemeans,forexample,carpentryandmedicine.This,byitself,isanunremarkableconclusionitleavesopenthe possibilitythattomakegoodonthecraftanalogysomemodificationsmustbemade.However,Roochnikgoesontorejectthecraftanalogyaltogether.''Iftechneis theonlyformofknowledge,thentherecanbenoknowledgeofareteandSocraticprotrepticcannotbedistinguishedfromsophistry"(227).Hisargumentforthis latter,strongerconclusionisthattheresult(ergon)ofordinarytechneisdeterminatewhereastheresultofareteisindeterminatebecausewhatituseshealth,wealth, beauty,forexampleareindeterminate.Itisunclearwhathemeansby''indeterminate"inthisargument.However,hisargumentprecludesthepossibilitythatthecraft analogycanbecompletedbysubstitutingfortheseobjectsothersthatdonotsufferfromtheputativedefect.Ingeneral,Roochnikprecludesthepossibilitythatthe presentargumentisstillaprotrepticonethatsetsthestageforfurtherinvestigationintojustsuchquestions.CompareSprague(PhilosopherKing,53)onthispoint. Inthesequel,wearguethatPlatomakesgoodonthecraftanalogybysubstitutingforsuchassetsashealth,wealth,andbeautyotherobjectsuponwhichtherevised craftofjusticeworks. 16.IrwinexpressesaversionofthisobjectioninPlato'sMoralTheorywewillanalyzehisversionofitinsection3below. 17.Thispassageisanexampleofapartialuseofthecraftanalogy.LachesisusingthecaseofthephysiciantorefuteNicias'claimthatcourageisknowledgeofwhat istobefearedandofwhatistobeencouragedby.Knowledgehere,aselsewhere,meanscraftknowledge.SoLachesusesacounterexamplefromcraft knowledge.Niciasfinallyrepliesthattheonlycraftsman(demiourgos)whoknowsaboutwhatistobefearedandwhatisnottobefearedisthecourageousperson. Clearly,Nicias,atleast,believesthatcourageisakindofcraftknowledge.Moreover,hegivesanaccountofitsparticularergonitisknowledgeofwhatistobe fearedandwhatisnottobefeared.However,hecannottaketheanalogymuchbeyondthatpoint.WhereasintheEuthydemusSocratesintroducestheobjectson whichthecraftofwisdomworksmaterialandspiritualassetsinthisdialoguenosuchintriguingdetailisgiven. 18.Cf.Woodruff,"TheoryofKnowledge,94:"Iftechnaiarespecialised,theneachonehasitsspecificgoal,thegoodofitsobject,whichitpursuestotheexclusion ofallothers....Thisleadstoparadoxifeachtechneoperateswithoutfault....Tooperatefaultlessly,atechnewouldneedtoknowwhatreallypromotesthe advantageofitsobject.Itwould

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havetoask,forexample,whetheramutilatedpatientisreallybetteroffaliveordeadbutthatwouldbebeyondthescopeofspecialiseddoctoring."Cf.Sprague, PhilosopherKing,6869. 19.Cf.Woodruff,"TheoryofKnowledge,"95:"Thedefectofthesubordinatetechnaiisthattheyweretoospecialisedtoknowhowtoputtheirskillstogooduse, andsowouldhavetobesubordinatetoatechnethatdidspecialiseintherelevantgood.Butanytruetechne,itnowappears,mustaimatthegood,andmust thereforeknowwhatthisis." 20.Cf.RenfordBambrough,"Plato'sPoliticalAnalogies,"201202."WhereverPlatoturnsamongthetechnai...hecannotfindwhatheisseeking,askillat determiningwhichendsoughtandoughtnottobepursued.Heisconsciousofthisdifficulty,andheattemptstoovercomeitbydistinguishingbetweenthestandard, instrumentalarts,andahigher,prescriptiveart,thekinglyartofpolitics....Thereisnoprescriptivetechne...fortheinescapablelogicalreasonthatanythingthat canproperlybecalleda"techne"willbebyitsverynatureinstrumental,andthedecisionaboutthepurposeforwhichitistobeusedwilllieoutsideitsownscope." SeealsoReeve,PhilosopherKings,8and19.Althoughhedoesnotusetheterminstrumental,heholdsthattheargumentatRepublicI(333e)pointsupafatal flawinthecraftanalogy. 21.Cf.O'Brien,SocraticParadoxes,1718,103106asimilarpointsismadebyTerryPenner,"SocratesonVirtueandMotivation,"inArgumentandExegesis, Lee,Mourelatos,andRorty,eds.(Assen:VanVanGorcum,1973),143146.SeealsoJ.E.Tiles("TechneandMoralExpertise,"4966)foraqualifiedanswerto Bambrough. 22.Cf.Roochnik,"SeriousPlay,"222228.Also231,n.7. 23.ThispositionowesmuchtoSprague'sdistinctionbetweenfirstorderandsecondordertechnai(78)andthespecificationthatthekinglytechneiseventually showntobeasecondorderknowledgeofgoodandevil. 24.Onemightobjectthattemperance,thevirtueofselfcontrol,isanexceptiontothisclaim.Iftemperancewerepresentedintheearlydialoguesasacraftofruling overone'sappetitesinordertoinstillvirtue,thenthedistinctionbetweenthecraftofrulingandthecraftofvirtuewouldnotbesoclearinturn,theclaimthatinthe RepublicPlatocombinedtwocraftswouldbeundermined.ItwouldappearthatbeforetheRepublichealreadyhadthenotionofvirtueasselfruleinordertoinstill virtue.First,letuslookattheevidence.Intheearlydialogues,temperanceisnotpresentedasthekindofselfrulefoundintheGorgias.Theonlydialoguethatcomes closeistheCharmides.AtonepointCritiassaysthattemperanceisselfknowledge(164dff.)thisclaimeventuallybecomestheclaimthattemperanceisknowledge ofknowledge.Inoneofitsmanifestationsthisclaimbecomestheclaimthatthetemperatepersonwouldknowwhetherhehasknowledgeofasubject.Thenat171e,

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Socratessaysthatsuchknowledgewouldbeusefulbecause"wewouldgothroughlife,bothwewhohavetemperanceandthoseunderourcommand,notmaking mistakes.Forwewouldnotattemptthethingswedonotknowbutsearchingoutthosewhodoknowwewouldturnthesethingsovertothem."Sincethe knowledgeiscomparedtocraftknowledge,thispassageisdefinitelycomparingtemperancetoacraftandthepassagedoessuggestselfrule.However,thisself rulewouldbelikethecraftofrulingasthatoccursintheGorgiasonlyiftheselfrulewereacraftofrulingoverone'sappetitesthatitselfinstilledvirtueinthesoul. Butnothinginthispassagesaysanythingaboutrulingoverone'sappetitesnoranythingaboutinstillingvirtueascontrolofappetites.Whateverselfrulethereisin thispassage,itismuchclosertothecraftofvirtuebecausetemperanceislikethemanagementofone'sresourcesofbodyandsoul.Inthiscase,oneismanaging hisknowledge. InSocratesintheApology(134136),C.D.C.Reeveidentifiestemperancewiththecraftofruling.Inordertomakethisidentification,heusesthedisputed dialogueAlcibiadesI.Still,thepassagethatReevecites,133b7134a14,seemstomakeapointsimilartotheoneinCharmidesSocratessaysthatlackofself knowledgeislackofknowledgeofourownbelongingsthelatterislackoftemperance.Sofarnothingissaidaboutruling.ThenSocratessaysthatlackof knowledgeaboutone'sownbelongingsentailslackofknowledgeofthebelongingsofothers.Thelatterlackentailsthatoneisnotfittobeapoliticianorruler. Again,Socratessaysnothingaboutrulingoverone'sappetitesinordertoinstillvirtueone'sownbelongingscouldeasilybethosematerialandspiritual possessionsmentionedintheEuthydemus.Whilethereisnothingintheearlydialoguesthatjeopardizesthedistinctionbetweenthecraftofrulingandthecraftof virtue,theGorgiascomesclosertopresentingsuchachallenge.At491d,Socrates,inasuccessfulattempttogoadCalliclesintospeakinghismind,askshim aboutselfrule.InanswertoCallicles'suspiciousquestionastohismeaning,Socratessays,"Nothingcomplicatedbutasthemanysay,thetemperateperson controlshimselfandrulesoverhisownpleasuresandappetites."Heretherearetwooftheelementsofthecraftofruling:temperanceiscomparedtorulingandit rulesoverone'sownappetites.Nothingissaidaboutrulingoverone'sownappetitesinordertoinstillvirtue.However,thispassageallowsmetomakeasecond point:thedistinctionbetweenthetwokindsofcraftdoesnotrestupontheclaimthattemperanceisneverconsideredatypeofselfrule.Itrestsupontheclaimthat SocrateselaboratesacraftofcaringforthesoulsofothersandthatthatcraftbecomesfullydevelopedintothecraftofrulingintheGorgias.Thefocusofthiscraft isnotone'sownsoulbutthesoulsofothers,untilPlatoworksoutthewayinwhichselfrulebecomesthecraftofinstillingvirtueinone'sownsoulsomethingthat requiresconsiderableingenuityandsomethinghedoesnotdo

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untiltheRepublic,wherethecraftinquestionisnottemperanceatallbutjustice.If,inatransitionaldialogueliketheGorgias,thereisahintofanticipationthat selfruleoverappetitesandvirtueareassociated,mythesisisnotjeopardized.Inparticular,theshortpassageat491ddoesnotchangethefactthatSocratesdoes notdevelopthenotionofselfruleinthisdialoguebutratherthecraftofrulingasacraftofmoderatingtheappetitesofothersinordertoinstillvirtue. 25.ThiscomparisonofthecraftofvirtueintheEuthydemustothecraftofrulingintheGorgiasmakesnoassumptionsabouttherelativedatesofthetwodialogues, althoughtheformerwasprobablywrittenbeforethelatter. 26.Thetherapeuticcraftsbenefittheirobjectsbyprovidingfortheirwelfareandtheirgood(Rep.342a1c9)theyincludemedicine,gymnastic,andruling.Socrates understandsthiswelfareinanarrowsensethewelfareofanobjectisitsperfectionaccordingtoitsexcellence(Apo.20a6b2Rep.335b5c3).Socrates'replyto Thrasymachus(Rep.345b10e4)takesonaplausibilityitdoesnototherwisehaveiftobeltistonmeansexcellenceasitdoessurelyintheGorgias(464b2ff 503d6ff.). 27.Rep.488a1ff.showsthatPlatostillthinksofrulingasacraftinBookVI.Inthislastpassagerulingiscomparedtothecraftsofcarpentry,brassworking,and farming.Rulingissaidnottobeanyofthesecrafts,notbecauseitisnotacraft,butbecauseitsobjectisthegoodofthewholestatetheothercraftsaretoo particular.IamindebtedtoProfessorVlastosforremindingmeofthislastexample.Alsocf.Rep.VI,500c9. 28.C.D.C.Reeve(PhilosopherKings,8285)clearlypresentsrulinginBookVIVIIasacraft,eventhoughearlierherejectsthecraftanalogyinapassagein whichheconflatesthecraftofrulingandthecraftofvirtue(1719). 29.Differentcommentatorstakedifferentviewsofthenatureofthesepartsofthesoul.Cf.RichardRobinson,"Plato'sSeparationofReasonandDesire,"Phronesis 16(1971):3848R.F.Stalley,"Plato'sArgumentsfortheDivisionoftheReasoningandAppetitiveElementsWithintheSoul,"Phronesis20(1975):110128J.E. Tiles,"TheCombatofPassionandReason,"Philosophy52(1977):321330TerryPenner,''ThoughtandDesireinPlato,"and''PlatoandDavidson:Partsofthe SoulandWeaknessoftheWill,"CanadianJournalofPhilosophy,[SupplementaryVolume]16(1990):3574GlennLesses,"Weakness,Reasons,andtheDivided SoulinPlato'sRepublic,"HistoryofPhilosophyQuarterly4(1987):147161JuliaAnnas,AnIntroductiontoPlato'sRepublic(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1981), 137151NicholasP.White,ACompaniontoPlato'sRepublic(Indianapolis:Hackett,1979),122130.TheviewsrangefromRobinson's(thatPlatohasonly shown

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thetrivialclaimthatthesoulhasdifferentaspects)toLesses'(thatPlatohasshowneachpartissomethinglikeaminiagent,withitsownconceptionofgoodness asitsmotivationandgoal).Annasgivesamediatingaccountthatsaysthatthepartsshouldbeseenasprimitiveagents:"Andsothereisnothingwrongwithtalking oftheexplanatorypartsofawholepersonasthoughtheywerethemselvespeopleofaverysimplekind.Talkingofthemashomunculiisverynaturaland unavoidable....[QuotingD.Dennett]'Homunculiarebogeymenonlyiftheyduplicateentirethetalentstheyarerungintoexplain.'Thatis,weareintroubleifthe homunculusreproducesthefeaturesthatwerefoundpuzzlingaboutthewholeperson.But'ifonecangetateamorcommitteeofrelativelyignorant,narrow minded,blindhomunculitoproducetheintelligentbehaviorofthewhole,thisisprogress'"(144). 30.Cf.Penner,"ThoughtandDesire,"101."ButoncertainassumptionswecanshowthatPlatowouldhavefounditplausibletomakesuchamovehimselfin particulartheassumptionthatdesiremusthave(atleastsomeminimum)conceptionofitsobject.Thiscorrespondstothebeliefthatwouldnowadaysbeexpressedby sayingthattheobjectofdesireisintentional,wherethisdoesnotmeansimply'Thepersonwhohasthedesirehassomeconceptionoftheobjectofhisdesire.'" 31.MostcommentatorstakethisargumenttobeanallbutexplicitrefutationoftheSocraticpositionthatdesireisalwaysforthegood.Lesses,however,arguesthat eveninthisargumentPlatoallowsthatthepartsofthesoulotherthanreasonmayhaveaconceptionofthegood.Theydifferfromreasoninthattheirconceptionof thegoodislimited(151). 32.GregoryVlastos,"JusticeandHappinessintheRepublic,"Plato:ACollectionofCriticalEssays,vol.2,GregoryVlastos,ed.(GardenCity:Doubleday, 1971),89.Ofcourse,itisnotclearthatallevildoingproceedsfromoneofthesedisorders.ItisapointofcontroversywhetherPlatonicjusticeinthesoulalways resultsinbeingjusttoothers.SeeDavidSachs,"AFallacyinPlato'sRepublic,"inPlato:ACollectionofCriticalEssays,vol.2,GregoryVlastos,ed.(Garden City:Doubleday,1971),3551.Ourownaccountofthisissuewilltakeplaceinchapter3withtheintroductionofthetheoryFormsasparadigms. 33.Thisorderisproperandspecifictothesoul.ThisisathemethatbeginswiththeGorgias(506e15)wheretheorderbroughtbythegoodoratorthecraftsman ofthesoulsofothersisproperandspecifictothesoulitisalsowhatvirtueinthesoulis.Socratesisquiteemphaticabouttheuniquerelationbetweenasoulanits orderwhatIhavecalled"proper"isGreekoikeios.AccordingtoBookIV,theorderaccordswithwhatPlatoclearlythinksisthenatureofthesoulanyother arrangementbringsruinanddecay(cf.Rep.445c4ff.).

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34.Iftheothertwodirectionsinthesoulcanbecomeoverweening,itstandstoreasonthatreasonitselfcouldalsooverstepitsbounds.However,howitwoulddoso isnotsoclearfromthedialogues.Socrateswillsoonpresentonepictureofthelifeofreasongonebad.InBookVI,heexplainswhyphilosophyhassuchapoor reputation.Itisbecausethosewhohavethetalenttopracticeithavebeenseducedtolesseractivities.Intheirplace,therecomeminorintellectswhoarelike mechanicswhohavemarriedabovetheirstation(495cff.).However,thisishardlyapictureofreasonhavingoversteppeditsboundsonewouldsuspectthatreason growninsatiableisreflectedinthelifeoftheintenselyintellectualbutineffectualscholar. ClosertothisstereotypeistheuncomplimentarypictureoftheintellectuallifeintheGorgias(484cff.).CalliclesopenshisconversationwithSocratesbypainting apicture,meanttobeminatoryanddirectedatSocrateshimself.Hespendstoomuchofhistimewhisperinginacornerwithyoungboysaboutquestionsthat makenodifferenceintherealworldofpolitics.Thesearechildishpursuitsthatwillrenderhimimpotentifanyoneevertriestodraghimintocourt.Perhapsinthese picturestherealsocanbeseenourownstereotypeoftheineffectual"egghead"someonewhoissobrilliantthatshecannotbebotheredwiththemeredetailsof dailyliving.Finally,thereisjustahintofthisthemeinBookVIIwheretheguardianwhohasattainedtocontemplationoftheFormsmustbeforcedtoturnaway fromherrealdelighttothepracticaltasksofrulingintheidealcity.Atleast,inSocrates'firstpicturethereisthesensethatthelifeofreasongoesastrayifitisnot reallythelifeofreason.Presumably,theclaimisthatapersonwhoreallypursuedthelifeofreasonwouldseethattheotherpartsofthesoulhadvalidclaimsas well.RichardPattersondevelopsthisideainasomewhatdifferentdirectionin"PlatoonPhilosophicCharacter,"JournaloftheHistoryofPhilosophy25 (1987):325350. 35.Irwin,Plato'sMoralTheory,8.AsignificantpartofIrwin'sinstrumentalistaccountofthecraftanalogydependsonhisrelianceonproductiveinsteadof therapeuticcraftasananalogueforvirtue.Whenhesaysthat"thevirtuousmandoesnotrejectthenonvirtuousman'schoiceoftheultimateend,butonlyhischoiceof instrumentalmeanstoit"heseemstobetakingthecraftofvirtuetobelikecarpentry(82).Bothcarpenterandnoncarpenteragreeabouttheendtobeproduced,for example,atablewhateverdisagreementtheremightbearisesaboutmeans.However,therapeuticcraftdoesnotsoeasilyfitIrwin'smodelofinstrumentality.Even Irwinadmitsthiswhenhecomparesvirtueandmedicine.Patientanddoctorwillnothavethesameunderstandingofhealthbutthevarianceinunderstandingisnot substantive,accordingtoIrwin(83).However,thelatterrelationbetweenpatientanddoctorisnottheoneSocratesattributestomedicine.ForSocrates,physician and

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patientarenotspeakingthesamelanguage.Thephysicianistalkingaboutanunderlyingphysicalcondition,whoseusualmanifestationtothepatientmightbea certainsenseofwellbeing.Thepatientistalkingaboutthesemanifestationsthemselves.Butthepatient'sbeinghealthyisnothishavingthissensesincehemay havethissenseandbeverysick(cf.Gor.464a1b1).Moreover,intheexamplefromGorgias521a3522a6inwhichphysicianandpastrycookcontendbefore ajuryofchildren,itisnotasthoughthephysiciancanwinoverthechildrenbyredescribinghealthforthem.AccordingtoSocratesthephysicianhasnothingtosay totheaccusationafterthechildrenscoffathispleathathedidallfortheirhealth.Craft,accordingtoIrwin'sinstrumentalistinterpretationofthecraftanalogy,is supposedtobeamodelofrationality(86).However,intheGorgias,weseethattherapeuticcraftisitselfcaughtinthebreakdownofrationality.Foranotherkind ofcriticismofIrwin'saccountofthecraftanalogyseeGeorgeKlosko,"TheTechnicalConceptionofVirtue,"JournaloftheHistoryofPhilosophy19 (1981):95102. 36.Irwin,Plato'sMoralTheory,185 37.Thereisalsoasecondcraftcharacterization:(C)anyactionthatpreservesandhelpsfinishtheorderofthesoulisjust,wisdombeingthecraftknowledgethat guidesthisaction(443e444a).However,wewillnotbeusingthisoneintheargument.Nevertheless,wecanseethatwhateveris(C)isalso(A)however,thereisa differenceinthewayinwhichwhateveris(B)is(A)andwhateveris(C)is(A).Thisdifferenceisduetothedifferencebetween(B)and(C).(B)issomethinglikea person'sestablishingjusticeinhisownsoul(presumably,preliminaryworkhasalreadybeendonebyone'smentors)(B)describesmoralselftending,undertaken beforeonebeginshisbusinessorpoliticalactivities.Ontheotherhand,(C)characterizeswhatonedoesaftertheestablishingofmoralvirtue,whenonedoesengage inbusinessandpoliticalactivities(C)describeswhathedoesintheselatteractivitiesinordertopreserveandhelpfinishtheorderwhoseestablishmentisdescribedin (B).Afterthisorderisestablished,thenpreservingandhelpingtofinishtheorder,withwisdomguidingthisactivitythatis,whatisdescribedby(C)isalsowhatis describedby(A).Iftheorderispreservedandperfectedundertheguidanceofwisdomtheneachpartisdoingitsownfunctionwithregardtorulingandbeingruled, thatis,(A).Theruleofreasonisnotbeingusurpedbythelowerpartssincethepreservationandperfectionisdoneundertheguidanceofwisdom,reason'speculiar virtue. 38.Ofcourse,that'justice'in(B)doesnotrefertoeachpart'sdoingitsowndoesnotmeanthat(B)doesnotinstantiate(A),where'justice'doesrefertoeachpart's doingitsown. 39.Cf.SarahWaterlowBroadie,"TheGoodofOthersinPlato'sRepublic,"ProceedingsoftheAristotelianSociety,73(197273):28:"Nowitisclearwhyjustice onPlato'saccountisnecessarilyselfpropa

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gatingwithinthesamesoul.Therationalelement'sfunctionistoseethateachelement,includingitself,functionsandisallowedbytheotherstofunctionasit shouldsothatthestateinwhichtheyallfunctionproperlyis,likePlato'sfavoritesimile,health,selfmaintaininginoneandthesameindividual."SeealsoDonald Zeyl,"SocraticVirtueandHappiness,"ArchivfrGeschichtederPhilosophie64(1982):237:"...theproductofthevirtuecraftmayalsobedescribedas virtuousactingorliving.Ifthisisright,thenitwillbetruethatvirtuousaction(asthepracticeofcraftknowledge)aimsatitsownreplication.Thusanypieceof virtuousbehaviormay,then,beviewedeitherasthepracticeofthevirtuecraftorastheproductofthatcraft.Tounderstandthis,wemay...comparethe virtuousagenttoanathleteinaction.Theathlete'sperformanceservesbothtoexpresshisskill(andassuchistheresultofpreviouspractice),andalsotodevelop andmaintainit.Insofarasitdoesthelatter,itsvalueisthatofaninstrumentalgood:itsaimistheperfectionoftheskill,andtheperformancethatsuchperfection makespossible.Insofarasitdoestheformer,itsvalueisthatofanintrinsicgood:possessingtheskillanddisplayingitisjustwhatitistoliveordowellforthe athlete."SeealsoJeromeSchiller,"JustMenandJustActsinPlato'sRepublic,"JournaloftheHistoryofPhilosophy6(1968):610NicholasP.White,A CompaniontoPlato'sRepublic,135,n.Fand23637,n.B.Forananalysisofpsychicharmonyashealth,seeR.F.Stalley,''MentalHealthandIndividual ResponsibilityinPlato'sRepublic,"JournalofValueInquiry15(1981):109124. 40.Cf.M.B.Foster,"AMistakeofPlato'sintheRepublic,"Mind46(1937):386393J.D.Mabbott,"IsPlato'sRepublicUtilitarian?"Mind46(1937):468474 M.B.Foster,"AMistakeofPlato'sintheRepublic:ARejoindertoMr.Mabbott,"Mind47(1938):226232I.M.Crombie,AnExaminationofPlato's Doctrines,vol.1(London:RoutledgeandKeganPaul,1962),8588R.C.CrossandA.D.Woozley,Plato'sRepublic(London:Macmillan,1964),6568. 41.Cf.Foster,"AMistake,"392393. 42.Thesuccessfulexerciseofanachievementdispositionlikeseeingcanbeviewedintwoindependentways.Itcanbeseenfromthepointofviewofwhatis achievedtheinherentconsequencesorfromthepointofviewoftheprocessofachievement.Thelatteristhecorrectfunctioningaccordingtoitsnatureofthe entityunderlyingthedisposition.Forexample,theeyesunderliethedispositionofseeing.Thecorrectfunctioningoftheeyesisduetothedispositionofseeingwell(cf. Rep.352d8ff.).Whenone'seyesfunctioncorrectlyonehasvisualinformationandviceversa.But"theeyesfunctioncorrectly"doesnotmeanthesameas"having visualinformation."Itislogicallypossibletohavecorrectvisualimagesevenifone'seyesarenotfunctioningcorrectly.Thecorrectfunctionoftheunderlyingentityis intrinsicgoodandtheinher

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entconsequencesoftheachievementofdispositionisconsequentialgood. 43.Cf.Foster,"AMistake,"387388White,Companion,7879. 44.Cf.JuliaAnnas,AnIntroductiontoPlato'sRepublic,6668.Mabbott,"Utilitarian?"(469470),confessingtofindtherelevantpassagesambiguousonthe distinction,stillbelievesthatSocratesarguesthatjusticeisgoodinitself. 45.Cf.J.D.Mabbott,"IsPlato'sRepublicUtilitarian?"Plato:ACollectionofCriticalEssays,vol.2.G.Vlastos,ed.(GardenCity:Anchor,1971),63.Moreover, themonitoringneednotevenbeaseparateoccurrencewithinthecorrectfunctioningoftheparts,notanobserving,forexample,ofoneselfinaction.Theagent's nonobservationalknowledgeofhisactionisdiscussedinRyle'sConceptofMind(NewYork:BarnesandNoble,1949),141148cf.myamendmentstothe accountin"TheAgent'sKnowledgeofHisAction,"ThePersonalist55(1974):4452. 46.Thisaccountoftheintrinsicgoodofjusticeinthesoulhelpstoexplaintheconnectionbetweenvirtueandhappinessinonefamousproblematicpassage.Inthe Gorgias(507c15)Socratessaysthatthevirtuouslifeisdoingwell,andthat,ifthevirtuousmandoeswell,hewillbehappy(cf.Rep.353e1354a2).Whatisusually takentobetheprobleminthisargumentispointedoutbyE.R.Dodds(Plato:Gorgias,335336).Henotestheactiveandpassivesensesof"doingwell"and chargesthatSocratesisbuyingplausibilitybytradingonanambiguity.Justbecauseonedoeswell,inthesenseofbeingvirtuous,itdoesnotfollowthatonewilldo well,inthesenseofbeinghappy.However,ifdoingwellisintrinsicallygoodinthewaytheaboveaccountmaintains,theambiguitydisappears."Doingwell"means one'ssoulisfunctioningcorrectly,accordingtothenatureofthesouland,ofcourse,knowingthatthesoulisfunctioningcorrectly.Tofunctionatone'sbestandto knowthatoneisdoingsoisanimportantpartofwhathappinessis. 47.Cf.Aristotle'saccountofthepleasureofactivity,BookXoftheNicomacheanEthics.Aswell,J.O.Urmson,"AristotleonPleasure,"Aristotle:ACollection ofCriticalEssays,J.M.E.Moravcsik,ed.(GardenCity:Anchor,1967),323333. 48.Thisunderstandingofthecraftofvirtue,however,doesnotmaketheRepublicutilitarianoregotisticallyhedonistic.Theendofthecraftistheperfectionofthe objectthisperfectionisgoodinitselfandtheprimarygoalofthecraft.Thattheexerciseofthisperfectionisalsoagoodforthevirtuousmandoesnotimplythatthis aspectisthegoalofthecraft.SeeJackKelly,"VirtueandPleasure,"Mind82(1973):408.Theauthormakesasimilarpointtothisone,butitisaboutvirtuein Aristotle'sethics. 49.Cf.Annas,Introduction,133ff.

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Chapter3 TheCraftofJusticeandImitationintheRepublic
Plato,infact,hasalreadypreparedusforthefactthathisimpressiveaccountofjusticeinthesoulis,nevertheless,inadequateinsomeway.InBookIV,justbeforehe launchesintothelongawaitedcomparisonbetweenthecityandthesoul,Socratesissuesawarningtohisinterlocutors.
...itismyopinionthatwewillnevergraspaccuratelythisthingfromthemethodswehavebeenusingintheseinvestigationsuptonow.Thereisanother,greaterandlongerway thatleadstothisthing.(435d)

Inspiteofthiswarning,Socratesplungesaheadwithhisaccount.Atfirst,thecontextwouldmakeitlookasthoughSocratesistalkingonlyaboutthestructureofthe soulwhenhetalksabout"thisthing"however,asubsequentpassageshowsthathemeansthewholematterofjusticeinthesoulandinthecity.InBookVISocrates refersbacktothisearlierwarning.

Yourememberthen,saidI,that,havingdistinguishedthethreepartsofthesoul,wesetupwhateach[ofthese]is:justice,temperance,courage,andwisdom.(504a)

Glauconsaysthathecouldnotforgetthisaccount.Then,Socratesalsoremindshimthattheclearestvisionofthismatterwasavailableonlytotheonewhotakesthe greaterroute.Hehintsthatitisnowtime,inthedialogue,totakethislongerwayround.Ofcourse,weknowthatthelongerwayroundisalsothegreatestlearning (megistonmathema),knowledgeoftheFormofthegoodand,throughit,alltheotherForms.AndwhileSocratesisnotableactuallytotakehisinterlocutorsonthe longerwayround,hedoesofferthemasketchofit.ThispassageinBookVIisthepreludetothemetaphysicalheightsoftheRepublic,theanalogyoftheSun,the DividedLine,andthesimileoftheCave.Inshort,thelongerwayround,

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themostaccurateknowledgeofthismatter,entailsthatthelearnercometoknowtheForms,bywayofthehighestForm,thegood. Inthisway,then,Plato,inthebooksimmediatelyfollowingBookIV,addstwomorelevelstohisargumentintheRepublic.Thewarningsjustquotedindicatethat theselevelsareofferedasmeansofcompletingtheaccountinBookIV.FirstistheintroductionoftheFormsasparadigms,tobeusedbytherulersinestablishing virtueinthecityandintheirownsouls.SecondisthecompletionoftheaccountofFormsbythehighestlearning,theknowledgeoftheFormofgood.Inthischapter, wewillconcentrateonthefirstofthesetwolevelstheintroductionofFormsasparadigms.Asweshallsee,PlatoseesthetheoryofFormsasacompletionofhis accountoftherulingcraft.However,itisclearthatthefocushasshiftedfromestablishingvirtueinthesoultoestablishingitinthecity,althoughSocratestalksas thoughthetwoenterprisesarenotreallyseparate.InthischapterwewillelaboratehisaccountoftherelationbetweentheFormsandthecraftofthephilosophical rulersthephilosopherkings.InthenextwewillturntothegreatestlearningtheroleoftheFormofthegoodintherulingcraft. I InBookV,theinterlocutorsinthedialoguebegintoexhibitananxietyaboutwhethertheidealcitytheyhavebeentalkingaboutispossible.Inparticular,havingbeen forcedtoaddresstheissueofthecommunityofwomenandchildren,Socratesworriesthathisideasonthissubjectwillleadsomepeopletoquestionwhetherthe idealcityispossible,indeedwhetheritisevendesirable.Inordertoaddresstheseproblems,Socratessketcheshisfamoustheoryabouttheroleofwomenas guardiansandaboutthekindoffamilytheguardianswillhave.Infact,Socratesarguesthatwomenshouldbeguardiansalongwiththementhenheoutlinesasystem ofmarriagesandchildcarethatexplodestheprivatefamilyandinitsplaceputsacommunalfamily.Concedingthatthesesuggestionsareparadoxicaltohis contemporaries,Socratescomparesthepredictablereactiontothesetwodoctrinestowaveswavesthathebelievestheirdiscussionhassuccessfullywithstood. However,itisthethirdwaveofparadoxthatwillprovethemostdifficult.ThisthirdwaveisthenotoriousPlatonic

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claimthat,inordertomaketheidealcitypossible,philosophersmustbecomekingsorthosewhonowrulemustbecomephilosophers.1 Thisthirdwaveisthemeans forintroducingthetheoryofForms,inparticularFormsasparadigms.InthenextsectionofBookV,philosophersaredefinedasthosewhohaveknowledgeofthe Forms.IntherestofBookV,SocratessetsforthacomplexargumenttoshowtherelationbetweenknowledgeandForms,aswellastherelationbetweenopinion andtheperceptualworld.HisargumentisaclassicstatementofPlatonicepistemology.However,itisalsomorethanepistemology,inthecontemporarysense,thatis atstakeinthispassage.Wemustrememberthatthelargerissueistheknowledgethattherulersmusthaveinordertobecapableofrulinginthecity.Byextension,it isalsothekindofknowledgeneededifreasonistoruleinthesoul.Thekindofknowledgethatissoughtisprimarilyacraftknowledge,akindofpracticalknowledge. Intheearlydialoguescraftisidentifiedwithknowledge.Inpartthisidentificationmarkstheinfallibilityofcraft,itsreliableproductionofresults.IntheGorgias,craftis definedbyitsseekingtheperfectionofwhatitworksonandbyitsabilitytogiveanaccountofitsprocedure.Medicine,forexample,knowswhathealthisandhowto goaboutproducingitithasanaccountofitsgoaland,thus,ofitsprocedure.Therulingcraftoughttohaveasimilarsortofaccountofitsprocedureandofitsgoal.In thecaseofthesoul,thegoalofthecraftispsychichealthandpsychichealthisabalanceandharmonyofpartsofthesoul.However,thewarningsthatSocratesgives showthatwhathehassofarsaidaboutthesetopicsisnotsufficienttoqualifyasthesortofaccountthatamountstocraftknowledge.Sincepsychichealthisjusticein thesoul,wecansaythatwedonotyethaveanaccountofjusticeinthesoulthatcountsasknowledgeofjusticeinthesoul.Andsinceitiscraftknowledgethatis sought,wecanaddthatwedonothaveanaccountofjusticeinthesoulthatwouldallowreasontoexercisethecraftofrulinginthesoul. However,theprobleminthetextdoesnotpresentitselfasknowledgeofjusticeinthesoulbutasknowledgeofjusticeinthecity.InBookVSocratesisconcernedto presentanaccountofthekindofknowledgethattherulersinthecitymusthave.Asitturnsout,theknowledgethattherulersofthecityneedisthesameasthe knowledgethatrulerofthesoulneeds.AllrulersneedknowledgeoftheForms,inparticularknowledgeoftheFormofjustice.

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ItisknowledgeoftheFormofjusticethatallowsrulerstoestablisheitherpsychicharmonyorcivicharmony.Somethingisatstakeotherthantheoreticalknowledgeof justice,then.WeknowthatsomethingelseisatstakebecausePlatointroducesFormsintothisconversationbywayofaplayonthenotionthatphilosophersare, literally,loversofwisdom.SocratesteasesGlauconaboutbeinganardentloverofboys,onewholovesalltypesofboys,whatevertheirphysicalcharacteristics. Clearlyuncomfortablebutwillingtogoalongwiththejoke,Glauconaskshowthischaracteristicofloversisfoundamongloversofwisdom.Socratessaysthatthe loverofwisdommustloveallofit,notjustsomepartofitsuchaloverofwisdomwillseekallkindsoflearning.ToGlaucon,onewhothusseeksallkindsoflearning issomethinglikeadilettante,whoreallyisaloverofspectacles(philotheamones).Socratescountersthattheloverofwisdomaboutwhichheistalkingisaloverof thespectacleoftruth(tesaletheias...philotheamonas[475e4]). Itisinexplicatingwhathemeansby"truth"thatSocratesintroducestheForms.AsinotherpassagesinthedialoguesthatrefertoForms,hereSocratestalksas thoughGlauconwillrecognizewhatheistalkingabout,asthoughthenotionhadalreadybeendiscussedamonghishearers.

Concerningjustandunjust,goodandbad,andalltheForms(eidon)theaccountisthesame:whileeachoftheseisone,eachmakesmanyappearancesbywayofvaried participationinactions,bodies,andsuchthings.(476a)

Thus,besidesbeingloversoftruth,philosophershaveanotherfeaturetheycandistinguishappearancefromreality.Philosophersaredividedfromthemereloversof spectaclesbecausephilosopherscandistinguishtheonefromthemany,therealityfromtheappearance.Mereloversofspectaclescanseeonlythemanybeautiful appearances,forinstancetheycannotknowandclingtothenatureofthebeautifulitself.Theyarecomparedtopeoplewhoaredreamingbecausetheycannot distinguishrealityfromappearance.

Todreamisthis:whetherasleeporawake,onebelievesthatwhichislikeisnotlikesomething[else]butratheristheverythingtowhichitislike.(476c)

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Thetwothemesoflovingwisdomandofdreamingandwakingareinterrelated,then.Therulersinthecityaretobesoinlovewiththetruththattheyseektofinditin anotherdimension,sotospeak.Becausetheyloveallofthetruththeyarenotsatisfiedwiththesurfacebutmustlookbeneaththesurfacetofindthewholetruth.Their loveofthetruthhasananalyticalandinvestigativebent.Sofarwehaveafamiliarthemeonemustgobehindtheobviousorpatenttosomethingmorefundamental. However,atthispoint,thecontrastbetweensurfaceandwhatisbelowthesurfaceischaracterizedinapeculiarway.Thewholetruthleadsthemfrom,forexample, manybeautifulthingstoonebeautybeyondthemanybeautifulthings.Moreover,thisonebeautybeyondthemanybeautifulthingsistherealityofwhichthemany beautifulthingsaretheappearance. Therefollowsalongargumenttoshowthatthischaracterizationofthedifferencebetweenthephilosopherandtheloverofspectaclesiscorrect.Theargument attemptstoestablishthatifthereisknowledge,itisofForms.Whatevergraspwehaveoftheperceptualworld,itcannot,byitselfatleast,everamounttoknowledge. Whenitcomestotheperceptualworld,wehaveopiniononly.Itisnotwithinthescopeofthisbooktodevelopthisargumentatanylength.Thereis,however,one pointthatisvitalforourpurposes. WithintheargumentSocratespresentstheclassictheoryofFormsfromthemiddledialogues.InwhatisusuallytakentobeareferencetoForms,hesaysthatwhat whollyis(panteloson)iswhollyknowable(pantelosgnoston)(477a3).WhilethecontextindicatesthattheFormsarewhatwhollyis,thenotionofwhatwhollyis, however,certainlyseemsmysterious.Wewillfollowthosecommentatorswhosaythatthisphraseshouldbetakentobeellipticalanothertermismeanttofollowthe 'is'.'Whatwhollyis'isellipticalfor'whatwhollyisF.'What'F'standsforisproblematic,however.Ontheonehand,itcouldstandforsuchpredicatesas'beautiful,' 'just,'or'good'thatapplyunivocallytoFormsandparticulars.Ontheotherhand,FcouldstandforatermthatprimarilydesignatesaForm(somewhatlikeaname) andderivativelyappliestootherFs.2 Whilethelatterviewismoreappropriatetoourinterpretation,wewillnotargueforit.Atthispoint,wewillassumethat''being wholly'F'"isawayofdesignatingtheFormofFastheexemplarofF.Thus,whatiswhollyknowableiswhatiswhollyjust,orwhollybeautiful.Tobewhollybeautiful is

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tobebeautifulatalltimes,fromallaspects,inallrelations,andsoon.Wecapturethisnotionbysayingthattobewhollybeautifulistobebeautifulwithout qualificationunqualifiedlybeautiful.SocratesgivessuchadescriptionoftheFormofbeautyintheSymposium(211a).Thenotionofunqualifiedbeautyleads naturallytothenotionofperfectbeautytobeunqualifiedlybeautifulistobebeautifulwithoutexception,thatis,tobeperfectlybeautiful.Inthisaccount,then,Forms areperfectandunqualifiedtheFormofFisperfectlyandunqualifiedlyF.AnotherwaytoputthismatteristosaythattheFormisrealF,authenticF.Thingsthatare ambiguouslyFarephonyorinauthenticF.Wewillassumethatthiswayoftalkingdoesnotimplyonlyaunivocalreadingof'F'butiscompatiblewith'F'havinga primaryandaderivativedesignation. Thisnotionofrealityisembeddedinanaccountofknowledge.Knowledgecannotbehadofwhatisqualifiedlybeautifulbutonlyofwhatisunqualifiedlybeautiful. Whatisqualifiedisambiguousandwhatisunqualifiedisclear.Knowledgeisalwaysrightopinioncanbeeitherrightorwrong.Thus,knowledgegoeswithclarity opiniongoeswithambiguity.Finally,knowledgegoeswithForms,whichareunqualifiedlywhatevertheyare.Theambiguousobjectofopinionturnsouttobeobjects intheperceptualworldthatarebothFandnotF,beautifulandnotbeautiful.Exactlywhyknowledgegoeswithclarityisnotaltogetherclearitself.Ofcourse,inone wayitseemsplausibletosaythatknowledgeisofwhatisunambiguous.IfanobjectisjustFandnotalsonotF,thenitisamoreconvenientobjectforknowledge onceonehasgraspeditthereisnoneedtoseparateoutextraneousmatter.However,itisnotclearthatknowledgerequiressuchrigidclarity.Afterall,itmightbe possibleforsomeonetoknow,forexample,thataparticulardecisionisbothjustandunjust.However,itwouldhelptorememberthatwhatSocrateshasinmindis thesortofknowledgethatmakesrulersabletoestablishandpreservejusticeinthecity.Thepointofthepassageisnottogiveageneralaccountofknowledgebutan accountofwhattherulerneedstoknowinordertoestablishandpreservejustice,temperance,courage,andwisdomintheidealcity,aswellasinhisownsoul.What therulerneedsisanunambiguousgraspof,forexample,justice,onethatwillserveasthegoalofhiscraft.Therulerwantstoknowprimarilywhatjusticeis.

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Ifwekeepthecraftofrulinginmind,wewillbeabletosiftthroughthevariousepistemologicalinterpretationsofthispassage.3 Whatthephilosophicalrulerneedsis agraspofjusticethatwillbeusefulandappropriateinallcontexts.Socratesissayingthatinordertofindsuchguidanceheshouldnotrelyonthemanycasesofjustice availabletoeventhecasualobserverhemustgobeyondthesetofindsomethingdifferentinkind,somethingmorereliable.Thus,therulerisnotwellservedbysimply graspingthejusticeof,forexample,Solon.Iftherulertriedtofixhergazeonjusticeinthisonecontextshemightwellmistakejusticeforwhatisnotjustice.For instance,ifshefixedhergazeonSolon,shemighttakehisjustactionsinreformingthecityaswhatjusticeis.ShethenmighttrytoreplicateSolon'sactionsinanother historicalsituationonlytofindoutthathisactionsarenotappropriatetothisdifferentsituation.ThegoalofhercraftisnotSolon'sjusticebutjusticeassuch.Thisshe mustgraspwithouttheambiguityofcircumstance.Ifshewereaphysicianinsteadofaruler,shewouldwantsuchagraspofhealth.EvenifwetakeAlcibiadestobea perfectspecimenofhealth,itwouldnotdoforthephysiciantoreplicatehisconditioninothers.Thereismuchabouthisconditionthatisidiosyncratic.Afterall,sheis notinterestedinAlcibiades'health,sheisinterestedinhealth.TograspthatitemitwouldbebettertohaveitisolatedfromAlcibiades'beauty,orotherpeculiarities. Isolated,abstracted,purified,healthcanbeappliedtoothers. Inshort,whatthephilosophicalrulerneedstoguidehercraftisaparadigmofjustice,whichaffordsagraspofjusticewithoutanyoftheshortcomingsoftheparticular instances.ThisroleforFormsisfoundintheCratylus,whereSocrateswishestoillustratehisnotionofthecraft(techne)ofnamegiver,thatis,theonewhogives thingstheirnames.Heislikeanothercraftsman,thecarpenter,inthat,inhiscraftofgivingnames,helookstowardsomething.Whenthecarpentermakesashuttle,he lookstoward(blepon)somethingwhosenatureistoweave.Moreover,
iftheshuttlewerebrokenwhileheismakingitwillhelooktoward(blepon)thebrokenshuttlewhenhemakesanotherortowardthatForm(toeidos)inaccordancewithwhichhe madethebrokenone?(389b)

TheansweristhathelookstowardtheForm,whichinturniscalled"thatwhichisshuttle"(autohoestinkerkis),oneofthefor

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mulasPlatousestodesignateaForm.TheconclusionisthatthenamegiveralsolookstowardaForm,thatwhichisname. ThatispreciselyhowSocratespresentsthephilosophicalrulersatthebeginningofBookVI.ItisthephilosophersthosewhoknowtheFormswhoarefittobe rulersintheidealcity.ThewaythatSocratesjustifiesthisclaimsoobviousinsomewaysissignificant.Thephilosophersusethisknowledgeinthewayartistsuse modelsthephilosoherswhoareabletodistinguishthemanyappearancesfromtheonerealityarecontrastedtothosewhohavenodistinctparadigminthesoul (medenenargesenteipsucheiechontesparadeigma[484c78])andareunable,incontrasttothewaythepainterworkswithhisparadigm,

tolooktoward(apoblepontes)thetruestthing,alwaysreferringbacktothat,andcontemplatinginthemostexactwaypossible,thustoestablishherethelawsconcerning beautifulthings,justthings,andgoodthings,ifthereisneedtoestablish,andcarefullytopreservewhathasbeenestablished.(484cd)

Ifweputthisdescriptioninapositiveform,then,wewouldsaythatthephilosopherkingislikeapainterwholookstowardaparadigm,amodel,inpaintingapicture. Justasthepainterreproducesthefeaturesofthemodel,thephilosopherkingreproducesthefeaturesoftheForms,whicharehisparadigms.Theseparadigms, however,arethetruest,affordingthemostaccuratevisionforbringingforwardthosefeaturesthus,thephilosopherkingisabletomakelawsforthecity,whichwill governbeauty,justice,andgoodness. AtthispointinBookVIthereisalonginterludeinwhichSocratesshowswhythetruephilosophicalnaturesintheactualcityarecountedasuseless.Afterthe interlude,hepicksupagainthemotifofphilosophicalruleasanimitativecraft.Notonlyisthisanalogywiththepainterappropriateforportrayingthewaythatthe philosopherkingrulesinthecity,italsoisusedtotalkaboutthewaythephilosopherkinghimselfbecomesvirtuous,aswecanseefromapassagelaterinBookVI. ThephilosopherhimselfbecomesvirtuousbecausehespendshistimelookinguponandobservingtheForms.

(hewill)imitate(mimeisthai)thosethingsandmakehimselfaslikethemaspossible.Ordoyouthinkthatthereisanywayforsomeonewhoassociateswithwhatheadmires (agamenos)nottoimitatethatthing?(500c)

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Thus,thephilosopher,whoassociateswithForms,willbecomeorderly(kosmios)anddivine(theios)insofarasahumanmaydoso.Inturn,ifsuchaoneisputin chargeofestablishinghumanpractices,bothintheprivateandinthepublicrealms,andnotjustofmolding(plattein)himself,hewouldbeagoodcraftsman (demiourgon)oftemperanceandjusticeandtheothercivicvirtues(500d48).Suchrulersarelikepainterswhomakeasketchaccordingtoadivineparadigm(toi theioiparadeigmati[500e3]).Socratesthenelaboratesonthisanalogywiththepainter,drivinghomethenotionthattheFormsserveasparadigmsforimitation.

Then,Isuppose,they[thephilosophicalrulers]wouldsetabouttheirwork,frequentlylooking(apoblepoien)inbothdirections,towardthejustthatexistsinreality,thebeautiful, thetemperate,andallsuchthings,andthentowardthatthingtheywouldcreateamonghumans.(501b)

Theruleruses,then,theFormsforthevirtuesforjustice,fortemperanceasparadigmsforhiswork.However,thereisacuriousadditiontotheFormsthatserve asparadigmsthatis,theFormofbeauty.Thus,besidesinstillingjusticeinthecity,andtemperance,therulerwillalsoinstillbeauty.Althoughitisnotsaid,itmightbe supposedthattherulerinstillsbeautybyinstillingjusticeandtemperance.Nevertheless,itshouldbenoticedthatPlatohasinsertedasomewhathighertermofvalue intotheaccountonewhichhasforusstrongaestheticconnotations. GiventhestrongwayinwhichimitationispresentedinthesepassageswecanappreciateSocrates'accountinBookVofthenatureofForms.IftheFormofjusticeis unambiguouslyjust,itisaperfectobjectoftheruler'spainterlyglances.WhentherulerlookstotheForm,shewantsaclearview,oneunobscuredbyextraneous matter.Sheneedstograspatypeofjusticethatdoesnotcometobenorpassaway,thatdoesnotwaxandwane,thatisnotjustfromonepointofviewbutunjust fromanother.Whatissignificantfortheruler,then,isthatFormsdonothaveperspectives.Onceonehasgraspedthem,therearenounseenpointsofview.This featureofFormsturnsouttobeanimportantcontrastwithordinaryperceptualobjects,whicharealwaysseenfromsomepointofvieworother.ThattheFormofF lacksperspectivesisrelatedtoitsbeingwhollyF.Unlikeperceptualobjects,theFormofFisnotgraspedfromaparticularpointofviewthereisnotanotherpointof viewfromwhichtoviewit.Thus,thereisnotthepossibilitythatfrom

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thisotherpointofviewitwillappearnotF.However,thereisalwaysthepossibilitythatsomeparticularFwillappearnotFfromanotherpointofview.TheFormof justice,forinstance,isjustfromeverypointofviewwhilethejusticeofSoloncanalwaysappearunjustfromsomeperspective.Itisbecausetheyhaveperspectives thatparticularsareliabletoambiguity. WhileweknowinBookVIthatFormsareparadigmsforimitation,wearenotgivenmuchmoredetailaboutthenatureoftheimagesmadebythephilosophical rulers.However,producingimagesarisesinBookXoftheRepublic.HereSocratesreturnstotheroleofthepoetsinhisidealcity.Nowthathehasestablishedthe theoryofFormsinhisaccountofthecity,hebelievesheisabletoofferfurtherjustificationforhisseveretreatmentofthepoets.Usingarandomandsomewhat bizarreexampleofthebed,Socratessaysthattherearethreekindsofbed.First,thereistheFormofbedorthatwhichisbed.Nextisthebedmadebythe carpenterthecarpentermakeshisbedbylookingtowardtoFormofbed(596bc).Thelatterdescriptionofthecarpenterresemblescloselythatofthephilosophical rulerwehavejustseeninBookVI,wheretherulerlookstowardtheFormsofjustice,temperance,andbeautyinfashioningthecity(500cd501bc).Therethe philosophicalrulerissaidtoimitatetheseForms.However,inBookX,Socrateswantstorestrictthewordimitationtothosewhoproducethethirdkindofbed themereappearanceofbed.Thethirdkindofbedisthepaintingofabed.Itisacopyofacopybecauseitcopiesthebedmadebythecarpenter,whichinturnisa copyoftheFormofbed.Thisthirdkindofbedissaidtobethriceremovedfromreality(countingtheFormasthefirststep[597e]).Socratesthendevelopsan elaborateindictmentofsuchimitators.Sincetheydonotknowtherealitybutonlytheappearance,theycanreproduceonlyimagesthatarepartialanddistorted.For instance,inpaintingabedwhichisonlyanappearanceoftheFormofbedthepainterpaintsonlythatperspectiveofthebedhesees,leavingoutwhathecannot see.Thepaintertherebyrepresentsonlytheappearanceandnotthereality(598b).Socratesgoesontodrawoutthisanalogyinthecaseofthedramaticpoets,who canproduceonlypartialanddistortedimagesofreality(605a). Whateveritsimplicationsforthetreatmentofpoets,thepassagedoesgiveussomeinsightintothedifferencebetweenthephilosophicalrulerandotherkindsofrulers. Thephilosophical

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ruler,infashioningaconstitutionoraparticularjudgment,islookingtowardtheFormofjustice.HisconstitutionorjudgmentisnotaperfectembodimentoftheForm bythenatureofthecaseitcannotbe.However,itisadistinctimprovementovertheconstitutionorjudgmentthatcomesfromthenonphilosophicalrulerwhohasonly theappearancesofjusticetocopy.Ifwefollowtheanalogywiththepainter,theappearancesofjustice,whichthenonphilosophicalrulerswillimitate,willbethe actuallyexistingcitiesthenonphilosophicalrulerwouldusethemasstandardsofjustice,unabletoseejusticeitself.SincehedoesnotknowtheFormofjusticeand cannotunderstandwhattheappearanceistryingtobelike,hemistakestheappearanceforthereality.Mistakingtheappearanceforthereality,thenonphilosophical rulerwouldproducedistortedimagesofjustice,justasthepainterproducesdistortedimagesofthebed. Thus,therewouldbetwokindsofimage.Theimageproducedbythephilosophicalrulerandtheimageproducedbythenonphilosophicalrulerwoulddifferintheir approximationtothereality.Thephilosophicalrulerproducesanimageofjusticetwiceremovedfromthereality(counting,intheusualGreekway,theFormitselfas thefirststep).Presumablyitislessdistortedthantheimageproducedbythenonphilosophicalruler.Thelatterproducesanimagethriceremovedfromrealityitmust bemoreofadistortionthanthefirst.Thereasonforthisdifferencebetweentheworkofthephilosophicalandthenonphilosophicalrulersisthatthelattercannottell thedifferencebetweenappearanceandrealityandmistaketheformerforthelatter.Inourinterpretation,thenonphilosophicalrulerisunabletodistinguishjusticeitself fromthecontextinwhichitappears.Thus,thenonphilosophicalrulerconfuseswhatisessentialtojusticewithwhatiscontextualinthisinstance.Heisliketheruler whoconfusesSolon'sjusticewithjustice.Thephilosophicalrulerhastheadvantageinthatshecanfitjusticeitself,notmerelySolon'sjustice,toeachcircumstance. Shegoesbacktothesourcetheessenceofjusticeandbeginsanewtoreplicatethejusticethatisappropriatetoallcontextsbecauseitisnotboundupwithany context,awarethatjusticewillwearadifferentappearanceineachnewcase.4 Finally,thesepassagesinRepublicVIextendtheanalogybetweencraftandjusticeofBookIVbyintroducingthenotionofaparadigmthecraftsmancopiesin accomplishinghistask.Indeed,thisextensionofthecraftofjusticeisthewaythatPlato

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connectsthiscraftwiththetheoryofForms.ItisbylookingupontheForms,understoodasparadigms,thatthecraftsmanofjustice,whetherinthesoulorinthecity, isbothinstructedandinspired.Histaskthenisoneofimitation.ImitationofFormsasparadigmscompletestheaccountofthecraftofjusticefromBookIV.The analogywithimitativecraftisnotjustadevicetointroducetheFormsintothisaccount,however.Platoismakinganimportantpointinhismoraltheory.Besidesthe accountofjusticefromBookIV,withitscogenteconomyofpsychicfunctions,thereisanotherlevelatwhichwecanseethevalueofjusticeinthesoul.Justiceinthe soul,likejusticeinthecity,isguidedbytheFormofjustice,thewayapainterisguidedbyhismodel.Thisanalogyisnottrivialitbringsintotheprojectofacquiring andmaintainingvirtueawholenewdimension,asweshallsee. Imitationis,ofcourse,averyimportantcomponentofthemorallifeandofmoraleducation.Mostofusbecomeawarethat,infashioningourlives,wearedepending oncertainindividualsasmodels.Someoftheseindividualsareactualpeople,friendsorrelativesothersarefictionalcharacters.Someoftheseindividualsaretakento bepositivemodelsonewishestobelikeUncleHank.OthersofthesemodelsarenegativeonedoesnotwishtobelikeJohnUpdike'sHarryAngstrom.Inthese models,then,weseeinstancesofwhatweadmireorwhatweabhor.InRepublicIIandIII,Socratesmakesimitationthecentralmotifintheeducationofthe guardians(377b).Heseesliteratureaspresentingtoyoungpeoplemodelsforimitation.Intraditionalliterature,themodelsaremorallylacking.Thestoriesofthegods mustbeexpurgatedbecausewedonotwantyoungpeopleintheidealcityimitatingthedeedsofKronosorOuranosandexcusingtheirevilbehaviorbycitingthese latterexamples.Likewise,thestoriesoftheheroesmustbechangedsothatmorallybettermodelswillbeheldupforemulation.Youngpeopleshouldnotreadstories thatpresentdeathtobesomethingterrible,forsuchstoriesunderminecouragebyattackingtheproperattitudetowarddeath,thatis,thatslaveryshouldbemore fearedthandeath(387b).Indeed,Socrateswouldevenforbidguardiansfromportrayingcharactersinplayswhoarenotmorallyworthyofimitationinreallife.From childhoodtheyshouldimitate(mimeisthai)onlypeoplewhoarecourageous,pious,moderate,andfree(395c). Inthisview,Platoistryingtoestablishthepositivekindofimitationastheheartofthemorallife.Inthisattempt,however,

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themodelsbecomeasitwerelargerthanlifebecausetheyareabstractedfromlife.InsteadofimitatingSocrates'justice,thephilosopherimitatesjusticeitselfthe Formofjustice.Insteadoftryingtodiscernjustice,forexample,obscuredbySocrates'badcharactertraits,thephilosophercandiscernjusticeunobscuredby injustice.Finally,thisunobscuredjustice,becauseofitsabstractnature,isapplicablebothintheprivatelifeofthephilosopherandinthepubliclifeofthecity. However,wemightwanttoknowhowliterallytotakethistalkaboutparadigms.Takenliterally,thenotionofparadigmimpliesthatthephilosophicalrulerisactuallyin possessionofaninnervisionoftheFormofjustice.TheFormofjusticeseeninthisvisionwouldexhibitacharacteristicthatalljustlawsandinstitutionswouldhave.In virtueofthischaracteristic,therulerwouldbeabletosaythatjustlaws,forexample,allshareacommoncharacteracharacterthatisseeninaparticularlypureway intheparadigm.Inthisnaivereading,then,theidealinsomewayhasandthusexhibitsthecharacteristicjusticesothatitcanbetakeninbyavisionlikegrasp.Onthe otherhand,therearethesophisticatedinterpreterswhoresistsuchaliteralreadingoftalkaboutparadigms.Totheseinterpreters,thephilosophicalrulerisnotlooking ateven(orespecially)intellectuallyanobjectthatexhibitsthecharacterofjustice.5 Thetalkaboutvisionisjustmetaphorical.Thephilosophicalruleris,for example,consultingasetofpropositionsorevenoneparticularlyrichpropositionthatarticulatesthetruthaboutjustice.Thenshecomparesthelanguageofthe proposedlawsorthedescriptionsoftheproposedinstitutionswiththepropositionsoftheaccountofjustice.Shetriestofindoutwhethertheformerareconsistent withthelatter,whetherthelatterimplytheformer.Thetalkofvisionismerelyametaphoricalwayofpresentingthisessentiallyintellectualprocessofdeductive reasoning. ThenaiveviewisnaivebecauseittakesliterallySocrates'talkaboutimitation.Thesophisticatedview,ontheotherhand,triestotranslatethattalkintocategories morefamiliartocontemporarythought.Infact,atthispointinPlato'smoraltheory,eitherwayofinterpretingSocrates'teachingaboutimitationseemspossible.Atthis level,Formsaresourcesofinformation,sotospeaktheycommunicatetothephilosophicalrulerwhat,forexample,justiceis.WhetherFormsareselfexemplifying paradigmsorpropositionalformulas,theyarecapableoffulfillingthisfunction.

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ThedifferencebetweenthenaiveandthesophisticatedviewofFormsbecomesimportant,however,laterwhentheFormofgoodnessasthesourceofmotivation becomesrelevant.Wewillseetherethatwhenthegood,alongwiththeotherForms,isthesourceofmotivation,Formsalsoneedtobeselfexemplifying. Accordingly,withthislevelofPlato'smoraltheoryinmind,weneedtoadoptthenaiveview. II Inthefollowingsectionwewillattempttogiveanaccountofthenaiveview.Wewillassumethataparadigmactuallyhasthecharacteristicforwhichitisaparadigm. Thus,theparadigmforjusticeislike,insomeway,theparadigmforthecapitalofaCorinthiancolumnfoundintheancientGreeksculptor'sshop.Theparadigmfor thecapitaldisplaysthecharacteristictobecopiedbythesculptor.Therearedifficulties,however,withtryingtograspthenotionofsuchaparadigmwhenitcomesto Forms.ThecomparisonwiththeparadigmforCorinthiancolumnsishelpful,butonlypartially.TheparadigmCorinthiancolumnembodiestherelevantcharacteristics forbeingcopied.ButtheparadigmCorinthiancolumnisaperceptualobjectitisfairlyeasytoseehowitcanembodythecharacteristicforwhichitisaparadigm.The Formofjusticeis,obviously,notaperceptualobject.Itis,thus,difficulttoseehowitcanembodythecharacteristicofjustice. Tohelp,wecanstartwithsomethingsimilartoaparadigmforjusticethepersonificationofjustice.On,orin,manycourthousesonefindsastatueofJusticeasthe blindfoldedwomanholdingscalesinonehandandaswordintheother.Ifitwereaseriesofstatements,itwouldsaythatcourtsshouldbeblindtosuchaspectsofa caseassocialrank,thatclaimsshouldbecarefullyandaccuratelyweighed,thatpunishmentshouldbesevere.Moreover,thepersonificationisakindofidealization. ThejudgecanonlyapproximatetheblindnessofJusticeherdecisionscanonlybeapproximatelyevenlybalancedbetweencompetingclaims.However,thestatue symbolicallyembodiesthesecharacteristics.Itpresents,undertheperceptualguiseofthestatue,thecharacteristicsofjustice.Thesecharacteristicsarenotthemselves perceptualbuttheycanbegraspedinasummary,nonpropositional,fashionbythesymbolicrepresentation.Ofcourse,wecannotmaketoomuchoutofthis

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example.Noonewoulduse,insteadofcasesandlaws,suchapersonificationasthesubjectmatterofalawschoolcourse.Nojudgewouldwalkouttothe courthousestepstocontemplatethestatueofJusticewhiletryingtodecideacase,lookingtoseeifherdecisioncomparedfavorablywithwhatthestatueembodied. Assuch,thepersonificationremindsusofwhatwehaveotherwiseagreedupon,taught,orpromoted.Thepersonificationhasamerelysymbolicfunctionforus. Now,however,supposeanonmaterialparadigmthatembodiedthecharacteristicthatjusticeinthecity(orinthesoul)wasstrivingtohave,butinsomethingmore thanasymbolicway.Itissomethingthatexhibitsjustice,then.Moreover,inthissupposition,theparadigmisabstract.Itisperfectlyjustitexhibitsjusticewithoutthe taintofinjusticeunliketheaveragecourtdecision,whichcanonlybeapproximatelyjust.Moreover,theparadigmisunqualifiedlyjusttherearenootherqualities mixedwithjusticethatdistractfromtheparadigm.Thisparadigmwould,then,exhibitthecharacteristicsthatheretoforewereonlyapproximatelyembodied.The difficultywithtalkinginthiswayisthat,whileitmakessensetotalkaboutjusticeinthelawsofthecity,itdoesnotmakemuchsensetotalkaboutjusticeina paradigm.Inthecity,ajustlawguaranteesthateachcitizencanfulfillhisfunction.Alaw,forexample,aboutweightsandmeasurestakesintoconsiderationtheneeds ofmarketvendorsforfaircompetition.Whateverthischaracteristicofjusticemightbeinthelaw,itisverydifficulttoimaginewhatitwillbecomeifitisabstracted fromtheactualmarket,vendors,andbuyersinourexperience.Ifjusticeisfoundintherelationsamongtheseactualpeople,howcanitpossiblybefoundinaworldof abstractparadigms? Atthispoint,ofcourse,itishardtomakeoutwhatPlatomighthavemeant.Thedimensionsoftheproblemarethat,ontheonehand,thereshouldbeacharacteristic thatisjustice,whetheritisfoundinthecityorinthesoulontheotherhand,thissamecharacteristicnottheuniversalforthecharacteristiccanbefound, uninstantiatedinacityorasoul,allbyitself.Finally,weshouldbeabletorecognizethatthecharacteristicisthesame,whetherinthecityorinthesoulorexistingby itself.WecouldleavetheproblematthispointandsimplystipulatethattheFormexhibitsinsomeappropriatesensethecharacteristicforwhichitisaFormwithout anyfurtherexplanation.

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Forthepurposesofillustration,however,wewillofferaversionofoneofthespeculativeanswerstothisproblem.Althoughithassometextualgrounding,wearenot maintainingthatPlatoactuallyheldthisspeculativeaccount,onlythatitisoneofthepossibilitieshemighthaveconsideredformakingthenotionofFormsasself exemplifyingparadigmsspecific.ThespeculativeaccountissimplyofferedasoneofthewaysPlatomighthaveansweredtheproblemastowhattheselfexemplifying Formmightbe.Moreover,whilethesubsequentaccountofPlato'smoraltheorydependsonthenotionthatFormsareselfexemplifying,itwillnotdependonthis particularversionofthewaythattheFormofjustice,forexample,isselfexemplifying.Indevisingthisspeculativeanswerweshallpaycloseattentiontothewaythat Platohasintroducedintohisaccountconceptsthatwewouldcall''aesthetic.''Hetalksasthoughwhatjusticeaimsatbothinthelawsofthecityandinitslegal decisionsisabalanceandaharmonyakindofbeauty.Ifweexploitthisnotion,wecanseewhatPlatomaymeanbysuchlanguage.Justicedoesansweraneedfor balanceandharmonyamongthefunctionsandneedsofthecitizens.Justicebringsthedifferentkindsofcitizenstogether,withduerespectfortheirdifferencesan attempttomakeakindofkosmosororderoutofthechaosofcompetingfunctions.Ifweseejusticeasakindoforderedharmonyoffunctions,thenitispossibleto talkaboutabstractingthatorderandharmony.Weabstracttheorderandharmonyfromthesurroundingconditionsinwhichtheorderandharmonyarefound.We abstracttheorderandharmonyfromthecitizensandtheircounterclaimstheresultisorderandharmonywithoutobscuringelements.Theconsequencewouldbethat, whenjusticeisabstractedfromactualpersonsandtheirfunctionsandwhenitis,nevertheless,notauniversalforjustice,butstilljusticeeveninthisstateof abstractionitisanabstract,butreal,orderandharmony.6 Asanabstraction,themodeofexistenceoftheFormofjusticecanbecomparedtothemodeofexistenceofmathematicalentities.Amathematicalentityisbothapart fromperceptualexistenceandstillexhibitsthecharacteristicfound,inamoreobscureway,inperceptualexistence.Forexample,themathematicalentitythe equilateraltriangleexists,inthisaccount,abstractedfromallperceptualequilateraltrianglesnevertheless,themathematicalentitystillexhibits,butnowinaclearand pureway,thosecharacteristicsthattheperceptualequilateraltrianglesexhibitedinamore

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obscureway.Justso,theFormofjusticeexistsapartfromcasesofjusticeintheperceptualworld.Initsabstractedstateitisanorderandharmonythisorderand harmonyexhibitthecharacteristicthatperceptualcasesofjusticeexhibitinamoreobscureway.7 Thisparadigmwouldbelikethepersonification,inthatitexhibits thecharacteristicfoundinjustlaws,decisions,policies.However,itwoulddifferinthatthecharacteristicwouldnotbeexhibitedinasymbolicway.ThisFormwill standatoneendofacontinuumwiththeorderandharmonyofthecity'sjustlawsanddecisionsattheotherend.While,inthecity,thisorderandharmonycanonly beachievedinanapproximateway,intheparadigmorderandharmonyareperfectlyandunqualifiedlyachieved.Inthisway,wearriveatthisparadigmaticorderand harmonybyabstractingfromthequalifyingandtheimperfect. JustsuchavisionoftheFormsseemstobetheonePlatoattributestotherulerinapassagepartofwhichwehavealreadyseeninBookVI(500c).Herethe philosopherissaidnottolookupontheaffairsofhumans,

thushedoesnotengageinthestrifewhichfillsonewithfearandillwillratherlookingtothosethings[theForms]whicharewellorderedandremainthesamealwaysandseeing thatneitherdotheytransgressupon,norsuffertransgressionby,oneanother(out'adikountaout'adikoumenahup'allelon)theyareorderlyandproportionate(kosmoide pantakaikatalogonechonta)heimitatesthemandmakeshimselfaslikethemaspossible.8

Ifwereadthispassageinanaiveway,theparadigmscorrespondingtojusticeinthesoulareclearlydescribedasorderlyandproportionate.Thisdescriptionseemsto explaintheclaimthattheparadigmsdonotcommitorsuffertransgression.Itishardtoimaginehowaparadigmmightcommitatransgressionstillitisclearthatthey arebeingcharacterizedasthemselvesjust.Infact,beingorderlyandproportionateseemstoexplainwhytheyareamongthemselvesjustasthoughwhenjusticeis abstractedfromthecontextofcityandsoulitisaproportionateorder. FurtherconfirmationforthenaiveviewisfoundwhenwelooktothewaythatimitationoftheFormsisdescribedinthispassage.Iftheparadigmforjusticeisan abstractorderandproportion,thenthesecharacteristicsoughtalsotobefoundinthejustsoul.Infact,indescribingtheeffectsofimitatingtheForms

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ofjustice,temperance,andbeauty,Socratesattributestothesouladivineorder,whichisclearlymeanttobeacopyoftheorderfoundintheparadigms.
Thusthephilosopherwhoassociateswithdivineorder(theioidekaikosmioi)willbecomeorderlyanddivine(kosmiostekaitheios)asfarasitispossibleforahumantodoso (500d).

WethinkimmediatelyofthedescriptionattheendofBookIV,wherethejustsoulisalsodescribedintermsoforderandharmony.TherePlatousesthecraftwords kozmesantaandsunarmosantabringingorderandharmonizing.WhenimitatingtheFormofjustice,thephilosophicalrulermakesthesoulorderlyandharmonious. Justiceinthesoulthatis,eachpartofthesoulfulfillingitsfunctionisakindoforderandproportion.9 Thus,inanaivereadingofthepassage,theFormofjustice modelsthejusticeofsuchanarrangement,bymodelingthequalitiesoforderandproportioninthisarrangementinthesoul.Inthenaiveview,itdoessobecause justiceabstractedfromthesoulandthecityisorder,proportion,andharmony.Inthesoulorinthecity,thisorderandharmonyarewhatjusticeamountsto. Abstractedtheysimplyareorder,proportion,andharmonythatorderhassomeintrinsicrealityapartfromitsinstances. Ofcourse,tothenonphilosopher,suchaparadigmmightnotbethesubjectofalawschoolcourse,northeobjectofajudge'scontemplation.Thereasonisthatits existenceis,atbest,ahypothesisandhisgraspofitintuitiveandunsure.However,Platocouldsaythatitispresentasakindofmemorytrace,motivatinginan unrecognizedwaythelegislatorandthejudgetoseekmorejustlawsanddecisions.Itwouldserveasadimlydivinedideal,then.Platomightsaythatifalawstudent neverintuitivelygraspedthisparadigm,shewouldhavemissedthepoint,insomerealsense,toherlegaleducation.Thelawsandthedecisionsarealltryingtoembody thisoneparadigmofjusticewithoutintuitivelygraspingtheparadigm,shewouldnotunderstandthelawsandthedecisions. Followingthisnaivereading,wecanseeoneofthereasonsPlatomighthaveusedthenotionofparadigm.Abstractedfromactualsituations,theparadigmgivesthe philosophicalrulerneededclarityinherjobasruler.Imaginetheidealcityruledbytruephilosophers.Inthiscity,therulerknowsdirectlygraspsinaclearintuition thisparadigmanddoesnotjustdimlyrecollect

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itfromwhatsheobservesintheperceptualworld.InlookingattheFormofjustice,therulerseesexhibitedthatcharacteristicthatoughttobeexemplifiedinthecity, aswellasinherownsoul.10IntheFormtherulerseesclearlyandfullythecharacteristic,perfectandunqualified,whichisonlydimlyseeninSocrates'Athens.11 WhatsheseesistheFormofjusticeinourspeculativereadingsheseesanorderandharmonynottiedtothislaworthatcourtcase,notmixedwithanyother elementsthatwouldobscureitsessence.Thussheseesapurifiedandclarifiedorderandharmony.Forinstance,wecanimagineacourtcaseinwhichthecompeting claimsofrightareparticularlystrong.Thenonphilosophicalruleristryingtocomeupwithajustdecisiononethatadequatelyaddressestheclaimsbutthestrength oftheclaimskeepsobscuringwhatisjustinthiscase.Theruler'smindispulledthiswaybyonesetofclaims,thenitispulledtheotherwaybytheothersetofclaims. Itbecomesincreasinglyunclearwhatjusticeisinthiscaseorwhatitisingeneral.Thephilosophicalruler,however,hastheFormonherside,theunobscuredjustice itself.Whileshetoowillbepulledincontrarydirectionsbythecompetingclaims,shehasanadvantageinthatshecanlookattheFormofjusticefromtimetotime. Thisconsultingofthepureparadigmoforderandharmonywillbringstabilitytothedeliberationsoftherulerasshetriesvarioussolutionstotheproblematiccase.Her graspofthenatureofjusticewillnotbeunderminedbytheconfusingcasebeforeher.Shecancontinuetryingvarioussolutionstothecasebecauseshehasnotlost herbearings,sotospeak.Inturn,inthisaccount,keepingtheunobscuredparadigminhermindwillgiveherasensitivitytofeaturesofthecasethattouchonjustice, anabilitytonoticesignificantbuthithertoobscureddetails.Finally,oneortwosolutionswillhavemostclearlytheorderandharmonysheseesexhibitedintheForm. InRepublicVII,therulerswhohaveseentheFormofgoodnessandthusalltheotherFormsbehaveinjustthisway.Socrateswarnsthat,descendingagaininto the"cave"oftheperceptualcity,afterseeingtheForms,thephilosophicalrulerwillatfirstexperiencedifficultyseeingintheshadowsthatis,seeingjusticeobscured intheperceptualworld.Addressinghishearersaspotentialrulers,Socratesthensays:
However,havinggottenusedtoit,youwillseethosethingsathousandtimesbetter,andyouwillknowabouteachofthese

Page150 imageswhatitisandofwhat[itisanimage],throughhavingdiscoveredtherealityconcerningthebeautiful,thejust,andthegoodthings.(520cd)

Inthisaccount,then,itisnotaquestionofapplyingphilosophicaldefinitionsofjusticenorofapplyinglegaldefinitionsofpropertyrights.Themethodisnotoneof deductionfromageneralprincipletoaparticularcase.Thejudgmentoftherulerwillbeclosertowhatwecall"intuition."Giventhedoctrineofrecollection,wecan presumethateveryonehassomeintuition,howeverweak,oftheForms.Thephilosophicalrulersimplyhastheweakintuitionraisedtothelevelofknowledge.12 III Ifcraftimitatesaparadigmthenitproducesimages.Thecraftofjustice,then,producesimagesofjusticeimagesofjusticeinthesoulandinthecity.Inthissection wewillinvestigateimagesintheRepublicinordertounderstandthewaythatthecraftofjusticeproducesimagesofjustice.Ofcourse,itisstraightforwardenoughto saythatimitativecraftproducesimages.Afterall,thecraftintendstomakecopiesoftheparadigmthecopiesare,inaneasilycomprehensiblesense,imagesofthe original.ThecopyoftheparadigmoftheCorinthiancapitalisanimageoftheparadigm.However,thenotionofimageintheRepublicismorecomplicatedthanthis notionoftheimageoftheCorinthiancapital.TheimageoftheCorinthiancapitalisitselfanotherrealCorinthiancapitaltheimageoftheFormofjusticeisnotitself anotherFormofjustice.TheimageofjusticeislessrealthantheForm.IntheRepublic,animageisanappearanceofamorefundamentalreality. Thatimagesshouldbeappearancesofamorefundamentalrealityisnotanecessaryconsequenceofthenotionofimage,then.However,wehavealreadyseenone reasonwhyPlatowouldhavechosenthiswayofexplicatingtherelationbetweenimageandoriginalintheRepublic.InBookV,eachofthemanybeautiful,just,and piousthingsbothisandisnotwhatitissaidtobe.
Ofallofthemanybeautifulthings...isthereanywhichdoesnotappearugly,andofthejust[isthereany]whichdoesnotappearunjust,andofthepious[isthereany]which doesnotappearimpious?(479a)

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OnewaytointerpretthispassageistosaythatanFisbothFandnotF(whereFstandsfortherangeoftermsintheabovequotation)becauseithasthequalitythat properlybelongstotheFormbutalsohasotherqualitiesthatdonotbelongtotheForm,thatis,nonFqualities.ThenonFqualitiesincludequalitiesboth contradictoryandcontrarytoF.AnF,then,differsfromtheFormbecausetheFormisunmixedF.13 Thereasonthataninstanceofjustice,forexample,isbothjustandnotjustisthatinstancesofjusticearealwaystiedtoaparticularcontext,aparticulartimeand place.ThejusticeofSolonistiedtotheparticularitiesofthateraofAthenianhistory.AlthoughwhatSolondidmayhavebeenjustforthatera,itisnotnecessarilyjust foranotherera.IfSolon'ssolutiontothesituationofAthensintheearlysixthcenturywereimportedinaliteralwayintofifthcenturyAthens,itwouldnotwork.In ordertobejustinthesixthcentury,thesolutionhadtobemixedwithmuchthatwasnonjust.Thenonjustisnotthesameaswhatisunjustthenonjustissimply whatisnotanessentialpartoftheFormofjustice.OnewayofpresentingthisblendofjusticewithcontextistosaythatSolonproducedanimageofjustice,onethat isanappearanceoftherealityofjustice.Indeed,itisthisambiguousaspectofinstancesofjusticethatledPlatotothinkofthemasappearancestheyhavetheability todeceivethewayappearancesdo(Rep.476c).Apreliminarywaytoappreciatethispointistorememberthatanappearancebothrevealsandconcealsreality. Therearewaysinwhichanappearanceisdiaphanousandtherearewaysinwhichanappearanceisopaque.Anappearanceofjusticeisthesame:therearewaysin whichitrevealstheFormofjusticeandwaysinwhichitconcealstheForm.Understandingtherelationoftheappearancetotherealityofjusticerevealsjustice throughtheappearancefailingtounderstandtherelationconcealsthereality.Aswehaveseen,excessiveattentiontothedetailsofSolon'sreformscanconcealjustice becauseitconcentratesattentiononwhatisthenonjustoneconfusesjusticewiththeparticularityofthereforms.Ontheotherhand,seeingSolon'sreformsasan appearanceoftheFormofjusticerevealstheForminthoseparticularlivesandfortunesoneseesthejusticethatis,asitwere,beyondtheparticularityofthereforms. Inthisway,aninstanceofjusticeislikeanappearancebecauseitbothrevealsandconcealsjustice.

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AgoodwayoftalkingaboutthewayaninstancerevealstheFormistosaythatitreflectstheForm,thewayamirrorimage,forinstance,reflectstheoriginal.It revealstheFormbecauseitisareflection.However,itisonlyareflectionandnottherealthingbecauseitismixedwithotherqualitiesthatarenotjustice.Thusit concealstheparadigmbecauseitsjusticeismixedwithotherqualitiesthattemptonetomisunderstandthetruenatureofjustice.OnlyknowledgeoftheFormof justicewouldallowonetodisambiguatejusticeintheinstancefromitscontext.Ifwesupposejusticetobeatypeofbalanceandproportionthenunembodieditwould bepurejustice.Ontheotherhand,whenitisembodiedinamaterialparticularitwouldbemixedwithwhatisnotbalanceandproportion,withwhatisbalancedand proportioned.OnewouldneedtoknowtheFormassuchtoabstractthebalanceandproportionfromitsembodiment.Errorwouldbetoidentifyjusticewiththis particularembodimentofbalanceandproportion,tofailtoseehowitisareflection. Thus,inordertounderstandimagesandtheroleofthephilosopherasonewhoproducesimageswemustinvestigatetherelationbetweenappearanceandreality.14 Inthissectionwewillexploretwoaspectsoftherelationbetweenappearanceandrealityinordertounderstandbettertherelationbetweenimageandoriginal.The firstisthewaythat,inBookVI,anappearanceisdependentonthereality.Thesecondaspectfollowsfromthefirst:thewaythatproperlyunderstandingan appearanceandthusanimageistounderstanditsrelationtoreality.ThepointofphilosophicaleducationintheRepublicistoavoidmisunderstandingtherelation betweenappearanceandreality.Misunderstandingtherelationleadsonetotakeanappearancefortherealityinthiswaytherearisesthenotionofadeceptiveimage. InBookXwewillseethewayinwhichaparticularkindofdeceptiveimagearises.Thesetwoaspectsoftherelationbetweenappearanceandrealityarethemselves related,ofcourse.IfthejusticeinsoulsandinthecityisanimageoftheFormofjusticeandiftheimageisanappearanceoftheForm,thenjusticeinsoulsandinthe cityisdependentontherealityoftheForm.JusticeinsoulsandinthecitysimplycouldnotexistwithouttheForm,anymorethanthereflectionofSimmiasinamirror couldexistwithoutSimmias.Inturn,understandingjusticeinsoulsandinthecityentailsunderstandingtheirrelationtotheForm,justasunderstandingthereflectionof SimmiasentailsunderstandingitsrelationtoSim

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mias.Moreover,beingabletoreproduceimagesofjusticealsoentailsunderstandingtherelationbetweenappearancesofjusticeandtheFormofjustice. TheRepublicmakesclearthatappearancescaneitherconcealtherealityortheycanrevealthereality.WhenPlatointroducestheFormsattheendofBookV,he saysthattheloversoftruthcantellthedifferencebetweenappearanceandreality.Theloversofsightscannottellthedifference.Thelattertaketheappearancesfor thereality.Iftheloversoftruthcantellthedifference,theycanseethewaysinwhichtheappearanceisafaithfulreflectionandthewaysinwhichitisnotafaithful reflectionofthereality.Thedeficiencyoftheloversofsightsmaybeduetotheirbeingobtuseontheotherhand,theappearancesmaythemselvesbemisleading.In anyevent,theerroroftheloversofsightsisthattheydonotseeorperhapscannotseetherelationbetweenappearanceandreality. However,itisinBookVIthatPlatoelaboratestherelationbetweenappearanceandreality.Thereheusesseveraldifferentkindsofexamplesoftherelation.Theyall emphasizethedependencebetweenappearanceandreality.TherearethetwofamousexamplesfromtheDividedLine(510a)shadowsandreflectionsinsmooth surfaces.IfweconstrueshadowsintermsoftheCavemetaphor,theshadowsarerelatedtowhatcaststheshadowinsomewhatthewayinwhichreflectionsare relatedtowhattheyreflect.Hereobjectthereshadoworreflection.Beforetheseexamples,however,thereistheexamplefromtheanalogyoftheSun(508c).Inthis passage,theimagesintheperceptualworldarenotshadowsandreflectionsbutareobjectsilluminatedbydifferentkindsoflight.First,theobjectsareilluminatedby thesunthentheseobjectsareilluminatedbythelightofthestarsandthemoon.Inthelattercase,theimagesareactuallyamixtureoflightanddark.Thereisineacha realobjectbutthetruecontoursoftheserealobjectsareshroudedinshadow.Liketheexamplesofshadowsandreflections,shadowenshroudedobjectsemphasize thecontinuitybetweenappearanceandreality.Whentheshadowenshroudedobjectisseenbysomeonewhohasseenitinthelightofthesun,itispossibleto disentanglerealityfromappearance.EventhoughtheimagesoftheSunpassagearedifferentfromthoseintheDividedLineandtheCave,thereisanimportant similarity.ThesimilaritybetweentheshadowenshroudedobjectandtheshadowsandreflectionsoftheDividedLineisthatinallof

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thesecasesthereisafundamentalrealitythatisthesourceoftheappearance.Wisdomistoseetheimagenotasthoughitwerearealityinitsownrightbuttoseethe imageasrelatedtothefundamentalreality.Toseetheshadowenshroudedobjectcorrectlyistoseetherelationbetweenshadowsandthefundamentalreality.Tosee projectedshadowsandreflectionscorrectlyistoseetheminrelationtotheirprojectingorreflectedobjects. Tothisextent,then,thenotionofFormsasparadigmsfindssupportintherealityandappearancemotifofthecentralbooksoftheRepublic.ThenotionofFormsas paradigmshastheconsequencethatFormsarerealandcopiesareappearance,andthatisjustwhatwefindinthetext.However,ifthenotionofFormsasparadigms hastheconsequencethatFormsarerealandcopiesareappearance,thisconsequenceitselfisproblematic.Thedistinctionbetweenrealityandappearanceintroduces gradesordegreesintoreality.15Somethingsaremorerealotherthingsarelessreal.SucharadicaldistinctionbetweenFormsandcopiesseemstoflyinthefaceof robustcommonsense.Foronething,weareexpectedtobelievethattheworldinwhichweliveislessthanfullyreal.Howcantheworldofourexperienceusually consideredtobetheverytouchstoneofrealitybethoughttoconsistofmereimagesofreality?Accordingtothiscriticismoftheappearanceandrealitymetaphysics, Platorequiresustobelievethatthehorses,humans,andbedsofourexperiencearenotrealhorses,humans,orbeds.Theyareonlyappearancesoftherealhorses, humans,orbeds.Wearethen,presumably,ridingaroundonmereappearancesofhorses,fallinginlovewithmereappearancesofhumans,andfallingtosleepinmere appearancesofbeds.Indeed,itmayormaynotbepossibletodefendthisinterpretationofappearanceandrealitywhenitisstatedinthissweepingway.Certainly, wewillnottry.However,anarrowerversionofappearanceandrealitymighthaveabetterchanceatplausibility. Wecanbeginbynotingthat,forthemostpart,PlatoisinterestedinFormsforcomparativeterms,includingevaluativeterms.16Thatistosay,intheRepublicPlato doesnottypicallytalkaboutFormsforsubstanceslikehorsesandhumanshisinterestislargelyintermsforjustice,good,beauty,equals,andhalves.Theseterms allowforoppositeswhateverisjustisalsounjust,forexample.Ifhisappearancerealitymetaphysicsisdesignedprimarilyforsuchterms,thenitisametaphysicsthat dealswiththeappearancesofjustice,ofgoodness,andofequals.Itdoesnot

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claim,inthefirstinstance,atleast,thattherearenorealhorsesorrealhumansonlythattherearenorealgoodthingsandnorealjustthingsintheworldofour ordinaryexperience.Wemightsaythattherearenoobjectsofrealvalueinourordinaryexperience.Horsesandhumanstheremightbe,buttheycannotbevaluablein thefullestsense.However,eventhisstatementcanbemisunderstoodunlesswearecareful.Justbecausetherearenorealgoodthingsornorealjustthingsinthe worldofourordinaryexperiencedoesnotmeanthattherearenogoodthingsornojustthingsinthatexperience.Therearegoodthingsandjustthingshowever,they arenot"goodnomatterwhat,"just"nomatterwhat,"not"goodwithoutqualification,"just"withoutqualification."17SoPlato'smetaphysicsofappearanceand realitymighthavemoreplausibilityifitisrestrictedtovalueterms,likejusticeandgoodness.Certainly,inthecentralbooksoftheRepublic,wherethemotifof appearanceandrealityisused,Socratesconcentratesonsuchnotionsasgoodnessandjustice.Inthesebooks,theimplicationisthatinourordinaryexperiencewe justdonotfinditemsthatareunconditionallygoodandunconditionallyjust. Afullertreatmentofthisrestrictedversionoftheappearanceandrealitydistinctionmustawaitchapter4andourconsiderationoftheFormofthegood.Whatwewill seethereisthatthedependencebetweenFormandwhatparticipatesintheFormhasgreatsignificanceforthewholeprojectofimitation.WhenPlatocaststhemoral lifeorpoliticallifeasoneofimitation,hehasalreadypresentedthesetwoactivitiesinanunusuallight.However,whentheimitation,whichconstitutesmoraland politicallife,producesimagesappearancesoftherealityoftheFormthesetwoactivitiesareevenmoretransformed.Thedependenceoftheseactivities,andof theirproducts,ontheFormsofjustice,moderation,andgoodnesshassuchimportantimplicationsforthenotionofimitationthatwewillexplorethemindetailin chapter4.Nevertheless,atthispoint,wecangiveageneralideaofthesignificanceofthedependencebetweenFormandwhatparticipatesintheFormforPlato's moraltheory.Inageneralandroughwaywecanexpressitsimportanceinatwopartclaim.First,thesuccessfulmorallifeis,totheoneleadingit,animageofa deepermoralrealityitdependsonthatdeeperrealitythewayanappearancedependsonitsoriginal.Sothemorallifeisbeingguidedbysomethingmoreprofound thantheconventionsofsociety,somethingthatstandsbehindthoseconventionsbutthatisnotcompletely

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capturedbythem.Second,theunsuccessfulmorallifeisalsoanimage,butanillusoryone.Theonewholeadssuchalifeisthesubjectofillusionthatperson'sisa deceptiveimage,insomesense. Wewilldevelopthefirstinchapter4whenwetreattheFormofthegood.Fornow,wecananticipatethediscussionofchapter4byquicklynotinghowthemorallife involvesimitation.Whetherinthecityorinherownsoul,thephilosophicalrulerimitatesanidealthatinthenatureofthecasecannotbefullyembodied.Thereasonis thatshelooksbeyondtheparticularinstancesofjusticeinherexperiencetojusticeitselfitistheFormofjusticethatdirectshercraftofruling.Moreover,whatshe achievesissodependentontheFormforwhateverjusticeithasthatitcanbefairlycalledan''imageoftheFormofjustice.''Asweshallsee,insteadofthis dependencybeingaweaknessforthephilosopher,itiswhatgivesherachievementstheirvalidity.Beinganimageofjusticeitselfisnomeanachievement,butitdoes affecthowonegoesaboutone'staskasweshallsee.Forthepresentwecandwellonthesecondpartoftheclaim.Ifthesuccessfulmorallifeisatrueimageofa deeperreality,thentheunsuccessfulmorallifemustbeakindoffalseimageorillusion.ItissignificanttonotethewayinwhichPlatofrequentlypresentsthetaskofthe philosopherasoneofbeingabletodistinguishtruefromfalseimages.Ifthephilosophercandistinguishtrueimagesofjusticefromfalseones,thenthenonphilosopher cannotsodistinguishorcannotdosoreliably.Itistragicforthecitywhenithasthelatterkindofrulers.Itisequallytragicfortheindividualwhocannotdistinguishin herownlifebetweentrueandfalseimages.Suchinabilitysuggeststhatthenonphilosopherisliabletochoosethefalseimageandthat,thus,theunjustorimmoderate lifeisinsomewayillusory.Itisthelatterthemewewillexploreforthepresent. Inthosethingsthataregoodandjust,theirbeinggoodorjustisdependentonrealgoodnessandrealjustice.Thisdependenceallowsonetochoosebetweenthe goodthingsandthosethatarenotgood.Onecanmakeanimportantdistinctionbetweengoodappearancesandbadappearancesthosethatarefaithful representationsoftheoriginalandthosethatarenot.Thedistinctionbetweenappearanceandreality,then,isthefoundationfortheclaimthatthereisadependence betweenappearanceandreality.Theabilitytoseethedependence,inturn,helpsonetotellthedifferencebetweengoodandbadappearances.Certainly,itisthe

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casethat,forexample,knowingtherealSimmiaswouldallowonetorecognizethatabadimageofSimmiasjustdoesnotlooklikeSimmiasaknowledgeable personwouldnotseeanimageoftheoriginalinthebadportrait.Bycontrast,thepersonwhodidnotknowSimmiasmighttaketheportraittobeafaithfulportraitof Simmias. However,thereisanotherdimensiontothebadorpoorappearanceinPlato'saccountitisalsodeceptiveinaspecialway.Theappearancethatisbadisnotjusta poorimageoftheoriginalratheritobscuresitsrelationtotheoriginalinsuchawaythatitsubstitutesfortheoriginal.Itlosesitsstatusasanappearanceandistaken tobereality.InRepublicV,forinstance,theloverofsights,takingtheappearanceofbeautytobetherealityofbeauty,iscomparedtosomeoneinadreamwho mistakesappearanceforreality(476c).ThiskindofdeceptionisnotjusttakingthepoorportraittobeafaithfulrepresentationofSimmias,forexample.Itisanother orderofdeceptionaltogetheritistoseethedeceptiveimagenotasa"goodimage"butastherealityitself.Perhapswecancallthis"substitutedeception."Plato's favoriteexampleofthiskindofdeceptionistrompel'oeilpainting,inwhichtheeyeatleastisdeceivedintothinkingthepaintingistherealthing.Theremedy,of course,istohavethepersonliabletosubstitutedeceptioncometoknowtheoriginal.Thepeasant,forexample,whotookthestatueofAthenatobetherealAthena wouldovercomethisdeceptionifheeversawtheoriginal.Ofcourse,suchistheroleoftheFormsinPlato'saccountinRepublicVknowledgeoftheFormskeeps onefromtakingappearancesof,forexample,beautytoberealbeauty.Inthepoliticalcase,theFormofjusticeservesasimilarpurpose.Thepersonwhomightbe deceivedaboutthenatureofjusticewhomighttaketheappearanceofjusticeinthecaseofSolon,forexample,tobetherealityofjusticewillberelievedofthat tendencyifheknowstheFormofjustice.Forms,then,armoneagainstthiskindofdeception. However,inthecentralbooksoftheRepublicwearenotreallytoldthewaysinwhichsubstitutedeceptionarises.Thecontextofthosebooksleavesuswiththe impressionthatdeeplyintellectualpeoplearecapableoftheintensestudyneededtodiscoverthenatureofFormsandthatsuchpeoplearenotsubjecttothe deceptionbyappearances.Thus,byimplication,thosewhoarenotcapableofsuchstudyareliabletobeingdeceived,oftakingtheappearanceofjusticeforthereal thing.Itis,ofcourse,forthis

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reasonthattheseintellectuallyinferiortypesneedthestronghandoftherulersintheirotherwisejeopardizedlives.Still,whiletheaccountisratherabstract,enforced bymetaphorandallegoryinwhichdeceptiveappearancesareshadowsandreflections,theburdenoftheaccountisthatthedefectivefacultyintheinferiorsortistheir reason. WegetadifferentaccountinBookX,whereSocratespresentsanexpandedaccountofappearancesauthenticanddeceptiveinhisfinalindictmentofthe dramaticpoets.Theyareindicatedforbeingimitators.Aswenotedbefore,inthiscontextimitationnowseemstobeusedonlyinapejorativesense,tomeanthrice removedfromreality.Elaboratingontheclaimthattheimitatoristhriceremovedfromreality,Socratestalksaboutthatpartofthesoultowhichimitationisdirected.It isthatgulliblepartthatissusceptibletoillusion.Socratescomparesthiskindofillusiontotheillusionofvisualperception.Totheeye,thesamemagnitude,when viewedcloseupandfromafar,appearsnottobeequal(602cd).Theuntutoredeye,then,issubjecttoanillusion.Ontheotherhand,therationalpartofthesoul, whichcalculates,weighsandmeasures,isnotfooledbysuchappearancesitknowsthatthedifferentappearancesareappearancesofthesamemagnitude.However, eventhoughtherationalpartdoesitsmeasuring,andthusknowsthatthemagnituderemainsthesameinspiteofitsdisparateappearances,theappearancesremain. Theeyestillseesdifferentsizeswhenlookingatthesamemagnitudefromdifferentdistances. Next,Socratesconcludesthatpainting,asimitation,dealsinappearancesthatappealtothenonrationalpartofthesoul(603b).Themissingstephereseemstobeone Socrateshaspreviouslyintroduced.At598ab,wheretheexampleofimitationispainting,hearguesthattheimitatorcanpresentonlyaspectsofanobject,neverthe objectitself.Hecharacterizesthesedifferentaspectsasdifferentappearancesoftheobjectbeingpainted.Thustheobjectappearsdifferentwithoutbeingso.Since paintingdealsinappearances,presumablyitappealstothesameirrationalpartofthesoulasthepartappealedtobythedifferentappearancesofthesamemagnitude inthepreviousexample.Aftercharacterizingimitationbyusingpaintingashisexample,Socratesthenturnstodramaticpoetry.Thisisthekindofpoetrythatimitates varioustypesofcharacters.Hewantstoarguethatittooimitatesappearances,missesthereality,andappealstotheirrationalpartofthe

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soul.However,heretheargumentisnecessarilymorecomplicated. Hestartsbysayingthatthedramaticpoetsimitatepeoplecarryingoutactions,eitherbyforceorwillingly,whothinkthemselvesdoingeitherwellorbadly,andinallof theseaffairsfeelingpleasureorpain.Thatisthewholeofdrama(603c).Thenhecomparessuchpresentationstowhatthegoodpersonwillactuallydoinsimilarreal lifesituations.Insuchapersonthereisanoppositionbetweenwhatreasonandlaw(logoskainomos)urgeandwhatfeelings(pathos)urges(604a10b1).Thelatter urgehimtogiveintohisgrievingandtoactratherthewaythatcharactersonthestagewouldact,engagingindramaticactsofweepingandwailing.Reasonurges anotherpath.Calculatingthathedoesnotknowwhatisgoodandevilinsuchthings,andthatgrievingcanchangenothingandmightevenpreventhealing,thewise mandoesnotgiveintotheirrationalpartthatlikestodwellongrieving(604be).Thepoet,ontheotherhand,playstothisirrationalpartbyrepresentingcharacters actinginwaysoppositetothewaysthatthegoodmanacts.Firstofall,thepoeticimageisonlyanappearance.Likethepainter,whocanrepresentonlyoneaspectof anobjectandnottheobjectitself,thedramaticpoetisconfinedtorepresentinganexteriorandpartialviewofhissubject(605a).Inthecaseofthedramatists,the exteriorandpartialviewpresentstheeasilyobservableemotionalbehaviorofacharacterinaplay.Thisbehaviortoofrequentlyistheexcessiveexpressionofpains andpleasurestheweeping,thecrying,thesighsofpassion.Whilethisbehavioriseasytoportray,theinnerlifeofreasonandlawusuallyexpressedbyarather undramaticexteriorcalmisnoteasilyrepresented. Moreover,thepoeticimageisdirectedattheirrationalpartofthesoul(605c).Thisisthepartthat,leftonitsown,wouldgiveintothevicissitudesoflifeitisthe sourceofexcessivecryingandgrieving.Itisthepartthattakesthevicissitudesoflifetoberealgoodandrealevil(603c).Presumably,theirrationalpartofthesoul doessobecauseitisincapableofcalculatingthetrueweightofthesefortuitousevents.Liketheuntutoredeye,theirrationalpartofthesoulissubjecttoillusion. Indeed,thisillusioncouldbeacaseofsubstitutedeceptionbecausethepoeticimage,ifsuccessful,wouldmakeonesubstituteappearanceforreality.Certainly,it posesitselfagainstthecalculatingpartofthesoulaspresentingacontraryimage,justastotheuntutoredeyetheappearancesof

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differentmagnitudesposethemselvesagainstcalculatingreason.Thepoeticimagepresentsapparentgoodagainstrealgood.Therealgoodisvirtuenotthe pleasurescausedbythevicissitudesoflife(600e).Presumably,realevilisvicenottheequallyfortuitouspain.Thedramaticpoetsthentemptustomistakeapparent goodfortherealgoodandapparentevilfortherealevil.Moreover,theapparentgoodandevilhavesuchseductiveforcebecausetheyappealtotheirrationalpartof thesoul. Inthisaccount,thedeceptiveimageisnotdeceptivejustbecausethereasonofthesubjectistooweaktocomprehendthereality.Thesubstitutionofimageforreality nowtakesplacebecauseofthepullofthedesires.Nowthedeceptiveimageisdeceptivebecauseofitsrelationtothosedesiresinthesoulthatarenotidentifiedwith reasonthatis,thedesiresassociatedwiththespiritedpartandtheappetites.18Presumably,thedeceptivepoeticimagepresentsasrealwhatthesedesires,leftto themselves,taketobereal.Theypresentasrealwhattheexcessivegriefisabout,ortheexhilaratingeroticpassion,andothersuchdesiresthat,inPlato'sscheme, shouldbemoderatedbyreason.Hereillusionisnotjustopticalillusion.19Ratheritisassociatedwiththedistortingeffectsofpleasureandpain.Theillusionworksits magicbypresentingasrealwhatthesedesires,intheirshortsightedness,sotospeak,taketobereal,justasthenoncalculatingeyetakestheappearancetobereal. Indeed,itisbecauseitworksonthispartofthesoulthatthepoeticimageissoobjectionable.Notonlydoesthepoeticimageappeal,withinthecontextofthedrama, totheirrationalpart,italsostrengthensitasaforceinone'sreallife.Socratessaysthateveninthebettersortofperson,whenthisbetterpartofhisnatureisnot adequatelyeducatedbyreasonorhabit(todephyseibeltistonhemonhateouxhikanospepaideumenonlogoioudeethei[606a78])itwilldropitsguardinthe faceofpoeticdrama(606ab).Presumably,itthenentertainsthepoeticimageandgivesintoit.Itallowsfullreintothosefeelingsthatoughtnottobeindulged.In doingsoitwatersandfosterstheirrationalpartofthesoul.Thedangerhereisthat,whenitcomestoleadingone'slife,theirrationalpartofthesoul,thusstrengthened, becomestherulerinsteadoftheruled(606e). Iftherationalpartofthesoulweretobeeducated,presumablyitwouldbeabletocarryouttherequisitecalculationsandmeasurements.Itwouldnot,then,entertain thepoeticimage

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becauseitwouldseetheimageasanillusion.Inthatregarditwouldbesimilartothecalculatingreasonthatcanidentifythesamemagnitudeinspiteofcontrary appearances.Intheuntutoredreason,however,thepoeticimageisallowedtobecomeanillusion,tosubstituteforthereality.Thus,inthisillusoryimage,whatthe irrationalpartofthesoultakestobegoodisseentobereallygoodandwhatittakestobeevilisseentobereallyevil.Whattheirrationalpartweepsoverisseento betrulyworthweepingoverandwhatitrejoicesinisseentobetrulyworthyofrejoicing.Whatisinterestinghereistheimplicationthatthecalculatingpartofthesoul, ifitwereeducatedinreasonorhabit,wouldbeabletodissipatetheillusoryimage.Presumably,thepoeticimagewouldbeliketheappearancesofthemagnitudeto theuntutoredeye.Tothepersonwitheducatedreason,theappearancesofthemagnitudewouldnotpresentaseriousrivaltowhatcalculationholdsout.Justso,to thepersonwithareasonthatcouldmaketruecalculationsaboutthevicissitudesoflife,thepoeticimagewouldnotpresentaseriouspicture.Onewouldseeitasonly anappearance,asuperficialviewofwhatlifereallyis. TofilloutSocrates'accountletusimaginetheunenlightenedspectatorintheTheatreofDionysos.Hewouldwatchatragedyandbetakeninbythedeceptiveimages ofgoodandevil.HewouldthinkthatPhaedra,tornbyherpassionforHippolytus,issufferingrealevil.Onthecontrary,ifPhaedracouldonlyrealizethatpassionfor Hippolytus,shewouldhaverealgood.Ofcourse,shecannotrealizethatpassionherbeingunabletodosoispartofhertragedy.Herlifeisdefinedbyheremotions andthevicissitudesofhumanexistencearetearingherlifeapart.Itisastrongimagethatisimmenselyenthrallingbecausethespectatorisnaturallysympatheticwith Phaedra.Heliveshislifeatthesameemotionalleveltheimageappealstothoseemotionsandthusappearsreal. However,thebettersortofspectator,althoughcapableofbeingcaughtup,andevenseduced,bythetragedy(605c),mightwellexperiencesomethingelse.What abouthervirtue?hewouldlikelyask.Whyisshenotcopingbetterwithheremotions?Whereisherselfcontrol?Theanswer,ofcourse,isthatPhaedradoes,at least,trytocontrolherbehaviorhowever,AphroditehasafflictedherwiththepassionforHippolytus.Phaedraishelplesstocontrolherpassion,evenifshehad knownthatpassion,whenitmadeitsfirstspringlikeappearance,forwhatitwasandwouldbecome.

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Shecannotresolutelysetherfaceagainstanysuchemotionshecouldnotmakeuphermind,withalloftheresourcesofherformidablestrengthofcharacter,to extirpatetherootsofherbuddingpassion.Ifthebettersortofspectator,throughlackofeducation,acceptsthispremiseletsdownhisguardthenhewilltakethe image,atleastduringtheperformance,tobereal.Hewillthenindulgetheemotionsandfeelingsasthoughtheywereappropriatereactionstothetragicsituation. Realitywouldbedefinedintermsagreeabletotheirrationalpartofthesoul.Ontheotherhand,ifhewereeducatedhewouldnotacceptthepremisenorcouldhe taketheimagetobereal.Perhapsitwouldjustnotringtruetohim.HewouldseePhaedramakingthewrongcalculation,forexample.Hemightevendeconstructthe drama,askingwhoputthenotioninPhaedra'smindthatAphroditeisirresistible.Isnotthatnotionanillusionputforthbytheerosinone'ssoulorperhapsbythe partisansoferosinthelargercultureinordertounderminereason'sabilitytocurbpassion? InBookXSocratesdoesnotfurtherelaborateonthewaythatpoeticimagesmislead.Inparticular,hedoesnotsayhowsuchimagesgenerateillusionwithinone's actualmorallife.However,inBookIXSocratesdoestouchonillusioninone'smorallife.Hemakesadistinctionbetweenpleasuresofthemindandthoseassociated withthebody.Theformerarealtogethertrueandpurehowever,thelatteraredeceptive,akindofscenepainting(Rep.583b).Thedeceptivepleasuresare deceptivebecausetheyariseinthesoulwhenthereleasefrompain,whichleadstoaneutralstate,iswronglytakentobepleasure(584a).Socratesamplifiesthis distinctionbetweentrueanddeceptivepleasuresbyarguingfortherelativerealityofthepartsofthesoulinvolvedandtherelativerealityoftheirobjects(585ae).We willnotreviewthedetailsoftheargumentherewhatisimportantforourpurposesisthatthedeceptivepleasuresgiverisetoillusioninone'slife.Thesedeceptive pleasures
engenderraginglovesforthemselvesamongthosewithoutjudgmentandarefoughtover,justasStesichorussaysthatthemereimageofHelenwasfoughtoverbythoseatTroy throughignoranceofthetruth.(586c)

Ifthepoeticimageswerewateringandnurturingthepartsofthesoulthatgiverisetothesepleasures,thentheywouldbecontributingtoillusioninone'smorallife.

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Indeed,illusionisanimportantmoralcategory.Theprospectofaloveaffair,forinstance,presentsavividimage,withitsjoys,heightsanddepths.Theprospectthat onewillnotfulfillone'sloveispainfulanddesolate.However,iftheloveaffairisnotpursuedbecause,say,itisatoddswiththecontoursofone'smorallife,the subsequentexperiencecanhaveanuncannyresemblancetoawakingfromadream.Onecanlookbackatwhatwasatemptingimageandwonderwhatwasso attractive.Comparingittoone'slifeofcontinuedvirtue,onecanactuallyfeelthewholeprospectthewouldbeloveobjectandtheentiresituationasakindof illusionforawhileone'svisionwasdistortedbysomethingthatisnowseentobewhollysuperficial.Now,atlast,however,realityhasreasserteditself.Ofcourse,itis wellknownthatillusionisgeneratedbyone'sdesires.Forinstance,itisnotoriousthattheeroticdrivemakesoneoverlookvitalfactsaboutthecharacterofone'slove objectandconcentrateonsexualcharacteristics.Theconcentrationonthesecharacteristicsbecomesafixationassuchitsubstitutesfortherealityuponwhich,for example,alastingrelationshipmustbebased.Aswell,thefixationcanobscureone'sownmotives.Suchisthestuffofcomedy.Itislikelyenoughpartofthemeaning ofOscarWilde'saphorismthattheonlywaytoovercomeatemptationistogiveintoitgivingintothetemptationsatisfyingthedesireisthebestmeansofgetting ridofit,andevenofdispellingitsillusorypower.Portrayingthispullbetweenone'ssenseofright,orsimplyone'ssenseofsoundpolicy,andone'seroticdesireasa contestbetweenrealityanddesiregeneratedillusioncorrespondswithourexperience,then. ToseetherelevanceofknowledgeofFormstothisissue,imagineaphilosopherwhoistakingstockofhissoulhethinksaboutthepossibilitiespresentedbyhis sexualpassion,eros.Herecognizesthatitispossibletofallinlovewithanynumberofpartners,thateachofthemcouldbeanexcellentlovernotjustinthesense thateachcouldbesexuallyadeptbutinthesensethateachcouldbeloving,considerate,compassionate,andexcitingtobewith,givinghimnewvistas,perspectives andinsights.Sothisphilosopherisnotthinkingaboutbriefsexualencountersratherheistalkingaboutcompleteaffairseachwithabeginning,amiddle,andanend. Ifweassumethathispartnerisalsoaneroticadept,aswellasaphilosopher,eachwillrecognizethattheaffairisnotmeanttolastforeverbuttohaveitsownnatural rhythmoflifeanddeath.Eachoftheseaffairspromisestoopenupadifferent

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aspectofhis,andhispartner's,personalitythereisaneroticexplorationthatbothseek,comingtoknoweachothersointimately.Whilemullingoverallofthese possibilities,thephilosopherbeginstonoticethatthereisagreatvarietyofinterestingpartners,promisingmanysortsoferoticadventure.Hiswholeeroticlifestretches beforehim,likeanOdyssey. Ofcourse,inPlato'saccount,thephilosophermustexercisethecraftofjusticeinhisownsoul,seetoitthateachpartofthesoulisallowedtoperformitspeculiar function.Inthefirstplace,hewouldwanttoknowhowbalancedsuchaneroticlifewouldbe,howjustitwouldbetotheotherpartsofhissoul.Inthisaccounthe wouldseethatwhathereallyproposesisalifedevotedtoarranging,having,andmanagingtheseloveaffairs.Wecanimaginethephilosopherwouldsuspectthatsuch alife,whileithasmuchtorecommendit,isnotparticularlywellbalanced.Erosmustbebroughtintobalancewithotherpartsofthesoulfirstofallwiththeother appetites,thenwiththespiritedpart,andwithreason.Eroticpursuitscannotcrowdouttheexerciseofthespiritedpartandofthereason.Butthephilosophermight wellwonderwhetheralifegivenovertoeroticpursuitswouldleaveenoughtimetothelifeofreason,withitsrigorousdemandsofstudyandthought,ortothe cultivationofthespiritedpart,whichmakesoneboldenoughtoembodywhatone'sreasondiscovers. Inthisscenario,then,thephilosopherisproposingtosacrificealifeoferoticadventureforthelifeofpsychicjustice.Heoughttobesurethatthesacrificeisrequired heshouldhavedeterminingevidenceinthecontestbetweenthesetwoprospectivelives.Wecancontrasthisdecisionwiththatofthenonphilosopherwhomightbe weighingthetwolives.Ifthenonphilosopherfeelspulledtowardjustice,heprobablyfeelspulledmoretowarderos.IfwefollowtheaccountinBookIX,thevisionof justiceinthesoulofthenonphilosopherwillbecloudedbypassions,whichwillgiverisetoillusions.ItwillseemtohimlikethetheatergoerinBookXthatthelife oferoticadventureisrealgoodandthelossoferoticadventurerealevilthevalueofbalanceandharmonyinthesoulwillappearpaleincomparisontotheotherlife. Indeed,passionateloveitsexhilarationsanditsdepths,itssighsanditsjoysmayseemmorerealthanvirtueitself.Finally,hemaysubstitutetheeroticlifeforreal virtueandcometobelievethattheeroticlifeisthevirtuouslife.Now,suppose,perimpossible,thatthisnonphilosophercouldhavethevisionofjusticeaclearintu

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itionofbalance,proportionandharmony.Moreover,thisintuition,letussuppose,issoclearthat,incomparison,thelifeoferoticadventurewillappeartobe unbalanced,disproportionate,anddisharmonious.Finally,becausebalance,proportion,andharmonyaresoattractive,theattractionoftheeroticlifewilldissipateit willnowseemillusory.Nowwecanseethatthephilosophermusthavejustsuchaclearintuitionoftheimportanceofjusticeinhissoul.Hisvisionshouldbesostrong thatitmakesclearwhatheistryingtoestablishinhissoulandwhyhemustdoso.Hemustcherishjusticeinhissoulmorethanhecherishesthemonomaniacalclaims oferos.Giventhestrongattractionoftheeroticlife,thisidealmustbeastrongerandmoreattractivecountervailingforcesostrongthatitwillshowtheeroticlifeto beillusory. Atthispointinourinterpretation,wecanperhapsseewhatPlatomeantfortheroleoftheFormasparadigmtobe.Thenativeviewsuggeststhatthephilosopherhas somethinglikeanintellectualvisionofanidealforjustice.ThisidealisanindependentFormthatexhibitsjustice.Assuchitreinforcesreason'srulebecausereasonis inspiredbywhatitsees.Whilethenotionofasoulinwhicheachpartfulfillsitsfunctionpresentsastrongcaseforacquiringjustice,theFormofjusticeengagesreason atadeeperlevel.TheFormofjusticeaparadigmthatexhibitsjusticeinitspurityandclarityisthestrongerandmoreattractivecountervailingforce.InBookXthe souloftheeducatedmancancorrectlymeasureandweightthevicissitudesoflifebothofthelatteractivitiestypicallyuseastandardagainstwhichtomeasureor weight.Thestandardtellsusthetrueheightorthetrueweight,whichdifferfromwhattheappearancesseemtotellus.WhileSocratesdoesnotmentioninBookXthe roleofFormsinthiscalculating,nowwecanseethattheFormisthestandardbywhichtomeasureandweighone'slife.Whenthephilosopherwinsthestrugglewith passionsinhisownsoul,inthisstory,itwillbebecausehisvisionofjusticeisstrongenough.Nowitisnotoriousthatsuchastrongenoughvisionofjusticeiselusive, thatpeoplearefrequentlydazzledbythevisionofpleasurethatactuallymasksinjusticebothtooneselfandtoothers.However,theresolutionofsuchbedazzlement wouldoccurifastandardweretoshowthatthevisionofpleasureisanillusion.Theveryrecognitionofthedistinctionbetweenrealityandillusionsettlestheissue.

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Finally,thisaccountjustgivenisnotthewholestoryabouttheimportanceofappearanceandrealityinPlato'saccountofFormsasparadigms.Wewillfullyaddress theissueinthenextchapter,wherewewilltalkaboutthehighestFormsgoodnessandbeauty.ForthepresentwecannotethatPlatodevelopsmostfullythemotif ofrealityandappearancewhenheintroducestheFormofthegood.Formsthusrepresentnotonlyamovementawayfromobscureappearancetowardclearreality butalsoawayfromtheappearanceofgoodnesstotherealityofgoodness.TheFormofjusticewhichtherulerusesasaparadigmisalsotherealityofwhichthe cityandthesoularecopiesbecausetheFormisrealgoodness(orasweshallseea''species''ofrealgoodness)thecityandthesoulareappearancesof goodness.Tothecontemporarymind,thisontologyisatbestcumbersome.Leavingasidealltheothermetaphysicalquestionsabout,forexample,therealityofthe perceptualworld,wemightsimplyaskwhatadvantagePlatomightthinkhecangetfromconceiving,inthisway,oftherelationbetweentheFormofjusticeandjustice inthecity.TheanswertothisquestionmustawaitourtreatmentoftheFormofthegoodinthenextchapter.However,thepreliminaryanswercanbesketched.The Formparadigmsarenotinthemselvesparadigmsfortheperceptualworld.Theyareprimarilyexemplarsofvarietiesofgoodnesstheyareintrinsicallygood,without referencetotheperceptualworld.They,asitwere,definegoodnessinthemselves.Ontheotherhand,theperceptualworldisinnocentoftrueintrinsicgoodnessand getstheintrinsicgoodnessithasbyimitatingthegoodnessintheForms.Theperceptualworldisasincapableofbeingintrinsicallygoodasthepaintingisincapableof beingtherealSimmias.However,theperceptualworld,bybeinganimageofthegood,canaffordusaccesstotheintrinsicallygood.Toaffordthisaccessisthebest thatimitationoftheperceptualworldcanoffer.However,itwouldbeamisconceptiontothinkthatitsbestissomethingmeanasweshallsee. IV Letusendthischapterbyseeinghowthenotionofimitationaddressestheproblemsencounteredattheendofthelastchapter.InthecraftofjusticefromBookIV, wefoundafulleraccountofwhat"consistencyinthesoul"meant.WhenPlatohasgiventhe

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completemoralpsychologyofBookIV,wecanseethatconsistencyisharmonyofthethreefunctionsofthesoul:thereason,thespiritedpart,andtheappetites. However,theproblemweencounteredtherewasthatitisnotsoclear,evenwiththiscompletemoralpsychology,thatthereisonlyonewaytoachieveharmony amongthefunctions.Afterall,subordinatingreasontoinsatiabledesirealsowouldachieveatypeofharmony.Then,itisnolongerclearthatalifewithjusticeinthe souloneinwhichreasonrulesisobviouslymorevaluablethanalifeinwhichinsatiabledesiresareallowedtoruletherest.Calliclesmightstilldismissthehappiness associatedwiththecraftofjusticeastoopalewhencomparedtothelifeofenormouspleasurepromisedbybecomingatyrant. ItispartoftheaimofthepresentinterpretationtohaveshownthattheaccountofFormsasparadigmsisanattempttoofferahigherorderjustificationforjusticein thesoul.InBookIVwelearnthatjusticeinthesoulisaharmonyofthepartsthatrespectsthefunctionofreasontorule.Byimplication,withthisorderinone'ssoul, insatiabledesiresmustbesubordinatetotheruleofreason.InBookVIwelearnthatthistypeofharmonyamongthepartsofthesoulisreallyimitationofthatdivine orderandharmonyfoundintheForms.WhentheharmonyofpartsofthesoulisseentobeanimageoftheorderandharmonyoftheFormofjusticethenthereisan addedargumentforthepositionthatthelifeofjusticeismorevaluablethanthelifeofenormouspleasure.Theformerisorderlyandproportionate,liketheForm,while thelatterisdisorderlyanddisproportionate. Thus,theFormstellushowtoarrangeoursoulsnotonlyinthesensethattheyareasetofinstructionswecanfollowifwesochoosetheyalsohaveacertain compellingquality.InthispassageSocratesasks,rhetorically,withrespecttothewaythatthephilosopherimitatestheFormsofjusticeandtemperance,isthereany wayforsomeonewhoassociateswithwhatheadmiresnottoimitatethatthing(500c)?ThephilosophersthusimitatetheFormsbecausetheylovethem.However, whenSocratestalksaboutthefeaturesoftheFormsthatareimitated,heseemstoshiftfromtalkingaboutjusticeandtemperancetotalkingaboutorderand proportion.WhatthephilosopheradmiresandlovesintheFormsistheirorderandproportion.Inthisway,thephilosopherimitatesthemandthusbecomeshimself orderlyanddivine.WhenimitationbecomespartofthecraftofjusticeinBookVIthereisalsoa

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curiousadditiontothelistofFormsthatareimitatedbytherulerSocratesincludestheFormofbeautyalongwiththeFormsofjusticeandtemperance(501b).Inone way,itisnaturaltoincludebeauty.Thephilosophicalrulerisbeingcomparedtoapainter.Itisthebeautyofhismodelthatthepainteradmiresandthathewishesto imitate.Thus,iftherulerislikeapainter,thenwhathelookstoasaparadigmmusthavebeauty.AddingbeautyisPlato'swayofreferringtothedeterminingfactor thatthephilosophicalrulerfindsintheForms.SoitislittlewonderthattheFormsofjusticeandtemperanceandtheothercommonvirtuesarecompletedbytheForm ofbeauty.TheirrealvalueisgroundedintheFormofbeauty. Wecannowsee,perhaps,howthisaccountofparadigmscountsagainstCallicles.Callicles'notionofthelifeofenormouspleasuremustsubordinatethefunctionsof reasonandthespiritedparttothatofthedesires.OurimaginaryCalliclesattheendofthelastchapteradmittedasmuch.IntheCallicleanideal,reasondoesnotrule becausereasondoesnotdeterminethegoalofliferatherdesirehasthisfunction.Althoughreasonisabletocalculatethelongtermbenefitsanddisadvantages,when desirerulesreasoncanonlycalculatesuchbenefitsintermsofthepleasuresofreplenishment.Reasonwouldhavetocalculatewhichcourseofactionwouldprovide themostpleasure,inintensityandinquantity.Ifsuchacourserequiredreasontogiveupthepursuitoftruthorthespiritedparttogiveupadventureasitfrequently doesthenreason,asdesire'ssubordinate,wouldshowtheway(cf.Rep.553d).Moreover,Calliclescoulddismissthecounterargumentwhoseconclusionisthat reasonshouldrule.Hecouldsaythatitisbasedontheassumptionthatitisthefunctionofreasontorule.Thelatterseemslittlemorethanthequestionbeggingclaim thatreasonshouldrule.Socrates'reply,ofcourse,isthatreasonshouldrulebecauseitknowswhatisgoodforthesoulanditsparts.However,bytheendofBook IVthisreplyislittlemorethananassertion.Ifreasonknowswhatisgoodforthesoulanditspartsbecauseofitswisdom,wedonotknowwhatwisdomis.Thus, eventothesympatheticreader,reason'sclaimtoruleisunsubstantiated. InviewofBooksVandVI,theanswertothislatterobjectioninvokestheroleofForms.Itisanalogoustotheanswertotheobjectionbroughtagainstthenotionof philosopherkings.Theanswertotheobjectionaboutphilosopherkingsisthattheir

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knowledgeoftheFormsmakesthemableandworthytorulepresumably,knowledgeoftheFormswillbestowtheknowledgeofthewaythecitymaymaintainthe bestrelationswithinitselfandwithothercities(Rep.428d).Sotoo,knowledgeoftheFormswillbestowtheknowledgeofwhatisadvantageousforeachpartofthe soulandforthewhole(Rep.442c).Presumably,thisknowledgedoesnottellthephilosophersuchthingsasthatreasoncalculatesandexercisesforethoughtforthe soulthesecharacteristicsofreasonarealreadyestablished(Rep.439dand441e).WhattheFormofjusticewouldshowisthatthearrangementinthesoulinwhich reasonrulesthatis,inwhichthecalculatingfunctionmakesthefinaldecisionsaccordingtowhatitthinksbestisthejustarrangement.Itisthearrangementthat mostcloselyconformstotheparadigmforjustice.Inthisarrangement,eachpartgetstofulfillitsfunction,andfulfillingitsfunctionseemstobewhatisgoodforeach andwhatisgoodforthewhole.Thus,ifCalliclescouldknowtheFormofjustice,hisinitialobjectionscouldbeovercome.PresumablytheknowledgeoftheFormof justicewouldgivehimadeeperinsightintotherequirementsofjustice.Hewouldseethatwhenreasondoesnotrulebutissubordinatedtothepassions,for exampleitspeculiarfunctionofcalculatingandexercisingforethoughtisnotbeingtreatedfairly,isbeingforeshortenedorstunted.Inordertobetreatedfairly,the functionofcalculatingandexercisingforethoughtmustruleitandnotappetitemustdecidethedirectionforone'slife.Aswell,hisincreasedsensitivitytotheissue ofjusticewouldhelphimseethattheindulgenceoftheappetites,inthelifeofenormouspleasure,isnotactuallytreatingtheappetitesfairly,isnotgivingthemwhatis goodfortheirownbestfunctioning.OnceCallicles'focusisshiftedfrombodilypleasureasthecriterionofjudgmenttojustice,presumablyhisassessmentofthelifeof enormouspleasurewouldchange. Thiskindofdeterminationisalmostaesthetic.WhatismissingintheCallicleansoulisacertaintypeoforderamongthefunctions.Itisasthoughonecouldlookatthe soulthewayonelooksatapainting,orasculpture,orevenaflowerarrangement.TherelationofreasontodesireintheCallicleansoulisnotanorderthatis proportionate,katalogon,tothefunctionsofthedifferentparts,whereasinthePlatonicsoultheorderisproportionate.Tosomeitmayseemtooetherealtoassessa lifefromthepointofviewoforderandharmonywithinthefunctionsofthesoul.The

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realbusinessoflifewouldseemtobemoreconcretetoinvolvetheimmediaterealitiesofsatisfyingdesires.Ofcourse,bothSocratesandCalliclesbelieveinthe importanceofsatisfyingdesiresthedifferencebetweenthetwoofthemisthatSocrates'versionofthatprojectentailsthevalueofproportionandharmonywithinthe soul.Finally,Platoseemstosaythatwhatisrealseemsetherealtomostpeopleproportionandharmony.Thisrealitymaybeobscuredbytheprospectofenormous pleasuretheappetitesmaygiverisetoanillusoryimageofthegoodonethatsubstitutesfortherealgood.Itwouldthusobscurewhatisreallyproportionateto reasonandjustforreasonthatis,ruling.Thusitwouldobscurewhatisreallygoodforthepartsandforthewhole.Ifone'svisionwereclarified,however,one wouldunderstandwhatproportionandharmonyamongthefunctionsofone'ssoulreallyare.Inturn,thevalueofproportionandharmonywouldoutweighthevalueof thelifeofenormouspleasure,withitsdisproportionanddisharmony. Nowwecanseetheimportanceofthemotifthatthelifeofvirtueisoneofimagemaking,inwhichtheimagesareappearancesoftheFormforjustice.Ifweusethis motif,theanswertoCalliclestakesonanotherdimension.Thelifeofenormouspleasureisanimagebutitisadeceptiveimageitsubstitutesforrealjusticereal virtueandgoodness.Calliclesevensaysthatthelifeofenormouspleasureisvirtueandhappiness(492c).Thisdeceptiveimage,likethepoeticimage,gainsitsability todeceivefromtheappetites.Ontheotherhand,thelifeofbalanceandproportionisanimageaswellit,however,isnotdeceptive.Thelatterimagedoesnot substituteforrealjusticeratheritfaithfullyreflectsrealjustice.Thus,evenCallicles,ifhecouldknowtheFormforjustice,wouldseethelifeofenormouspleasureas anillusion.Itsillusoryqualitywouldbeevident,itsforcedissipated,incomparisonwiththeForm.Thisresultwouldnotcomefromaprooforanargumentitwouldbe somethinglikeaninsightinwhichthevalueofthelifeofbalanceandproportionoverthelifeofdisproportionatepleasurewouldbecomesoevidentthattheformer wouldseemtobegroundedinamorefundamentalrealityandthelatterwouldseemtolacksuchgroundingthatis,tobeanillusion. Tothequestion,then,howdoesreasonknowwhatisbestforthepartsofthesoulandforthewhole,thefirstansweristhatreasonknowstheFormofjustice.The latteristheparadigmofproportionandharmony.Havingthisknowledge,reasoncanrecog

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nizethatthearrangementofthesoulinwhichreasonrulesistheonethatallowseachpartincludingreasontofulfillitsfunctionandistheauthenticimageofthe Formofjustice.Untiloneseesthearrangementinthelightofthisparadigmofproportionandharmonyonehasnotseenwhatfinallymakesitjustforthesoulandfor itsparts.IfonestayedatthelevelofBookIV,onewouldhaveseentheappearanceofjusticewithoutseeingitsrelationtothereality.Atthislevel,theeconomyof functionsappearstobejustforthesoulhowever,onlywhenoneseesthearrangementofthesoulinrelationtotheFormcanoneseethewaythisarrangement correspondstothereality.WhatwehaveyettoseeiswhyPlatothinksthattheparadigmforjusticeisalsogood,necessarilygood.Inshort,wehaveyettoseethe relationbetweenthisFormandtheFormofgoodness.Plato'saccountoftheknowledgeofwhatisbestforthesoulanditspartsisnotfinished,then.UntiltheFormof goodnessisintroduced,onecannotseethattheproportionandharmonyoftheFormofjusticeisalsogood,isnecessarilygood.Weturntothatissueinthenext chapterwherewedealwiththeFormofthegoodinBookVI. Notes 1.At472ainBookV,Socratesslowlyleadsuptohissuggestionaboutphilosopherkingsbyreflectingontheproblemofrealizingtheaccountofvirtueinthe individual.Hesaysthat,indevisingtheiraccountofjusticeinthesoul,heandhisinterlocutorswereseekingaparadigmoftheFormofjustice(paradeigmatosara heneka,end'ego,ezetoumenautotedikaiosunenhoionesti[472c45]).Theywishedtolooktowardthatparadigminordertobeabletodiscernwhetherthejust personishappyornot.Here,itisimportanttonote,theFormofjusticeisnotcalleda"paradigm"asitisinotherplaces.Rather,theaccountofthejustmanisa paradigmoftheFormofjusticenotthattheFormofjusticeisfashionedontheaccountofthejustman.Rather,theaccountisarepresentationoftheFormof justiceitisthisrepresentationthat,inturn,islookedtowardasaparadigminjudgingabouthappinessanditsopposite.Socratesthencomparestheinterlocutorstoa painterwhopaints,inlovingdetail,aparadigmofthemosthandsomeman.Suchapainterwouldnotbethoughtalesserpainterbecausehecouldnotshowthatsucha manispossible.Presumably,whatthepaintercannotdoistoshowhowsuchamanispossibleintheperceptualworldeventhough,insomesense,suchamanis possibleintheidealworld.Socratesnowturnstotheirdiscourseabouttheidealcity.Justso,inthatendeavor,

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theyweretryingtomaketheparadigm,inwords,ofagoodcity(paradeigmaepoioumenlogoiagathespoleos[472d910]).Theyshouldnotbefaulted becausetheycannotshowwhetherthiscityispossible.Thispassageisthefirstplaceinwhichtheanalogywiththepainterisintroduced.Asweshallsee,itwillbe usedagaininBookVIbutinadifferentsense.However,alreadyitshouldbesuspectedthattheanalogybetweencraftandjusticeistakingonanadded dimensionviz.,thewaythatimitationofaparadigmisanimportantaspectofcraft. 2.Forexample,twosuchdifferentinterpretersasVlastosandAllenadoptthisreadingof'is':GregoryVlastos,PlatonicStudies,chap.2(Princeton:Princeton UniversityPress,1973)R.E.Allen,"PredicationandParticipationinPlato'sMiddleDialogues,"StudiesinPlato'sMetaphysics,R.E.Allen,ed.(London: RoutledgeandKeganPaul,1965),54.Thetwodisagreefundamentallyabouttheconsequencesofthisreadingof'is',ofcourse.Thelatterholdsthat'F'hasprimary andderivativeapplicationintheprimarydesignation'F'belongstotheFormproperlyandissomethinglikeaname(46).SeealsoNicholasP.White,Companion, 160.ForanexcellentsummaryofthediscussiononthistopicseeJuliaAnnas,Introduction,195200. 3.Forinstance,somedisagreeaboutwhattheobjectsofknowledgeare.Againstthetraditionalinterpretationthatholdsthattheobjectsofknowledgeareexclusively Forms,GailFine,in"KnowledgeandBeliefinRepublicV,"ArchivfrGeschichtederPhilosophie60(1978):121139,arguesthattheobjectsofknowledgeare truthsratherthanobjects.Onecanknowtruthsabout,forexample,perceptualobjects,althoughthesetruthsaredependentonForms.SeealsoJuliaAnnas, Introduction,210.Fine'saccountmakesknowledgeinthispassageseemmoretheoreticalthanpractical.Annasmoderatesthisreadingwithwhatshesaysabout understanding,butneitherexploitsthewayinwhichknowledgeinthispassageisstillcraftknowledge,thatis,knowledgeisdirectedtowardaparadigm.Another traditionalinterpretationholdsthattheobjectsofopinionareparticulars.J.Goslinghasargued,however,thattheobjectsofopinionareparticularstakentobetypes whosetokensaresometimesFandsometimesnotF.SeeJ.Gosling,"TaPollaKala"Phronesis5(1960):116128:''What,then,isPlato'spointat476a?Surelythis: ifweconcentrateonobjectsweshallfind,notthatthereareagoodmanybeautifulones,butthatagoodvarietyofthemisbeautiful,thatobjectsofveryvaried descriptionsarebeautiful.Consequentlywhenwetrytogivesomeaccountofwhatmakesobjectsbeautifulweshallfindthatwehavetogiveavarietyofdifferent accountsandthoughwemaybesurethatwhatwepointtointhiscaseiswhataccountsforthebeautyofthis,itisundeniablynotwhataccountsforthebeautyofthis otherthing....Tapollakalaestikaioukesti,theninthesensethatthemany'things'giveninanswerto'tiestikalon'failasmuchastheysucceedandunless

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'kalos'istobesaidtobehopelesslyambiguous,ormerelysubjective,theremustbesomefurtheraccountofanallembracingkind"(12223).SeealsoF.C. White'sobjectionin"The'Many'inRepublic475a480a,"CanadianJournalofPhilosophy7(1977):291306,andGosling,"ReplytoWhite"inthesame volume,307314. 4.Cf.W.J.Verdenius,Mimesis(Leiden:E.J.Brill,1972),21:"Itmaybeconcludedthattherearetwopointsdifferentiatinggoodartfrommeretrickery:its truthfulnessanditsmodesty.Theartistshouldnotcontenthimselfwithasuperficialglanceathisobject,buthemusttrytopenetrateitsinnerstructure.Histaskis faithfulinterpretation,notslavishimitation.Secondly,heshouldhavethehonestytoadmitthepoornessofhismeansandnottrytooverstepthelimitationstheylay uponhim.Hisworkshouldclearlyshowthatitsrepresentationofreality,inspiteof,orrather,onaccountof,itsveryfaithfulness,isfundamentallydifferentfromthe realityitself.Itshouldpresentitself,notasacopy,butasatranspositiononadifferentlevelandasobedienttothelawsofthismedium." 5.RichardPatterson,inImageandRealityinPlato'sMetaphysics(Indianapolis:Hackett,1985),givesonetypeofsophisticatedreadingoftherelationbetween Formsandparticulars.HeexploitsthenotionthataparticularisanimageofaForm.Thus,heassimilatestheparadigmcopyrelationtotheoriginalimagerelation.For Patterson,theessenceofthelatterrelationisthattheimageofabed,forexample,isnotanotherrealbed.Thus,themirrorimageofabedisnotarealbedbecauseit doesnotfulfillthefunctionfulfilledbythebedproducedbythecarpenter(2021,61).Inanotherpassage,PattersonsaysthatthedreamimageofNapoleon"willnot becoloredorshapedatallinthesamesenseastheportrait"ofNapoleon(51).Indeed,hedeniesthatanyresemblancebetweenoriginalandimageisrequiredforthe lattertobeanimageoftheformer.Otherthanthedifferencebetweenoriginalandimage,Pattersondoesnotseemtoofferanyotherfeaturesoftherelationthenotion 'imageof'seemsprimitive(42).Patterson'sreasonforemphasizingthisdifferencebetweenimageandoriginalbecomesclearwhenweunderstandhispositiveaccount ofthenatureofaForm.HeholdsthataFormforFistheabstractnatureoressenceofF(6768).Whathemeansby'abstractnature'or'essence'isnotaltogether clear.Hedoesseemtothinkthatabstractnaturesarecomparableinonewayto"afixedabstractpatternorstructurewhichdoesnotexemplifyitself"(18).Ablueprint wouldbeanexampleofsuchapatternorstructure.Inanyevent,thenotionclearlyseparatesFsfromtheFormforFtheFsarenototherrealFormsofFbecause theyarenotabstractnaturesofF.Thisreadingofparadigmavoidsthenaiveview,then,becausesuchparadigmsdonothavetohavethecharacteristicforwhichthey areparadigms.Forexample,ablueprintdoesnothaveanyofthecharacteristicsforwhich

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itisablueprint.However,thereadingrunsintodifficultywithatleastoneaspectofPlato'swayofexpressingtheparadigmcopyrelation.Platoseemstoapplythe termFbothtotheparadigmofFandtoFs.Pattersonsaysthat'F'isaname(onoma)thatprimarilydesignatestheForm(71).Butifthereisnoresemblance betweentheFitselfandFs,itsoundsoddtosay'F'primarilydesignatestheForm.Compare:onemightcallablueprintofahouse"ahouse"(inthearchitect's officeonemightsay,"Lookatthishouse.").Butitwouldbeoddtosaythatthename'house'primarilydesignatestheblueprint.Surelyitdesignateshousesand, whenitisusedofblueprints,'house'reallymeans"blueprintofahouse."Somewhatthesamethingcouldbesaidforhisotherexampleofanabstractnature politicalofficesasdefinedbyacharter,forexample,dogcatcher.Surelythename(onoma)of'dogcatcher'belongstothedogcatcherandnottotheofficeof dogcatcher. 6.Cf.CharlesKahn,"TheMeaningof'Justice'andtheTheoryofForms,"TheJournalofPhilosophy69(1972):571:"Fromthephilosophicalpointofview, however,thereisnodoubtthatPlatodoesenvisagethejusticeofmanandcityasderivedfromthemoreabstractorintelligiblepatternoftheForm.Letus,exempli gratia,generalizethedefinitionsPlatodoesgiveinordertoseewhatformulahemighthavegivenfortheFormitself.Wemaysupposethatitrunsasfollows.
(J)Justiceisawellorderedwhole.

Or,morefully:
(J')Justiceisaunityofdifferentiatedparts,eachwithitsownnature,andthesepartsaresointerrelatedthateachoneperformsthetaskforwhichitisbestfitted.

SeealsoJohnCooper,"ThePsychologyofJusticeinPlato,"AmericanPhilosophicalQuarterly14(1977):155:"Somuchforwhatonemightcallthe'functional properties'ofthegooditself.Howaboutitssubstanceornature?HereSocratesisdeliberatelyleastinformative.Onemay,however,renderthiscuriousentity moreconcretebythinkingofitsomehoworotherasaperfectexampleofrationalorder,conceivedinexplicitlymathematicalterms:acomplex,orderedwhole, whoseorderlinessisduetothemathematicalrelationshipsholdingamongitsparts."AlthoughthisquotationdealswiththeFormofgood,laterweshallmakethe connectionbetweentheFormofgoodandtheFormofjustice.SeealsoF.C.White,"JusticeandtheGoodofOthersinPlato'sRepublic,"Historyof PhilosophyQuarterly5(1988):395410:''Theprincipleof'doingone'sown'notonlyatbottomconstitutesjusticeintheindividualandinsociety,butis responsiblefortheworthwhilenessofthese.Paripassu,informingthebasisofordinaryjustice,theprincipleof'doingone'sown'willengenderworthwhilenessin thistoo.Intheiressencethe

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threesortsofjusticearethesame:eachisakindoffittingness,balance,properdistributionandharmony.Anditisthisintheend,theirkosmos,whichmakesthem worthwhile"(404).Again,weseethat,abstracted,justiceisakindoforderofcourse,WhitedoesnotsaythattheFormofjusticeisabstractedorder,evenifhis accountofitiscompatiblewiththeForm'sbeingsuch. 7.TherelationbetweentheorderandharmonyofjusticeinthecityandtheorderandharmonyoftheFormisnotoneofanalogy.Theformerisnotanalogoustothe latter.Thesamecharacteristicisfoundinbothinoneitisobscureandintheotheritisclear.Similarly,theperceptualtriangleisnotanalogoustothemathematical triangle. 8.'Proportion'translateskatalogon.Thelattercanalsomean"accordingtoreason"theusualtranslation.However,"proportionate"isapossibletranslation moreover,anythingorderedaccordingtoreasonwouldbeproportionate. 9.White,Companion,inhiscommentaryon500c,takesthesameapproachtoimitation:"In500citissaidthatapersonobservingtheorderlinessoftheFormswill wishtomakebothhimselfandthecityorderlyinalikemanner.ThisstatementrevealsanimportantaspectofPlato'sviewsaboutthemotivesofhisrulers,andindeed ofanyonewhoisabletoapprehendtheForms"(173,n.D).ReevegivesaverygooddescriptionofthispsychicorderandharmonyinhisaccountofPlato's psychology.Cf.PhilosopherKings,140144. 10.Cf.Annas,Introduction,236239. 11.Anobviousconsequenceofthisaccountisthatonlythephilosophercanpracticethecraftofjustice.OnlythephilosopherhasknowledgeoftheFormsnecessary forimitatingjusticeinherownsoul.Thus,auxiliariesandartisanscannotpracticethecraftofjustice.Ofcourse,whatsortsofvirtuearepossibleforauxiliariesand artisansisanotoriousproblemintheRepublic.Ifthereistobeananswer,ithastobethattheirvirtueisparasiticonthevirtueoftherulers.Forinstance,auxiliaries arebravebecausetheypreservetheteachingoftherulersaboutwhatistobefearedandnotfeared(Rep.429c).Butrulersknowwhatistobefearedandnotfeared becauseoftheirwisdom.Thus,thebraveryoftheauxiliariesisparasiticonthewisdomoftherulers.Thetemperanceoftheartisansistheirdeferencetotheruleofthe guardianrulersandtheguardiansregulatetheappetitesoftheartisans(Rep.431be).Thustheirtemperancedependsonthewisdomoftherulers.Thechief differencebetweenauxiliariesandartisansinthisregardisthatauxiliaries(orsomeofthem,anyway)willultimatelygaintheknowledgenecessaryforthecraftof justice.Theartisansmustalwaysremaindependentontherulers. 12.Substitutingclearintuitionofaparadigmforknowledgeofgeneralprinciplescaststheissueofobjectivityinmoraljudgmentintoanentirelydifferentlight,of course.Oneoftheobviousconsequencesof

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seeingthemorallifeinthiswayisthatintuitionofaparadigmallowsforapproximationtothatparadigm.Ifjusticeisnotaprinciplebutaparadigm,thenwecan understandthephenomenonofshadingsbetweentheparadigmandthoseinstancesthatarenotfullyjust.Thus,onecanhavetheobjectivityoftheFormwithout theconsequencethatmanypeoplefeartheoverwhelmingoftheparticularityoftheindividualcase.AlthoughPlato'smoraltheoryisbeingincreasingly representedashostiletothedetailsthatarethesubstanceofhumanmorality,thenaiveinterpretationoftheFormsasparadigmspointsintheoppositedirection. 13.Cf.AlexanderNehamas,''PlatoontheImperfectionoftheSensibleWorld,"AmericanPhilosophicalQuarterly12(1975):105117:"Thusthepropertiesthat particularspossessareperfectcopiesoftheFormsinwhichtheseparticularsparticipate.Theimperfectionofthesensibleworlddoesnotconsistinthosevery propertiesthatitshareswiththeworldofForms.Itconsists,rather,inthatsensibleobjectspossesstheirperfect(thatis,exact)propertiesimperfectly"(109). NehamasseemstoassumethatparticularsaresubstanceswithpropertiestheydifferentfromFormsinthatthelatterhavetherelevantpropertiesbynecessity.See RichardPatterson,ImageandReality,16.OnecouldinterpretthispassageinawaysimilartoNehamas'interpretationwithoutassumingthatFsaresubstancesifFs areappearancesoftheFormofF,thentheywouldbeFandnotF,whiletheFormisonlyF. 14.R.E.AllenhaspointedouttheimportanceoftherealityappearancemetaphysicsfordeflectingtheThirdManArgumentinhisarticle,"Participationand PredicationinPlato'sMiddleDialogues,"inStudiesinPlato'sMetaphysics,Allen,ed.AccordingtoAllen,theinfiniteregressoftheargumentsatParmenides132a band132d133aisaproblemonlyforthosewhotakethemeaningof'F'tobeunivocal.IfFthingsandtheFormofFareFinthesamesense,thentheTMAworks. However,ifFthingsareFinasensethatisdifferentfromthewaythattheFormofFisF,thentheTMAdoesnotwork.Ofcourse,itwillnotdoforAllentosaythat 'F'isjustequivocal,meaningsomethingtotallydifferentwhenusedofFthingsandoftheForm.Hewants'F'tomarkacommunityofcharacterbetweenFthingsand theFormofF(59).Thispeculiarkindofequivocityhefindsintheappearancerealitydistinction.Thereflectionofascarfisnotascarfinthewayinwhichthescarfis ascarfthereflectionisnotevenredinthewayinwhichthescarfisred.(50)However,thereflectionsareresemblancesoftheoriginal,eventhoughtheydonot resembletheoriginal(4951).Clearly,reflectionsareappearancesofamorefundamentalrealityindeed,allappearancesincludingappearancesofFormslack substantiality,arerelationalentities(57and60).Themoralofthestory,accordingtothisinterpretation,isthatunderstandingtherelationbetweenappearanceand realityisthekeytoseeingwhyselfexemplifyingFormsarenotliabletotheTMA.WhetherAllen's

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argumentisasuccessfuldefenseofthenotionofFormsasexemplarswillhavetobeleftasidehowever,itisworthnotingthatifAllen'soranAllenlike defenseisright,itwouldlendsupporttothepresentinterpretationofthecraftofjusticeasmakingimagesthatareappearancesoftheFormofjustice. 15.GregoryVlastos,inPlatonicStudies,saysthatPlatodoesnotneedadistinctionamongdegreesofrealitybutonlyadistinctionbetweenkindsofreality."Tosee thathegottheseresultsfromadegreesofrealitytheory,whileallheneededasakindsofrealitytheory,willhelpustorecognizetheways,goodandbad,inwhich histheoryservedhim.Certainlyakindsofrealitytheorywouldhaveservedhimmuchbetterasaninstrumentofcategorialinquiry.Onehasabetterchancetoseeand statecorrectlythedifferencesbetweenparticularsanduniversals,ifoneexpectsinadvancethebothwillbeequally"real"intheirdifferentways.Forthenonewillnot betemptedtomisconstrueuniversalsasahighergradeofparticulars,orthinkofsensibleparticularsasinferior"imitations"or''copies''ofIdealForms"(75).R.E. Allen,ontheotherhand,takesthedistinctionbetweenrealityandappearanceveryseriouslyandthinksthatdegreesofrealityisessentialtoPlato'smetaphysics. "ParticularsandFormsarenotmerelydifferenttypesofthingstheyaretypesofthingsthatdifferindegreeofreality,fortheoneiswhollydependentupontheother. Particularshavenoindependentontologicalstatustheyarepurelyrelationalentities,entitiesthatderivetheirwholecharacterandexistencefromForms"(57in StudiesinPlato'sMetaphysics,Allen,ed.). 16.Cf.R.E.Allen,"ArgumentfromOppositesfromRepublicV,"inEssaysinAncientGreekPhilosophy,JohnP.AntonandGeorgeL.Kustas,eds.(Albany: StateUniversityofNewYorkPress,1972),168AnnasIntroduction,219ff.Sharvy,"Plato'sCausalLogicandtheThirdManArgument,"Nous20(1986):507 530.Aswell,inBookVII,Socratestalksaboutobjectsthatsummonthesoultodialectic.Substanceslikefingerdonotwhilecomparativeslikelargeandsmalldo (Rep.523aff.). 17.EvenSocratesissomixedwithinjusticethat,fromsomepointofview,heisunjust.ItisnotpossibletodisambiguateSocrates'justicefromitscontext.Takefor instanceSocrates'treatmentofAlcibiades,recountedbyAlcibiadesattheendoftheSymposium.ThestoryofhisattemptedseductionofSocratesisrepletewith irony.EvenPlato'srepresentationofSocratesisironic.Alcibiades'viewofSocrates'refusaltobeseducedbyhisconsiderablebeautyisthatitwasavisionof beautifulcourageofauthenticvirtue.Andyet,aswerereadtheaccount,wemightseesomethingelse,somethinglessattractive.DidSocratesleadAlcibiadeson? Didhehavetodealsoharshlywiththeyoungman,evenifhewasabsorbedinhisownbeauty?WasSocratesfairtoAlcibiades?Evensupposingtheanswerstothese questionsareallpositive,itishardlyobviousthattheyarepositive.Thereisstillsomethingambiguousabout

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Socrates'behaviorhere,somethingevendark.Attheveryleast,onewouldbeilladvisedtoattempttoreplicateSocrates'behaviorinanothercontext,with anotherselfabsorbedyoungman.Eventhebestintentionedmoralteachermightfindhimselfembroiledinadisasterifheletoneofhisstudents,forexample,carry outaplanofseduction,inordertorebuffthebeautyprofferedassomesortofmorallesson.Suchbehaviorwouldshowfartoogreataconfidenceinthejusticeof Socrates'treatmentofAlcibiades. 18.Cf.AlexanderNehamas,"PlatoonImitationandPoetryinRepublic10,"PlatoonBeauty,Wisdom,andtheArts,JuliusMoravcsikandPhilipTemko,eds. (Totowa:RowmanandLittlefield,1982),67:"Poetry,therefore,tendstoappealtotheirrationalaspectofthesoulmuchmorethanpainting,sincethedominationof reasoniswhatgivesmostpoetstheirobjectofimitation.Moreover,inthispassagePlatoseemstoopposereasonbothtospirit(thumos)andtheappetite (epithumetikon).Ithasbeenclaimedthatthisisevidencethathewasneverseriousabouttheexistenceofspiritoremotionasapartofthesoulinthefirstplace.But emotionisinfactasourceofmotivation,andPlatothoughtsoforgoodreasons.Theexplanationofwhyheopposesreasontospiritandappetitetogether,itseemsto me,issimplythathedoesnotneedtodistinguishthesetwoforhispresentpurposes." 19.ForanilluminatingdiscussionofthissectionofBookXseeElizabethBelfiore,"Plato'sGreatestAccusationAgainstPoetry,"NewEssaysonPlato,Francis JeffreyPelletierandJohynKingFarlow,eds.(Guelph:CanadianAssociationforPublishinginPhilosophy,1983),3962.

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Chapter4 ImitationandInspirationintheRepublicandtheSymposium
AtthispointinourexpositionwecanreadtheRepublicasanextendedargumentaboutthevalueofjusticeinthesoul.More,ofcourse,isgoingoninthedialogue thananargumentforthevalueofjusticeinthesoulbutatleastthatmuchisthere.Moreover,theargumentforjusticeinthesoulhasthreetiers.Thefirsttierofthe argumentBookIIIVcouldbecalled"naturalist"itarguesthatjusticeinthesoulisperfectionofitsunderlyingnature.Thus,accordingtothistieroftheargument, justiceinthesoulisgoodbecauseitperfectsthesoul'snaturalfunction.Theargumentmaynotbeexplicitlysostatedbutthesebooksareclearlyurgingthevalueof thisarrangementinthesoulbecauseoftheperfectionofitsunderlyingfunction.ThesecondtieroftheargumentthefirstpartofBookVIcouldbecalled"idealist" itstartsbyarguingthatjusticeinthesoulisachievedbyimitatingtheFormofjustice.Butthisargument,too,impliesaclaimaboutvaluejusticeinthesoulisvaluable becauseitisanembodimentoftheidealofjustice.Thesefirsttwotierspresentjusticeasacraft,botharulingcraftthatperfectsthesoulatthesametimethatitisan instanceofthatperfectionandarulingcraftimitativeoftheForms. ThethirdtieroftheargumentthelastpartofBookVIandBookVIIisthelastandhighestjustificationforjusticeinthesoul.Inthistier,Platoshowstherelation betweenimitatingtheFormjusticeinthesoulandtheFormofgoodinthistierthevalueofjusticeinthesoulisfinallygroundedintheFormofgood.Ittellsuswhy imitatingtheidealofjusticeisvaluable.Thus,whenwereachthisFormwehavereachedtheapexofPlato'sargumentforthevalueofjusticeinthesoul.Itisthistier thatSocratesgivesovertothegreatestlearning(megistonmathema),theknowledgeoftheotherFormsbymeansofknowledgeofthegooditself.Inthischapterwe willelaborateonPlato'saccountoftherelation

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betweenthegooditselfandthecraftofimitatingjusticeinthesoul. Inthefirsttier,Plato'saccountofvirtueispsychological.Inthisway,itdiffersinasubtlebutimportantwayfrommostmodernaccountsofvirtue.Modernphilosophy attemptstodefinetheactsthataremorallycorrect,byspecifyingeithertherulesuchactsshouldfollowortheconsequencessuchactsshouldprovide.Plato,by contrast,identifiesvirtuewithhavingacertaindisposition.Dispositionisdistinguishedfromactioninthattheformeristhecapacityandtheproclivitytoact,thatis,itis thesourceofaction.Thevirtueofcourage,forexample,isthecapacityandproclivitytoactincertainwayswaysnotalwaysforeseeable,notalwaysspecifiableby arule.Whatmedievalthinkerscalled"habitus,"dispositionsarewhatwemodernsmightcall"qualitiesofcharacter."Ofcourse,sincethesedispositionsnaturallygive risetocertainkindsofactions,ifoneneverperformedvirtuousacts,onecouldnotbesaidtohavethedispositionofvirtue.StillPlatoidentifiesvirtuewiththedeeper sourceoftheactionsvirtueisawayofbeingmorallyspeaking,astyleoflife.DispositionsasinnersourcesofactionareattributedbyPlatotothesoul.Asa consequence,Plato'saccountofvirtuetellsuswhatthesoulofthejustpersonwillbelike.Itisanaccountofthecharacterofthejustpersonseenfromhisinteriorlife. AsGlauconsays,"ForwhatIwanttoheariswhateach(justiceandinjustice)isandwhatpowereachhas,itselfbyitself,dwellinginthesoul,therewardsand consequencesthatfollowfromthembeingleftaside"(358b).Aswehaveseen,thisaccountisalsoanaccountofhappiness.Thepersonwhohasinhissoulthevirtues ofjustice,wisdom,courage,andselfcontrolisalsoandalwaysthepersonwhoishappyinasensethatincludesbutisnotexhaustedbyournotionofpleasure. BeforePlatocangiveanaccountofvirtueasdispositionshemustfirsthaveatheoryaboutthesoul,itspartsanditsstructure.Thiskindoftheoryissometimescalleda "moralpsychology"andtellsaboutthoseassumptionsthatamoralistismakingwhensherecommendsonewayoflifeoveranother.Generally,amoralpsychologytells ussomethingaboutreasonanditsfunctions,abouttheroleofthewill,andaboutthatrecalcitrantsourceofmostmoralconflict,thepassions.Platohassomethingto sayonallofthesesubjectswithhistripartitedivisionofthesoul. Aftergivingusthisinventoryofpsychologicalfunctions,Platoquicklyturnstohisaccountofvirtueinthesoul(Rep.441d

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448e).Virtueisthatsetofdispositionsthatperfectthesepsychologicalfunctions.Thesefunctionsbecomevirtuousbyacquiringthecapacityandproclivitytofunction wellorcorrectly.Thus,wisdomisreason'srulinginthesoulwithknowledgeofwhatisgoodforthethreepartsandforthewholeformedbythethreeparts.Wisdom isthedispositionforreasontomakelongtermpolicyforone'slifeandshorttermdecisionswithinit,armedwithinsightintowhatistrulybeneficialforreason, thymos,andthepassionsaswellasforthepolityformedbythethree.Thissortofdispositionisbestappreciatedwhenitiscontrastedwith,say,thedispositionto giveoverpolicyanddecisionstothepassions.Heedlessoftheothers,nonewithanysenseofthegoodofthewhole,thepassionsasrulersaretheverypictureoffolly. Theremaybemoretowisdomthanrulebyinformedreasonbutnotmuchmore.Ourgreatesthesitancymaybethatnoplaceisarrangedforexperienceoflife.But thenifonereallyknewwhatwasforthegoodofthepartsandthegoodofthewhole,experiencemightnotseemsogreatlyneeded.Courageisthequalityofthe spiritedpart.Whenthymosfollowstheleadofreasonaboutwhatistobefearedandwhatisnottobefeared,apersoniscourageous.Thymosbecomesvirtuous whenithabituallypointsitsaggressiveandadventurousenergiestowardsthegoalsreasonsanctions.Presumablyreasonguidesthethymossothatitisaggressive againstthepassionsandagainstotherpeopleonlywhenone'srealinterestisthreatened.Sinceone'srealinterestisone'sstabledispositiontoactwisely, courageously,temperately,justly,acourageouspersonhasthedispositiontofendoffthoseinfluencesthatwouldunderminethesedispositions.Realcourageisthe couragetopreservevirtue,thecouragetopersevereinawayoflife.Temperanceisthatconditionofsoulthatresultswhentheextravagantappetitesandtheebullient thymosarecontrolledbythewiseandnaturallymoderatereason.ButPlatohasamoreprofoundnotionofthisvirtueaswell.Oneistemperatewhenallpartsofher soulagreetoreason'srule.Oneistemperate,then,whentheappetites,forexample,areaccustomedtorecognizethatreasonknowsbestwhatarethelimitstoeach driveandtheproperbalanceamongthem.Strivingeachforitsownfulfillment,eachpassionhasthedispositiontodefertothedeeperinsightofreason. Finally,justiceisthestateofsoulachievedwheneachpartofthesoulhasthedispositiontoperformitsproperfunctionandnottointerferewiththefunctionsofthe otherparts.Inthefirst

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instance,thisvirtuemeansthattheappetitesseektheirownsatisfactionswithoutattemptingtoruleintheplaceofreason.Oneseeks,forexample,suchfoodasthe appetiteforfoodwantsinwhatevervarietyandquantityaslongasdoingsodoesnotkeepreasonfromexercisingitsbenevolentruleoverthepsychic commonwealth.Reasonmustcontrolthesesatisfactionssothatthegoodofotherappetites,ofthethymos,andofreasonitselfisachieved.However,itshouldnotbe overlookedthatjusticeworksbyimplicationinanotherdirection.Itwouldbeequallyunjustforreasontoconstraintheappetitesinfavorofitsownnarrow interests.Reasonrulestoachievethegoodofall,notjustitspeculiargood.Thus,anasceticrepressionoftheappetitesisnotatalljust,evenifoneachievedthereby thesuperficialpeaceneededbyreasontoread,study,puzzle,orcontemplate.ThisimplicationisrenderedlesssecurebywhatPlatosaysaboutsublimation.Buteven atthat,theremustbeadifferencebetweensublimationandrepression.Thelatterisclearlyunjustusageofanappetite.Suchalifewouldshowadeftnessatbeing humanthatwouldclearlybeakindofnaturalperfection.Platocallsthislife"happy"eudaimonliterallyput,itiswellgeniused.Alifelongperformanceofthissort wouldbeasgraceful,adroit,andfittingasthatofthegymnast.ItwouldbethespiritualequivalentoftheOlympicathlete.AtthislevelofunderstandingofPlato's accountofvirtueinthesoul,wemightthinkthatwehavealltherecommendationnecessary.Alifebuiltofdispositionstoperformatthislevelalifebaseduponthe abilityandproclivitytobeanOlympicheroofthespiritsuchalifeseemstohavethehighestpossiblerecommendation.Notonlyisitthemostsatisfyinglife,itisthe mostfitting,graceful,andwelldone.Butthereisanotherlevelofunderstandingofvirtueinthesoul. Thissecondlevelisthesubjectofthesecondtierofhisargument.Inthelatter,heexplainshowoneestablishesvirtueinthesoul.Theprocessisportrayedasoneof imitation.MostofthepassagesshowthephilosophicalrulerlookingtotheFormsasparadigmstobecopiedinsomeway.Whenthevirtuouspersongazesuponthe Forms,heseesidealexemplarsofjustice,temperance,andbeauty.Theyareusedasmodelsthewayapainterusesamodeltobringorderandharmonyintothe soul.BecomingandremaininganOlympicheroofthespiritisfinallybaseduponimitationoftheorderandharmonyoftheseidealForms.Inthistieroftheargument, thereasonforhavingjusticeinthesoulwould

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seemtobethatsuchanarrangementbesidesprovidingsatisfactiontoallpartsofthesoul,besidesbeingtheperfectionofallthefunctionsofthesoulisanimitation ofanorderfoundamongtheseideals.WewouldstrivetoestablishthisorderinthesoulbecauseweareinspiredbyitsperfectembodimentintheseForms.Atthis level,thewayPlatodescribesjusticeinthesoulbeginstoemphasizethebeautyofthisarrangementinthesoul.Indeed,justiceinthesoulcanbeseenasvaluablefrom thispointofviewaswell.IfthejustpersonistheOlympicathleteofthespirit,weallknowthatsporthasitsbeautifulaspectsandcanbeappreciatedpurelyfromthat pointofview.Ifthelifeofthejustpersoncouldbefrozenintoonemomentrenderedinsculptureratherthanindramaitwouldhaveallofthespiritualbalanceand harmony,energyandeasetowhichthefifthcenturyathleticstatuesarethephysicallyidealequivalent. Aswehaveseen,atthisleveloftheaccount,inBooksVandVI,themotifisthepainterandtheparadigm.Thus,itisnaturaltointroducethenotionofbeautyintothe account.Ifwetakethismotifasmorethanmetaphor,wewouldseemtohaveamplejustificationforseeingthevalueofavirtuouslifeintermsofthosevalueswecall "aesthetic"(althoughwemustbecarefultounderstandthetermsasmorethanaesthetic).Finally,however,eventhislevelofcommendationisnotenoughinPlato's account.WhiletheRepublicintroducestheideathattheFormsarebothpatternsandmotivationforembodyingthosepatterns,aswenotedinthelastchapteritisthe Formofthegood,inthefinalanalysis,thatistheultimatemotivationforimitatingtheseForms.IfweusetermsborrowedfromAristotlewecannowsaythatForms havetwofunctionsinthisaccount.Thefirstfunctionistobeakindofformalcause.TheFormofjustice,forinstance,istheformalcauseofjusticeinthesoulandin thecitybecausethephilosophicalrulerusesitastheformorpatternthatshetriestoreplicateinhersoulandinthecity.However,Formsarethefinalcausefor imitation.Thus,theseexemplarsconstitutebothasetofdirectionsandamotivation.Althoughmotivationisnotthecentralthemeofthesepassages,itisnevertheless present.Notonlydoestheexemplaractasamodelofwhatistobeimitatedbutitshowswhatistobeimitatedasmoreattractivethananyalternative.Inthe Republic,Plato'sexemplarsforvirtuearetheFormsofjustice,temperance,andbeauty:

Page184 ...lookingtothosethingswhicharewellorderedandremainthesamealwaysandseeingthatneitherdotheytransgressupon,norsuffertransgressionby,oneanotherthey areorderlyandproportionateheimitatesthemandmakeshimselfaslikethemaspossible.Ordoyouthinkthatthereisanywayforsomeonewhoassociateswithwhathe admiresnottoimitatethatthing?(500bc)

Plato'sintroductionofthegooditselfemphasizesanddevelopsthenotionthatFormsinspireimitation.ThephilosophicalrulerwantstoimitatetheFormsbecauseof theirgoodness.Asweshallsee,thereisasenseinwhichthegooditselfisthatforthesakeofwhichthephilosophicalrulersimitatetheFormofjustice,forexample. Thus,Platointendstodevelopamoreprofoundargumentastowhyjustice,order,andharmonyaregoodinordertoexplainwhytheseidealsinspirethephilosopher toimitatethem.So,itisnowtimeforustolookatimitationandtheFormofgood.Herewetakeupthethirdtieroftheargument:thefinalreasonforimitatingthe Forms. I AfterelaboratingtheanalogybetweentherulerandpainterinBookVI,Platoisreadytointroducethegreatestlearningthedisciplineofdialecticthatleadsuptothe Formofthegood,thatFormthatcompletesthelearningoftheruler.AfterexplainingwhyinAthensphilosophicnaturesarecorrupted,Socratesdisconcertshis interlocutorsbysayingthat,intheidealcity,philosopherkingswillbetestedfinallybymeansofthisgreatestlearning.Whenheisquestionedaboutthegreatest learning,SocratessaysthatitisabouttheFormofthegood.ThenhedeliversanexplanationofwhylearningabouttheFormofthegoodisimportant.Sincethis explanationformssomethingofanintroductiontothepassagesabouttheanalogyoftheSun,theDividedLine,andthesimileoftheCave,thetendencyistooverlook itinordertoconcentrateonthelatterpassage.However,itwillrepayustoconcentrateinsteadontheexplanationitselfasanintroductiontowhatwehavecalledthe "thirdlevel"ofthisaccount. Ingeneral,wecansaythattheFormofthegoodisimportantbecause,withoutit,wecannotrealizeanybenefitfromtryingto

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bejust.Thus,assoonasheintroducesthenotionthatthehighestlearningistheForm(idea)ofthegood,Socratesadds,
bywhich(thatis,theFormoftheGood)justthings,andalltheotherthingsundertakenbecomeusefulandbeneficial.AndnowsurelyyouknowthatIamgoingtotalkaboutthis [learning]and[say]that,whenitcomestoit,wedonothavesufficientknowledgeofthis[Form].Further,ifwedonotknow[it]then,evenifwefullyknewtheotherthings(scil. justthings)withoutthis[Form],yourealizethatitwillbenefitusnothing,justasifwepossessedsomethingwithoutitsgoodness.(505a)

Thecontextmakesclearthatthe"justthings"aretheaccountofjusticeinBookIV.Socratesissayingthattheaccountofjusticeinthecityandinthesoulmayseem impressivetohishearers.However,withoutknowledgeoftheFormofgood,thisknowledgeoftheaccountsofjusticeandtheothervirtueswillnotbebeneficial. Inshort,SocratesiswarninghishearersthattheaccountinBookIVisnotcomplete. Moreover,wehavejustseenintheimmediatelyprecedingparagraphsofBookVIthatestablishingtruejusticeinthesoulandinthecityisaccomplishedbyimitating theFormofjustice.Indeed,almostallcommentariesfailtonotesufficientlythatthehighestlearningisintroducedtocompletetheaccountoftheknowledgeofForms thatthemselveshavebeenintroducedasparadigmsforimitation.Weshouldconcludethatthehighestlearningisintroducedinordertoroundoutwhatthephilosopher needstoknowtobesuccessfulinimitatingtheFormofjustice.Indeed,thesubsequentpassagestheSunandDividedLinetellusthatknowledgeofallother Forms,presumablyincludingtheFormofjustice,dependsonknowledgeoftheFormofgood.SinceitseemssafetoassumethatimitationoftheFormofjustice dependsonknowledgeoftheFormofjustice,imitatingtheFormofjusticewouldthendependonknowledgeoftheFormofgood.1 Moreover,thisimplicationis onethatPlatowouldhaveexpectedhisreaderstomake,giventhatimitationistheimmediateconcernbeforetheintroductionoftheFormofthegood. Inwhatfollows,then,weshalltreattheFormofthegoodashavingaroletoplayinthephilosopher'staskofimitatingtheForms,bothinherownsoulandinthecity. Asweshallsee,however,therearetwoaspectstotheroleoftheFormofgoodinimitatingtheFormofjustice.Thefirstaspectisepistemologicaland

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thesecondiscausal.Besidesbeingnecessaryforunderstandingandthusimitatingjustice,theFormofgoodisalsothesourceofgoodness.Thislatterclaimisdifferent fromtheepistemologicalone.ItisnotjusttheclaimthatonemustknowtheFormofgoodinordertoimitatejustice,itistheclaimthatthegoodnessofimitatingjustice dependsnotonlyontheknowledgeoftheonewhoimitatesitbut,apartfromthatknowledge,itdependsontheexistenceoftheFormofgoodness.Whatevergood comesfromimitatingtheFormofjusticedependsnotjustepistemologicallybutontologicallyontheFormofgood.TheFormofgoodnessisanepistemological paradigmofgoodnessforthephilosophertoimitatetheFormofgoodnessisatthesametimethecontinuingcauseofgoodnessinthatwhichthephilosopher produces.InwhatfollowsweshallseethatbothoftheseaspectsareimportantforunderstandingtheroleoftheFormofgoodnessinimitation. Firstofall,wewilltracetheepistemologicalroleoftheFormofthegood.Thenwewillturntoitscausalrole.Thelatter,asweshallsee,isthesameasthetheoryof participation,themostimportantimplicationofPlato'stheoryofForms.Asmightbeexpected,thesetwoaspectshaveimplicationsforoneanother.Thechief implicationforourpurposesiswhatthesetwoaspectscantellusaboutthemotivationofthephilosophicalruler.Asweshallsee,thetwoaspectsgiveusanimportant insightintowhythephilosophicalrulerimitatestheFormsbothinhersoulandinthecity.Infact,thisinsightwillhelpusaddressthatnaggingproblem,thereluctant philosopherofBookVIIthatis,thephilosopherwhoisreluctanttoreturntothe"cave,"totakeupthetaskofrulinginthecity. Wecanbeginwiththeepistemologicalaspect.Itis,insomeways,themostobvioustousitistheoneoutlinedinthosefamouspassagesfromBookVI,theanalogy oftheSunandtheDividedLine.IntheSunpassage,theFormofgoodiscomparedtothesun.Justasthesunshedslightonvisibleobjectstomaketheeyestosee them,sotheFormofgoodmakestheotherFormstobeknownbyreason.Astheimagesoflightandshadowindicate,theemphasisisonepistemologicalaspectsof thischiefForm.Inlookingatvisibleobjectsilluminatedbythesun,weseeclearly.Justsowhenwelookonintelligibleobjectswheretruthandbeingshineforth(hou katalampeialetheiatekaitoon[508d5]),wegrasp,know,andhaveunderstanding.IntheDividedLine,Socratesoutlinesdivisionsofepistemicallygraspable objects,fromthedimmestto

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theclearestfromimagesandreflectionstovisibleobjects,tomathematicaltruths,finallytotheFormsthemselves.However,knowledgeoftheselatterisconditioned onattainingknowledgeofthegooditself.InthislastsectionoftheDividedLine,reasonitselfgrasps,bymeansofdialectic,whatwereuptothispointungrounded assumptions,treatingthemnowassteppingstones

andgoingrightuptothebeginningpointofall,whichisnotitselfanassumption.Therereasongraspsthisbeginningpoint,andlayingholdofthosethingsthatpertaintoit, reasonproceedsdowntoitsconclusion,notbywayofvisibleobjects,butbywayofForms,andthroughForms,toForms,concludinginForms.(511bc)

ThenotoriouslydifficultpassagesinwhichSocratessetsforththeSunandDividedLinecannotbeadequatelydealtwithinshortcompass,ofcourse.However,ifwe stayonacertainlevelofgenerality,onethingseemsobvious.Atthislevelofgenerality,theSunandDividedLinepassagesseemtosaythatonecannotgraspwhat FormsareunlessonefirstgraspsthecentralForm,thegooditself.Thisgeneralclaim,however,mustnotbereadasonesimplyaboutpropositions.Admittedly, Plato'slanguageintheDividedLinetemptsustothinkthatthegooditselfisamathematicalaxiomfromwhichtheexistenceandnatureoftherestoftheFormscould bederivedbyalogicallydeductivemethodasthoughthegoodwereaparticularlyrichproposition.TheSunpassagereinforcesthattemptation.Thereasonthatwe aresotemptedisthatPlatoseemstobetalkingaboutnecessaryrelationsbetweenthegoodandtheotherForms.Tothecontemporaryphilosophicalunderstanding, necessaryrelationsexistonlybetweenpropositions.However,thegooditselfisnotapropositionitisanentityinitsownrightthathas,nevertheless,whatseemtobe certainnecessaryrelationstootherentitiesthatis,theotherFormsrelationsimpliedbytheupwardmovementofdialecticandthedownwardmovementthrough Forms.Moreover,thatnecessaryrelationshipisintheorderofvalue.ThegooditselfstandsinsomesortofnecessaryrelationtotheotherFormsbecauseeachof themisnecessarilygoodandthegooditselfdefinesgoodness. SotherearetwoaspectstotherelationbetweenthegooditselfandtheotherForms.First,itisanecessaryrelationsecond,itisarelationthatdefinesthevalueofthe otherForms.Thetwoaspects

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oftherelationarethemselvesinterrelated.Firstofall,wecanseethatthenecessityoftherelationisboundupwiththegoodnessoftheForms.IfSocrateshadsaid thatwecouldnotunderstandthegoodnessofthejustitselfwithoutunderstandingthegooditself,therelationbetweenthetwomightnotbethoughttobenecessary. Suppose,forinstance,thatgoodnessisnotanecessarypropertyofjusticethenitsrelationtothegoodwouldnotbeanecessaryone.Thedialecticiancould understandthejustitselfwithoutunderstandingitsgoodness.ButPlatosaidthatwecannotunderstandthejustitselfwithoutunderstandingthegooditselfasthough goodnesswereanessentialpropertyofthejustitself,butonethatcannotbegraspeduntilwehadgraspedthegooditself.Giventhisroleofthegooditselfin understandinganessentialpropertyofthejustitself,wesaythattherelationbetweenthetwoisanecessaryonebutitisanecessaryonebecauseitisarelationshipin theorderofvalue.ItisasthoughPlatowantedtosaythattheotherFormsparticipateinthegooditselfbuthedidnotwanttoimplythattheotherFormsparticipatein thegooditselfinthewayinwhichperceptualparticularsparticipateinForms.Perceptualparticularsare,ofcourse,onlycontingentlygood.However,theotherForms arenecessarilygood.Thus,therelationoftheotherFormstothegooditselfisnotcontingentbutnecessary.WhileitisnevereasytosaywhatPlatomeanshere,of course,thereisacertainsenseofitthatissuggestiveforthenaiveview.Fundamentally,itcomestothis:(1)thegooditselfisintrinsicallygoodinsuchawaythatit definesintrinsicgoodnessfortheotherForms(2)whenwecometograspthisintrinsicgoodness,weunderstandthatorhowtheotherFormsforexample, justiceare,bynecessity,intrinsicallygoodandthusunderstandthemfully. ItisaviewlikethisthatGerasimosSantassetsforthinhisbook,PlatoandFreud.ClaimingthatPlatoconceivedofFormsas''idealexemplarsorparadigms,self exemplifyingorselfpredicating,''SantasdistinguishesbetweentheproperandidealattributesofaForm.Forexample,theproperattributeofthebeautifulisbeauty itsidealattributesarethosesharedbyallForms.Inturn,hesaysthattheFormofthegood"istheformalcauseofalltheotherFormshavingtheiridealattributes...." Inturn,
TheidealattributesofalltheotherFormsareproperattributesoftheFormoftheGoodor,theFormoftheGoodconsistsintheidealityoftheForms.Soconceived,eachForm otherthan

Page189 theFormoftheGoodisthebestobjectofitskind,anditissuchbyvirtueofparticipating(fully)intheFormoftheGood.
2

Bycontrast,thegoodnessofperceptualparticularsiscausedbyalesserparticipation,orresemblancetosomedegree,inthegood. Onthenaiveviewbeingdefendedinourinterpretation,ifthejustitselfisanabstract,butreal,proportionateorder,then,onceweunderstandthegooditself,we understandthatthisproportionateorderisbynecessityintrinsicallygood.Itisnottheintrinsicgoodbutitisatypeofintrinsicgood.Insayingthatitisatypeofintrinsic good,weshouldnotthinkthatthejustitselfandtheotherFormstogetherconstitutethegooditselforthatthegooditselfisagenusofwhichtheotherFormsare species.ThegooditselfisstillaForminitsownright,besidetheseotherForms. GiventhisaccountoftherelationbetweentheFormofgoodandtheFormofjustice,wemightbetemptedtoconcludethattheroleoftheFormofgoodinimitationis confinedtobeingsomethinglikeahighersetofinstructions.BothFormsareintegrallyrelatedaspatternsforimitation.TheFormofjusticetellsthephilosopherwhat justiceistheFormofgoodtellsthephilosopherhowtheFormofjusticeisgood.Thus,theimitationisgoodandthusisafaithfulimitationofjustice.Presumably,the Formofgooddoeshavethisepistemologicalrole.However,ithasanotherdistinctiveroleitisalsothecauseofgoodness.Atfirstonemightbetemptedtothinkthat itsepistemologicalroleisthesameasitscausal.Afterall,ifonedependsontheFormofgoodforinstructionsaboutimitation,insomesensethisFormiscausal.Itis causalinthesensethatitcausesthegoodofjustthingsbymediationthroughtheagencyoftheonewhoimitatestheForm.However,thesenseinwhichtheFormof goodiscausalisdistinctfromthisepistemologicalcausalrole. Inthequotationfrom505awecanseeareferencetothisdistinctcausalrole.Atfirst,thepassageseemstoimplythattheonlyrolefortheFormofgoodis epistemologicalsincethepassageemphasizestheneedforknowledgeoftheForm.However,thepassagesaysmorethanthat.Theopeningsentencedoesnotsay thatitisbytheknowledgeoftheideaofthegoodthatjustthingsbecomeusefulandbeneficialasthoughknowledgeoftheideaofthegoodisonlyasetof instructionsfortheonewhoimitatestheForm.Itsaysthatitisbytheideaofthegoodthatjustthingsbecomeusefulandbeneficial(epeihotigehetouagathouidea

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megistonmathema...heidedikaiakaitallaproschresamenachresimakaiophelimagignetai[505a24]).IntheGreek,thegrammarofthesentencemakes clearthatthereisadirectcausalitybetweentheideaofthegoodandthejustthings.Again,attheendofthepassage,wehaveareferencetothecausalroleoftheidea ofgood.Iftheroleoftheideaofgoodwereonlyepistemologicalthenwewouldexpectthesentencetosaythatknowledgeoftheideaofthegoodprovidesuswith theknowledgeofjustthingssothatwewillknowhowtousethemsothattheywillbebeneficial.Insteadthesentencesaysthatknowledgeofthejustthingswithout thisFormthatis,ideaofthegoodwouldbelikehavingthejustthingswithouttheirgoodness.Whilethesentenceisconsistentwithanepistemologicalreading,itis alsoconsistentwithacausalreading.InthisreadingtheFormofgoodisthecauseofgoodnessinthejustthingsthus,toknowthejustthingswithoutthisFormisto failtoobtainthegoodnessofthesethingsasthoughknowingthecauseofgoodnessisapartofhavingthegoodnessofjustthings.Thiskindofclaimisdifferentfrom sayingthatknowingthecauseofgoodnessisnecessaryforproducinggoodnessratherthiskindofclaimmakesthecauseofgoodnessmoreintegraltothegoodness ofjustthings.TheFormofgoodislikeacontinuingsourceofgoodnessinthejustthings.Knowingthiscontinuingsourceisintegraltohavingthegoodnessofthese justthings. Thereis,obviously,aspecialsenseofthenotionofcauseatworkinthesepassages.SincethissenseofcauseisessentialtounderstandingtheroleoftheFormof goodnessinimitation,wewillspendsometimein,first,explicatingitand,then,showingthatitoccursinRepublicVIandVII.ThecausalroleoftheFormcanbe summedupinthiswaytheFormofgood,byitselfbeinggood,causeswhatevergoodnessthereis.Indeed,thistypeofcausalityisPlato'sfamousdoctrineof participation.ThisfundamentalprincipleofparticipationisfoundinthePhaedo(100c):"IfanythingisbeautifulbesidestheBeautifulitself,itisbeautifulonlythrough participationintheBeautifulitself."Thisfamiliarstatementimplies(1)thatthebeautifulitselfisbeautifulindeed,perhapstheonlyauthenticallybeautifulthingand(2) thatallotherbeautifulthingsarederivativelybeautifularebeautifulonlybyparticipation.Thus,onlythebeautifulitselfisnotderivativelybeautifulmoreover,without thebeautifulitselftheresimplywouldnotbeanythingthatisbeautiful.3

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Inordertounderstandfullythedependenceofallotherbeautifulthingsonthebeautifulitselfwemustunderstandthecontextinwhichthedoctrineofparticipationis introduced.ThispassageinthePhaedobeginswithamethodologicalreflectioninwhichSocrateshassaidthathisinvestigationintothecausesofcomingtobeled himtothemethodofhypothesis.Accordingtothismethod,firstofallhewouldpositastrue,orhypothesize,apropositionhejudgedtobe"thestrongest."Thenhe would"acceptastruewhateveragreeswith(symphonein)"thehypothesis(100a).RichardRobinsonarguesconvincinglythatPlatomeant"acceptastruewhatagrees with''asawayofreferringtodeducingthelogicalconsequencesofthehypothesis.4 Afterthismethodologicalreflection,SocratesstateshishypothesisthatForms exist,"Thereexiststhebeautifulitselfbyitself,thegood,thegreat,andalltheothers"(100b).Thenthefirstconsequenceofthehypothesisisthedoctrineof participation.WhatispeculiaraboutthisprogressionofthoughtisthenotionthatparticipationisaconsequenceoftheexistenceofForms.Atfirstglance,itisnot obviousthatparticipationshouldbeaconsequence.Afterall,evenifwesupposethatthebeautifulitselfexists,evenifwesupposethatthebeautifulitselfisperfectly andunqualifiedlybeautiful,itdoesnotfollowthateveryotherbeautifulthingmustparticipateinthebeautifulitself.Itwouldseempossiblethattherecouldbe imperfectlybeautifulobjectsnotrelatedtothebeautifulitselfbyparticipationtherecouldbeimperfectly,andindependently,beautifulthings.Thedifferenceintheway inwhichthebeautifulitselfisbeautifulandtheotherbeautifulthingsarebeautifuldoesnotbyitselfseemtoimplyparticipation.However,Socratestalksasthough participationisanecessaryconsequenceofthenotionofForm.ItisasthoughtheFormofbeautyisbeautifulinsuchawaythatitwouldbeimpossibletothinkofit withoutrealizingthatallotherbeautifulthingsarebeautifulonlybyparticipation.IftheFormisunqualifiedlyandperfectlybeautiful,thenwewouldsaythatitis impossibletothinkoftheFormasunqualifiedlyandperfectlybeautifulwithoutrealizingthatallotherbeautifulthingsarederivativelybeautiful,orbeautifulby participation.SotheFormofbeautyisnotjustinstrumentallyvaluable,asameansforidentifyingthebeautifulthingsorasameansformakingbeautifulthings.Itis intrinsicallyvaluablebut,moretothepoint,itisintrinsicallyvaluableinsuchawayastobealsothesourceofvalue.Thebeautifulitselfisintrinsicallybeautifulitdoes notdependonanything

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elseforitsbeauty.Itisalsothesourceofbeautybecauseitisbeautifulinsuchawayastobethecauseofbeautyinallotherbeautifulthings. IfwereturntotheRepublicwecanseethatthecausalroleofthegooditselffitsthisdoctrineofparticipation.Ifweapplyparticipationtothegooditself,weseethat therearetwocorollariestothisapplication:(1)thegooditselfistheonlyauthenticgoodnessand(2)allothergoodthingsaregoodonlyinaderivativeway.They derivetheirgoodnessfromthegooditself.Whatfollowsfromthisclaimisaviewofvaluethatisstrangetoourearsandsometimeshardtounderstand. Letusbegintheaccountofcausalitywiththefirstpartoftheclaimonlythegooditselfisauthenticgoodness.Inasubsequentpassage,Socratessaysthatwhenit comestojustthings,manypeoplewillchoosewhatseemsjust.

However,whenitisaquestionofgoodthings,nooneissatisfiedtopossesswhatseemstobegood,buteveryoneseekstohavewhatisreallygood,shunningtheseeminggood immediately....Indeed,eachsoulseeksthisgoodanddoesallthatitdoesforitssake,diviningthatitisreal,butactuallybeingatalossandnothavinganadequategraspof whatitis,nordoesthesoulhaveastablebeliefaboutit,asitdoeswiththeothers(scil.thejustthings),andbecauseofthissituationitfailstoget(apotugchanei)whatever benefittheremaybefromtheseothers....(505de)

Therearetwowaystoreadthispassage.Oneistoreadtheprojectoffindingthegooditselfasaprojectoffindingtheconceptordefinitionbywhichwecanidentify thosethingsinourperceptualworldthatcountasauthenticgood.Theotheristoreadtheprojectoffindingthegooditselfasaprojectoffindingathingthatis authenticallygood,andthusoutsideourperceptualworld.Asweshallsee,Socratespresentsthegooditselfnotasameanstothisrealauthenticgoodbutasidentical withit.5 Thosewhoseekauthenticgoodness,notseeminggoodness,areactuallyseekingthegooditself.Thegooditselfisatoneendofthecontinuumfrom appearancetoreality.Thegooditself,thus,willsatisfyalongingthattheappearancesofgoodwillnot.Thelongingisnotsimplyanepistemologicallongingforatrue accountofgoodness,noralongingforauthenticgoodnessinthisworldmadepossiblebyknowingtheFormofgoodness,butalongingforthegooditself.

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ThattheFormofgoodandnotaperceptualgoodiswhateveryoneseekswhentheyseekgoodnessisshownbytheinterveningpassagewhereSocratesassesses twoviewsofthegood(505bc).Whilehesaysthattheseviewsaremistaken,itisinstructivetoseehowtheseviewsaremistaken.Firstofall,Socratessaysthatmost peoplethinkpleasure(hedone)isthegood.Thereisinthisadmittedlymistakenopinionatleastthesuggestionthatthemanyseethegoodassomethinggood.Since, however,somepleasuresaregoodandsomearebad,thisopinionofthemanyiswrong.ThesecondopiniongivenbySocratesisthatofthebetterpeople,whosay thatknowledge(phronesis)isthegood.WhileSocratesdoesnotsaythatthesepeoplearewronginthisopinion,hedoessaythattheopinionisnotveryilluminating because,whenelaborated,itturnsouttobetheopinionthatknowledgeofthegoodisthegood.Whatweneedtoknow,however,isthisgoodofwhichthe knowledgeisthegood.Theproblemhereisnotjustoneofbeggingthequestion.Rather,theproblemcouldbestatedinthisway:ifknowledgeofthegoodisthe good,thenitisparasiticonthegoodforbeingthegood.Thus,thevalueoftheknowledgeofthegoodisnotfundamentalassuchitcannotbethegood.6 Inreferringtothesetwocandidatesforthegood,SocratesrecallsforustheearlierdiscussioninBookIIofthatwhichisgoodinitselfandthatwhichisgoodinitself andinitsconsequences.ThemanyidentifythegoodwithpleasureinBookII,simplepleasurewasanexampleofsomethinggoodinitself.Thebetterpeopleare identifyingthegoodwithknowledge,whichinBookIIwasamongthosethingsthataregoodinthemselvesorgoodinthemselvesandintheirconsequences.The mistakeofthesepeopleinBookVIisnotinthinkingofthegoodasgoodinitselforasgoodinitselfandinitsconsequencestheirmistakeisthattheyhaveidentified thegoodwiththewrongitem.Whilethegoodisgoodinitselforgoodinitselfandinitsconsequences,itisnoteitherpleasure,whichisgoodinitself,norknowledge, whichisgoodinitselfandinitsconsequences.TheintroductionoftheFormsintothedialoguehasintervenedsincethediscussionofBookII.So,thereasonthat pleasureandknowledgewillnotdoascandidatesforthegoodisthatneitherisgoodinitselfandinitsconsequencesinthewayinwhichtheFormofgoodisgoodin itselfandinitsconsequences. Inthesemistakenopinionswecanseeacommonassumption.Thegooditselfissomethingthatisgood.Moreover,incomparing

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ittotwoitemsthatarethemselvesgood,Platoisimplyingthatthegooditselfisagoodthingliketheseonlybetter.AsaForm,itissomethingthatisperfectlyand unqualifiedlygoodinitselfunlikepleasure,forexample,whichissometimesgoodandsometimesbad.Further,unliketheknowledgeofthegood,thegooditselfwill beperfectlyandunqualifiedlygoodinitselfandgoodinitsconsequences.Thus,thegooditselfisthetrueobjectofpeoplewhoareseekingthegood.Wealsofindthe secondaspectofparticipationintheRepublic.Thegooditselfalsohasacausalrole.Ofcourse,intheSunpassage,thereisthemysteriousreferencetothegooditself beingthecauseoftheexistenceandbeingoftheotherobjectsofknowledge.Lessmysterious,butperhapsmoresignificant,isthesummationofthethreepassagesin BookVII.HereSocratesquicklysaysthattheCavepassageistobecomparedtotheSunpassage,therealmofsightbeingthesituationofthoseinthecaveandthe realmofintelligencebeingtheupperworld.Summingallofthisimageryup,hesays

...havingbeenseen,theFormoftheGoodrequirestheconclusionthatitisitselfthecause(aitia)forallthingsofallthatisrightandbeautiful.(517c)

Thus,therelationofallothergoodthingsincludingjusticeinthesoulandinthecitytothegooditselfmustbeoneofeffectstocause,astheuniquesourceof goodness.7 Thiskindofcausalityisastrangetypeofcausalityindeed,astrangetypeofeffect.Usually,wethinkofcauseandeffectasbeingontologicallyindependentofone another.AcausesBbutaftercausingB,AcanceasetoexistwithoutjeopardizingtheexistenceofB.Forinstance,thecarpentercausesthetabletoexistwhenthe carpenterdiesthetabledoesnotceasetoexist.However,inthetypeofcausalitythatPlatoistalkingabout,causeandeffectarenotontologicallyindependent.Ais thecauseofBinsuchafashionthatifAdidnotexist,BwouldnotexistbutmoretothepointifAceasedtoexist,Bwouldceasetoexist.Itisinordertoportray thiskindofcausalitythatSocratesusesthelanguageofappearanceandreality.Infact,thelanguageofappearanceandrealitybecomesprominentintheRepublicat thepointwhereheintroducestheFormofthegood.Atthatpoint,thegoodbecomestherealitybehindtheappearances.Thereasonisnotdifficulttosee.Ifweare talkingaboutacontinuingcause,onewhosedisappearancewouldmeanthedisappearanceoftheeffect,agoodway

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ofexpressingsuchacauseisbythenotionofappearanceandreality.Forinstance,therealscarf,ifitweretodisappear,wouldmeanthatthereflectionofthescarf woulddisappear.SotheuseofthelanguageofappearanceandrealityisanotherindicationofthekindofcausalitySocratesisattributingtotheFormofthegood. PerhapswecanunderstandthisdependencebetweentheFormofgoodnessandallothergoodsinanotherway.Wecanusethenotionofthegoldstandard.Under thegoldstandard,goldisthestandardofvalueforallpapercurrency.Tounderstandthevalueofadollar,orapound,oradrachmaonehastotranslatethevalueof eachofthesecurrenciesintoacertainweightofgold.Ofcourse,anAmericancouldsellherdollarstoaBritishsubjectinexchangeforpoundswithoutfirstbuying goldandthenusingthegoldtobuypoundshowever,itwouldbeunderstoodthatwhatgaveeachofthecurrenciesvalueatallwasthepossibilitythateachpartnerin theexchangecouldexchangethecurrencyforgold.Thereisasense,then,inwhichthevalueoftheothercurrenciesisdependentonthevalueofgold.Withoutgold thesecurrencieswouldbevalueless.Inturn,onthistheory,goldisnotdependentinthiswayonanyothercurrency. Ofcourse,manypeoplewouldattributethisfunctionofgoldtoconvention.Wejustdecidetousegoldasthestandardofvalueforothercurrencies.However,ifone iscompletelyinthegripofthegoldstandardtheory,hewoulddenythatthegoldstandardisjustaconvention,thatwehavejustdecidedtousegoldasthestandard forallothercurrencies.Rather,suchapersonmightargue,goldinfactistheonlyvaluethatstaysconstantovertheyears,peoplewhoholddollars,orpounds,or drachmasfindthatthesecurrencieslosevalue.Butpeoplewhokeeptheirassetsingoldfindthattheyneverloseanyvalue.Thevalueofallothercurrenciesfluctuates thevalueofgolddoesnotfluctuate.Suchapersonmightconcludethat,whenitcomestocurrencies,goldisintrinsicallyvaluablebecauseitistheonlythingwhose valueremainsconstant.Inturn,onemightgoontosaythat,withoutgold,thevalueoftheothercurrencieswouldcollapse.Theywouldlosetheirvalue,wouldbecome "worthlesspaper."Onemightevensaythatwithoutgoldtherewouldbenostandardofvalueofcurrenciesinthemarketplace.Withoutthegoldstandard,thevalueof othercurrencieswouldvanish.Imightagree,forexample,toexchangemydollarsforyourtomatoesatacertainrateof

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exchangebutwithoutthegoldstandardyouhavenoguaranteethatthenextpersonwillexchangeherokraforyourjustacquireddollars.Thus,ascendingtothe leveloftheoryagain,onemightconcludethat,bybeingintrinsicallyvaluable,golddefinesvalue.Withoutit,therewouldbenovaluetocurrency.Thus,becausegoldis theonlythingwithintrinsicvalue,allothercurrenciesderivetheirvaluefromgold. ReasoninganalogoustothatofthegoldstandardtheorycanexplainPlato'snotionthatthegooditselfisthesourceofvalue.Ofcourse,itsvalueisnotthatofthe marketplace.Indeed,theanalogywillseriouslymisleadunlesswepurgeitofoneimportantfeatureofthemarketplacethewayinwhichgoldcanbeexchangedfor othergoodswemustconfineourattentiontotherelationbetweengoldandpapercurrencies.Ifwedoso,thegooditselfislikethegoldstandardforeverythingof value.Thevalueofallothergoodsfluctuatesthevalueofthegooditselfisconstant.Thegooditselfisconstantbecauseitisperfectlyandunqualifiedlygoodinitself. Nothingismorevaluable.Underthegoldstandard,thereisalsoadependencybetweengoldandtheothercurrenciesbecausetheothercurrenciescanbeexchanged forgold.Ofcourse,nosuchexchangetakesplaceinthecaseofthegooditself.However,somethinganalogoushappenswiththegooditselfandothergoods.In Plato'saccount,whenoneknowsaboutthegooditself,onenecessarilycomparestheothergoodstothegooditself.8 Inourexperience,goodnessissounstablethat withoutthecomparisontothegooditselfwecannotgraspwhetheritispresentornot.Weneedthegooditselftobeablereliablytoidentifygoodinourexperience. Buttheobscurityhereisnotjustepistemological.Theproblemisnotjustthatthereisauthenticintrinsicgoodnessinourexperiencethatisobscuredinsomewayfor example,bysomeinterveningmedium.Thegoodnessofourexperienceisitselfontologicallyobscured,sotospeak,becausenothinginourexperienceisauthentic intrinsicgoodness.Itisallunstableandincomplete.Likethepapercurrencies,thegoodthingsinourexperiencehavenoauthenticintrinsicgoodness.Whatgoodness theyhaveisthereonlybecauseofitsrelationtothegooditself.Aswithpapercurrency,weseethatallothergoodnessmustbeseenasdependentontheintrinsic goodnessofthegooditself. ToseewhatisatstakeherewemightaskwhyPlatomighthavethoughtthatthereisnoauthenticintrinsicgoodnessinour

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world.Whensomethingisintrinsicallygood,itsgoodnessisnotduetoanotheronecouldsaythatitisunconditionallygood.9 Itisgoodnomatterwhatisaddedor subtractedgoodnomatterwhat.However,theredonotseemtobeanycandidatesforthetitleofunconditionedgoodamongthosethingswefindintheperceptual world.Somethings,insomeaspects,forsomeperiodsoftime,seemtoqualifyforexample,love.Butloveisnotanunmixedgoodindeed,thatmaybeitssecret attraction.Anothercandidateforintrinsicgood,pleasureis,ofcourse,notoriouslyunreliable.Weknow,forinstance,thatitsgoodnessisnotdurable.Moreover,its constantrepetitionwillpall.Nothinginourexperienceisunconditionallygoodgoodalways,fromallaspects.Sothatwhichiscompletelyandfullygoodinitselfhas tobeanimprovementoverallthosethingsinourworldthatcountintheirqualifiedwayasgooditwillbesomethingoutsideourexperienceofthegoodthingsofour world.Platoisclaimingthatbesidesthegoodsofourexperience,whichareambiguousandtransitory,theremustbeagoodthatisunconditionallygood.Ashesaysin BookVI,apartfromtheappearancesofgoodthereistherealgoodwemightsaythegoodnomatterwhat,thealwaysgood.LiketheFormofbeautyinthe Symposium,theFormofgooddoesnotcometobeorpassaway,doesnotgrowordiminishitisnotgoodfromonepointofviewandbadfromanother,goodto onepersonandbadtoanother,goodatonetimeandbadatanother. Thisunderstandingoftherelationbetweenthegooditselfandthegoodthingsofourperceptualexperienceissomewhatdisconcerting.Justhowdisconcertingcanbe seenifweinspectoneofitsimportantimplications.Ifthegooditselfisthesourceofgoodness,theknowledgeoftheFormdoesnotjustallowustodiscernbetter amongimages.Theknowledgeofthegooditselfnotonlyshowsphilosopherswhichimageisclosertotheidealand,thus,howbettertoimitatetheForms.Italso showsthatthegooditselfismorevaluablethananyimage.10Thegooditself,asthesourceofgoodnessintheimage,isnecessarilymorevaluablethantheimage.In ananalogousway,goldisnecessarilymorevaluablethanthepapercurrency.Whatwouldfollowfromthisrelationbetweensourceandimageisthat,ifonehasto choosebetweenimageandoriginal,onewouldchoosetheoriginal,thatis,thegooditself.OnemighthesitatetoreadintothecentralbooksoftheRepublicthis understandingoftherelationbetweenthegooditselfand

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goodthings,withitsimplicationabouttherelativevalueofthegooditselfandgoodthings.Nevertheless,thisveryrelativevaluationisfoundinRepublicVII,inthe famousCavepassage.Inthisallegory,thephilosopher,ofcourse,ascendstothevisionofthegooditself.Ratherthanimmediatelyreturningtothecavethatis,the actualcityandtheimagesofreality,thephilosopherwantstocontemplatetheFormsthemselves(519d).Thephilosopherdoesnotwanttoruleatallhemustbe madetodoso.Wemustbecarefulnottomaketoomuchoutofthispassage.Plato'smaininterestistoshowacontrastbetweenthoserulerswhowanttoruleand thosewhodonot.Thelatter,accordingtoPlato,aretheoneswhoshouldrulebecausetheirmotivationsarepure.Still,asthecontrastshows,thephilosopher understandsthatultimatelythetruevalueofgoodthingsisfoundinthegooditself.Thathehasthisunderstandingisshownbythefactthat,lefttohimself,the philosopherwouldnaturallychoosetocontemplatethegooditselfratherthanlookatimagesofthegooditself. Incidentally,ifthegooditselfwerejusttheconceptofgoodness,somethingthathelpsustounderstandthegoodnessofourperceptualworld,thereluctanceofthe philosopherswouldbeafoibleinsteadofarealtemptation.Ifthegooditselfwereonlyaconcept,thenthephilosopherwouldbeonewhojustlikestheworldof theory,ofconceptsandtheirconnections,insteadofpracticalapplication.Hewouldbelikethemathematicianortheoreticalphysicisthewouldprefertheactivityof theorizingtothatofapplication.However,Socratespresentsthephilosophernotasonewholovestheactivityoftheorizingovertheactivityofpracticebutasonewho lovestheobjectofhisphilosophyovertheobjectsintheperceptualworldbecausetheformerisrealgoodnessandthelatterimage. Platoshowsusthatthephilosopherunderstandsthisfeatureofhissituation.Returningtothecave,thephilosopher'seyesaredimbecauseofthedarknessbutonce hiseyeshavegrownusedtothedarknesshewillhaveanadvantage(520c).Thephilosopherwouldbeabetterrulerbecausehewouldhaveabetterinsightintothe daytodayissueshecanseemoreclearlywhenjusticeisatissue.However,evenatthisjunctureintheargument,theabilityoftherulersisnotjustepistemologicalit isnotjusttheabilitytodiscernwellamongimages.Italsoimpliesthatthephilosopherknowswhatistrulyvaluable.Socratescontraststhephilosophicalwiththe nonphilosophicalrulers:

Page199 Inthisfashionthecitywillbegovernedbyusandbyyou,aswaking,notasinadream,asnowmanycitiesaregovernedbythosewhofightshadowsandraisefactionsagainst oneanotherinordertorule,asthoughthiswereinrealityagreatgood.(520cd)

Thecontrastbetweenthenonphilosophicalandthephilosophicalrulerisclearlythatthenonphilosophicalrulers,lostinaworldofshadows,takerulingtobeagreat goodinrealitywhereasthephilosophicalrulerknowswhatthegreatgoodinrealityis.Thephilosophicalruler,notmystifiedbyshadows,doesnotmistakerulingfor thegooditself.Presumably,thenonphilosophicalrulerisnotawarethattheimagesareimagesthusthereferencetothedreamingstate,firstmentionedinBookV, wheretheonewhomistakestheimagefortherealityissaidtobeinadreamingstate.Ontheotherhand,thephilosophicalrulerwouldbeimmunetothatkindof mistake.Hewouldunderstandtheimagesintheirproperrelationtothegooditself.Understandingtheproperrelation,thephilosophicalrulerunderstandstheirrelative worth. Ifthispassageconfirmstheaccountofthecausalroleofthegooditself,italsoimpliesdisasterforPlato'swholeprogramintheidealcity.Ifthegooditselfismore valuablethananyofitsimages,thephilosopherhasgreatmotivationtoremainwiththegooditselfandtoavoiditsimages.Ifremainingwiththegooditselfmeans contemplatingtheForm,thenthephilosopherswouldpreferalifeofcontemplation.ButiftheyremainincontemplationoftheForm,theycannotexerciseruleinthe city.Thenthewholeprojectoftheidealcityfallstotheground. II WehavereachedanoddpointinboththeRepublicandinourinterpretationoftheRepublic.Weintroducedthecaseofthereluctantphilosopherinorderto substantiateouraccountofthecausalroleoftheFormofthegood.Thelatteristhecauseofgoodnessbecauseitisitselfgood,indeedtheepitomeofgoodness.The textcorroboratesthelastpartofthisclaimbysayingthatthephilosopherwouldprefertoremaincontemplatingtheFormofgood.However,theaccountofthecausal roleoftheFormofgoodwasalsosupposedtoilluminatethewaythatthephilosophicalrulersimitatedtheFormintheirrulinginthecity.Theprospectsforillumination aresuddenlydimmedbywhatwassupposedto

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corroborate.TheFormofthegoodissogooditappearstomakerulingunattractive.Insteadofhavingacausalroleinimitation,theFormofthegoodseemsto militateagainstimitation.Thusitsexplanatorypowerseemstopointintheoppositedirection.SothedisasterforPlato'saccountoftheidealcityhasaparallelinthe disasterforouraccountofthecausalroleoftheFormofthegoodinthephilosophicalrulers'imitationoftheForm.Fortunately,theparallelturnsouttobehelpful. Indeed,recognizingthedisastrousconsequenceforhisaccountoftheidealcity,Platoimmediatelylaunchesintoanargumenttocounteractit.AlthoughPlato's argumentisultimatelydisappointing,exploringitwillproveimportantforouraccountofthecausalroleoftheFormofthegoodinPlato'smoraltheory.Bylooking closelyatthisargument,wewillbeabletodevelopouraccountofthewayinwhichtheFormofthegoodistheultimatecauseofthephilosophicalruler'sactivityof ruling.Whatwewillfindisthattheargumenthasattractedtheattentionofseveralcommentators,someofwhomhaveattemptedtosupplementitwithother arguments,drawnfromotherpartsofthedialogues.Asweshallsee,onetypeofthesesupplementaryargumentswhichwewillcallthe''expressive"or"creative" argumentwillprovevaluableinexplainingthecausalroleoftheFormofthegoodinimitation.Ineffect,wewillofferanewversionoftheexpressiveorcreative argumentonethatincorporatesimitationandthecausalroleoftheFormofthegood. WecanbeginwithPlato'scuriouslydisappointingargument.Socratessaysthatinactualcitiesphilosophersarejustifiedinavoidingthetasksofruling.Suchcitiesdo noteducatenornurturethephilosopherssothatthelatterdonotoweanydutytothecity.Intheidealcity,however,thecityhaseducatedandnurturedthe philosophersthustheargumentseemstogotheyareobligatedtoundertakethetaskofruling(520bc).Theconclusionisthatthephilosopherwillassumeruleas aresultoftheargumentbecausetheargumentwillbeproposingjustthingstojustpeople(520e).Thus,theargumentassumesthatthecountervailingmotivationofthe philosopheristodowhatisjust.Themotivationisnotexplainedfurther,althoughitissupposedtoovercomethecontrarymotivationtospendone'slifecontemplating theForms. ThisproblemofthereluctantphilosopherformssomethingofacruxininterpretationsoftheRepublic.SomebelievethatitshowsPlato'saccountoftheidealcitytobe incoherent.11Philos

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opherscanbeeitherhappyorjust,butnotbothcontrarytothecentralclaimthatthejustperson,andonlythejustperson,ishappy.Evenamongthose commentatorswhowishtodefendPlatoagainstthechargethathisaccountoftheidealcityfallsapartatthiscrucialpoint,therearemanywhofindSocrates'argument unconvincing.Theytrytosupplementitinvariousways.Someofferwhatwecancalla''prudentialdefense"insomesenseoftheterm,itisprudentialforthe philosophertoassumerule,eventhoughitismoreattractive,insomeothersense,forthephilosophertoremaincontemplatingtheFormofgoodness.12Forexample, Socratesmeansforthephilosophertohaveanexpandedsenseofherownwelfarethatincludesthewelfareofthoseforwhomsheassumesruleinthecity.However, othersarguethatthephilosopherismotivatedtorulebyacreativeorexpressiveurge.13Intheseaccounts,thephilosopherhasaneedtocreatevirtueorjustice. Thus,notonlyisthephilosophermovedtocreatejusticeinherownsoul,butinthoseofothersandinthecityingeneral.Obviously,ifthiscreative,expressiveurgeis notonlyamotivation,buttheleadingmotivation,ofthephilosopher,thenshewouldhaveanexcellentreasontoreturnfromcontemplatingtheFormofgoodnesstothe tasksofestablishingvirtueinthecity. So,havingarrivedatthisinterpretativecrux,weare,oddlyenough,nowinthepositiontotakeupthediscussionoftheFormofgoodnessandimitationinthecentral booksoftheRepublic.Inparticularwewanttoseehowthephilosophercomestoseethiscreativeorexpressiveroletobesocentralastorequirehertogiveup contemplationofthegooditselfinordertocreategoodnessinthecity.Whatwewillseeisthatthecreativeorexpressiveurgeinthephilosophicalrulerisbest explainedbythecausalroleoftheFormofthegood.Inthisexplanation,theFormofthegoodcausesthephilosophicalrulertoexpressorcreategoodnessbothinthe cityandinthesoul.Tobeginwith,theexpressiveorcreativeurgeofthephilosopherfindsadequategroundinginBookVI,wherethenotionofimitationisintroduced forthefirsttime.Indeed,theproblematicpassageinBookVIIistied,byimplication,tothispassage.Intheproblematicpassagewearetoldthatthephilosopheris alreadyajustperson.Presumablythephilosopherwouldalreadybejustandthusliabletodothejustthingbecausehehasalreadyestablishedjusticeinhissoulby imitatingtheFormofjustice(500d).However,ifwecanmakethisassumptionwecanalsoofferanotherargumenttoshowthatthephilo

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sophicalrulerhasgoodreasontoassumeruleinthecity.Inessence,theargumentsaysthatthephilosopherhasastrongmotivationtoestablishjusticeinthecity becausedoingsoisanimitationoftheFormofjustice.SuchanargumentwouldbeanextensionofRepublicVIwhereSocratessaysthattheFormisapatternfor imitationbothinthesoulandinthecity(500dff.).NotonlyareFormspatternsforimitation,theyarealsomotivation.Talkingabouttheimpactoftheknowledgeof theFormsofjustice,temperance,andbeautyonthephilosopher'ssoul,Socratessaysthatthephilosophermustimitatewhatheadmires.Thenecessityforsuch imitationisstatedinaparticularlyemphaticway.Whilethisinspirationisdirectedtowardthesoul,thereisnoreasontobelievethatitisnotalsodirectedtothecity. 14Inthenextsentence,Socratessaysthatthephilosopherwillbeequallyaseffectiveasacraftsmanofthecitypresumablynotonlybecausehehasthesame knowledgebutalsobecausehehasthesamemotivationtoimitatetheForms. Thus,thephilosopherwouldhavesomemotivationfortakingupthetaskofrulinginthecity.HecannothelpbutimitatewhatheadmiresheadmirestheFormof justicesohecannothelpbutimitatetheFormofjusticeinhisownsoulandinthecity.Ofcourse,suchanargumentissomewhatformalsincewedonotyet understandwhyhismotivationforimitatingwhatheadmiresissostronginthephilosopher.Wewouldliketoknowmoreaboutthephilosopherandhismotivations. Indeed,whathashappenedsincethisaccountinBookVIistheintroductionofthegooditself.OnewouldexpectthattheintroductionoftheFormofthegoodwould giveussomefurtherinsightintothephilosopher'sreasonsforimitatingtheForms.Ifanything,thenotionofthegooditselfoughttomakeclearertheroleofFormsas motivationforimitation.Ifthephilosophercannothelpbutimitatewhatheadmires,certainlyhecanadmirenothingsomuchastheFormofthegood.However,inthe RepublicPlatodoesnotgiveusanaccountofthewayinwhichtheFormofthegoodmotivatesimitation.YetitoughttoroundoutthenotionoftheFormofjusticeas amotivationforimitation.ItwouldseemreasonabletosupposethatthephilosophicalrulerisultimatelymotivatedtoimitatetheFormofjusticebytheFormofgood. SincetheFormofjusticeisanidealtypeofgoodness,thephilosophicalrulerwishestoreplicatethatjusticebecauseitisanidealtypeofgoodness.Thisreferenceto goodnessasthesourceofmotivationisseeninthecreation

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accountoftheTimaeus(29e).TheDemiurgoswishestheCosmosheisabouttocreatetobeasgoodaspossiblethushechoosestoimitatethebestpossibleForm. Desiringthegoodforherownsoulandforthecity,thephilosophicalrulerwillbemovedtoimitatetheFormofjusticebecauseofitsrelationtotheFormofgood.The Formofjusticeistheparadigmofgoodnessforthesoul,bothaspatternandasmotivation. InthiswaytheFormofgoodnesswouldcompletetheclaimmadeinBookVIthatthephilosophermustimitatewhatheadmires.Indeed,thosecommentatorswho exploitthenotionoftheexpressiveorcreativeurgeofthephilosophicalrulersagreethatthefinalmotivationforestablishingjusticeinthesoulorinthecityisthatdoing soinstantiatesgoodnessandthatthefinalmotivationforthephilosopheristoinstantiategoodness.15However,withthenotableexceptionofRichardKraut,these commentatorsdonotpaymuchattentiontothenotionofimitation.KrautmaintainsthatPlatomeantforthephilosophicalrulersnotonlytoknowtheFormsbuttolove andimitatethemaswellapositionthatcorroboratestheinterpretationofferedhere.16Inwhatfollowswewillembellishtheseaccountsbydevelopingthenotionof imitationandbylookingatadimensionofthatnotiontowhichthesecommentators,includingKraut,donotpayattention.Wewishtolookatthewayinwhichthe Formofgoodnessinspiresimitationthroughitscausalrole.Ineffect,weareofferinganewversionoftheexpressiveorcreativeaccountofthephilosophicalrulers. ThenewversionisbasedontheclaimthattheFormofgoodnessisthefinalcauseofimitation.However,itisimportanttoappreciatethesenseinwhich,inthis account,thegooditselfisthefinalcauseforthephilosophicalruler.InthefollowingwewillconstructanaccountofwhatitmeanswhenwesaythattheFormof goodnessisthefinalcauseforimitation.Wecanbeginbynotingthatwhatthephilosopherwantsisthathersoulandhercitybeasgoodaspossible.Inthisdesire,she ismotivatedbyselfinterest,presumablyshewantsthebestforhersoulandhercitybecausetheyarehers.However,inouraccount,beyondthissortofselfinterest thereisanothermotivation.Sincethephilosophicalrulerhasnoindependentknowledgeofwhatthebestis,shemustlooktothegooditself.Thegooditselfisthebest toutcourt.Thus,itshowsherwhatthebestis.Itisanimportantpartofouraccountthatbecausethegooditselfisthebestitalsoinspiresherina

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certainway.Wemightsaythatthegooditselfbecauseitistheepitomeofgoodnessdeservesorrequiresinstantiationordissemination.Thephilosophernow desiresnotonlytoknowgoodnessbuttopropagategoodness.Thusshenotonlywantstounderstandthegooditselftheepitomeofgoodnessforherselfbutshe wantsherselfandotherthingstoparticipateinit,tohaveashareinthegooditself.Ifthephilosopher'smotivationistoembodyjusticeinthecityandhersoul,this motivationhasapeculiardependencyonthegooditself,then.Thegooditselfseemstobetheultimatejustificationfortheprojectofbringingjusticeintothecityand soul. Thegooditselfasfinalcauseofimitationhastwoaspectsthen.ThetwoaspectscorrespondroughlytothetwosensesoffinalcauseinAristotle'sMetaphysics,Book XII,chapter7(1072b15).Thecontextistheexplanationofthewaythattheunmovedmoveristhecauseofmotion.Aristotlereflectsonthenotionoffinalcauseand howitmightapplytounchangingthingsliketheunmovedmover.However,finalcauseseemstohavethesenseofsomethingtobeachievedthissenseoffinalcauseis foundinPhysicsII(194b30)wherethefinalcauseofwalkingistobehealthy.Thissenseisnotappropriatetounchangingthingsliketheunmovedmoverbecause nothingaboutthemcanbeachieved.Asthoughheweretryingtoaddressthisproblem,Aristotleclaimsinchapter7that'finalcause'hastwomeanings:thegoodfor somethingandthegoodasobjectofdesire.TheformersenseistheoneexemplifiedbyPhysicsIIhealthisthefinalcausebecauseitisthegoodfortheonewho walksthegoodtobeachieved.However,nounchangingobjectincludingtheunmovedmovercanbefinalcauseinthissensebecausenothingaboutitcanbe achieved.Thus,theunmovedmovercanbefinalcauseonlyinthesenseofobjectofdesire,wherethedesirecanonlyadmireandnotchangetheobject.Thesetwo sensesoffinalcausedonotseemunrelated.Thattheobjectofdesirewouldinspireonetodosomethingelsebesidessimplyadmiringtheobjectisanaturalenough motif.Thustheobjectofdesireasfinalcausemightinspireonetopursuewhatcanbeachievedasfinalcause.Indeed,inthetraditionalreadingofthispassage,the unmovedmovercausesmotionintheouterspherebecauseitisfinalcauseinthesenseofobjectofdesirethedesireoftheoutersphere.Theunmovedmoverispure contemplation.Unabletoengageinthatactivity,theouterspheredoesthenextbestthingitimitatestheobjectofitsdesire

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ineternalcircularmotion.17Inthisreadingthetwosensesoffinalcausearelinkedthedesirefortheunmovedmoverfinalcauseasobjectofdesiregivesriseto eternalmotionfinalcauseasthegoodforsomething,aswhatistobeachieved. WhilethedetailsofAristotle'sphysicsarenotrelevanttoPlatometaphysics,thetwosensesoffinalcausecanbeadaptedtoexplicatetheroleofthegooditselfas motivationforthephilosophicalrulers.Inouraccount,thegooditselfisfinalcauseinthesensethatitistheobjectofadmiration.ImitatingtheFormofjusticeisfinal causeinthesenseofthegoodtobeachieved.Thelinkbetweenthesetwoaspectsrequirestwoassumptions.First,heradmirationforthegooditselfisaninspiration forthephilosopherinitsheseesthenecessitytodisseminategoodness.Second,thephilosophercomestoadmiretheFormofjusticeinthesamewaybecauseofits necessaryrelationtothegooditself.OncethenecessaryrelationbetweenthegooditselfandtheFormofjusticeisrecognized,thephilosopherseekstoimitatethe Formofjusticeoutofadmirationforthegooditselfanditsnecessarydependency,theFormofjustice. Inwhatfollowswewillexplicatebothaspectsoffinalcauseandtherelationbetweenthetwo.Inthefirstaspect,thegooditselfisanobjectofadmiration.Itsbeing suchanobjectisanimplicationofthenaivetheoryofForms.Inthenaiveview,thegooditselfisnotjustaninstrumentalvalue.Itisnot,forexample,aformulathat showsusqualitiesthatweknowotherwisetobegood.Norisitschieffunctionasanaidinfindingorproducinggoodnessinotherthings.Whileitis,infact,usefulfor producinggoodness,itspropergoodnessisnotinstrumentalitisgoodinitself,unconditionallygood.Thephilosopheradmiresthegooditselfbecauseitis unconditionallygood.Ofcourse,thisaspectistherootoftheproblemofthereluctantphilosopher.However,theaccountbeingofferedhereisthatthisadmiration givesriseto,evenexpressesitselfas,thedesiretodisseminategoodness.Thisdesirearisesbecausethegooditselfshowsthenecessitytopropagategoodness.Ifone understandsthegooditself,oneunderstandsthenecessitytodisseminategoodnessand,thus,onedesirestodisseminategoodness.Inthiswayadmirationforthe gooditselfovercomesthereluctanceofthephilosopher.AlltalktothecontraryisPlatonicrhetorictoshowthatthephilosopherisaworthyrulerbecauseshedoesnot wanttoruleasindeedshedoesnot,inthesensethatwouldmakeheranunworthyruler,eveninouraccount.This

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admirationthatgivesrisetothedesiretodisseminateisalreadyfoundinBookVIwhenSocrates,talkingabouttheForms,askswhetheritispossibletoadmire somethingwithoutimitatingit.Ifonetakesthisfeatureofthenaiveviewseriously,onecanseeitsaffectsonthesecondaspectofthegooditselfasfinalcause.We havesaidthatbecausethegooditselfisunconditionallygood,itrequiresdisseminationorpropagationhowever,itisnotdisseminatedassuch.Ratheritis disseminatedinitsvarious"types"andtheFormofjusticeisoneofitstypes.Thus,imitatingjusticeisawayofinstantiatingordisseminatinggoodness.Finallyone imitatesthejustitselfbecause,initsintegralrelationtothegooditself,thejustitselfrequiresdissemination.Inthisaccount,thejustitself,becauseofitsrelationtothe gooditself,issuitableforcopyingbecauseitisgooditisnotgoodbecauseitissuitableforcopying.NowwecanseethereasonthattheFormofjusticemustbeself exemplifying.Inthisaccount,theFormofjustice,becauseofitsnecessaryrelationtothegooditself,exemplifiesgoodness.IftheFormofjusticewereauniversal,a formula,orablueprintforjustice,itishardtoseehowitcouldexemplifygoodness.Auniversaltellsusaboutgoodnessaformulahelpsustoidentifygoodnessa blueprinttellsushowtoconstructgoodness.Noneoftheseexemplifiesgoodness,exceptperhapsinsomenonrelevantwaybybeingagooduniversal,goodformula, orgoodblueprint.Rather,inthenaiveview,iftheFormofjusticeexemplifiesgoodness,itdoessobyexemplifyingjustice. ThissenseoftheFormofgoodnessasfinalcauseforimitationoffersawayofunderstandingthecausalroleoftheForminimitation.Thephilosophicalruleristhe agentwhomakesthecitytobegoodbymakingittobejust.However,ifthecityorthesoulisgood,itisgoodonlybyparticipationinthegooditselfthegooditselfis thusdirectlycausal.Thephilosophicalruler,then,makesthecityorthesoultobegoodinawaythatisconsistentwiththefactthateachparticipatesinthegooditself. Giventhedoctrineofparticipation,thisaccountofimitationisnotsurprising.Ifeverythingthatisgoodisgoodonlybyparticipationinthegooditself,itwouldfollow thatifjusticeinthesoulorinthecityisgood,itisgoodonlybyparticipationinthegooditself.Inturn,ifjusticecomesaboutinthesoulorinthecitybywayof imitationbythephilosophicalrulerimitatingtheFormofjusticeinitsnecessaryrelationtotheFormofgoodnesstheimitationwouldbeaconsciousparticipation, sotospeak,inthegooditself.Thus,the

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philosophicalrulerwouldproducesomethingthatsheunderstandsisgoodonlybecauseitparticipatesinthegooditself.Thegoodnessofjusticeinthesoulorinthe citywouldbethatkindofgoodnessdependentonthegooditself,asitssource.Thisrelationbetweenperceptualgoodnessandthegooditselfisalsoexpressedby sayingthattheperceptualgoodnessistheappearanceofthegooditself.Putthisway,therelationclearlyimpliesthedependenceofperceptualgoodnessonthegood itself.Italsoimpliesthatcorrectlyunderstandingperceptualgoodnessentailsunderstandingitsdependenceonthegooditself.Thus,thephilosophicalrulerwould producesomethingsheunderstandsasanappearanceofthegooditself,somethingwhoseultimatevaluederivesfromthegooditself. SomuchfollowsfromthecausalroleoftheForm,understoodasparticipation.However,seeingimitationinthelightofthiscausalrolesuggestsanotherclaim,one aboutthephilosopher'smotiveinimitatingtheForm.SofarwehavesaidthattheproductofimitationwillparticipateintheFormofgoodness.Ifparticipationimplies thattheproductofimitationwillhavethiskindofdependenceontheForm,italsosuggeststhattheactivityofimitationhasananalogousdependenceontheFormof goodness.TheonewhoimitatestheFormofjusticeseesthatgoodnessoftheproductofimitationcomesfromtheFormofgoodnessinturn,theonewhoimitates seesthattheactivityhasthatdependencyaswell.ThattheactivityissodependentmeansthatthemotivationforimitatingtheFormofjusticeisdependentontheForm ofgoodness.Sotospeak,thevalueoftheproductofimitationflowsfromthegooditselfthus,thevaluetotheimitatoroftheactivityofimitationflowsfromthegood itself.Thegooditselfisthecauseofthegoodnessoftheactivityofimitationfortheimitator.Wecanexplainthiscausalrolebycastingitintermsoffinalcausalityby sayingthattheFormofgoodnessisthefinalcauseofimitation.ThattheFormisthefinalcauseimpliesthatoneimitatestheFormofjusticebecauseofitsintegral relationtotheFormofgoodnessandoneunderstandsthatthelattermustbedisseminatedonewantstodisseminategoodnessoutofadmirationforthegooditself.If oneimitatestheFormofjusticebecauseofthisrelationtotheFormofgoodnessbecauseonebelievesthattheFormofgoodnessmustbedisseminatedthenthe Formofgoodnessisthefinalcauseofthegoodnessoftheactivityofimitationfortheimitator.

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However,wemustbecarefulinthewayinwhichweunderstandthesecondaspectoffinalcause.Inthisaspect,thefinalcauseofimitationisthatimitatingtheFormof justicebringsthecityandinthesoultoparticipationinthegooditself.Inonewayoflookingatit,imitatingtheFormofjusticeinthesewaysisjusttheparticularmeans thephilosopheradoptsfordisseminatingthegooditselfbecauseitisthegooditself.However,inanotherwayoflookingatit,disseminatinggoodnessisgoodfor whateverreceivesthegoodness,forwhateverismadegood.Thephilosopherismotivatedbythisaspectaswellthephilosopheralsoseekstodisseminategoodness becausedoingsoisgoodforwhateverreceivesthegoodness.Seekingtoembodyjusticeinthecityandthesoulmeansmakingthecityandsoulgood.Afterall,the gooditselfistheparadigmofgoodnesseachthinghaswhatevergoodnessithasbyparticipatinginthegooditself.Thephilosopherunderstandsthisrelationshipand consciouslyparticipatesinitwhensheimitatestheFormofjustice.Suchimitationsarethemselvesgoodandthephilosopherismovedbytheprospectofachievingthat goodness. ChristineKorsgaardmakesaimportantpointthatcanbeusedtoilluminatethesecondaspectofouraccount.AlthoughsheisinterpretingKant,shehassomething relevanttosayabouttherelationbetweenunconditionedandconditionedgoods.Whileconditionedgoodsdependontheunconditionedfortheirgoodness,theformer arenotinthemselvesvaluelessnoraretheymerelymeanstotheunconditionedgood.SincesheisexplicatingKant,Korsgaardholdsthattheunconditionedgoodis thegoodwillfromitflowsallthegoodnessintheworld.18Thus,allothergoodsareconditionedonthegoodwill.Theothergoods,however,arenotthereforein themselvesvaluelessnormerelymeanstothegoodwill.Herreasonforthispositionisthat,oncetheconditionedgoodsareproperlyrelatedtotheunconditioned good,theyareobjectivegoods.19Theirbeingobjectivegoodsseemstomeanthat,theirconditionforbeinggoodbeingmet,theyhavesomeobjectiveclaimtobe regardedasgood.Insomeway,theirgoodnessbelongstothemandnotjusttotheunconditionedgooduponwhichtheirgoodnessdepends.Forthisreason, conditionedgood,whoseconditionforgoodnesshasbeenmet,arevaluableinthemselves.20Forinstance,oncehappinessaconditionedgoodisrelatedtoa goodwill,itbecomesanobjectivegood.Itsconditionforbeinggoodbeingmet,happinessthenhasanobjec

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tiveclaimtoberegardedasgood.Inturn,itisthendesirableinitselfnotasameanstothegoodwill,butassomethingproperlyrelatedtothegoodwill.Soto speak,happiness"packaged"withagoodwillissomethingvaluableinitself. Althoughthegooditselfisanentirelydifferentkindofthingfromthegoodwill,somethinganalogouscanbesaidaboutitsrelationtotheothergoodthingsdependent onitforinstance,justiceinthesoul.Justiceinthesoulisaconditionedgoodinthesensethatitdependsonthegooditselfforitsgoodness.Withoutthegooditself, justiceinthesoulwouldnotbegooditwouldnotevenexistatleastinthesenseinwhichPlatounderstandsjusticeinthesoul.However,onceitsrelationtothe Formofgoodnessisestablished,wecansaythatitisanobjectivegooditsconditionforgoodnessbeingmet,ithasanobjectiveclaimtoberegardedasgood.Since itsconditionforbeinggoodismet,justiceinthesoulisalsovaluableinitself.AlthoughitisanappearanceoftheFormofgoodness,itisnotsimplyameanstothe Formofgoodness.Justiceinthesoulandinthecity,seeninrelationtotheFormofgoodness,arevaluableinthemselves.Theyhavevalueinthemselvesasimagesof justiceandgoodnessinaworldinwhichtherecanneverbeunmixedjusticeandgoodness.Sowemustnottaketheimagesproducedbyimitationtobemereimages. TheyaretrueimageswhoserelationtotheFormsconfersonthemaninherentorobjectivevalue.Torealizetherelationdoesnotrobtheimageofitsvalueratheritis tounderstandtheproper(inbothsensesof'proper')valueoftheimage.ThephilosopherismovedtoimitatetheFormofjusticebecausedoingsoisawayofgetting goodnessintocirculation,sotospeak.Theimagesarelikepapercurrencyinaworldinwhichgoldcannotcirculate.Inthissense,justiceinsoulsandjusticeinthecity aretokensoftheForms.Thephilosopherwishestoproducethesetokensbecausetheyhavevaluefortheprojectofleadingone'slifeorfortheprojectofrulingthe city.ThisvaluecomesfromtheFormbutitisnotconfinedtotheForm,sotospeak.IthasvalueforthesoulandthecitybecauseitcomesfromtheForm.Inthisway ofinterpretingthenotionofFormasfinalcause,theFormisgoodinitselfandgoodinitsconsequences,ifwetaketheconsequencestobe,amongotherthings,the imagesproducedbyphilosophersandothers.Infact,theFormisgoodinitsconsequencesbecauseitisgoodinitself. ThiswayofseeingtherelationbetweenimageandoriginaladdressestheissueofegoisminPlato'sthoughtthatis,theclaim

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thatvirtueisjustifiableintermsofone'sownwelfarealways.Thus,Socratesgoestogreatlengthstoshowthatthesearrangementsinthesoulareproductiveor constitutiveofhappiness(Rep.580b).Happinessistheultimatemotivationforpursuingawayoflife.21Ouraccountofimitationmustbeconsistentwiththisbasic tenetofPlatonicthought.Theansweristhat,inthisinterpretation,happinessisnotjustacertainarrangementinthesoul.Itisacertainarrangementbasedupon imitatingtheFormsofjusticeandgoodness.Moreover,thevalueofimitationcomesfromthevalueofwhatisimitated.Eventhoughhappinessisvaluableinitself,itis valuableinitselfbecauseitisanimitationoftheForms.Thus,theultimatejustificationthephilosophicalrulercangiveforanylawordecision,anyinstitutionor arrangementinrulingthecity,orforestablishingjusticeinthesoulforarrangingthepartsofthesoulsothatreasonrulesisthatsucharrangementsimitatethegood itself.Alloftheseperceptualgoodsaretokensorappearancesofthegooditselfthatstatusisthereasonthatthephilosopherwantsthem.Moreover,astokensofthe gooditself,theyaregoodforthesoulandforthecity.22ThenotionofperceptualgoodsastokensofthegooditselffitswithPlato'sdistinctionbetweengoodandbad images.Abadimageisonethatsubstitutesfortherealityitisthecauseof,ortheoccasionfor,deception.Theonewhoisdeceivedtakestheimageofgoodtobethe good,forexample.Theoppositeattitudeistounderstandthattheimageisanimage,tounderstandtherelationbetweenimageandreality.However,tounderstand thisrelationisnottodevaluetheimage.Thedeceptiveimageisdevalued,ofcourse,ifoneovercomesthedeception.Itsclaimtobevaluablecollapseswhenitisseen inrelationtoreality.Butthetrueimagetheonewhoserelationtorealityisclearisnotdevaluedthroughrealizingthisrelation.Itsvaluedoesnotcollapseinto transparencybeforethegooditself.Ifthetrueimagehadnoinherentvalue,thephilosophicalruler'sabilitytodistinguishamongimageswouldbeofnoearthlyuseand thephilosopher'sabilitytodistinguishwhichimageswerefaithfultotheoriginalwouldhavenopoliticalsignificance.Still,thephilosophercanonlyrealizethisusefulness byappreciatingtherelationbetweenimageandForm. Wearenowabletoreturntotheproblemofthereluctantphilosopher.IfweacceptthatthemotivationforimitatingtheFormofjusticeisfoundinitsrelationtothe gooditself,wecanseeanewargumentforthephilosophertotakeupthejobofrulingin

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thecity.ImitatingtheFormofjusticeisawayofinstantiatingtheFormofgoodnessitisawayofbringingtotheworldofoureverydayexperienceanimageof intrinsicgoodness.Thisimagehasvalueforundertakingswithinoureverydayexperience,ofcourse.However,oneimitatesthejustitselfbecauseofitsrelationtothe gooditself.Imitatingthejustitselfisawayofinstantiatingthegooditselfandoneunderstandsthenecessityforinstantiatingthegooditself.Thisunderstandingmeans thatthephilosopherismotivatedbythedesiretodisseminategoodnessbecauseofheradmirationforthegooditself.Wecouldalsosaythatoneimitatesthejustitself becauseofwhatitisinitself,assumingitsnecessaryrelationtothegooditself.Ifthegooditselfanditsdependenciessuchasthejustitselfrequireinstantiation, replication,dissemination,thisrequirementbecomesthephilosophicalrulers'ultimatemotivation.Imaginetheyoungphilosopherscontemplatingthejustitselfandthe gooditselfwithoutwishingtoinstantiatethemintheirownsouls.Suchanattitudeseemsimpossibleonemustimitatewhatoneadmires.However,ininstantiating goodnessintheirownsouls,thephilosophers'motivationisnotonlythatthisgoodnessistheirgoodness.Theirfinalmotivationforinstantiatinggoodnessintheirown soulsisthatitisaninstantiationofthegooditselftheyunderstandthenecessityforinstantiatingthegooditself.Theiradmirationforthegooditselfmovesthemto disseminategoodness.Suchamotivationmeans,inturn,thatthephilosopherswillalsoseektoinstantiatethejustitselfinthecity.Theyseektoinstantiatejusticeinthe citybecauseofitsrelationtothegooditself.Itistheirconsistentmotivationnotonlyinimitationbutforimitation. AttheendofBookVII,inrecapitulatingtheeducationoftheguardians,Socratesattributesthismotivationtothephilosophicalrulers.Inthispassage,themotivationof thephilosophersisclearlydifferentfromthemotivationSocratesgivesat520bcwherethephilosophersshouldruleasawayofrepayingobligationstothecityhere philosophersareinspiredbytheirvisionofthegooditself.Moreover,thegooditselfismorethanthegoalofdialecticalinvestigation.Socratessaysthatitwillbe requiredthatthephilosophersraisethevisionofthesoultofixitsgazeonthesourceofalllight,thusseeingthegooditself,thenusingitasaparadigm(paradeigma)in bringingorderintothecity,itscitizensandthemselves(Rep.540a).Thus,becomingtruephilosopherstheywilllookdownonthehonorsthatnowareconsidered suchrather,

Page212 havingesteemedtheright(toorthon)tobeofthegreatestimportance,andthehonorsthatcomefromit,andthejust(todikaion)tobethebestandthemostnecessarything, servingthat[therightandthejust]andmakingittoincrease,theywouldbringorderintotheirowncity.(540de)

Itseemsnaturaltosupposethat''theright''and"thejust"arewaysofreferringtothegeneralexistenceofjusticeinourperceptualworldjusticewithoutreferenceto anyparticularinstance.Thephilosophersesteemtheexistenceofjusticeassuchtobeofsupremeimportance.Wemustunderstandthisesteeminthelightofthefact thatthephilosophers,becauseoftheirvisionofthegooditself,treatitasaparadigmfororderingthecitythentheycometoesteemtheembodimentofjusticeassuch. Inturn,theyservethisembodimentandincreaseit.Asawayofservingandincreasingjusticeassuch,theypursuejusticeinthisinstancebybringingorderintothe city.Thispassagereflectsouraccountofthegooditselfasfinalcauseinthefirstplace,thephilosophersesteemtherightandjustasofgreatestimportance,asthe bestandmostnecessary,becauseoftheirknowledgeofthegooditself.Accordingtoouraccount,knowledgeofthegooditselfincludesitsnecessaryrelationtothe FormofjusticeitisthisknowledgeoftherelationbetweenthegooditselfandtheFormofjusticethatleadsthephilosopherstoconcludethattherightandthejustare ofsupremeimportanceinourworld.Theytransfer,sotospeak,thevaluerelationsamongtheFormstotheperceptualworld.Inthesecondplace,thisgooditself inspiredknowledgeoftheimportanceofjusticeleadsthemtoconceiveofpropagatingjusticeasthefinalcauseoftheiractionstheyserveandincreasetherightand thejust.Inouraccount,thegooditself,anditsnecessarydependenciessuchasthejustitself,requiredissemination.TheFormofjustice,asalogicaldependencyof thegooditself,deservespropagationordissemination.Again,transferringtotheperceptualworld,thephilosopherscometoconceiveofservingandincreasingthe rightandthejustinauniversalsenseasthefinalcauseoftheiractionsinturn,thisconceptiontakestheformofbringingorderintothecity.Thepassagereflectsthe centralclaimsofouraccount,thatthemotivationforbringingorderintothecitycomesfromthedesiretoimitatejustice.Imitatingjusticeisnecessarybecauseitisa wayofdisseminatinggoodness.Thenecessity

Page213

fordisseminatinggoodness,andthusimitatingjustice,isinspiredbyknowledgeofthegooditself. III Likealloftheotherreadingsoftheexpressiveorcreativeroleofthephilosophicalrulers,ourinterpretationisaconstructplacedupontheRepublicinorderto understandtheultimatemotivationoftherulers.Itsplausibilitydependsonhowwellitilluminatesthatproblem.InaddressingthatproblemwehaveattributedtoPlato aratherstrongposition.Wehaveclaimedthattheultimatemotivationofthephilosophicalruleristodisseminategoodness,thattheFormrequiresdissemination. Ultimately,valueforthephilosophicalrulerisfoundinproducingimagesoftheFormofjusticebecauseofitsrelationtothegooditself.Wehavesaidthatthisstrong positionfollowsfromwhatPlatosaysaboutimitationandparticipation.WhetherPlatodrewthisimplicationinitsfullstrengthintheRepublicisnotaltogetherclear, althoughtheimplicationdoesdevelopthatstrainofinterpretationwhichholdsthatthephilosophicalrulerismotivatedtoexpressorcreatevirtue.However,thebest placetoseewhatPlatothinksabouttheexpressiveorcreativefacetofthephilosopherisintheSymposium.Itisinthelatterdialoguethatwefindthemostcomplete accountofthewayinwhichonecreatesvirtueinone'sownorinanother'ssoul.Socrates'famousspeech,infact,explorestheintricaterelationbetweenvirtueandthe Formofbeauty.RecentcommentatorshavecomparedthismotifwiththeprojectoftheRepublicinwaysnotalwaysclear,thetwodialoguesechooneanotheron thesevitalthemes.23SowewillturntotheSymposiumtoseewhatithastosayaboutthemotivationforcreatingvirtue.Wewanttoseehowfaritoffersbackingfor whatwehavecalledthe"strongposition." TheSymposiumbeginsthisaccountofacquiringvirtuewithSocrates'speechtotheassembledcelebrants.Infact,inanintriguinganddramaticmove,Socratesquotes histeacherinthesemattersoflove,Diotima,theMantineanseeress.Shebeganbysayingthatallloveevenearthlyloveisalwaysloveofsomethingbeautiful (204b).Leadingherdisciple,Socrates,throughthestepsofelementarylearningaboutlove,next,sheasksSocrateswhatitisthattheloverlovespresumably,what ishisobjectinloving

Page214

thebeautiful(hoerontonkalontierai[204d56]).Socratescannotanswer,soDiotimachangestheobjectoflovefromthebeautifultothegoodsheasksthen, Whatdoestheloverdesireinlovingthegood?24Socratesanswerspromptlythattheloverdesiresthatthegoodbelongtohim(204d).TherefollowsDiotima's argumenttotheeffectthatalllovethegood(hosoudengealloestinouerosinanthropoietouagathou[205e7n206a1).Finally,shesaysthattheydesireitnot justtobetheirsbuttobetheirsalways.Shesumsup:lovehasasitsaimthatthegoodbeone'salways(hoerostoutoagathonautoieinaiaei[206a1112]). Now,however,heraccounttakesanunexpectedturn.Sheasksaboutthemethodthaterospursuesinitsseekingtohavethegoodalways.Atthispoint,without announcement,thebeautifulmakesitsappearanceagainastheobjectoferos.25Therefollowsapassageremarkablealmostbreathtakingforitsmixtureofsexual andbirthingimages.Theloverispregnantwithvirtueinhissoulbutthispregnancyisalsoanerotictensionthatcanonlyberelievedbyspiritualdiscoursewitha beautifulyouth.Thisparturition,whichisalsoaconsummation,iscompletedincreatingthebeautyofvirtueinthesoulofthebeloved(206cd).Afterthisrevelation, Diotimachangesoneoftheconclusionspreviouslyagreedto.

Forloveisnot[love]ofthebeautiful,asyouthought,Socrates....Itis[love]ofthegenerationandbringingforthinthebeautiful(tesgenneseoskaitoutokouentoikaloi). (206e)

Thestrangemixtureofsexualandbirthingintroducestheextremelyimportant,andmysterious,notionofbringingforthinthebeautiful.Diotimaseemstobeshiftingthe focusoferossheisattemptingtoshowSocratesthatithasamorefundamentalgoalthanimmediatepleasure.Thepointoferosisnotpossession,muchless consummation,but,ratheritspointisbringingforthinthebeautiful.Thus,afterhavingrelatedthatapersonconceivesandbringsforthinthepresenceofbeauty, Diotimaturnstothedistinctionbetweenphysicalandspirituallovers(Sym.206ce).Whenthepersonisofthephysicaltype,hemarriesawomanandbringsforth children.Whenheisofthespiritualtypehefallsinlovewithayouthespeciallyiftheyouthhasspiritualbeautyandbringsforth,byspeechandbeautiful conversation,virtueinthesoulofthebelovedandultimatelyinhisownsoul(Sym.209bc).

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ThethrustofthepassageissignificantforthewholeprojectoftheGorgiasandRepublic.InthisdialoguePlatoisaddressingtheroleoferospositively.Insteadofa forcethatmustbedisciplinedandcontrolledbecauseittooeasilyseeksonlypleasure,Platoportrayserosnowashavingamoreusefulrole.Diotimaisclaimingthat erosdoesnotseekonlythepleasuresofreplenishmentinfact,itseeksthegoodtobeone'sforever.PuttingthematterinthismoregeneralwayallowsDiotimato arguethaterosseeksagoodthatismuchbroaderincontentthanthegoodofimmediatepleasure.Iferosseekstohavethegood,itmightwellseektohavesomething besidesimmediatepleasure.Indeed,aswehavejustseen,erosbecomesthechiefdrivingforceforacquiringvirtuebothinthecityandinthesoul.Describingitas "seekingtohavethegoodalways"laysthegroundworkforthissortofroleforerosoncevirtueisseenasconstitutingthegoodforever,eroswillnaturallyseekvirtue. ObviouslyPlatoisagaindealingwiththerelationbetweendesireandthegoodbutinsteadofmakingreasontherulerthatestablishesvirtueinthesoulbyforcingor guidingdesire,Platohasmadedesirethechiefunderlyingforceintheactivity.Thisnewroleforerosisastonishinginmanyways.However,thetransformationoferos intothechiefforceforacquiringvirtuedependsonDiotima'sfurtherclaimthaterosseeksreallytobringforthinthebeautiful.Itisnotaradicaldeparturetoclaimthat erosreallydesiresthegoodtobeone'sforever.EvenCallicleswouldagreedefiningpleasureasthegood,hewouldsaythaterossimplydesirestohavepleasure forever.However,sayingthaterosseekstobringforthinthebeautifulisaradicaldeparturebecauseitwouldimplythaterossimplycannothavepleasureasitsonly goal.Atfirstblush,moreover,thechangeinthefunctionofdesireseemsgratuitous.Itsoundsmorehopefulthanrealistictosaythaterosseekstobringforththe beautifulratherthantopossessthebeautiful.Afterall,noteveryonewhohasmarried,andevenbegottenchildren,wouldsaythatgenerationwasthegoaloftheir desire.AndthepreviousspeechesoftheSymposiumshowthatsomeloversseekonlysexualgratification.Asthoughmindfulofthislackofplausibilityintheshiftof thegoaloferos,Diotimalaunchesintoafairlylengthyargumentthatseemsdesignedtobackupthisshiftinthisargumentsheexplainsthepurposeofthisloveof generation. Shegivesanargumenttoshowthatseekingtogenerateandbringforthisawayofachievingimmortality.Inthepreviouspas

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sage,theyhadagreedthattheloverdesiresthegoodtobehisalwayssosheconcludesthattheloverdesiresimmortality(206e).Thereasoningmaybespecious however,theconclusioninitselfholdssomeinterestforanyonewhoispersuadedorevenintriguedbytheCallicleanherooftheappetites.ForCallicles,eroshas asitsaimpossessionandconsummationasameanstopleasure.Diotimasaysthatthepointoferosisbegettinginthebeautifulasameanstoimmortality.She doubtlesswouldseeCallicleaneroticbehaviorasafranticattempttoattainimmortalityaninsightnotunfamiliartoreadersofJohnUpdike.Thus,eroswillnotbe stilleduntilitreachesitsgoal,tobringforthsomethingthatcanbeseenasachievingimmortality. Ofcourse,Diotimasaysthathumanscannottrulybecomeimmortal.Onlythegodsareimmortal.Themostthathumanscandoisleaveafterthemoffspringorworks. Sheseemstosaythatthesesatisfythedesireforimmortality.Diotima'sclaimhereispuzzlinginviewofPlato'sviewofimmortalityinotherdialogues,forexample,the PhaedoandthePhaedrus,inwhichhesaysthatthesoulisimmortal.ThisdifferencebetweenDiotima'sspeechandotherPlatonicwritinghasledsometoholdthat thespeechdoesnotrepresentPlato'sthinkingonthis,oranyother,topic.26A.W.PriceoffersonewaytoreconcileDiotima'sviewsaboutimmortalitywithother Platonicwriting.Pricemakesadistinctionbetweenthesoul,whichisimmortal,andthelifeledbythesoul,whichismortal.Thus,thesoulislikeabareparticular, whichmightleadanynumberoflives,whereasanindividualidentifiesherselfwiththelifethatthesoulleadsduringaparticularlifetime.27Thus,Diotimaisnotdenying theimmortalityofthebaresoulbutonlytheimmortalityoftheledlifeso,ifPlato,intheotherdialogues,istalkingabouttheimmortalityofthebaresoul,Diotimaisnot denyingthatimmortality.Thus,herspeechdoesnotcontradictPlatonicteaching.Suchapositionhas,atleast,oneveryattractivefeature.Itofferssomeplausibilityto Diotima'sclaimthatpeoplewouldacceptthesubstituteimmortalityofchildrenandaccomplishments.Weareexpectedtobelieve,accordingtoDiotima,thathuman beings,convincedoftheirownmortality,wouldacceptsubstitutesforindividualimmortalitythatis,childrenoraccomplishmentsinpublicandpoliticallife.Ifchildren andaccomplishmentsextendedorreplicatedfeaturesofone'slife,onemightsettleforsuchsubstituteimmorality.Achildwouldperpetuate,initsownlife,someofthe featuresofitsparent'slifea

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treatiseoraworkofartwouldlikewiseperpetuatesomefeatureofone'sintellectuallife.28Thus,evenifone'sbaresoulwereitselfimmortal,onemightbemore interestedinperpetuatingfeaturesofone'slife,whichotherwisearedestinedtoperishwhenonedies. However,evenifweacceptthisrationaleforsubstituteimmortality,theforceofDiotima'sargumentisstillobscureatthispoint.Evenifhumanscanbeseenassatisfied withsubstituteimmortality,thelatternotionisproblematicinitsturn.Itishardlyobviousthatchildrenandaccomplishmentsachieveevensubstituteimmortality.Whileit maybetruethatachildoraworkwilloutlastone'sownlifespan,suchanobjecthardlyconfersimmortality.Children,atmost,conferaplaceinthememoriesofthe nextseveralgenerations.Evenifparentsdonotseektheimmortalityconferredbymemory,butonlytheimmortalityofhavingoffspringwhoreplicateone'sphysicalor psychologicalcharacteristics,havingchildrendoesnotevenguaranteethelatterkindofimmortalityone'sphysicalprogenycaneasilypeteroutinseveralgenerations. Inthecaseofaccomplishments,theresultsaresomewhatmoredurable.Constitutionsandbuildingscanlastcenturiesthelatterareusuallymoredurablethanthe formerlastingsometimesmillennia.Poetryseemstobethemostdurable,astheworksofHomerandHesiodattestinturn,suchheroicdeedsasarerecountedin HomerandHesiodhavetheirownimmortalitybutonlybecauseoftheimmortalityofthepoet.Finally,however,theimmortalityofthepoetsisnotguaranteeditis alwayspossiblethatallthemanuscriptsoftheIliadandeverymemorytracewilldisappear. Evenifweputthatpossibilityaside,weshouldnotethattheimmortalitydesiredbyapoetcanhavetwoforms.Thepoetmightdesiretobeimmortalinthesensethat shedesirestohavehernamealwaysassociatedwithherworkandherworktolastforever.Inanotherway,shemightonlywishforimmortalityinthesensethatshe wishestohaveherpoemreadandrecitedaslongastherearehumanbeings,evenifnooneremembershername.Ifwesupposethelatterkindofdesire,wecan supposeapoetwishingtowritefortheagestheobjectofherlaborwouldbetowriteapoemthatwouldberead,recited,andanthologizedaslongasthereare humanstoread,recite,andpublish.However,itishardtoseehowevensuchamodestdesirecouldbesatisfied.Atthemost,shecouldrealizethesatisfactionof havingwrittenapoemthatreceivedwideacclaimduringherlifetimefromthisacclaimshe

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mighthopethatthepoemwouldbereadinthenextgenerationandthereafter.Butsurely,anypoetmustrealizethecrueltyofpublicopinion,thewaysinwhichsome poemscometobeignoredandfinallylosttomemory.AtthispointitishardtotakeDiotima'sargumentliterally,inspiteoftheamountoftimesheusestodevelopit.If wesupposethatthereisaspecificdesireforimmortalityeventheattenuateddesireforimmortalitythatissatisfiedbythecreationofobjectsthatlastforeverit wouldbereasonabletosupposethatsuchadesirewouldbesatisfiedonlybythecreationofanobjectoneknewwouldlastforeverintheesteemofhumanity. Otherwise,thedesirewouldbedoomedtofrustration.Infact,wemustwaitforthenextsegmentofherinstructioninerosbeforewecanseetheanswerstothis problem. However,weshouldnotleavethispassagewithoutmakingclearPlato'sachievementinintroducingthenotionofbringingforthinthebeautiful.Inexplicatingthe notion,DavidHalperinmakesausefuldistinctionbetweentheobjectoferosandtheaimoferos.Itsobjectisthebeautiful(tokalon)anditsaimiswhateroswants fromitsobjectthatis,good(toagathon)."Butthereisadifferencebetweendesiringsomethingforthesakeofagoodanddesiringitbecauseitisgood."29Infact, HalperinmaintainsthatPlatodistinguishesthesetwowaysofdesiring."Platodifferentiatesthesetwoaspectsoferoticdesirebydistinguishingthelover'sboulesisfrom hiserosproper(Symp.204d205a)bydistinguishing,thatis,whattheloverwants(thatis,hisaim)fromwhatheisattractedtoordesires(thatis,hisobject)."30 Therelationbetweenthetwoisthattheobjectinspiresthelovertoachievetheaim.
WhatDiotimaistryingtoelucidate,then,isnotonlyourmotiveforwantingthethingsthatwevaluebutalsoforvaluingthethingsthatwedo.Beauty,sheconcludes, contributesanessentialelementtothewayoractivity(tropos,praxis)bywhichwesetabouttopossessthegoodforever(206b),foritcausesustocherish...whateverenables ustogivebirthtoareteittherebymotivatesustopossessthegoodandsoconducestooureudaimonia.31

Halperin'sdistinctionbetweendesiringsomethingbecauseitisgoodanddesiringsomethingforthesakeofagoodseemstocontainthetwosensesoffinalcause.The thingdesiredbecauseitisgoodisfinalcauseinthesenseofobjectofdesireandthegoodforthesakeofwhichathingisdesiredisfinalcauseinthesenseof

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whatistobeachievedthelatter,accordingtoDiotima,beingimmortality.However,therelationbetweenthesetwosensesoffinalcauseismorecomplicatednow. Wecannotsaythatthedesireforbeautygivesrisetothelover'sstrivingforimmortalityinthewayinwhichthelovefortheunmovedmovergivesrisetotheouter sphere'sundertakingperpetualcircularmotion.InDiotima'saccountthedesireforimmortalityseemstobefundamentalstillthedesireforbeautyandthedesirefor immortalitybecomerelatedwhenthelattergivesrisetothedesiretobringforthinthebeautiful.Thedesireforimmortalitybecomesthedesireforbringingforthinthe beautifulbecauseofakindoffrustration.Unabletohaveimmortality,properlyspeaking,thedesireissatisfiedbysubstituteimmortality.Itisasthoughthedesirefor beautywereitcapableofitmighttrytopossessthebeautifulforeverinitsownrightand,thus,cometoenjoyimmortalityinthiswayitisadesireforbeautyand immortality.Unabletopossessthebeautifulforever,thedesire,sotospeak,bifurcatesintothedesireforbeautyandthedesireforimmortality.Bythistransformation, Diotimaineffectmakestheobjectoferosandtheaimoferosdistinct.Thebeautifulbecomestheobjectandsubstituteimmortalitytheaim.Inthisway,begettingin thebeautifulcombinesbothsubstituteimmortalitythegoodtobeachievedandbeautytheobjectofdesire. Diotimahassavedthefullestaccountofimmortalityfortheinitiateintothehighestmysteriesoferos.NowshetellsSocratesthatearthlyloveisreallystrivingfor contemplativeunionwiththemostauthenticbeauty,theFormofthebeautiful.Onemayrealizethisstrivingthroughinitiationinthemysteriesoflove.Thisinitiationisthe famousascentpassageoftheSymposium.32Firstthelover,rightlyinitiated,learnstolovemoreandmoreabstractthings,movingfromloveofonebeautifulbodyto manybeautifulbodiestobeautifulsouls,thencetobeautifulcustomsandlaws,andthencetothebeautyofknowledge.Thepenultimatestepisasummaryviewofwhat Diotimacallsthe"seaofbeauty."Inthisupwardmovement,theloverhasbeendiscoveringmoreandmoreabstractbeautyinpreparationforafinalvisionofbeauty.
Theonewhohasbeentaughtuptothispointintheaffairsoflove(taerotika),viewingthebeautifulobjectsinrightorder,andnowcomingtothegoaloftheaffairsoflove, suddenlyhasrevealedsomethingamazing,beautifulinitsnature,thatthing,

Page220 OSocrates,onaccountofwhichallpreviouslaborshavebeensuffered.(210e)

ThisbeautyistheFormofbeauty.Itdoesnotcometobenorpassawaynordoesitsufferanyoftheothervicissitudesofthebeautythatisseenwiththeeyes(Sym. 211a).Perhapsmostremarkableofall,itisnotaqualityfoundinanothersubstance.Nothingbutundiluted,purebeauty,itisnoteveninanythingelsenotinfacenor handsnorknowledge.Itishardtodecidewhetherwhatmakesthislatterclaimsoremarkableisthemetaphysicalimplicationthatthereisasubstancelessqualityorthe moralandpsychologicalimplicationthatsupremelovehasanobjectthatisnotpersonalinanyway. Theeffectsofcontemplatingthisunearthlybeautyseemtobeautomaticandprofound.Atthispointthesoulexperiencesthemostauthenticgenesisofvirtue, quickenedbythemostauthenticbeauty.Diotimasays

Doyouthinkcontemptible...thelifeoftheonewhosogazes,lookinguponthatthingbythatmeanswhichheoughttouseandbeingwithit?Orratherdoyousuppose... thattherebelongstothatonealone,whoseesbythemeansbywhichheoughttoseethebeautiful,tobringforth(tiktein)notmereimages(eidola)ofvirtue,sinceheisnot pursuingamereimage,buttruevirtue,becauseheispursuingthetruth?Whenhehasbroughtforthandnurturedtruevirtuehewillbebelovedofthegods,andifanyhumanis immortalthisoneis.(212a)

Thetalkofbringingforth(tiktein)truevirtueisasignalthatwearetoimportintothispassagethepreviousdiscourseaboutbringingforthinthebeautiful.Intheearlier passagethebeautifulwasfoundinthebeloved.Presumably,thenthevirtuebroughtforthwouldhavebeenamereimagebecauseitwasinspiredbyanimageof beautytheimageofbeautyfoundinthebelovednotbythereality,theForm.IngazingupontheFormofbeauty,thelovernowbringsforthtruevirtue.Whileitis notclearwhatDiotimaistryingtoindicatewiththisdistinctionbetweenthemereimagesofvirtueandtruevirtue,sheisbasingitonadistinctionbetweentheinspiration inthetwocases.Diotimasaysthatthenonphilosophicalloverpursuesanimagethenonphilosophicalloverisinspiredbyabeautifulyouth,whoisanimageofbeauty (cf.Phaedrus251a).Animageisnotthebeautifulitselfandisnecessarilylimitedbecausetherearewaysinwhichitisnotbeautiful.Onemight

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expectthebeautyproducedundersuchalimitedinspirationtobeitselfanimageofbeautythemereimage(eidola)ofvirtue,asDiotimasaysinherspeech.The philosophicallover,however,isinspiredbythebeautifulitselfthushewouldproducetruevirtue.Thedistinctionbetweentheinspirationofthephilosophicalloverand thatofthenonphilosophicalloverisreminiscentofthedistinctioninRepublicXbetweenthecarpenter,whoseestheFormofbed,andthepainter,whoseesonlythe imageoftheForm(597de).Thus,thedifferencebetweentheimageandtruevirtueislikethedifferencebetweenthebedproducedbythepainterthriceremoved fromrealityandthebedproducedbythecarpentertwiceremovedfromreality. Moreover,thenotionoftruevirtue,whichisleftunexplained,containsananswertotheproblemofimmortality.Atleast,Diotimaendstheencomiumtotheloverof beautywiththepromiseofimmortality.Wemightsupposethatthetrueloverofbeautywillbringforthvirtuethatwill,insomeway,partakeoftheeternalityofthe Form.Enlivenedbybeautyitself,thisimmortalityseemstobeamoreauthenticimmortalitythanthatconferredbychildrenandbytheworksofpoetryandphilosophy inspiredbyone'sbeloved.Wewanttoknowwhyitisamoreauthenticimmortality.WhileDiotimahastoldSocratesthattheloverbringsforthinthebeautifulbecause hewantstobeimmortal,weshouldnotethewayinwhichthesetokensofimmortalityalsoembodybeauty.33Throughoutthesepassages,bringingforthinthe beautifulissaidtoproducesomethingthatisbeautiful.At210a8,ontheladderoferos,theonewholovesonebodybringsforthbeautiful(kalous)speechperhaps lovepoetry.Whentheloverhasascendedtotheseaofbeauty,byhiscontemplationofit,hebringsforthbeautiful(kalous)philosophicaltreatises.At209c67the spiritualloversaresaidtobringforth"children(thatis,virtue)whicharemorebeautifulandimmortal(kalliononkaiathanatoteron)"thanthoseofphysicallovers. Fromtheseexampleswecanconcludethatbringingforthinthebeautifulentailsbothbeinginspiredbythebeautifulandembodyingthebeautiful. Whatthispresenceofbeautyatthesestagesoftheascentsuggestsisthatbeautyhasanintegralroletoplayintheattempttoachieveimmortality.Achieving immortalitymeanstranscendingthelimitsofone'sownlife.AccordingtoPrice,onewaytotranscendthetemporallimitsofone'slifeistopassonone'sown characteristicstoanother.Still,therearetwoapproachestosucha

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project.Onecanpassonacharacteristicbecauseitisone'sownorbecauseitisavaluablecharacteristictopasson.Similarly,onecanpassonamementowhose onlyvalueisthatitisone'sownalockofhair,forexampleoramementothathassomeinherentvalueacollectionofbooks,forexample.Ifwetakeseriously thewayinwhichtheresultsofbringingforthinthebeautifularethemselvesbeautiful,thenwecanseethatitisthelatterkindofpassingonthatDiotimaintends.The lover,inspiredbyhisbeloved'sbeauty,givessomethingvaluabletothebeloved,somethingbeautifulinreturn.Inthiswaythelovertranscendsthetemporallimitsofhis life.Hislifeisextendedbeyondhisdeathbecausehepassesonsomethingofhisowntohisbeloved.However,hetranscendsanotherkindoflimitinhislife.The beautythathepassesonisabletoservedifferentandwiderpurposesthanhisownparticularpurposes.34Thisbeautytranscendsthepeculiarlimitationsimposedby aparticularlife.Thelover,forinstance,passesonvirtuetohisbelovedbecauseitisvaluableinitself,apartfromthedetailsofhisownlife.Thus,hetranscendsanother limitandachievesanothertypeofimmortality. Wecan,then,amendPrice'saccountofsubstituteimmortality.Atfirstwesaidthatoneachievesimmortalitybyperpetuatingcertainfeaturesofone'sownlifein childrenorinotherkindsofaccomplishments.However,onceweseetheroleofbeautyinimmortality,weseeadeepermotivationatwork.Onewishestocreate somethingbeautifulthatwillperpetuateone'sownlifebyoutlastingit.Thebeautyisafeatureofone'sownlifeinthecreationofitbutwilloutlastone'screationofit. First,animportantpartofthemotivationforreproducingthesefeaturesistheirbeauty.Bringingforthinbeautymeansbringingforthbecauseofbeauty,motivatedby beautytoproducebeauty.Second,itisinthiswaythattheloverachievesakindofimmortality.Bringingforthinbeautytakesonanewdimensionofmeaningthat relatestotheissueofimmortality.Infact,suchimmortalitycanbefoundatalllevelsofDiotima'saccount.Inthecaseofthelover,seekingimmortalitytakestheform ofthelover'spromotingvirtueinthebeloved'ssoul.Thevirtueisimmortaltotheextentthat,inbegettingandbringingitforth,theloverisnotsimplyproducing somethingvaluableforhimselfbutsomethingvaluabletohisbeloved.Moreover,accordingtoourinterpretation,heisabletotranscendthelimitsofhislifebecauseof thebeautyofwhatheiscreating.Heisnotreplicatinghisownvirtuejustbecauseitishisvirtuehe

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isreplicatingvirtuebecauseitisbeautifulbecauseitisanindependentexcellence.Itisbyconceivingofitassomethingbeautifulthathewantstotransferittothe belovedtherefore,itdoesnotdiewiththeloverbutliveswiththebeloved.35Whentheloverspromotevirtueinthesociety,theirvirtuechildisimmortalbecauseit doesnotserveonlytheirparticulargoalsbutthegoodofthecity.Moreover,theywishtobringforththevirtuechildnotjustbecauseitistheirvirtuechildbutbecause ofitsinherentbeauty.Thus,itlivesoninthecitythesetokensmightwellbeimmortalinthememoriesofhumankindjustbecausetheycapturebeautyinthisselfless way. Iftheroleofbeautyisthusintegraltotheachievingofimmortalityatthislevelofthescaleofbeauty,thenithasananalogousroleatthehigherlevel.Beautyshedslight onthedifferencebetweentheimmortalityoftheimageofvirtueandthatoftruevirtuethatis,betweentheimmortalityachievedbythenonphilosophicalloversand theimmortalityachievedbytheonewhoseestheForm.Diotimamakesastrongbutnotverycleardistinctionbetweenthesubstituteimmortalityofthosewhodo notknowtheFormofbeautyandtheloverwhodoescometoknowtheForm.Theimmortalityofthelatterseemstobeofadifferentsorteithertrueimmortalityor thebestkindofsubstituteimmortality.Relyingontheroleofbeautyinachievingimmortality,wecanseethedifference:Aswehaveargued,thebeautyachievedbythe loverswhodonotknowtheFormofbeautywouldbeonlyimagesofbeautyinspiredbyimagesofbeauty.ThebeautyachievedbytheloveroftheForm,however, wouldbeinspiredbythebeautifulitself.Thelatterimagemightwellhavemoredurabilitythantheformer.Intheformercase,thevisionofbeautyisclouded,sothe imageproducedwillbelesssure.Inspiredbyapartialviewofbeauty,theimageisnecessarilylimited.Onemightexpectthemereimageofvirtueforexample,virtue inthesoulofthebelovedtofalteroccasionallythebelovedmaysometimesfailtoactvirtuously.Aswell,theimageislimitedtocontext.Whilethevirtueofthe belovedisanimageofbeautythatisindependentoftheaimsofthelover,itisnotindependentofthebelovedinwhomitisembodied.Hisvirtueisconfinedtothe contextofhislifeandwillperishwithhim.Norisitclearthatthebelovedcanovercomehislimitationsenoughtopassvirtueontoanother.Andwhilethevirtueofthe cityisindependentoftheaimsofitsmakers,stillitisinspiredbyanimageofbeauty.Thus,ittoomightwellfalterfromtimetotimeitalsoiscircumscribedbythe

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contextofthecityanditscontinuitytooisindoubt.Bycontrast,ifanyimagewouldescapethisfateitoughttobetheimageofthebeautifulitself. TheinspirationoftheloverwhoknowstheFormisnotlimitedintheseways.Firstofall,unlikethebeautifulyouth,theFormofbeautydoesnotchangeitsinspiration isconstant.Thephilosophicallover'svisionofbeautyissurerthereforethushisactivityofbringingforthinthebeautifulisconstantandsure.Thevirtuehebringsforth inthesoulsofothers,orinthecity,wouldnotfalterbecauseitwouldbebasedontherealityoftheForm.SuchvirtuewouldpartakeinthechangelessnessoftheForm andwouldbeatokenofimmortality.AnotherdimensionofthismoreauthenticimmortalityalsodependsontheknowledgepossessedbytheloveroftheFormof beauty.IfthetrueloverknowstheFormofbeautythenhecanteachittoothers.Thus,theloverwouldperpetuatehisownvirtuebyhisabilitytoshowothersthe samevisionofbeauty,whichwill,inturn,engendertruevirtueinothers.InspiredbythevisionoftheForm,thisvirtueisnotlimitedbythelifeoftheloverorevenof thebeloved.ItisavirtuebasedontheuniversalvisionoftheFormofbeautyintheory,atleast,itcanbereplicatedineachsucceedinggeneration.36Andthecity thatisfoundedonthisknowledgeinitsguardianshasthebestpromiseforlastingstability. However,thereisanotheraspecttotheinspirationthatcomesfromtheFormofbeauty.Aswehaveseen,thereisasenseinwhichbeautyisthefinalcauseofbringing forthinthebeautiful.Itanswersthequestionastowhyonebringsforththatis,onebringsforthinbeautybecauseofbeauty.Beautyisfinalcauseinthesenseof objectofdesireitisthelover'sinspiration.Thenonphilosophicalloverisinspiredbyaparticularbeautyhebringsforthinaparticularbeautybecauseofaparticular beauty.Thatparticularbeautyisthefinalcauseofhisactionsbecausehedoeswhathedoesinordertobringforthinthatbeauty.Bycontrast,thephilosophicallover isinspiredbythebeautifulitselfthenhispurposewillbedifferent.Wecanputthisdifferencebysayingthatthephilosophicallover'sfinalcauseinthesenseofobject ofdesireforbringingforthinthebeautifulisthebeautifulitself.Bringingforthinthebeautifulitselfmeanspropagatingbeautyundertheinspirationofthebeautiful itselfbringingforthbeautybecauseofloveforthebeautifulitself,motivatedbythebeautifulitselftoproducebeauty.Ofcourse,thefinalcauseinthesenseofwhatis tobeachievedis

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immortalityorsubstituteimmortality.Thetwosensesoffinalcausearerelatedinthatloveforthebeautifulitselfinspirestheachievementofamoredurablesubstitute immortality.Thebeautifulitselfnotthebeautyofthebelovedisthevaluetheloveristryingtopropagate.Itisastrongerinspirationthatevokesapurermotivation. Thelatteristhekeytoamoredurablesubstituteimmortality.Loveofthebeautifulitselfisamotivationthatassuresasubstituteimmortalitythatcomesclosertoreal immortality.Onceheconceivesofthebeautifulitselfasobjectofdesire,hisdesireforimmortalitycanreachanotherlevel.Atthelevelatwhichheproducesbeauty becauseofthebeautifulitself,thelover'sinspirationisnotlimitedtoparticularcontexts.Thebeautyproducedatthislevelisasurerkindofsubstituteimmortality becausethelover,whileserving,alsotranscendshisownandothers'mortalitytheirindividualdesires,aims,andgoalstoserveavaluegreaterthananyonecould conceiveorcreateonhisown.HemayhaveseenthisvaluedimlyinthebelovedbutcouldnotfullyappreciateituntilhesawtheForm.Indeed,hisworkismore authenticallyimmortalnotjustbecauseitisdestinedtooutlastothers'butbecauseitservesagoodthat,tothephilosopher,isimmortalthebeautifulitself.Wecan illustratethispointbythinkingofsomeonewhospendsherlifepromotingacausewhosecontinuedexistencesherecognizesiscontingent.Sheisawarethatthisvalue sheistryingtopropagatemaydisappearaltogetherinseveralgenerations.Contrastherwithsomeoneelsewhospendsherlifepromotingacausewhosecontinued existencesheknowstobenecessary.Sincehercauseisimmortalherworkhasakindofimmortality.Inherownmind,sheisimmortalnotsomuchbecauseofwhat sheachievesbutbecauseofwhatsheserves.ThelatterpersonislikePlato'sloverofthebeautifulitself,whothroughthiskindofloveachievesasubstituteimmortality thatisclosertotrueimmortality.Thus,whentheFormofbeautybecomesthefocusoferos,wearebetterabletounderstandDiotima'sclaimthattheloverofthe Formhasamoreauthentickindofimmortality.WhenthefocusoferosistheFormofbeautyandnot,forexample,thebeautyofthebelovedtheloverfashions virtueon,andbecauseof,thehighestideal. PerhapswecanexpresstherelationbetweentheloverandtheFormbysayingthattherealissuebecomesoneofappropriation.Fundamentallyerosisanurgeto appropriateitsobjecttohavethegoodalways.Consummationandpossessionarewaysofappropriatingtheobjectofone'slovetheyare,ofcourse,destruc

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tive.Thus,consummationandpossessionarenotthewaytoappropriatetheFormofthebeautiful.37Ontheotherhand,whilegazingpassivelyonthebeautifulitself isnotdestructive,neitherisitawayofappropriatingit.Inpassivecontemplationthebeautifulitselfremainsexternaltotheloverbecausetheloverdoesnotincorporate thebeloveddoesnotpossessthegood.BringingforthinthebeautifulitselfistheonlywaytoappropriatetheFormwithoutdestroyingit.Bringingforthinthe beautifulitselfisawayofappropriatingtheFormthatrecognizestheindependenceandintrinsicvalueoftheForm.Atthesametimebringingforthinthebeautifulitself producessomethingthatpartakesoftheimmortalityoftheFormbecauseitappropriatesitsobjectwithoutdestroyingitthroughpossessionorconsummation.Now wecanunderstandthetransformationoferosintheSymposium.Perhapswecansaythateros,inseekingimmortality,reallyseeksagoodthatitcannotpossessor consumeagoodthatwillnotperishinbeingpossessedorconsumeditseeksagoodthatwillbewithitalways.Suchagoodisthebeautifulitself.However,the pricetopayforappropriatingsuchagoodisgivinguppossessionandconsummationastheendoflife.Finallywearriveataparadox.Theonlywaytoappease immortalityseekingerosistofindaneternalgoodbuttheonlywaytoappropriatethatgoodistopropagateit.Thus,bringingforthinthebeautifulitselfmeans producingvirtueinthesoulandinthecity.Inthiswayiserostransformedintothechiefmotivationforacquiringvirtueinthesoul.38 IfthisreadingoftheroleofimmortalityintheargumentoftheSymposiumiscorrect,itcorroboratestheaccountintheRepublicofthegooditselfasfinalcause.The twoaccountsareparalleltooneanothereveniftheyarenotexactlysimilar.IntheRepublicwesaidthephilosophicalrulerdisseminatesgoodnessinthefinalanalysis becauseofadmirationforthegooditself.ThusherfinaljustificationforimitatingtheFormofjusticerestswiththegooditselfbecausetheFormofjustice,invirtueofits relationtothegooditself,deservesorevenrequiresdissemination.IntheSymposium,imitationisnotexplicitlyanissuehowever,somethingsimilarisanissue bringingforthinthebeautiful.Inourreading,bringingforthinthebeautifulmeanspropagatingbeautyundertheinspirationofbeauty.Forthephilosophicallover bringingforthinthebeautifulmeanspropagatingbeautyundertheinspirationofthebeautifulitself.Forthetrueloverthepurestloveistheloveofthebeautifulitselfthe purestmotivationisloveofthe

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beautifulitself.Whenthephilosophicalloverisinspiredbythebeautifulitself,hepropagatesbeautybecauseofhisloveforthebeautifulitself.Heislikethe philosophicalrulerintheRepublic,whodisseminatesgoodnessbecauseofadmirationforthegooditself.Ofcourse,intheSymposium,Diotimadoesnotsaythatthe linkbetweeninspirationbythebeautifulitselfandthecreationofbeautyisimitationalthoughthebeautycreatedwillnecessarilyreflectthebeautifulitself.However, theroleoftheFormintheaccountofthefinalcauseissimilarinbothcases.Thus,neithertheFormofgoodnessnortheFormofbeautyisappropriatedbybeing possessedandconsumed.Noraretheyappropriatedbyalovinggazeorevenworshiptheseessentiallypassiveattitudesarenotmodesofappropriationatall.Inthe naiveview,ontheotherhand,propagationordisseminationisthewaytoappropriatetheForm.Finally,itistheFormthatmotivatesthephilosophicalrulerandthe truelovertoestablishvirtueinthesoulandinthecity.TheneedtopropagateordisseminatetheFormisbasedonloveandadmirationfortheForm.TheForm,then, finallyexplainsthevalueofpropagationordisseminationnotbybeingameanstowhatweotherwisevaluebutbybeingthatwhichismostvaluable.39Whenone graspsthisentity,onegraspsnotameanstogoodnessandbeautybutsomethingunconditionallygoodandbeautiful.Thevalueofpropagatingordisseminatingthis kindofentityliesfinallywiththeentityitself.Itisbecauseofthisdependencythatthepropagatingordisseminatingisalsovaluableforwhatreceivesit.Atlastwesee thethirdlevelofunderstandingofPlato'saccountofimitation.Oneseekstheperfectionofthesoul'sfunctionasthenaturaloutcomeofseeingtheidealintheForm. Thelifelongperformanceofthevirtuoussoulisindeedstriking,valuableinitselfapartfromwhateversatisfactionitaffordsalthoughthesatisfactionsarenotnegligible. Butfinallyitisvaluableinitselfbecauseitisanembodimentof,areflectionof,theForm.ItisloveoftheFormthatprovidesselfperfection,justiceinthecity,and durablesubstituteimmortalityuntiloneconceivesthislovethelattercannotbeachieved. IV Whatanswer,atlast,dowehaveforCallicles?Attheendofthesecondchapter,ourimaginaryCallicles'objectedthatallofthe

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talkaboutorderandharmonyisjusttalkaboutwhatisgoodforreasonbutnotaboutwhatisgoodfortheappetites.Attheendofthethirdchapter,wetriedto answertheobjectionbyexplicatingtheclaimthatreason,endowedwithwisdom,knowswhatisgoodforthepartsofthesoul,includingtheappetites.Wearguedthat knowledgeoftheFormofjusticegivesreasonagraspofthetruecontoursofjusticeinthesoulsothatitwillhaveinsightintowhatisgoodforeachpartofthesoul justassomeonesensitivetojusticewillbemorelikelytobecarefulintheassessmentofothers'needsandrequirements.Still,beyondthisgeneralclaimaboutthe affectofknowledgeoftheFormsonthesoul,wehadnothingveryspecifictosay.Now,however,Diotima'saccountoferosaddressesthatdeficiencyshehasgiven anaccountofwhatisgoodforappetiteoratleastforappetiteaseros. TheanswertoCalliclesisthatproportionateorderinthesoulisnotjustreasonarrogantlyimposingitsviewpointontherestofthesoul.Itisnotthesoulimitatingthe Formofjusticesimplybecausereasonfindssuchproportionandorderattractive.IntheSymposium,Platoisnowsayingthatproportionateorderallowserosto achieveitstruegoalitsgood.Fundamentally,erosisloveofthebeautifulitselfanditstrueaccomplishmentisbringingforthinthebeautifulitself.Firstofall,onlyby moderatingeroscanonehopetoweanitawayfromunrestrainedindulgenceinpleasuretowardloveforthebeautifulitself.Finally,however,proportionateorderis theformthatthisaccomplishmenttakesproportionateorderinthesouliswhathappenswhenerosisaccomplishedandbringsforthinthebeautiful.Itisnotthatsuch alifewillnothavethepleasuresofreplenishment.Ratheritisthatthegoalofsuchalifewillnotbethepleasuresofreplenishment.Thegoalwilltobeachievethe embodimentofanideal.Themeanswillbetobringacertainorderandharmonyintotheappetites.Notonlywillbringingorderandharmonyintotheappetitiesallow onetopursuetheidealitwillembodytheideal.Embodyingtheidealwillsatisfyerosatitsmostprofoundlevelbecause,accordingtoDiotima,eroswantstobring forthinthebeautiful.However,satisfactionatthismostprofoundlevelmeanserosmustleavebehindunrestrainedpossessionandconsummation. WhatarethechancesthatCallicleswillbeconvincedbythisaccount?Theanswerdependsontheanswertotwootherquestions:(1)WillCalliclesbeconvincedthat thereisanunconditionedgood?and(2)WillCalliclesbeconvincedthattheaimof

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erosistobringforthinthebeautiful?TheanswertothefirstquestiondependsonthesuccessofPlato'smetaphysicalprojectinthemiddledialogues.IfPlatocanfulfill hispromisesaboutthehighestlearning,Calliclescouldbeconvincedif,ofcourse,hehasthesoulofaphilosopherandhissoulhasnotyetbeencorrupted.Likewise, ifhehasthesoulofaphilosopherhemightbeabletofollowtheleadofaDiotimaindiscoveringthelesserandthegreatermysteriesoferosinparticular,hemightbe abletofollowtheargumentthaterosisfulfilledbybringingforthinthebeautiful.Supposethereisagooditself,aFormthatisgoodfromeverypointofview, unconditionallygood.Itisthedistilledessence(liketheessenceofascentorperfume)ofgoodness,unmixed,whosemixedanddilutedtracesarefoundinalltheother goodsofone'slife.Itisthefullstrengthofthegoodnessonlypartiallygraspedinthepleasuresofreplenishment.Itisnotitselfpleasurebutwhatmakespleasuregood. Ifonevaluespleasureonewouldvaluethegoodevenmore.Onemightnothavetogiveuppleasuretograspthisother,greatergood.Itwould,however,berational toleadalifeinwhichonehadthepleasuresofreplenishmentandthegooditself.Nowsupposethattheonlywaytohavethegooditselfalwaysisthesameastheway tohavethebeautifulitselftopropagateordisseminateit.ThissuppositionisthekeytothesuccessofPlato'sprogramitexpresseswhatDiotimameansbybringing forthinthebeautiful.Whateros,theleadingappetite,reallywantsistopropagatebeautyandbyextensionhere,goodness.However,disseminatinggoodness impliesbringingorderandharmonyintoone'sappetitesbringingjusticeintoone'ssoulandgivingupthelifeofunrestrainedpleasure.Ifthegooditselfwerethe essenceofgoodness,andifone'sdeepestdesireweretoappropriatethatgoodness,andiftheonlywaytoappropriatethegooditselfisbyimitatingtheFormof justice,andifimitatingtheFormofjusticeimpliedrestrainingone'sappetites,therationalpersonifshegraspedalloftheseconditionswouldrestrainherappetites. Wouldtherationalhedonistfollowtheargumentandrestrainhisappetites?Theanswer,inPlato'swayoflookingatit,dependsonwhetherheismoreofarationalist orahedonist.Ifahedonistidentifiesthegoodwithpleasure,hewouldnotagreethattheessenceofgoodnessisthegooditself.Hewouldnotagreethatthegooditself isthefullstrengthofthegoodnessonlypartiallygraspedinthepleasureofreplenishmentifhedidagree,hewouldnotbeahedonistinthissense.Whileifhedidnot agree,hewould

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notbearationalistinPlato'ssense.Ontheotherhand,aweakerformofhedonismmightbecompatiblewithpursuingthegooditself.Imagineamoderatehedonistfor whomthereareothergoodsbesidespleasurebutwhorequiresthatothergoodsentailpleasureindeed,thehigherthegoodthegreaterthepleasure.SinceSocrates maintainsthatthephilosophicallifeisthemostpleasantlife,thenheshouldbeabletoconvincethemoderatehedonist(Rep.587e).Indeed,itwouldbetheusualsort ofparadoxicalargumentwhichsaysthat,ifyouwantpleasure,youshouldgiveuppleasureasyourgoalandaimatsomethingelsethenyouwillhavepleasure.Atthis point,wecanseetheimportanceoftherealityappearancemotif.Togetthehedonistbeyondtheconceptionofpleasureasthefundamentalreality,Socratesmust representunrestrainedpleasureasanillusoryimageofthegoodonethatsubstitutesfortherealgood.Ofcourse,itisnotaquestiononlyofrepresentationSocrates mustbeabletoshowtherationalhedonistthatthereisarealgoodnessbeyondtheapparentgoodofpleasure.Thenthelifeofunrestrainedpleasurewillappeartothe hedonistasanillusionadeceptiveimagethelifeofunrestrainedpleasurewillappearasanimageofthegoodthathassubstitutedforrealgood.Indeed,Socrates shouldalsobeabletoshowtherationalhedonistthat,ifoneunderstandstherealgood,onecanmakeimagesofthegoodthatarenotdeceptiveimagesbutfaithful reflectionseveninthematterofpleasures.Presumablyafaithfulreflectionofthegooditselfwouldbealifeofmoderatepleasuresbalanced,proportionate,and harmonious. AbsentthecompletionoftheprojectofPlatonicmetaphysicstheprospectsofconvincingCalliclesare,ofcourse,somewhatdimmer.Thatistosay,withoutthe knowledgeneededtodifferentiatebetweenappearanceandreality,acompletelyconvincingargumentisnotavailable.Whatwehaveinactualityareincomplete argumentsandpartial,fleetinginsights.Wehaveanextendedargument,forinstance,aboutthepartsofthesoulandtheirperfectioninvirtueSocrateshimselfsaysthat theaccountisincomplete(Rep.504ab).ItneedscompletioninthehighestlearningabouttheFormofthegood.Itmay,nevertheless,havesomeforceinits incompletenessitcertainlygivesadirectionfortherestoftheargument.Inasimilarfashion,Diotima'steachingabouterosthatitseekscompletioninbringingforth inthebeautiful,especiallythebeautifulitselfisapartialinsight.Callicles

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couldhavethatpartialinsightifheweretoexperiencetheincompletenessoferosasconsummation,ifheweretoseeerosasstrivingforsomethingmorethan pleasure.SuchaninsightwouldtakereflectionandanadeptguidebutitseemspossibleevenforCallicles.Ifhedidgetthepoint,hewouldnotbethefirstnorthelast toseethelimitationofthelifeoferosasconsummation.WilltheincompleteargumentsandpartialinsightsbeenoughtorecruitCalliclestothecraftofjustice?The effectsofincompleteargumentsandpartialinsightsarecontingent,ofcourse,onothermatterslessrational.Alcibiades,forinstance,couldescapeSocrates'arguments byavoidingSocrates(Sym.216b).However,weshouldnotconcludethatthefaultlieswiththeincompleteargumentsandpartialinsights.Alcibiadesdoesnotreject theargumentsasfallaciousordismisstheinsightsasdelusion.HefeelstheforceofthelifeofvirtueespeciallyinitsappearanceintheimageofSocrates.Hisreaction towhatSocratessaysiswellrepresentedinhisreactiontoSocratestheperson.AlcibiadesfeelstheattractionofthelifeofvirtueinthepersonofSocrates,whomhe seesasakindofimage,evenashefeelsrepelledbythatlife. Liveswhosegoalsarehiddenandloftyidealsarealwaysfascinatingbecausetheyarebothattractiveandrepellent.Oneisattractedbyalifethathassuchastrong center,byalifelivedwithsuchclearandcertaindevotion.Ontheotherhand,suchalifeisrepellentbecauseitseemstorequirethelossofsomuchthatmostofus associatewithlife.Fundamentally,suchalifegivesuppleasureandambition,forthatmatterasgoals.Ofcourse,thelifeofdevotiontoagoalmayalsobe pleasurablebutitspleasureissecondaryandalmostunintended.Theseidealistsarehappybutnotbecausetheyseekpleasureaslife'sgoal.Socratesis,ofcourse, Plato'sportraitofsuchaperson.NowhereistheportraitclearerthanintheSymposium.Alcibiades,hisbeloved,paintsitwithinspiredskill.Byanironicreversal,the physicallybeautifulAlcibiadescametoseethebeautyoftheuglySocrates'soul.ComparinghimtooneofthestatutesoftheuglysatyrMarsyas,inwhichare concealedbeautifulimagesofgods,Alcibiadesdeliversoneofthemosthauntingeulogiesofourtradition:
IdonotknowifanyonehasseenwhenheisbeingearnestandopenthosefigureswithinhimbutIdidseethemonceandtheyseemedtometobesimplygodlikeandgolden, altogetherbeau

Page232 tifulandamazingsothatIhadtodostraightawaywhatSocratesrequired.(216e217a)

ThebeautifulimagesthatAlcibiadessawwererevealedtohimwhenhe,thebeloved,triedtobecomethelover.HisillfatedattempttoseduceSocratestophysical consummationoferosfailed,ofcourse,becauseSocratesresistedhisadvances.Alcibiadeshimself,thoughabashed,admiredSocrates'natureforitstemperanceand courage(agamenondetontoutouphysintekaisophrosunenkaiandreian[219d45]). PeoplelikeSocratesarenotalwayssympathetic.Infact,muchaboutSocrates'portraitinthedialoguespresentshimasadifficultanddangerouspersonjustbecause heissosingleminded.HistreatmentofAlcibiades'attemptatseduction,forinstance,isasAlcibiadessaysarrogant.Itisnotclearhowmuchhecaresfor Alcibiades.However,thereisalsosomethingattractiveabouthimanditishisdevotiontoanidealoflifethatmakeshimso.Socratesisbothattractiveandrepellent forthesamereason,theidealthathepursues.Thesecontradictoryaspectsofhislifemakehimfascinating.Ifhewerealwaysgoodorifhewerealwaysbad,hewould notbefascinating.ItistheingeniouswayinwhichPlatohasputthecontradictoryaspectstogetherthatmakestheportraitofSocratesitselfsoseductive.Thereisin theportraitsomethingthatpromisesthecontradictionwillberesolved.Ifwestudy,read,andimaginehardenough,wewillatlastseehowtheattractiveandthe repellentarereconciledinsomesynthesiswithinSocrates'personality.Atthispointwemightsuspectthat,ifthereistobeareconciliationofthecontradictoryaspects, itisbecausethecontradictionpointsbeyonditselfjustasSocrates'life,asportrayedinthedialogues,pointsbeyonditself.Socrates'lifecanbeseenasanimageof thegooditselfitsvalueisinthefactthatitisanimitationofthegooditself.Likeotherimages,ithasconflictingaspectstheseaspectsarereconciledwhenonesees thatbehindtheaspectsthereisareality,therealityofthegooditself.Thephilosopherswhoparticipateinthedialoguesboththecharactersinthedialoguesandthe fascinatedreadersofthedialoguesareonthissideoftheimage.WearenotyettruephilosophersthosewhohavegraspedtheFormofthegoodweareatbest thosewhohavehypothesizedthattheremustbesuchanintrinsicgood.Platohasdevisedforusanimagethatisamostpotenttraceofevidencefortherebeingsucha thingtheimageofthegooditselfthatPlato

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createsinSocratesgivesusanimaginativegraspoftherealitythatmakessuchalifepossible. V Plato'scraftofjusticehastwosources.Oneistheanalogybetweencraftandvirtuefoundintheearlydialogues.InitsfullestformintheEuthydemus,theanalogy comparesacraftlikecarpentrytothevirtueofwisdom.Justasacarpenterbothpossessestoolsandmaterialsandknowshowtousethem,sothewisepersonknows howtousehisphysicalandspiritualassets.Theformerproduces,forexample,atablethelatterachieveshappiness.Ofcourse,Socratescannottellhisinterlocutors whatthisknowledgeofrightuseofassetsis.Thesecondsourceisthecraftofruling,whichispresentedinitfullestformintheGorgiasasatherapeuticcraftone thatlooksoutafterthesoulinawaythatisanalogoustothewaythatmedicinelooksoutafterthebody.Thegoalofthecraftofrulingistobringvirtueintothesoulsof thoseitcaresforthesoulsofothers.VirtueisidentifiedwithaharmonyandbalanceofcertainpartsofthesoulwhileSocratesdoesnotelaborateonthenotionof partsofthesoul,theusualbodilydesiressuchasthoseforfood,drink,andsexarethefocusofhisaccountofharmonyinthesoul.Socratesidentifiesunrestrained bodilydesiresasthesourceofdisharmonyandimbalance.Thus,thecraftofrulingwouldhavetorestrainthesedesiresinordertoreturnharmonyandbalancetothe soul.Judgingisthecraftthatrestrainsthedesiresanditdoessobypunishment.Socratesdoesnotgointomuchdetailaboutthewaypunishmentachievesrestraintbut heseemstopresenthisownelenchusasawayofrestrainingdesiresbymeansofuncoveringcontradictionsinbeliefs. Thecraftofjusticecombinesthesetwocrafts.LikerulingintheGorgias,itisatherapeuticcraftthatcaresforthesoulbybringingbalanceandharmonynowofthe soul'sfunctions:reason,spiritedpart,andappetitesthisharmonyisthesameasthearchvirtueofjustice.Moreover,itincorporatesthevirtueofwisdomfromthe Euthydemusbecauseitisdirectedatone'sselfone'sownsoulnotthoseofothersitalsoistheknowledgeoftherightuseofone'sassets,ifassetsarenowtaken tobethesoul'sfunctions.ThecraftofjusticesolvestheproblemoftheEuthyde

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musbecauseitshowsthehappiness,whichwastheelusivegoalofthecraftofwisdominthatdialogue,tobeortobelargelybalance,proportion,andharmonyin thesoul.Itsolvestheproblemofthecraftanalogy,whichwehavecalledits''instrumentality'':virtuecannotbeacraftbecausecraftisalwaysinstrumentaltosome otherendandisnotvaluableinitselfbutvirtueisvaluableinitselfandisnotinstrumentaltosomeotherend.Theansweristhatthecraftofjusticenotonlybrings balanceandharmonyintothesoulthusbringinghappinessitalsoisbalanceandharmonyoffunctions.Thecraftofjusticeisnotinstrumentaltohappinessitisor islargelyhappiness.PlatohasaccomplishedthismuchbytheendofRepublicIV.Atthispointhisfocusshiftstojusticeinthecityandthewaytoestablishitthere. TheansweristomakephilosophersrulersphilosophersarethosewhohavetheknowledgeneededtoestablishandpreservejusticebecausetheyknowtheFormsof justice,temperance,andbeauty.InRepublicVI,SocratespresentstheseFormsasparadigmsthatthephilosopher,likeapainter,copies.Thephilosopherimitates theseparadigmsinhisownsoulandinthecitybringingjustice,temperance,andbeautyintohissoulandintothecitybecausehemustimitatewhatheadmires.The Forms,then,fulfilltwofunctions:theyshowwhatrealjustice,temperance,andbeautyareandtheyinspirethephilosophertoimitatethem.InRepublicVI,then,the craftofjusticebecomesanimitativecraft,oneinformedbyknowledgeoftheForms. IfthecraftofjusticeimitatestheForms,thenwhatitproduceswillbeimagesofjustice,temperance,andbeauty.WhatwelearnintheRepublicisthattheseimages arealsoappearancesofwhichtheFormsofjustice,temperance,andbeautyarethereality.Thisassociationofimageandappearancegivesanimportantemphasisto thejobofthephilosophers.AttheplaceinRepublicVwhereSocratesintroducesForms,hedoessobycontrastingFormswithdeceptiveimages.Thelatterare imagesofbeautythathavecometosubstitutefortheFormofbeautytheloversofsightsandsoundsmistakenlythinktheseimagesarerealbeauty.Thephilosopher candistinguishbetweentheimageandthereality.Thephilosophicalruleralsocandistinguishbetweenimagesofjusticeandrealjusticethus,thephilosophicalruler canguardagainsttheillusionthatcomesfromidentifyingjusticeintheperceptualworldwithrealjustice.Thephilosophicalrulerisawareofthedependentstatusof justiceintheperceptualworldthatourjusticeisa

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tokenofrealjusticebutisnottherealthing.Thisawarenessgiveshimasurergraspofthesituationthanthatofsomeonewhothinksthatjusticeintheperceptualworld isthesameasrealjustice.Presumably,increatingimagesofjustice,thephilosophicalrulerisalsoawareofthedifferencebetweenevenagoodimageofjusticeand realjustice.Thisdistinctionbetweenrealityandappearanceisimportantwithinone'sownsoul,aswell,whereillusionwhatwehavecalled"substitutedeception"is causedbytheappetiteswhentheyarenotdisciplined.TheFormsareavaluableguideinthemorallifebecausetheycanexposetheillusionsgeneratedbyappetites andshowthemtobedeceptive.Presumably,knowledgeoftheFormsofjustice,temperance,andbeautycanalsoguidethephilosopherinmakinganimageinher soulthatisafaithfulreflectionofthebalanceandharmonyfoundintheForms. SofarouraccountisanelaborationofthenotionofthecraftofjusticeasimitativeofFormsandwhatSocratessaysaboutappearance,imitation,andillusioninthe secondhalfoftheRepublic.Theaccount,thusfar,hasnotaddressedafundamentalissue:whydoFormshavethisauthorityinthelifeandpracticeofphilosophers? EvenifthereissuchathingastheFormofjustice,whyshouldphilosopherstreatthisFormasaparadigmforimitation?Tofindtheanswertothesequestionswemust leaveSocrates'discussionofimitationandimagesinordertoexplorethesubjectofthegreatestlearning(megistonmathema).Theansweristhat,intheRepublic, theinspirationforimitatingtheFormofjusticecomesfromknowledgeoftheFormofgoodness,thesubjectofthegreatestlearning.SocratesintroducestheFormof justiceasaparadigmforimitationhealsointroducestheFormofgoodnessasepistemicallyandontologicallypriortotheotherForms,includingjustice.The implicationforthecraftofjusticeisthattheFormofgoodnessisthefinalcauseforimitation.Itshouldfollowthat,oncethephilosophergraspstheFormofgoodness, sherealizeswhyshemustimitatetheFormofjustice.ThenotionoftheFormofgoodnessasfinalcausefindsananalogueintheFormofbeautyintheSymposium.In thatdialogue,theaccountbeginswithDiotima'sstrikingclaimthattheaimoferosistobringforthinthebeautiful.Bringingforthinthebeautifulmakespropagation andnotmerepossessiontheaimoferosandinthecaseofthespiritualloversitmeanspropagatingthebeautyofvirtueinthesoul.Moreover,beautyisthefinal causeofbringingforthinthebeautifulitanswersthequestionastowhytheybring

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forthinbeauty.OncethephilosopherdiscoverstheFormofbeauty,bringingforthinthebeautifulbecomesbringingforthinthebeautifulitself.Thelattermeans propagatingthebeautyofvirtueundertheinspirationofthebeautifulitself.Thebeautifulitselfbecomesthefinalcauseforthephilosophicallover'sacquiringand instillingvirtue.AsimilarmotivationisatworkinthecraftofjusticewhenitimitatestheFormofjustice.Inthecaseofthecityandthesoul,thephilosopher'sproducing imagesofjusticeimitatingtheFormofjusticeisthewayofdisseminatinggoodness.Finally,Plato'scraftofjusticeisanimitativecraftwhoseparadigmistheForm ofjusticeandwhosefinalcauseistheFormofgoodness.Thephilosopherwhopursuesthiscraftproducesimagesofjusticeinhersoulandinthecitytheseimages aretokensofintrinsicgoodnessinaworldthatisinnocentofauthenticintrinsicgoodness.Althoughtheseimagesaregoodforhersoulandforthecity,theyaregood becausetheyaretokensofintrinsicgoodness.ThereasonthephilosopherimitatestheFormofjusticeistopropagatethesetokensbothbecausetheyarevaluablein themselvesandbecausetheyareimagesofgoodness,whichisunconditionallygood. Notes 1.See,forinstance,J.Cooper,"PsychologyofJustice,"153154.J.C.B.Gosling,Plato,55:"He[Plato]isliabletosayfirstthatapersononlyhasknowledgeifhe candistinguishbetweengoodandbadsecond,thatifonecantalkofagood(orbad)X,thenXissomethingofwhichwecanhaveknowledgethird,anideal analogueofthefirst,realknowledgeisofthegoodfourth,anidealanalogueofthesecond,thegoodisresponsibleforknowledge." 2.GerasimosSantas,PlatoandFreud:TwoTheoriesofLove(Oxford:BasilBlackwell,1988),4546.C.D.C.Reeve(PhilosopherKings)alsopresentsthe FormofgoodasasystemofForms.Cf.8485.SeealsoNicholasP.White(Companion,4043),wheretheauthorpresentsanaccountoftherelationbetweenthe goodandtheotherFormsinwhichthegoodisresponsibleforthegoodnessoftheotherForms.Seealso175181. 3.Forasimilarreadingofthe(unpromisingcandidate)Formofbed,cf.my"TheUniquenessProofforFormsinRepublicX,"140141. 4.RichardRobinson,Plato'sEarlierDialectic,2ded.(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1953),126133.

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5.Cf.Cooper,"PsychologyofJustice,"154:"First,pendingaqualificationtobeentereddirectly,thegooditselfisagoodthing,overandabovethegoodthingsof thisworld:overandabove,thatisbothindividualgoodthingslikeparticularpersonsandevents,andsuchthingsasaquiet,studiouslifeoracooldrinkonahotday whichonemightspeakofasgoodthings,thoughtheyarenotindividualsbutclassesofindividuals.Unliketheseothergoodthings,however,itisnotmerelyagood somethingorother,orgoodassuchandsuch,orgoodforsoandsoorfromsuchandsuchapointofview.TouseAristotelianlanguage,onecouldsayitsessenceis tobegooditisnot,likeeveryothergoodthing,essentiallysomethingelse(ameal,aperson)that,foronereasonoranother,happenstobegood(isaccidentally good).Itsgoodnessisnot,thereforedilutedandcompromisedbybeingmingledwithandmadedependentonotherfeaturesofthingsasistrueofeveryothergood. Thusitsgoodnessispure,asthatofnoothergoodis.Furthermore,itistheonlyperfectgood." 6.Cf.H.W.B.Joseph,KnowledgeandtheGoodinPlato'sRepublic(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1948),10:"Thatthegoodisknowledge,orphronesis, Platoregardedalsoasanunsatisfactorydoctrinetoknow,orthink,isgood,butonlyiftheobjectofyourthoughtorknowledgeisso." 7.Cf.DavidHitchcock,"TheGoodinPlato'sRepublic,"Apeiron19(1985),7172:"Likewise,theFormofthegoodwillbeasubstantivedeterminingcriterion pleasure,orwisdom,orsomeotherpropertysuchthatby'gazingat'itonecansaythatsomeparticularthingisintrinsicallygoodforasoulwhichpossessesit becauseitspossessionbyasoulis'like'thatpropertythatis,becausethesoulwhichpossessesitwilltothatextentacquirethepropertyinquestion.Weshould thereforetakePlato'sclaimsabouttherelationbetweenthegoodandthebeingandtruthofthingsknowntobeintendedasholdingtrueinvirtueofwhattheFormof goodis.Ifthegoodispleasure,forexample,thentheclaimthatthegoodisthecauseofthebeingofthingsknown(includingtheForms)wouldmeanthatpleasureis thecauseoftheirbeing,thatis,that,forathingknown(includinganyForm),tobeistobepleasant." 8.Cf.Cooper,"PsychologyofJustice,"155:"He[thejustperson]knowsthegooditselfandthereforewhateverhevalueshevaluesstrictlyinthelightofa comparisonbetweenthatthingandthegood.Whateverexhibitsmorefullyandperfectlythesortofrationalorderthattheformofthegoodpossessesasitsessencehe valuesmorehighlythanotherthings." 9.WhatChristineKorsgaardsaysin"TwoDistinctionsinGoodness"(PhilosophicalReview92[1983]:169195)illuminatesthisdistinctionbetweenthegoodsofour experienceandauthenticintrinsicgood.Shepointsoutthatthedistinctionbetweenintrinsicandextrinsicgoods

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isdifferentfromthedistinctionbetweenthingsvaluedasendsandthingsvaluedinthemselves.Theformeristhedifferencebetweenthingsthathavegoodnessin themselvesandthingsthatderivetheirgoodnessfromsomethingelse.Thelatterisadifferencebetweenthewaysinwhichthingscanbedesired.Thetwo distinctionsarenotthesameanddifferentiatingthemallowsustoseesomeimportantdifferencesinmoraltheories.ClaimingthatKantobservesthedifference betweenthetwodistinctions,shesaysthatheallowstheretobeonlyoneintrinsicgood,thegoodwill.Moreover,thegoodwillisunconditionedgoodbecauseitis goodinallcircumstances."Athingisunconditionallygoodifitisgoodunderanyandallconditions,ifitisgoodnomatterwhatthecontext"(178).Itis unconditionalgoodnessthatwewereascribingtothegooditselfwhenwecalledit"authenticintrinsicgoodness"beinggoodnomatterwhat.Thereareother goodthingsthatarenotunconditionedgoodstheirgoodnessdependsonotherfactors.Thus,insomecircumstancestheyaregoodandinothercircumstances theyarenotgood. 10.Cf.Cooper,"PsychologyofJustice,"157:"Thisis,Ithink,thedirectconsequenceoftheroleplayedinPlato'stheorybytheformofthegood.Itistheultimate objectofpursuit,yetliesoutsidetheworld.Hencenoworldlythingoractivitycan,becauseofitsownproperties,becauseofwhatitis,interestthejustmananything interestshimonlyasameansofcomingnearertothegooditself." 11.See,forinstance,S.H.Aronson,"TheHappyPhilosopher:aCounterExampletoPlato'sProof,"JournaloftheHistoryofPhilosophy10(1973):383398. 12.Cf.JosephBeatty,"WhyShouldPlato'sPhilosopherBeMoralAnd,Hence,Rule?"ThePersonalist57(1976):132144ThomasBrickhouse,"Moreonthe ParadoxofthePhilosopher'sRule,"ThePersonalist59(1978):304306,and''TheParadoxofthePhilosopher'sRule,"Apeiron15(1981):68. 13.Cf.R.Kraut,"Egoism,LoveandPoliticalOfficeinPlato,"PhilosophicalReview82(1973):330344."Thephilosopher,onhis[Plato's]viewnotonlywantsthe citizensofthepolistobevirtuous,healsowantstohelpcreatevirtueinthoseheloves.Andifhereceivesnopoliticalassignment,thisdesiretocreatemustremain unsatisfied"(339)R.Demos,"AFallacyinPlato'sRepublic,"inPlato,vol.2,Vlastos,ed.:''Toaimatthegoodisalsotoaimattheproductionofgoodthingsthus foranindividualtoaimatjusticemeansthathecaresnotonlyforjusticeintheabstract,butalsothatjusticeshouldbeembodiedinhumanbeingsingeneral....The healthofthesoulincludes,aboveall,thefulfillmentofitsreason:andtheconcernofreasonisthatthegoodshouldbeexemplifiedeverywhere"(55).Timothy Mahoney,"DoPlato'sphilosopherrulerssacrificeselfinteresttojustice?"Phronesis37(1992):265282."Thus,thepreeminentaimoftheidealhumanlifeistosatisfy reason's

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desirefortheactualizationofthegoodofeverythingandanything"(280). 14.Cf.D.Hall,"TheRepublicandthe'LimitsofPolitics'"PoliticalTheory5(1977):307:"Now,becausetheoreticalandpracticalreasonarethetwoaspectsofthe samepowerorfaculty,wecangeneralizefromreason'sprocedureinthetheoreticalmodetoitsoperationinthepractical.Becauseinthepracticalmodereason functionsinthesameway,itseeksnaturallytoreproduceplatonicjusticeequallyinanyoftheparticularpsychaithatfallwithinthescopeofitsaction.Justasinthe theoreticalmodereason'spurposeofapprehendingtheformsisidenticalinrelationtoalltheparticularsofthesensibleworld,so,inthepracticalmode,itspurposeof recreatingtheorderoftheformsisthesameinallsimilarcases." 15.Cf.NicholasP.White(Companion,49)."Iaminclinedtobelieve,infact,thatPlatothoughtthatthemereapprehensionoftheGoodcouldmoveapersonto actionwithoutanyfurtherstepofanykind,andthat,forhim,toapprehendtheGoodfullyalongwithasituationinwhichitmightbeexemplifiedsimplyistohavea desireoverwhelmingallotherstoseethatinstantiationtakeplace"(cf.5354).Also"ThedesiretoimitatetheForms,bothinconductingoneselfandinactingonother things,isnotpresentedasderivativefromsomeotherdesire,butseemstoberegardedbyPlatoasitselfbasic..."(173),n.D.SeealsoJ.Cooper,"Psychologyof Justice,''156:"Butthereisnocauseforalarm,sincethepurerprinciplesPlatohimselfhasbeenespousingleadtothesameconclusion.Thatthesephilosophersarejust means,onPlato'saccount,thattheyknowthegooditselfandactalwayswithaviewtoadvancingrationalorderinthewholeworld."Cf.J.Cooper,"Plato'sTheory ofHumanMotivation,"HistoryofPhilosophyQuarterly1(1984):8:''Sowhatisinherentinreasonisthedesireforgood,assuchnotthedesireforanyparticular good."G.Klosko,"The'Rule'ofReasoninPlato'sPsychology,"HistoryofPhilosophyQuarterly5(1988):341356,agreeswithpartofwhatCoopersaysabout therelationbetweenreasonandthegood.Whatissignificantforouraccountishisclaimthatinthesoulsofphilosophersreason,inpartatleast,rulesforthegood. "AccordingtoCooper'sstrongerview[oneKloskofindsinPlato'spsychology],healthisdesired,notbecauseitsatisfiesotherdesires,butbecauseitisperceivedby reasontobegood.Healthisaconditioninwhichthebodyfulfillsitsnaturalfunction,andPlatobelievesthatsuchconditionsaregood.Thusthedesireforhealth,asa particularmanifestationofthedesireforthegood,isaninherentdesireofreason(likecognitivedesires)"(350351).T.Irwin,Plato'sMoralTheory,237,242,and 255257,isalsoanadvocateoftheexpressivethesis.Cf.CharlesKahn,"Plato'sTheoryofDesire,"ReviewofMetaphysics41(1987):84:"Thisisthesecond controversialthesisIshalldefendhere:

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thatreasonintheRepublicisnotonlyessentiallydesirebutessentiallydesireforthegood....Hencethegoalofrationaldesire,ofreasonassuch,isneitherthe goodoftheindividualalone(asitissometimessaidtobe,onegoisticreadingsofPlato)northegoodofthecommunityalone,butthegoodineverycase,thegood ingeneralortheGoodassuch."Finally,GregoryZeigler,"Plato'sGorgiasandPsychologicalHedonism,"Personalist60(1979):123133,makesanimportant distinctionbetweenegoismandaltruismSocrates'theoryisneither."Socrates'theorymaybestbecapturedbyreferencetotheGreekwordforgood,agathos. Heclaimsthatallmenhaveastheirobjectofwish,whentheyact,thegood,impersonallyconceived.Thus,Iwishtocallhimapsychologicalagathist''(125). 16.RichardKrautmaintainsathesisclosetotheonewemaintain."ReturntotheCave:Republic519521,"ProceedingsoftheBostonAreaColloquiumin AncientPhilosophy7(1991)"TheDefenseofJusticeinPlato'sRepublic,"TheCambridgeCompaniontoPlato(RichardKraut,ed.Cambridge:Cambridge UniversityPress,1992).ToKraut,loveoftheFormofgoodandimitatingtheFormgotogether."ThecruxofmyviewisthattheFormsconstitutethesupremegood becausetheyexhibitthehighestkindoforder,andthathumanbeingscanpossessthissupremegoodbyenteringintoacertainkindofrelationshipwiththeForms,a relationshipthatinvolvesnotmerelyunderstandingtheseabstractobjectsbutlovingandimitatingthemaswell"("ReturntotheCave,"5152,n.15).Thisviewismore fullydevelopedin"TheDefenseofJusticeinPlato'sRepublic.''"Whathe[Plato]mustholdisthatone'shighestgoodisnotalwaysservedbypurelycontemplatingthe Formsrather,one'shighestgoodistoestablishandmaintainacertainimitativerelationshipwithForms,arelationshipthatisstrainedorrupturedwhenonefailstodo one'sfairshareinajustcommunity"(328329).KrautdiffersfromthecommentatorsmentionedinthepreviousnoteintheemphasisheputsonimitationofForms. 17.Rosssaysthattheoutersphere'sloveofgodimpliestheoutersphere"desiresalifeaslikeaspossibletothatofitsmovingprinciple."SeeW.D.Ross,Aristotle (London:Methuen,1949),181182seealsoJ.L.Ackrill,AristotlethePhilosopher(Oxford:TheClarendonPress,1981),129and133.Itsmovingprincipleis god,whoeternallycontemplatesthought.Unabletoreproducetheeternalactivityofcontemplation,thespheredoesthenextbestphysicalthingeternalmotionina circle.Recently,in"QueFaitLePremierMoteurD'Aristote"(RevuePhilosophiquedeFranceetdel'Etranger183[1993]),SarahBroadieobjectedtothis interpretationshesaysthatthetraditionalinterpretationmultipliesentitiesnotmentionedinthetext.Theseare:asoulfortheoutersphere,twoobjectsofdesire,two noeticactivitiesforthesoul,andtwosensesoffinalcause(385).Itisnotnecessaryforourpurposesto

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decidewhetherthetraditionalistsorBroadieisright,ofcourse,becauseourinterpretationsimplyusesthedistinctionbetweensensesoffinalcauseadistinction Aristotleclearlymakes.Whetherthisdistinctionexplainseternalmotionintheoutersphereisnotintegraltousingthedistinction.However,onemightarguethat Broadie'sobjectionscouldapplytoourreadingofthedistinction,mutatismutandis.Broadieconstruesthedistinctionbetweenthetwosensesoffinalcause,in thetraditionalreading,tobeendofactionandbeneficiaryofaction.Sheobjectsthatthedistinctionbetweenthetwosensesoffinalcause,whenunderstoodin thetraditionalreading,doesviolencetotheusualmeaningof'end'.Shesaysthat'end'(whatwehavecalledthe"objectofdesire")usuallymeanssomethingtobe achieved.However,thePrimeMover,asendofdesire,isnotachievedinanyway.Thus,shesays,finalcauseasendofdesire,inthistraditionalreading,really meansexemplarycause(382).ItishardtounderstandwhyBroadieisobjectingtothisreadingoffinalcauseasexemplarycause.Ithardlyseemsunusualtothink ofloveforsomethingbeingexpressedbyimitationnorisitstrangetosaythattheobjectofloveisthatforthesakeofwhichoneimitates.'End',inthiscontext, wouldrefertosomethingwhosevalueisnotconferedbybeingdesiredonedoesnotachievesuchavaluebutmerelyrecognizesit.Likeanactofhomage, imitationisawayofrecognizingthevalue.Thisactofrecognizingthevaluecanbeexpressedbysayingthatthisvalueisthatforthesakeofwhichoneundertakes imitation. 18.Korsgaard,"TwoDistinctions,"181. 19.Korsgaard,"TwoDistinctions,"179. 20.Korsgaard,"TwoDistinctions,"184. 21.ThispositiontouchesontheissueofegoisminPlato'smoralphilosophy.Platoisanegoistinsomesensebecauseheholdsthatone'sownhappinessisthegoalof life(Sym.205a).However,ifhappinessisimitatingthegooditselfbecauseitisthegooditself,thentheegoismofhappinessissomewhatcomplicated.Happiness takesontheparadoxicalaspectofallidealistundertakings.Happinessistheresult,butnotthegoal,ofidealistlives.Ifonewantstobehappyoneshouldnotaimat happiness.In"TwoConceptionsofHappiness,"PhilosophicalReview88(1979):167197),RichardKrautdistinguishesourcontemporarynotionofhappiness whichhecalls"subjective"withAristotle'swhichhecalls''objective."Theformerissubjectivebecauseitdependsontheachievement(andawarenessof achievement)ofgoalsthatanindividualsetsforhimself(173and180).Thelatterisobjectivistbecauseitdependsontheachievement(andawarenessofachievement) ofanidealstandard(181).InAristotle'scasetheidealwouldbespecifiedby"certaindeepseatedfactsofhumannatureandsocialorganization..."(190).(Itisthe inabilityofobjectivismtomakesuchaspecificationthatmakesitimpractical,accordingtoKraut[190191].)Wemightadapt

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Kraut'sdistinctioninexplicatingPlato'sidealism.Platotoowouldsaythathappinessistheachievementofanideal.However,happinessisnottheidealitiswhat happenswhenoneachievestheidealforexample,bysuccessfullyimitatingthegooditselfandisawareofdoingso.Thus,thegoaloflifeistoachievetheideal. 22.Aswell,iftheFormofgoodnessisthefinalcauseofimitation,wecanunderstandthefullanswertotheproblemofthecraftanalogy.Inchapter2,wesaidthat craftscouldbeusedtodoharmbecause,althoughcraftsseekthewelfareoftheirobjects,craftsmencanmisusethecrafts.Thereisasenseinwhichcraftsare instrumentaltheycanbemisusedtoseeksomeotherendthantheendofthecraft.However,wesaidthatthecraftanalogywasdefensibleifthereisatleastonecraft thatisnotinstrumental,cannotbemisused.Thiswastherulingcraft,whichusedwhatitproduced.Becausetherulingcraftwastheknowledgeofgoodandevilthe implicationseemedtobethatitwouldalwayspursuethegoodandusewhatitproducedsothatitwouldservethegood.Nowwecanseethatthecraftofimitating thejustitselfbecauseofitsrelationtothegooditselfisthisrulingcraft.Imitatingthejustitselfbecauseofitsrelationtothegooditselfisnotinstrumentalitpursuesthe highestgoodasanendinitself.Itseekstodisseminatethegooditselfbecauseitisthegooditselfandbecausedoingsoisgoodforwhatreceivesthegoodness. 23.AlthoughthefollowingdiscussionrestsontheassumptionthattheSymposiumhasafullertreatmentoftheexpressivefacetofthephilosopher,itmakesno assumptionabouttherelativedatesoftheRepublicandtheSymposium. 24.A.W.Price,LoveandFriendshipinPlatoandAristotle(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1989),16,usesKennethDover'sdistinctionhere."Thekaloniswhat presentsitselfappealingly(thoughnotonlytothesenses)theagathonisgoodforsomeoneinsomeway(thoughnotonlyinstrumentally)thekalondrawsusandthe agathonhelpsus.Tospellouttheirequivalence:whateverattractsusalsobenefitsus(ifonlyinitscontemplation)while,solongasourjudgmentcolourstheway thingsstrikeus,whateverservesuswellislikelytocreateinusafavourableimpression."Santasholdsthatthisshiftisactuallyachangeoffocusfromaspecific accountoferostoageneralaccountofloveforanythingsuchloveisalwaysforthegood.Thespecificaccountappliestosexuallove,wherebeautyisthespecific kindofgoodobject.GerasimosSantas,PlatoandFreud:TwoTheoriesofLove(Oxford:BasilBlackwell,1988),3233.DavidHalperin,"PlatonicErosandWhat MenCallLove,"AncientPhilosophy5(1985):180,seesinthismoveadistinctionbetweenwhathecallsthe"objectoferoticdesires''thatis,thebeautifulandthe aimoferoticdesirethatis,possessionofthegoodweexploitthisdistinctionsubsequently.

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25.Santasholdsthatthisshiftisashiftbacktospecificaccountoferos,thatis,sexuallove(34).Ofcourse,accordingtoHalperin,theshiftintheconversationwould simplybeawayofdevelopingtheaimoferosthatis,howthelovercancometopossessthegoodalways.Thisingenioussuggestion,however,makesthe reintroductionofbeautyintotheconversationalittlepuzzlingsince,accordingtoHalperin,theaimoferosisthegood.Cf.R.G.Bury,TheSymposiumofPlato,2d ed.(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1969),109. 26.Cf.WilliamS.Cobb,translatedwithintroductionandcommentaries,TheSymposiumandthePhaedrus(Albany:StateUniversityofNewYorkPress,1993), 76. 27.Thisdistinction,oritsforerunner,wasintroducedbyMartinWarner,"Love,SelfandPlato'sSymposium,"PhilosophicalQuarterly29(1979):337338. However,Price,LoveandFriendship,exploitsthedistinctioninthewayrepresentedinthisparagraph.Cf.25and3031:"TheimmortalitythatPlatoproves elsewhereisapropertyofthesoulassubjectthequasiimmortalitythatDiotimaoffersattachestolivesindividuatedindependentlyofsubjects." 28.Cf.Price,LoveandFriendship,34. 29.Halperin,"PlatonicEros,"179. 30.Halperin,"PlatonicEros,"179. 31.Halperin,"PlatonicEros,"181. 32.Fortwothoroughanalysesofthisascentoftheladderoflove,see:J.M.E.Moravcsik,"ReasonandErosinthe'Ascent'PassageoftheSymposium,"inEssays inAncientGreekPhilosophy,JohnP.AntonandGeorgeL.Kustas,eds.(Albany:StateUniversityofNewYorkPress,1972),285302,andPrice,Loveand Friendship,3842. 33.Cf.Cobb,SymposiumandPhaedrus,75.Talkingabouttheconceptofbringingforthinbeauty,hesays,"Thebasicmetaphor,then,isthatofgivingbirthina beautifulmanner,whichcanimplythatthesurroundingsandproductofthebirth,aswellastheeventitself,arebeautiful."AlsoPrice,LoveandFriendship,52."Yet thereisagreatdifferencebetweentheroleoftheboy'sbeautyin209c,andthatofthesequenceofbeautiesin210:ateachstageoftheascenttheloverowestothe beautyinwhichhegeneratesnotonlyreleasefrompregnancy,buttheverycharacterofhisoffspringbeautyhasbecomelessmidwifethanonlybegetter."G.R.F. Ferrari,"PlatonicLove,''TheCambridgeCompaniontoPlato(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1992),255,referringtothepassageat209c:"Thisisthe firsttimethatwhatissuesfromtheactof'begettinginthebeautiful'hasitselfbeendescribedasbeautiful,anditrevealssomethingthatwillbecruciallyimportantto love'sGreaterMysteries:namely,thatbeautycanbelongtotheproductaswellastotheinstrumentofspecificlove."

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34.AnanalogouspositionisfoundinIrisMurdoch'sTheSovereigntyofGood(London:RoutledgeandKeganPaul,1985).ToMurdoch,themorallifeisastruggle toovercomeone'sownselfishnessandselfservingillusions.Theaimofthemorallife,then,istoseetheothernotasaninstrumentofone'sownselfishaimsbutto achievewhatshecalls"ajustandlovinggazedirecteduponanindividualreality"(34).SheseestheideaofthegoodinBookVIIoftheRepublicasvitalinthismoral struggle."Goodisthefocusofattentionwhenanintenttobevirtuouscoexists(asperhapsitalmostalwaysdoes)withsomeunclarityofvision"(70). Whatissuggestiveinthisaccountiswhatshesaysabouttherolesofgoodnessandbeautyinthestruggletobreakthroughone'sselfishillusion.Goodnessand beautybothresisttheselfishurgetopossessanddestroy.Insteadofthemodernnotionthatwillcreatesgoodness,shesaysthatwemustretainPlato'sideaofthe good

asacentralpointofreflection...Good,notwill,istranscendent.Willisthenaturalenergyofthepsychethatissometimesemployableforaworthypurpose.Goodseemsto ussomethingnecessarybecausetherealism(abilitytoperceivereality)requiredforgoodnessisakindofintellectualabilitytoperceivewhatistrue,whichisautomaticallyat thesametimeasuppressionofself(66).

Thusgoodnesshasaroleinresistingselfishness.Murdochseemstobehintingatanexplanationforthisresistancewhenshesaysthat"TheGoodhasnothingtodo withpurpose,indeeditexcludestheideaofpurpose....Theonlygenuinewaytobegoodistobegood'fornothing'..."(71and92).Ifthegoodexcludes purpose,thentotheselfishitisgoodfornothing.Paradoxically,itisthisfeatureofgoodnessthatcandrawoneoutofselfishillusion.Althoughthegoodisthe centerofreflectioninthemorallife,"itcannotbeexperiencedorrepresentedordefined."Rather,itisbeautythatisthe"visibleandaccessibleaspectofthe Good"(70).Murdochpresentsastrikingcasefortheclaimthatbeauty,fullyunderstood,isfullycapableofresistingselfishness.

Art,andby"art"fromnowonImeangoodart,notfantasyart,affordsusapuredelightintheindependentexistenceofwhatisexcellent.Bothinitsgenesisandits enjoymentitisathingtotallyopposedtoselfishobsession(8586).

Whatshemeansby"enjoyment"ispresumablyafamiliarexperience.One'sperceptionofbeautyintheperformanceofadancer,forinstance,hasthequalityof unselfishness.Withoutreferencetoone'sowninterestsorneeds,onecansimplyrejoiceintheperformanceoftheotherforwhatitis,forthewaythatitexhibitsan idealtoolittleseeninoureverydayworld.Thereisanundeniabletranscendenceofselfintherecognitionofsomethingthatweallloveandadmirepartofthis experienceisthesenseofleavingourselvesbehindinthisrecognition.Asforthegenesisofart,

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theartistdelightsintheindependentexistenceofwhatisexcellentinasomewhatdifferentway.Inthecaseoftheartist,presumablytheindependentexistenceis whatsheproduces.Inmakingitindependent,theartisttranscendsherownselfishaims.Inmakingitexcellent,sheisaimingatanidealoutsideofherself.Sheis aimingtowardsthatsameidealperceivedbytheonewhoenjoysthedanceperformance.Thisaimisalsoexperiencedinwhatwesometimescall"loveofone's craft"thecarpenterwhoadmirestheexcellenceofthecabinet,whetherhemadeitornot. 35.Cf.PeterVernezze,"ThePhilosopher'sInterest,"AncientPhilosophy12(1992):342."Justasaparentleavesbehindachildwhoinstantiateshisphysicaltraits andwillpasstheseonthroughtime,weshouldthinkofthepropagatorsatthelevelofthesoulasleavingbehindthemaproductthatwillpassonthevirtueoftheagent throughtime:byinspiringgreatandnobledeeds,thepoemsofHomerandthelawsofSolonwillberesponsibleforbringingforthactsofvirtuelongafterthedeathof theircreators.Similarly,thepedagogicalloverinstantiatesvirtueinhisbeloved,whowillinturneducateanother,andsoondowntheline,thusassuringthathisvirtue survivesdeath." 36.MarthaNussbaum,FragilityofGoodness,claimsthattheloveroftheFormleaveshumanlovebehind."Insteadoffleshandallthatmortalrubbish,animmortal objectmust,andthereforecan,befound.Insteadofpainfulyearningforasinglebodyandspirit,ablissfulcontemplativecompleteness"(183).Thissevereassessment ofDiotima'sspeechleavesoutofconsiderationthewayinwhichbringingforthinbeautyispervasivetotheaccountoferosandthusthewaytheloverseekstoinstill virtueinthesoulofthebeloved.Inreality,erosbeginstolooklikebenevolence,asthelover,eschewingsexualintercourse,seeksthespiritualimprovementofhis beloved.InspiredbytheFormofbeauty,theloverwishestoreplicatetheForminthesoulofthebeloved.Inthisway,theloverachievesakindofpassionate detachmentnotunlikethepassionatedetachmentoftheartist.Theloverwhowishesnothingmoreforthebelovedthanthemostbeautifulofsoulsmaynotbe Nussbaum'spassionatelover,whoaims"toachieveamorecompleteunderstandingofthisparticularcomplexportionoftheworld"(190),butneitherdoessucha loverseeminhuman. 37.Cf.Kraut,"TheDefenseofJusticeinPlato'sRepublic,"TheCambridgeCompaniontoPlato,RichardKraut,ed.(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1992),321:"AndsothemerefactthataFormcannotbepossessed(thatis,owned)givesusnoreasontorejectPlato'sideathatifonebearsacertainrelationshipto Formsarelationshipthatinvolvesbothemotionalattachmentandintellectualunderstandingthenone'slifebecomesmoreworthwhilepreciselybecauseoneis connectedinthiswaywithsuchvaluableobjects.Infact,therearesimilari

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tiesbetweenthewayinwhichpersonscanenterourlivesandimprovethemandthewayinwhichPlatothinksweshouldberelatedtotheForms.Wecaneasily understandsomeonewhosaysthatoneofthegreatprivilegesofhislifeistohaveknownacertaineminentandinspiringperson." 38.Indeed,inthePhaedrusthevirtueoftheimmortalloversisagainassociatedwithharmonyandorderliness,akindofbeautyofthesoulthatisfamiliartousfrom theRepublic.However,whiletheseloversrecollecttheFormofbeautyandwhiletheyacquirevirtuebyimitation,theimitationisofthegods.Loverandbelovedhave natureslikethegodtheyfollowedintheprocessionintheupperworldforexample,thosewhofollowedZeushaveZeuslikenatures,philosophicalandlordly(252c e).Theloverhonorsandimitates(timontekaimimoumenos[252d2])thatgod.Somehow,inassociatingwiththebeloved,thelovergazesuponhisgod,graspsit bywayofmemory,andtakesonthegod'scharacterandwaysofacting(253a).Finally,byimitatinghisgod,theloverhelpsthebelovedtotakeonthewaysofacting andformofthegod(253b). 39.ThisinterpretationoftheroleofthegoodcontrastsinstructivelywiththeinterpretationofC.D.C.Reeve(PhilosopherKing.)Forhimthegoodispleasure reasonisinstrumental.WhileReevedeniesbothoftheseclaimshisdenialsreallyamountonlytoqualificationsofthem."Thegoodisthestructure...withinwhichthe pleasureofknowingthetruthisreliablymadeavailabletothosewhofinditmostpleasant..."(154).However,Reevenevertellsushowthestructureisgoodinitself itisclearlyaninstrumentalgoodgoodasameanstorationalpleasure.Again,comparingHumefavorablywithPlato,ReevesaysthatPlatois,nevertheless,different inthatheincludesinreason"conativeandcognitiveelements"(168).Thatis,reasonhasitsowndesiresatisfyingrationaldesirebydiscoveringthetruthprovidesthe pleasureofdiscoveringthetruth.Sothecognitivepartofreasonservesthisconativepartfinally,reasonoritscognitivepartisinstrumental.

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