TESORO v PRISONS

MORAN, J.:
On October 10, 1934, petitioner, Eufemio P. Tesoro, was convicted in the Court of First
Instance of Manila of the crime of falsification of a public document and sentenced
to an indeterminate penalty of from two (2) to three (3) years, six (6) months and
twenty-one (21) days, to pay a fine of one hundred pesos (100), or undergo subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. This penalty was to expire on October 28, 1937.
On November 14, 1935, the then Governor-General Frank Murphy granted the
petitioner a parole, which the latter accepted, subject to the following conditions:
1. That he will live in the City of Manila and will not change his residence
without first obtaining the consent of the Board of Indeterminate Sentence;
2. That he will not commit any other crime and will conduct himself in an
orderly manner;
3. That he will report, during the period of his parole, to the Executive
Secretary of the Board of Indeterminate Sentence, during the first year, once
a month, and thereafter, once every three months.
Should any of the conditions stated be violated, the sentence imposed shall
again be in full force and effect.
On December 3, 1937, petitioner was charged in the justice of the peace court of
San Juan, Rizal, with the crime of adultery alleged to have been committed with one
Concordia Dairo, wife of petitioner's brother-in-law, Jose Nagar. To the complaint
were attached the affidavits of the complainant Jose Nagar, of Luz Nagar and of
Epimaco Nagar. The case was thereafter forwarded to the Court of First Instance of
Rizal where the provincial fiscal filed the corresponding information which, however,
was dismissed for non-appearance of the complainant.
Sometime in the month of February, 1938, the same Jose Nagar lodged a complaint
with Board of Indeterminate Sentence, and upon the same facts supporting the
criminal action aforementioned, charged the petitioner with violation of the
conditions of his parole. On February 3, 1938, petitioner was summoned to appear
before the board for a hearing on the aforecited complaint, but petitioner asked for
postponement until the day following. On February 4, 1938, petitioner addressed a
letter to the board denying the charge of illicit relations with the complainant's wife
the included therewith the supposed retraction of Epimaco Nagar of what the latter
had stated in his former affidavit. On the same date Simeon Figalang, a parole officer
assigned to investigate the case, submitted his report to the board, and, on the
strength thereof and papers supporting it, the acting chairman of the board
addressed a communication to the President of the Philippines, recommending the
arrest and reincarceration of the petitioner. And on February 19, 1938, the President
issued the following order:
To any lawful officer:
Whereas, Eufemio P. Tesoro, convicted by the Court of First Instance of
Manila of the crime of falsification of an official document, and sentenced
to an indeterminate term of from 2 years to 3 years, 6 months and 21 days'
imprisonment, plus P100 fine, was granted pardon on parole by His
Excellency, the Governor-General, on November 14, 1935, under certain
conditions, one of which provides that he will not commit any other crime
and will conduct himself in an orderly manner, and
Whereas, said Eufemio P. Tesoro has violated this condition in that, in the
latter part of September, 1937, and continuously thereafter, he betrayed the
confidence of his brother-in-law, Jose Nagar, by maintaining adulterous
relations with the latter's wife, under the following circumstances: Upon the
death on September 18, 1937, of parolee Tesoro's wife (sister of Jose Nagar)
and in order to mitigate the grief of the bereaved family and to help in the
keeping of the house and caring of the children of said parolee, Jose Nagar
and his wife came to live with the parolee in San Juan, Rizal; but taking
advantage of the frequent absences of Jose Nagar from the house, parolee
Tesoro made advances to Jose Nagar's wife, Concordia Dairo, succeeded
in having illicit relations with her and even went to the extent of taking away
the woman from her legitimate husband, after the couple had moved from
his home, and he is now living with her in adultery.
Therefore, by virtue of the authority conferred upon me by section 64 (i) of
the Administrative Code, you are hereby ordered to arrest parolee Eufemio
P. Tesoro and to commit him to the custody of the Director of Prisons, Manila,
who is hereby authorized to confine said person for the service of the
unexpired portion of the maximum sentence for which he was originally
committed to prison.
By virtue of this order, the petitioner was arrested and recommitted to the custody of
the Director of Prisons. Thereupon, petitioner sued for a writ of habeas corpus against
the Director of Prisons, and upon denial thereof by the trial court, took the present
appeal.
Section 63 (i) of the Administrative Code, by virtue of which the petitioner was
granted parole, gives the Governor-General the following powers and duties:
To grant to convicted persons reprieves or pardons, either plenary or partial,
conditional or unconditional; to suspend sentences without pardon, remit
fines, and order the discharge of any convicted person upon parole, subject
to such conditions as he may impose; and to authorize the arrest and re-
incarceration of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply
with the condition, or conditions, of his pardon, parole, or suspension of
sentence.
Paragraph 6, section 11, Article VII, of the Constitution of the Philippines, provides as
follows:
The President shall have the power to grant reprieves, commutations, and
pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction, for all offenses,
except in cases of impeachment, upon such conditions and with such
restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper to impose. He shall have
the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of the National Assembly.
Appellant contends that section 64 (i) of the Administrative Code, above quoted, in
so far as it confers upon the Chief Executive the power to grant and revoke paroles,
has been impliedly repealed by the aforecited constitutional provision, as the latter
omitted to specify such power in connection with the powers granted therein to the
President of the Philippines. This contention is untenable. The power to pardon given
the President by the Constitution, "upon such conditions and with such restrictions and
limitations as he may deem proper to impose," includes the power to grant and
revoke paroles. (20 R.C.L., 577; 46 C.J. 1205.) If the omission of the power of parole in
the Constitution is to be construed as a denial thereof to the President, the effect
would be to discharge unconditionally parolees, who, before the adoption of the
Constitution, have been released conditionally by the Chief Executive. That such
effect was never intended by the Constitutional Convention is obviously beyond
question.
Appellant also contends that the Board of Indeterminate Sentence has no legal
authority to investigate the conduct of the petitioner, and recommend the
revocation of his parole. By the terms of his parole, petitioner agreed to report the
executive secretary of the board once a month during the first year of his parole,
and, thereafter, once every three months. By his consent to this condition, petitioner
has placed himself under the supervision of the board. The duty to report on the part
of the petitioner implies a corresponding power on the part of the board to inquire
into his conduct, and a fortiori to make recommendations to the President by whose
authority it was acting. Besides, the power to revoke paroles necessarily carries with it
the power to investigate and to inquire into the conduct of the parolees, if such
power of revocation is to be rational and intelligent. In the exercise of this incidental
power of inquiry and investigation, the President of the Philippines is not precluded by
law or by the Constitution from making use of any agency of the government, or
even of any individual, to secure the necessary assistance. When, therefore, the
President chose to intrust his power of inquiry upon the Board of Indeterminate
Sentence, a government agency created precisely for the concern of persons
released on parole, he acted both upon legal authority and good judgment.
Appellant further contends that judicial pronouncement to the effect that he has
committed a crime is necessary before he can be properly adjudged as having
violated his conditional parole. Under condition No. 2 of his parole, petitioner agreed
that he "will not commit any other crime and will conduct himself in an orderly
manner." (Emphasis ours.) It was, therefore, the mere commission, not his conviction
by court, of any other crime, that was necessary in order that the petitioner may be
deemed to have violated his parole. And under section 64 (i) of the Administrative
Code, the Chief Executive is authorized to order "the arrest and re-incarceration of
any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition, or
conditions, of his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence." (Emphasis ours.)
Appellant impugns the findings of the President regarding the violation of the
conditional parole. He claims that, according to the weight of the evidence, the
violation took place, not "in the latter part of September, 1937," as found by the
President, but after October 28, 1937, the date when the parole was supposed to
expire. But that as it may, where, as in the instant case, the determination of the
violation of the conditional parole rests exclusively in the sound judgment of the Chief
Executive, the courts will not interfere, by way of review, with any of his findings. The
petitioner herein having consented to place his liberty on parole upon the judgment
of the power that has granted it, he cannot invoke the aid of the courts, however
erroneous the findings may be upon which his recommitment was ordered.
Besides, even conceding that the petitioner's violation of the parole took place after
October 28, 1937, when his maximum penalty was to have expired, we still find no
error in the order of the arrest and recommitment. It is the petitioner's contention that,
upon the expiration of his maximum term of imprisonment, his conditional parole also
expires, and, therefore, his liberty becomes absolute subject to no conditions
contained in his parole. In other words, he holds the view that the period during which
he was out on parole should be counted as service of his original sentence. We do
not subscribe to this contention.
In People vs. Tapel (35 Off. Gaz., 1603), we said:
When a conditional pardon is violated, the prisoner is placed in the same
state in which he was at the time the pardon was granted. He may be
rearrested and recommitted to prisons (See U.S. vs. Ignacio [1916}, 33 Phil.,
202, 204; U.S. vs. Villalon [1917], 37 Phil., 322.) And the rule is well-settled that,
in requiring the convict to undergo so much of the punishment imposed by
his original sentence as he had not suffered at the time of his release, the
court should not consider the time during which the convict was at large by
virtue of the pardon as time served on the original sentence. (20 R.C.L., p.
570; State vs. Horne [1906], 52 Fla., 125; 42 So., 388; 7 L.R.A. [N.S.}, 719,
725. Vide, also, Ex parte Bell [1879], Miss., 282.)
This rule applies, by analogy, to conditional parole. (46 C.J., 1209.)
The foregoing discussion brings us to the last contention of the appellant as to the
duration of the penalty he has yet to serve after his recommitment. Act No. 1561
provided that a convict released on parole and who, thereafter, violates its
conditions, shall serve the full sentence of the court as though no parole has ever
been granted him, the time between the parole and the subsequent arrest not being
considered as part of the term of his sentence in computing the period of his
subsequent confinement. But this Act has been repealed by the Administrative Code,
and section 64 (i) thereof omitted such provision. Act No. 4103, section 8, provides
that any prisoner released on parole who violates any condition thereof, shall, upon
re-arrest and confinement, serve the remaining unexpired portion of the maximum
sentence for which he was originally committed to prison. This Act is not, however,
applicable to the present case, as the petitioner was paroled not under the provision
thereof, but by virtue of section 64 (i) of the Administrative Code. There is, thus, no
statutory provision squarely governing the case with respect to the duration of the
petitioner's confinement after his recommitment. In the absence of such statutory
provision, the terms of the parole shall govern. From the express terms of the parole
that "should any of the conditions stated be violated, the sentence imposed shall
again be in full force and effect," it is evident that the petitioner herein should serve
the unexpired portion of the penalty originally imposed upon him by the court.
Judgment is affirmed, with costs against appellant.


SUMULONG v GONZALES
This is an original petition for habeas corpus filed on behalf of petitioner Wilfredo S.
Torres, presently confined at the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa. We issued the
writ and during the hearing and from the return filed by the respondents through the
Solicitor General, and other pleadings in this case, the following facts emerged:
1. Sometime before 1979 (no more specific date appears in the records
before this Court), petitioner was convicted by the Court of First Instance of
Manila of the crime of estafa (two counts) and was sentenced to an
aggregate prison term of from eleven (11) years, ten (10) months and
twenty-two (22) days to thirty-eight (38) years, nine (9) months and one (1)
day, and to pay an indemnity of P127,728.75 (Criminal Cases Nos. 68810,
91041 and F-138107). These convictions were affirmed by the Court of
Appeals (CA-G.R. Nos. 14773-CR and 17694-CR). The maximum sentence
would expire on 2 November 2000.
1

2. On 18 April 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to the petitioner by
the President of the Philippines on condition that petitioner would "not again
violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines. Should this condition be
violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by
law."
2
Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently
released from confinement.
3. On 21 May 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole (the "Board") resolved
to recommend to the President the cancellation of the conditional pardon
granted to the petitioner. In making its recommendation to the President,
the Board relied upon the decisions of this Court in Tesoro vs. Director of
Prisons (68 Phil. 154 [1939]) and Espuelas vs. Provincial Warden of Bohol (108
Phil. 356 [1960]). The evidence before the Board showed that on 22 March
1982 and 24 June 1982, petitioner had been charged with twenty counts of
estafa in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-19672 and Q-20756, which cases were then
(on 21 May 1986) pending trial before the Regional Trial Court of Rizal
(Quezon City). The record before the Board also showed that on 26 June
1985, petitioner had been convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Rizal
(Quezon City) of the crime of sedition in Criminal Case No. Q-22926; this
conviction was then pending appeal before the Intermediate Appellate
Court. The Board also had before it a letter report dated 14 January 1986
from the National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI"), addressed to the Board, on
the petitioner. Per this letter, the records of the NBI showed that a long list of
charges had been brought against the petitioner during the last twenty
years for a wide assortment of crimes including estafa, other forms of
swindling, grave threats, grave coercion, illegal possession of firearms,
ammunition and explosives, malicious mischief, violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22, and violation of Presidential Decree No. 772 (interfering with police
functions). Some of these charges were Identified in the NBI report as having
been dismissed. The NBI report did not purport to be a status report on each
of the charges there listed and Identified.
4. On 4 June 1986, the respondent Minister of Justice wrote to the President
of the Philippines informing her of the Resolution of the Board
recommending cancellation of the conditional pardon previously granted
to petitioner.
5. On 8 September 1986, the President cancelled the conditional pardon of
the petitioner.
6. On 10 October 1986, the respondent Minister of Justice issued "by
authority of the President" an Order of Arrest and Recommitment against
petitioner. The petitioner was accordingly arrested and confined in
Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence.
Petitioner now impugns the validity of the Order of Arrest and Recommitment. He
claims that he did not violate his conditional pardon since he has not been convicted
by final judgment of the twenty (20) counts of estafa charged in Criminal Cases Nos.
Q-19672 and Q-20756 nor of the crime of sedition in Criminal Case No. Q-
22926.
3
Petitioner also contends that he was not given an opportunity to be heard
before he was arrested and recommitted to prison, and accordingly claims he has
been deprived of his rights under the due process clause of the Constitution.
The issue that confronts us therefore is whether or not conviction of a crime by final
judgment of a court is necessary before the petitioner can be validly rearrested and
recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to
serve the balance of his original sentence.
This issue is not novel. It has been raised before this Court three times in the past. This
Court was first faced with this issue in Tesoro Director of Prison.
4
Tesoro, who had been
convicted of the crime of falsification of public documents, was granted a parole by
the then Governor-General. One of the conditions of the parole required the parolee
"not [to] commit any other crime and [to] conduct himself in an orderly manner."
5
Two
years after the grant of parole, Tesoro was charged before the Justice of the Peace
Court of San Juan, Rizal, with the crime of adultery said to have been committed with
the wife of Tesoro's brother-in-law. The fiscal filed with the Court of First Instance the
corresponding information which, however, was dismissed for non-appearance of the
complainant. The complainant then went before the Board of Indeterminate
Sentence and charged Tesoro with violation of the conditions of his parole. After
investigation by the parole officer, and on the basis of his report, the Board
recommended to the President of the Philippines the arrest and recommitment of the
petitioner. Tesoro contended, among other things, that a "judicial pronouncement to
the effect that he has committed a crime" is necessary before he could properly be
adjudged as having violated his conditional parole.
Addressing this point, this Court, speaking through then Mr. Justice Moran, held that
the determination of whether the conditions of Tesoro's parole had been breached
rested exclusively in the sound judgment of the Governor-General and that such
determination would not be reviewed by the courts. As Tesoro had consented to
place his liberty on parole upon the judgment of the power that had granted it, we
held that "he [could not] invoke the aid of the courts, however erroneous the findings
may be upon which his recommitment was ordered."
6
Thus, this Court held that by
accepting the terms under which the parole had been granted, Tesoro had in effect
agreed that the Governor-General's determination (rather than that of the regular
courts of law) that he had breached one of the conditions of his parole by
committing adultery while he was conditionally at liberty, was binding and conclusive
upon him. In reaching this conclusion, this Court relied upon Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code which empowered the Governor-General
to grant to convicted prisoners reprieves or pardons, either plenary or
partial, conditional or unconditional; to suspend sentences without parole,
remit fines, and order the discharge of any convicted person upon parole,
subject to such conditions as he may impose; and to authorize the arrest
and recommitment of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to
comply with the condition or conditions, of his pardon, parole or suspension
of sentence. (Emphasis supplied)
In Sales vs. Director of Prisons,
7
the petitioner had been convicted of the crime of
frustrated murder. After serving a little more than two years of his sentence, he was
given a conditional pardon by the President of the Philippines, "the condition being
that he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines and that,
should this condition be violated, he shall be proceeded against in the manner
prescribed by law."
8
Eight years after the grant of his conditional pardon, Sales was
convicted of estafa and sentenced to three months and eleven days of arresto
mayor. He was thereupon recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of his
original sentence. Sales raised before this Court two principal contentions. Firstly, he
argued that Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code had been repealed by
Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. He contended, secondly, that Section 64 (i)
was in any case repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution (Article III [1],
1935 Constitution). This Court, through Mr. Justice Ozaeta speaking for the majority,
rejected both contentions of Sales.
Sales held, firstly, that Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code did not repeal Section 64
(i) Revised Administrative Code. It was pointed out that Act No. 4103, the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, which was enacted subsequent to the Revised Penal
Code, expressly preserved the authority conferred upon the President by Section 64.
The Court also held that Article 159 and Section 64 (i) could stand together and that
the proceeding under one provision did not necessarily preclude action under the
other. Sales held, secondly, that Section 64 (i) was not repugnant to the constitutional
guarantee of due process. This Court in effect held that since the petitioner was a
convict "who had already been seized in a constitutional was been confronted by his
accusers and the witnesses against him-, been convicted of crime and been
sentenced to punishment therefor," he was not constitutionally entitled to another
judicial determination of whether he had breached the condition of his parole by
committing a subsequent offense. Thus:
[a] statute [like Section 64 (i)] supervenes to avoid the necessity for any
action by the courts in the premises. The executive clemency under it is
extended upon the conditions named in it, and he accepts it upon those
conditions. One of these is that the governor may withdraw his grace in a
certain contingency, and another is that the governor shall himself
determine when that contingency has arisen. It is as if the convict, with full
competency to bind himself in the premises, had expressly contracted and
agreed, that, whenever the governor should conclude that he had violated
the conditions of his parole, an executive order for his arrest and
remandment to prison should at once issue, and be conclusive upon him.
9

In Espuelas vs. Provincial Warden of Bohol,
10
the petitioner had been convicted of the
crime of inciting to sedition. While serving his sentence, he was granted by the
President a conditional pardon "on condition that he shall not again violate any of
the penal laws of the Philippines."
11
Espuelas accepted the conditional pardon and
was released from confinement. Sometime thereafter, he was convicted by the
Justice of the Peace Court in Tagbilaran, Bohol, of the crime of usurpation of
authority. He appealed to the Court of First Instance. Upon motion of the provincial
fiscal, the Court of First Instance dismissed the case provisionally, an important
prosecution witness not having been available on the day set for trial. A few months
later, upon recommendation of the Board of Pardons and Parole, the President
ordered his recommitment to prison to serve the unexpired period of his original
sentence.
The Court in Espuelas reaffirmed the continuing force and effect of Section 64 (i) of
the Revised Administrative Code. This Court, quoting Tesoro and Sales, ruled that:
Due process is not necessarily judicial The appellee had had his day in court
and been afforded the opportunity to defend himself during his trial for the
crime of inciting to sedition, with which he was charged, that brought about
or resulted in his conviction, sentence and confinement in the penitentiary.
When he was conditionally pardoned it was a generous exercise by the
Chief Executive of his constitutional prerogative.The acceptance thereof by
the convict or prisoner carrie[d] with it the authority or power of the
Executive to determine whether a condition or conditions of the pardon has
or have been violated. To no other department of the Government [has]
such power been intrusted.
12

The status of our case law on the matter under consideration may be summed up in
the following propositions:
1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of
a conditional pardon are purely executive acts which are not subject to
judicial scrutiny.
2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a
pardon, and the proper consequences of such breach, may be either a
purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of
the Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial
for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Article 159 of
the Revised Penal Code. Where the President opts to proceed under
Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial
pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less
conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may
be recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.
3. Because due process is not semper et unique judicial process, and
because the conditionally pardoned convict had already been accorded
judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the offense for which he
was conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative
Code is not afflicted with a constitutional vice.
We do not believe we should depart from the clear and well understood rules and
doctrine on this matter.
It may be emphasized that what is involved in the instant case is not the prosecution
of the parolee for a subsequent offense in the regular course of administration of the
criminal law. What is involved is rather the ascertainment of whether the convict has
breached his undertaking that he would "not again violate any of the penal laws of
the Philippines" for purposes of reimposition upon him of the remitted portion of his
original sentence. The consequences that we here deal with are the consequences
of an ascertained breach of the conditions of a pardon. A convict granted
conditional pardon, like the petitioner herein, who is recommitted must of course be
convicted by final judgment of a court of the subsequent crime or crimes with which
he was charged before the criminal penalty for such subsequent offense(s) can be
imposed upon him. Again, since Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code defines a
distinct, substantive, felony, the parolee or convict who is regarded as having
violated the provisions thereof must be charged, prosecuted and convicted by final
judgment before he can be made to suffer the penalty prescribed in Article
159.1avvphi1
Succinctly put, in proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally
pardoned and who is alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the
Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him under Section 64 (i)
of the Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of
the Revised Penal Code which imposes the penalty of prision correccional, minimum
period, upon a convict who "having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief
Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon." Here, the President has
chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the President's executive
prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.
WHEREFORE, this Petition is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

CRSTOBAL v LABRADOR
LAUREL, J.:
This is the petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal in its election case No. 7890, rendered on November 28, 1940,
sustaining the right of Teofilo C. Santos to remain in the list of registered voters in
precinct No. 11 of the municipality of Malabon, Province of Rizal.
The antecedents which form the factual background of this election controversy are
briefly narrated as follows:
On March 15, 1930, the Court of First Instance of Rizal found Teofilo C. Santos,
respondent herein, guilty of the crime of estafa and sentenced him to six months
of arresto mayor and the accesories provided by law, to return to the offended
parties, Toribio Alarcon and Emilio Raymundo the amounts P375 and P125,
respectively, with subsidiary imprisonment in the case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs. On appeal, this court, on December 20, 1930, confirmed the judgment of
conviction. Accordingly, he was confined in the provincial jail of Pasig, Rizal, from
March 14, 1932 to August 18, 1932 and paid the corresponding costs of trial. As to his
civil liability consisting in the return of the two amounts aforestated, the same was
condoned by the complaints. Not withstanding his conviction, Teofilo C. Santos
continued to be a registered elector in the municipality of Malabon, Rizal, and was,
for the period comprised between 1934 and 1937, seated as the municipality of
Malabon, Rizal, and was, for the period comprised between 1934 and 1937, seated as
the municipal president of that municipality. On August 22, 1938, Commonwealth Act
No. 357, otherwise known as the Election Code, was approved by the national
Assembly, section 94, paragraph (b) of which disqualifies the respondent from voting
for having been "declared by final judgment guilty of any crime against the property."
In view of this provision, the respondent forth with applied to his Excellency, the
President for an absolute pardon, his petition bearing date of August 15, 1939. Upon
the favorable recommendation of the Secretary of Justice, the Chief Executive, on
December 24, 1939, granted the said petition, restoring the respondent to his "full civil
and political rights, except that with respect to the right to hold public office or
employment, he will be eligible for appointment only to positions which are clerical or
manual in nature and involving no money or property responsibility."
On November 16, 1940, the herein petitioner, Miguel Cristobal, filed a petition for the
exclusion of the name of Teofilo C. Santos from the list of voters in precinct No. 11 of
Malabon, Rizal, on the ground that the latter is disqualified under paragraph (b) of
section 94 of Commonwealth Act No. 357. After hearing, the court below rendered it
decision on November 28, 1940, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
Without going further into a discussion of all the other minor points and
questions raised by the petitioner, the court declares that the pardon
extended in favor of the respondent on December 24, 1939, has had the
effect of excluding the respondent from the disqualification created by
section 94, subsection (b) of the New Election Code. The petition for
exclusion of the respondent Teofilo C. Santos should be, as it hereby is,
denied. Let there be no costs.
Petitioner Cristobal has filed the present petition for certiorari in which he impugns the
decision of the court below on the several grounds stated in the petition.
It is the contention of the petitioner that the pardon granted by His Excellency, the
President of the Philippines, to the respondent, Teofilo C. Santos, did not restore the
said respondents to the full enjoyment of his political rights, because (a) the
pardoning power of the Chief Executive does not apply to legislative prohibitions; (b)
the pardoning power here would amount to an unlawful exercise by the Chief
Executive of a legislative function, and (c) the respondent having served his sentence
and all the accesory penalties imposed by law, there was nothing to pardon. All
these propositions involve an inquiry into the primary question of the nature and
extent of the pardoning power vested in the Chief Executive of the Nation by the
Constitution.
Paragraph 6 of section 11 of Article VII of our Constitution, provides:
(6) The President shall have the power to grant reprieves, commutations,
and pardons, and to remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction, for all
offenses, except in cases of impeachment, upon such conditions and with
such restrictions and limitations as may be deem proper to impose. He shall
have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of the National
Assembly.
It should be observed that there are two limitations upon the exercise of this
constitutional prerogative by the Chief Executive, namely: (a) that the power be
exercised after convictions; and (b) that such power does not extend to cases of
impeachment. Subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning
power does not extend to cases of impeachment. Subject to the limitations imposed
by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by
legislative action. It must remain where the sovereign authority has placed it and must
be exercised by the highest authority to whom it is entrusted. An absolute pardon not
only blots out the crime committed, but removes all disabilities resulting from the
convictions. In the present case, the disability is the result of conviction without which
there would no basis for disqualification from voting. Imprisonment is not the only
punishment which the law imposes upon those who violate its command. There are
accessory and resultant disabilities, and the pardoning power likewise extends to such
disabilities. When granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute
pardon removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction. In the present case,
while the pardon extended to respondent Santos is conditional in the sense that "he
will be eligible for appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature
involving no money or property responsibility," it is absolute insofar as it "restores the
respondent to full civil and political rights." (Pardon, Exhibit 1, extended December 24,
1939.) While there are cases in the United States which hold that the pardoning power
does not restore the privilege of voting, this is because, as stated by the learned
judge below, in the United States the right of suffrage is a matter exclusively in the
hands of the State and not in the hands of the Federal Government (Decision, page
9). Even then, there are cases to the contrary (Jones vs. Board of Registrars, 56 Miss.
766; Hildreth vs. Health, 1 Ill. App. 82). Upon the other hand, the suggestion that the
disqualification imposed in paragraph (b) of section 94 of Commonwealth Act No.
357, does not fall within the purview of the pardoning power of the Chief Executive,
would lead to the impairment of the pardoning power of the Chief Executive, not
contemplated in the Constitution, and would be no way of restoring the political
privilege in a case of this nature except through legislative action.
The petition for certiorari is denied, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.


LACUNA v ABES
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal from a dismissal, after trial, of a petition for quo warranto (Civil Case No. 306
of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch V, Gapan) challenging the
eligibility of the herein respondent-appellee, Benjamin Abes, to the position of mayor
of Pearanda, Nueva Ecija, to which he was duly proclaimed elected in the elections
of 14 November 1967.
Mayor-elect Abes (appellee herein) had been convicted of the crime of
counterfeiting treasury warrants and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6)
years and one (1) day to eight (8) years, eight (8) months, and (1) day of prision
mayor, and to pay a fine of five thousand pesos (P5,000.00). After he had partially
served his sentence, he was released from confinement on 7 April 1959 by virtue of a
conditional pardon granted by the President of the Philippines, remitting only the
unexpired portion of the prison term and fine (Annexes "F" & "G" to the Petition for Quo
Warranto). Without the pardon, his maximum sentence would have been served on
13 October 1961 (Annex "F" to Petition for Quo Warranto, CFI Record Wrapper, page
12).
With the approach of the 1967 elections, Abes applied for registration as a voter
under the new system of registration, but the Election Registration Board of the
municipality of Pearanda denied his application. The denial notwithstanding, he
filed his certificate of candidacy for the office of mayor, and, in the ensuing elections
in November, he came out the winner over three other aspirants. On 16 November
1967, the municipal board of canvassers proclaimed appellee Abes the fully elected
mayor. Petitioner-appellant Ambrocio Lacuna place second.
On 23 November 1967, Lacuna filed his petition for quo warranto with application for
preliminary injunction in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija.
On 7 December 1967, on the same day when hearing was held on the application for
preliminary injunction, the President of the Philippines granted to the respondent,
Benjamin Abes, an absolute and unconditional pardon and restored to him "full civil
and political rights".
After the scheduled hearing on 21 December 1967 and the submission of
memoranda, the court, with commendable dispatch, rendered, on 28 December
1967, its decision, dismissing the petition for quo warranto with application for
preliminary injunction and declaring the eligibility of mayor-elect Abes to the position
of mayor, in view of the Presidential full pardon granted him before he qualified for
the office.1wph1.t
Petitioner Lacuna appealed to this Court. 1wph1.t
Appellant's theory is that, by reason of his conviction and non-registration as a voter,
Abes was rot a qualified voter "at the time of the election", and was, therefore,
ineligible to the position of mayor, because Section 2174 of the Revised Administrative
Code requires the qualifications of a voter for eligibility to an elective municipal
office; that the restoration to him of his civil and political rights by the presidential
plenary pardon on 7 December 1967 did not retroact to remove the disqualification
existing anterior to the grant of the pardon.
Appellee's defense is two-pronged: first, that at the time of the elections he was a
qualified voter, notwithstanding his non-registration, because registration as elector is
not a qualification and because the term or duration of his disqualification arising
from his conviction has expired; and, second, that the absolute pardon blotted out all
the consequences of his conviction, including his disqualification.
The lower court rejected the theory of the petitioner, passed sub silentio the
respondent's first defense, but sustained him on the second.
On the first defense of respondent-appellee Abes, it must be remembered that
appellee's conviction of a crime penalized with prision mayor carried the accessory
penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage (Article 42, Revised Penal Code); and
Section 99 of the Revised Election Code disqualifies a person from voting if he had
been sentenced by final judgment to suffer one year or more of imprisonment.
The accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification disqualifies the convict
for public office and for the right to vote, such disqualification to last only during the
term of the sentence (Article 27, paragraph 3, & Article 30, Revised Penal Code) that,
in the case of Abes, would have expired on 13 October 1961.
But this does not hold true with respect to the other accessory penalty of perpetual
special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage. This accessory penalty
deprives the convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public office
perpetually, as distinguished from temporary special disqualification, which lasts
during the term of the sentence. Article 32, Revised Penal Code, provides:
Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special
disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage. The perpetual or
temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage
shall deprive the offender perpetually or during the term of the sentence,
according to the nature of said penalty, of the right to vote in any popular
election for any public office or to be elected to such office. Moreover, the
offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period
of disqualification.
The word "perpetually" and the phrase "during the term of the sentence" should be
applied distributively to their respective antecedents; thus, the word "perpetually"
refers to the perpetual kind of special disqualification, while the phrase "during the
term of the sentence" refers to the temporary special disqualification. The duration
between theperpetual and the temporary (both special) are necessarily different
because the provision, instead of merging their durations into one period, states that
such duration is "according to the nature of said penalty" which means according
to whether the penalty is the perpetual or the temporary special disqualification.
Since, under the criminal code, the second accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification for to exercise of the right of suffrage, deemed imposed on appellee
Abes, did not expire on 13 October 1961, or thereafter, he was, at the time of the
election on 14 November 1967, not qualified to vote or be voted for, or to hold public
office, if the effect of his subsequent absolute pardon is not to be considered. He is
thus thrown back upon his second defense.
Thus, the decisive issue in the case becomes whether or not a plenary pardon,
granted after election but before the date fixed by law for assuming office, had the
effect of removing the disqualifications prescribed by both the criminal and electoral
codes.
On this point, appellant Lacuna urges that the presidential prerogative of mercy is
prospective in operation and, when granted to Abes on 7 December 1967, did not
retroact to the time of the election; that Abes political and civil rights were lost
through his conviction and were restored, not at the time of the erection, but only
upon the grant of the plenary pardon; that, not being a qualified voter at the time of
the election, Abes was not eligible to the office in question.
Certain authorities (67 C.J.S. 578) do hold that a pardon is not retrospective.
1
But the
view consistently adopted in this jurisdiction is that the pardon's effects should not be
unnecessarily limited as it would lead to the impairment of the pardoning power,
which was not contemplated in the Constitution (Cristobal vs. Labrador, 71 Phil. 34, 39;
Pelobello vs. Palatino, 72 Phil. 4,11; Mijares vs. Custorio, 73 Phil. 507).
More specifically, this Court, in Pelobello vs. Palatino, 72 Phil. 441, through Justice
Laurel, stated:
... Without the necessity of inquiring into the historical background of the
benign prerogative of mercy, we adopt the broad view expressed in
Cristobal vs. Labrador, G.R. No. 47941, promulgated December 7, 1940
2
, that
subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power
cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action; that an absolute
pardon not only blots out the crime committed but removes all disabilities
resulting from conviction; and that when granted after the term of
imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the
consequences of conviction. While there may be force in the argument
which finds support in well considered cases that the effect of absolute
pardon should not be extended to cases of this kind, we are of the opinion
that the better view in the light of the constitutional grant in this jurisdiction is
not to unnecessarily restrict or impair the power of the Chief Executive who,
after inquiry into the environmental facts, should be at liberty to atone the
rigidity of law to the extent of relieving completely the party or parties
concerned from the accessory and resultant disabilities of criminal
conviction.. Under these circumstances, it is evident that the purpose in
granting him absolute pardon was to enable him to assume the position in
deference to the popular will; and the pardon was thus extended on the
date mentioned herein above and before the date fixed for assuming
office. We see no reason for defeating this wholesome purpose by a
restrictive judicial interpretation of the constitutional grant to the Chief
Executive. We, therefore, give efficacy to executive action and disregard
that at bottom is a technical objection. (Emphasis supplied).
Upon the, authority of the three cases previously cited, we conclude that the pardon
granted to appellee Abes has removed his disqualification, and his election and
assumption of office must be sustained.
Appellant Lacuna emphasizes the non-registration of Abes as a voter in order to
differentiate the case at bar fromPelobello vs. Palatino, 72 Phil. 441. The fact stressed
does not, however, make the cases dissimilar, because registration as a voter is not a
qualification for a candidate or a voter, within the meaning of "qualified voter" in
Section 2174 of the Revised Administrative Code; it is merely a step towards voting
(Rocha vs. Cordis, 103 Phil. 327). Moreover, the non-registration of Abes as voter was
predicated upon the same disqualifying effects of his previous conviction that were
blotted out by the plenary pardon.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed. No
costs.1wph1.t
PELOBELLO v PALATINO
The petitioner-appellant, Florencio Pelobello, instituted quo warranto proceedings in
the Court of First Instance of Tayabas against the respondent-appellee, Gregorio
Palatino, the mayor-elect of the municipality of Torrijos, Province of Marinduque. The
proceedings were had pursuant to the provisions of section 167, in relation with
section 94 (a), of the Election Code (Commonwealth Act No. 357). It was alleged that
the respondent-appellee, having been convicted by final judgment in 1912
of atendado contra la autoridad y sus agentes and sentenced to imprisonment for
two years, four months and one day of prision correccional, was disqualified from
voting and being voted upon for the contested municipal office, such disqualification
not having been removed by plenary pardon.
The fact of conviction as above set forth is admitted; so is the election and
consequent proclamation of the respondent-appellee for the office of municipal
mayor. It is also admitted that the respondent-appellee was granted by the
Governor-General a conditional pardon back in 1915; and it has been proven
(Vide Exhibit 1, admitted by the lower court, rec. of ap., p. 20) that on December 25,
1940, His Excellency, the President of the Philippines, granted the respondent-
appellee absolute pardon and restored him to the enjoyment of full civil and political
rights.
The question presented is whether or not the absolute pardon had the effect of
removing the disqualification incident to criminal conviction under paragraph (a) of
section 94 of the Election Code, the pardon having been granted after the election
but before the date fixed by law for assuming office (sec. 4, Election Code). Without
the necessity of inquiring into the historical background of the benign prerogative of
mercy, we adopt the broad view expressed inCristobal vs. Labrador, G. R. No. 47941,
promulgated December 7, 1940, that subject to the limitations imposed by the
Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative
action; that an absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but removes
all disabilities resulting from the conviction, and that when granted after the term of
imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the
consequences of conviction, While there may be force in the argument which finds
support in well considered cases that the effect of absolute pardon should not be
extended to cases of this kind, we are of the opinion that the better view in the light
of the constitutional grant in this jurisdiction is not to unnecessarily restrict or impair the
power of the Chief Executive who, after inquiry into the environmental facts, should
be at liberty to atone the rigidity of the law to the extent of relieving completely the
party or parties concerned from the accessory and resultant disabilities of criminal
conviction. In the case at bar, it is admitted that the respondent mayor-elect
committed the offense more than 25 years ago; that he had already merited
conditional pardon from the Governor-General in 1915; that thereafter he had
exercised the right of suffrage, was elected councilor of Torrijos, Marinduque, for the
period 1918 to 1921; was elected municipal president of that municipality three times
in succession (1922-1931); and finally elected mayor of the municipality in the election
for local officials in December, 1940. Under these circumstances, it is evident that the
purpose in granting him absolute pardon was to enable him to assume the position in
deference to the popular will; and the pardon was thus extended on the date
mentioned hereinabove and before the date fixed in section 4 of the Election Code
for assuming office. We see no reason for defeating this wholesome purpose by a
restrictive judicial interpretation of the constitutional grant to the Chief Executive. We,
therefore, give efficacy to executive action and disregard what at bottom is a
technical objection.
The judgment of the lower court is affirmed, with costs against the petitioner-
appellant, So ordered.

MONSANTO v FACTORAN
The principal question raised in this petition for review is whether or not a public
officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled
to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment.
In a decision rendered on March 25, 1983, the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner
Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) and three other
accused, of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents and
sentenced them to imprisonment of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as maximum, and to pay a fine of P3,500. They were further ordered to jointly
and severally indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50 representing the
balance of the amount defrauded and to pay the costs proportionately.
Petitioner Monsanto appealed her conviction to this Court which subsequently
affirmed the same. She then filed a motion for reconsideration but while said motion
was pending, she was extended on December 17, 1984 by then President Marcos
absolute pardon which she accepted on December 21, 1984.
By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting
that she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the same was
still vacant.
Petitioner's letter-request was referred to the Ministry of Finance for resolution in view
of the provision of the Local Government Code transferring the power of
appointment of treasurers from the city governments to the said Ministry. In its 4th
Indorsement dated March 1, 1985, the Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be
reinstated to her position without the necessity of a new appointment not earlier than
the date she was extended the absolute pardon. It also directed the city treasurer to
see to it that the amount of P4,892.50 which the Sandiganbayan had required to be
indemnified in favor of the government as well as the costs of the litigation, be
satisfied.
1

Seeking reconsideration of the foregoing ruling, petitioner wrote the Ministry on April
17, 1985 stressing that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which
implies that her service in the government has never been interrupted and therefore
the date of her reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive
suspension which is August 1, 1982; that she is entitled to backpay for the entire period
of her suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the proportionate share
of the amount of P4,892.50.
2

The Ministry of Finance, however, referred petitioner's letter to the Office of the
President for further review and action. On April 15, 1986, said Office, through Deputy
Executive Secretary Fulgenio S. Factoran, Jr. held:
We disagree with both the Ministry of Finance and the petitioner
because, as borne out by the records, petitioner was convicted of
the crime for which she was accused. In line with the government's
crusade to restore absolute honesty in public service, this Office
adopts, as a juridical guide (Miranda v. Imperial, 77 Phil. 1966), the
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, 2nd Division, in People v.
Lising, Crim. Case No. 6675, October 4, 1985, that acquittal, not
absolute pardon, of a former public officer is the only ground for
reinstatement to his former position and entitlement to payment of
his salaries, benefits and emoluments due to him during the period
of his suspension pendente lite.
In fact, in such a situation, the former public official must secure a
reappointment before he can reassume his former position. ...
Anent the civil liability of Monsanto, the Revised Penal Code
expressly provides that "a pardon shall in no case exempt the
culprit from payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by
the sentence." (Sec. 36, par. 2).
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Office holds that Salvacion A.
Monsanto is not entitled to an automatic reinstatement on the
basis of the absolute pardon granted her but must secure an
appointment to her former position and that, notwithstanding said
absolute pardon, she is liable for the civil liability concomitant to
her previous conviction.
3

Her subsequent motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the
present petition in her behalf We gave due course on October 13, 1987.
Petitioner's basic theory is that the general rules on pardon cannot apply to her case
by reason of the fact that she was extended executive clemency while her
conviction was still pending appeal in this Court. There having been no final judgment
of conviction, her employment therefore as assistant city treasurer could not be said
to have been terminated or forfeited. In other words, without that final judgment of
conviction, the accessory penalty of forfeiture of office did not attach and the status
of her employment remained "suspended." More importantly, when pardon was
issued before the final verdict of guilt, it was an acquittal because there was no
offense to speak of. In effect, the President has declared her not guilty of the crime
charged and has accordingly dismissed the same.
4

It is well to remember that petitioner had been convicted of the complex crime of
estafa thru falsification of public documents and sentenced to imprisonment of four
years, two months and one day of prision correccional as minimum, to ten years and
one day of prision mayor as maximum. The penalty of prision mayor carries the
accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage, enforceable during the term of the principal
penalty.
5
Temporary absolute disqualification bars the convict from public office or
employment, such disqualification to last during the term of the sentence.
6
Even if the
offender be pardoned, as to the principal penalty, the accessory penalties remain
unless the same have been expressly remitted by the pardon.
7
The penalty of prision
correccional carries, as one of its accessory penalties, suspension from public office.
8

The propositions earlier advanced by petitioner reveal her inadequate understanding
of the nature of pardon and its legal consequences. This is not totally unexpected
considering that the authorities on the subject have not been wholly consistent
particularly in describing the effects of pardon.
The benign mercy of pardon is of British origin, conceived to temper the gravity of the
King's wrath. But Philippine jurisprudence on the subject has been largely influenced
by American case law.
Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the
execution of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the
punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though
official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it
is intended, and not communicated officially to the Court. ... A pardon is a deed, to
the validity of which delivery is essential, and delivery is not complete without
acceptance."
8
-a
At the time the antecedents of the present case took place, the pardoning power
was governed by the 1973 Constitution as amended in the April 7, 1981 plebiscite. The
pertinent provision reads:
The President may, except in cases of impeachment, grant
reprieves, commutations and pardons, remit fines and forfeitures,
and with the concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa, grant
amnesty.
9

The 1981 amendments had deleted the earlier rule that clemency could be extended
only upon final conviction, implying that clemency could be given even before
conviction. Thus, petitioner's unconditional pardon was granted even as her appeal
was pending in the High Court. It is worth mentioning that under the 1987 Constitution,
the former limitation of final conviction was restored. But be that as it may, it is our
view that in the present case, it is not material when the pardon was bestowed,
whether before or after conviction, for the result would still be the same. Having
accepted the pardon, petitioner is deemed to have abandoned her appeal and her
unreversed conviction by the Sandiganbayan assumed the character of finality.
Having disposed of that preliminary point, we proceed to discuss the effects of a full
and absolute pardon in relation to the decisive question of whether or not the plenary
pardon had the effect of removing the disqualifications prescribed by the Revised
Penal Code.
In Pelobello v. Palatino,
10
We find a reiteration of the stand consistently adopted by
the courts on the various consequences of pardon: "... we adopt the broad view
expressed in Cristobal v. Labrador, G.R. No. 47941, December 7, 1940, that subject to
the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be
restricted or controlled by legislative action; that an absolute pardon not only blots
out the crime committed but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction. ...
(W)e are of the opinion that the better view in the light of the constitutional grant in
this jurisdiction is not to unnecessarily restrict or impair the power of the Chief
Executive who, after an inquiry into the environmental facts, should be at liberty to
atone the rigidity of the law to the extent of relieving completely the party ...
concerned from the accessory and resultant disabilities of criminal conviction.
The Pelobello v. Palatino and Cristobal v. Labrador cases,
11
and several others
12
show
the unmistakable application of the doctrinal case of Ex Parte Garland,
13
whose
sweeping generalizations to this day continue to hold sway in our jurisprudence
despite the fact that much of its relevance has been downplayed by later American
decisions.
Consider the following broad statements:
A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense
and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it
releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that
in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never
committed the offense. If granted before conviction, it prevents
any of the penalties and disabilities, consequent upon conviction,
from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties
and disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as
it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity.
14

Such generalities have not been universally accepted, recognized or
approved.
15
The modern trend of authorities now rejects the unduly broad language
of the Garland case (reputed to be perhaps the most extreme statement which has
been made on the effects of a pardon). To our mind, this is the more realistic
approach. While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence
of guilt so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as though he never
committed the offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The very essence of a
pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the
fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It does not wash out
the moral stain. It involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness.
16

The better considered cases regard full pardon (at least one not based on the
offender's innocence) as relieving the party from all the punitive consequences of his
criminal act, including the disqualifications or disabilities based on the finding of
guilt.
17
But it relieves him from nothing more. "To say, however, that the offender is a
"new man", and "as innocent as if he had never committed the offense;" is to ignore
the difference between the crime and the criminal. A person adjudged guilty of an
offense is a convicted criminal, though pardoned; he may be deserving of
punishment, though left unpunished; and the law may regard him as more dangerous
to society than one never found guilty of crime, though it places no restraints upon
him following his conviction."
18

A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective.
19
It makes no amends for the past.
It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose
upon the government any obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered.
"Since the offense has been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been
done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done
and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required."
20
This would explain
why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive backpay for lost
earnings and benefits.
Petitioner maintains that when she was issued absolute pardon, the Chief Executive
declared her not guilty of the crime for which she was convicted. In the case of State
v. Hazzard,
21
we find this strong observation: "To assume that all or even a major
number of pardons are issued because of innocence of the recipients is not only to
indict our judicial system, but requires us to assume that which we all know to be
untrue. The very act of forgiveness implies the commission of wrong, and that wrong
has been established by the most complete method known to modern civilization.
Pardons may relieve from the disability of fines and forfeitures attendant upon a
conviction, but they cannot erase the stain of bad character, which has been
definitely fixed.
22

In this ponencia, the Court wishes to stress one vital point: While we are prepared to
concede that pardon may remit all the penal consequences of a criminal indictment
if only to give meaning to the fiat that a pardon, being a presidential prerogative,
should not be circumscribed by legislative action, we do not subscribe to the fictitious
belief that pardon blots out the guilt of an individual and that once he is absolved, he
should be treated as if he were innocent. For whatever may have been the judicial
dicta in the past, we cannot perceive how pardon can produce such "moral
changes" as to equate a pardoned convict in character and conduct with one who
has constantly maintained the mark of a good, law-abiding citizen.
Pardon cannot mask the acts constituting the crime. These are "historical" facts which,
despite the public manifestation of mercy and forgiveness implicit in pardon,
"ordinary, prudent men will take into account in their subsequent dealings with the
actor."
23

Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the penalties and legal
disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. But unless expressly grounded on the
person's innocence (which is rare), it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty,
integrity and fair dealing.
24
This must be constantly kept in mind lest we lose track of
the true character and purpose of the privilege.
Thus, notwithstanding the expansive and effusive language of the Garland case, we
are in full agreement with the commonly-held opinion that pardon does not ipso
facto restore a convicted felon to public office necessarily relinquished or forfeited by
reason of the conviction
25
although such pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility
for appointment to that office.
26

The rationale is plainly evident Public offices are intended primarily for the collective
protection, safety and benefit of the common good. They cannot be compromised
to favor private interests. To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken
notion that the pardon virtually acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be
grossly untenable. A pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing
power from refusing appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor
moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction.
For petitioner Monsanto, this is the bottom line: the absolute disqualification or
ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishment prescribed by the Revised
Penal Code for estafa thru falsification of public documents. It is clear from the
authorities referred to that when her guilt and punishment were expunged by her
pardon, this particular disability was likewise removed. Henceforth, petitioner may
apply for reappointment to the office which was forfeited by reason of her
conviction. And in considering her qualifications and suitability for the public post, the
facts constituting her offense must be and should be evaluated and taken into
account to determine ultimately whether she can once again be entrusted with
public funds. Stated differently, the pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in
removing her disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go
beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply
and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.
Finally, petitioner has sought exemption from the payment of the civil indemnity
imposed upon her by the sentence. The Court cannot oblige her. Civil liability arising
from crime is governed by the Revised Penal Code. It subsists notwithstanding service
of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or
commutation of sentence. Petitioner's civil liability may only be extinguished by the
same causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due,
remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor, compensation and
novation.
27

WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of former Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgencio S.
Factoran, Jr., dated April 15, 1986, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
LLAMAS v ORBOS
The case before Us calls for a determination of whether or not the President of the
Philippines has the power to grant executive clemency in administrative cases. In
connection therewith, two important questions are also put in issue, namely, whether
or not the grant of executive clemency and the reason therefore, are political
questions beyond judicial review, and whether or not the questioned act was
characterized by grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioner Rodolfo D. Llamas is the incumbent Vice-Governor of the Province of Tarlac
and, on March 1, 1991 he assumed, by virtue of a decision of the Office of the
President, the governorship (p. 1, Petition). Private respondent Mariano Un Ocampo III
is the incumbent Governor of the Province of Tarlac and was suspended from office
for a period of 90 days. Public respondent Oscar Orbos was the Executive Secretary
at the time of the filing of this petition and is being impleaded herein in that official
capacity for having issued, by authority of the President, the assailed Resolution
granting executive clemency to respondent governor.
Sometime in 1989, petiotioner, together with Tarlac Board Members Marcelino
Aganon, Jr. and Arnaldo P. Dizon, filed on June 13, 1989 a verified complaint dated
June 7, 1989 against respondent governor before the then Department of Local
Government (DLG, for short), charging him with alleged violation of Section 203(2) (f)
203(2) (p), and 208(w), of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 337, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code, and other appropriate laws, among them, the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices ACt. Prior to that, petitoner filed with the Office of the
Omdusman a verified complainant dated November 10, 1988 against respondent
governor for the latter's alleged viloation of Section 3-G of Republic Act. (R.A.) No.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The complaint before the DLG, docketed as Administrative Case 10459, was
subsequently tried, where both petitioner and respondent govemor presented their
respective evidence.
Petitioner maintains that sometime in August, 1988, respondent governor, in his official
capacity as Provincial Governor Tarlac, entered into and executed a Loan
Agreement with Lingkod Tarlac Foundation, Inc., a non-stock and non-profit
organization headed by the governor himself as chairman and controlled by his
brother-in-law as executive director, trustee, and secretary; that the said Loan
Agreement was never authorized and approved by the Provincial Board, in direct
contravention of the provisions of the Local Government Code; that the said
Agreement is wholly one-sided in favor of the Foundation and grossly inimical to the
interest of the Provincial Government (because it did not provide for interest or for
any type security and it did not provide for suretyship and comptrollership or audit to
control the safe disbursement of said loan); that a total amount of P20,000,000.00 was
disbursed to the aforesaid Foundation; that the transactions constitute a fraudulent
scheme to defraud the Provincial Government; and that the said Agreement is wholly
unconstitutional, illegal, a immoral. (Annex "A", Petition)
On the other hand, it is the contention of respondent governor that "the funds were
intended to generate livelihood project among the residents of Tarlac and the use of
the Lingkod Tarlac Foundation, Inc. was authorized by law and considered the best
alternative as a matter of judgment." (pp. 12-13, Appeal Memorandom); that he
resigned from the said Foundation in order to forestall any suspicion that he would
influence it; that it is not true that the Loan Agreement did not provide for continuing
audit by the Provincial Government because the Memorandum of Agreement
provides otherwise; and that the Agreement is not manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the Provincial Government and respondent governor did not
and would not profit thereby because it provided sufficient safeguards for
repayment. (Annex "A", Petition)
After trial, the Secretary of the then Department of Local Government rendered a
decision dated September 21, 1990, dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, Governor Mariano Un Ocampo III is, as he hereby
found guilty of having violated Section 3(g) of Republic Act
No.3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, which act amounts to serious neglect of duty and/or abuse of
authority, for which tilp penalty of suspension from office for a
period of ninety (90) days, effective upon the finality of this
Decision, is hereby imposed upon him. (p. 3, Petition)
Parenthetically, be it noted that the Resolution imposed not a preventive suspension
but a penalty of suspension.
Respondent govemor moved for a reconsideration of the abovequoted decision but
the same was denied on October 19, 1990. Aggrieved, he appealed the DLG
decision dated September 21, 1990 and the order of denial dated October 19, 1990
to the Office of the President (O.P. Case No. 4480).
On February 26, 1991, herein public respondent Executive Secretary issued a
Resolution dismissing respondent governor's appeal and affirming the September 21,
1990 DLG decision.
Subsequently, and pursuant to Sec. 66, Chapter 4 of B.P. Blg. 337, to the effect that
the decision of the Office of the President in administrative suspension of local officials
shall be immediately executory without prejudice to appeal to appropriate courts,
petitioner, on March 1, 1991, took his oath of office as acting governor. Under the
administrative suspension order, petitioner had up to May 31, 1991 as acting
governor. On the same date (March 1, 1991), respondent govemor moved for a
reconsideration of the Executive Secretary's Resolution, to which petitioner filed an
opposition. From the allegations of the petitioner in his petition, respondent govemor
accepted his suspension and turned over his office to petitioner.
To the surprise of petitioner, however, respondent govemor on March 19, 1991, issued
an "administrative order" dated March 8, 1991, in which the latter signified his intention
to "(continue, as I am bound to exercise my fimctions as govemor and shall hold
office at my residence," in the belief that "the pendency of my Motion for
Reconsideration precludes the coming into finality as executory the DLG decision."
(Annex "E", Petition; p. 10, Comment). And, as categorically stated in the petition, the
reassumption ceremony by respondent governor was held on May 21, 1991 (p. 8,
Petition).
Without ruling on respondent governor's Motion for Reconsideration, public
respondent issued a Resolution dated May 15, 1991, in O.P. Case No. 4480, which
reads:
This refers to the petition of Gov. Mariano Un Ocampo III of Tarlac
for executive clemency, interposed in connection with the decision
of the Secretary of then Department of Local Governmen (DLG)
dated 21 September 1990, as affirmed in a Resolution of this Office
dated 26 February 1991, suspending petitioner from office for
period of ninety (90) days upon the finality of said decision.
As will be recalled, the DLG Secretary imposed the penalty of
suspension upon his finding that petitioner was guilty of serious
neglect of duty and/or abuse of authority for entering into a loan
contract with the Lingkod Tarlac Foundation, Inc. (LTFI)
grossly/manifestly disadvantageous to Tarlac Province. In his letter-
petition of 10 May 1991, thereby pleading for a thirty (30)-day
reduction of his suspension, petitioner invited attention to the DLG
Secretary's decision clearing him of having personally benefitted
from the questioned transaction. In the same letter, petitioner
manifests serving more than sixty (60) days of the ninety-day
suspension. Previously, petitioner submitted documents and letters
from his constituents tending to show the relative success of his
livelihood loan program pursue under the aegis of the LTFI and/or
the Foundation's credible loan repayment record. To cite some:
1. Certification of the Chairman,Tarlac Integrated Livelihood
Cooperative, Inc., attesting to the full payment of its loan (P15.05
M) plus interest with LTFI;
2. Certification of the Manager, Rural Bank of Geron (Tarlac), Inc.,
attesting to the gradual liquidation of the loan granted to family-
borrowers out of funds provided by LTFI;
3. Letter of Jover's Phil., expressing gratitude for the loan assistance
extended for its export activities by LTFI;
4. Letter of the Tarlac Provincial Agricultural Officer i forming that
the proceeds of the loan from LTFI have bee utilized in hybrid com
production; and
5. Letter of the President of the Federation of Tobacco Leaf
Producers of Tarlac, Inc., informing of the payment of 76 of the
amount (P203,966.00) loaned to the Federation for tobacco
production.
Petitioner's act, vis-a-vis the loan to LTFI, may have been promp by
an over eagerness to accelerate the delivery of livelihood services
to his provincemates. As the truism goes, however, the end does
not always justify the means. Be that as it may, but without
belaboring the propriety of the loan agreement aforementioned,
some measure of leniency may be accorded petitioner as the
purpose of his suspen sion may have made its mark.
WHEREFORE, Governor Mariano Un Ocampo III is hereby granted
executive clemency in the sense that his ninety-day suspension is
hereby reduced to the period already served.
SO ORDERED.
(Annex "F", Petition; pp. 25-26, Rollo)
By virtue of the aforequoted Resolution, respondent governor reassumed the
governorship of the province, allegedly withou any notification made to the
petitioner.
Petitioner posits that the issuance by public respondent of the May 15, 1991 Resolution
was "whimsical, capricious and despotic, and constituted grave abuse of discretion
amounting lack of jurisdiction," (p. 6, petition) basically on the ground th executive
clemency could be granted by the President only in criminal cases as there is nothing
in the statute books or even in the Constitution which allows the grant thereof in
administrative cases. Petitioner also contends that since respondent governor refused
to recognize his suspension (having reassumed the governorship in gross defiance of
the suspension order), executive clemency cannot apply to him; that his rights to due
process were violated because the grant of executive clemency was so sudden that
he was not even notified thereof; and that despite a finding by public respondent of
impropriety in the loan transaction entered into by respondent governor, the former
failed to justify the reduction of the penalty of suspension on the latter. Petitioner
further alleges that the exftutive clemency granted by public respondent was "the
product of a hocus-pocus strategy" (p. 1, Manifestation with Motion, etc.) because
there was allegedly no real petition for the grant of executive clemency filed by
respondent govemor.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides:
Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension. (1) Preventive suspension may
be imposed by the Minister of Local Government if the respondent
is a provincial or city official, ...
(2) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the
issues are joined, when there is reasonable ground to believe that
the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of,
when the evidence of culpability is strong, when the gravity of the
offense s warrants, or when the continuance in office of the
respondent coul influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the
safety and integrity the records and other evidence. In all cases,
preventive suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the
start of said suspension.
(3) At the expiration of sixty days, the suspended official shall
be deemed reinstated in office without prejudice to the
continuation the proceedings against him until its termination.
(Emphasis supplied)
It is admitted by petitioner that since March 1, 1991, he has assumed the
governorship. A portion of the petition is hereon der quoted as follows:
7. [On February 28, 1991], and in accordance with the provisions of
the Local Government Code (Sec. 66, Chapter 4, Batas Pambansa
Blg. 337), to the effect that the decision of the Office of the
President in an administrative suspension of local officials shall be
immediately executory without prejudice to appeal to appropriate
courts, Petitioner Llamas took his oath of office as acting govemor.
Under the administrative suspension order, Llamas had up to May
31 [sic 29] 1991 as acting governor;
8. A copy of this oath of office is attached and made a part hereof
as Annex B;
9. Significantly, this oath of office was sworn to by Petitioner Llamas
before Secretary Santos of the newly created Department Interior
and Local Government, as shown by the lower portion Annex B,
and by a picture of the oathtaking itself, attached and mad a part
hereof as Annex B-1;
10. Subsequently, Petitioner Llamas and Respondent Ocampo met,
where Ocampo was shown Llamas' oath of office. During meeting,
held in the presence of all department heads at the provi cial
capitol and in the presence of various local government offici and
representatives of the media, Ocampo agreed to turn over reigns
of the provincial government to Petitioner;
11. In fact, Ocampo had asked the department heads and all
other officials of the provincial government of Tarlac to extend their
cooperation to Llamas, during the ninety days that the latter would
assume the governorship;
12. And, as if this was not enough, Ocampo even made
announcements in the media that he was allowing Petitioner
Llamas to perform his functions as acting governor at the Office of
the Govern at the Capitol where he (Ocampo) used to hold office
(true enough Ocampo has subsequently allowed Llamas to hold
office at the of the Governor, with Ocampo even escorting the
acting therein last March 4, 1991);
l 3. An account of Ocampo's acceptance of his suspension and of
his having turned over his office to Petitioner Llamas was published,
front page, in the March 5, 1991 issue of the Manila Bulletin. A copy
of this news account is attached and made a part hereof as
Annex C);
14. Furthermore, various other officials, President Aquino Rep. Jose
Cojuangco included, have extended recognition to Petitions
Llamas' assumption of the governorship. Llamas met with President
Aquino and Rep. Cojuangco and, during this meeting, the two
highest officials of the land have asked Llamas to discharge his
duties acting governor;
15. Secretary Santos, for that matter, has issued a designation to
Tarlac Senior Board Member Aganon, dated March 18, 1991, a
pointing bim as acting vice governor of the province, "in view of
the suspension of Gov. Mariano Un Ocampo III, and the
assumption Vice Governor Rodolfo Llamas as acting governor." A
copy of this designation is attached and made a part hereof as
Annex D;
xxx xxx xxx
30. ... [T]he reassumption ceremony by [Governor] Ocampo was
held [in the] morning of May 21, 1991 ... (pp- 2-4 & 7, Petition; pp. 3-
5 & 8, Rollo)
It is prayed in the instant petition dated May 21, 1991 that:
b. In the meantime that this action is pending, and irnmediately
upon the filing hereof, a temporary restraining order be issued
stopping the Respondents from enforcing, in any manner, the
aforesaid contested resolution, and Respondent Ocampo, firom
continuing with his reassumption of the governorship. IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, that a cease and desist order be issued against
Respondent Ocampo stopping him from continuing with hiii
reassumption of the governorship.
Let us first deal with the issue on jurisdiction. Respondent govemor avers that since
under the Constitution fiffl discretionary authority is granted to the President on the
exercise of executive clemency, the same constitutes a political question which is
beyond judicial review.
Such a rule does not hold true in the case at bar. While it is true that courts cannot
inquire into the manner in which the President's discretionary powers are exercised or
into the wisdom for its exercise, it is also a settled rule that when the issue involved
concerns the validity of such discretionary powers or whether said powers are within
the limits prescribed by the Constitution, We will not decline to exercise our power of
judicial review. And such review does not constitute a modification or correction of
the act of the President, nor does it constitute interference with the functions of the
President. In this connection, the case of Tanada and Macapagal vs. Cuenco, et
al., 103 Phil. 1051, is very enlightening, and We quote:
Elsewhere in this treatise the well-known and well-established
principle is considered that it is not within the province of the courts
to pass judgment upon the policy of legislative or executive action.
Where, therefore, discretionary powers are granted by the
Consfitution or by statute, the manner in which those powers are
exercised is not subject to judicial review. The courts, therefore,
concern themselves only with the question as to the existence and
extent of these discretionary powers.
As distinguished from the judicial, the legislative and executive
departments are spoken of as the political departments of
government because in very many cases their action is necessarily
dictated by considerations of public or political policy. These
considerations of public or political policy of course will not permit
the legislature to violate constitutional provisions, or the executive
to exercise authority not granted him by the Constitution or by
statute, but, within these limits, they do permit the departments,
separately or together, to recognize that a certain set of facts
exists or that a given status exists, and these determinations,
together with the consequences that flow therefrom, may not be
traversed in the courts. (Willoughby on the Constitution of the
United States, Vol. 3, p. 1326).
xxx xxx xxx
What is generally meant, when it is said that a question is political,
and not judicial, is that it is a matter which is to be exercised by the
people in their primary political capacity, or that it has been
specifically delegated to some other department or particular
officer of the goverrunent, with discretionary power to act. See
State vs. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 497, 51 L.R.A. 561; In Re Gunn, 50
Fan. 155; 32 Pac. 470, 948, 19 L. RA. 519; Green vs. Mills, 69 Fed. 852,
16, C. CA 516, 30 L.R.A- 90; Fletcher vs. Tuttle, 151 111, 41, 37 N.E.
683, 25 L.R.A. 143, 42 Am. St. Rep. 220. Thus the Legislature may in its
discretion determine whether it will pass a law or submit a
proposed constitutional amendment to the people. The courts
have no judicial control over such matters, not merely because
they involve political question, but because they are matters which
the people have by the Constitute delegated to the Legislature.
The Governor may exercise the powers delegated to him, free
from judicial control, so long as he observes the laws and acts
within the limits of the power conferred. His discretionary acts
cannot be controllable, not primarily because they are of a
political nature, but because the Constitution and laws have
placed the particular matter under his control. But every officer
under a constitutional government must act according to law and
subject him to the restraining and controlling power of the people,
acting through the courts, as well as through the executive or the
Legislature. One department is just as representative as the other,
and the judiciary the department which is charged with the
special duty of determinining the limitations which the law places
upon all official action. The recognition of this principle, unknown
except in Great Britain and America, is necessary, to "the end that
the government may be one of laws and not men" words which
Webster said were the greatest contained in any written
constitutional document.
Besides, under the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court has been conferred an
"expanded jurisdiction" to review the decisions of the other branches and agencies of
the government to determine whether or not they have acted within the bounds of
the Constitution (See Art. VIII, Sec. 1, Constitution). "Yet, in the exercise thereof, the
Court is to merely check whether or not the govermental branch or agency has gone
beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different
view" (Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives & Ong, G.R. Nos.
92191-92 and Balanquit vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives & Ong,
G.R Nos. 92202-03, July 30, 1991).
In the case at bar, the nature of the question for determination is not purely political.
Here, we are called upon to decide whether under the Constitution the President
may grant executive clemency in administrative cases. We must not overlook the fact
that the exercise by the President of her power of executive clemency is subject to
constitutional l'um'tations. We will merely check whether the particular measure in
question has been in accordance with law. In so doing, We will not concern ourselves
with the reasons or motives which actuate the President as such is clearly beyond our
power of judicial review.
Petitioner's main argument is that the President may grant executive clemency only in
criminal cases, based on Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution which reads:
Sec. 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise pro
vided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves,
commu tations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after
conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress.
(Emphasis supplied)
According to the petitioner, the qualifying phrase "after conviction by final judgment"
applies solely to criminal cases, and no other law allows the grant of executive
clemency or pardon to anyone who has been "convicted in an administrative case,"
allegedly because the word "conviction" refers only to criminal cases (par. 22-b, c, d,
Petition). Petitioner, however, describes in his very own words, respondent governor as
one who has been "convicted in an administrative case" (par. 22-a, petition). Thus,
petitioner concedes that the word "conviction" may be used either in a criminal case
or in an administrative case. In Layno, Sr. vs. Sandiganbayan, 136 SCRA 536, We ruled:
For misfeasance or malfeasance ... any [elective official] could ...
be proceeded against administratively or ... criminally. In either
case, his culpability must be established ...
It is also important to note that respondent govemor's Motion for Reconsideration filed
on March 1, 1991 was withdrawn in his petition for the grant of executive clemency,
which fact rendered the Resolution dated February 26, 1991 affirming the DLG
Decision (which found respondent governor guilty of neglect of duty and/or abuse of
authority and which suspended him for ninety (90) days) final.
Moreover, applying the doctrine "Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguire debemos,"
We cannot sustain petitioner's view. In other words, if the law does not distinguish, so
We must no distinguish. The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases
executive clemency may be exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of
impeachment cases. By the same token, if executive clemency may be exercised
only in criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of
impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution.
Following petitioner's proposed interpretation, cases of impeachment are
automatically excluded inasmuch as the same do not necessarily involve criminal
offenses.
In the same vein, We do not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why the
President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It is Our
considered view that if the President can grant reprieves, commutations and
pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can
she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious
than criminal offenses.
A number of laws impliedly or expressly recognize or support the exercise of the
executive clemency in administrative cases.
Under Sec. 43 of P.D. 807, "In meritorious cases, ..., the President may commute or
remove administrative penalties or disabilities issued upon officers and employees, in
disciplinary cases, subject to such terms and conditions as he may impose in the
interest of the service."
During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, a subject of deliberations
was the proposed amendment to Art. VII, Sec. 19 which reads as follows: "However,
the power to grant executive clemency for violation of corrupt practices laws may
be limited by legislation."The Constitutional Commission, however, voted to remove
the amendment, since it was in derogation of the powers of the President. As Mr.
Natividad stated:
I am also against this provision which will again chip more powers
from the President. In case of other criminals convicted in our
society we extend probation to them while in this case, they have
already been convicted and we offer mercy. The only way we can
offer mercy to them is through this executive clemency extended
to them by the President. If we still close this avenue to them, they
would be prejudiced even worse than the murderers and the more
vicious killers in our society ....
The proposal was primarily intended to prevent the President from protecting his
cronies. Manifestly, however, the Commission preferred to trust in the discretion of
Presidents and refrained from putting additional limitations on his clemency powers. (II
RECORD of the Constitutional Commission, 392, 418-419, 524-525)
It is evident from the intent of the Constitutional Commission, therefore, that the
President's executive clemency powers may not be limited in terms of coverage,
except as already provided in the Constitution, that is, "no pardon, amnesty, parole,
or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules and regulations shall be
granted by the President without the favorable recommendation of the COMELEC"
(Article IX, C, Section 5, Constitution). If those already adjudged guilty criminally in
court may be pardoned, those adjudged guilty administratively should likewise be
extended the same benefit.
In criminal cases, the quantum of evidence required to convict an individual is proof
beyond reasonable doubt, but the Constitution grants to the President the power to
pardon the act done by the proved criminal and in the process exempts him from
punishment therefor. On the other hand, in administrative cases, the quantum of
evidence required is mere substantial evidence to support a decision, not to mention
that as to the admissibility of evidence, administrative bodies are not bound by the
technical and rigid rules of admissibility prescribed in criminal cases. It will therefore be
unjust and unfair for those found guilty administratively of some charge if the same
effects of pardon or executive clemency cannot be extended to them, even in the
sense of modifying a decision to subserve the interest of the public. (p. 34, Comment
of public respondent)
Of equal importance are the following provisions of Executive Order No. 292,
otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, Section I, Book III of which
provides:
SECTION 1. Power of Control. The President shall have control of
all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
SECTION 38. Definition of Administrative Relationships. Unless
otherwise expressly stated in the Code or in other laws defining the
special relationships of particular agencies, administrative
relationships shall be categorized and defined as follows:
(1) Supervision and Control. Supervision and control shall include authority to act
directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a
subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review,
approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units;
determine priorities in the execution of plans and programs. Unless a different
meaning is explicitly provided in the specific law governing the relationship of
particular agencies the word "control" shall encompass supervision and control as
defined in this paragraph. ... (emphasis supplied)
The disciplinary authority to investigate, suspend, and remove provincial or city
officials devolves at the first instance on the Department of Interior and Local
Government (Secs. 61 and 65, B.P. Blg. 337) and ultimately on the President (Sec. 66).
Implicit in this authority, however, is the "supervision and control" power of the
President to reduce, if circumstances so warrant, the imposable penalty or to modify
the suspension or removal order, even "in the sense" of granting executive clemency.
"Control," within the meaning of the Constitution, is the power to substitute one's own
judgment for that of a subordinate. Under the doctrine of Qualified Political Agency,
the different executive departments are mere adjuncts of the President. Their acts are
presumptively the acts of the President until countermanded or reprobated by her
(Vinena v. Secretary, 67 Phil. 451; Free Telephone Workers Union vs. Minister of Labor
and Employment, 108 SCRA 767 [1981]). Replying upon this view, it is urged by the
Solicitor General that in the present case, the President, in the exercise of her power
of supervision and control over all executive departments, may substitute her decision
for that of her subordinate, most especially where the basis therefor would be to serve
the greater public interest. It is clearly within the power of the President not only to
grant "executive clemency" but also to reverse or modify a ruling issued by a
subordinate against an erring public official, where a reconsideration of the facts
alleged would support the same. It is in this sense that the alleged executive
clemency was granted, after adducing reasons that subserve the public interest.
"the relative success of . . . livelihood loan program." (pp. 39-40, Comment of public
respondent)
We wish to stress however that when we say the President can grant executive
clemency in administrative cases, We refer only to all administrative cases in the
Executive branch, not in the Judicial or Legislative branches of the government.
Noteworthy is the fact that on March 1, 1991, respondent governor filed a motion for
reconsideration and the same may be regarded as implicitly resolved, not only
because of its withdrawal but also because of the executive clemency which in
effect reduced the penalty, conformably with the power of "control."
On petitioner's argument that private respondent's motion for reconsideration has
abated the running of the reglementary period for finality of judgment in O.P. Case
No. 4480 (that is, there being no final judgment to speak of, the pardon granted was
premature and of no effect, We reiterate the doctrine that upon acceptance of a
presidential pardon, the grantee is deemed to have waived any appeal which he
may have filed. Thus, it was held that:
The commutation of the penalty is impressed with legal
significance. That is an exercise of executive clemency embraced
in the pardoning power. According to the Constitution: "The
President may except in cases of impeachment, grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons, remit fines and forfeitures and, with
the concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa, grant amnesty.
"Once granted, it is binding and effective. It serves to put an end to
this appeal." (Mansanto v. Factoran, Jr., G.R. No. 78239, 170 SCRA
190. 196). (See also Peo v. Crisola, 129 SCRA 13)
Consequently, respondent governor's acceptance of the presidential pardon "serves
to put an end" to the motion for reconsideration and renders the subject decision
final, that of the period already served.
Finally, petitioner's argument that his constitutional rights to due process were violated
is uruneritorious. Pardon has been defined as "the private, though official, act of the
executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended and
not communicated officially to the court. ..." (Bernas, The Constitution of the
Philippines, Vol. II, First Ed. 1988, pp. 239-240, citing U.S. v. Wilson, 7 Pet. 150 [U.S. 1833]).
Thus, assuming that petitioner was not notified of the subject pardon, it is only
because said notice is unnecessary. Besides, petitioner's claim that respondent
governor has not begun serve sentence is belied by his very own factual allegations
in his petition, more particularly that he served as Acting Governor of Tarlac effective
from the date he took his Oath of Office on February 28, 1991 up to the time
respondent govemor reassumed the governorship of Tarlac on May 21, 1991 (par. 30
petition). It is, therefore, error to say that private respondent did not serve any portion
of the 90-day suspension meted upon him.
We fail to see any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction committed by public respondent.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: (1) DECLARING that the President did not
act arbitrarily or with abuse, much less grave abuse of discretion in issuing the May 15,
1991 Resolution granting on the grounds mentioned therein, executive clemency to
respondent governor and that, accordingly, the same is not unconstitutional (without
prejudice to criminal proceedings which have been filed or may be filed against
respondent governor), and (2) DENYING the rest of the prayers in the petition for
being unmeritorious, moot and academic. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE v PATRIARCA
The case under revie4w is an appeal from the 18
th
February 1999 decision
1
of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 16,
2
of Kabacan, Cotabato, in Criminal Case No. 965,
convicting Jesus Patriarca of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of Melchor Gulmayo
P50,000.00 civil indemnity, P50,000.00 moral damages, and P1,500.00 and P800.00
representing, respectively, reimbursement of the cost for embalmingsd and the coffin
used.
The Information filed before the trial court which indicted Patriarca for murder read:
"That on the 24
th
day of December 1993 at about 7:00 o'clock in the
evening, more or less at Barangay Pag-asa, Municipality of Mlang, Province
of Cotabato, Philippines, the above-named accused, armed with a 22
magnum revolver, with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and with evident premeditation and treachery, attack, assault
and shot therewith the person of MELCHOR GULMAYO, thereby hitting him in
the different parts of his body, which caused his instataneous death
thereafter."
3

The accused pled "not guilty" to the charge.
The evidence for the prosecution consisted basically of the testimony of witnesses
Romy Gulmayo, Ervin Gulmayo, Alicia Gulmayo, Dr. Candida Paracha, Rodrigo Elvas
and Francisco Pastolero.
Romy Gulmayo, a nine-year old son of Melchor, testified that on 24 December 1993
he was at home at Pag-asa, Mlang, Cotabato, together with his brother Ervin, his
mother Alicia, and his father Melchor. At around sevent-thirty in the evening, he and
Ervin were resting at the "lawting," an elevated portion of the house, when, suddenly,
they heard a gunshot. He looked through an opening and, at a distance of about 5
meters, saw the accused, armed with a short firearm, running away from their house.
The accused was wearing a pair of short pants and had an orange shirt wrapped
around his hand. His mother, brother Ervin and he ran towards the kitchen, located in
the annex of their house, where they saw Melchor screaming in pain ("Agoy") from a
gunshot wound. Moments later, Melchor died. Romy identified in court the accused
who had been a long time neighbor.
Ervin Gulmayo, the twelve-year old son of the victim, corroborated the testimony of
Romy. The two were resting in the "lawting" when they heard the gunshot. He then
saw the accused running away from their house with a shirt wrapped around his right
hand. He was able to identify the accuse because of the light coming from the
kitchen. The accused, he said, was a neighbor whose house was only about 250
meters away from the Gulmayos. The following day, Ervin, along with some neighbors,
surveyed the scene of the incident. The group was able to retrive an orange t-shirt a
few meters away from their house. It was the same shirt Ervin saw wrapped around
the accused's hand on the night of the incident.
Alicia Gulmayo declared that on 24 December 1993, She was at their residence in
Pag-asa, Mlang, Cotabato, when her husband was shot and killed. Shortly after
hearing the gunshot, she, with her sons Romy and Ervin, rushed to help Melchor. She
said her family spent P1,500.00 for embalming and P800.00 ofr the coffin. She also
testified on the moral anguish they had suffered due to the untimely death of her
husband.
Dr. Candida paracha, the resident physician of Mlang District Hospital at Mlang,
Cotabato, conducted an autopsy on the body of Melchor. She found Melchor to
have sustained a gunshot wound with entry at the back of the ribs which caused his
death.
Rodrigo Elvas, a resident of Pag-asa, Mlang, Cotabato, was at home on 24
December 1993 when he heard a gunshot coming from the direction of the house of
Melchor Gulmayo and his family. He later learned that Melchor was shot to death.
The next day, he went to the Gulmayo residence to survey the place, where he saw
footprints which led him to an orange t-shirt near the creek. The shirt appeared to be
the same shirt the accused was seen to have been wearing around five-thirty in the
afternoon on the day of the incident when he and his friends were drinking tuba and
beer at Eming Idobingco's nearby store.
Francisco Pastolero, also a resident of Pag-asa, Mlang, Cotabato, corroborated the
testimony of Rodrigo that the accused was wearing an orange t-shirt the day Melchor
was shot and killed, the same shirt which was later found at the creek near Melchor's
house the following day.
The defense, on its part, presented the testimony of accused Jesus Patriarca and its
witnesses Rex Fare, Rodolfo Perseverancia, PS1 Noemi Austero and SPO4 Joel. Burgos.
The accused claimed that at around seven o'clock in the evening of 24 December
1993, he was in his house at Pulang-lupa, Mlang, Cotabato, with his nephew, Rex
Fare, and Rodolfo Perseverancia. Earlier, he and Rex were at Inggo Tababa's
residence in Pulang-lupa from three o'clock until five o'clock in the afternoon fetching
water in preparation for the wedding of one of Inggo's daughters. At about five
o'clock, he and Rex went home to meet with Rodolfo Perseverancia who spent the
night in his house. He denied having shot and killed Melchor. He also denied having
owned the orange colored t-shirt found near Melchor's house after the incident. He
admitted having had a drinking spree at Erning Idobingco's store but that it was, he
said, on 20 December 1993 and not on 24 December 1993.
Rex Fare, a nephew of the accused, averred that he and the accused were together
on the afternoon and night of 24 December 1993. He asserted that the accused did
not own any orange colored t-shirt. He added that neither he nor the accused had a
drinking spree at Erning Idobingco's store on 24 December 1993.
Rodolfo Perseverancia, a resident of La Fortuna, Mlang, Cotabato, confirmed that at
about five o'clock in the afternoon of 24 December 1993, he went to the house of the
accused to borrow rice palay. He claimed that he spent the whole night with the
accused.
SPO4 Jocel Burgos of the Provincial Crime Laboratory Office 12, Kidapawan City,
conducted a paraffin test on the accused following the incident. The cast taken from
the accused was then forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination.
PSI Noemi Austero, a forensic chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory, Regional Unit II,
Ecoland, Davao City, testified that the pair of paraffin cast taken from both hands of
Jesus Patriarca yielded negative results for gun-powder nitrates.
On the basis of the evidence before it, the trial court, in its decision on 18 February
1999, found the accused guilty of murder. It held:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, the court finds and so holds
that the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. The court, therefore, declares the accused JESUS
PATRIARCA, 31 years old (born May 31, 1967), GUILTY of MURDER, defined
and punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and he is hereby
punished as follows:
"1) To the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA;
"2) To pay to the heirs of Melchor Gulmayo the sum of P50,000.00 in concept
of indemnity;
"3) To pay to the heirs of Melchor Gulmayo the sum of P50,000.00 by way of
moral damages;
"4) To pay to the heirs of Melchor Gulmayo the sum of P1,500.00 and P800.00
as reimbursement for the embalming and for the coffin, respectively of
Melchor Gulmayo;
"5) Whether or not the accused will file a notice of appeal, let the records be
forwarded to the Supreme Court for review."
4

In the appeal brief, the defense contended that -
"1) The trial court a quo erred in covicting the accused considering that his
constitutional rights were violated when he was arrested without a warrant
under circumstances which do not warrant the Application of Rule 113,
Section 5 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure allowing warrantless arrest
under exceptional circumstances;
"2) The trial court a quo erred in convicting the accused considering that the
guilt of the accused was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
"3) In the alternative, the trial court a quo erred in convicting the accused of
the crime of murder, qualified by treachery considering that this qualifying
circumstance was not proved beyond reasonable doubt."
5

The trial court convicted appellant on the basis of circumstantial evidence testified to
by the victim's two sons, Romy and Ervin Gulmayo, who swore that they had seen
appellant running away from their house after their father, Melchor, was shot and
killed. Appellant was holding a gun and had an orange colored shirt wrapped
around his hand. Prosecution witnessess Rodrigo Elvas anf\d Francisco Pastolero
stated that an orange t-shirt was found at a nearby creek, the same shirt that
appellant was seen wearing on the day of the incident while appellant and his friends
were drinking tuba and beer at a nearby store.
The Court finds the prosecution's evidence to be insufficient to sustain the conviction
of appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
The criminal complaint for murder against appellant was filed on 27 December 1993
before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Mlang, Matalam, Cotabato. The
Information against appellant for murder was subsequently filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Kabacan, Cotabato, on 18 February 1994. The filing of the criminal
complaint and Information for murder against appellant were premised at the time
solely on the sworn statements of Rodrigo Elvas and Francisco Pastolero, together with
the sworn statements of Ernie Idobingco and Dr. Candida Paracha, about the
incident. The sworn statements of Ervin and Romy Gulmayo were procured only on 21
February 1994 after the complaint and the information were filed and two months
after the incident. Why the statements of the two sons were not taken earlier
considering that their testimony clearly appeared to be vital to the case was not
aptly explained. Was it possible that the substance of the testimony of Romy and that
of Ervin Gulmayo were put merely to dovetail the theory of the prosecution?
Romy and Ervin claimed that they were able to identity the accused because of the
light coming from the kitchen. The records, however, would show the kitchen's
location to be in a separate portion of the Gulmayo house that could make it
doubtful that the beam coming therefrom provided sufficient illumination to the area.
The incident occurred around seven-thrity in the evening in December in
a barrio whose surroundings were not shown to have been well-lighted.
What would then appear to be the primary evidence linking appellant to the crime
was an orange colored t-shirt, he was seen to have been wearing on the day of the
incident, found the day after at a nearby creek. No motive was imputed to
appellant; the firearm used was not recovered, and appellant was, in fact, negative
for gun-powder nitrates when a paraffin test was conducted on him.
In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an accused is entitled to an acquittal
unless his guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt. Here, the court entertains
serious doubt on the guilt of appellant upon the strength of circumstantial evidence.
In order to warrant a conviction, the circumstantial evidence shown should constitute
an unbroken chain which leads to but one fair and reasonable conclusion that points
to the defendant, to the exclusion of all others, as being the guilty person.
6
This
species of evidence should be considered and weighed with great caution for our
jurisprudence is built around the precept that it would be preferable for theguilty to
remain unpunished than for an innocent person to suffer unjustly.
7

Acquittal being its verdict, the Court need not delve into appellant's other claim that
his arrest is illegal for having been immediately and summarily done on the basis of a
mere "call" or "report" by police officers who did not have personal knowledge of the
circumstances of the crime.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Kabacan, Cotabato, Branch
16, is REVERSED. Appellant Jesus Patriarca is ACQUITTED of the crime of murder on the
ground of the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
He is ordered released forthwith unless there are other lawful reasons for his continued
detention. The Director of the Bureau of Prisons is directed to uniform this Court
forthwith of the action taken by him in this respect. Cost de oficio.
SO ORDERED.1wphi1.nt