G.R. No.

L-26868
February 27,
1969
IN THE MATTER OF ATTORNEY LOPE E.
ADRIANO Member of the Philippine Bar.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee,
vs.
REMIGIO ESTEBIA, accused-appellant.
SANCHEZ, J.:
Once again, this Court is confronted with the
unwanted task of ascertaining whether
certain acts and conduct of a member of the
Bar deserve disciplinary action.
The problem arose because of facts that
follow:
One Remigio Estebia was convicted of rape
by the Court of First Instance of Samar, 1 and
sentenced to suffer the capital punishment.
His case came up before this Court on
review.
On December 14, 1966, Lope E. Adriano, a
member of the Bar, was appointed by this
Court as Estebia's counsel de oficio. In the
notice of his appointment, Adriano was
required to prepare and file his brief within
thirty days from notice. He was advised that
to enable him to examine the case, the
record would be at his disposal. Adriano
received this notice on December 20, 1966.
On January 19, 1967, Adriano sought for a
30-day extension to file appellant's brief in
mimeographed form. On February 18,
Adriano again moved for a 20-day extension
(his second). This was followed by a third
filed on March 8, for fifteen days. And a
fourth on March 27, also for fifteen days. He
moved for a "last" extension of ten days on
April 11. On April 21, he even sought a
special extension of five days. All these
motions for extension were granted. The
brief was due on April 26, 1967. But no brief
was filed.
On September 25, 1967, Adriano was
ordered to show cause within ten days from
notice thereof why disciplinary action should
not be taken against him for failure to file

appellant's brief despite the lapse of the time

therefor. Adriano did not bother to give any
explanation.
For failing to comply with the September 25,
1967 resolution, this Court, on October 3,
1968, resolved to impose upon him a fine of
P500 payable to this Court within fifteen
days from notice with a warning that upon
further non-compliance with the said
resolution of September 25, 1967 within the
same period of fifteen days, "more drastic
disciplinary action will be taken against him."
Still, counsel paid no heed.
Finally, on December 5, 1968, this Court
ordered Adriano to show cause within ten
days from notice thereof why he should not
be suspended from the practice of law "for
gross misconduct and violation of his oath of
office as attorney." By express order of this
Court, the resolution was personally served
upon him on December 18, 1968. He
ignored the resolution.
Upon the facts just narrated, we now pass
judgment.
1. By specific authority, this Court may
assign an attorney to render professional aid
to a destitute appellant in a criminal case
who is unable to employ an attorney.
Correspondingly, a duty is imposed upon the
lawyer so assigned "to render the required
service." 2 A lawyer so appointed "as counsel
for an indigent prisoner", our Canons of
Professional Ethics demand, "should always
exert his best efforts" in the indigent's
behalf. 3
No excuse at all has been offered for nonpresentation of appellant's brief. And yet,
between December 20, 1966, when he
received notice of his appointment, and
December 5, 1968, when the last show
cause order was issued by this Court, more
than sufficient time was afforded counsel to
prepare and file his brief de oficio. The death
sentence below imposed was upon a plea of
guilty. The record of the proceedings leading
to the lower court's sentence consists of but

31 pages. Counsel had the record since

January 19, 1967. In fact, in his third motion
for extension of time, he manifested that the
drafting of apellant's brief "is more than halfway through" and that "additional time is
needed to review, effectuate the necessary
corrections, put in final form and print the
said brief." In his motion for fourth extension,
he intimated that the preparation of the brief
"is almost through" and that "additional time
is needed to redraft and rehash some
significant portions of said brief and have the
same stencilled and mimeographed upon
completion of a definitive text." His motion
for last (fifth) extension of time came with
the excuse that he "suddenly got sick
(influenza) in the course of redrafting and
rehashing some significant portions of said
brief, which ailment hampered and
interrupted his work thereon for sometime."
Finally, in his "Special Extension of Time" to
file brief, he claimed that he needed only five
days from April 21, 1967 to put said brief in
final form and have the same stencilled and
mimeographed.
In the face of the fact that no brief has ever
been filed, counsel's statements in his
motions for extension have gone down to
the level of empty and meaningless words;
at best, have dubious claim to veracity.
It is true that he is a court-appointed
counsel. But we do say that as such counsel
de oficio, he has as high a duty to the
accused as one employed and paid by
defendant himself. Because, as in the case
of the latter, he must exercise his best
efforts and professional ability in behalf of
the person assigned to his care. His is to
render effective assistance. The accused
defendant expects of him due diligence, not
mere perfunctory representation. We do not
accept the paradox that responsibility is less
where the defended party is poor. It has
been said that courts should "have no
hesitancy in demanding high standards of
duty of attorneys appointed to defend
lawphi1.nt

indigent persons charged with crime." 4 For,

indeed, a lawyer who is a vanguard in the
bastion of justice is expected to have a
bigger dose of social conscience and a little
less of self interest. Because of this, a
lawyer should remain ever conscious of his
duties to the indigent he defends.
Worth remembering is the 1905 case of In
the matter of Jose Robles Lahesa. 5 He was
counsel de oficio before the Supreme Court
in two cases: one for robo en cuadrilla and
the other for homicide. He failed to take any
action in behalf of the defendants in both
eases. This Court imposed upon him a fine
of P200. Significant is the pronouncement
we there made that: "This court should exact
from its officers and subordinates the most
scrupulous performance of their official
duties, especially when negligence in the
performance of those duties necessarily
result in delays in the prosecution of criminal
cases and the detention of accused persons
pending appeal." The validity of the
foregoing observation remains to the
present day. 6 It applies to the present case.
Here, appellant was without brief since
December 20, 1966. The effect of this long
delay need not be essayed. We, therefore,
find that Attorney Lope E. Adriano has
violated his oath that he will conduct himself
as a lawyer according to the best of his
"knowledge and discretion".
2. An attorney's duty of prime importance is
"[t]o observe and maintain the respect due
to the courts of justice and judicial officers.
The first Canon of the Code of Ethics
enjoins a lawyer "to maintain towards the
Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake
of the temporary incumbent of the judicial
office, but for the maintenance of its
supreme importance." By the oath of office,
the lawyer undertook to "obey the laws as
well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities." In People vs.
Carillo, 8 this Court's pointed observation was
that as an officer of the court, it is a lawyer's

"sworn and moral duty to help build and not

destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and
regard towards the courts so essential to the
proper administration of justice."
Here, we have a clear case of an attorney
whose acts exhibit willful dis-obedience of
lawful orders of this Court. A cause sufficient
is thus present for suspension or
disbarment. 9 Counsel has received no less
than three resolutions of this Court requiring
compliance of its orders. To be recalled is
that on September 25, 1967, this Court
directed him, in ten days from notice, to
show cause why disciplinary action should
not be taken against him for his failure to file
appellant's brief despite the lapse of the time
therefor. Nothing was done by counsel for
over a year. To impress upon counsel the
gravity of his repeated failure to obey this
Court's orders, on October 3,1968, a fine of
P500 was clamped upon him. He was
directed to pay that fine in ten days. He was
in that order also required to file his brief in
fifteen days. He was warned that more
drastic disciplinary action would be taken
upon his failure to do either. Still he
remained unmoved. Then, this Court issued
the peremptory order of December 5, 1968
commanding him to show cause within ten
days from notice thereof why he should not
be suspended from the practice of law for
gross misconduct and violation of his oath of
office. The Court made it certain that this
order would reach him. He personally
acknowledged receipt thereof. He has not
paid the fine. He has done nothing.
This is 1969. No brief has as yet been filed.
And this, inspite of the fact that as early as
March 27, 1967, when he moved for a fourth
extension of time to file his brief de oficio, he
represented to this Court that all that was
needed was to redraft and to rehash some
significant portions of the brief which was
almost through and to have the same
stencilled and mimeographed upon
completion of a definitive text.

Disrespect is here present. Contumacy is as

patent. Disciplinary action is in order.
Controlling here is the 1961 decision In the
Matter of Atty. Filoteo Dianala Jo. 10 There,
as here, counsel failed to file appellant's
brief (in a criminal case) despite extensions
of time granted him by this Court. Likewise,
this Court issued a show-cause order why
disciplinary action should not be taken
against him. The explanation was
considered unsatisfactory. This Court
imposed a fine of P50 payable in ten days
from notice. Attorney Dianala Jo did not pay
that fine. Came the subsequent resolution of
this Court advising him to pay the fine,
otherwise, he would be arrested and
confined to jam. This warning was not
heeded. On November 18, 1960, the Court
resolved to give him ten days from notice
within which to explain why he should not be
suspended from the practice of law. Despite
receipt of this notice, he did not care to
explain his behaviour which this Court
considered as "consumacy and
unwillingness to comply with the lawful
orders of this Court of which he is an officer
or to conduct himself as a lawyer should, in
violation of his oath of office." He was
suspended from the practice of law for three
months.
In the present case, counsel's pattern of
conduct, it would seem to us, reveals a
propensity on the part of counsel to benumb
appreciation of his obligation as counsel de
oficio and of the courtesy and respect that
should be accorded this Court.
For the reasons given, we vote to suspend
Attorney Lope E. Adriano from the practice
of law throughout the Philippines for a period
of one (1) year.
Let a copy of this resolution be attached to
the personal record, in this Court, of Lope E.
Adriano as member of the Bar. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon,
Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando,

Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ.,

concur.
G.R. No. L-36138 January 31, 1974
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO ROSQUETA, JR., EUGENIO
ROSQUETA and CITONG BRINGAS,
defendants-appellants; ATTY. GREGORIO
B. ESTACIO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
FERNANDO, J.:
Every now and then, although there
seems to be more of such cases of late, a
member of the bar is proceeded against
for failure to live up to the responsibility
owed to a client as well as to this Court.
This is another such instance. In our
resolution of May 25, 1973, we required
respondent Gregorio B. Estacio, counsel
de parte for appellants to show cause
why disciplinary action should not be
taken against him for failure to file the
brief for appellants within the period
which expired on March 30, 1973. He
failed to show cause as thus required,
and on September 7, 1973, we issued a
resolution suspending him from the
practice of law except for the purpose of
filing the brief which should be done
within thirty days from receipt of notice.
Then on October 22, 1973, he filed a
motion for reconsideration wherein it
appeared that he did seek to explain his
failure to file the brief on time, but he left
it to be mailed on June 9, 1973 with
Antonio Rosqueta, Sr., father of
appellants Antonio Rosqueta, Jr. and
Eusebio Rosqueta, who, however, was
unable to do so as on the 10th of June,
his house caught fire. He would impress
on this Court that he was not informed of
such occurrence until the preparation of
1wph1.t

his motion for reconsideration. At any

rate, he would stress that both Antonio
Rosqueta, Sr. and Salvador Labariento,
father-in-law of the third appellant,
Citong Bringas, informed him they would
withdraw the appeal as they could not
raise the money needed for pursuing it.
He had a supplement to such motion for
reconsideration filed on October 25, 1973
wherein he stated that he could not
secure the affidavits of appellants
themselves as two of them were in the
Penal Colony in Davao and the third in
the Iwahig Penal Colony in Palawan. On
November 5, 1973, this Court required
appellants to comment on a motion for
reconsideration of respondent
concerning specifically their alleged
desire to withdraw appeal.
Then on December 27, 1973, there was a
motion of respondent submitting two
affidavits, one from Antonio Rosqueta, Jr.
and the aforesaid Citong Bringas and the
other from Eusebio Rosqueta wherein
they indicated their consent and approval
to respondent's motion to withdraw
appeal. The joint affidavit of the first two
appellants reads as follows: "1. That we
are the same persons named above who
have been charged in Criminal Case No.
L-36138 entitled People v. Antonio
Rosqueta, Jr., et al. pending on appeal
before the Supreme Court of the
Philippines; 2. That we hereby consent
and approve the motion to withdraw the
appeal filed by our counsel, Atty.
Gregorio B. Estacio before the Supreme
Court of the Philippines on that Criminal
Case No. L-36138 their pending in said
Court;
3. That we have given our consent and
approval of our own will voluntarily,
without duress, force, threat or fraud or
deceit; [In witness whereof], we have
hereunto set our signatures this 4th day
of December 1973 in the Municipality of

Panabo, Davao." 1 The affidavit of Eusebio

Rosqueta follows: "1. That I am one of the
accused in that case entitled People v.
Antonio Rosqueta, Jr., et al. under G.R. No.
L-36138 now pending before the Supreme
Court of the Philippines; 2. That I hereby
give my consent and approval to the Motion
to Withdraw the Appeal which has been filed
by our counsel Atty. Gregorio B. Estacio
before the Supreme Court on the abovestated case; 3. That I have reached this
conclusion after I have conferred with our
counsel Atty. Gregorio B. Estacio and this
statement hereby revokes and nullifies the
statement signed by me on December 5,
1973 at the Central Sub-Colony, Iwahig Penal
Colony, Palawan before witnesses, namely,
Mr. Abencio B. Gabayan and Miss Merle J.
Jopida; 4. That I have executed this affidavit
of my own free will, without intimidation,
threat, fraud, deceit, duress or force; [In
witness whereof], I have hereunto set my
hand this 13th day of December, 1973 in the
City of Puerto Princesa." 2

Respondent's liability is thus mitigated

but he cannot be absolved from the
irresponsible conduct of which he is
guilty. Respondent should be aware that
even in those cases where counsel de
parte is unable to secure from appellants
or from their near relatives the amount
necessary to pursue the appeal, that
does not necessarily conclude his
connection with the case. It has been a
commendable practice of some members
of the bar under such circumstances, to
be designated as counsel de oficio. That
way the interest of justice is best served.
Appellants will then continue to receive
the benefits of advocacy from one who is
familiar with the facts of the case. What
is more, there is no undue delay in the
administration of justice. Lawyers of
such category are entitled to
commendation. They manifest fidelity to
the concept that law is a profession and
not a mere trade with those engaged in it
<re||an1w>

being motivated solely by the desire to

make money. Respondent's conduct
yields a different impression. What has
earned a reproof however is his
irresponsibility. He should be aware that
in the pursuance of the duty owed this
Court as well as to a client, he cannot be
too casual and unconcerned about the
filing of pleadings. It is not enough that
he prepares them; he must see to it that
they are duly mailed. Such inattention as
shown in this case is inexcusable. At any
rate, the suspension meted on him under
the circumstances is more than justified.
It seems, however, that well-nigh five
months had elapsed. That would suffice
to atone for his misdeed.
WHEREFORE, the suspension of Atty.
Gregorio B. Estacio is lifted. The
requirement to file the brief is dispensed
with but Atty. Gregorio B. Estacio is
censured for negligence and inattention
to duty. Likewise, as prayed for by
appellants themselves, their appeal is
dismissed.
Zaldivar (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio,
Fernandez. and Aquino, JJ., concur.
A.C. No. 853
June 22, 1940
MARCELINO MACOCO, complainant,
vs.
ESTEBAN B. DIAZ, respondent.
Esteban B. Diaz in his own behalf.
Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta and
Assistant Attorney Barcelona for
complainant.
MORAN, J.:
A complaint for malpractice filed by one
Marcelino Macoco against Esteban B. Diaz,
attorney-at-law, with license to practice in
Philippine courts.
In order to redeem a property belonging to
his wife's father, which had been levied upon
sold at public auction, complainant
Marcelino Macoco deposited with the

provincial sheriff of Ilocos Norte the sum of

P380. As no redemption could be done, the
money was returned by the sheriff to one
Alberto Suguitan, then counsel for Marcelino
Macoco. Suguitan used the money
according to himself and failed to turn it over
to Macoco; whereupon, the latter entrusted
its collection to respondent herein, Esteban
B. Diaz. It appears that Diaz succeeded in
collecting P300 from Suguitan, but he also
misappropriated this amount.
Respondent admitted the misappropriation.
He averred, however, that he had an
agreement with Macoco for the payment of
the money by him misappropriated; that
when this agreement failed, he again
entered into a similar arrangement with
Hermenegildo Galapia, Lope Ragragola and
Pedro Ragragola, who, as he attempted to
prove, were the persons to whom the sum of
P300 was really due, Macoco being merely
a trustee thereof; and that in pursuance of
this arrangement whereby he would pay the
sum of P300, deducting therefrom 20 per
cent for his attorney's fees, he had already
made partial payments to said persons.
Macoco, however, and Lope Ragragola
denied this agreement.
Whatever might have been the agreement
and with whomsoever respondent might
have entered it into, the undeniable fact
remains that he misappropriated the money
in breach of trust. This makes him unfit for
the office of an attorney-at-law. And his
being a deputy fiscal and not law practitioner
at the time of the misappropriation, far from
mitigating his guilt, aggravates it. Want of
moral integrity is to be more severely
condemned in a lawyer who holds a
responsible public office.
Wherefore, respondent Esteban B. Diaz is
hereby disbarred from the practice of law,
and is hereby ordered to surrender his
certificate to the clerk of court within five
days from notice. This Solicitor General is
hereby ordered to investigate the conduct of

Attorney Alberto Suguitan and file later the

corresponding report.
Avancea, C.J., Imperial, Diaz, Laurel and
Concepcion, JJ., concur.

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR.,

complainant, vs. ATTYS.
ANTONIO M. LLORENTE
and LIGAYA P. SALAYON,
respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is a complaint for disbarment

against respondents Antonio M.
Llorente and Ligaya P. Salayon for
gross misconduct, serious breach of
trust, and violation of the lawyers oath
in connection with the discharge of
their duties as members of the Pasig
City Board of Canvassers in the May
8, 1995 elections. Salayon, then
election officer of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), was
designated chairman of said Board,
while Llorente, who was then City
Prosecutor of Pasig City, served as its
ex oficio vice-chairman as provided by
law.[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] Complainant, now a
senator, was also a candidate for the
Senate in that election.
Complainant alleges that, in
violation of R.A. No. 6646, 27(b),[if !
supportFootnotes][2][endif] respondents
tampered
with the votes received by him, with
the result that, as shown in the
Statements of Votes (SoVs) and
Certificate of Canvass (CoC)
pertaining to 1,263 precincts of Pasig
City, (1) senatorial candidates Juan

Ponce Enrile, Anna Dominique

Coseteng, Gregorio Honasan, Marcelo
Fernan, Ramon Mitra, and Rodolfo
Biazon were credited with votes which
were above the number of votes they
actually received while, on the other
hand, petitioners votes were reduced;
(2) in 101 precincts, Enriles votes were
in excess of the total number of voters
who actually voted therein; and (3) the
votes from 22 precincts were twice
recorded in 18 SoVs. Complainant
maintains that, by signing the SoVs
and CoC despite respondents
knowledge that some of the entries
therein were false, the latter committed
a serious breach of public trust and of
their lawyers oath.
Respondents denied the
allegations against them. They alleged
that the preparation of the SoVs was
made by the 12 canvassing
committees which the Board had
constituted to assist in the canvassing.
They claimed that the errors pointed
out by complainant could be attributed
to honest mistake, oversight, and/or
fatigue.
I n h i s C o n s o l i d a t e d R e p l y,
complainant counters that respondents
should be held responsible for the
illegal padding of the votes considering
the nature and extent of the
irregularities and the fact that the
canvassing of the election returns was
done under their control and
supervision.
On December 4, 1998, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, to
which this matter had been referred

pursuant to Rule 139-B, 13, in relation

to 20 of the Rules of Court,
recommended the dismissal of the
complaint for lack of merit.[if !supportFootnotes][3]
[endif]
Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration on March 11, 1999, but
his motion was denied in a resolution
of the IBP Board of Governors dated
April 22, 1999. On June 4, 1999, he
filed this petition pursuant to Rule 139B, 12(c).
It appears that complainant
likewise filed criminal charges against
respondents before the COMELEC
(E.O. Case No. 96-1132) for violation
of R.A. No. 6646, 27(b). In its
resolution dated January 8, 1998, the
COMELEC dismissed complainants
charges for insufficiency of evidence.
However, on a petition for certiorari
filed by complainant,[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] this
Court set aside the resolution and
directed the COMELEC to file
appropriate criminal charges against
respondents. Reconsideration was
denied on August 15, 2000.
Considering the foregoing facts,
we hold that respondents are guilty of
misconduct.
First. Respondent Llorente seeks the
dismissal of the present petition on the
ground that it was filed late. He
contends that a motion for
reconsideration is a prohibited
pleading under Rule 139-B, 12(c)[if !
supportFootnotes][5][endif] and, therefore, the filing
of such motion before the IBP Board of
Governors did not toll the running of
the period of appeal. Respondent
further contends that, assuming such

motion can be filed, petitioner

nevertheless failed to indicate the date
of his receipt of the April 22, 1999
resolution of the IBP denying his
motion for reconsideration so that it
cannot be ascertained whether his
petition was filed within the 15-day
period under Rule 139-B, 12(c).
The contention has no merit. The
question of whether a motion for
reconsideration is a prohibited
pleading or not under Rule 139-B,
12(c) has been settled in Halimao v.
Villanueva,[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif] in which this
Court held:
Although Rule 139-B, 12(c) makes no
mention of a motion for reconsideration, nothing
in its text or in its history suggests that such
motion is prohibited. It may therefore be filed
within 15 days from notice to a party. Indeed,
the filing of such motion should be encouraged
before resort is made to this Court as a matter
of exhaustion of administrative remedies, to
afford the agency rendering the judgment an
opportunity to correct any error it may have
committed through a misapprehension of facts
or misappreciation of the evidence.[if !supportFootnotes]
[7][endif]

On the question whether

petitioners present petition was filed
within the 15-day period provided
under Rule 139-B, 12(c), although the
records show that it was filed on June
4, 1999, respondent has not shown
when petitioner received a copy of the
resolution of the IBP Board of
Governors denying his motion for
reconsideration. It would appear,
however, that the petition was filed on
time because a copy of the resolution
personally served on the Office of the
Bar Confidant of this Court was
received by it on May 18, 1999. Since

copies of IBP resolutions are sent to

the parties by mail, it is possible that
the copy sent to petitioner was
received by him later than May 18,
1999. Hence, it may be assumed that
his present petition was filed within 15
days from his receipt of the IBP
resolution. In any event, the burden
was on respondent, as the moving
party, to show that the petition in this
case was filed beyond the 15-day
period for filing it.
Even assuming that petitioner
received the IBP resolution in question
on May 18, 1999, i.e., on the same
date a copy of the same was received
by the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
delay would only be two days.[if !
supportFootnotes][8][endif]
The delay may be
overlooked, considering the merit of
this case. Disbarment proceedings are
undertaken solely for public welfare.
The sole question for determination is
whether a member of the bar is fit to
be allowed the privileges as such or
not. The complainant or the person
who called the attention of the Court to
the attorneys alleged misconduct is in
no sense a party, and generally has no
interest in the outcome except as all
good citizens may have in the proper
administration of justice.[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif]
For this reason, laws dealing with
double jeopardy [if !supportFootnotes][10][endif] or
prescription [if !supportFootnotes][11][endif] or with
procedure like verification of
pleadings[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif] and prejudicial
questions [if !supportFootnotes][13][endif] have no
application to disbarment proceedings.

Even in ordinary civil actions, the

period for perfecting appeals is relaxed
in the interest of justice and equity
where the appealed case is clearly
meritorious. Thus, we have given due
course to appeals even though filed
six,[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif] four,[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif]
and three[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif] days late. In
this case, the petition is clearly
meritorious.
Second. The IBP recommends the
dismissal of petitioners complaint on
the basis of the following: (1)
respondents had no involvement in the
tabulation of the election returns,
because when the Statements of
Votes (SoVs) were given to them, such
had already been accomplished and
only needed their respective
signatures; (2) the canvassing was
done in the presence of watchers,
representatives of the political parties,
the media, and the general public so
that respondents would not have
risked the commission of any
irregularity; and (3) the acts dealt with
in R.A. No. 6646, 27(b) are mala in se
and not mala prohibita, and petitioner
failed to establish criminal intent on the
part of respondents.[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif]
The recommendation is
unacceptable. In disciplinary
proceedings against members of the
bar, only clear preponderance of
evidence is required to establish
liability.[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif] As long as the
evidence presented by complainant or
that taken judicial notice of by the
Court[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif] is more convincing
and worthy of belief than that which is

offered in opposition thereto,[if !supportFootnotes]

[20][endif]
the imposition of disciplinary
sanction is justified.
In this case, respondents do not
dispute the fact that massive
irregularities attended the canvassing
of the Pasig City election returns. The
only explanation they could offer for
such irregularities is that the same
could be due to honest mistake,
human error, and/or fatigue on the part
of the members of the canvassing
committees who prepared the SoVs.
This is the same allegation made
in Pimentel v. Commission on Elections.[if !
supportFootnotes][21][endif] In rejecting this allegation
and ordering respondents prosecuted
for violation of R.A. No. 6646, 27(b),
this Court said:
There is a limit, We believe, to what can be
construed as an honest mistake or oversight
due to fatigue, in the performance of official
duty. The sheer magnitude of the error, not only
in the total number of votes garnered by the
aforementioned candidates as reflected in the
CoC and the SoVs, which did not tally with that
reflected in the election returns, but also in the
total number of votes credited for senatorial
candidate Enrile which exceeded the total
number of voters who actually voted in those
precincts during the May 8, 1995 elections,
renders the defense of honest mistake or
oversight due to fatigue, as incredible and
simply unacceptable.[if !supportFootnotes][22][endif]

Indeed, what is involved here is

not just a case of mathematical error in
the tabulation of votes per precinct as
reflected in the election returns and the
subsequent entry of the erroneous
figures in one or two SoVs[if !supportFootnotes][23]
[endif] but a systematic scheme to pad the
votes of certain senatorial candidates
at the expense of petitioner in

complete disregard of the tabulation in

the election returns. A cursory look at
the evidence submitted by petitioner
reveals that, in at least 24 SoVs
involving 101 precincts, the votes for
candidate Enrile exceeded the number
of voters who actually voted in the said
precincts and, in 18 SoVs, returns from
22 precincts were tabulated twice. In
addition, as the Court noted in
Pimentel, the total number of votes
credited to each of the seven
senatorial candidates in question, as
reflected in the CoC, markedly differ
from those indicated in the SoVs.[if !
supportFootnotes][24][endif]Despite the fact that these
discrepancies, especially the double
recording of the returns from 22
precincts and the variation in the
tabulation of votes as reflected in the
SoVs and CoC, were apparent on the
face of these documents and that the
variation involves substantial number
of votes, respondents nevertheless
certified the SoVs as true and correct.
Their acts constitute misconduct.
Respondent Llorentes contention
that he merely certified the
genuineness and due execution of the
SoVs but not their correctness is
belied by the certification which reads:
WE HEREBY CERTIFY that the
foregoing Statement of Votes by . .
. [p]recinct is true and correct. IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, we sign
these presents at the City/
Municipality of ___________
Province of ____________ this
_______ day of May, 1995.
(Emphasis added)

Nor does the fact that the

canvassing was open to the public and
observed by numerous individuals
preclude the commission of acts for
which respondents are liable. The fact
is that only they had access to the
SoVs and CoC and thus had the
opportunity to compare them and
detect the discrepancies therein.
Now, a lawyer who holds a
government position may not be
disciplined as a member of the bar for
misconduct in the discharge of his
duties as a government official.[if !
supportFootnotes][25][endif]
H o w e v e r, i f t h e
misconduct also constitutes a violation
of the Code of Professional
Responsibility or the lawyers oath or is
of such character as to affect his
qualification as a lawyer or shows
moral delinquency on his part, such
individual may be disciplined as a
member of the bar for such
misconduct.[if !supportFootnotes][26][endif]
Here, by certifying as true and
correct the SoVs in question,
respondents committed a breach of
Rule 1.01 of the Code which stipulates
that a lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. By express provision
of Canon 6, this is made applicable to
lawyers in the government service. In
addition, they likewise violated their
oath of office as lawyers to do no
falsehood.
Nowhere is the need for lawyers to
observe honesty both in their private
and in their public dealings better

expressed in Sabayle v. Tandayag[if !

supportFootnotes][27][endif] in which this Court said:
There is a strong public interest involved in
requiring lawyers . . . to behave at all times in a
manner consistent with truth and honor. It is
important that the common caricature that
lawyers by and large do not feel compelled to
speak the truth and to act honestly, should not
become a common reality. . . .[if !supportFootnotes][28][endif]

It may be added that, as lawyers in the

government service, respondents were
under greater obligation to observe
this basic tenet of the profession
because a public office is a public
trust.
Third. Respondents participation in
the irregularities herein reflects on the
legal profession, in general, and on
lawyers in government, in particular.
Such conduct in the performance of
their official duties, involving no less
than the ascertainment of the popular
will as expressed through the ballot,
would have merited for them
suspension were it not for the fact that
this is their first administrative
transgression and, in the case of
Salayon, after a long public service.[if !
supportFootnotes][29][endif] Under the circumstances,
a penalty of fine in the amount of
P10,000.00 for each of the
respondents should be sufficient.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds
respondents Antonio M. Llorente and
Ligaya P. Salayon GUILTY of
misconduct and imposes on each of
them a FINE in the amount of
P10,000.00 with a WARNING that
commission of similar acts will be dealt
with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-41692 April 30, 1976

EUGENIO CABRAL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. BENIGNO M. PUNO, Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF BULACAN, and
SILVINO SAN DIEGO, respondents.
Arturo Agustines for petitioner.
Celso B. Poblete for private respondent.
ANTONIO, J.:p
Certiorari and prohibition to nullify the Order
of respondent Judge dated May 21, 1975,
reviving the Information in Criminal Case
No. B-537-74 of the Court of First Instance
of Bulacan, Baliwag Branch, and to prohibit
said court from conducting further
proceedings on the case.
On the complaint of private respondent
Silvino San Diego, the Provincial Fiscal filed
an Information on September 24, 1974 with
respondent court, accusing petitioner
Eugenio Cabral of the crime of Falsification
of Public Document for allegedly falsifying
on August 14, 1948 the signature of Silvino
San Diego in a deed of sale of a parcel of
land. Before arraignment, petitioner moved
to quash the Information on the ground of
prescription of the crime charge, as the said
document of sale of Lot No. 378-C was
notarized on August 14, 1948, registered
with the Register of Deeds of Bulacan on
August 26, 1948 and as a consequence the
original certificate of title was cancelled and
a new transfer certificate of title issued, and
since then Eugenio Cabral had publicly and
continuously possessed said property and
exercised acts of ownership thereon, which
facts are apparently admitted in the letter of
San Diego's lawyer to Cabral on September
17, 1953. After hearing said motion, Judge
Juan F. Echiverri, in a Resolution dated
March 25, 1975, granted the motion to
quash and dismissed the Information on the
ground of prescription. The order of
dismissal was predicated upon said court's

finding that the factual averments contained

in the notion to quash were supported by the
evidence. Private prosecutor, who was not
present during the hearing of the motion to
quash, filed a motion dated April 8, 1975, for
the reconsideration of said Resolution. This
was opposed by petitioner on the ground
that San Diego can no longer intervene in
the criminal case, having filed a civil action
in April 1974 against the same accused
(Eugenio Cabral) on the basis of the same
factual averments contained in the criminal
Information. Acting on the motion for
reconsideration, respondent. Judge Benigno
M. Puno, now presiding, ordered on May 12,
1975 the Fiscal to "make known his position
to the Court." In compliance with said Order,
the Fiscal submitted his comment dated May
19, 1975, expressing the view that the
crime, has not prescribed as Silvino San
Diego stated that he only discovered the
crime sometime in October 1970, and "...
that, in the interest of justice, arraignment
and trial is proper to ventilate the respective
evidence of both parties in their total
meaning and import in determining once and
for all the direction direction and thrust of
these evidence of both parties."
Two (2) days later on, or on May 21, 1975,
respondent Judge set aside the Resolution
of March 25, 1975, and reinstated the
Information. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration of the Order on the ground
that (a) "the judgment of acquittal which
became final immediately upon
promulgation and could not, therefore, be
recalled for correction or amendment"; and
(b) by instituting Civil Case No. 120-V-74,
respondent San Diego lost his right to
intervene in the prosecution of the criminal
case. This motion was denied, as well as the
second motion for reconsideration, hence
this petition, raising the issue of whether or
not the trial court had jurisdiction to set aside
its Resolution of March 25, 1975.

The issue being purely legal and considering

that the matter has been amply discuss in
the pleadings, 1 this case was deemed
submitted for decision without need of
memoranda.

The Solicitor General was required to

appear in this case, and he recommends
giving due course to the petition and the
reversal of the challenged order. According
to the Solicitor General, the Resolution of
March 25, 1975 dismissing the Information
on the ground of prescription of the crime
became a bar to another charge of
falsification, including the revival of the
Information. This is more so, because said
Resolution had already become final and
executory, inasmuch as the Fiscal neither
sought its reconsideration nor appealed
therefrom within the. reglementary period of
fifteen (15) days after his receipt of a copy
thereof on March 31, 1975. When the Fiscal
moved to reinstate the case on May 21,
1975, or about two (2) months from receipt
of a copy of the order of dismissal, the same
had already long been final.
We agree with the Solicitor General. The
Rules of Court is explicit that an order
sustaining a motion to quash based on
prescription is a bar to another prosecution
for the same offense. 2 Article 89 of the
Revised Penal Code also provides that
"prescription of the crime" is one of the grounds
for "total extinction of criminal liability."
Petitioner was charged with the crime of
falsification under Article 172, sub-paragraphs
(1) and (2) of the Revised Penal Code, which
carries an imposable penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum
periods and a fine of not more than P5,000.00.
This crime prescribes ten (10) years. 3 Here,
San Diego had actual if not constructive notice
of the alleged forgery after the document was
registered in the Register of Deeds on August
26, 1948.
In Pangan v. Pasicolan, 4 where the trial court
set aside its own order dismissing the criminal
case nine (9) months thereafter, this Court held

that the order was null and void for want of

jurisdiction, as the first order had already
become final and executory.

Petition for certiorari to set aside the order of

the Court of First Instance of Pampanga
setting aside its order of September 10,
1956 dismissing the case against petitioners
nine months thereafter, or on June 11, 1957.
The issue is whether or not the court had
jurisdiction to enter that order. While the
court may find it necessary to hear the views
of a private prosecutor before acting on a
motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal, it does
not follow that it can set aside its order
dismissing the case even if the same has
already become final. There is no law which
requires notice to a private prosecutor,
because under the rules all criminal actions
are prosecuted "under the direction and
control of the fiscal" (Section 4, Rule 106). It
appearing that the order already final, the
court acted without jurisdiction in in issuing
the the subsequent order.
And likewise, in People v. Sanchez, 5 it was
held that "a judgment in a criminal case
becomes final after the lapse of the period for
perfecting an appeal, ... Under the
circumstances, the sentence having become
final, no court, not even this high Tribunal, can
modify it even if erroneous ...". We hold that
these rulings are applicable to the case at bar.

While it is true that the offended party,

Silvino San Diego, through the private
p r o s e c u t o r, f i l e d a m o t i o n ' f o r
reconsideration within the reglementary
fifteen-day period, such move did not stop
the running of the period for appeal. He did
not have the legal personality to appeal or
file the motion for reconsideration on his
behalf. The prosecution in a criminal case
through the private prosecutor is under the
direction and control of the Fiscal, and only
the motion for reconsideration or appeal filed
by the Fiscal could have interrupted the
period for appeal. 6

The right of the offended party to appeal is

recognized under the old Code of Criminal
Procedure. Under Section 4 of Rule 110
which provides that the prosecution shall be
"under the direction and control of the fiscal"
without the limitation imposed by section
107 of General Order No. 58 subjecting the
direction of the prosecution to the right "of
the person injured to appeal from any
decision of the court denying him a legal
right", said right to appeal by an offended
party from an order of dismissal is no longer
recognized in the offended party. ... (U)nder
the new Rules of Court, the fiscal has the
direction and control of the prosecution,
without being subject to the right of
intervention on the part of the offended party
to appeal from an order dismis ing a criminal
case upon petition of the fiscal would be
tantamount to giving said party as much
right the direction and control of a criminal
proceeding as that of fiscal. 7
More important, he lost his right to intervene
in the criminal case. Prior to the filing of the
criminal case on September 24, 1974, the
spouses Silvino San Diego and Eugenia
Alcantara, on the basis of the same
allegations that San Diego's signature on
the deed of August 14, 1948 was a forgery,
filed on May 2, 1974 an action against
Eugenio Cabral and Sabina Silvestre, with
the Bulacan Court of First Instance (Civil
Case No. 120-V-74) for the recovery of the
same property and damages. It appearing,
therefore, from the record that at the time
the order of dismissal was issued there was
a pending civil action arising out of the same
alleged forged document filed by the
offended party against the same defendant,
the offended party has no right to intervene
in the prosecution of the criminal case,, and
consequently cannot ask for the
reconsideration of the order of dismissal, or
appeal from said order. 8
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby
granted, and Orders of May 21, 1975,

August 4, 1975 and September 3, 1975, of

respondent Judge are hereby set aside. No
pronouncement as to costs.
Fernando, C.J., Barredo (Chairman), Aquino
and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.