Meaning of Metaphor
Meaning of Metaphor
deliver it?
Excerpts and Notes from Ken Baake’s Metaphor and Knowledge: The Challenges of
Writing Science, SUNY, 2003
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Kenneth Burke’s sparse description of metaphor: one of the “master tropes” of language
—“a device for seeing something in terms of something else,” (qtd. in Johnson-Sheehan
48).
Aristotle draws this distinction between the literal and metaphorical in the
Poetics, where he writes that every word “is either authoritative, foreign, metaphorical,
ornamental, made up, extended, contracted, or altered” (39). ). Ortony summarizes
Aristotle’s comparison view of metaphor as one that assumes metaphors “are not
necessary, they are just nice” (“Metaphor” 3). Aristotle adheres to the Platonic tradition in
accepting that the naming of a thing, or “subject,” is different from its intrinsic nature, or
“substance.”
We can create yet another dichotomy and view language from one of two extreme
positions—that all language is literal, or all language is metaphoric—or from some point
in between those extremes. Richards proclaims that we must renounce the idea that words
have intrinsic meanings, a concept he refers to as the “Proper Meaning Superstition”
(11). Words change meaning according to context, Richards argues. Hence, metaphors
resonate with multiple meanings—what I refer to as “harmonics.”
I.A. Richards begins his famous 1936 lecture on metaphor (published 1965) by quoting
Aristotle, who in the Poetics argued that metaphor requires an eye for resemblances,
which “is the mark of genius” (qtd. in Richards 89). Metaphor theorists following this
tradition have adopted the views that metaphor functions either as a “substitution” of the
figurative for the literal, or as an “elliptic simile”—a “comparison” of the figurative and
the literal (Black “More” 28).
Baake excerpts 2
In some cases, scientists develop metaphors because they have no other means of
conceiving of an idea, Boyd writes (360). These are “theory-constitutive,” a term that is
similar to the idea of a constructivist metaphor, but perhaps more sweeping—or
“inductive open ended.” Hoffman shows that the best metaphors in science are those that
spawn theoretical ponderings over many years, such as the metaphor of light as a “wave”
or a “particle.” Yet, Boyd holds other metaphors to be “exegetical” or “literary,” which
means that they follow theory and explain it without being essential to the genesis of the
theory. These non-constructivist metaphors are “conceptually open ended” because they
help create new ways of envisioning an existing theory. He gives the example of early
modern physicists, including Neils Bohr, who worked with models of the atom
Baake excerpts 3
resembling the solar system. For Boyd, the metaphors embedded in this model are of a
limited teaching value, but do not conjure up new aspects of the theory. To proceed
further in explaining atoms a scientist must go well beyond the solar system imagery in
order to capture the quirky erratic behavior of sub-atomic particles.
Similes overtly state that something is like something else, and therefore, call
attention to the act of comparing in a way that metaphors do not. Arguably, a simile is
less dangerous than a metaphor because it acknowledges the comparison and invites
rebuttal.