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H - Protection & Controls

The document discusses engineering controls for hazard prevention. It describes principles of inherent safety and prevention over protection. It then details various prevention, control and mitigation systems that can be used like alarms, trips, isolation valves, instrumentation and process controls. It discusses factors like safety integrity levels and maintenance of safety critical equipment.

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63 views12 pages

H - Protection & Controls

The document discusses engineering controls for hazard prevention. It describes principles of inherent safety and prevention over protection. It then details various prevention, control and mitigation systems that can be used like alarms, trips, isolation valves, instrumentation and process controls. It discusses factors like safety integrity levels and maintenance of safety critical equipment.

Uploaded by

NguyễnTrường
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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H - Engineering Controls

Designing in
Engineering Risk Controls?

Inherently Safer Design Philosophy


HAZARD ELIMINATION is better than
PREVENTION is better than
CONTROL is better than
MITIGATION is better than
EMERGENCY RESPONSE
AND
PASSIVE controls are more reliable than
ACTIVE controls are more reliable than
OPERATIONAL or PROCEDURAL controls.

Prevent/Control/Mitigation Systems
Keep equipment within safe operating limits
Operational controls
TOP EVENT
Alarms
H
Trips

Minimize
escalation by

A
Z
A
R
D

PREVENTION
PREVENTION
BARRIERS
BARRIERS

CONTROL
CONTROL- -MITIGATION
MITIGATION
ESCALATION
ESCALATIONBARRIERS
BARRIERS

C
O
N
S
E
Q
U
E
N
C
E

Containment > Isolation > Survival > Relieving

Prevent/Control/Mitigation Systems
Overpressure protection
Protective instrumentation
to alert/alarm/control
Devices to maintain Safe
Operating Limits
Ignition prevention
measures
Fire/gas detection,
alarms
Emergency shutdown,
isolation, and flare
Fire protection
Evacuation/survival
equipment

TO FLARE

Class 1 Div. 1

Emergency Isolation Valves


1. Provide isolation between different hazards within a
system.
2. Quickly interrupt flow through a system or prevent
gross movement of hazardous material into an
exposed location.
3. Block in specific pieces of hardware that may be
involved in an incident.
4. Cause an orderly shutdown of equipment.
EIVs are typically actuated into the closed position.

Instrumentation & Control


Process Control
Measure all significant variables.
Control those variables which have
the greatest influence on the process.
Control Hazards
Determine independent and dependent variables.
Evaluate relative sensitivities.
Alarm flood.
Consider prevalent failure modes in system design,
instrumentation, hardware including human error.

Common Control Problems

Incorrect sensing
Contamination of process stream
AAA
Inaccurate readings
1
Wrong response
Delayed response
Wrong sensor location
Defective actuator
Plugged or restricted impulse line
Process upset outside range of specified
control loop.
Control valve failure

PSVs: Last overpressure barrier

Process alarms/trips: The first barriers

Safety Instrumented System


Plant Area

Control Room

High
Pressure
Sensor

Mechanical
Relief Valve
to Flare
Gas

ESD Valve

Separator
Well Fluids

Operator Interface
Shutdown System
Logic Solver

Water

Oil

Safety Instrumented Systems


IEC 61508 (ISA S84.01) requires all critical
instruments to demonstrate level of integrity
required in design.
Analyze the reliability of the safety instrumented
function as an overall system
Each instrument loop must be individually
analyzed to determine how and when failures
might occur.
Required reliability may be achieved through
redundancy, increased testing, use of PLCs

Safety Integrity Level - SIL


SAFETY INTEGRITY
LEVEL *

PROBABILITY OF THE SYSTEM


FAILING ON DEMAND (PFD)

SIL-1

10-1 TO 10-2

SIL-2

10-2 TO 10-3

SIL-3

10-3 TO 10-4

* SIL performance can be improved by the addition of redundancy,


more frequent testing, use of diagnostic fault detection, diverse
sensors and control element selection.

Gas Detection
Gas detection is used to determine the presence
of undesired vapors and gases at some specified
concentration.
Used to support some action or decision.
Sensor needs to be located where gas is most
likely to accumulate.

Gas Detection interpretation of results


WHAT WE KNOW
Concentration of
test gas at point of
measurement at
specific time.

WHAT WE DONT KNOW


1. How much gas is present.
2. How far the gas cloud
extends.
3. Concentration profile within
the cloud.
4. What other gases are
present.
5. How fast the gas is moving.

Fire Protection
Conduct a Fire Hazard
Analysis to understand
residual risk that warrants
fire protection
Type of fire, size, duration

Fireproofing on
structural and process
equipment (2-4 hr) and 30
minutes on critical E&I
systems.

Fire Protection
Fire water pump, supply, and delivery
systems
Fire hydrants and monitors
Deluge protection in critical areas such as
pump bays.
Sprinkler systems
Foam Systems
Carbon dioxide
systems

Safety Critical Equipment


Define what equipment is Safety Critical
What % of all equipment?

Define what maintenance and testing regime is


required for Safety Critical Equipment
SCE needs to work when you want it to

Safety critical equipment (SCE)


Equipment that has the greatest influence on
the safety of:
People
Environment
Integrity of equipment

Identifies equipment that is most critical to


the management of major accident hazards
Allows management to optimise maintenance
and inspection of equipment to manage MARs
Recorded in registers that include
performance standards

Critical equipment assessments

In general, static equipment, e.g. hydrocarbon duty piping,


is not considered SCE unless there is a reasonable
expectation that the equipment might fail in service,
e.g. due to corrosion

80-20 Rule Equipment-Risk Distribution

Safety-Related Devices (pressure)


Maintain Equipment in Design Envelope

Relief valves
Bursting discs
Vacuum breakers
Restriction orifices
Flame arrestors
High integrity
protective systems Safety Critical
Equipment
Check valves
Flow-limiting control valves
Fire resistant insulation

Full Equipment
Inventory

List

Evacuation / Survival equipment is SCE

Safe Plant?

How do you ensure you


get what you want?

Design and Construction Assurance

Codes, Standards, ETPs


Design reviews
ensure
you get
How
Eng do
andyou
Tech
Authorities
you want?
what
Approved
contractors/vendors
Certification / Handover
BP Capital Value Process

Capital Value Process


APPRAISE

SELECT

Gate
DSP

DEFINE

Gate
DSP

Gate

EXECUTE

DSP

OPERATE

Gate

Gate
DSP

DSP

Capital Value Process

Front End Loading

Determine
project feasibility
and alignment
with business
strategy

Main Project
CVP Staged
deliverables

Select the
preferred
project
option(s)

Finalize project
scope, cost and
schedule and
get
project funded

Evaluate asset
to ensure
performance to
specifications and
maximum return to
the shareholders

Produce an
operating asset
consistent
with scope,
cost and
schedule

Safety Reviews in Projects


CONCEPTUAL
WHAT IF

LOPA

FIRE CODES
FIRE PROTECTION
REVIEWS

PFD DEVELOPMENT
CONSEQUENCE
MODELING

TECHNOLOGY
SCREENING STUDIES

PLOT PLAN
REVIEW

TECHNOLOGY SAFETY
REVIEWS

YEAR 1

ENGINEERING QUALITY REVIEWS

WHAT IF ANALYSIS

INHERENT SAFETY
REVIEWS

SCENARIO
PLANNING

REVIEW OF SPEC
DEVIATIONS

HAZOPS

H&M BALANCES
PRODUCTION
MODELING

RE-VISIT FACILITY
SITING

YEAR 2

PRE-STARTUP
SAFETY REVIEWS

REVIEW OF PROCESS
SAFETY CONCEPTS

YEAR 3

What is a PHSSER?
Project Health, Safety, Security and Environment Review
Seven reviews matching key gates of Project
development
Face-to-face discussion with
project/contractor/operations personnel
Focuses only on HSSE issues not schedule and cost
Team of independent, experienced specialists
Reports findings and recommendations to client and
project

ETP GP 48-01 HSSE Review of Projects

PHSSER Alignment with CVP


APPRAISE

SELECT

Gate
DSP

Gate
DSP

DEFINE

EXECUTE

Gate
DSP

OPERATE

Gate

Gate
DSP

DSP

Capital Value Process

Front End Loading

Main Project
CVP Staged
deliverables

HSSE Review
Requirements

Determine
project feasibility
and alignment
with business
strategy

Select the
preferred
project
option(s)

Finalize project
scope, cost and
schedule and
get
project funded

Produce an
operating asset
consistent
with scope,
cost and
schedule

Evaluate asset
to ensure
performance to
specifications and
maximum return to
the shareholders

Pre-Startup
PHSSER
Appraise
PHSSER

Select
PHSSER

Pre-Sanction
PHSSER

Construction
PHSSER

Operate
PHSSER

Detailed
Engineering
PHSSER

Case History CH9

BP Grangemouth - UK

Case History 9-Grangemouth Power


1999 BP Grangemouth Refinery, UK
New 33kV Sub Station in main power feed
Sub Station commissioning in stages
Full power tripped new Sub Station
Site not able to recover and almost the entire site
experienced an electrical shutdown.

10

The Incident

What Happened
Two wires in the protection circuit were interchanged.
Full Over-current protection testing not completed.
Protection coped when first half board commissioned
Protection tripped after second half board was switched
in took full power.
Site not able to recover and almost the entire site
experienced an electrical shutdown.

Major Lessons Learned

Be sure you have tested all


functionality before
commissioning
Reviews may not catch
everything.

Pre
-s
ta r
tu
pS
a
Pro
c

ess

Sa

fe
ty

fe
ty

Re

vie
ws

Au
dit

11

All Trip Checks have been tested???

Grangemouth July 1999

Incomplete 33kV Breaker Tests


Complex Shutdown

12

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