SYLLABUS IN POLITICAL lA\.

V AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW IN

CONNECTION WITH THE 2013 BAR EXAMINATION PROMULGATED BY
THE -SUPREME COURT BAR COMMITTEE
(Inclusion of relevant legislation, more recent jurisprudence, and commentaries in
certain topics in this syllabus was made by Attorney EDWIN REY SANDOVAL,
Professor of Law and Bar Reviewer in Political Law and Public International Law)
(from April 9 - May 30, 2013)

I. THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION

A. Constitution: definition, nature and concepts
The Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy

Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any

norm of the Constitution, that law or contract, whether promulgated by the legislative or
by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes, is null
and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the
fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every
statute and contract. (Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, 267 SCRA 408 [1997]
[Bellosillo])

B. Parts
C. Amendments and Revisions

R.A. No. 6735 (The Initiative and Referendum law)

D. Self-executing and Non-self-executing Provisions

A provision which .lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II
of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete
in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation,
or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be
en_ioyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing
if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the
Constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction
of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the
legislature for action. (Manila Prince Hotel v. GS.IS, 267 SCRA 408 [1.997]
[Bellosillo])
Provisions of the Constitution are presumed to be Self-executing. Reason.
Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions are self-executing. If
the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing,
the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the
fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. (Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, 267

SCRA 408 [1997}[Bellosillo])

II. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
Sovereignty Distinguished from Dominion
Sovereignty is the right to exercise the functions of a State to the exclusion of
any other State. It is often referred to as the power of 1rnperium, which is defined as

the government authority possessed by the State. On the other hand, dominion, or
dominium, .is the capacity of the State to own or acquire property such as lands and
natural resources. (Separate Opi11ion, Kapunan, J., i11 Isagani Cruz v. Secretary
of l>ENR, G.R. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000, En Banc, See Footnote 86)

The Concept of an Associated State

An association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish
durable links.
In the basic model, one state, the associate, delegates certain
responsibilities to the other, the principal, while maintaining its international status as a
state.
Free associations represent a middle ground between integration and
independence. Examples of states which maintain an associated state relationship with
the United States are the newly-formed states of Micronesia and the Marshall Islands in
the Pacific.
In US constitutional and international practice, free association is understood as
an international association between sovereigns. The Compact of Free Association is a
treaty which is subordinate to the associated nation's national constitution, and each
party may terminate the association consistent with the right of independence. It has
been said that, with the admission of the US-associated states to the UN in 1990, the
UN recognized that the American model of free association is actually based on an
underlying status of independence.
In international practice, the ''associated state// arrangement has usually been
used as a transitional device of former colonies on their way to full independence.
Examples of states that have passed through the status of associated states as a
transitional phase are Antigua, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent
and Grenada. All have since become independent states. (The Province of North
Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of tlie Philippines Peace Panel,
G.R. No. 18359.1., October 14, 2008, En Banc [Carpio-Morales])

The Concept of "Association" is not recognized under the 1987 Phiiippine

Constitution
The 1987 Constitution provides that no province, city, or municipality, not even
the Autonomous Regiori for Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) is recognized under our laws as
having an ''associative//relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept
implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or
regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state.
The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than
the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to
prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence. {Tire Province of North
Cotabato v. The Governme11t of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel,
G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008, En Banc [Carpio-Morales])
~~--~--~-~

'

ll',ll

A. National territory
1. Archipelagic doctrine
Prof'es~'1r Merlin M. Maga/Iona, et al. v. Hon.
:1.97:1.67, August' 16, 201.1., En Banc [Carpio]}

Eduardo Ermita, et al. (G.R. No.

In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046) demarcating the
maritime baselines of the Philippines as an archipelagic State.. This law followed the
fram ing of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone in 1958
(UNCLOS I), codifying, among others, the sovereign right pf States parties over their
"territorial sea," the breadth of which, however, was left undetermined. Attempts to fil!

this void during the second round of negotiations in Geneva in 1960 (UNCLOS II) proved
futile. Thus, domestically, RA 3046 remained unchanged for nearly five decades, save
for legislation passed in 1968 (Republic Act No. 5446 [RA. 5446]) correcting
typographical errors and reserving the drawing of basel ines around Sabah in North
Borneo.
In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522 x x x. The
change was prompted by the need to make RA 3046 compliant with the terms of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which the Philippines
ratified on 27 February 1984. Among others, UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land
ratio, length, and contour of baselines of archipelagic states like the Philippines and sets
the deadline for the filing of application for the extended continental shelf. Complying
with these requirements, RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of
some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories,
namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as "regimes of
islands" wl1ose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.

RA 9522 ~s not unconstatutionat It is a statutory tooft to demarcate the

coul!1try's maritime zones and cont3nental shelf under UNCLOS III~ not to
delineate Philippine territory.
UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a
multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones (i,e.,
the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical
miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the
baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits. UNCLOS III was the
culmination of decades~ long negotiations among United Nations members to codify
norms regulating the conduct of States in the world's oceans and submarine areas,
recognizing coastal and archipelagic States' graduated authority over a limited span of
waters and submarine lands along their coasts.
On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III
States parties to worlc-out specific basepoints along their coasts from which baselines
are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to
measure the breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf. Article 48 of UNCLOS
III on archipelagic States like ours could not be any clearer:
Article 48.
Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the
contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf. The
breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone
and the continental shelf shalD be measured from archipe!agic baselines
drawn in accordance with Article 47.
Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III
States parties to delimit with precision the exte0t of their maritime zones and
continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rst of the international community
of the scope of the maritime space and submarine ~reas within which States parties
exercise treaty-based rights, namely. The exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters
(Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, jmrnigration and sanitation laws in
the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the iiving and non-living
resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77).
Even under petitioners' theory that the Philippine territory embraces the islands

and all the waters within the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris, the
baselines of the Philippines would still have to be drawn in accordance with RA 9522
because this is the only way to draw the baselines in conformity with UNCLOS III. The
baselines cannot be drawn from the boundaries or other portions of the rectangular area

delineated in the Treaty of Paris, but from the "outermost islands and drying reefs of the
archipelago."
UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition,
enlargement or x x x diminution of territory.
Under traditional international !aw
typology, states acquire (or conversely, lose) territory through occupation, accretion,
cession and prescription, not by executing multilateral treaties on the regulation of seause rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treaty's terms to delimit maritime
zones and continental shelves. Territorial claims to land features are outside UNCLOS
IIII, and are instead governed by the rules on general international law. (Professor
Merlin M. Maga/Iona, et al. v. Hon. Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 1871.67,
August 16, 201.1., En Banc [Carpio])

RA 9522's use of the framework of Regime of Islands to determine the

maritime zones of the l<alayaan Island Group (KCG) and the Scarborough
Shoal is not inconsistent with the Philippines' claim of sovereignty over these

areas.
The configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 shows
that RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046, save for at least nine
basepoints that RA 9522 skipped to optimize the location of basepoints and adjust the
length of one baseline (and thus comply with UNCLOS III's limitation on the maximum
length of baselines). Under RA 3046, as under RA 9522, the KIG and the Scarborough
Shoal lie outside of the baselines drawn around the Philippine archipelago. Trds
undeniable cartographic fact takes the wind out of petitioners' argument branding RA
9522 as a statutory renunciation of the Philippines' claim over the KIG, assuming that
baselines are relevant for this purpose.
Petitioners' assertion of loss of "about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial
waters" under RA 9522 is similarly unfounded both in fact and law. On the contrary, RA
9522, by optimizing the iocation of basepoints, increasedthe Philippines' total maritime
space (covering its internal waters, territorial sea and exclusive economic zone) by
154,216 square nautical miles xx x.
Further, petitioners' argument that the KIG now lies outside Philippine territory
because the baselines that RA 9522 draws do not enclose the KIG is negated by RA
9522 itself. Section 2 of the law commits to text the Philippines' continued claim of
sovereignty and jurisdiction over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal:
The baselines in the following areas over which the
Section 2.
Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be
determined as "Regime of Islands" under the Republic of the Philippines
consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS):

a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree

No. 1596 and
b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal.
Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as part of
the Philippine archipelago, adverse legal effects would have ensued. The Philippines
would have committed a breach of two provisions of UNCLOS III. First, Article 47 (3) of

UNCLOS III requires that "[t]he drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any
appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago." Second, Article
47 (2) of UNCLOS III requires that "the length of the baselines shall not exceed 100
nautical miles," save for three per cent (3%) of the total number of baselines which can
reach up to 125 nautical miles.

Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the KIG and
the Scarborough Shoal for several decades, these outlying areas are located at an
appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago, such that
any straight baseline loped around them from the nearest basepoint will inevitably
"depart to an appreciable extent from the general configuration of our archipelago."

Xxx
Similarly, the length of one baseline that RA 3046 drew exceeded UNCLOS III's
limits. The need to shorten this baseline, and in addition, to optimize the location of
basepoints using current maps, became imperative x x x.
[T]he amendment of the baselines law was necessary to enable the Philippines
to draw the outer limits of its maritime zones including the extended continental shelf
provided by Article 47 of [UNCLOS III]. As defined by R.A. 3046, as amended by R.A.
5446, the baselines suffer from some technical deficiencies x x x.
Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines' claim over the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal, Congress' decision to classify the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as
""Regime[s] of Islands' under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121"
of UNCLOS III manifests the Philippine State's responsible observance of its pacta sunt
servanda obligation under UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III, any "naturally
formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide," such as
portions of the KIG, qualifies under the category of "regime of islands," whose islands
generate their own applicable maritime zones. (Professor Merlin M. Maga/Iona, et
al. v. Hon. Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 187167, August 16, 2011, En Banc
[Carpio])

Statutory daim over Sabah under RA 5446 retained.

Petitioners' argument for the invalidity of RA 9522 for its failure to textualize the
Philippines' claim over Sabah in North Borneo is also untenable. Section 3 of RA 5446,
which RA 9522 did not repeal, keeps open the door for drawing the baselines of Sabah:
Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the
Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act is without prejudice to the
delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of
Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the
Philippines has acquired doniinion and sovereignty.
{Professor Merli11 M. Maga/Iona, et al. L'. Hon. Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No.
:187167, August 16, 2011, En Banc [Carpio])

UNCLOS III and RA 9522 not incompatible with the Constitution's delineation
of internal waters.
Whether .referred to as Philippine "internal waters" under Article I of the
Constitution or as "archipelagic waters" under UNCLOS III (Article 49[1]), the Philippines
exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including
the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath. UNCLOS III affirms this x x
x.
The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of municipal
and international law norms subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to
necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the interest of maintaining unimpeded,
expeditious international navigation, consistent with the international law principle of
freedom of navigation . Thus, domestically, the political branches of the Philippine
government, in the competent discharge of their constitutional powers, may pass

legislation designating routes within the archipe!agic waters to reguiate innocent and sea
lanes passage. Indeed, bills drawing nautical highways for sea lanes passage are now
pending in Congress.
In the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms, now codified in
UNCLOS III, operate to grant innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or
archipeiagic waters, subject to the treaty's limitations and conditions for their exercise.
Significantly, the right of innocent passage is a customary international law, thus
automatically incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law. No modern State can validly
invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in
accordance with customary international law without risking retaliatory measures from
the international community.
The fact that for archipelagic States, their archipelagic waters are subject to both
the right of innocent passage and sea lanes passage, does not place them in lesser
footing vis-a-vis continental coastal States which are subject, in their territorial sea, to
the right of innocent passage and the right of transit passage through internationai
straits. The imposition of these passage rights through archipelagic waters under
UNCLOS III was a concession by archipelagic States, in exchange for their right to claim
all the waters landward of their baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the
coast,, as archipelagic waters subject to their territorial sovereignty. More importantly,
the recognition of archipelagic States' archipelago and the waters enclosed by their
baselines . as one cohesive entity prevents the treatment of their islands as separate
islands under UNCLOS III. Separate islands generate their own maritime zones, placing
the waters between islands separated by more than 24 nautical miles beyond the States'
territorial sovereignty, subjecting these waters to the rights of other States under
UNCLOS III.

Xxx
In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its
exclusive economic zone, reserving solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all living
and non-living resources within such zone. Such a maritime delineation binds the
international community since the delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If
the maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community will of
course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it.
UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the Philippines. UNCLOS III
creates a sui generis maritime space - the exclusive economic zone - in waters
previously part of the high seas. UNCLOS III grants new rights to coastal States to
exclusively exploit the . resources found within this zone up to 200 . nautical miles.
UNCLOS III, however, preserves the traditional freedom of navigation of other States
that attached to this zone beyond the territorial sea before UNCLOS III.
Xxx
The enactment of UNBCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine
archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationallyrecognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines' maritime zones and continental
shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the Philippines in
safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Consbtution and our national
interest. (Professor Merlin M. Maga/Iona, et al. v. Ho11. Eduardo Ermita, et al.,
G.R. No. 187167, August 16, 201:1.r En Ba1u: [Carpio))

B. State immunity

Government Funds may not be Subject to Garnishment

UP

11.

Dizon, G.R. No. 171182, 23 August 2012,

1st

Div. (Bersamin)

The funds of the UP are government funds that are public in character. They
include tl1e income accruing from the use of real property ceded to the UP that may be
spent only for the attainment of its institutional objectives. Hence, the funds subject of
this action could not be validly made the subject of writ of execution or garnishment.
The adverse judgment rendered against the UP in a suit to which it had impliedly
consented was not immediately enforceable by execution against the UP, because
suability of the State did not necessarily mean its liability.

C. General Principles and State Policies

The Philippine adopts the generally-accepted principles of international law
as part o'the law of the land (Section 2, Article II, .1.987 Constitution).

Have the Yogyakarta Principles evolved in'ito a genera&ly accepted principle of

international law and, therefore, binding upon the Philippines?
We refer now to the petitioner's invocation of the Yogyakarta Principles (the
Application of Internationa~ Human Rights law In Relation to Sexual
Orientation and Gender Identity), which petitioner declares to reflect binding
principles of international law.
At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Pnncip/es
contain norms that are obligatory on the Philippines. There are declarations and
obligations outlined in said Principles which are not reflective of the current state of
international law, and do not find basis in any of the sources of international law
enumerated under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
Petitioner has not undertaken any objective and rigorous analysis of these alleged
principles of international law to ascertain their true status.
Xxx

Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a
declaration formulated by various international law P\Ofi=.ssors, are - at best - de lege
refenda - and do not constitute binding obligations on the.Philippines. Indeed, so much
of contemporary international law is ct1aracterized by the "soft law" nomenclature, i.e.,
international law is full of principles that promote interfiational cooperation, harmony,
and respect for human rights, most of which amounts to no more than well-meaning
desires, without the support of either State practice or opinio Juris. (Ang LADLAD
LGBT Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190582, Aprif 8, 2010, En Banc {Del
Castillo])

Policy against Estab/i..,;;hment and Maintenance oT.IJrivate Army Groups (PA Gs)

Private armies and other armed grtp.ups not recognized by duly

constituted authority shall be dismantled. All paramilitary forces including
Civilian Horne Defense Forces not consistent , ll)lith the citizen armed force
established in this Constitution, shall be disso.lved or, where appropriate 1
converted into the regular force. (Sec. 24, Art. xytrr, 1987 Constitution)
Marynette R. Gamboa v. P/SSPT Marlou C Chan ahd P/Supt. William
G.R. No. :J.93636, 24 July 201.2, En Banc {Sereno)

o. Fangr

Former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Administrative Order No. 275
(A.O. 275) creating the Zenarosa Commission (Commission) which was formed to
investigate the existence of private army groups (PAGs) in the country in view of

eliminating and dismantling them permanently in the future. Upon conclusion of its
investigation, the Commission submitted a confidential report to the Office of the
President.
Marynette Gamboa was the Mayor of Dingras, !locos Norte. Gamboa alleged
that the PNP !locos Norte conducted surveillance operation against her and her aides,
and classified her as a PAG coddler. Purportedly without the benefit of date verification,
PNP forwarded the information gathered on her to the Commission, causing her
inclusion in the Report's enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs.
Gamboa's association with PAG was published and released in the different forms
of media, publicly tagging her as a PAG coddler. Xx x

Held: The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and other
armed groups not recognized by the duly constituted authority. It also provides for the
establishment of one police force that is national in scope and civilian in character, and
is controlled and administered by a national police commission.
Taking into account these constitutional fiats, it is clear that the issuance of A.O.
275 articulates a legitimate state aim, which is to investigate the existence of PAGs with
the ultimate objective of dismantling them permanently. Pursuant to the state interest
of dismantling PAGs, as well as the powers and functions accorded to the Commission
and the PNP, the latter collected information on individuals suspected of maintaining
PAGs, monitored them and counteracted their activities. One of these individuals is
herein petitioner Gamboa.
This Court holds that Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that the data
contained in the Report listing her as a PAG coddler came from the PNP. Contrary to
the ruling of the trial court, however, the fon.ivarding of information by the PNP to the
Commission was not an unlawful act that violated or threatened her right to privacy in
life, liberty or security. The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share
intelligence regarding PAGs with the body specifically created for the purpose of
investigating the existence of these notorious groups. Moreover, the Commission was
explicitly authorized to deputize the police force in the fulfillment of the farmer's
mandate, and thus had the power to request assistance from the latter. The fact that
the PNP released information to the Commission without prior communication to
Gamboa and without affording her the opportunity to refute the same cannot be
interpreted as a violation or threat to her right to privacy since that act is an inherent
and crucial component of intelligence gathering and investigation. Additionally, Garcia
herself admitted that the PNP had a validation system, which was used to update
information on individuals associated with PAGs and to ensure that the data mirrored
the situation on the field. Thus, safeguards were put in place to make sure that the
information collected maintained its integrity and accuracy.

D.
E.
F.
G.

:UI.

Separation of Powers
Checks and Balances
Delegation of Powers
Forms of Government

LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

A. Who may exeirdse legislative powe

1. Congress
2. Regional/Local legislative power
3. People's initiative on statutes
a) Initiative and referendum

4. The President under a martial law rule or in a revolutionary government

B. Mouses of Congress
1. Senate
2. House of Representat ives

a. District representatives and questions of apportionment

Senator Benigno Simeon c. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 189793, 7 April 2010, En Banc (Perez)

Petitioners x x x sought the nullification of Republic ct No. 9716 (R.A. 9716),

titled ':4n Act Reapportioning the Composition of the Arst (ft) and Second (Z1d)
Legislative Distncts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New
Legislative District From Such Reapportionment"for being unconstitutional.
R.A. 9716 created an additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines
Sur by reconfiguring the existing 1st and 2nd legislative districts of the province. Hence,
the 1st district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamp!ona, Pasacao, and San
Fernando were combined with the 2nd district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form
a new 2nd legislative district.
Aquino and Robredo, relying on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
contend that the reapportionment introduced by R.A. 9716, runs afoul with the explicit
constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. Thus, the reconfiguration by
R.A 9716 of the 1st and 2"d districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the
proposed 1st district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.

Issue:

Whether or not a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional

requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a province.

Held: There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum
population that must compose a legislative district. The second sentence of Section
5(3), Article VI of the Constitution , succinctly provides: ''Each city with a population of
at least 250,000,. or each province,. shall have at least one representative. "
The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a
city to a dist1ict on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the
other. For while a province is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing
mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in
order to be similarly entitled.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each city
with a population of at least 250,000 11 from the phrase "or each province" point to no
other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a city,
but not for a province.
In Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC, the Court limited the application of the 250,000
minimum population requirement for cities only to its initial legislative district. In other
words, while Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a
minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does not have to
increase its population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional district.
The Court sees no reason why the Mariano case, which involves the creation of
an additional district within a city, should not be applied to additional districts in
provinces. Indeed, if an additional legislative district created within a city is not required

to represent a population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid, neither should such be

needed for an additional district in a province, considering moreover that a province is
entitled to an initial seat by the mere fact of its creation and regardless of its population.
Further, apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code
on the creation of a province which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least
a legislative district. Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government Code states the
Requisites for Creation that a province may be created if it has an average annual
income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos
(20,000,000) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites: a
contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by
the Lands Management Bureau, or a population of not less than 250,000 inhabitants as
certified by the National Statistics Office.
Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but
is merely an alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement.

Aldaba v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 1.88078"' 25 January 2010, En Banc (Carpio)

The City of Malolos and the Municipalities of Hagonoy, Calumpit, Pulilan, Bulacan,
and Paombong comprise the first district of the pmvince of Bulacan. A Certification of
Regional Director Alberto N. Miranda of Region III of the NSO (National Statistics Office)
states that the population of the City of Malolos "will be 254,030 by the year 2010."
Based on the projection, Congress enacted Republic Act No, 9591 (RA 9591), making
the City of Malolos a separate district from the existing first legislative district of
Bulacan.
Petitioners Aldaba, et al. xx x filed this petition assailing the constitutionality of
RA 959L They contend, inter alia, that the law failed to comply with the requirement of
Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that a city must have a population of at
least 250,000 (to be entitled to a separate legislative district).

Held: The Certification of Regional Director Miranda, which is based on demographic

projections, is without legal effect because Regional Director Miranda has no basis and
no authority to issue the Certification. The Certification is also void on its face because
based on its own growth rate assumption, the population of Malolos will be less than
250,000 in the year 2010. In addition, intercensal demographic projections cannot be
made for the entire year. In any event, a city whose population has increased to
250,000 is entitled to have a legislative district only in the 'Immediately following
election''after the attainment of the 250,000 population.

FirsC certifications on demographic projections can be issued only if such

projections are declared official by the National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB).
Second, certifications based on demographic projections can be issued only by the NSO
Administrator or his designated certifying officer.
Third, intercensal population
projections must be as of the middle of every year.
Based on the Certification's own growth rate assumption, the population of
Malolos will be less than 250,000 before the 10 May 2010 elect:ons. Incidentally, the
NSO has no published population projections for individual municipalities or cities but
only for entire regions and provinces.
A city that has attained a population of 250,000 is entitled to a legislative district
only in the "immediately following election." In short, a city must first attain the
250,000 population, and thereafter, in the immediately following elections, such city
shall have a district representative. There is no showing in the present case that the
City of Malolos has attained or will attain a population of 250,000, whether actual or
projected,, before the 10 May 2010 elections. Thus, the City of Mafolos is not qualified

I(\

to have a legislative district of its own under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.

b. Party-list system
Republic Act No. 7941 (The Party-list System Act) - The iaw that implements
the party-list system prescribed in the Constitution

Atong Paglaum,

Inc., et al. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 203766; April 2, 2013, En

Ban.c (Carpio)

The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of
representation. Simply put, the party-list system is intended to democratize political
power by giving political parties that cannot win in legislative district elections a chance
to win seats in the House of Representatives. The voter elects two representatives in
the House of Representatives: one for his or her legislative district, and another for his
or her party-list group or organization of choice. X x x
Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system,
stressed that "the party-list system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral
representation." X x x
Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system
to include not only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended
the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party~list system.
As explained by Commissionew Wilfredo Villacorta, politkal parties can
participate in the party-list system "[F]or as long as they field candidates who
come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this

Constitution."
In fact, the framers voted down xx x a proposal to reserve permanent seats to
sectoral parties in the House of Representatives, or alternately, to reserve the party-list
system exclusively to sectoral parties. Xx x
Thus, in the end, the proposal to give permanent reserved seats to certain
sectors was outvoted. Instead, the reservation of seats to sectoral representatives was
only allowed for the first three consecutive terms. There can be no doubt whatsoever
that the framers of the 1987 Constitution expressly rejected the proposal to make the
party-list system exclusively for sectoral parties only, and that they clearly intended the
party-list system to include both sectoral and non-sectoral parties.
The common denominator between sectoral and non-sectoral parties is that they
cannot expect to win in legislative district elections but they can garner, in nationwide
elections, at least the same number of votes that winning candidates can garner in
legislative district elections. The party-list system will be the entry point to membership
in the House of Representatives for both these non-traditional parties that could not
compete in legislative district elections.
The indisputable intent of the framers of the 19876 Constitution to include in the
party-list system both sectoral and non-sectoral parties is dear~y written in Section
5(1), Article VI of the Constitution xx x.
Section 5(1), article VI of the Constitution is crystal-clear that there shall be "a
party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations." The commas after the words "nationa!L]" and "regional[,]" separate
national and regional parties from sectoral parties. Had the framers of the 1987
Constitution intended national and regional pa1ties to be at the same time sectoral, they

' 1

would have stated "national and regional sectoral parties." They did not, precisely
because it was never their intention to make the party-list system exclusively sectoral.
What the framers intended, and what they e>cpressly wrote in Section 5(1), could
not be any clearer: the party-list system is composed of three different groups, and the
sectoral parties belong to oniy one of the three groups. The text of Section 5(1}
leaves no room for a~y doubt that national and regional parties are separate
from sectoral parties.
Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national
parties or organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations. National and regional parties or organizations are different from sectoral
parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations need not be
organized along sectoral lines and need not represent any particular sector.
Moreover, Section 5(2t Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during
the first three consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, "one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled
as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by iaw, except the religious sector." This provision clearly shows again that
the party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two reasons.
First, the other half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would
naturally be open to non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea
that the party-list system is exclusively for sectoral parties representing the
"marginalized and underrepresented." Second,. the reservation of one-half of the partylist seats to sectoral parties applies only for the first "three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution," clearly making the party-list system fully open after the
end of the first three congressional terms. This means that, after this period, there will
be no seats reserved for any class or type of party that qualifies under the three groups
constituting the party-list system.

Hence, the dear intent, express wording, and party-list structure

ordained in Section 5(1) and (2), Artide VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot
be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral parties only; but also for
non-sectoral parties.
Xxx
1

Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a "party' as "either a political party or
a sectoral party or a coalition of parties." Clearly, a political party is different from a
sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further provides that a ~'political party
refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform,
principles and policies for the genera~ conduct of government." On the other
hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a "sectoral party refers to an
organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5
hereof whose principa! advocacy pertains to the speciaB interest and concerns
of their sector." R.A. No. 7941 provides different definitions for a political and a
sectoral party. Obviously, they are separate and distinct from each other.

R.A. No. 7941 does not require 1111aticmai and regionai parties or
organizations to repr;esent the "marginalized and 1.mdenepiresernted" sectors.

To require all national and regional parties under the party-list system to represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideologybased and cause-oriented parties from the party-list system . How will these ideologybased and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative district elections,
participate in the electoral process if they are exciuded from the party-list system? To
exclude them from the party-list system is to prevent them from joining the

1 ')

parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only option the armed struggle. To exclude
them from the party-list system is, apart from being obviously senseless, patently
contrary to the clear intent and express wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No.
7941.
Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is
clearly different from a sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a
sectoral party and need not represent any particular sector. There is no requirement in
R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional political party must represent a "marginalized
and underrepresented" sector. It is sufficient that the political party consists of citizens
who advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same governance principles and
policies, regardless of their economic status as citizens.
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that "the sectors shal! include labor, peasant,
firsherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, e!derly, handicapped,
women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professmonals." The sectors
mentioned in Section 5 are not necessarily "marginalized and underrepresented." For
sure, "professionals" are not by definition "marginalized and underrepresented," not
even the elderly, women, and the youth. However, professionals, the elderly, women,
and the youth may "lack well-defined political constituencies," and can thus organize
themselves into sectoral parties in advocacy of the special interests and concerns of
their respective sectors.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 provides another compelling reason for holding that
the !aw does not require national and regional parties, as well as certain sectoral parties
in Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941, to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented."
Section 6 provides the grounds for the COMELEC to refuse or cancel the registration of
parties or organizations after due notice and hearing.
X x x. None of the grounds to refuse or cancel registration refers to nonrepresentation of the "marginalized and underrepresented."
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" appears only once in
R.A. No. 7941, in section 2 on Declaration of Policy. Section 2 seeks "to promote
proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives through the party-list system," which will enable Filipinos belonging to
the "marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties,
and who lack well-defined political constituencies," to become members of the
House of Representatives. While the policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941
broadly refers to "marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties," the specific implementing provisions of R.A. No. 7941 do not define or require
that the sectors, organizations or parties must be "marginalized and underrepresented."
On the contrary, to even interpret that all the sectors mentioned in Section 5 are
"marginalized and underrepresented" would lead to absurdities.
How then should we harmonize the broad policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A.
No. 7941 with its specific implementing provisions, bearing in mind the applicable
provisions of the 1987 Constitution on the matter?
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" should refer only to the
sectors in Section 5 that are, by their nature, economically "marginalized and
underrepresented." These sectors are: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other
similar sectors. For these sectors, a majority of the members of the sectoral
party must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented."
The
nominees of the sectoral party either must belong to the sector, or must have
a track record of advocacy for the sector represented. Belonging to the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector does not mean one must "wallow in
poverty, destitution or infirmity." It is sufficient that one, or his or her sector, is below

11.

the middle class.

More specifically, the economically "marginalized and
underrepresented" are those who fall in the low income group as classified by the
National Statistical Coordination Board.
The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of
professionals, the elderly, women and the youth, need not be "marginalized and
underrepresented" will allow small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack
"well-defined political constituencies" a chance to win seats in the House of
Representatives.
On the other hand, limiting to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" the sectoral parties for labor, peasant, fisheriolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other
sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of society, will give the
"marginalized and underrepresented" an opportunity to iikewise win seats in the House
of Representatives.
This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and
will give rise to a multi-party system where those "marginalized and underrepresented,"
both in economic and ideological status, will have the opportunity to send their
own members to the House of Representatives. This
interpretation will also make the party-list system honest and transparent, eliminating
the need for relatively well-off party-list representatives to masquerade as "wallowing in
poverty, destitution and infirmity," even as they attend sessions in Congress riding in
SU Vs.
The major political parties are those that field candidates in the legislative district
elections. Major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections since they
neither lack "well-defined political constituencies" nor represent "marginalized and
underrepresented" sectors. Tims, the national or regional parties under the
party-list system are necessarily those that do not belong to major political
parties. This automatically reserves the national and regional parties under the partylist system to those who "lack well-defined political constituencies,"-giving them the
opportunity to have members in the House of Representatives.

Xxx
In 2009 x x x in BANAT,. this Court stretched the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling
further.
In BANA T, the majority officially excluded major political parties from
participating in party-list elections, abandoning even the lip-service that Ang Bagong
Bayani accorded to the 1987 Constitution and R..A.. No. 7941 that major political parties
can participate in party-list elections.
The minority in BANAT,. however, believed that major political parties can
participate in the party-list system through their sectoral wings. The minority expressed
that "[e]xcluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against
the Constitution 1 the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This
Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion
of major political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the
Constitution and the law. The experimentations in socio-political engineering have only
resulted in confusion and absurdity in the party-list system. Such experimentations, in
clear contravention of the 1987 Constitution and R.A.,.,o. 7941, must now come to an
e~.

Xxx

'

.. :r.

tolh~

Thus, we remand all the present petitions

COMELEC. In determining who
may participate in the ;coming 13 May 2013 and .subsequent party-list elections, the
COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:

L1

l.

Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national
parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral
patties or organizations.

2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not

need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under
the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A
political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district
elections can participate in party-list elections through its sectoral wing that can
separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and
underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political constituencies." It is
enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns
of their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and underrepresented'
include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "welldefined political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women and
the youth.
1

5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the

"marginalized and underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members
of sectoral parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies"
must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented,' or that
represent those , who lack "well-defined politicai constituencies/' either must
belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for
their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona fide members of such parties or organizations.
1

6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if

some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one
nominee who remains qualified.

Daryl Grace J. Abayon v. The Honorable House or Representatives Electoral

Tribunal, et al., G.R. No!.-. 189466 and 189506, 1:1. February 2010r En Banc

{Abad)
Once elected, both the district representatives and the party-list representatives
are treated in like manner. They have the same deliberative rights, salaries, and
emoluments. They can participate in the making of laws that will directly benefit their
legislative districts or sectors. They are also subject to the same term limitation of three
years for a maximum of three consecutive terms.

Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANA T) v.

COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, July 2, 2009, En Banc (Carpio)
The Ruling of the Court

The petitions have partial merit. We maintain that a Philippine-style party-list

election has at least four inviolable parameters as clearly stated in Veterans. X x x
However, because the formula in Veterans has flaws in its mathematical interpretation of

the term "proportional representation," this Court is compelled to revisit the formula for
the allocation of additional seats to party-list organizations .

Xxx
After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list representatives to the total
number of representatives, the Constitution left tile manner of allocating seats
available to party-list representatives to the wisdom of the legislature.

Xxx
The second clause of Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that "those
garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes." X x x. Veterans interprets the clause "in
proportion to their total number of votes" to be in proportion to the votes of the first
party. This interpretation is contrary to the express language of R.A. No . 7941 .
We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued
operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found
in the second clause of Section 11 (b) of R.A . No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court
finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the
maximum number of available party list seats when the m1mber of available party list
seats exceeds 50.
The continu.ed operation of till#. two percent threshold in the
distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attain~E:nt of the permis~ive ceiling th_at
20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list
representatives .
.
~ -

Xxx
We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the
distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11 (b) of R.A.
No. 7941 . The two percent threshold presents an ur')warranted obstacle to the full
implementation of Section 5(2) , Artiele VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment
of "the broadest possible representation of party, sectoraf or group interests in the House
of Representatives.
In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section
11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 , the following procedure shall be observed:
1.

The parties, ,o rganizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to
the lowest based on the number votes they 'garnered during the elections.
2 . The parties , organizations, and coalitions receivinfJ at least two percent (2%)
of the total votes cast for party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed
seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes , according to the ranking in
paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes until all the additional seats are aliocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be ' entitled to not more than three
(3) seats.
In computing tht:; additional seats, the guaranteed seats sha)I no longer be
included because they have already been allocated , at one .seat each , to every two-

percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as "additional seats" are
the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats .
Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in RA. No. 7941 allowing
for a rounding off of frac~ional seats .
In declaring the. two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our
allocation of additional seats in Table 3 below to the two-percenters. X x x

c.
o.

Legislative Privileges, Inhibitions and Disqualifications

Quorum and Voting Majorities
IE. Discipline of Members
F. Electoral Tribunals and the Commissaon on Appointments
1. Nature
2. Powers

The EBectoral Trebunals in Congress

Daryl Grace J. Abayo,n v. The Honorable House of Representatives Electoral

Tribunal, et al.F G.R. Nos. 189466 and 189506, 11 February 2010, En Banc
{Abad)
It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a
nominee - the need for him or her to be a bona fide member or a representative of his
party-list organization """" in the context of the facts that characterize Abayon and
Palparan's relation to Aangat Tayo and Bantay, respectively, and the marginalized and
underrepresented interests that they presumably embody.

Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members
of the House of Representatives. Since party-list nominees are "elected members" of
the House of Representatives, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their
qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or
organization of the partY-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken
his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the
COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualification ends and the
HRET's own jurisdiction begins.

G. Powers of Congress

1. Legislative

Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP) v. The Secretary of Budget

and Management (G.R. No. 164987, Apr" 24, 2012,, E61 Banc [Mendoza])
The Power of Appropriation

Under the Constitution, the power of appropriation is vested in the Legislature,

subject to the requirement that appropriations bills originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives with the option of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments.
While the budgetary process commences from the proposal submitted by the President
to Congress, it is the latter which concludes the exercise by crafting an appropriation act
it may deem beneficial
the nation,, based on its own judgment, wisdom and purposes.
Like any other piece of legislation, the appropriation act may then be susceptible to
objection from the branct1 tasked to implement it, by way of a Presidential veto.
Thereafter, budget execution comes under the domain of the Executive branch which
deals with the operational aspects of the cycle including the allocation and release of
funds earmarked for var;ious projects. Simply put, from the regulation of fund releases,
the implementation of payment schedules and up to the actual spending of the funds
specified in the law, the Executive takes the wheel. "The DBM (Department of Budget
and Management) lays down the guidelines for the disbursement of the fund. The
Members of Congress are then requested by the President to recommend projects and
programs which may be. funded from the PDAF (Priority Development Assistance Fund).
The list submitted by the Members of Congress is endorsed by the Speaker of the House
of Representatives to the DBM, which reviews and determines whether such list of
projects submitted is consistent with the guidelines and the priorities set by the

to

17

Executive."
This demonstrates the power given to the President to execute
appropriation laws and therefore, to exercise the spending per se of the budget.

In Philconsa/ th~ Court upheld the authority of individual Members of Congress

to propose and identify: priority projects because this was merely recommendatory in
nature and it also recognized that individual members of Congress far more than the
President and their congressional colleagues were likely to be knowledgeable about the
needs of their respective constituents and the priority to be given each project.

a. Legislative Inquiries and the Oversight Functions

PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation

2012 En Banc [Perlas-Bernabe])

IV.

Senate (G.R. No. 180308,

J1111e

19,

The Senate Committees' power of inquiry relative to PSR No. 455 has been
passed upon and upheld in the consolidated cases of In the Matter of the Petition for
Habeas Corpus of Camilo L. Sabio which cited Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution x
xx.
The Court explained that such conferral of the legislative power of inquiry upon
any committee .of Congress x x x must carry with it all powers necessary and proper for
its effective discharge. On this score, the Senate Committee cannot be said to have
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when
it submitted Committee Resolution No. 312, given its constitutional mandate to conduct
legislative inquiries. Nor can the Senate Committee be faulted for doing so on the very
same day that the assailed resolution was submitted. The wide latitude given to
Congress with respect to these legislative inquiries has long been settled, otherwise,
Article VI, Section 21 would be rendered pointless.

b. Bicameral Conference Committee

c. Limitations on legislative power

i.
ii. .

Limitations on revenue, appropriations and tariff measures

Presidential veto and Congressional override

2. Non-legislative
a. Informing function
b. Power of impeachment
c. Other non-legislative powers

J.V. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

A. Privileges, inhibitions and Disquaaificat9ons

1. Presidential Immunity
2. Presidential Privilege

B. Powers
1. Executive and Administrative Powers in General
2. Power of Appointment

a. In general
b. Commission on Appointments confirmation
c. Midnight Appointments

1R

d. Power of Removal
3. Power of Control and Supervision
a. Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency
b. Executive Departments and Offices
c. Local Government Units
4. Military Powers

Jamar Kulayan v. Gov. Abdus~7kur Tan (G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012, En Banc
{Sereno])
The Calling-out Power of the President as Commander-in-Chaef of the Armed
Forces

It has already been established that there is one repository of executive powers,
and that is the President of the Republic. This means that when Section 1, Article VII of
the Constitution speaks of executive power, it is granted to the President and no one
else. Corollarily, it is only the President, as Chief Executive, who is authorized to
exercise emergency powers as provided under Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution,
as well as what became known as the calling-out powers under Section 18, ~rticle VII-thereof.
While the President is still a civilian, Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution
mandates that civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military, making the
civilian president the nation's supreme military leader. The net effect of Article II,
Section 3, when read with Article VII, Section 18, is that a civilian President is the
ceremonial, legal and administrative head of the armed forces. The Constitution does
not require that the President must be possessed of military training and talents, but as
Commander-in-Chief, he has the power to direct military operations and to determine
military strategy. Normally, he would be expected to delegate the actual command of
the armed forces to military expe1ts, but the ultimate power is his.
Given the foregoing, Governor Tan is not endowed with the power to call upon
the armed forces at his own bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor
Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state of emergency and called upon the
Armed Forces, the police, and his own civilian Emergency Force. The calling-out powers
contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An exercise by
another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be
justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code.

5. Pardoning Power
a. Nature and limitations
b. Forms of executive clemency
6. Diplomatic Power
7. Powers relative to Appropriation measures
8. Delegated Powers

The President's Continuing Authornty to Reorganize the Offices under the

Office of the President

Pichay, Jr. v. Office of tlle Deputy Executive Secretary for legal Ar'fairs, et al,
G.R. No. :J.96425, 24July 2012, En Banc{Perlas-Bernabe)

10

Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292 (E.O. 292), otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987, vests in the President the continuing authority to
reorganize the offices under him to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency. The
Office of the President must, in order to remain effective and efficient, be capable of
being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner he deems fit to carry out his
directives and policies.
Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC (Presidential Anti-Graft Commission) and the
transfer of its functions to a division specially created within the ODESlA (Office of the
Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs) is properly within the prerogative of the
President under his continuing delegated legislative authority to reorganize his own
office. Since both of these offices belong to the Office of the President Proper, the
reorganization by way of abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the IADODESLA is allowable under Section 31 (1) of E.O. 292.

9. Veto Powers
10. Residual Powers
11. Executive Privilege

C. Rules of Succession

V. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
A. Concepts

1. Judicial power
2. Judicial review

a. Operative fact doctrine

b. Moot questions
c. Political question doctrine
Vinuya, et. al. v. The Honorable Executive Secretary Alberto G. Romulo, et. al.,
G.R. No. 162230, April 28. 2010, En Banc (Del Castillo)

The Treaty of Peace with Japan, insofar as it barred future claims such as those
asserted by plaintiffs in' these actions, exchanged full compensation of plaintiffs for a
future peace. History has vindicated the wisdom of that bargain. And while full
compensation for plaintiffs' hardships, in the purely economic sense, has been denied
these former pr~soners and countless other survivors of the war, the immeasurable
bounty of life for themselves and their posterity in a free society and in a more peaceful
world services the debt
There is a broad range of vitally important areas that must be regularly decided
by tl1e Executive Department without either challenge or interference by the Judiciary.
One such area involves the delicate arena of foreign relations. It would be strange
indeed if the courts and .tile executive spoke witl1 different voices in the realm of foreign
policy. Precisely because of the nature of the questions presented, and the lapse of
more than 60 years since the conduct complained of, we make no attempt to lay down
general guidelines covering other situations not involved here, and confine the opinion
only to the very questions necessary to reach a decision on this matter.

xx x
Stripped down to its essentials, the issue in this case is whether the Executive
Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing petitioners' claims for
official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan.

The petition lacks merit.

From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has exclusive
prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners' claims against Japan.
Baker v. Carr remains the starting point for analysis under the political question

doctrine. Xx x
In Tanada v. Cuenca, we held that political questions refer "to those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent
upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure. "
Certain types of cases often have been found to present political questions. One
such category involves questions of foreign relations. It is well-established that "[t]he
conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to
the executive and legislative ~ 'the political' - departments of the government, and the
propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to
judicial inquiry or decision." The US Supreme Court has further cautioned that decisions
relating to foreign policy' are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy.
They are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people
whose welfare they advance or imperil. They are decisions of a kind for which the
Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility.
To be sure, not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions,
and courts certainly possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and
executive agreements. However, the question whether the Philippine government
should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations
matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the
courts but to the political branches. in this case, the Executive Department has already
decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for
reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision
is not for the courts to question . Neither could petitioners herein assail the said
determination by the Executive Department via the instant petition for certiorari.
In the seminal case of US v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., the US Supreme Court
held that "[t}he President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its
sole representative with foreign relations."
It is quite apparent that if, in the maintenance of our international relations,
embarrassment - perhaps serious embarrassment - is to be avoided and success for
our aims achieved, congressional legislation which is to be made effective through
negotiation and inquiry 1i;vithin the international field must often accord to the President a
degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be
admissible where domestic affairs alone involved. Moreover, he, not Congress, has the
better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign countries, and
especially is this true in time of war. He has his confidential sources of information. He
has his agents in the form, of diplomatic, consular and other officials. Xxx
This ruling has been incorporated in our jurisprudence through Bayan v.
Executive Secretary and Pimentel v. Executive Secretary, its overreacl1ing principle was,
perhaps, best articulated in (now Chief) Justice Puno's dissent in Secretary of Justice v.
Lantion xx x
The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners' cause
would be inimical to our country's foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations
with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for stability in this region. For us to
overturn the Executive Department's determination would mean an assessment of the
foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to make that
judgment has been constitutionally committed .

') l

B.
C.
O.
E.

Safeguards of Judicial Independence

Judicial Restraint
Appointments to the Judidaay
Supreme Court

1.
2.
3.
4.

En bane and division cases

Procedural rule-making
Administrative supervision over lower courts
Original and appellate jurisdiction

F. Judicial Privilege
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
A. Constitutional Safeguards to Ensure Independence of Commissions
B. Powers and: Functions of each Commission
Dela Liana v. The Chairperson, COA (G.R. No. 190989, Feb .7, 2012, En Banc
[Sereno])

The Constitutional Duty of the COA to Conduct a Pre-audit

Dela Liana claimed that the constitutional duty of COA includes the duty to
conduct pre-aud:t. A pre-audit is an examination of financial transactions before their
consumption or payment. It seeks to determine whether the following conditions are
present: (1) the proposed expenditure complies with an appropriation law or other
specific statutory authority; (2) sufficient funds are available for the purpose; (3) the
proposed expenditure is, not unreasonable or extravagant, and the unexpended balance
of appropriations to whrch it will be charged is sufficient to cover the entire amount of
the expenditure; and (4) the transaction is approved by the proper authority and the
claim is duly supported by authentic underlying evidence. It could; among others,
identify government agency transactions that are suspicious on their face prior to their
implementation and prior to the disbursement of funds.
Dela Liana's allegations find no support in the Section 2 of Article IX-D of the
1987 Constitution . There is nothing in the said provision that requires the COA to
conduct a pre-audit of all government transactions and for all government agencies.
The only reference to a :pre-audit requirement is found in Section2, paragraph 1, which
provides that a pre-audit is mandated for certain government or private entities with
state subsidy or equity and only when the internal control system of an audited entity is
inadequate. In such a situation, the COA may adopt measures, including a temporary or
special pre-audit, to correct the deficiencies.
Hence, the condiJct of a pre-audit is not a mandatory duty that this Court may
compel the COA to perform. This discretion on its part is in line with constitutional
pronouncement that the COA has the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit
and examination. When the language of the law is clear and explicit, there is no room
for interpretation, only application. Neither can the scope of the provision be unduly
enlarged by this Court.

C. Prohibited Offices and Interests

D. Jurisdiction: of Each Constitutional Commission
E. Review of Final Orders, Resolutions and Decisions

1. Rendered in the exercise of quasi-judicial functions

') ')

Dela Liana v. The Chairperson, Commission On Audit, G.R. No. 180989, 7 Feb.
2012, En Banc (Serenp)
Dela Liana is correct in that decisions and orders of the COA are reviewable by
the Court via a petition for certioran: However, these refer to decisions and orders
which were rendered by the COA in its quasi-judicial capac!ty. Circular No. 89-299 was
promulgated by the COA under its quasi-legislative or rule-making powers. Hence,
Circular No. 89-299 is not reviewable by certioran:

2. Rendered in the exercise of administrative functions

VII.

BILL OF RIGHTS

A. Fundamental Powers of the State (Police Power, Eminent Domain,

Taxation)
1.
2.
3.
4.

Concept, application and limits

Requisites for valid exercise
Similarities and differences
Delegation

B. Private Acts and the Bill of Rights

C. Due Process ..... the Rights to life, liberty and Property

1. Relativity .of due process

2. Procedural and substantive due process

Pie/Jay, Jr. v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary ror legal Affairs, et al.,
G.R. No. 196425, 24 .July 2012, En Banc (Perlas-Bernabe)
Pichay's right to due process was not violated when the IAD-ODESLA took
cognizance of the administrative complaint against him. In administrative proceedings,
the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to
answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due
process, which simply means having the opportunity to explain one's side. Hence, as
long as Pichay was given the opportunity to explain his side and present evidence, the
requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied with because what the law
abhors is an absolute lack of opportunity to be heard.
Also, Pichay is a presidential appointee occupying the high-level position of
Chairman of the LWUA. (Local Water Utilities Administration). Necessarily, he comes
under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the President, who is well within his right to order
an investigation into matters that require his informed decision. There are substantial
distinctions that set apart presidential appointees occupying upper-level positions in
government from non-presidential appointees and those that occupy the lower positions
in government.

3. Constitutional and Statutory Due Process

4. Hierarchy of Rights
5.

Judicial Standards of Review

6. Void-for-vagueness Doctrine
D. Equal Protection

1. Concept

2. Requisites for valid classification

3. Standards of judicial review
a. Rational Basis Test
b. Strict Scrutiny Test
c. Intermediate Scrutiny Test

E. Searches and Seizures

1. Concept
2. Warrant requirement
a. Requisites

Del Castillo v. People (G.R. No. 185128, Jan. 30 20:1.2, 3'd Div., [Peralta])
It must be remembered that the warrant issued must particularly describe the
place to be searched arid persons or things to be seized in order for it to be valid. A
designation or description that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all
others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the
constitutional requirement of definiteness.
In the present case, the search warrant specifically designates or describes the
residence of the petitioner (Del Castillo) as the place to be searched. Incidentally, the
items were seized by a barangay tanod in a nipa hut, 20 meters away from the
residence of Del Castillo. The confiscated items, having been found in a place other
than the one described in the search warrant, can be considered as fruits of an invalid
warrantless search, the presentation of which as an evidence is a violation of Del
Castillo's constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure.

Evidence obtained due to warrantless search conducted by a barangay tanod is

inadmissible in evidence since a barangay tanod is an agent of a person in authority
under the Revised Penal Code (Article 152) and the Local Government Code (Section
388).
(Del Castillo v. People, G.R. No. 185128, Jan. 30 2012, :r' Div.,
[Peralta])

3. Warrantless searches
4. Warrantless arrests
luz v. People, G.R. No. 197788, 29 February 2012, 2''d Div. (Sereno)

Traffic enforcer P02 Emmanuel L. Alteza flagged down petitioner Redel Luz for
driving a motorcycle without a helmet. Alteza invited Luz to come inside their substation located near the area. While issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal
ordinance, Alteza was alerted by Luz's uneasy movement and thus asked him to put out
the contents of the pocket of his jacket. Consequently, it was revealed that Luz was in
possession of prohibited drugs.

Issue: Whether or not the roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a

routine traffic stop can be considered a formal arrest.
Held: At the time that he was waiting for P03 Alteza to write his citation ticket,
petitioner Redel Luz co;uld not be said to have been "under arrest." There was no
intention on the part of P03 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his liberty, or take him
into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during which Luz was at the
police station may be characterized merely as waiting time. In fact x x x P03 Alteza
himself testified that the only reason they went to the police sub-station was that Luz

had been flagged down "almost in front" of that place. Hence, it was only for the sake
of convenience that they were waiting there. There was no intention to take Luz into
custody.
The United States Supreme Court also discussed in Berkemer v. McCarty at
length whether the roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a routine
traffic stop should be considered custodial interrogation. The Court held that, such
questioning does not fall under custodial investigation, nor can it be considered a formal
arrest, by virtue of the nature of the questioning, the expectations of the motorist and
the officer, and the iength of time the procedure is conducted. Since the motorist
therein was only subjected to modest questions while still at the scene of the traffic
stop, he was not at that moment placed under custody (such that he should have been
apprised of his Miranda rights), and neither can treatment of this sort be fairly
characterized as the functional equivalent of a formal arrest. Similarly, neither can
Rodel Luz here be considered "under arrest" at the time that his traffic citation was
being made.
It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No ~ 98-012, which was violated
by Luz, the failure to wear a crash helmet while riding a motorcycle is penalized by a
fine only. Under the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest need not be issued if the
information or charge was filed for an offense penalized by a fine only. It may be stated
as a corollary that neither can a warrant!ess arrest be made for such an offense.

This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic violation.
Certainly, when there is an intent on the part of the police officer to deprive the motorist
of liberty, or to take the 'latter into custody, the former may be deemed to have arrested
the motorist. In this case, however, the officer's issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic
citation ticket negates the possibility of an arrest for the same violation.
If it were true that Luz was already deemed "arrested" when he was flagged
down for a traffic violation and while he was waiting for his ticket, then there would
have been no need for him to be arrested for a second time - a~er the police officers
allegedly discovered the :drugs - as he was already in their custody.

5. Administrative arrests
6. Drug, alcohol and blood tests

F. Privacy of Communications and Correspondence

1. Private and public communications
2. Intrusion, when allowed
3. Writ of habeas data
G. freedom of Expression

1. Concept and Scope

a. Prior Restraint (Censorship)
b. Subsequent Punishment
2. Content-based and Content-neutral Regulations

a. Tests
b. Applications
3. Facial Challenges and the Overbreadth Doctrine

Southern Hemisphere Engageme11t Netll'Jork, Inc., et al v. Anti-Terrorism

Council, et al. (G.R. Nos. 178552, .1.7858.t., 178890, .1.7915~ & :J.79461, 5
October 20.lO, En Banc (Carpio-Morales)
In addition, a statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at
its meaning and differ as to its application. The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile,
decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally
subject to state regulations, may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily
broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only extant facts affecting real litigants, a facial
invalidation is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not
only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties 1 but also on the assumption or
prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or activities.
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an
exception to some of the usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular
litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or her. Moreover,
challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can only
assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis 1 those rules give way; challenges are
permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute
"on its fad:," not merely "as applied for" so that the overbreadth law becomes
unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes it more narrowly. The factor
that motivates courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with
the "chilling" deterrent effect of the overbreadth statute on third parties not courageous
enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbreadth law's "very existence may
cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or
expression." An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that deterrent effect on the
speech of those third parties.
The rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech, religious
freedom, and other fundamental rights may be facially challenged. Under no case may
ordinary penal statutes; be subjected to a facial challenge. Criminal statutes have
general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is
allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws
against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take
chances as in the area of free speech.
Xxx
Utterances not elemental but inevitably incidental to the doing of the criminal
concluct alter neither the intent of the law to punish socially harmful conduct nor the
essence of the whole act as conduct and not free speech. It is true that the agreements
and course of conduct ' were in most instances brought about through speaking or
writing. But it has never been deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or press to
make a course of conduct illegal merely because that conduct was, in part, initiated,
evidenced, or carried out by means of language, eitl1er spoken, written, or printed.
Such an expansive interpretation of the constitutional guarantees of speech and press
would make it practically impossible ever to enforce laws against agreements in restraint
of trade as well as many other agreements and conspiracies deemed injurious to
society.

4. Tests
The Clear and Present Danger Test

Integrated Bar of the Philippi11es v. Non. Mayor Jose "Lito'' Atienza, G.R. No.
175.241/ 24 February 20.1.0, 1st Div. {Carpio Morales)
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) xx x applied for a permit to rally at
Mendiola Bridge. However, then Manila Mayor Jose "Lita" Atienza issued a permit to
rally at Plaza Miranda instead.

Issue: Whether or not the appellate court erred in holding that the modification of the
venue in IBP's rally permit does not constitute grave abuse of discretion.
Held: Section 6(c) of the Public Assembly Act (BP 880) provides that "If the mayor is of
the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil warranting the
denial or modification of the permit, he shall immediately inform the applicant who must
be heard on the matter."
In modifying the :permit outright, Atienza gravely abused his discretion when he
did not immediately inform the IBP who should have been heard first on the matter of
his perceived imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that may warrant the
changing of the venue. Atienza failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the
terms of the permit against the standard of a clear and present test which x x x is an
indispensable condition to such modification. Nothing in the issued permit adverts to an
imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, which "blank" denial or modification
would, when granted imprimatur as the appellate court would have it, render illusory
any judicial scrutiny thereof.
It is true that the licensing official xx xis not devoid of discretion in determining
whether or not a permit would be granted. It is not, however, unfettered discretion.
While prudence requires that there be a realistic appraisal not of what may possibly
occur but of what may , probably occur, given all the relevant circumstances, still the
assumption - especially so where the assembly is scheduled for a specific public place is that the permit must :be for the assembly being held there. It smacks of whim and
caprice for Atienza to impose a change of venue for an assembly that was slated for a
specific public place. It is thus reversible error for the appellate court not to have found
such grave abuse of discretion and, under specific statutory provision, not to have
modified the permit "in terms satisfactory to the applicant."

5. State Regulation of Different Types of Mass Media

6. Commercial Speech
7. Private v. Government Speech
8. Heckler's Veto
H. Freedom of:Re!igion
1. Non-establishment clause

a. Concept and basis

b. Acts permitted and not permitted by the clause
c. Test
Ang LADLAD LGBT Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010, En Banc
{Del Castillo)
Against this backdrop, we find that Ang Lad/ad has sufficiently demonstrated its

compliance with the ,legal requirements for accreditation.

Indeed, aside from
COMELEC's moral objection and the belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the
records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Lad/ad is not qualified to register
as a party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941 or the guidelines

in Ang Bagong Bayani. The difference, COMELEC claims, lies in Ang Lad/ad's morality,
or lack thereof.
Religion as the Basis for Refusal to Accept Ang Lad/ad's Petition for Registration

Our Constitution , provides in Article III, Section 5 that"[n]o law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." At
bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is "government neutrality in
religious matters."
Clearly, "governmental reliance on religious justification is
inconsistent with this policy of neutrality." We thus find that it was grave violation of
the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to
justify the exclusion of Ang Lad/ad
Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions
should depend, instead, on whether the COMELEC is able to advance some justification
for its rulings beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine.
Otherwise stated,
government must act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular
effects. As we held in Estrada v. Escrltor:
x x x The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not
religious as the dissent of Mr. Justice Carpio holds. "Religious teachings as
expressed in public debate may influence the civil public order but public moral
disputes may oe resolved only on grounds articulable in secular terms."
Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs in formulating public
policies and morals, the resulting policies and morals would require conformity to
what some might regard as religious programs or agenda. The non-believers
would therefore be compelled to conform to a standard of conduct buttressed by
a religious belief~ i.e., to a "compelled religion," anathema to religious freedom.
Likewise, if government based its actions upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly
approve or endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary
religious or non-religious views that would not support the policy. As a result,
government will not provide full religious freedom for all citizens, or even make it
appear that those whose beliefs are disapproved are second-class citizens.
In other words, government action, including its proscription of
immorality as expressed in criminal law like concubinage, must have a secular
purpose.
That is, the government proscribes this conduct because "it is
detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend the existence
and progress of human society" and not because the conduct is proscribed by
the beliefs of one religion or the other. Although admittedly, moral judgments
based on religion might have a compelling influence on those engaged in public
deliberations over what actions would be considered a moral disapprobation
punishable by law. After all, they might also be adherents of a religion and thus
have religious opinions and moral codes with a compelling influence on them;
the human mind endeavors to regulate the temporal and spiritual institutions of
society in a uniform manner, harmonizing earth with heaven. Succinctly put, a
law could be religious or Kantian or Aquinian or utilitarian in its deepest roots,
but it must have an articulable and discernible secular purpose and justification
to pass scrutiny of the religion clauses. xx x Recognizing the religious nature of
the Filipinos and the elevating influence of religion in society, however, the
Philippine constitution's religion clauses prescribe not a strict but a benevolent
neutrality. Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its
secular goals and interests but at the same time strive to uphold religious liberty
to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits.
Thus,
although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality
could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provide it does not
offend compelling state interests.
Public Morals as a Ground to Deny Ang Lad/ad's Petition for Registration

')Q

Respondent suggests that although the moral condemnation of homosexuality

and homosexual conduct may be religion-based, it has long been transplanted into
generally accepted public morals. Xx x
We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct, and
perhaps homosexuals themselves, have borne the brunt of societal disapproval. It is not
difficult to imagine the reasons behind this censure - religious beliefs, convictions about
the preservation of marriage, family, and procreation, even dislike or distrust of
homosexuals themselves and their perceived lifestyle. Nonetheless, we recall that the
Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently, therefore,
these "generally accepted public morals" have not been convincingly transplanted into
the realm of law.
The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act
performed by Ang Lad/ad. Even the OSG agrees that there should have been a finding
by the COMELEC that the group's members have committed or are committing immoral
acts."
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or
why special protection is required for the youth.
Neither has the COMELEC
condescended to justify its position that petitioner's admission into the party-list system
would be harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society. We, of course,
do not suggest that the :state is wholly without authority to regulate matters concerning
morality, sexuality, and sexual relations, and we recognize that the government will and
should continue to restrict behavior considered detrimental to society. Nonetheless, we
cannot countenance advocates who, undoubtedly with the loftiest of-intentions, situate
morality on one end ofan argument or another, without bothering to go through the
rigors of legal reasoning and explanation. In this, the notion of morality is robbed of all
value. Clearly then, the bare invocation of morality will not remove an issue from our
scrutiny.
We also find the! COMELEC's reference to purported violations of our penal and
civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a
nuisance as "any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else
which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality/' the remedies for which are a
prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance. a civil action, or
abatement without judicial proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal
Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal
conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is
not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution
of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient
governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the
party-list system. The . denial of Ang Lad/ads registration on purely moral grounds
amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a
tool to further any substantial public interest. Respondent's blanket justification give
rise to the inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC targets homosexuals themselves as a
class, not because of any particular morally reprehensible act. It is this selective
targeting that implicates' our equal protection clause.

2.

Free exercise clause

3. Tests
a. Clear and Present Danger Test
b. Compelling State Interest Test
c. Conscientious Objector Test

')0

I. liberty of Abode and Freedom of Movement

1. Limitations
2. Right to travel
limitation on the Right to Travel
Office of Administrative Services - Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge
Ignacio B. Macarine, .A.M. No. MTJ-10-1770, :1.8 July 2012, 2"d Div. (Brion)
The right to travel is guaranteed by the Constitution. However, the exercise of
such right is not absolute.
Section 6, Article III of tl1e 1987Constitution allows
restrictions on one's right to travel provided that such restriction is in the interest of
national security, public safety or public health as may be provided by law. This,
however, should by no means be construed as limiting the Court's inherent power of
administrative supervision over lower courts.
OCA Circular No 7 49-2003 does not restrict but merely regulates, by providing
guidelines to be complied by judges and court personnel, before they can go on leave to
travel abroad. To "restrict" is to restrain or prohibit a person from doing something; to
"regulate" is to govern or direct according to rule. To ensure management of court
dockets and to avoid disruption in the administration of justice, OCA Circular No. 492003 requires a judge who wishes to travel abroad to submit, together with his
application for leave of absence duly recommended for approval by his Executive Judge,
a certification from the 'Statistics Division, Court Management Office of the OCA. The
said certification shall state the condition of his docket based on his Certificate of Service
for the month immedic;itely preceding the date of his intended travel, that he has
decided and resolved all cases or incidents within three (3) months from date of
submission, pursuant to Section 15(1) and (2), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
Thus, for traveling abroad without having been officially allowed by the Court,
Judge Macarine is guilty of violation of OCA Circular No. 49-2003.

a. Watch-list and hold departure orders

3. Return to one's country

J. Right to Information
1. Limitations
2. Publication of laws and regulations
3. Access to court records
4; Right to information relative to:
1

a. Government contract negotiations

b. Diplomatic negotiations
Re: Request for Copy of 2008 Statement of' Assets, Liabilities and Networth
{SALN) and Personal Data Sheet or Curriculum Vitae of the Justices of' the
Supreme Court and Officers and Employees of the Judiciary {A.M. No. 09-8-6SC, June 13, 2012, En Banc {Mendoza])
Section 7 of Article III of the Constitution is relevant in the issue of public
disclosure of SALN and other documents of public officials x x x.
Emphasizing the import and meaning of the foregoing constitutional provision,
the Court, in the landmark case of Valmonte v. Belmontef Jr., elucidated that the right

to information goes hancj in hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure
and honesty in the public service. It is meant to enhance the widening role of the
citizenry in governmental decision-making as well as in checking abuse in government.
The importance of the said right was pragmatically explicated that the incorporation of
this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of
information in a democracy. There can be no realistic perception by the public of the
meaningful democratic decision-making if they are denied
nation's problems nor
access to information of:general interest. Information is needed to enable the members
of society to cope with the exigencies of the times. However, restrictions on access to
certain records may be imposed by law.

Thus, while "public concern" like "public interest" eludes exact definition and has
been said to embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know,
either because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen, the
Constitution itself, under: Section 17, Article XI, has classified the information disclosed in
the SALN as a matter of public concern and interest. In other words, a "duty to
disclose" sprang from the "right to know." Both of constitutional origin, the former is a
command while the latter is a permission. Hence, there is a duty on the part of
members of the government to disclose their SALNs to the public in the manner
provided by law.
In the case at bar, the Court notes the valid concerns of the other magistrates
regarding the possible illicit motives of some individuals in their requests for access to
However, custodians of public
such personal .information and their publication.
documents must not concern themselves with the motives, reasons and objects of the
persons seeking to access to the records. The moral or material injury which their
misuse might inflict on others is the requester's responsibility and lookout. While public
officers in the custody or control of public records have the discretion to regulate the
manner in which records may be inspected, examined or copied by interested parties,
such discretion does not carry with it the authority to prohibit access, inspection,
examination, or copying of the records. After all, public office is a public trust.
I<. Right of Association
l. Eminent Domain

1. Concept
2. Expansive concept of "public use"
3. Just compensation
a. Determination
b. Effect of delay
LBP V. Honeycomb Farms Corporation (G.R. No. :J.69903, Feb. 29, 2012, Z'd
Div. [Brion])
Mandatory Application of the DAR Formula in Payment of Just Compensation
in Agrarian reform Cases

To guide the RTC in its function as Special Agrarian Courts, Section 17 of RA

6657 (The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law) enumerates the factors that have to be
taken into consideration to accurately determine just compensation. Xx x
The DAR is the administrative agency tasked with the implementation of the
agrarian reform program. While the RTC is required to consider the acquisition cost of
the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the
sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declaration and the assessments made by the
government assessors to determine just compensation, it is equally true that these

factors have been translated into a basic formula by the DAR pursuant to its rule-making
power under Section 49 .of R.A. No. 6657. As the government agency principally tasked
to implement the agrarian reform program, it is the DAR's duty to issue these rules and
regulations to carry out the object of the law.
Special Agrarian Courts are not at liberty to disregard the formula laid down in
DAR A.O. No. 5, series of 1998, because unless an administrative order is declared
invalid, courts have no option but to apply it. The courts cannot ignore, without
violating the agrarian reform law, the formula provided by the DAR for the
determination of just compensation.

Payment of Just Compensation in the Implementation of the Agrarian Reform

Program
(The compensation to be paid should not be less than the market value
of the property although the taking was not done in LBP's traditional exercise of the
power of eminent domain.)

When the State exercises its inherent power of eminent domain~ the Constitution
imposes the corresponding obligation to compensate the landowner for the expropriated
property. This principle is embodied in Section 9, Article III of the Constitution xx x.
When the State exercises the power of eminent domain in the implementation of
its agrarian reform program, the constitutional provision which governs is Section 4,
Article XIII of the Constitution, which provides that the State shall, by law, undertake an
agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farm workers who
are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other
farm workers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof.
Notably, this provision also imposes upon the State the obligation of paying the
landowner compensation for the land taken, even if it is for the government's agrarian
reform purposes.
Specifically, the provision makes use of the phrase "just
compensation," the same phrase used in Section 9, Article III of the Constitution. That
the compensation mentioned here pertains to the fair and full price of the taken
property. (LBP V. Hoi1eycomb Farms Corporation, G.R. No. 169903, Feb. 29,

2012, 2'1d Div. [Brion])

4. Abandonment of intended use and right of repurchase
5. Miscellaneous application
M. Contract Clause
1. Contemporaty application of the contract clause

N. Legal Assistance and Free Access to Courts

o.

Rights of Suspects (Custodial Investigation Rights)

R.A. No. 7438 (An Act Defining Certain Rights of Person Arrested, Detained or
Undler Custodial Investigation as well as the Duties of the Arresting,
Detaining and Investigating Officers and Providing Penalties for Violations
Thereof)
1. Availability

People v. Lauga, G.R. No. 186228, 15 March 2010, :!'d Div. (Perez)
Accused Antonio Lauga was charged and convicted of the crime of rape of. his
daughter. During the proceedings in the trial court, the prosecution presented as

witnesses, the victim, the victim's brother, and one Moises Boy Banting, a bantay bayan
in the barangay.
Banting testified that he accosted accused Lauga in his home, and that accused
Lauga confessed to him that he had in fact raped his daughter, but only because he
could not control himself. Lauga contends that the confession he made to Banting
should be inadmissible as evidence, since the same was made while he was in custody
of the authorities, and therefore, within the protection of the Miranda doctrine.

Issue: Whether or not Lauga's extra-judicial confession to a bantay bayan is admissible

as evidence.
People v. Malngan is the authority on the scope of the Miranda doctrine provided
for under Article III, Section 12(1) and (3) of the Constitution. In Malngan/ appellant
questioned the admissibility of her extrajudicial confessions given to the barangay
chairman and a neighbor of the private complainant. The Supreme Court distinguished.
Thus:
Arguably, the barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman, in this
particular instance, may be deemed as law enforcement officer for purposes of
applying Article III, Section 12(1) and (3), of the Constitution. When accusedappellant was brought to the barangay hall in the morning of 2 January 2001,
she was already a suspect, actually the only one, in the fire that destroyed
several houses x x x. She was, therefore, already under custodial investigation
and the rights guaranteed by xx x [the] Constitution should have already been
observed or applied to her.
Accused-appellant's confession to Barangay
Chairman xx x was made in response to the 'interrogation' made by the latter admittedly conducted without first informing accused-appellant of her rights
under the Constitution or done in the presence of counsel. For this reason, the
confession of accused-appellant, given to Barangay Chairman xx x, as well as
the lighter found x x x in her bag are inadmissible in evidence against her x x

x.
Following the rationale behind the ruling in Malngan, the Court needs to
ascertain whether or not a '1Jantay bayan 11 may be deemed a law enforcement officer
within the contemplation of Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution.
In People of the Philippines v. Buendia, the Court had the occasion to mention
the nature of a ''bantay bayan, Nthat is, "a group of male residents living in [the] area
organized for the purpose of keeping peace in their community [,which is] an accredited
auxiliary of the x x x PNP."
Also, it may be worthy to consider that pursuant to Section 1(g) of Executive
Order No. 309 issued on 11 November 1987, as amended, a Peace and Order
Committee in each barangay shall be organized "to serve as implementing arm of the
City/Municipal Peace and Order Council at the Barangay level." The composition of the
Committee includes, among others: (1) the Punong Barangay as Chairman; (2) the
Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan; (3) a Member of the Lupong Tagapamayapa;
(4) a Barangay Tanod, and (5) at least three (3) Members of existing Barangay-Based
Anti-Crime or neighborhood Watch Groups or a Non-Government Organization
Representative well-known in his community.
The Court is, therefore, convinced that barangay-based volunteer organizations
in the nature of watch groups, as in the case of the "bantay bayan,. "are recognized by

the local government unit to perform functions relating to the preservation of peace and
order at the barangay level. Thus, without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by
Moises Boy Banting, and the specific scope of duties and responsibilities delegated to a
''bantay bayan/ ,,. particularly on the authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any
inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related function and objective insofar as the

entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided for under Article III, Section
12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned.
The Court, therefore, finds the extra-judicial confession of Lauga, which was
taken without a counsel, inadmissible in evidence.

Luz v. People, G.R. No. 197788, 29 February 2012, 2"d Div. (Sereno)
Whether the roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a
routine traffic stop should be considered custodial investigation
The United States Supreme Court also discussed in Berkemer v. McCarty at
length whether the roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a routine
traffic stop should be considered custodial interrogation. The Court held that, such
questioning does not fall under custodial investigation, nor can it be considered a formal
arrest, by virtue of the nature of the questioning, the expectations of the motorist and
the officer, and the length of time the procedure is conducted. Since the motorist
therein was only subjected to modest questions while still at the scene of the traffic
stop, he was not at that moment placed under custody (such that he should have been
apprised of his Miranda rights), and neither can treatment of this sort be fairly
characterized as the functional equivalent of a formal arrest. X x x

1. Requisites
2. Waiver

P. Rights of the Accused

1. Criminal due process
2. Bail
3. Presumption of innocence
4. Right to be heard
5. Assistance of counsel
6. Right to be informed
7. Right to speedy, impartial and public trial
8. Right of confrontation
9. Compulsory process
10. Trials in absentia

Q. Writ of Habeas Corpus

R. Writs of Amparo. Habeas Data and Kalikasan

The Writ of Amparo and the Writ of Habeas Data
The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right
to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats
thereof. (Sec. 1, The Rule on The Writ of Amparo)

The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to
privacy in life, liberty or :security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission
of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family,

'.Lt

home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. (Sec. 1, The Rule on The Writ of
Habeas Data, A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, Jan. 22, 2008)

Marynette R. Gamboa v. P/SSPT Marlou C. Chan and P/Supt. William O. Fang,

G.R. No. 193636, 24.July 201.2, En Banc(Sereno)

In this case, Chang and Fang admitted the existence of the Report, but
emphasized its confidential nature. That it was leaked to third parties and the media
was regrettable, even warranting reproach. But it must be stressed that Gamboa failed
to establish that PNP was responsible for this unintended disclosure. In any event, there
are other reliefs available to her to address the purported damage to her reputation,
making a resort to the extraordinary remedy of the writ of habeas data unnecessary and
improper. Finally, the Court rules that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial
evidence that her inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs (Private Army
Groups) made her and her supporters susceptible to harassment and increased police
surveillance. In this regard, Chan and Fang sufficiently explained that the investigations
conducted against her were in relation to the criminal cases in which she was implicated.
As public officials, they enjoy the presumption of regularity, which she failed to
overcome. It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the state interest of dismantling
PAGs far outweighs the :alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when
the collection and forwarding by the PNP of information against her was pursuant to a
lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data must be denied.

S. Self-incrimination Clause
1. Scope and coverage

a. Foreign laws
2. Application
3. Immunity statutes
T. Involuntary Servitude and Political Prisoners

U. Excessive Fines and Cruel and Inhuman Punishments

V. Non-imprisonment for Debts

W. Double Jeopardy
1. Requisites
2. Motions for reconsideration and appeals
3. Dismissal with consent of accused

X. Ex post Facto laws and Bills of Attainder

VIII. CITIZENSHIP
A. Who are Filipino Citizens
B. Modes of Acquiring Citizenship
C. Naturalization and Denaturalization
Edison So v. Republic of' the Philippines, G.R. No. 170603, January 29 2007.
'
'

:r' Div., (Callejo, Sr.)

Naturalization signifies the act of formally adopting a foreigner into the political
body of a nation by clothing him or her with the privileges of a citizen (RECORD,
SENATE 11TH CONGRESS [June 4 - 5, 2001]). Under current and existing laws, there
are three ways by which an alien may become a citizen by naturalization: (a)
administrative naturalization pursuant ta R.A. No. 9139; (b) judicial naturalization
pursuant to C.A. No. 473, as amended; and (c) legislative naturalization in the form of a
law enacted by Congress bestowing Philippine citizenship to an alien (R.E. Agpalo 1
Philippine Political Law, 2005 ed., 63-64).

Republic Act No. 9139 (Providing for Administrative Naturalization of an

Alien)
R.A. No. 9139 was enacted as a remedial measure intended to make the process
of acquiring Philippine citizenship less tedious, less technical and more encouraging
(Sponsorship Speech of the late Senator Cayetano, RECORD1 SENATE 11TH CONGRESS
[June 4-5, 2001]). It likewise addresses the concerns of degree holders who, by reason
of lack of citizenship requirement, cannot practice their profession, thus promoting
"brain gain" for the Philippines (Id.).
R.A. No. 9139 may be availed of only by native-born aliens who lived here in the
Philippines all their lives, who never saw any other country and all along thought that
they were Filipinos; who have demonstrated love and loyalty to the Philippines and
affinity to the customs and traditions. To reiterate, the intention of the legislature in
enacting R.A. No. 9139 was to make the process of acquiring Philippine citizenship less
tedious, less technical and more encouraging which is administrative rather than judicial
in nature. X x x. What the legislature had in mind was merely to prescribe another
mode of acquiring Philippine citizenship which may be availed of by native born aliens.
The only implication is that, a native born alien has the choice to apply for judicial or
administrative naturalization, subject to the prescribed qualifications and
disqualifications. (Edison So v. Republic of' the Philippines, G.R. No. 170603,
January 29, 2007,

:r' Div., [Callejo,

Sr.])

D. Dual Citizenship and Dual Allegiance

Republic Act No. 9225 (The Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of

2003)
E. Loss and Re-acquisition of Philippine Citizenship
F. Natural-born .Citizens and Public Office

XX. LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS

A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

General Principles
Modes of Acquiring Title to Public Office
Modes and Kinds of Appointment
Eligibility and Qualification Requirements
Disabilities and Inhibitions of Public Officers

The law on Nepotism

Under the definition of nepotism, one is guilty of nepotism if an appointment is

issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of
any of the following:
a) appointing authority;
b) recommending authority;

c) chief of the bureau or office; and

d) person exerci,sing immediate supervision over the appointee.
Clearly, there are four situations covered. In the last two mentioned situ_ations,
it is immaterial who the appointing or recommending authority is. To constitute a
violation of the law, it s'uffices that an appointment is extended or issued in favor of a
relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of the chief of the bureau
or office, or the person ,exercising immediate supervision over the appointee. (CSC v.
Pedro O. Dacoycoy, G.R. No. 135805, April 29, 1999, En Banc [Pardo])
What are the exemptions from the operation of the rules on nepotism?

The following are exempted from the operation of the rules on nepotism: (a)
persons employed in a confidential capacity, (b) teachers, (c) physicians, and (d)
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
The rules on nepotism shall likewise not be applicable to the case of a member
of any family who, after his or her appointment to any position in an office or bureau,
contracts marriage with someone in the same office or bureau, in which event the
employment or retention therein of both husband and wife may be allowed. (Sec. 59,
Chap. 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Bk. V, E.O. No. 292)

F. Powers and Duties of Public Officers

G. Rights of Public Officers
H. Liabilities of Public Officers
1. Preventive Suspension and Back Salaries

QUIMBO V. GERVACIO, 466 SCRA 277, August 9, 2005,

Morales)

T1

Div. (Carpio-

Jurisprudential law (Reyes v. De/Jin, 368 SCRA 323, 333 [2001}; Yabut v. Office
of the Ombudsman, 233 SCRA 310, 316-317 {1994}; Beja, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, 207
SCRA 689, 694 {1992}) establishes a clear-cut distinction between suspension as
preventive measure and suspension as penalty. The distinction, by considering the
purpose aspect of the suspensions, is readily cognizable as they have different ends to
be achieved.
Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a preliminary step in an
administrative investigation. The purpose of the suspension order is to prevent the
accused from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to
influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the
prosecution of the case against him.
If after such investigation, the charge is
established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his suspension
or removal, then he is suspended, removed or dismissed. This is the penalty.
That preventive suspension is not a penalty is in fact explicitly provided by
Section 24 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative
Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292) and other Pertinent Civil Service Laws.
Xxx
Clearly, service of the preventive suspension cannot be credited as service of
penalty. To rule otherwise is to disregard above-quoted Sections 24 and 25 of the
Administrative Code of 1987 and render nugatory the substantial distinction between,
and purposes of imposing preventive suspension and suspension as penalty.
Xxx

17

En passant, neither may the concept of crediting, criminal law, preventive

imprisonment in the service of a convict's term of imprisonment (Article 29 of the
Revised Penal Code) be applied to preventive suspension during investigation in
administrative law in the service of a respondent's final penalty of suspension. For not
only are they distinct in the objective or purpose, or in their nature as preventive
imprisonment involves restriction of personal liberties which is not the case with
preventive suspension; the respective laws coveting them are explicit.

2. Illegal Dismissal, Reinstatement and Back Salaries

Russel Ulysses I. Nieves v. Jocelyn LB. Blanco, in her capacity as the Regional
Director, Regional Office No. II, DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY (G.R.
No. :1.90422, June :1.9,' 2012, En Banc [Reyes])

On Reassignment of Employees

Under Section 6 of the Revised Rules on Reassignment; an appointment is

considered station-speci,fic when the particular office or station where the position is
located is specifically indicated on the face of the appointment paper. The Revised
Rules on Reassignment has clearly confined the coverage of the phrase "reassignment
outside geographical location" to the following: (1) reassignment from one provincial
office to another; (2) reassignment from the regional office to the central office; and (3)
reassignment from the central office to the regional office. The said provision used the
word "may" to emphasize that a "reassignment outside geographical location" is
restricted only to either reassignment from one regional office to another regional office
or a reassignment from the central office to a regional office and vice-versa. X x x
The language of: the Revised Rules on Reassignment is plain and unambiguous.
The reassignment of an 'employee with a station-specific place of work indicated in their
respective appointments is allowed provided that it would not exceed a maximum period
of one year. On the other hand, the reassignment of an employee whose appointment
is not station-specific has no definite period unless otherwise revoked or recalled by the
Head of the Agency, the CSC, or a competent court.

Immunity of Public Officers

De Facto Officers
I<. Termination of Official Relations

I.

J.

Resignation and Retirement, Distinguished

Resignation and retirement are two distinct concepts carrying different meanings
and legal consequences in our jurisdiction. While an employee can resign at any time,
retirement entails the compliance with certain age and service requirements specified by
law. Resignation stem.s from the employee's own intent and volition to resign and
relinquish his/her post. ' Retirement takes effect by operation of law. In terms of
severance to one's employment, resignation absolutely cuts-off the employment
relationship in general;: in retirement, the employment relationship endures for the
purpose of the grant of retirement benefits. (Re: Application ror Retirement of"
Judge Moslemen T. Macarambon Under Republic Act No. 910, as Amended by
Republic Act No. 9946, A.M. No. 14061-RET; 1.9 June 2012, En Banc [Brion])
L. The Civi I Service

1. Scope
2. Appointments to the Civil Service

3. Personnel Actions
M. Accountability of;Public Officers

1. Impeachment
2. Ombudsman (Sections 5 to 14, Article IX of the 19876 Constitution, in
relation to R.A. No. 6770 or otherwise known as "The Ombudsman Act of
1989. ")
a. Functions

Pic/1ay, Jr. v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary For Legal Affairs, et al.,
G.R. No. 1.96425, 24 ..July 2012, En Banc (Perlas-Bernabe)
The primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute cases
refers to criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and not to administrative
cases. It is only in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction that the Ombudsman may, at
any time, take over the dnvestigation being conducted by another investigatory agency.
Since the case filed before the IAD-ODESLA is an administrative disciplinary case for
grave misconduct, Pichay may not invoke the primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to
prevent the IAD-ODESLA from proceeding with its investigation. In any event, the
Ombudsman's authority to investigate both elective and appointive officials in the
government, extensive as it may be, is by no means exclusive. It is shared with other
similarly authorized government agencies.
Moreover, as the function of the Ombudsman goes into the determination of the
existence of probable cause and the adjudication of the merits of a criminal accusation,
the investigative authority of the IAD-ODESLA is limited to that of a fact-finding
investigator whose determinations and recommendations remain so until acted upon by
the President. As such, it commits no usurpation of the Ombudsman's constitutional
duties.

b. Judicial Review in Administrative Proceedings

c. Judicial Review in Penal Proceedings

3. Sandiganbayan
4. Ill-gotten Wealth
N. Term Limits

X. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A. General Principles
B. Administrative Agencies
1. Definition

2. Manner of Creation
3 . Kinds
UP v. Dizon, G.R. No. 171182, 23 August 2012, ist Div. (Bersamin)
Despite its establishment as a body corporate, the UP remains to be a "chartered
institution" performing a legitimate governmental function. The UP is a government
instrumentality, performing the State's constitutional mandate of promoting quality and
accessible education. As a government instrumentality, the UP administers special funds
sourced from the fees and income enumerated under Act No. 1870 and Section 1 of
Executive Order No. 714, and from the yearly appropriations, to achieve the purposes

10

laid down by Section 2 of Act 1870, as expanded in Republic Act No. 9500. All the funds
going into the possession of the UP, including any interest accruing from the deposit of
such funds in any banking institution, constitute a "special trust fund,f/ the disbursement
of which should always be aligned with the UP's mission and purposes, and should
always be subject to auditing by the COA.

C. Powers of Administrative Agencies

1. Quasi-legislative (rule-making) Power

a. Kinds of Administrative Rules and Regulations

b. Requisites for Validity

2. Quasi-judicial (adjudicatory) Power

a. Administrative Due Process
b. Administrative Appeal and Review
c. Administrative Res Judicata

3. Fact-finding, investigative, Licensing and Rate-fixing Powers

D. Judicial Recourse and Review
Dela Liana v. The Chairperson, Commission On Audit, G.R. No. 180989, 7 Feb.
20.12, En Banc (Sereno)

Dela Liana is correct in that decisions and orders of the COA are reviewable by
the Court via a petition for certiorari. However, these refer to decisions and orders
which were rendered by the COA in its quasHudicial capacity. Circular No. 89~299 was
promulgated by the COA under its quasi-legislative or rule-making powers. Hence,
Circular No. 89-299 is not reviewable by certiorati.
Nonetheless, the Court has in the past seen fit to step in and resolved petitions
despite their being the subject of an improper remedy, in view of the public importance
of the issues raised therein. In this case, Dela Liana averted that the conduct of pre~
audit by the COA could have prevented the occurrence of the numerous alleged
irregularities in government transactions that involved substantial amounts of public
money. This is a serious allegation of a grave deficiency in observing a constitutional
duty if proven correct. The Court can use its authority to set aside errors of practice or
technicalities of procedure, including the aforementioned technical defects of the
petition, and resolve the merits of a case with such serious allegations of constitutional
breach.

1. Doctrine of Primary Administrative Jurisdiction

2. Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
3. Doctrine of Finality of Administrative Action

XI. ELECTION LAW

A. Suffrage
B.

Qualification and Disqualification of Voters

Republic Act No. 9189 (The Absentee Vot:eii"S Act of 2003)

C. Registration of Voters
D. Inclusion and Exclusion Proceedings

E.

Political Parties
1. Jurisdiction of the COMELEC over Political Parties
2. Registration

Magdalo Para Sa Paghabago v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 190793, June 19, 2012, En
Banc [Sereno])

The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in finding that MAGDALO
uses violence or unlawful means to achieve its goals. Under Article IX-C of the 1987
Constitution, parties, organizations and coalitions that "seek to achieve their goals
through violence or unlawful means" shall be denied registration. This disqualification is
reiterated in Section 61 ,of B.P. 881, which provides that "no political party which seeks
to achieve its goal through violence shall be entitled to accreditation."

Xxx
The finding that MAGDALO seeks to achieve its goals through violence or
unlawful means did not operate as a prejudgment of Criminal Case No. 03-2784. The
power vested by Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution and Section 61 of BP 881
in the COMELEC to register political parties and ascertain the eligibility of groups to
participate in the elections is purely administrative in character. In exercising this
authority, the COMELEC only has to assess whether the party or organization seeking
registration or accreditation pursues its goals by employing acts considered as violent or
unlawful, and not necessarily criminal in nature.
In finding that . MAGDALO resorts to violence or unlawful acts to fulfill its
organizational objectives, the COMELEC did not render an assessment as to whether the
members of MAGDALO committed crimes, as COMELEC was not required to make that
determination in the first place. Its evaluation was limited only to examining whether
MAGDALO possessed all' the necessary qualifications and none of the disqualifications for
registration as a political party. Accreditation as a political party is not a right but only a
privilege given to groups who have qualified and meet the requirements provided by
law.

F. Candidacy
1.

Qualifications of Candidates

Residence Qualification of a Candidate

Rommel Apolinario Ja/osjos v. COMELEC {G.R. No. 191970, Apr. 24, 2012, En
Banc[Abad])
The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the position of
provincial governor to be a resident of the province for at least one year before the
election. For purposes of the election laws, the requirement of residence is synonymous
with domicile, meaning that a person must not only intend to reside in a particular place
but must also have personal presence in such place coupled with conduct indicative of
such intention.
There is no hard and fast rule to determine a candidate's compliance with
residency requirement since the question of residence is a question of intention. Still,
jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile or
residence somewhere; (b) where once established, that domicile remains until he
acquires a new one; and (c) a person can have but one domicile at a time.

LI. 1

It is inevitable under these guidelines and the precedents applying them that
Jalosjos has met the residency requirement for provincial governor of Zamboanga
Sibugay.
It is clear from the facts that Quezon City was Jalosjos' domicile of origin, the
place of his birth. It may be taken for granted that Jalosjos effectively changed his
domicile from Quezon City to Australia when he migrated there at the age of eight,
acquired Australian citizenship, and lived in that country for 26 years. Australia became
Jalosjos' domicile by operation of law and by choice.
On the other hand, when Jalosjos came to the Philippines to live with his brother
in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change his
domicile for good. Jalosjos left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and
renounced his allegiance to that country. In addition, Jalosjos reacquired his old
citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in
his being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of
Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly
proving that he gave up! his domicile there. And he has since lived nowhere else except
in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
To hold that Jalosjos has not established a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay
despite the loss of his domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his domicile of choice and by
operation of law (Australia) would violate the settled maxim that a man must have a
domicile or residence somewhere. Indeed, a candidate is not required to have a house
in a community to establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. It is sufficient
that he should live there even if it be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or
relative.
To insist that the candidate own the house where he lives would make
property a qualification for public office. What matters is that Jalosjos has proven two
things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an intention of making it his domicile.

2. Fifing of Certificates of Candidacy

What is the purpose of the law in requiring the filing of certificate of

candidacy and in fixing the time limit therefor?
The evident purpose of the law in requiring the filing of certificate of candidacy
and in fixing the time limit therefor are: (a) to enable the voters to know, at least sixty
days before the regular election, the candidates among whom they are to make the
choice, and (b) to avoid confusion and inconvenience in the tabulation of the votes cast.
For if the law did not confine the choice or election by the voters to the duly registered
candidates, there might be as many persons voted for as there are voters, and votes
might be cast even for unknown or fictitious persons as a mark to identify the votes in
favor of a candidate for another office in the same election. (Miranda v. Abaya, G.R.
No. 136351, July 28, 1999)

a. Effect of filing
b. Substitution of candidates

May a disqualified candidate and whose certificate of cand~dacy was denied

due course and/ or canceled by the COMELEC be validly substituted?
Even on the most basic and fundamental principles, it is readily understood that

the concept of a substitute presupposes the existence of the person to be substituted,

for how can a person take the place of somebody who does not exist or who never was.
The Court has no other choice but to rule that in all instances enumerated in Section 77
of the Omnibus Election Code, the existence of a valid certificate of candidacy
seasonably filed is a requisite sine qua non.

Li')

All told, a disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a valid

certificate of candidacy in the first place because, if the disqualified candidate did not
have a valid and seasonably filed certificate of candidacy, he is and was not a candidate
at all. If a person was 'not a candidate, he cannot be substituted under Section 77 of
the Code. (Miranda v. Abaya, G.R. No. 13635:1, July 28, 1999, en Banc [Melo])

c.
d.
e.
f.
g.

Ministerial duty of COMELEC to receive certificate

Nuisance candidates
Petition to deny or cancel certificates of candidacy
Effect of disqualification
Withdrawal of candidates

G. Campaign
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.

Premature campaigning
Prohibited contributions
Lawful and prohibited election propaganda
Limitations on expenses
Statement of contributions and expenses

H. Board of Election Inspectors and Board of Canvassers

1. Composition
2. Powers
I.

Remedies and jurisdiction in election law

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

J.

Petition not to give due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy

Petition for disqualification
Petition to declare failure of elections
Pre-proclamation controversy
Election protest
Quo warranto

Prosecution of election offenses

XII. LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

A. Public Corporations
1. Concept
a. Distinguished from government-owned or controlled corporations
2. Classifications
a. Quasi.,.corporations
b. Municipal Corporations
B. Municipal Corporations
1. Elements
2. Nature and Functions
Dual Nature and Functions of local Governments

Every local government unit created or recognized under this Code is a body
politic and corporate endowed with powers to be exercised by it in conformity with law.
As such, it shall exercise powers as a political subdivision of the National Government
and as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its territory. (Section 15,
R.A. No. 7160 othetwise known as The Local Government Code of1991)

3. Requisites for Creation, Conversion, Division, Merger or Dissolution

No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local :government code and subject to approval by a majority of the
votes case in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. (Section .10, Article X,
1987 Constitution)

Requisites for the Creation of a Province

Rodolf'o G,, Navarro, et al. v. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R.
No. 180050, 12 May 2010, En Banc {Peralta)
Section 7, Chapter 2 paragraph (c) of the Local Government Code (LGC),
provides that the land area must be contiguous, unless it comprises two (2) or more
islands, or is separated by a local government unit independent of the others; properly
identified by metes and :bounds with technical descriptions; and sufficient to provide for
such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace.
Therefore, there are two requirements for land area: (1) the land area must be
contiguous; and (2) the land area must be sufficient to provide for such basic services
and facilities to meet the requirements of its popuf ace. A sufficient land area in the
creation of a province is at least 2,000 square kilometers, as provided by Section 461 of
LGC.

Hence x x x the requirement of a contiguous territory and the requirement of a

land area of at least 2,000 square kilometers are distinct and separate requirements for
land area under paragrnph (a) (i) of Section 461 and Section 7 (c) of LGC.
However, paragraph (b) of Section 461 provides two instances of exemption
from the requirement of territorial contiguity, to wit, "the territory need not be
contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands, or is separated by a chartered city or
cities which do not contribute to the income of the province."
The exemption a;bove pertains only to the requirement of territorial contiguity. It
clearly states that the requirement of territorial contiguity may be dispensed with in the
case of a province comprising two or more islands, or is separated by a chartered city or
cities which do not contribute to the income of the province.
Nowhere in paragraph (b) is it expressly stated or may it be implied that when a
province is composed of two or more isiands, or when the territory of a province is
separated by a chartered city or cities, such province need not comply with the land
area requirement of at least 2,000 square kilometers or the requirement in paragraph
(a) (i) of Section 461 ofLGC.
Where the law is free from ambiguity, the court may not introduce exceptions or
conditions where none is provided from considerations of convenience, public welfare,

or for any laudable purpose; neither may it engraft into the law qualifications not
contemplated, nor construe its provisions by taking into account questions of
expediency, good faith, practical utility and other similar reasons so as to relax noncompliance therewith. Where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is
no room for interpretation, but only for application.

C. Principles of Local Autonomy

The Concept of Local Autonomy

Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of

power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government
delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of
government and in the process to make local governments more responsive and
accountable, and ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make
them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress.
At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local
affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises
general supervision over them, but only to ensure that local affairs are administered
according to law. He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute
their judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power/ on the other hand 1 involves an abdication of political
power in favor of local government units declared autonomous. In that case, the
autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its own future with
minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author,
decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event1 the
autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its
constituency. (Limbona v. Mange/in, .170 SCRA 786, Feb. 28, 1989, En Banc
[Sarmiento])
What kind of local autonomy is contemplated by the Constitution? What
about the autonomy contemplated insofar as the autonomous regions are
concerned?
1. The principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means
"decentralization." It does not make local governments sovereign within the state or an
"imperium in imperio." Remaining to be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign
nation, but not intended, however1 to be an imperium in imperio/ "the local government
unit is autonomous in the sense that it is given more powers, authority, responsibilities
and resources. Power which used to be highly centralized in Manila, is thereby
deconcentrated 1 enabling especially the peripheral local government units to develop not
only at their own pace and discretion but also with their own resources and assets.
(Alvarez v. Guingona, Jr., 252 SCRA 695, Jan. 3.t, 1996, En Banc
[Hermosisima])

2. The constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution refers to

the administrative autonomy of local government units or, cast in more technical
language, the decentralization of government authority.
On the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and
the Cordilleras 1 which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution, contemplates the grant of
political autonomy and not just administrative autonomy to these regions. Thus, the
provision in the Constitution for an autonomous regional government with a basic
structure consisting of an executive department and a legislative assembly and special
courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction in each of the autonomous
regions. (Cordillera Broad Coalition v. COA, 181 SCRA 495, Jan. 29, 1990, En
Banc [Cortes]}

D. Powers of Local Government Units (LGUs)

1. Police Power (General Welfare Clause)

2. Eminent Domain

3. Taxing Power
4 . Closure and Opening of Roads
5. Legislative Power
a. Requisites for Valid Ordinance
b. Local Initiative and Referendum

6. Corporate Powers

a.

To Sue and be Sued

b. To Acquire and Sell Property
c. To Enter into Contracts
(i) Requisites
(ii) Ultra ViresContracts

Vicencio v. Villar, et al. (G.R. No. .1.82069, July 3, 2012, En Banc [Sereno])

Issue: Whether or not the Commission ori Audit (COA) committed serious errors and
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction when it affirmed
ASB'S decision relative to the disallowance of disbursements concerning the services
rendered by hired consultants for the Sangguniang Pan/ungsod of Malabon.
HELD: Under Section 456 of R.A. No. 7160, or the Local Government Code, there is no
inherent authority on the part of the city vice-mayor to enter into contracts on behalf of
the local government unit, unlike that provided for the city mayor. Thus, the authority
of the city vice-mayor to enter into contracts on behalf of the city was strictly
circumscribed by the ordinance granting it.
Ordinance No. 15-2003 specifically
authorized Vice-Mayor Yambao to enter into contracts for consultancy services. As this
is not a power or duty given under the law to the Office of the Vice-Mayor, Ordinance
No. 15-2003 cannot be construed as a "continuing authority" for any person who enters
the Office of the Vice-Mayor to enter into subsequent, albeit similar, contracts.

The COA's assailed Decision was made in fruitful compliance with its mandate
and in judicious exercise of its general audit power as conferred on it by the
Constitution. The COA was merely fulfilling its mandate in observing the policy that
government funds and property should be fully protected and conserved, and that
irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant expenditures or uses of such funds and
property should be prevented. Thus, no grave abuse of discretion may be imputed to
the COA.

7. Liability of LGUs
8. Settlement of Boundary Disputes
9. Succession of Elective Officials

Farias v. Barba case : If Sang. Bayan causing vacancy did

not belong to any political party ,must be Appointee of
Governor but recommended Mayor

How is Section 45{b} of the Local Government Code to be interpreted? What

is the reason behind the right given to a political party to nominate a
replacement where a.permanent vacancy occurs in the Sanggunian?
What is crucial is the interpretation of Section 45(b) providing that " x x x only
the nominee of the political party under which the Sanggunian member concerned has
been elected and whose elevation to the position next higher in rank created the last
vacancy in the Sanggunian shall be appointed in the manner hereinabove provided. The
appointee shall come from the political party as that of the Sanggunian member who
caused the vacancy x x x."

The reason behind the right given to a political party to nominate a. replacement
where a permanent vacancy occurs in the Sanggunian is to maintain the party
representation as willed by the people in the election.
With the elevation of petitioner Tamayo, who belonged to REFORMA-LM, to the
position of Vice-Mayor, a vacancy occurred in the Sanggunian that should be filled. up
with someone who should belong to the political party of pet1t1oner Tamayo. Otherwise,
REFORMA-LM's representation in the Sanggunian would be diminished. To argue that
the vacancy created was that formerly held by Rolando Lalas, a LAKAS-NUCD-Kamp1
member would result in the increase of that party's representation in the Sanggunian at
the exp~nse of the REFORMA-LM. This interpretation is contrary to the letter and spirit
of the law and thus violative of a fundamental rule in statutory construction which is to
ascertain and give effect to the intent and purpose of the law. As earlier pointed out,
the reason behind par. (b), section 44 of the Local Government Code is the maintenance
of party representation in the Sanggunian in accordance with the will of the electorate.
The "last vacancy 11 in the Sanggunian refers to that created by the elevation of
the member formerly occupying the next higher in rank which in turn also had become
vacant by any of the causes already enumerated. The term "last vacancy" is thus used
in Sec. 45 (b) to differentiate it from the other vacancy previously created. The term by
no means refers to the vacancy in the No. 8 position which occurred with the elevation
of Rolando Lalas to the seventh position in the Sanggunian. Such construction will
result in absurdity. (Navarro v. Court of Appeals, 355 SCRA 672, Mar. 28, 2001,
1st Div. [Kapunan])
M1:1y an incumbent Vice-Governor, while concurrently the Acting Governor,
continue to preside over the sessio11s of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP)?
If no, who may preside in the meantime?
Being the acting governor, the Vice-governor cannot continue to simultaneously
exercise the duties of the latter office, since the nature of the duties of the Provincial
Governor calls for a full-time occupant to discharge them. Such is not only consistent
with but also appears to be the clear rationale of the new (Local Government) Code
wherein the policy of performing dual functions in both offices has already been
abandoned. To repeat, the creation of a temporary vacancy in the office of the
Governor creates a corresponding vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor whenever
the latter acts as Governor by virtue of such temporary vacancy. This event constitutes
an "inability" on the part of the regular presiding officer (Vice-Governor) to preside
during the SP sessions, which thus calls for the operation of the remedy set in Article
49(b) of the Local Government Code - concerning the election of a temporary presiding
officer. The continuity of the Acting Governor's (Vice-Governor) powers as presiding
officer of the SP is suspended so long as he is in such capacity. Under Section 49(b), "in
the event of the inability of the regular presiding officer to preside at the sanggunian
session, the members ,present and constituting a quorum shall elect from among
themselves a temporary presiding officer." {Gamboa, Jr. v. Aguirre, Jr., G.R. No.
134213, July 20, 1999, En Banc [Ynares-Santiago])

10. Discipline of Local Officials

a. Elective Officials
(i)
(ii)

Grounds
Jurisdiction

(iii)

Preventive Suspension

(iv)
(v)
(vi)

Removal
Administrative Appeal
Doctrine of Condonation

The Doctrine of Condonation

A public official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct committed

during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the
officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him
therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal cases pending
against petitioner. {Aguinaldo v. Santos, 212 SCRA 768, 773 [1992])

Reason for the Doctrine

A reelected local official may not be held administratively accountable for

misconduct committed during his prior term of office. The rationale for this holding is
that when the electorate put him back into office, it is presumed that it did so with full
knowledge of his life and character, including his past misconduct. If, armed with such
knowledge, it still reelects him, then such reelection is considered a condonation of his
past misdeeds. {Mayor Alvin B. Garcia v. Hon. Arturo C. Mojica, et al, G.R. No.
139043, Sept. 10, 1999 [Quisumbing])

b. Appointive Officials
11. Recall
R.A. No. 9244 (Februi;)ry 18, 2004) - An Act Abolishing the Preparatory Recall
Assembly as a Mode of Initiating Recall

12. Term limits

The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall
be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than
three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected. (Section B,. Article X, 1987 Constitution)

The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be
elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is
not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local
office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of
times before the disqualification can apply. (Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC and Capco, Jr.,
G.R. No. 133495, Sept. 3, 1998, 295 SCRA 157, En Banc {Mendoza])

The two conditions for the application of the disqualification prov1s1on are: (1)
that the local official concerned has been elected three consecutive times for the same
position; and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. Absent one or both
of these two conditions, the disqualification may not yet apply. (Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC
and capco, Jr., G.R. No. 133495, Sept. 3, 1998, 295 SCRA 157, En Banc
[Mendoza])

What are the policies embodied in the constitutional prov1s1on barring

elective local officials, with the exception of barangay officials, from setving
more than three consecutive terms?
To prevent the establishment of political dynasties is not the only policy
embodied in the constitutional provision in question (barring elective local officials, with

the exception of barangay officials, from serving more than three consecutive terms).
The other policy is that of enhancing the freedom of choice of the people. To consider,
therefore, only stay in office regardless of how the official concerned came to that office
- whether by election or by succession by operation of law - would be to disregard one
of the purposes of the constitutional provision in question. (Bo1ja, Jr. v. COMELEC
and capco, Jr., G.R. No. J.33495, Sept. 3, 1998, 295 SCRA 157, En Banc
[Mendoza])

Is the preventive suspension of' an elected local government official an

interruption of his term of office f'or purposes of the three-term limit rule?
The "interruption" of a term exempting an elective official from the three-term
limit rule is one that involvers no less than the involuntary loss of title to office. The
elective official must have involuntarily left his office for a length of time, however short,
for an effective interruption to occur. Thus, based on this standard, loss of office by
operation of law, being involuntary, is an effective interruption of service within a term.
On the other hand, temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the functions of an
elective post, even if involuntary, should not be considered an effective interruption of a
term because it does not involve the loss of title to office or at least an effective break
from holding office; the office holder, while retaining title, is simply barred from
exercising the functions of his office for a reason provided by law.
An interruption occurs when the term is broken because the office holder lost the
right to hold on to his office, and cannot be equated with the failure to render service.
The latter occurs during an office holder's term when he retains title to the office but
cannot exercise his functions for reasons established by law. Of course, the term
"failure to serve" cannot be used once the right to office is lost; without the right to hold
office or serve, then no service can be rendered so that none is really lost.
To put it differently, Sec. 8, Art. X fixes an elective official's term of office and
limits his stay in office to three consecutive terms as an inflexible rule that is stressed no
less, by citing involuntary renunciation as an example of a circumvention. The provision
should be read in the context of interruption of term, not in the context of interrupting
the full continuity of the exercise of the powers of the elective position. The "voluntary
renunciation" it speaks of refers only to the elective official's voluntary relinquishment of
office and loss of title to his office. It does not speak of the temporary "cessation of the
exercise of power or authority" that may occur for various reasons, with preventive
suspension being only one of them.
In all cases of preventive suspension, the suspended official is barred from
performing the functions of his office and does not receive salary in the meanwhile, but
does not vacate and lose title to his office; loss of office is a consequence that only
results upon an eventual finding of guilt or liability. (Aldovino, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R.
No. 184836, Dec. 23,2009, En Banc [Brion])

XIII. NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY

A. Regalian Doctrine
B. Nationalist and Citizenship Requirement Provisions
C. Exploration, Development and Utilization of Natural Resources
D. Franchises 1 Authority and Certificates for Public Utilities
E. Acquisition, Ownership and Transfer of Public and Private Lands
F. Practice of Professions
G. Organization and Regulation of Corporations, P1ivate and Private
H. Monopolies, Restraint of Trade and Unfair Competition

XJl:V. SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

A. Concept of Social Justice
B. Commission on Human Rights

XV. EDUCATION, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, ARTS, CULTURE AND SPORTS

A. Academic Freedom
Academic freedom of educational institutions has been defined as the right of the
school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain
them - free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding
public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide spt1ere of autonomy certainly
extending to the choice of students. Said constitutional provision is not to be construed
in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion. That would be to frustrate its purpose
and nullify its intent. (University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 230
SCRA 76:1., 774-775, March 7, 1994 [Nocon})

What are the essentiaR freedoms subsumed in the term "academic freedom"?
In Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong (G.R. No. 99327/ 27 May 1993)/ this
Court cited with approval the formulation made by Justice Felix Frankfurter of the
essential freedoms subsumed in the term "academic freedom" encompassing not only
"the freedom to determine x x x on academic grounds who may teach, what may be
taught (and) how it shall be taught," but likewise "who may be admitted to study." We
have thus sanctioned its invocation by a school in rejecting students who are
academically delinquent, or a laywoman seeking admission to a seminary, or students
violating "School Rules on Discipline." (Isabelo, Jr. v. Perpetual Help College of'
Rizal, Inc., 227 SCRA 595-597, Nov. B, .1.993, En Banc {Vitug])

XVI. PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

A. Concepts

1. Obligations erga omnes

2. Jus cogens
What is a jus cogens norm? "compelling law"

Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a }us cogens
mandatory
norm, thus: "a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and
recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which
no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of
general international law having the same character."
A jus cogens or peremptory norm is a norm which States cannot derogate or
deviate from in their agreements. It is a mandatory norm and stands on a higher
category than a jus dispositivum norm which States can set aside or modify by
agreement. Jus cogens norms are recognized in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties as a ground for invalidity and termination of treaties, when they are in conflict

with such norms. {Magallona, Fundamentals oF Public International Law [2005

ed.])
What norms, for example, are considered as jus cogens in character?

1. The prohibition against the use of force under the UN Charter;

2. The law on genocide;

3. The principle of self determination;
4. Crimes against humanity;
5. Prohibition against slavery and slave trade; and
6. Piracy.
{Maga/Iona, Fundamentals of Public International Law [2005 ed.])

What is an obligation erga omne!fl

obligation to ALL states, of ALL

states to the International Community

It is an obligation of every State towards the international community as a

whole. All States have a legal interest in its compliance, and thus all States are entitled
to invoke responsibility for breach of such an obligation. The distinctive character of this
obligation is pointed out by the IO in the Barcelona Traction Case by distinguishing it
from an obligation inter se which a State owes to another State: "[A]n essential
distinction should be drawn between the obligation of a state towards the international
community as a whole, and those arising vis-a-vis another State ... By their nature xx x
[they] are the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all
States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga
omnes' (IO Reports, 1970, pp. 3, 32). {Maga/Iona, Fundamentals of Public
International Law [2005 ed.])

Give examples of obligations erga omnes

The ICJ gives examples in the Barcelona Traction Case/ as follows: "Such
obligations, derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from the outlawing
of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning
the basic right of the human person, including protection from slavery and racial
discrimination" (IO Reports, 1970, pp. 3, 32) . (Maga/Iona, Fundamentals of Public
International Law [2005 ed.])
3. Concept of ex aequo et bono to decide by equity

Article 38, par. 2, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice

states that if both parties to a dispute agree, the court can decide a case ex aequo et
bono, i.e., the court can apply equity in precedence to all other legal rules. (Timothy
Ht/lie~ Lecture Notes in Public International Law, 1994, p. 48)
B. InternationaB and National law
1. The Doctrine of Incorporation

Under the doctrine of incorporation, rules of international law form part of the
law of the land and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable
If irreconcilable and conflict cannot be fixed
in the domestic sphere.
Municipal law is upheld over International Law

The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local

courts) are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a
rule of international law and the provisions of the Constitution or statute of the local
state. Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both
since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the
generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the Incorporation
Clause in Section 2, Article
II of the Constitution. In a situation however I where the
'
conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law
and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the
municipal courts for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are
accordingly bound by it in all circumstances. The fact that international law has been

"1

made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of
international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of
incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are
given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments.
Accordingly, the principle of lex posterior derogat priori takes effect - a treaty may
repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the Constitution is
the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and
treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the Constitution. (Secretary of
Justice v. Hon. Ralph C. lantion, G.R. No. :J.39465, Jan. 18, 2000, En Banc
[Melo])

The Right to Self-determination of Peoples as a Generally Accepted Principle

of International Law
This right to self-determination of peoples has gone beyond mere treaty or
convention; in fact, it has now been elevated into the status of a generally accepted
principle of international law.
{The Province or North Cotabato v. The
Government of the Republic of the P/111ippines Peace Panel, G.R. No. 183591,
October 14, 2008, En Banc [Carpio-Morales])

Distinction between Internal and External Self-determination

However, in international law, the right to self-determination of peoples should
not be understood as extending to a unilateral right of secession. A distinction should
be made between the right of internal and external self-determination. The right to selfdetermination of a people is normally fulfilled through internal self-determination - a
PESC
people's pursuit of its political, economic, social and cultural development within the
framework of an existing state. A right to external self-determination (which takes the
form of the assertion of a right to unilateral secession) arises in only the most extreme
of cases and, even then, under carefully defined circumstances. The right to external
self-determination can arise only in exceptional cases, namely, where a people is under
colonial rule, is subject to foreign domination or exploitation outside of a colonial
context, and is blocked from the meaningful exercise of its right to internal selfdetermination. {The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the
Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel, G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008,
En Banc [Carpio-Morales])

2. The Doctrine of Transformation

C. Somces
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
D. Subjects

1. States

Sovereignty as an Element of a State in International law

Is sovereignty really absolute and all-encompassing? If not, what are its
restrictions and limitations?

While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing

on the domestic level, .it is however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily
agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of
nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted
principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part of our own

laws. One of the oldest and most fundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt
servanda -'- international agreements must be performed in good faith. A state which
has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislations such
modifications as may be ;necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations.
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of
sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state

power in exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived from a convention or pact.
After all, states, like individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit of mutually
covenanted objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the exercise of
their otherwise absolute rights. Thus, treaties have been used to record agreements
between States concerning such widely diverse matters as, for example, the lease of
naval bases, the sale or cession of territory, the termination of war, the regulation of
conduct of hostilities, the formation of alliances, the regulation of commercial relations,
the settling of claims, the laying down of rules governing conduct in peace and the
establishment of international organizations. The sovereignty of a state therefore
cannot in fact and in reality be considered absolute. Certain restrictions enter into the
picture: (1.) limitations imposed by the very nature of membership in the family of
nations and (2) limitations imposed by treaty stipulations. {Tanada v. Angara, 272
SCRA 18, May 2, 1997 [Panganiban])

2. International organizations
3. Individuals
Discuss the contemporary view on the rightful place of an Individual in
International Law? Does he remain a mere "object" of International Law, or
is he now a proper "subject" of International law?
Then came the long and still ongoing debate on what should be the subject of
international law. The 20th centu1y saw the dramatic rise and fall of different types and
hues of authoritarianism - the fascism of Italy's Mussolini and Germany's Hitler, the
militarism of Japan's Hirohito and the communism of Russia's Stalin, etc. . The sinking of
these isms led to the elevation of the rights of the individual against the state. Indeed,
some species of human rights have already been accorded universal recognition. Today,
the drive to internationalize rights of women and children is also on high gear. The
higher rating given to human rights on the hierarchy of values necessarily led to the reexamination of the rightful place of the individual in international law. Given the
harshest eye is the moss-covered doctrine that international law deals only with States
and that individuals are not its subject For its undesirable corollary is that sub-doctrine
that an individual's right in international law is a near cipher. Translated in extradition
law, the view that once commanded a consensus is that since a fugitive is a mere object
and not a subject of international law, he is bereft of rights. An extraditee, so it was
held, is a mere "object transported from one state to the other as an exercise of the
sovereign will of the two states involved." The re-examination consigned this pernicious
doctrine to the museum of ideas. The new thinkers of international law then gave a
significant shape to the role and rights of the individual in state-concluded treaties and
other international agreements. x x x (Concurting Opinion, Puno J., in Jeffrey
Liang [Huefeng] v. People, G.R. No. 12586~ Mar. 26, 2001, .1.st Div. [Motion
for Reco11sideration])

The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth
of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that
the individual person may properly be a subject of international law is now taking root.
The vulnerable doctrine that the subjects of international law are limited only to states
was dramatically eroded towards the second half of the past century. For one, the
.Nu~emberg and Tokyo trials after World War II resulted in the unprecedented spectacle
of rnd1v1dual defendants (prosecuted) for acts characterized as violations of the laws of
war, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity.
Recently, under the

Nuremberg principle, Serbian leaders have been prosecuted for war crimes and crimes
against humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia. These significant events show
that the individual person is now a valid subject of international law. (Government of
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, represented by the Philippine
Department ofJustice v. Hon. Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 153675,
April 19, 2007, En Banc [Sandoval-Gutierrez])

E. Diplomatic and Consular law

Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
F. Treaties
Vienna Convention on the Law of treaties
The Rome Statute (that established the International Criminal Court)
The Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court which "shall have
the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of
international concern x x x and shall be complementary to the national criminal
jurisdictions." (Article I, Rome Statute) Its jurisdiction covers the crime of genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression as defined in the
Statute (Article 5, Rome Statute). The Statute was opened for signature by all States in
Rome on July 17, 1988 and had remained open for signature until December 31, 2000
at the United Nations Headquarters in New York. The Philippines signed the Statute on
December 28, 2000 x x x. Its provisions, however, require that it be subject to
ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory states (Article 25, Rome Statute).
{Pimentel, Jr. v. Office of the Executive Secretary, 462 SCRA 622, July 6,
2005, En Banc [Puno])

What offenses fall under the jurisdiction of the Internationa! Criminal Court
(ICC)?
The International Criminal Court (ICC) shall have the power to exercise
jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern. Its
jurisdiction covers the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the
crime of aggression as defined in the Statute (Article 5, Rome Statute). (Pimentel, Jr.
v. Office of" tl1e Executive Secretary, 462 SCRA 622, July 6, 2005, En Banc
{Puno])

What is the Principle of Complementarity in the Statute of the International

Criminal Court (ICC)?
The tenth preambular paragraph of the ICC Statute emphasizes that ''the
International Criminal Court x x x shall be complementary to national criminal
jurisdiction." This principle becomes operative in Article 1 of the Statute. This,
however, has to be correlated with tl1e sixth preambular paragraph of the Statute which
declares that "it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those
responsible for international crimes." The principle of complementarity produces a
correlation of the ICC jurisdiction with that of every state over international crimes under
the ICC Statute.
The principle of complementarity gives primacy to national jurisdiction x x x.
The principle of ne bis in idem in Article 20, paragraph 3, of ICC Statute
strengthens complementarity, thus: Unless the proceedings in the national court is for
the purpose of shielding the person concerned from liability, or not conducted

independently or impartially, "no person who has been tried by another court for
conduct ... [constituting crimes within its jurisdiction] shall be tried by the Court with
respect to the same conduct x x x." (Maga/Iona, Fundamentals of Public
International Law [2005 ed.})

G. Nationality and Statelessness

Asylum
Refugee
Stateless persons
The Right of Non-refoulement
The right of a refugee not to be expelled or returned "in any manner whatsoever
to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account
of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion." The prohibition of such expulsion or return becomes an obligation of States
parties to the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.
(Maga/Iona,
Fundamentals of Public InternatioOnbal Law, 2005 Ed., p. 289)

H. State Responsibility

1. Doctrine of State Responsibility

A state is under no legal obligation in international law to admit an alien in its
territory. However, once it admits an alien, it becomes its obligation to afford protection
to that alien so that when the State was remiss in the performance of this duty of
affording protection and the alien dies or suffers damage or injury, this may give rise to
liability on the part of the State.
This doctrine sometimes has been referred to loosely as "international tort."
Requisites
1. An act or omission in violation of International Law
2. Attributable to the State
3. Causing damage to a third State either directly or, indirectly, to a national of
the third State

Conditions for Enforcement of Claims under this Doctrine

1. Nationality of the Claim

The Doctrine of Effective Nationality (Otherwise known as "The Genuine Link

Doctrine")
2. Exhaustion of Local Remedies
3. No Waiver
"Calvo Clause"
4.

No Unnecessary Delay

5.

No Improper Behavior on the Part of the Injured Alien

I. Jurisdiction of States
1. Territoriality Plinciple

2. Nationality Principle and Statelessness

3. Protective Principle
4. Universality Principle
5. Passive Personality Principle
Passive Personality Pirinciple

By this principle, a state may exercise jurisdiction against foreign nationals who
commit acts to the injury of its nationals within the territory of another state.
This principle may imply that a national of a state carries with him the authority
of its law for his protection outside its territorial jurisdiction, thereby adversely affecting
the territorial sovereignty of other states thus affected. (Maga/Iona, Fundamentals
of Public International Law, 2005 ed., p. 50)

6. Conflicts of jurisdiction

J. Treatment of Aliens
1. Extradition
a. Fundamental Principles
b. Procedure
c. Distinguished from Deportation

K. International Human Rights Law

1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights
2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
3. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
L

International Humanitarian Law and Neutrality

International lllumanitaraan law is the branch of public international law

which governs armed conflicts to the end that the use of violence is limited and that
human suffering is mitigated or reduced by regulating or limiting the means of military
operations and by protecting persons who do not or no longer participate in hostilities.
{Maga/Iona, Fundamentals ofPublic International law, 2005 ed., p. 291)
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) encompasses both humanitarian principles
and international treaties that seek to save lives and alleviate suffering of combatants
and noncombatants during armed conflict. Its principal legal documents are the
Geneva Conventions of 1949, four treaties signed by almost every nation in the
world. The Conventions define fundamental rights for combatants removed from the
fighting due to injury, illness, or capture, and for civilians. The 1977 Additional
Protocols, which supplement the Geneva Conventions, further expand those rights.
These are:
sick / wounded soldiers (1)

6 legal instruments

Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded

and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949 (First Geneva
Convention);
sick / wounded naval (2)
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded 1 Sick
soldiers
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of August 12, 1949
(Second Geneva Convention);
Prisoners of war
(3) Geneva Convention Relative to t he Treatment of Prisoners of War of August
12, 1949 (Third Geneva convention);
civilian
( 4) Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War of August 12, 1949 (Fourth Geneva Convention);

 Refugees

(5) Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and

Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol I)of 8 June 1977; and
(6) Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol II) of 8 June 1977.

IHL is not concerned with the lawfulness or unlawfulness of armed

In violation of the prohibition against the threat or use of force under
international law, a state may engage in armed attack against another state, resulting in
armed conflict between them. The application of IHL in their conflict pertains solely to
the fact of armed conflict as the use of force remains unlawful. Armed conflict, in which
IHL properly applies, may arise from a legitimate use of force as when a multinational
force of UN members engages in armed attack against a State by authority of the UN
Security Council as an enforcement measure under Article 42 of the UN Charter. In
either case there will be victims of the conflict who must come under the protection of
IHL, and there may be methods of warfare which may come under the prohibition of
IHL. Hence, the issue of lawfulness or unlawfulness of the armed conflict is of no legal
importance from the standpoint of IHL.
(Mag,'lllona, Fundamentals of Public
International Law, 2005 ed., p. 293)

conflict.

1. Categories of Armed Conflicts

a. International Armed Conflicts
b. Internal or Non-international Armed Conflicts
c. War of National Liberation

War of Nall:ional liberation

An armed conflict may be of such nature in which "peoples are fighting against
colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of
their right of self-determination."
This conflict involving the right of peoples to self-determination, is an
international armed conflict. It is so classified under Article I, paragraphs 3 and 4 of
Protocol I. Under these provisions, this conflict which may be referred to as "war of
national liberation," is included in the classification set out in Article 2 common to the
four Geneva Conventions of 1949 x x x. {Maga/Iona, Fundamentals of Public
International law, 2005 ed., p. 307)

The Martens Clause

In cases not covered by this Protocol (I) or by any other international

agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the
principles of international law derived from established custom, from the principles of
humanity and from the dictates of public conscience.
The Martens Clause originally formed part of the Hague Convention II with
respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 1899. It was also one of the
preambular paragraphs of Hague Convention No. IV which provides that in cases not
covered by the rules of law, "the inhabitants and belligerents remain under the
protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the
usages established by civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity and the dictates of
public conscience. Its modern version x x x is Article I, paragraph 2, of Additional
Protocol I of 1977.

Where lacunae or loopholes arise in the interpretation and application of

international agreements or treaties of humanitarian law, resort may be made to the
Martens Clause. {Mag.rJllona, Fundamentals of' Public International Law, 200.'5
ed., pp. 300-301)

2. Core international oblioations of states in International Humanitarian Law

a. Treatment of civilians
b. Prisoners of war
3. Law on Neutrality

M. law of the Sea

The UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TM!E SEA (UNCLOS) IH
1. Baselines
2. Archipelagic states

a. Straight archipelagic baselines

b. Archjipelagic waters
c. .L\rchipelagic sea lanes passage
3.
4.
5.
6.

Internal waters
Territorial sea
Exclusive economic zone
Cotinental shelf
a.

Extended continental shelf

7. International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea

N. Madrid Protocol and the Paris

Industrial Propert-1
0.

!nternationa~

1.

Co:nrvenrt~on

for the !Protection of

Environment law

Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration

...
}

The Stockholm Dedarat;m~ is the Dec~aration of thle Uilltitecil Nataons

Conference on the Human Environment made in Stockholm Sweden on June 16,
1972. It has 26 Principles. Principle 21 thereof states that:

States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the
principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources
pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure
that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the
environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.

P. Inlteirnational Economic taw

i