TORTS | Atty.

Rashid Pandi REGINALD HILL, minor, and

(2019-2020) MARVIN HILL, as father and
Natural Guardian of said
A. INTRODUCTORY CONCEPTS minor, defendants-appellees.

Nature, Scope, Coverage

Cases: Cruz & Avecilla for appellants.
Elcano vs Hill 77 SCRA 98
Gashem Shookat Baksh vs CA GR No 97336 February Marvin R. Hill & Associates for appellees.
19 1993
Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils Inc vs CA GR No 110295
October 18 1993
Navida vs Dizon GR No 125078 May 30 2011 DECISION

Requisites
Child Learning vs Tagorio GR No 150920 November 25 BARREDO, J p:
2005
Appeal from the order of the Court of First
B. QUASI-DELICT DISTINGUISHED FROM Instance of Quezon City dated January 29, 1965 in
Civil Case No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano et al. vs.
Culpa Criminal Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to
Cases: dismiss of defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs for
Barredo vs Garcia and Almario GR No 48006 July 8 recovery of damages from defendant Reginald Hill,
1942 a minor, married at the time of the occurrence, and
Joseph vs Bautista GR No L-41423 February 23 1989 his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he
Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation vs People of the was living and getting subsistence, for the killing by
Philippines GR No 129029 April 3 2000 Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito
Sps. Santos et al vs Pizardo GR No 151452 July 29 2005 Elcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted, the
Manliclic vs Calaunan GR No 150157 January 25 2007 said accused was acquitted on the ground that his
Lumantas vs Calapiz GR No 163753 January 15 2014 act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to
kill, coupled with mistake."

Culpa Contractual Actually, the motion to dismiss based on

Torres-Madrid Brokerage vs FEB Mitsui GR No 194121 the following grounds:
July 11 2016 "1. The present action is not
Ochoa vs G&S Transport GR No 170071 March 9 2011 only against but a violation of section
G&S Transport vs Ochoa GR No 170125 March 9 2011 1, Rule 107, which is now Rule III, of
Gutierrez vs Gutierrez 56 Phil 177 the Revised Rules of Court;
Philippine School of Business Administration et al vs CA
GR No 84698 January 4 1992 "2. The action is barred by a
Air France vs Carrascoso 18 SCRA 155 prior judgment which is now final and
Regino vs Pangasinan Colleges of Science and or in res-adjudicata;
Technology GR No 156109 November 18 2004
Manila Railroad Co. vs La Compania Trasatlantica GR "3. The complaint had no
No 11318 October 26 1918 cause of action against defendant
Calalas vs CA GR No 122039 May 31 2000 Marvin Hill, because he was relieved
Construction Development Corporation of the as guardian of the other defendant
Philippines vs Estrella GR No 147791 September 8 2006 through emancipation by marriage."
(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on
Appeal.])
A. INTRODUCTORY CONCEPTS
Nature, Scope, Coverage was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon
motion for reconsideration of the defendants of
such denial, reiterating the above grounds that the
Elcano vs Hill 77 SCRA 98 following order was issued:

"Considering the motion for

SECOND DIVISION reconsideration filed by the
defendants on January 14, 1965 and
after thoroughly examining the
[G.R. No. L-24803. May 26, 1977.]
arguments therein contained, the
Court finds the same to be
PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA meritorious and well-founded.
ELCANO, in their capacity as
WHEREFORE, the Order of
Ascendants of Agapito Elcano,
this Court on December 8, 1964 is
deceased, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. 

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 hereby reconsidered by ordering the 1. Is the present civil action for damages
dismissal of the above entitled case. barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal
case wherein the action for civil liability was not
"SO ORDERED. reversed?
"Quezon City, Philippines, 2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last
January 29, 1965." (p. 40, Record [p. paragraphs) of the Civil Code be applied against
21, Record on Appeal.) Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that
at the time of the occurrence complained of,
Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs- Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting
appellants, the spouses Elcano, are presenting for subsistence from his father, was already legally
Our resolution the following assignment of errors: married?
"THE LOWER COURT ERRED The first issue presents no more problem
IN DISMISSING THE CASE BY than the need for a reiteration and further
UPHOLDING THE CLAIM OF clarification of the dual character, criminal and civil,
DEFENDANTS THAT — of fault or negligence as a source of obligation
I which was firmly established in this jurisdiction in
Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607. In that case, this
"THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT Court postulated, on the basis of a scholarly
ONLY AGAINST BUT ALSO A dissertation by Justice Bocobo on the nature
VIOLATION OF SECTION 1, RULE 107, of culpa aquiliana in relation to culpa
NOW RULE 111, OF THE REVISED criminal or delito and mere culpa or fault, with
RULES OF COURT, AND THAT pertinent citation of decisions of the Supreme Court
SECTION 3(c) OF RULE 111, RULES OF of Spain, the works of recognized civilians, and
COURT IS INAPPLICABLE; earlier jurisprudence of our own, that the same
given act can result in civil liability not only under
II the Penal Code but also under the Civil Code. Thus,
the opinion holds:
"THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A
PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOW "The above case is pertinent
FINAL OR RES-ADJUDICATA; because it shows that the same act
may come under both the Penal Code
III and the Civil Code. In that case, the
"THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI- action of the agent was unjustified
DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176 TO 2194 OF and fraudulent and therefore could
THE CIVIL CODE, ARE INAPPLICABLE have been the subject of a criminal
IN THE INSTANT CASE; and action. And yet, it was held to be also
a proper subject of a civil action
IV under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It
is also to be noted that it was the
"THAT THE COMPLAINT employer and not the employee who
STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION was being sued." (pp. 615-616, 73
AGAINST DEFENDANT MARVIN HILL Phil.) 1
BECAUSE HE WAS RELIEVED AS
GUARDIAN OF THE OTHER
DEFENDANT THROUGH
EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE." (page
4, Record.)

It appears that for the killing of the son,

Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants, defendant-appellee
Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally in Criminal
Case No. 5102 of the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City. After due trial, he was acquitted on
the ground that his act was not criminal because of
"lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake."
Parenthetically, none of the parties has favored Us
with a copy of the decision of acquittal, presumably
because appellants do not dispute that such indeed
was the basis stated in the court's decision. And so,
when appellants filed their complaint against
appellees Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin Hill,
on account of the death of their son, the appellees
filed the motion to dismiss above-referred to.
As We view the foregoing background of
this case, the two decisive issues presented for Our
resolution are:

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 "It will be noticed that the aquiliana? We are loath to impute to
defendant in the above case could the lawmaker any intention to bring
have been prosecuted in a criminal about a situation to absurd and
case because his negligence causing anomalous. Nor are we, in the
the death of the child was punishable interpretation of the laws, disposed to
by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a uphold the letter that killeth rather
clear instance of the same act of than the spirit that giveth life. We will
negligence being a proper subject not use the literal meaning of the law
matter either of a criminal action with to smother and render almost lifeless
its consequent civil liability arising a principle of such ancient origin and
from a crime or of an entirely such full-grown development as culpa
separate and independent civil action aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is
for fault or negligence under article conserved and made enduring in
1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish
jurisdiction, the separate individuality Civil Code.
of a cuasi-delito or culpa
aquiliana under the Civil Code has "Secondly, to find the
been fully and clearly recognized, accused guilty in a criminal case,
even with regard to a negligent act proof of guilt beyond reasonable
for which the wrongdoer could have doubt is required, while in a civil
been prosecuted and convicted in a case, preponderance of evidence is
criminal case and for which, after sufficient to make the defendant pay
such a conviction, he could have been in damages. There are numerous
sued for this civil liability arising from cases of criminal negligence which
his crime." (p. 617, 73 Phil.) 2 can not be shown beyond reasonable
doubt, but can be proved by a
"It is most significant that in preponderance of evidence. In such
the case just cited, this Court cases, the defendant can and should
specifically applied article 1902 of the be made responsible in a civil action
Civil Code. It is thus that although J. under articles 1902 to 1910 of the
V. House could have been criminally Civil Code. Otherwise, there would be
prosecuted for reckless or simple many instances of unvindicated civil
negligence and not only punished but wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium." (p.
also made civilly liable because of his 620, 73 Phil.)
criminal negligence, nevertheless this
Court awarded damages in an "Fourthly, because of the
independent civil action for fault or broad sweep of the provisions of both
negligence under article 1902 of the the Penal Code and the Civil Code on
Civil Code." (p. 618, 73 Phil.) 3 this subject, which has given rise to
the overlapping or concurrence of
"The legal provisions, spheres already discussed, and for
authors, and cases already invoked lack of understanding of the
should ordinarily be sufficient to character and efficacy of the action
dispose of this case. But inasmuch as for culpa aquiliana, there has grown
we are announcing doctrines that up a common practice to seek
have been little understood, in the damages only by virtue of the civil
past, it might not be inappropriate to responsibility arising from a crime,
indicate their foundations. forgetting that there is another
remedy, which is by invoking articles
"Firstly, the Revised Penal 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although
Code in articles 365 punishes not only this habitual method is allowed by our
reckless but also simple negligence. If laws, it has nevertheless rendered
we were to hold that articles 1902 to practically useless and nugatory the
1910 of the Civil Code refer only to more expeditious and effective
fault or negligence not punished by remedy based on culpa
law, accordingly to the literal import aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual.
of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the In the present case, we are asked to
legal institution of culpa help perpetuate this usual course. But
aquilina would have very little scope we believe it is high time we pointed
and application in actual life. Death or out to the harms done by such
injury to persons and damage to practice and to restore the principle
property through any degree of of responsibility for fault or
negligence — even the slightest — negligence under articles 1902 et
would have to be indemnified only seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor.
through the principle of civil liability It is high time we caused the stream
arising from a crime. In such a state of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to
of affairs, what sphere would remain flow on its own natural channel, so
for cuasi-delito or culpa that its waters may no longer be

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 diverted into that of a crime under recover damages twice for the same
the Penal Code. This will, it is act or omission of the defendant."
believed, make for the better
safeguarding or private rights According to the Code Commission: "The
because it re-establishes an ancient foregoing provision (Article 2177) through at first
and additional remedy, and for the sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary
further reason that an independent when we consider the exact nature of criminal and
civil action, not depending on the civil negligence. The former is a violation of the
issues, limitations and results of a criminal law, while the latter is a 'culpa aquilian' or
criminal prosecution, and entirely quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its
directed by the party wronged or his own foundation and individuality, separate from
counsel, is more likely to secure criminal negligence. Such distinction between
adequate and efficacious redress." (p. criminal negligence and 'culpa extra-contractual' or
621, 73 Phil.) 'cuasi-delito' has been sustained by decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as clear,
Contrary to an immediate impression one sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an
might get upon a reading of the foregoing excerpts outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the
from the opinion in Garcia - that the concurrence of proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation
the Penal Code and the Civil Code therein referred of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable
to contemplate only acts of negligence and not doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent
intentional voluntary acts — deeper reflection civil action, not for civil liability arising from
would reveal that the thrust of the pronouncements criminal negligence, but for damages due to a
therein is not so limited, but that in fact it actually quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article
extends to fault or culpa. This can be seen in the forestalls a double recovery." (Report of the Code)
reference made therein to the Sentence of the Commission, p. 162.)
Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1919,
Although, again, this Article 2177 does
supra, which involved a case of fraud or estafa, not
seem to literally refer to only acts of negligence,
a negligent act. Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil
the same argument of Justice Bacobo about
Code of Spain, in force here at the time of Garcia,
construction that upholds "the spirit that giveth life"
provided textually that obligations "which are
rather than that which is literal that killeth the
derived from acts or omissions in which fault or
intent of the lawmaker should be observed in
negligence, not punishable by law, intervene shall
applying the same. And considering that the
be the subject of Chapter II, Title XV of this book
preliminary chapter on human relations of the new
(which refers to quasi-delicts.)" And it is precisely
Civil Code definitely establishes the separability
the underline qualification, "not punishable by law",
and independence of liability in a civil action for
that Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to an
acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 32)
undesirable construction or interpretation of the
from the civil responsibility arising from crime fixed
letter of the law that "killeth, rather than the spirit
by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and, in a
that giveth life" hence, the ruling that "(W)e will not
sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3
use the literal meaning of the law to smother and
(c), Rule 111, contemplate also the same
render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient
separability, it is "more congruent with the spirit of
origin and such full-grown development as culpa
law, equity and justice, and more in harmony with
aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and
modern progress", to borrow the felicitous relevant
made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the
language in Rakes vs. Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific Co.,
Spanish Civil Code." And so, because Justice
Bacobo was Chairman of the Code Commission that 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that Article
2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence,"
drafted the original text of the new Civil Code, it is
covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but
to be noted that the said Code, which was enacted
also acts criminal in character, whether intentional
after the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses the term,
and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a
"not punishable by law," thereby making it clear
separate civil action lies against the offender in a
that the concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts
criminal act, whether or not he is criminally
which are criminal in character or in violation of the
prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided
penal law, whether voluntary or negligent. Thus,
that the offended party is not allowed, if he is
the corresponding provisions to said Article 1093 in
actually charged also criminally, to recover
the new code, which is Article 1162, simply says,
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in
"Obligations derived from quasi-delicts shall be
such eventuality only to the bigger award of the
governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII
two, assuming the awards made in the two cases
of this Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by special laws."
vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability
More precisely, a new provision, Article 2177 of the
referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers
new code provides:
exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of
"ART. 2177. Responsibility for the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability
fault or negligence under the for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only
preceding article is entirely separate and not as a crime is not estinguished even by a
and distinct from the civil liability declaration in the criminal case that the criminal
arising from negligence under the act charged has not happened or has not been
Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here
hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa

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aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts by their minor married child without their consent.
which may be punishable by law. 4 (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)
It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article
Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the
extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that emancipation by marriage of Reginald. However,
acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of
him. age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill
has become merely subsidiary to that of his son.
Coming now to the second issue about the
effect of Reginald's emancipation by marriage on WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is
the possible civil liability of Atty. Hill, his father, it is reversed and the trial court is ordered to proceed in
also Our considered opinion that the conclusion of accordance with the foregoing opinion. Costs
appellees that Atty. Hill is already free from against appellees.
responsibility cannot be upheld.
Fernando (Chairman), Antonio and Martin,
While it is true that parental authority is JJ., concur.
terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article
Concepcion Jr., J., is on leave.
327, Civil Code), and under Article 397,
emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the Martin, J., was designated to sit in the
minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that Second Division.
pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage
of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus ||| (Elcano v. Hill, G.R. No. L-24803, [May 26, 1977],
"(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary 167 PHIL 462-475)
concession shall terminate parental authority over
the child's person. It shall enable the minor to
administer his property as though he were of age,
but he cannot borrow money or alienate or
encumber real property without the consent of his
father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be
sued in court only with the assistance of his father,
mother or guardian."
Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation
imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible. The father
and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother,
are responsible. The father and, in case of his death
or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the
damages caused by the minor children who live in
their company." In the instant case, it is not
controverted that Reginald, although married, was
living with his father and getting subsistence from
him at the time of the occurrence in question.
Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient
to and dependent on his father, a situation which is
not unusual.
It must be borne in mind that, according to
Manresa, the reason behind the joint and solidary
liability of parents with their offending child under
Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the parent to
supervise their minor children in order to prevent
them from causing damage to third persons. 5 On
the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399,
in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage
may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the
assistance of the parents, is that such
emancipation does not carry with it freedom to
enter into transactions or do any act that can give
rise to judicial litigation. (See Manresa, id., Vol. II,
pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing someone else
invites judicial action. Otherwise stated, the
marriage of a minor child does not relieve the
parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while
still a minor, does not give answerable for the
borrowings of money and alienation or
encumbering of real property which cannot be done

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Gashem Shookat Baksh vs CA GR No 97336 When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
February 19 1993 petitioners' main and reply briefs are not disputed by
the respondents (Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of
the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed
THIRD DIVISION absence of evidence and is contradicted by the
evidence on record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242
[1970])." Petitioner has not endeavored to point out to
[G.R. No. 97336. February 19, 1993.] Us the existence of any of the above quoted exceptions
in this case. Consequently, the factual findings of the
trial and appellate courts must be respected.
GASHEM SHOOKAT
BAKSH, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT 2. CIVIL LAW; QUASI-DELICT; TORTS; ART. 21 OF THE
OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. CIVIL CODE; CONSTRUED. — Article 2176 of the Civil
GONZALES, respondents. Code, which defines a quasi-delict is limited to
negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of
willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish
Public Attorney's Office for petitioner. legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept
while torts is an Anglo-American or common law
Corleto R. Castro for private respondent. concept. Torts is much broader than culpa
aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but
intentional criminal acts as well such as assault and
SYLLABUS battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the general
scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by
the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF Code, intentional and malicious acts. with certain
WITNESSES; FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT; RULE AND exceptions, are to. be governed by the Revised Penal
EXCEPTIONS. — It is the rule in this jurisdiction that Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be
appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's findings covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. In between
as to the credibility of witnesses, the latter court having these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in
heard the witnesses and having had the opportunity to the absence of Article 21, would have been beyond
observe closely their deportment and manner of redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even
testifying, unless the trial court had plainly overlooked postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the
facts of substance or value which, if considered, might Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope
affect the result of the case. (People vs. Garcia, 89 of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more
SCRA 440 [1979]; People vs. Bautista, 92 SCRA 465 supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on
[1979]; People vs. Abejuela, 92 SCRA 503 [1979]; torts. (TOLENTINO, A.M. Commentaries and
People vs. Arciaga, 98 SCRA 1 [1980]; People vs. Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, vol.
Marzan, 128 SCRA 203 [1984]; People vs., Alcid, 135 1, 1985 ed., 72).
SCRA 280 [1985]; People vs. Sanchez, 199 SCRA 414
[1991]; People vs. Atilano, 204 SCRA 278 [1991]). 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY;
Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law RULE; RATIONALE. — The existing rule is that a breach
may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is not the (Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, 109 Phil. 629
function of this Court to analyze or weigh all over again [1960]; Estopa vs. Piansay, 109 Phil. 640 [1960])
the evidence introduced by the parties before the lower Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the
court. There are, however, recognized exceptions to New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it
this rule. Thus, in Medina vs. Asistio, Jr., this Court took so. The reason therefor is set forth in the report of the
the time, again, to enumerate these exceptions: "(1) Senate Committee on the Proposed Civil Code, from
When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on which We quote: "The elimination of this chapter is
speculation, surmises or conjectures (Joaquin v. proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not
Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When the inference actionable has been definitely decided in the case of De
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible Jesus vs. Syquia (58 Phil. 866 [1933]). The history of
(Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3) Where there is breach of promise suits in the United States and in
a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. England has shown that no other action lends itself
453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on a more readily to abuse by designing women and
misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing, L-4875, Nov. unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to
27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting the abolition of rights of action in the so-called Heart
(Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.) (6) Balm suits in many of the American states . . ." This
When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision,
beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept of
to the admissions of both appellant and appellee torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting
(Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil. adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral
401 [1958]); (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to
are contrary to those of the trial court (Garcia v. Court specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books
of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v. (Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 83 SCRA
Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the 237 [1978]).
findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based (Ibid.,); (9)

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4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; AWARD OF DAMAGES, JUSTIFIED and the other one is not (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40
BECAUSE OF FRAUD AND DECEIT BEHIND IT; CASE AT Phil. 209)."
BAR. — In the light of the above laudable purpose of
Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that
where a man's promise to marry is in fact the
proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a DECISION
woman and his representation to fulfill that promise
thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving
of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he
had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that DAVIDE, JR., J p:
the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive
device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the
obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the Rules of Court seeking to review and set aside the
award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because Decision 1 of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-
of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and G.R. CV No. 24256 which affirmed in toto the 16
deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and October 1989 Decision or Branch 38 (Lingayen) of the
reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan in Civil Case
however, that such injury should have been committed No. 16503. Presented is the issue of whether or not
in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to
policy. In the instant case, respondent Court found that marry on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the
it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive Philippines. cdphil
protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff
that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to  
him and to live with him on the honest and sincere
belief that he would keep said promise, and it was The antecedents of this case are not complicated:
likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the
that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's assistance of counsel, filed with the aforesaid trial court
living-in with him preparatory to their supposed a complaint 2 for damages against the petitioner for
marriage." In short, the private respondent surrendered the alleged violation of their agreement to get married.
her virginity, the cherished possession of every single She alleges in said complaint that: she is twenty-two
Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral (22) years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good
seduction — the kind illustrated by the Code moral character and reputation duly respected in her
Commission in its example earlier adverted to. The community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian
petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments, Guilig,
punished under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Dagupan City, and is an exchange student taking a
Revised Penal Code because the private respondent medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in
was above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the Dagupan City; before 20 August 1987; the latter
seduction. Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his
that Article 21 may be applied-in a breach of promise to love on the condition that they would get married; they
marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction. therefore agreed to get married after the end of the
5. ID.; PARI DELICTO RULE; DEFINED; NOT school semester, which was in October of that year;
APPRECIATED IN CASE AT BAR. — The pari delicto rule petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents
does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private in Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their
respondent may not have been impelled by the purest approval to the marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987,
of intentions, she eventually submitted to the petitioner the petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano
in sexual congress not out of lust, but because of moral Apartments; she was a virgin before she began living
seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of with him; a week before the filing of the complaint,
conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she petitioner's attitude towards her started to change; he
found out that the petitioner was not going to marry maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of
her after all, she left him. She is not, therefore, in pari such maltreatment, she sustained injuries, during a
delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal confrontation with a representative of the barangay
fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the
legal fault." (Black's Laws Dictionary, Fifth ed., 1004). complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage
At most, it could be conceded that she is merely in agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore
delicto. "Equity often interferes for the relief of the less and; the petitioner is already married to someone living
guilty of the parties, where his transgression has been in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for
brought about by the imposition or undue influence of judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in
the party on whom the burden of the original wrong the amount of not less than P45,000.00,
principally rests, or where his consent to the reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to
transaction was itself procured by fraud." (37 AM Jur 2d. P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, and granting her
401). In Mangayao vs. Lasud, (11 SCRA 158 [1964]) We such other relief and remedies as may be just and
declared: "Appellants likewise stress that both parties equitable. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No
being at fault, there should be no action by one against 16503.
the other (Art. 1412, New Civil Code). This rule, In his Answer with Counterclaim, 3 petitioner admitted
however, has been interpreted as applicable only where only the personal circumstances of the parties as
the fault on both sides is, more or less, equivalent. It averred in the complaint and denied the rest of the
does not apply where one party is literate or intelligent

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allegations either for lack of knowledge or information thousand (P3,000.00) pesos as atty's
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof or fees and two thousand (P2,000.00)
because the true facts are those alleged as his Special pesos at (sic) litigation expenses and
and Affirmative Defenses. He thus claimed that he to pay the costs.
never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married
with the private respondent; he neither sought the 3. All other claims are denied." 6
consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings
live in his apartment; he did not maltreat her, but only and conclusions that (a) petitioner and private
told her to stop coming to his place because he respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is not a
discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who
money and passport; and finally, no confrontation took readily submits to sexual advances, (c) petitioner,
place with a representative of the barangay captain. through machinations, deceit and false pretenses,
Insisting, in his Counterclaim, that the complaint is promised to marry private respondent, (d) because of
baseless and unfounded and that as a result thereof, he his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed
was unnecessarily dragged into court and compelled to herself to be deflowered by him, (e) by reason of that
incur expenses, and has suffered mental anxiety and a deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents
besmirched reputation, he prayed for an award of — in accordance with Filipino customs and traditions —
P5,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses and P25,000.00 made some preparations for the wedding that was to
as moral damages. be held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs
After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the and chickens, inviting friends and relatives and
trial court issued a Pre-Trial Order 4 embodying the contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his
stipulated facts which the parties had agreed upon, to promise to marry her and (g) such acts of the
wit: petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has abused
Philippine hospitality, have offended our sense of
"1. That the plaintiff is single and morality, good customs, culture and traditions. The trial
resident (sic) of Bañaga, Bugallon, court gave full credit to the private respondent's
Pangasinan, while the defendant is testimony because, inter alia, she would not have had
single, Iranian, citizen and resident the temerity and courage to come to court and expose
(sic) of Lozano Apartment, Guilig, her honor and reputation to public scrutiny and ridicule
Dagupan City since September 1, if her claim was false. 7
1987 up to the present;
The above findings and conclusions were culled from
2. That the defendant is presently the detailed summary of the evidence for the private
studying at Lyceum-Northwestern, respondent in the foregoing decision, digested by the
Dagupan City, College of Medicine, respondent Court as follows:
second year medicine proper.
"According to plaintiff, who claimed
3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an that she was a virgin at the time and
employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette, that she never had a boyfriend
Fernandez Avenue, Dagupan City before, defendant started courting
since July, 1986 up to the present and her just a few days after they first
a (sic) high school graduate; met. He later proposed marriage to
her several times and she accepted
4. That the parties happened to know his love as well as his proposal of
each other when the Manager of the marriage on August 20, 1987, on
Mabuhay Luncheonette, Johnny which same day he went with her to
Rabino introduced the defendant to her hometown of Banaga, Bugallon,
the plaintiff on August 3, 1986." cdll Pangasinan, as he wanted to meet
her parents and inform them of their
After trial on the merits, the lower court, relationship and their intention to get
applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered on 16 married. The photographs Exhs. "A"
October 1989 a decision 5 favoring the private to "E" (and their submarkings) of
respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to pay defendant with members of plaintiff's
the latter damages and attorney's fees; the family or with plaintiff, were taken
dispositive portion of the decision reads: that day. Also on that occasion,
defendant told plaintiff's parents and
"IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing brothers and sisters that he intended
consideration, judgment is hereby to marry her during the semestral
rendered in favor of the plaintiff and break in October, 1987, and because
against the defendant. plaintiff's parents thought he was
good and trusted him, they agreed to
1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to his proposal for him to marry their
pay the plaintiff the sum of twenty daughter, and they likewise allowed
thousand (P20,000.00) pesos as him to stay in their house and sleep
moral damages. with plaintiff during the few days that
they were in Bugallon. When plaintiff
2. Condemning further the defendant and defendant later returned to
to pay the plaintiff the sum of three Dagupan City, they continued to live

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 together in defendant's apartment. urban life', and certainly would (sic)
However, in the early days of not have allowed 'herself to be
October, 1987, defendant would tie deflowered by the defendant if there
plaintiff's hands and feet while he was no persuasive promise made by
went to school, and he even gave her the defendant to marry her.' In fact,
medicine at 4 o'clock in the morning we agree with the lower court that
that made her sleep the whole day plaintiff and defendant must have
and night until the following day. As a been sweethearts or so the plaintiff
result of this live-in relationship, must have thought because of the
plaintiff became pregnant, but deception of defendant, for
defendant gave her some medicine to otherwise, she would not have
abort the foetus. Still plaintiff allowed herself to be photographed
continued to live with defendant and with defendant in public in so (sic)
kept reminding him of his promise to loving and tender poses as those
marry her until he told her that he depicted in the pictures Exhs. "D" and
could not do so because he was "E". We cannot believe, therefore,
already married to a girl in Bacolod defendant's pretense that plaintiff
City. That was the time plaintiff left was a nobody to him except a
defendant, went home to her parents, waitress at the restaurant where he
and thereafter consulted a lawyer usually ate. Defendant in fact
who accompanied her to the admitted that he went to plaintiff's
barangay captain in Dagupan City. hometown of Banaga, Bugallon,
Plaintiff, her lawyer, her godmother, Pangasinan, at least thrice; at (sic)
and a barangay tanod send by the the town fiesta on February 27, 1987
barangay captain went to talk to (p. 54, tsn May 18, 1988), at (sic) a
defendant to still convince him to beach party together with the
marry plaintiff, but defendant insisted manager and employees of the
that he could not do so because he Mabuhay Luncheonette on March 3,
was already married to a girl in 1987 (p. 50, tsn id.), and on April 1,
Bacolod City, although the truth, as 1987 when he allegedly talked to
stipulated by the parties at the pre- plaintiff's mother who told him to
trial, is that defendant is still single. marry her daughter (pp. 55-56,
tsn id.). Would defendant have left
Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also Dagupan City where he was involved
claimed that after defendant had in the serious study of medicine to go
informed them of his desire to marry to plaintiff's hometown in Banaga,
Marilou, he already looked for Bugallon, unless there was (sic) some
sponsors for the wedding, started kind of special relationship between
preparing for the reception by looking them? And this special relationship
for pigs and chickens, and even must indeed have led to defendant's
already invited many relatives and insincere proposal of marriage to
friends to the forthcoming plaintiff, communicated not only to
wedding." 8 her but also to her parents, and (sic)
Marites Rabino, the owner of the
Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the
restaurant where plaintiff was
respondent Court of Appeals which docketed the case
working and where defendant first
as CA-G R. CV No. 24256. In his Brief, 9 he contended
proposed marriage to her, also knew
that the trial court erred (a) in not dismissing the case
of this love affair and defendant's
for lack of factual and legal basis and (b) in ordering
proposal of marriage to plaintiff,
him to pay moral damages, attorney's fees, litigation
which she declared was the reason
expenses and costs. Cdpr
why plaintiff resigned from her job at
On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the restaurant after she had accepted
the challenged decision 10 affirming in toto the trial defendant's proposal (pp. 6-7, tsn
court's ruling of 16 October 1989. In sustaining the trial March 7, 1988).
court's findings of fact, respondent Court made the
 
following analysis:
Upon the other hand, appellant does
"First of all, plaintiff, then only 21
not appear to be a man of good moral
years old when she met defendant
character and must think so low and
who was already 23 years old at the
have so little respect and regard for
time, does not appear to be a girl of
Filipino women that he openly
loose morals. It is uncontradicted that
admitted that when he studied in
she was a virgin prior to her
Bacolod City for several years where
unfortunate experience with
he finished his B.S. Biology before he
defendant and never had a boyfriend.
came to Dagupan City to study
She is, as described by the lower
medicine, he had a common-law wife
court, a barrio lass 'not used and
in Bacolod City. In other words, he
accustomed to the trend of modern

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 also lived with another woman in moral character. Moreover, his controversial "common
Bacolod City but did not marry that law wife" is now his legal wife as their marriage had
woman, just like what he did to been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian
plaintiff. It is not surprising, then, that Embassy. As to his unlawful cohabitation with the
he felt so little compunction or private respondent, petitioner claims that even if
remorse in pretending to love and responsibility could be pinned on him for the live-in
promising to marry plaintiff, a young, relationship, the private respondent should also be
innocent, trustful country girl, in order faulted for consenting to an illicit arrangement. Finally,
to satisfy his lust on her." 11 petitioner asseverates that even if it was to be
assumed arguendo that he had professed his love to
and then concluded: the private respondent and had also promised to marry
her, such acts would not be actionable in view of the
special circumstances of the case. The mere breach of
"In sum, we are strongly convinced promise is not actionable. 14
and so hold that it was defendant-
appellant's fraudulent and deceptive On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had
protestations of love for and promise filed her Comment to the petition and the petitioner
to marry plaintiff that made her had filed his Reply thereto, this Court gave due course
surrender her virtue and womanhood to the petition and required the parties to submit their
to him and to live with him on the respective Memoranda, which they subsequently
honest and sincere belief that he complied with. prLL
would keep said promise, and it was
likewise these (sic) fraud and As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of
deception on appellant's part that the petitioner's arguments in support of his thesis, it is
made plaintiff's parents agree to their clear that questions of fact, which boil down to the
daughter's living-in with him issue of the credibility of witnesses, are also raised. It is
preparatory to their supposed the rule in this jurisdiction that appellate courts will not
marriage. And as these acts of disturb the trial court's findings as to the credibility of
appellant are palpably and witnesses, the latter court having heard the witnesses
undoubtedly against morals, good and having had the opportunity to observe closely their
customs, and public policy, and are deportment and manner of testifying, unless the trial
even gravely and deeply derogatory court had plainly overlooked facts of substance or value
and insulting to our women, coming which, if considered, might affect the result of the
as they do from a foreigner who has case. 15
been enjoying the hospitality of our
Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both
people and taking advantage of the
the appellate and trial courts had overlooked any fact
opportunity to study in one of our
of substance or value which could alter the result of the
institutions of learning, defendant-
case.
appellant should indeed be made,
under Art. 21 of the Civil Code of the Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law
Philippines, to compensate for the may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari
moral damages and injury that he under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is not the
had caused plaintiff, as the lower function of this Court to analyze or weigh all over again
court ordered him to do in its decision the evidence introduced by the parties before the lower
in this case." 12 court. There are, however, recognized exceptions to
this rule. Thus, in Medina vs. Asistio, Jr., 16 this Court
Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the
took the time, again, to enumerate these exceptions:
instant petition on 26 March 1991; he raises therein the
single issue of whether or not Article 21 of the Civil xxx xxx xxx
Code applies to the case at bar. 13
"(1) When the conclusion is a finding
It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not grounded entirely on speculation,
applicable because he had not committed any moral surmises or conjectures (Joaquin v.
wrong or injury or violated any good custom or public Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2)
policy; he has not professed love or proposed marriage When the inference made is
to the private respondent; and he has never maltreated manifestly mistaken, absurd or
her. He criticizes the trial court for liberally invoking impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil.
Filipino customs, traditions and culture, and ignoring 15 [1942]); (3) Where there is a grave
the fact that since he is a foreigner, he is not abuse of discretion (Buyco v. People,
conversant with such Filipino customs, traditions and 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the
culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar with judgment is based on a
Catholic and Christian ways. He stresses that even if he misapprehension of facts (Cruz v.
had made a promise to marry, the subsequent failure Sosing, L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5)
to fulfill the same is excusable or tolerable because of When the findings of fact are
his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, L-
Code which purportedly allows a Muslim to take four (4) 9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.) (6) When
wives and concludes that on the basis thereof, the trial the Court of Appeals, in making its
court erred in ruling that he does not possess good findings, went beyond the issues of

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 the case and the same is contrary to have actually suffered material and
the admissions of both appellant and moral injury, the Commission has
appellee (Evangelista v. Alto Surety deemed it necessary, in the interest
and Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401 of justice, to incorporate in the
[1958]); (7) The findings of the Court proposed Civil Code the following
of Appeals are contrary to those of rule: LLpr
the trial court (Garcia v. Court of
Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay 'ARTICLE 23. Any
v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 person who wilfully causes
[1986]); (8) When the findings of fact loss or injury to another in a
are conclusions without citation of manner that is contrary to
specific evidence on which they are morals, good customs or
based (Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set public policy shall
forth in the petition as well as in the compensate the latter for the
petitioners' main and reply briefs are damage.'
not disputed by the respondents 'An example will illustrate the purview
(Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of of the foregoing norm: 'A' seduces
the Court of Appeals is premised on the nineteen-year old daughter of 'X.'
the supposed absence of evidence A promise of marriage either has not
and is contradicted by the evidence been made, or can not be proved.
on record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 The girl becomes pregnant. Under the
SCRA 242 [1970])." present laws, there is no crime, as
Petitioner has not endeavored to point out to Us the the girl is above eighteen years of
existence of any of the above quoted exceptions in this age. Neither can any civil action for
case. Consequently, the factual findings of the trial and breach of promise of marriage be
appellate courts must be respected. filed. Therefore, though the grievous
moral wrong has been committed,
And now to the legal issue. and though the girl and her family
have suffered incalculable moral
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to damage, she and her parents cannot
marry per se is not an actionable wrong. 17 Congress bring any action for damages. But
deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil under the proposed article, she and
Code the provisions that would have made it so. The her parents would have such a right
reason therefor is set forth in the report of the Senate of action.
Committee on the Proposed Civil Code, from which We
quote: Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if
the foregoing rule is approved, would
"The elimination of this chapter is vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for
proposed. That breach of promise to that untold number of moral wrongs
marry is not actionable has been which it is impossible for human
definitely decided in the case of De foresight to provide for specifically in
Jesus vs. Syquia. 18 The history of the statutes." 21
breach of promise suits in the United
States and in England has shown that Article 2176, of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-
no other action lends itself more delict thus:
readily to abuse by designing women
and unscrupulous men. It is this "Whoever by act or omission causes
experience which has led to the damage to another, there being fault
abolition of rights of action in the so- or negligence, is obliged to pay for
called Heart Balm suits in many of the the damage done. Such fault or
American states .." 19 negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the governed by the provisions of this
concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by Chapter."
granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number
of moral wrongs which is impossible for human  
foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the
statute books. 20 is limited to negligent acts or omissions and
excludes the notion of willfulness or intent. Quasi-
As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report: delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa
"'But the Code Commission has gone aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an
farther than the sphere of wrongs Anglo-American or common law concept. Torts is
defined or determined by positive much broader than culpa aquiliana because it
law. Fully sensible that there are includes not only negligence, but intentional
countless gaps in the statutes, which criminal acts as well such as assault and battery,
leave so many victims of moral false imprisonment and deceit. In the general
wrongs helpless, even though they scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned

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 by the Commission responsible for drafting the New insurance agent are supposed to be
Civil Code, intentional and malicious acts. with — when she became intimate with
certain exceptions, are to. be governed by the petitioner, then a mere apprentice
Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or pilot, but, also, because the court of
omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the first instance found that, complainant
Civil Code. 22 In between these opposite spectrums 'surrendered herself' to petitioner
are injurious acts which, in the absence of Article because, 'overwhelmed by her love'
21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article for him, she 'wanted to bind' him 'by
21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated that having a fruit of their engagement
together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, even before they had the benefit of
Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope of the clergy.'"
law on civil wrongs; it has become much more
supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 26 while this Court
on torts. 23 likewise hinted at possible recovery if there had been
moral seduction, recovery was eventually denied
because We were not convinced that such seduction
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, existed. The following enlightening disquisition and
We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a man's conclusion were made in the said case:
promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the
acceptance of his love by a woman and his "The Court of Appeals seems to have
representation to fulfill that promise thereafter overlooked that the example set forth
becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself in the Code Commission's
unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in memorandum refers to a tort upon a
reality, no intention of marrying her and that the minor who had been seduced. The
promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device essential feature is seduction, that in
to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her law is more than mere sexual
consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of intercourse, or a breach of a promise
damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such of marriage; it connotes essentially
promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit the idea of deceit, enticement,
behind it and the willful injury to her honor and superior power or abuse of
reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, confidence on the part of the seducer
however, that such injury should have been committed to which the woman has yielded (U.S.
in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S.
policy. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was It has been ruled in the Buenaventura
the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations case (supra) that —
of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her
surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live 'To constitute
with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would seduction there must in all
keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and cases be some sufficient
deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's promise or inducement and
parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him the woman must yield
preparatory to their supposed marriage." 24 In short, because of the promise or
the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the other inducement. If she
cherished possession of every single Filipina, not consents merely from carnal
because of lust but because of moral seduction — the lust and the intercourse is
kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its example from mutual desire, there is
earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not be held no seduction (43 Cent Dig. tit.
liable for criminal seduction punished under either Seduction, par. 56). She must
Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code be induced to depart from the
because the private respondent was above eighteen path of virtue by the use of
(18) years of age at the time of the seduction. some species of arts,
persuasions and wiles, which
Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article are calculated to have and do
21 may be applied-in a breach of promise to marry have that effect, and which
where the woman is a victim of moral seduction. Thus, result in her ultimately
in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, 25 this Court submitting her person to the
denied recovery of damages to the woman sexual embraces of her
because: LibLex seducer' (27 Phil. 123).
" . . . we find ourselves unable to say And in American Jurisprudence we
that petitioner is morally guilty of find:
seduction, not only because he is
approximately ten (10) years younger 'On the other hand, in
than the complainant — who was an action by the woman, the
around thirty-six (36) years of age, enticement, persuasion or
and as highly enlightened as a former deception is the essence of
high school teacher and a life the injury; and a mere proof

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 of intercourse is insufficient to knowledge, there is a chance that
warrant a recovery. there was criminal or moral
seduction, hence recovery of moral
Accordingly it is not damages will prosper. If it be the
seduction where the other way around, there can be no
willingness arises out sexual recovery of moral damages, because
desire or curiosity of the here mutual lust has
female, and the defendant intervened). . . . ."
merely affords her the
needed opportunity for the
commission of the act. It has together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be
been emphasized that to any, such as the expenses for the wedding
allow a recovery in all such preparations (See Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil.
cases would tend to the 471)." LLpr
demoralization of the female
sex, and would be a reward Senator Arturo M. Tolentino 29 is also of the same
for unchastity by; which a persuasion:
class of adventuresses would
be swift to profit.' (47 Am. Jur. "It is submitted that the rule
662). in Batarra vs. Marcos 30 still subsists,
notwithstanding the incorporation of
xxx xxx xxx the present article 31 in the Code.
The example given by the Code
Over and above the partisan Commission is correct, if there was
allegations, the facts stand out that seduction, not necessarily in the legal
for one whole year, from 1958 to sense, but in the vulgar sense of
1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman deception. But when the sexual act is
of adult age, maintained intimate accomplished without any deceit or
sexual relations with appellant, with qualifying circumstance of abuse of
repeated acts of intercourse. Such authority or influence, but the
conduct is incompatible with the idea woman, already of age, has
of seduction. Plainly there is here knowingly given herself to a man, it
voluntariness and mutual passion; for cannot be said that there is an injury
had the appellant been deceived, had which can be the basis for indemnity.
she surrendered exclusively because
of the deceit, artful persuasions and But so long as there is fraud, which is
wiles of the defendant, she would not characterized by wilfullness (sic), the
have again yielded to his embraces, action lies. The court, however, must
much less for one year, without weigh the degree of fraud, if it is
exacting early fulfillment of the sufficient to deceive the woman
alleged promises of marriage, and under the circumstances, because an
would have cut short all sexual act which would deceive a girl sixteen
relations upon finding that defendant years of age may not constitute
did not intend to fulfill his promise. deceit as to an experienced woman
Hence, we conclude that no case is thirty years of age. But so long as
made under Article 21 of the Civil there is a wrongful act and a resulting
Code, and no other cause of action injury, there should be civil liability,
being alleged, no error was even if the act is not punishable
committed by the Court of First under the criminal law and there
Instance in dismissing the should have been an acquittal or
complaint." 27 dismissal of the criminal case for that
reason."
In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate
Justice Edgardo L. Paras, who recently retired from this We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative
Court, opined that in a breach of promise to marry proposition to the effect that granting, for argument's
where there had been carnal knowledge, moral sake, that he did promise to marry the private
damages may be recovered: respondent, the latter is nevertheless also at fault.
According to him, both parties are in pari delicto;
" . . . if there be criminal or moral hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the Civil Code and
seduction, but not if the intercourse the doctrine laid down in Batarra vs. Marcos, 32 the
was due to mutual lust. (Hermosisima private respondent cannot recover damages from the
vs. Court of Appeals, L-14628, Sept. petitioner. The latter even goes as far as stating that if
30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L- the private respondent had "sustained any injury or
14733, Sept. 30, 1960; Batarra vs. damage in their relationship, it is primarily because of
Marcos, 7 Phil. 56 (sic); Beatriz her own doing," 33 for:
Galang vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-
17248, Jan. 29, 1962). (In other  
words, if the CAUSE be the promise to
marry, and the EFFECT be the carnal

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 " . . . She is also interested in the In Mangayao vs. Lasud, 37 We declared:
petitioner as the latter will become a
doctor sooner or later. Take notice "Appellants likewise stress that both
that she is a plain high school parties being at fault, there should be
graduate and a mere employee . . no action by one against the other
(Annex C ) or a waitress (TSN, p. 51, (Art. 1412, New Civil Code). This rule,
January 25, 1988) in a luncheonette however, has been interpreted as
and without doubt, is in need of a applicable only where the fault on
man who can give her economic both sides is, more or less,
security. Her family is in dire need of equivalent. It does not apply where
financial assistance (TSN, pp. 51-53, one party is literate or intelligent and
May 18, 1988). And this predicament the other one is not (c.f. Bough vs.
prompted her to accept a proposition Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209)."
that may have been offered by the We should stress, however, that while We find for the
petitioner." 34 private respondent, let it not be said that this Court
These statements reveal the true character and motive condones the deplorable behavior of her parents in
of the petitioner. It is clear that he harbors a letting her and the petitioner stay together in the same
condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the private room in their house after giving approval to their
respondent on account of the latter's ignoble birth, marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents to protect the
inferior educational background, poverty and, as honor of their daughters and infuse upon them the
perceived by him, dishonorable employment. Obviously higher values of morality and dignity.
then, from the very beginning, he was not at all moved WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the
by good faith and an honest motive. Marrying with a challenged decision, the instant petition is hereby
woman so circumstanced could not have even remotely DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. cdll
occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and
promise to marry were empty words directly intended SO ORDERED.
to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor
woman into believing that indeed, he loved her and Feliciano, J ., Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ ., concur.
would want her to be his life partner. His was nothing
Gutierrez, Jr., J ., is on terminal leave.
but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina
who honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of ||| (Gashem Shookat Baksh v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
love and proposal of marriage, she would be able to No. 97336, [February 19, 1993])
enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly
violated the Filipino's concept of morality and so
brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for
their women. It can even be said that the petitioner
committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of
Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person
to act with justice, give everyone his due and observe
honesty and good faith in the exercise of his rights and
in the performance of his obligations.

No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our

laws, customs and traditions.
The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for
while indeed, the private respondent may not have
been impelled by the purest of intentions, she
eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual
congress not out of lust, but because of moral
seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of
conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she
found out that the petitioner was not going to marry
her after all, she left him. She is not, therefore, in pari
delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal
fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in
legal fault." 35 At most, it could be conceded that she
is merely in delicto. cdphil

"Equity often interferes for the relief

of the less guilty of the parties, where
his transgression has been brought
about by the imposition or undue
influence of the party on whom the
burden of the original wrong
principally rests, or where his consent
to the transaction was itself procured
by fraud." 36

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Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils Inc vs CA GR No 110295 likewise be liable for quasi-delict under Article 2176
October 18 1993 of the Civil Code, and an action based thereon may
be brought by the vendee. While it may be true
that the pre-existing contract between the parties
FIRST DIVISION may, as a general rule, bar the applicability of the
law on quasi-delict, the liability may itself be
deemed to arise from quasi-delict, i.e., the act
[G.R. No. 110295. October 18, 1993.] which breaks the contract may also be a quasi-
delict. Thus, in Singson vs. Bank of the Philippine
Islands, (23 SCRA 1117 [1968]) this Court stated:
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS "We have repeatedly held, however, that the
PHILIPPINES, existence of a contract between the parties does
INC., petitioner, vs. THE not bar the commission of a tort by the one against
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS the other and the consequent recovery of damages
(Fifth Division) and MS. LYDIA therefor. Indeed, this view has been, in effect,
GERONIMO, respondents. reiterated in a comparatively recent case. Thus, in
Air France vs. Carrascoso, involving an airplane
passenger who, despite his first-class ticket, had
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz been illegally ousted from his first-class
Law Offices for petitioner. accommodation and compelled to take a seat in the
Alejandro M. Villamil for private respondent. tourist compartment, was held entitled to recover
damages from the air-carrier, upon the ground or
tort on the latter's part, for, although the relation
between the passenger and a carrier is 'contractual
SYLLABUS both in origin and nature . . . the act that breaks the
contract may also be a tort.'" Otherwise put,
1. CIVIL LAW; PRESCRIPTION OF ACTIONS; liability for quasi-delict may still exist despite the
RULE IN CAUSE OF ACTION FOUNDED ON QUASI- presence of contractual relations.
DELICT. — The public respondent's conclusion that 4. ID.; ID.; BASIS OF LIABILITIES OF
the cause of action in Civil Case No. D-9629 is MANUFACTURER OR SELLER OF INJURY-CAUSING
founded on quasi-delict and that, therefore, PRODUCTS; RULE. — Under American law, the
pursuant to Article 1146 of the Civil Code, it liabilities of the manufacturer or seller of injury-
prescribes in four (4) years is supported by the causing products may be based on negligence,
allegations in the complaint, more particularly breach of warranty, tort, or other grounds such as
paragraph 12 thereof, which makes reference to fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. Quasi-delict, as
the reckless and negligent manufacture of defined in Article 2176 of the Civil Code, (which is
"adulterated food items intended to be sold for known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana,
public consumption." culpa extra-contractual or cuasi-delitos) is
2. ID.; SPECIAL CONTRACTS; SALE; homologous but not identical to tort under the
WARRANTY AGAINST HIDDEN DEFECTS; REMEDIES common law, which includes not only negligence,
OF VENDEE IN RESPECT THERETO. — The vendee's but also intentional criminal acts, such as assault
remedies against a vendor with respect to the and battery, false imprisonment, and deceit.
warranties against hidden defects of or
encumbrances upon the thing sold are not limited
to those prescribed in Article 1567 of the Civil Code
which provides: "Art. 1567. In the case of Articles DECISION
1561, 1562, 1564, 1565 and 1566, the vendee may
elect between withdrawing from the contract and
demanding a proportionate reduction of the price,
with damages in either case." The vendee may also DAVIDE, JR., J p:
ask for the annulment of the contract upon proof of
error or fraud, in which case the ordinary rule on This case concerns the proprietress of a
obligations shall be applicable. Under the law on school canteen which had to close down as a
obligations, responsibility arising from fraud is consequence of the big drop in its sales of soft
demandable in all obligations and any waiver of an drinks triggered by the discovery of foreign
action for future fraud is void. Responsibility arising substances in certain beverages sold by it. The
from negligence is also demandable in any interesting issue posed is whether the subsequent
obligation, but such liability may be regulated by action for damages by the proprietress against the
the courts, according to the circumstances. Those soft drinks manufacturer should be treated as one
guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay in the for breach of implied warranty against hidden
performance of their obligations and those who in defects or merchantability, as claimed by the
any manner contravene the tenor thereof are liable manufacturer, the petitioner herein, which must
for damages. therefore be filed within six months from the
delivery of the thing sold pursuant to Article 1571
3. ID.; QUASI-DELICT; LIABILITY THERETO of the Civil Code, or one for quasi-delict, as held by
MAY STILL EXIST DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF the public respondent, which can be filed within
CONTRACTUAL RELATION. — The vendor could

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four years pursuant to Article 1146 of the same thus, on the basis of Article 1571, in relation to
Code. prLL Article 1562, the complaint should have been filed
within six months from the delivery of the thing
On 7 May 1990, Lydia L. Geronimo, the sold.
herein private respondent, filed a complaint for
damages against petitioner with the Regional Trial Her motion for the reconsideration of the
Court (RTC) of Dagupan City. 1 The case was order having been denied by the trial court in its
docketed as Civil Case No. D-9629. She alleges in Order of 17 April 1991, 7 the private respondent
her complaint that she was the proprietress of came to this Court via a petition for review
Kindergarten Wonderland Canteen located in on certiorari which we referred to the public
Dagupan City, an enterprise engaged in the sale of respondent "for proper determination and
soft drinks (including Coke and Sprite) and other disposition." 8 The public respondent docketed the
goods to the students of Kindergarten Wonderland case as CA-G.R. SP No. 25391.
and to the public; on or about 12 August 1989,
In a decision promulgated on 28 January
some parents of the students complained to her
1992, 9 the public respondent annulled the
that the Coke and Sprite soft drinks sold by her
questioned orders of the RTC and directed it to
contained fiber-like matter and other foreign
conduct further proceedings in Civil Case No. D-
substances or particles; she then went over her
9629. In holding for the private respondent, it ruled
stock of soft drinks and discovered the presence of
that:
some fiber-like substances in the contents of some
unopened Coke bottles and a plastic matter in the "Petitioner's complaint being
contents of an unopened Sprite bottle; she brought one for quasi-delict, and not for
the said bottles to the Regional Health Office of the breach of warranty as respondent
Department of Health at San Fernando, La Union, contends, the applicable prescriptive
for examination; subsequently, she received a period is four years.
letter from the Department of Health informing her
that the samples she submitted "are adulterated;" It should be stressed that the
as a consequence of the discovery of the foreign allegations in the complaint plainly
substances in the beverages, her sales of soft show that it is an action for damages
drinks severely plummeted from the usual 10 cases arising from respondent's act of
per day to as low as 2 to 3 cases per day resulting 'recklessly and negligently
in losses of from P200.00 to P300.00 per day, and manufacturing adulterated food items
not long after that she had to close shop on 12 intended to be sold for public
December 1989; she became jobless and destitute; consumption' (p. 25, rollo). It is a
she demanded from the petitioner the payment of truism in legal procedure that what
damages but was rebuffed by it. She prayed for determines the nature of an action
judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her are the facts alleged in the complaint
P5,000.00 as actual damages, P72,000.00 as and not those averred as a defense in
compensatory damages, P500,000.00 as moral the defendant's answer (I Moran 126;
damages, P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, the Calo v. Roldan, 76 Phil. 445; Alger
amount equal to 30% of the damages awarded as Electric, Inc. v. CA, 135 SCRA 340).
attorney's fees, and the costs. 2
Secondly, despite the literal
The petitioner moved to dismiss 3 the wording of Article 2176 of the Civil
complaint on the grounds of failure to exhaust Code, the existence of contractual
administrative remedies and prescription. Anent relations between the parties does
the latter ground, the petitioner argued that since not absolutely preclude an action by
the complaint is for breach of warranty under one against the other for quasi-delict
Article 1561 of the Civil Code, it should have been arising from negligence in the
brought within six months from the delivery of the performance of a contract.
goods pursuant Article 1571 of the said Code. In
her Comment 4 thereto, private respondent alleged In Singson v. Court of
that the complaint is one for damages which does Appeals (23 SCRA 1117), the
not involve an administrative action and that her Supreme Court ruled:
cause of action is based on an injury to plaintiff's 'It has been
right which can be brought within four years repeatedly held: that the
pursuant to Article 1146 of the Civil Code; hence, existence of a contract
the complaint was seasonably filed. Subsequent between the parties does not
related pleadings were thereafter filed by the bar the commission of a tort
parties. 5 by the one against the other
In its Order of 23 January 1991, 6 the trial and the consequent recovery
court granted the motion to dismiss. It ruled that of damages therefor . . . Thus
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative in Air France vs.
remedies does not apply as the existing Carrascoso, . . . (it was held
administrative remedy is not adequate. It also that) although the relation
stated that the complaint is based on a contract, between a passenger and a
and not on quasi-delict, as there exists a pre- carrier is "contractual both in
existing contractual relation between the parties; origin and nature the act that

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 breaks the contract may also rescission nor for proportionate reduction of the
be a tort.' price, but for damages arising from a quasi-delict
and that the public respondent was correct in ruling
Significantly, in American that the existence of a contract did not preclude
jurisprudence, from which Our law on the action for quasi-delict. As to the issue of
Sales was taken, the authorities are prescription, the private respondent insists that
one in saying that the availability of since her cause of action is based on a quasi-delict,
an action for breach of warranty does the prescriptive period therefor is four (4) years in
not bar an action for torts in a sale of accordance with Article 1144 of the Civil Code and
defective goods." 10 thus the filing of the complaint was well within the
said period. prLL
Its motion for the reconsideration of the
decision having been denied by the public We find no merit in the petition. The public
respondent in its Resolution of 14 May 1993, 11 the respondent's conclusion that the cause of action in
petitioner took this recourse under Rule 45 of the Civil Case No. D-9629 is founded on quasi-delict
Revised Rules of Court. It alleges in its petition that: and that, therefore, pursuant to Article 1146 of the
Civil Code, it prescribes in four (4) years is
"I supported by the allegations in the complaint, more
particularly paragraph 12 thereof, which makes
reference to the reckless and negligent
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
manufacture of "adulterated food items intended to
COMMITTED A GRAVE AND
be sold for public consumption."
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT
ARTICLE 2176, THE GENERAL The vendee's remedies against a vendor
PROVISION ON QUASI-DELICTS, IS with respect to the warranties against hidden
APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE WHEN THE defects of or encumbrances upon the thing sold are
ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT not limited to those prescribed in Article 1567 of
CLEARLY SHOW THAT PRIVATE the Civil Code which provides:
RESPONDENT'S CAUSE OF ACTION IS
BASED ON BREACH OF A SELLER'S "ART. 1567. In the case of
IMPLIED WARRANTIES UNDER OUR Articles 1561, 1562, 1564, 1565 and
LAW ON SALES. 1566, the vendee may elect between
withdrawing from the contract and
demanding a proportionate reduction
II of the price, with damages in either
case." 13
COROLLARILY, THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A The vendee may also ask for the annulment of the
GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN contract upon proof of error or fraud, in which case
OVERRULING PETITIONER'S the ordinary rule on obligations shall be
ARGUMENT THAT PRIVATE applicable. 14 Under the law on obligations,
RESPONDENT'S CAUSE OF ACTION responsibility arising from fraud is demandable in
HAD PRESCRIBED UNDER ARTICLE all obligations and any waiver of an action for
1571 OF THE CIVIL CODE." 12 future fraud is void. Responsibility arising from
negligence is also demandable in any obligation,
The petitioner insists that a cursory reading but such liability may be regulated by the courts,
of the complaint will reveal that the primary legal according to the circumstances. 15 Those guilty of
basis for private respondent's cause of action is not fraud, negligence, or delay in the performance of
Article 2176 of the Civil Code on quasi-delict — for their obligations and those who in any manner
the complaint does not ascribe any tortious or contravene the tenor thereof are liable for
wrongful conduct on its part — but Articles 1561 damages. 16
and 1562 thereof on breach of a seller's implied
warranties under the law on sales. It contends that The vendor could likewise be liable for
the existence of a contractual relation between the quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
parties (arising from the contract of sale) bars the and an action based thereon may be brought by
application of the law on quasi-delicts and that the vendee. While it may be true that the pre-
since private respondent's cause of action arose existing contract between the parties may, as a
from the breach of implied warranties, the general rule, bar the applicability of the law on
complaint should have been filed within six months quasi-delict, the liability may itself be deemed to
from delivery of the soft drinks pursuant to Article arise from quasi-delict, i.e., the act which breaks
1571 of the Civil Code. prcd the contract may also be a quasi-delict. Thus,
In her Comment the private respondent in Singson vs. Bank of the Philippine Islands, 17 this
argues that in case of breach of the seller's implied Court stated:
warranties, the vendee may, under Article 1567 of "We have repeatedly held,
the Civil Code, elect between withdrawing from the however, that the existence of a
contract or demanding a proportionate reduction of contract between the parties does not
the price, with damages in either case. She asserts bar the commission of a tort by the
that Civil Case No. D-9629 is neither an action for one against the other and the

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 consequent recovery of damages
therefor. 18 Indeed, this view has
been, in effect, reiterated in a
comparatively recent case. Thus, in
Air France vs.
Carrascoso, 19 involving an airplane
passenger who, despite his first-class
ticket, had been illegally ousted from
his first-class accommodation and
compelled to take a seat in the tourist
compartment, was held entitled to
recover damages from the air-carrier,
upon the ground of tort on the latter's
part, for, although the relation
between the passenger and a carrier
is 'contractual both in origin and
nature . . . the act that breaks the
contract may also be a tort.' "

Otherwise put, liability for quasi-delict may

still exist despite the presence of contractual
relations. 20
Under American law, the liabilities of the
manufacturer or seller of injury-causing products
may be based on negligence, 21 breach of
warranty, 22 tort, 23 or other grounds such as
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. 24 Quasi-delict,
as defined in Article 2176 of the Civil Code, (which
is known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa
aquiliana, culpa extra-contractual or cuasi-
delitos) 25 is homologous but not identical
to tort under the common law, 26 which includes
not only negligence, but also intentional criminal
acts, such as assault and battery, false
imprisonment, and deceit. 27
It must be made clear that our affirmance
of the decision of the public respondent should by
no means be understood as suggesting that the
private respondent's claims for moral damages
have sufficient factual and legal basis.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the
instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit,
with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Bellosillo and Quiason, JJ ., concur.
Griño-Aquino, J ., is on leave.
||| (Coca-Cola Bottlers Phil., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 110295, [October 18, 1993], 298 PHIL 52-62)

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Navida vs Dizon GR No 125078 May 30 2011 CORTES, NOEL Y. CORTEZ,
SERNUE CREDO, CORNELIO A.
CRESENCIO, ALEX CRUZ, ROGER
FIRST DIVISION CRUZ, RANSAM CRUZ, CANUTO M.
DADULA, ROMEO L. DALDE,
ZACARIAS DAMBAAN, ELISEO
[G.R. No. 125078. May 30, 2011.] DAPROZA, VIRGILIO P. DAWAL,
TESIFREDO I. DE TOMAS,
GAMALLER P. DEANG,
BERNABE L. NAVIDA, JOSE P. CARMELINO P. DEANG, DIOSDADO
ABANGAN, JR., CEFERINO P. P. DEANG, DOMINGO A. DEANG,
ABARQUEZ, ORLANDITO A. FELIPE R. DEANG, JR., JULIETO S.
ABISON, FELIPE ADAYA, ALBERTO DELA CRUZ, ELIEZER R. DELA
R. AFRICA, BENJAMIN M. ALBAO, TORRE, JEFFREY R. DELA TORRE,
FELIPE ALCANTARA, NUMERIANO RAUL DEMONTEVERDE, FELIPE P.
S. ALCARIA, FERNANDO C. DENOLAN, RUBENCIO P. DENOY,
ALEJADO, LEOPOLDO N. RODRIGO M. DERMIL, ROLANDO
ALFONSO, FLORO I. ALMODIEL, B. DIAZ, LORENZO DIEGO,
ANTONIO B. ALVARADO, ELEANOR JOVENCIO DIEGO, SATURNINO
AMOLATA, RODOLFO P. DIEGO, GREGORIO DIONG,
ANCORDA, TRIFINO F. ANDRADA, AMADO R. DIZON, FE DIZON,
BERT B. ANOCHE, RAMON E. VIRGILO M. DOMANTAY, LEO S.
ANTECRISTO, ISAGANI D. ANTINO, DONATO, DOMINADOR L.
DOMINGO ANTOPINA, MANSUETO DOSADO, NESTOR DUMALAG,
M. APARICIO, HERMINIGILDO FREDDIE DURAN, SR., MARIO C.
AQUINO, MARCELO S. AQUINO, ECHIVERE, AQUILLO M.
JR., FELIPE P. ARANIA, ULYSES M. EMBRADORA, MIGUEL EMNACE,
ARAS, ARSENIO ARCE, RUPERTO RIO T. EMPAS, EFRAIM ENGLIS,
G. ARINZOL, MIGUEL G. ARINZOL, ANICETO ENOPIA, DIOCENE
EDGARADO P. ARONG, RODRIGO ENTECOSA, RUBENTITO D.
D.R. ASTRALABIO, RONNIE ENTECOSA, AVELINO C. ENTERO,
BACAYO, SOFRONIO BALINGIT, FORTUNATA ENTRADA, ROGELIO
NELSON M. BALLENA, EMNIANO P. EROY, RODOLFO M.
BALMONTE, MAXIMO M. BANGI, ESCAMILLA, SERGIO C.
SALVADOR M. BANGI, ESCANTILLA, LAZARO A.
HERMOGENES T. BARBECHO, ESPAÑOLA, EULOGIO M. ETURMA,
ARSENIO B. BARBERO, DIOSDADO PRIMO P. FERNANDEZ,
BARREDO, VIRGILIO BASAS, EDILBERTO D. FERNANDO,
ALEJANDRO G. BATULAN, GREGORIO S. FERNANDO,
DOMINGO A. BAUTISTA, VICTOR VICENTE P. FERRER, MARCELO T.
BAYANI, BENIGNO BESARES, FLOR, ANTONIO M. FLORES,
RUFINO BETITO, GERARDO A. REDENTOR T. FLOREZA,
BONIAO, CARLO B. BUBUNGAN, NORBERTO J. FUENTES, RICARDO
FERNANDO B. BUENAVISTA, C. GABUTAN, PEDRO D.V.
ALEJANDRINO H. BUENO, TOMAS GALEOS, ARNULFO F. GALEOS,
P. BUENO, LEONARDO M. EDGARDO V. GARCESA,
BURDEOS, VICENTE P. BURGOS, BERNARDO P. GENTOBA,
MARCELINO J. CABALUNA, EDUARDO P. GENTOBA, VICTORIO
DIOSDADO CABILING, EMETRIO C. B. GIDO, ROLANDO V. GIMENA,
CACHUELA, BRAULIO B. EARLWIN L. GINGOYO, ERNESTO
CADIVIDA, JR., SAMSON C. CAEL, GOLEZ, JUANITO G. GONZAGA,
DANIEL B. CAJURAO, REY A. ONOFRE GONZALES, AMADO J.
CALISO, NORBERTO F. GUMERE, LEONARDO M. GUSTO,
CALUMPAG, CELESTINO ALEJANDRO G. HALILI, NOEL H.
CALUMPAG, LORETO CAMACHO, HERCEDA, EMILIO V. HERMONDO,
VICTORIANO CANETE, CLAUDIO HIPOLITO, TORIBIO S.
DOMINADOR P. CANTILLO, ILLUSORIO, TEODURO G. IMPANG,
FRUCTUSO P. CARBAJOSA, JR., GIL A. JALBUNA, HERMIE L.
VICTORINO S. CARLOS, VICTOR JALICO, ARMANDO B. JAMERLAN,
CARLOS, GEORGE M. CASSION, NARCISO JAPAY, LIBURO C.
JAIME S. CASTAÑARES, FLAVIANO JAVINAS, ALEJANDRO S. JIMENEZ,
C. CASTAÑARES, ELPIDIO FEDERICO T. JUCAR, NAPOLEON T.
CATUBAY, NATHANIEL B. JUMALON, OSCAR JUNSAY,
CAUSANG, BEOFIL B. CAUSING, ANASTACIO D. LABANA, CARLOS
ADRIANO R. CEJAS, CIRILO G. C. LABAY, AVELINO L.
CERERA, SR., CRISTITUTO M. LAFORTEZA, LOE LAGUMBAY,
CEREZO, DANTE V. CONCHA, NORBETO D. LAMPERNIS,
ALBERT CORNELIO, CESAR ROLANDO J. LAS PEÑAS, ISMAEL

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LASDOCE, RENOLO L. LEBRILLA, ROMAN G. SALIGONAN,
CAMILO G. LEDRES, ANASTACIO VICTORINO SALOMON, GENEROSO
LLANOS, ARMANDO A. LLIDO, J. SALONGKONG, RODOLFO E.
CARLITO LOPEZ, ARISTON LOS SALVANI, JIMMY A. SAMELIN,
BAÑEZ, CONCISO L. LOVITOS, EDUARDO A. SAMELIN, ANDRES
ARQUILLANO M. LOZADA, A. SAMELIN, GEORGE SAMELIN,
RODOLFO C. LUMAKIN, PRIMITIVO ROMEO A. SARAOSOS, RUDIGELIO
LUNTAO, JR., EMILIO S. MABASA, S. SARMIENTO, CIRILO SAYAANG,
JR., JUANITO A. MACALISANG, JARLO SAYSON, LEONCIO
TEOTIMO L. MADULIN, JOSEPH D. SERDONCILLO, RODOLFO C.
MAGALLON, PEDRO P. SERRANO, NESTOR G. SEVILLA,
MAGLASANG, MARIO G. SIMEON F. SIMBA, CATALINO S.
MALAGAMBA, JAIME B. SIMTIM, SERAFIN T.
MAMARADLO, PANFILO A. SINSUANGCO, EDUARDO A. SOLA,
MANADA, SR., RICARDO S. VICTORINO M. SOLOMON, JAIME
MANDANI, CONCHITA MANDANI, B. SUFICIENCIA, LYNDON
ALBERTO T. MANGGA, ALEJANDRO SUMAJIT, ALFREDO P. SUMAJIT,
A. MANSANES, RUFINO T. ALFREDO L. SUMAJIT, PEDRO A.
MANSANES, EUTIQUIO P. SUMARAGO, ERNESTO SUMILE,
MANSANES, ALCIO P. MARATAS, NESTOR S. SUMOG-OY, MANUEL
AGAPITO D. MARQUEZ, RICARDO T. SUPAS, WILFREDO A.
R. MASIGLAT, DENDERIA TABAQUE, CONSTANCIO L.
MATABANG, ARNELO N. TACULAD, EUFROCINO A.
MATILLANO, HERNANI C. TAGOTO, JR., SERAPIO TAHITIT,
MEJORADA, ROSITA MENDOZA, PANTALEON T. TAMASE, ERNESTO
GREGORIO R. MESA, RENATO N. TARRE, MAGNO E. TATOY,
MILLADO, ANTONIO L. MOCORRO, AVELINO TAYAPAD, SAMUEL S.
ALBERTO M. MOLINA, JR., TERRADO, APOLINARIO B. TICO,
DOMINGO P. MONDIA, JUANITO P. ORLANDO TINACO, ALBERT G.
MONDIA, RICARDO MONTAÑO, TINAY, ANTONIO TOLEDO,
RAUL T. MONTEJO, ROGELIO ANTONIO M. TORREGOSA,
MUNAR, RODOLFO E. MUÑEZ, ISABELO TORRES, JIMMY C.
CRESENCIO NARCISO, PANFILO C. TORRIBIO, EDUARDO Y. TUCLAOD,
NARCISO, BRICS P. NECOR, JACINTO UDAL, RICARDO M.
MOISES P. NICOLAS, NEMESIO G. URBANO, ERNESTO G. VAFLOR,
NICOLAS, ALFREDO NOFIEL, FELIX FILOMENO E. VALENZUELA,
T. NOVENA, MARCELO P. OBTIAL, SALORIANO VELASCO, RODOLFO
SR., TEODORO B. OCRETO, VIDAL, WALTER VILLAFAÑE,
BIBIANO C. ODI, ALFREDO M. DANTE VILLALVA, PERIGRINO P.
OPERIO, TEOTISTO B. OPON, IZRO VILLARAN, JESUS L. VILLARBA,
M. ORACION, ALAN E. ORANAS, ELEAZAR D. VILLARBA, JENNY T.
ELPEDIO T. OSIAS, ERNESTO M. VILLAVA, HENRY C. VILLEGAS,
PABIONA, NARCISO J. PADILLA, DELFIN C. WALOG, RODOLFO
NELSON G. PADIOS, SR., YAMBAO, EDGAR A. YARE,
FRNACISCO G. PAGUNTALAN, MANSUETO M. YBERA, EDUARDO
RENE B. PALENCIA, MICHAEL P. G. YUMANG, HENRY R. YUNGOT,
PALOMAR, VIRGILIO E. ROMEO P. YUSON, ARSENIA
PANILAGAO, NOLITO C. PANULIN, ZABALA, FELIX N. ZABALA and
ROMEO PARAGUAS, NESTOR B. GRACIANO
PASTERA, VICENTE Q. PEDAZO, ZAMORA, petitioners, vs. HON.
EDGAR M. PEÑARANDA, TEODORO A. DIZON, JR.,
ILUMINIDO B. PERACULLO, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
ANTONIO C. PEREZ, DOMINGO Court, Branch 37, General Santos
PEREZ, OSCAR C. PLEÑOS, City, SHELL OIL CO., DOW
ANTONIETO POLANCOS, SERAFIN CHEMICAL CO., OCCIDENTAL
G. PRIETO, ZENAIDA PROVIDO, CHEMICAL CORP., STANDARD
FERNANDO Y. PROVIDO, ERNESTO FRUIT CO., STANDARD FRUIT &
QUERO, ELEAZAR QUIJARDO, STEAMSHIP CO., DOLE FOOD CO.,
WILLIAM U. QUINTOY, LAURO INC., DOLE FRESH FRUIT CO., DEL
QUISTADIO, ROGELIO RABADON, MONTE FRESH PRODUCE N.A.,
MARCELINO M. RELIZAN, RAUL A. DEL MONTE TROPICAL FRUIT CO.,
REYES, OCTAVIO F. REYES, EDDIE CHIQUITA BRANDS
M. RINCOR, EMMANUEL RIVAS, INTERNATIONAL, INC. and
RODULFO RIVAS, BIENVENIDO C. CHIQUITA BRANDS,
ROMANCA, JACINTO ROMOC, INC., respondents.
ROMEO S. ROMUALDO, ALBERTO
ROSARIO, ROMEO L. SABIDO,
SIMON SAGNIP, TIMOTEO SALIG,

Page 20 of 151 | TORTS (2019-2020) | CASES COMPILATION

 [G.R. No. 125598. May 30, 2011.] CRESENCIO, ALEX CRUZ, ROGER
CRUZ, RANSAM CRUZ, CANUTO M.
DADULA, ROMEO L. DALDE,
THE DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY ZACARIAS DAMBAAN, ELISEO
and OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL DAPROZA, VIRGILIO P. DAWAL,
CORPORATION, TESIFREDO I. DE TOMAS,
petitioners, vs. BERNABE L. GAMALLER P. DEANG,
NAVIDA, JOSE P. ABANGAN, JR., CARMELINO P. DEANG, DIOSDADO
CEFERINO P. ABARQUEZ, P. DEANG, DOMINGO A. DEANG,
ORLANDITO A. ABISON, FELIPE FELIPE R. DEANG, JR., JULIETO S.
ADAYA, ALBERTO R. AFRICA, DELA CRUZ, ELIEZER R. DELA
BENJAMIN M. ALBAO, FELIPE TORRE, JEFFREY R. DELA TORRE,
ALCANTARA, NUMERIANO S. RAUL DEMONTEVERDE, FELIPE P.
ALCARIA, FERNANDO C. ALEJADO, DENOLAN, RUBENCIO P. DENOY,
LEOPOLDO N. ALFONSO, FLORO I. RODRIGO M. DERMIL, ROLANDO
ALMODIEL, ANTONIO B. B. DIAZ, LORENZO DIEGO,
ALVARADO, ELEANOR AMOLATA, JOVENCIO DIEGO, SATURNINO
RODOLFO P. ANCORDA, TRIFINO DIEGO, GREGORIO DIONG,
F. ANDRADA, BERT B. ANOCHE, AMADO R. DIZON, FE DIZON,
RAMON E. ANTECRISTO, ISAGANI VIRGILO M. DOMANTAY, LEO S.
D. ANTINO, DOMINGO ANTOPINA, DONATO, DOMINADOR L.
MANSUETO M. APARICIO, DOSADO, NESTOR DUMALAG,
HERMINIGILDO AQUINO, FREDDIE DURAN, SR., MARIO C.
MARCELO S. AQUINO, JR., FELIPE ECHIVERE, AQUILLO M.
P. ARANIA, ULYSES M. ARAS, EMBRADORA, MIGUEL EMNACE,
ARSENIO ARCE, RUPERTO G. RIO T. EMPAS, EFRAIM ENGLIS,
ARINZOL, MIGUEL G. ARINZOL, ANICETO ENOPIA, DIOCENE
EDGARADO P. ARONG, RODRIGO ENTECOSA, RUBENTITO D.
D.R. ASTRALABIO, RONNIE ENTECOSA, AVELINO C. ENTERO,
BACAYO, SOFRONIO BALINGIT, FORTUNATA ENTRADA, ROGELIO
NELSON M. BALLENA, EMNIANO P. EROY, RODOLFO M.
BALMONTE, MAXIMO M. BANGI, ESCAMILLA, SERGIO C.
SALVADOR M. BANGI, ESCANTILLA, LAZARO A.
HERMOGENES T. BARBECHO, ESPAÑOLA, EULOGIO M. ETURMA,
ARSENIO B. BARBERO, DIOSDADO PRIMO P. FERNANDEZ,
BARREDO, VIRGILIO BASAS, EDILBERTO D. FERNANDO,
ALEJANDRO G. BATULAN, GREGORIO S. FERNANDO,
DOMINGO A. BAUTISTA, VICTOR VICENTE P. FERRER, MARCELO T.
BAYANI, BENIGNO BESARES, FLOR, ANTONIO M. FLORES,
RUFINO BETITO, GERARDO A. REDENTOR T. FLOREZA,
BONIAO, CARLO B. BUBUNGAN, NORBERTO J. FUENTES, RICARDO
FERNANDO B. BUENAVISTA, C. GABUTAN, PEDRO D.V.
ALEJANDRINO H. BUENO, TOMAS GALEOS, ARNULFO F. GALEOS,
P. BUENO, LEONARDO M. EDGARDO V. GARCESA,
BURDEOS, VICENTE P. BURGOS, BERNARDO P. GENTOBA,
MARCELINO J. CABALUNA, EDUARDO P. GENTOBA, VICTORIO
DIOSDADO CABILING, EMETRIO C. B. GIDO, ROLANDO V. GIMENA,
CACHUELA, BRAULIO B. EARLWIN L. GINGOYO, ERNESTO
CADIVIDA, JR., SAMSON C. CAEL, GOLEZ, JUANITO G. GONZAGA,
DANIEL B. CAJURAO, REY A. ONOFRE GONZALES, AMADO J.
CALISO, NORBERTO F. GUMERE, LEONARDO M. GUSTO,
CALUMPAG, CELESTINO ALEJANDRO G. HALILI, NOEL H.
CALUMPAG, LORETO CAMACHO, HERCEDA, EMILIO V. HERMONDO,
VICTORIANO CANETE, CLAUDIO HIPOLITO, TORIBIO S.
DOMINADOR P. CANTILLO, ILLUSORIO, TEODURO G. IMPANG,
FRUCTUSO P. CARBAJOSA, JR., GIL A. JALBUNA, HERMIE L.
VICTORINO S. CARLOS, VICTOR JALICO, ARMANDO B. JAMERLAN,
CARLOS, GEORGE M. CASSION, NARCISO JAPAY, LIBURO C.
JAIME S. CASTAÑARES, FLAVIANO JAVINAS, ALEJANDO S. JIMENEZ,
C. CASTAÑARES, ELPIDIO FEDERICO T. JUCAR, NAPOLEON T.
CATUBAY, NATHANIEL B. JUMALON, OSCAR JUNSAY,
CAUSANG, BEOFIL B. CAUSING, ANASTACIO D. LABANA, CARLOS
ADRIANO R. CEJAS, CIRILO G. C. LABAY, AVELINO L.
CERERA, SR., CRISTITUTO M. LAFORTEZA, LOE LAGUMBAY,
CEREZO, DANTE V. CONCHA, NORBETO D. LAMPERNIS,
ALBERT CORNELIO, CESAR ROLANDO J. LAS PEÑAS, ISMAEL
CORTES, NOEL Y. CORTEZ, LASDOCE, RENOLO L. LEBRILLA,
SERNUE CREDO, CORNELIO A. CAMILO G. LEDRES, ANASTACIO

Page 21 of 151 | TORTS (2019-2020) | CASES COMPILATION

LLANOS, ARMANDO A. LLIDO, M. SALONGKONG, RODOLFO E.
CARLITO LOPEZ, ARISTON LOS SALVANI, JIMMY A. SAMELIN,
BAÑEZ, CONCISO L. LOVITOS, EDUARDO A. SAMELIN, ANDRES
ARQUILLANO M. LOZADA, A. SAMELIN, GEORGE SAMELIN,
RODOLFO C. LUMAKIN, PRIMITIVO ROMEO A. SARAOSOS, RUDIGELIO
LUNTAO, JR., EMILIO S. MABASA, S. SARMIENTO, CIRILO SAYAANG,
JR., JUANITO A. MACALISANG, JARLO SAYSON, LEONCIO
TEOTIMO L. MADULIN, JOSEPH D. SERDONCILLO, RODOLFO C.
MAGALLON, PEDRO P. SERRANO, NESTOR G. SEVILLA,
MAGLASANG, MARIO G. SIMEON F. SIMBA, CATALINO S.
MALAGAMBA, JAIME B. SIMTIM, SERAFIN T.
MAMARADLO, PANFILO A. SINSUANGCO, EDUARDO A. SOLA,
MANADA, SR., RICARDO S. VICTORINO M. SOLOMON, JAIME
MANDANI, CONCHITA MANDANI, B. SUFICIENCIA, LYNDON
ALBERTO T. MANGGA, ALEJANDRO SUMAJIT, ALFREDO P. SUMAJIT,
A. MANSANES, RUFINO T. ALFREDO L. SUMAJIT, PEDRO A.
MANSANES, EUTIQUIO P. SUMARAGO, ERNESTO SUMILE,
MANSANES, ALCIO P. MARATAS, NESTOR S. SUMOG-OY, MANUEL
AGAPITO D. MARQUEZ, RICARDO T. SUPAS, WILFREDO A.
R. MASIGLAT, DENDERIA TABAQUE, CONSTANCIO L.
MATABANG, ARNELO N. TACULAD, EUFROCINO A.
MATILLANO, HERNANI C. TAGOTO, JR., SERAPIO TAHITIT,
MEJORADA, ROSITA MENDOZA, PANTALEON T. TAMASE, ERNESTO
GREGORIO R. MESA, RENATO N. TARRE, MAGNO E. TATOY,
MILLADO, ANTONIO L. MOCORRO, AVELINO TAYAPAD, SAMUEL S.
ALBERTO M. MOLINA, JR., TERRADO, APOLINARIO B. TICO,
DOMINGO P. MONDIA, JUANITO P. ORLANDO TINACO, ALBERT G.
MONDIA, RICARDO MONTAÑO, TINAY, ANTONIO TOLEDO,
RAUL T. MONTEJO, ROGELIO ANTONIO M. TORREGOSA,
MUNAR, RODOLFO E. MUÑEZ, ISABELO TORRES, JIMMY C.
CRESENCIO NARCISO, PANFILO C. TORRIBIO, EDUARDO Y. TUCLAOD,
NARCISO, BRICS P. NECOR, JACINTO UDAL, RICARDO M.
MOISES P. NICOLAS, NEMESIO G. URBANO, ERNESTO G. VAFLOR,
NICOLAS, ALFREDO NOFIEL, FELIX FILOMENO E. VALENZUELA,
T. NOVENA, MARCELO P. OBTIAL, SALORIANO VELASCO, RODOLFO
SR., TEODORO B. OCRETO, VIDAL, WALTER VILLAFAÑE,
BIBIANO C. ODI, ALFREDO M. DANTE VILLALVA, PERIGRINO P.
OPERIO, TEOTISTO B. OPON, IZRO VILLARAN, JESUS L. VILLARBA,
M. ORACION, ALAN E. ORANAS, ELEAZAR D. VILLARBA, JENNY T.
ELPEDIO T. OSIAS, ERNESTO M. VILLAVA, HENRY C. VILLEGAS,
PABIONA, NARCISO J. PADILLA, DELFIN C. WALOG, RODOLFO
NELSON G. PADIOS, SR., YAMBAO, EDGAR A. YARE,
FRANCISCO G. PAGUNTALAN, MANSUETO M. YBERA, EDUARDO
RENE B. PALENCIA, MICHAEL P. G. YUMANG, HENRY R. YUNGOT,
PALOMAR, VIRGILIO E. ROMEO P. YUSON, ARSENIA
PANILAGAO, NOLITO C. PANULIN, ZABALA, FELIX N. ZABALA, and
ROMEO PARAGUAS, NESTOR B. GRACIANO ZAMORA, respondents. 
PASTERA, VICENTE Q. PEDAZO,
EDGAR M. PEÑARANDA,
ILUMINIDO B. PERACULLO, [G.R. No. 126654. May 30, 2011.]
ANTONIO C. PEREZ, DOMINGO
PEREZ, OSCAR C. PLEÑOS,
ANTONIETO POLANCOS, SERAFIN CORNELIO ABELLA, JR., IRENEO
G. PRIETO, ZENAIDA PROVIDO, AGABATU, PRUDENCIO
FERNANDO Y. PROVIDO, ERNESTO ALDEPOLIA, ARTEMIO ALEMAN,
QUERO, ELEAZAR QUIJARDO, FIDEL ALLERA, DOMINGO
WILLIAM U. QUINTOY, LAURO ALONZO, CORNELIO AMORA,
QUISTADIO, ROGELIO RABADON, FELIPE G. AMORA, LEOPOLDO
MARCELINO M. RELIZAN, RAUL A. AMORADO, MARCELINO
REYES, OCTAVIO F. REYES, EDDIE ANDIMAT, JORGE ANDOY,
M. RINCOR, EMMANUEL RIVAS, MARGARITO R. ANGELIA,
RODULFO RIVAS, BIENVENIDO C. GREGOTIO APRIANO, ALFREDO A.
ROMANCA, JACINTO ROMOC, ARARAO, BONIFACIO L. ARTIGAS,
ROMEO S. ROMUALDO, ALBERTO JERSON ASUAL, SERAFIN
ROSARIO, ROMEO L. SABIDO, AZUCENA, FELIX M. BADOY,
SIMON SAGNIP, TIMOTEO SALIG, JULIAN J. BAHALLA, REYNALDO
ROMAN B. SALIGONAN, BAHAYA, ANTONIO L. BALDAGO,
VICTORINO SALOMON, GENEROSO CESAR N. BALTAZAR, DOMINADO

Page 22 of 151 | TORTS (2019-2020) | CASES COMPILATION

A. BARING, ANTIPAS A. PILAGO, ROMEO PRESBITERO,
BATINGAL, MARCIANO NATINGAL, OMEO L. PRIEGO, ELADIO QUIBOL,
MARINO BIBANCO, LEANDRO JESUS D. QUIBOL, MAGNO
BILIRAN, MARGARITO BLANCO, QUIZON, DIONISIO RAMOS,
CATALINO BONGO, MELCHOR MAMERTO RANISES, NESTOR B.
BRIGOLE, ELISEO BRINA, REBUYA, RODRIGO REQUILMEN,
ROBERTO BRINA, LUIS BUGHAO, ISIDRO RETANAL, CARLITO
EDUARDO L. BURGUINZO, CELSO ROBLE, GLICERIO V. ROSETE,
M. BUSIA, RPDITO CABAGTE, TINOY G. SABINO, MELCHOR
RICARADO C. CABALLES, CARLITO SALIGUMBA, SILVERIO SILANGAN,
A. CAINDOC, CANDIDO CALO, JR., ROBERTO SIVA, PACITA SUYMAN,
PEDRITO CAMPAS, FERNANDO R. CANILO TAJON, AVELINO
CAPAROSO, DANILO CARILLO, TATAPOD, ROMEO TAYCO,
BONIFACIO M. CATCHA, RENATO TAYCO, CONRADO
FRANKLIN CLARAS, JOSE F. TECSON, AGAPITO TECSON,
COLLAMAT, BERNARDO M. ROMAN E. TEJERO, ALFREDO
COMPENDIO, CORNELIO TILANDOCA, CARLOS B. TIMA,
COSTILLAS, ENERIO R. DAGAME, HERMONEGES TIRADOR, JOSELITO
FELIMON DEBUMA, JR., RICADO C. TIRO, PASTOR T. TUNGKO,
DEIPARIME, GREGORIO S. DE LA LEANDRO B. TURCAL, VICENTE
PENA, JOSE G. DELUAO, JR., URQUIZA, VICENTE VILLA,
ELPEDIO A. DIAZ, QUINTINO ANTONIO P. VILLARAIZ,
DISIPULO, JR., CESAR G. LEOPOLDO VILLAVITO and
DONAYRE, JOSE DULABAY, JAIRO SAMUEL M. VILLEGAS,
DUQUIZA, ANTONIO ENGBINO, petitioners, vs. THE HON. ROMEO
ALFREDO ESPINOSA, ALONZO D. MARASIGAN, Presiding Judge
FAILOG, JAIME FEROLINO, of Regional Trial Court, Branch
RODOLFO L. GABITO, PEDRO G. 16, Davao City, SHELL OIL CO.,
GEMENTIZA, RICARDO A. DOW CHEMICAL CO., OCCIDENTAL
GEROLAGA, RODULFO G. GEROY, CHEMICAL CORP., STANDARD
ROGELIO GONZAGA, ROLANDO FRUIT CO., STANDARD FRUIT &
GONZALES, MODESTO M. STEAMSHIP CO., DOLE FOOD CO.,
GODELOSAO, HECTOR GUMBAN, INC., DOLE FRESH FRUIT CO., DEL
CAMILO HINAG, LECERIO IGBALIC, MONTE FRESH PRODUCE N.A.,
SILVERIO E. IGCALINOS, ALFREDO DEL MONTE TROPICAL FRUIT CO.,
INTOD, OLEGARIO IYUMA, CHIQUITA BRANDS
DOMINGO B. JAGMOC, JR., INTERNATIONAL, INC. and
EDUARDO JARGUE, ROLANDO A. CHIQUITA BRANDS, INC.,
LABASON, ROLANDO LACNO, respondents.
VIRGILIO A. LADURA,
CONSTANCIO M. LAGURA,
FRANCISCO LAMBAN, ENRIQUE [G.R. No. 127856. May 30, 2011.]
LAQUERO, LUCIO B. LASACA,
SISINO LAURDEN, VIVENCIO
LAWANGON, ANECITO LAYAN, DEL MONTE FRESH PRODUCE N.A.
FERNANDO P. LAYAO, MARDENIO and DEL MONTE TROPICAL FRUIT
LAYAO, NEMENCIO C. LINAO, CO., petitioners, vs. THE REGIONAL
PEDRO LOCION, ENERIO LOOD, TRIAL COURT OF DAVAO CITY,
DIOSDADO MADATE, RAMON BRANCHES 16 AND 13, CORNELIO
MAGDOSA, NILO MAGLINTE, ABELLA, JR., IRENEO AGABATU,
MARINO G. MALINAO, CARLITO PRUDENCIO ALDEPOLIA, ARTEMIO
MANACAP, AURELIO A. MARO, ALEMAN, FIDEL ALLERA,
CRISOSTOMO R. MIJARES, CESAR DOMINGO ALONZO, CORNELIO
MONAPCO, SILVANO MONCANO, AMORA, FELIPE G. AMORA,
EMILIO MONTAJES, CESAR B. LEOPOLDO AMORADO,
MONTERO, CLEMENTE NAKANO, MARCELINO ANDIMAT, JORGE
RODRIGO H. NALAS, EMELIANO C. ANDOY, MARGARITO R. ANGELIA,
NAPITAN, JUANITO B. NARON, JR., GREGOTIO APRIANO, ALFREDO A.
LUCIO NASAKA, TEOFILO NUNEZ, ARARAO, BONIFACIO L. ARTIGAS,
JORGE M. OLORVIDA, CANULO P. JERSON ASUAL, SERAFIN
OLOY, DOROTEO S. OMBRETE, AZUCENA, FELIX M. BADOY,
TEOFILIO OMOSURA, MIGUEL JULIAN J. BAHALLA, REYNALDO
ORALO, SUSANTO C. OTANA, JR., BAHAYA, ANTONIO L. BALDAGO,
CHARLIE P. PADICA, ALFREDO P. CESAR N. BALTAZAR, DOMINADO
PALASPAS, CATALINO C. PANA, A. BARING, ANTIPAS A.
ERNESTO M. PASCUAL, BATINGAL, MARCIANO NATINGAL,
BIENVENIDO PAYAG, MARINO BIBANCO, LEANDRO
RESURRECCION PENOS, PEDRO BILIRAN, MARGARITO BLANCO,

Page 23 of 151 | TORTS (2019-2020) | CASES COMPILATION

CATALINO BONGO, MELCHOR MAMERTO RANISES, NESTOR B.
BRIGOLE, ELISEO BRINA, REBUYA, RODRIGO REQUILMEN,
ROBERTO BRINA, LUIS BUGHAO, ISIDRO RETANAL, CARLITO
EDUARDO L. BURGUINZO, CELSO ROBLE, GLICERIO V. ROSETE,
M. BUSIA, RPDITO CABAGTE, TINOY G. SABINO, MELCHOR
RICARADO C. CABALLES, CARLITO SALIGUMBA, SILVERIO SILANGAN,
A. CAINDOC, CANDIDO CALO, JR., ROBERTO SIVA, PACITA SUYMAN,
PEDRITO CAMPAS, FERNANDO R. CANILO TAJON, AVELINO
CAPAROSO, DANILO CARILLO, TATAPOD, ROMEO TAYCO,
BONIFACIO M. CATCHA, RENATO TAYCO, CONRADO
FRANKLIN CLARAS, JOSE F. TECSON, AGAPITO TECSON,
COLLAMAT, BERNARDO M. ROMAN E. TEJERO, ALFREDO
COMPENDIO, CORNELIO TILANDOCA, CARLOS B. TIMA,
COSTILLAS, ENERIO R. DAGAME, HERMONEGES TIRADOR, JOSELITO
FELIMON DEBUMA, JR., RICADO C. TIRO, PASTOR T. TUNGKO,
DEIPARIME, GREGORIO S. DE LA LEANDRO B. TURCAL, VICENTE
PENA, JOSE G. DELUAO, JR., URQUIZA, VICENTE VILLA,
ELPEDIO A. DIAZ, QUINTINO ANTONIO P. VILLARAIZ,
DISIPULO, JR., CESAR G. LEOPOLDO VILLAVITO and
DONAYRE, JOSE DULABAY, JAIRO SAMUEL M. VILLEGAS,
DUQUIZA, ANTONIO ENGBINO, respondents.
ALFREDO ESPINOSA, ALONZO
FAILOG, JAIME FEROLINO,
RODOLFO L. GABITO, PEDRO G. [G.R. No. 128398. May 30, 2011.]
GEMENTIZA, RICARDO A.
GEROLAGA, RODULFO G. GEROY,
ROGELIO GONZAGA, ROLANDO CHIQUITA BRANDS, INC., and
GONZALES, MODESTO M. CHIQUITA BRANDS
GODELOSAO, HECTOR GUMBAN, INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
CAMILO HINAG, LECERIO IGBALIC, petitioners, vs. HON. ANITA
SILVERIO E. IGCALINOS, ALFREDO ALFELOR-ALAGABAN, in her
INTOD, OLEGARIO IYUMA, capacity as Presiding Judge of
DOMINGO B. JAGMOC, JR., the Regional Trial Court, Davao
EDUARDO JARGUE, ROLANDO A. City, Branch 13, CORNELIO
LABASON, ROLANDO LACNO, ABELLA, JR., IRENEO AGABATU,
VIRGILIO A. LADURA, PRUDENCIO ALDEPOLIA, ARTEMIO
CONSTANCIO M. LAGURA, ALEMAN, FIDEL ALLERA,
FRANCISCO LAMBAN, ENRIQUE DOMINGO ALONZO, CORNELIO
LAQUERO, LUCIO B. LASACA, AMORA, FELIPE G. AMORA,
SISINO LAURDEN, VIVENCIO LEOPOLDO AMORADO,
LAWANGON, ANECITO LAYAN, MARCELINO ANDIMAT, JORGE
FERNANDO P. LAYAO, MARDENIO ANDOY, MARGARITO R. ANGELIA,
LAYAO, NEMENCIO C. LINAO, GREGOTIO APRIANO, ALFREDO A.
PEDRO LOCION, ENERIO LOOD, ARARAO, BONIFACIO L. ARTIGAS,
DIOSDADO MADATE, RAMON JERSON ASUAL, SERAFIN
MAGDOSA, NILO MAGLINTE, AZUCENA, FELIX M. BADOY,
MARINO G. MALINAO, CARLITO JULIAN J. BAHALLA, REYNALDO
MANACAP, AURELIO A. MARO, BAHAYA, ANTONIO L. BALDAGO,
CRISOSTOMO R. MIJARES, CESAR CESAR N. BALTAZAR, DOMINADO
MONAPCO, SILVANO MONCANO, A. BARING, ANTIPAS A.
EMILIO MONTAJES, CESAR B. BATINGAL, MARCIANO NATINGAL,
MONTERO, CLEMENTE NAKANO, MARINO BIBANCO, LEANDRO
RODRIGO H. NALAS, EMELIANO C. BILIRAN, MARGARITO BLANCO,
NAPITAN, JUANITO B. NARON, JR., CATALINO BONGO, MELCHOR
LUCIO NASAKA, TEOFILO NUNEZ, BRIGOLE, ELISEO BRINA,
JORGE M. OLORVIDA, CANULO P. ROBERTO BRINA, LUIS BUGHAO,
OLOY, DOROTEO S. OMBRETE, EDUARDO L. BURGUINZO, CELSO
TEOFILIO OMOSURA, MIGUEL M. BUSIA, RPDITO CABAGTE,
ORALO, SUSANTO C. OTANA, JR., RICARADO C. CABALLES, CARLITO
CHARLIE P. PADICA, ALFREDO P. A. CAINDOC, CANDIDO CALO, JR.,
PALASPAS, CATALINO C. PANA, PEDRITO CAMPAS, FERNANDO R.
ERNESTO M. PASCUAL, CAPAROSO, DANILO CARILLO,
BIENVENIDO PAYAG, BONIFACIO M. CATCHA,
RESURRECCION PENOS, PEDRO FRANKLIN CLARAS, JOSE F.
PILAGO, ROMEO PRESBITERO, COLLAMAT, BERNARDO M.
OMEO L. PRIEGO, ELADIO QUIBOL, COMPENDIO, CORNELIO
JESUS D. QUIBOL, MAGNO COSTILLAS, ENERIO R. DAGAME,
QUIZON, DIONISIO RAMOS, FELIMON DEBUMA, JR., RICADO C.

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DEIPARIME, GREGORIO S. DE LA LEANDRO B. TURCAL, VICENTE
PENA, JOSE G. DELUAO, JR., URQUIZA, VICENTE VILLA,
ELPEDIO A. DIAZ, QUINTINO ANTONIO P. VILLARAIZ,
DISIPULO, JR., CESAR G. LEOPOLDO VILLAVITO and
DONAYRE, JOSE DULABAY, JAIRO SAMUEL M. VILLEGAS,
DUQUIZA, ANTONIO ENGBINO, respondents.
ALFREDO ESPINOSA, ALONZO
FAILOG, JAIME FEROLINO,
RODOLFO L. GABITO, PEDRO G.
GEMENTIZA, RICARDO A. DECISION
GEROLAGA, RODULFO G. GEROY,
ROGELIO GONZAGA, ROLANDO
GONZALES, MODESTO M.
GODELOSAO, HECTOR GUMBAN, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J p:
CAMILO HINAG, LECERIO IGBALIC,
SILVERIO E. IGCALINOS, ALFREDO Before the Court are consolidated Petitions
INTOD, OLEGARIO IYUMA, for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
DOMINGO B. JAGMOC, JR., of Court, which arose out of two civil cases that
EDUARDO JARGUE, ROLANDO A. were filed in different courts but whose factual
LABASON, ROLANDO LACNO, background and issues are closely intertwined.
VIRGILIO A. LADURA,
CONSTANCIO M. LAGURA, The petitions in G.R.
FRANCISCO LAMBAN, ENRIQUE Nos. 125078 1 and 125598 2 both assail the
LAQUERO, LUCIO B. LASACA, Order 3 dated May 20, 1996 of the Regional Trial
SISINO LAURDEN, VIVENCIO Court (RTC) of General Santos City, Branch 37, in
LAWANGON, ANECITO LAYAN, Civil Case No. 5617. The said Order decreed the
FERNANDO P. LAYAO, MARDENIO dismissal of the case in view of the perceived lack
LAYAO, NEMENCIO C. LINAO, of jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter of
PEDRO LOCION, ENERIO LOOD, the complaint. The petition in G.R. No. 125598 also
DIOSDADO MADATE, RAMON challenges the Orders dated June 4, 1996 4 and July
MAGDOSA, NILO MAGLINTE, 9, 1996, 5 which held that the RTC of General
MARINO G. MALINAO, CARLITO Santos City no longer had jurisdiction to proceed
MANACAP, AURELIO A. MARO, with Civil Case No. 5617. 
CRISOSTOMO R. MIJARES, CESAR On the other hand, the petitions in G.R.
MONAPCO, SILVANO MONCANO, Nos. 126654, 6 127856, 7 and 128398 8 seek
EMILIO MONTAJES, CESAR B. the reversal of the Order 9 dated October 1, 1996
MONTERO, CLEMENTE NAKANO, of the RTC of Davao City, Branch 16, in Civil Case
RODRIGO H. NALAS, EMELIANO C. No. 24,251-96, which also dismissed the case on
NAPITAN, JUANITO B. NARON, JR., the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
LUCIO NASAKA, TEOFILO NUNEZ,
JORGE M. OLORVIDA, CANULO P. G.R. Nos. 125078, 125598, 126654,
OLOY, DOROTEO S. OMBRETE, 127856, and 128398 were consolidated in the
TEOFILIO OMOSURA, MIGUEL Resolutions dated February 10, 1997, 10 April 28,
ORALO, SUSANTO C. OTANA, JR., 1997 11 and March 10, 1999. 12
CHARLIE P. PADICA, ALFREDO P.
The factual antecedents of the petitions are
PALASPAS, CATALINO C. PANA,
as follows:
ERNESTO M. PASCUAL,
BIENVENIDO PAYAG, Proceedings before the Texas Courts
RESURRECCION PENOS, PEDRO
PILAGO, ROMEO PRESBITERO, Beginning 1993, a number of personal
OMEO L. PRIEGO, ELADIO QUIBOL, injury suits were filed in different Texas state courts
JESUS D. QUIBOL, MAGNO by citizens of twelve foreign countries, including the
QUIZON, DIONISIO RAMOS, Philippines. The thousands of plaintiffs sought
MAMERTO RANISES, NESTOR B. damages for injuries they allegedly sustained from
REBUYA, RODRIGO REQUILMEN, their exposure to dibromochloropropane (DBCP), a
ISIDRO RETANAL, CARLITO chemical used to kill nematodes (worms), while
ROBLE, GLICERIO V. ROSETE, working on farms in 23 foreign countries. The cases
TINOY G. SABINO, MELCHOR were eventually transferred to, and consolidated in,
SALIGUMBA, SILVERIO SILANGAN, the Federal District Court for the Southern District
ROBERTO SIVA, PACITA SUYMAN, of Texas, Houston Division. The cases therein that
CANILO TAJON, AVELINO involved plaintiffs from the Philippines were "Jorge
TATAPOD, ROMEO TAYCO, Colindres Carcamo, et al. v. Shell Oil Co., et
RENATO TAYCO, CONRADO al.," which was docketed as Civil Action No. H-94-
TECSON, AGAPITO TECSON, 1359, and "Juan Ramon Valdez, et al. v. Shell Oil
ROMAN E. TEJERO, ALFREDO Co., et al.," which was docketed as Civil Action No.
TILANDOCA, CARLOS B. TIMA, H-95-1356. The defendants in the consolidated
HERMONEGES TIRADOR, JOSELITO cases prayed for the dismissal of all the actions
TIRO, PASTOR T. TUNGKO,

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under the doctrine of forum non judgment rendered in
conveniens. DEScaT favor of plaintiffs by a
foreign court.
In a Memorandum and Order dated July
11, 1995, the Federal District Court conditionally xxx xxx xxx
granted the defendants' motion to dismiss.
Pertinently, the court ordered that: Notwithstanding the
dismissals that may result from this
Delgado, Jorge Carcamo, Memorandum and Order, in the event
Valdez and Isae Carcamo will be that the highest court of any foreign
dismissed 90 days after the entry of country finally affirms the dismissal
this Memorandum and Order for lack of jurisdiction of an action
provided that defendants and third- commenced by a plaintiff in these
and fourth-party defendants have: actions in his home country or the
country in which he was injured, that
(1) participated in expedited
plaintiff may return to this court and,
discovery in the
upon proper motion, the court will
United States . . .;
resume jurisdiction over the action as
(2) either waived or accepted if the case had never been dismissed
service of process for [forum non conveniens]. 13
and waived any other
Civil Case No. 5617 before the RTC of General
jurisdictional defense
Santos City and G.R. Nos.  125078  and 125598
within 40 days after
the entry of this In accordance with the above Memorandum
Memorandum and and Order, a total of 336 plaintiffs from General
Order in any action Santos City (the petitioners in G.R. No. 125078,
commenced by a hereinafter referred to as NAVIDA, et al.) filed
plaintiff in these a Joint Complaint 14 in the RTC of General Santos
actions in his home City on August 10, 1995. The case was docketed as
country or the Civil Case No. 5617. Named as defendants therein
country in which his were: Shell Oil Co. (SHELL); Dow Chemical Co.
injury occurred. Any (DOW); Occidental Chemical Corp. (OCCIDENTAL);
plaintiff desiring to Dole Food Co., Inc., Dole Fresh Fruit Co., Standard
bring such an action Fruit Co., Standard Fruit and Steamship Co.
will do so within 30 (hereinafter collectively referred to as DOLE);
days after the entry Chiquita Brands, Inc. and Chiquita Brands
of this Memorandum International, Inc. (CHIQUITA); Del Monte Fresh
and Order; Produce N.A. and Del Monte Tropical Fruit Co.
(hereinafter collectively referred to as DEL MONTE);
(3) waived within 40 days Dead Sea Bromine Co., Ltd.; Ameribrom, Inc.;
after the entry of this Bromine Compounds, Ltd.; and Amvac Chemical
Memorandum and Corp. (The aforementioned defendants are
Order any limitations- hereinafter collectively referred to as defendant
based defense that companies.)
has matured since
the commencement NAVIDA, et al., prayed for the payment of
of these actions in the damages in view of the illnesses and injuries to the
courts of Texas; reproductive systems which they allegedly suffered
because of their exposure to DBCP. They claimed,
(4) stipulated within 40 days among others, that they were exposed to this
after the entry of this chemical during the early 1970's up to the early
Memorandum and 1980's when they used the same in the banana
Order that any plantations where they worked at; and/or when
discovery conducted they resided within the agricultural area where
during the pendency such chemical was used. NAVIDA, et al., claimed
of these actions may that their illnesses and injuries were due to the
be used in any foreign fault or negligence of each of the defendant
proceeding to the companies in that they produced, sold and/or
same extent as if it otherwise put into the stream of commerce DBCP-
had been conducted containing products. According to NAVIDA, et
in proceedings al., they were allowed to be exposed to the said
initiated there; and products, which the defendant companies knew, or
ought to have known, were highly injurious to the
(5) submitted within 40 days
former's health and well-being.
after the entry of this
Memorandum and Instead of answering the complaint, most of
Order an agreement the defendant companies respectively filed their
binding them to Motions for Bill of Particulars. 15 During the
satisfy any final pendency of the motions, on March 13, 1996,

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 NAVIDA, et al., filed an Amended Joint the present complaint are examined
Complaint, 16 excluding Dead Sea Bromine Co., in terms of the particular categories
Ltd., Ameribrom, Inc., Bromine Compounds, Ltd. of tort recognized in the
and Amvac Chemical Corp. as party defendants. Philippine Civil Code, it becomes stark
clear that such averments describe
Again, the remaining defendant companies and identify the category of specific
filed their various Motions for Bill of tort known as product liability tort.
Particulars. 17 On May 15, 1996, DOW filed an This is necessarily so, because it is
Answer with Counterclaim. 18 the product manufactured by
On May 20, 1996, without resolving the defendant foreign companies, which
motions filed by the parties, the RTC of General is asserted to be the proximate cause
Santos City issued an Order dismissing the of the damages sustained by the
complaint. First, the trial court determined that it plaintiff workers, and the liability of
did not have jurisdiction to hear the case, to wit: the defendant foreign companies, is
premised on being
THE COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES the manufacturer of the pesticides.
FILED WITH THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR It is clear, therefore, that the
LACK OF JURISDICTION Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction
over the present case, if and only if
xxx xxx xxx the Civil Code of the Philippines, or a
suppletory special law prescribes a
The substance of the cause of product liability tort, inclusive of and
action as stated in the complaint comprehending the specific tort
against the defendant foreign described in the complaint of the
companies cites activity on their part plaintiff workers. 20
which took place abroad and had
occurred outside and beyond the Third, the RTC of General Santos City
territorial domain of the Philippines. adjudged that NAVIDA, et al., were coerced into
These acts of defendants cited in the submitting their case to the Philippine courts, viz.:
complaint included the manufacture
of pesticides, their packaging in FILING OF CASES IN THE PHILIPPINES
containers, their distribution through — COERCED AND ANOMALOUS
sale or other disposition, resulting in
The Court views that the
their becoming part of the stream of
plaintiffs did not freely choose to file
commerce.
the instant action, but rather were
Accordingly, the subject coerced to do so, merely to comply
matter stated in the complaint and with the U.S. District Court's Order
which is uniquely particular to the dated July 11, 1995, and in order to
present case, consisted of activity or keep open to the plaintiffs the
course of conduct engaged in by opportunity to return to the U.S.
foreign defendants outside Philippine District Court. 21
territory, hence, outside and beyond
Fourth, the trial court ascribed little
the jurisdiction of Philippine Courts,
significance to the voluntary appearance of the
including the present Regional Trial
defendant companies therein, thus:
Court. 19
THE DEFENDANTS' SUBMISSION TO
Second, the RTC of General Santos City JURISDICTION IS CONDITIONAL AS IT
declared that the tort alleged by NAVIDA, et al., in IS ILLUSORY
their complaint is a tort category that is not
recognized in Philippine laws. Said the trial Defendants have appointed
court: IcaEDC their agents authorized to accept
THE TORT ASSERTED IN THE service of summons/processes in the
PRESENT COMPLAINT AGAINST Philippines pursuant to the
DEFENDANT FOREIGN COMPANIES IS agreement in the U.S. court that
NOT WITHIN THE SUBJECT MATTER defendants will voluntarily submit to
JURISDICTION OF THE REGIONAL the jurisdiction of this court. While it
TRIAL COURT, BECAUSE IT IS NOT A is true that this court acquires
TORT CATEGORY WITHIN THE jurisdiction over persons of the
PURVIEW OF THE PHILIPPINE LAW defendants through their voluntary
appearance, it appears that such
  voluntary appearance of the
defendants in this case is conditional.
The specific tort asserted Thus in the "Defendants' Amended
against defendant foreign companies Agreement Regarding Conditions of
in the present complaint is product Dismissal for Forum Non Conveniens"
liability tort. When the averments in (Annex to the Complaint) filed with

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 the U.S. District Court, defendants THIS CASE IS BARRED BY THE RULE
declared that "(t)he authority of each OF "LITIS PENDENCIA"
designated representative to accept
service of process will become Furthermore, the case filed in
effective upon final dismissal of these the U.S. court involves the same
actions by the Court". The decision of parties, same rights and interests, as
the U.S. District Court dismissing the in this case. There exists litis
case is not yet final and executory pendencia since there are two cases
since both the plaintiffs and involving the same parties and
defendants appealed therefrom (par. interests. The court would like to
3(h), 3(i), Amended Complaint). emphasize that in accordance with
Consequently, since the authority of the rule on litis pendencia . . .; the
the agent of the defendants in the subsequent case must be dismissed.
Philippines is conditioned on the final Applying the foregoing [precept] to
adjudication of the case pending with the case-at-bar, this court concludes
the U.S. courts, the acquisition of that since the case between the
jurisdiction by this court over the parties in the U.S. is still pending,
persons of the defendants is also then this case is barred by the rule on
conditional. . . . .   "litis pendencia." 23

The appointment of agents by In fine, the trial court held that:

the defendants, being subject to a
It behooves this Court, then
suspensive condition, thus produces
to dismiss this case. For to continue
no legal effect and is ineffective at
with these proceedings, would be
the moment. 22
violative of the constitutional
Fifth, the RTC of General Santos City ruled provision on the Bill of Rights
that the act of NAVIDA, et al., of filing the case in guaranteeing speedy disposition of
the Philippine courts violated the rules on forum cases (Ref. Sec. 16, Article III,
shopping and litis pendencia. The trial court Constitution). The court has no other
expounded: choice. To insist on further
proceedings with this case, as it is
THE JURISDICTION FROWNS UPON now presented, might accord this
AND PROHIBITS FORUM SHOPPING court a charming appearance. But the
same insistence would actually thwart
This court frowns upon the the very ends of justice which it seeks
fact that the parties herein are both to achieve. DcCEHI
vigorously pursuing their appeal of
the decision of the U.S. District court This evaluation and action is
dismissing the case filed thereat. To made not on account of but rather
allow the parties to litigate in this with due consideration to the fact
court when they are actively pursuing that the dismissal of this case does
the same cases in another forum, not necessarily deprive the parties —
violates the rule on 'forum shopping' especially the plaintiffs — of their
so abhorred in this jurisdiction. . . . . possible remedies. The court is
cognizant that the Federal Court may
xxx xxx xxx resume proceedings of that earlier
case between the herein parties
THE FILING OF THE CASE IN U.S.
involving the same acts or omissions
DIVESTED THIS COURT OF ITS OWN
as in this case.
JURISDICTION
WHEREFORE, in view of the
Moreover, the filing of the foregoing considerations, this case is
case in the U.S. courts divested this now considered DISMISSED. 24
court of its own jurisdiction. This court
takes note that the U.S. District Court On June 4, 1996, the RTC of General Santos
did not decline jurisdiction over the City likewise issued an Order, 25 dismissing DOW's
cause of action. The case was Answer with Counterclaim.
dismissed on the ground of forum non
conveniens, which is really a matter CHIQUITA, DEL MONTE and SHELL each
of venue. By taking cognizance of the filed a motion for reconsideration 26 of the RTC
case, the U.S. District Court has, in Order dated May 20, 1996, while DOW filed a
essence, concurrent jurisdiction with motion for reconsideration 27 of the RTC Order
this court over the subject matter of dated June 4, 1996. Subsequently, DOW and
this case. It is settled that initial OCCIDENTAL also filed a Joint Motion for
acquisition of jurisdiction divests Reconsideration 28 of the RTC Order dated May 20,
another of its own jurisdiction. . . . . 1996.
In an Order 29 dated July 9, 1996, the RTC
xxx xxx xxx
of General Santos City declared that it had already

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lost its jurisdiction over the case as it took into sterility and severe injuries to their reproductive
consideration the Manifestation of the counsel of capacities." 39 ABELLA, et al., claimed that the
NAVIDA, et al., which stated that the latter had defendant companies manufactured, produced,
already filed a petition for review sold, distributed, used, and/or made available in
on certiorari before this Court. commerce, DBCP without warning the users of its
hazardous effects on health, and without providing
CHIQUITA and SHELL filed their motions for instructions on its proper use and application,
reconsideration 30 of the above order. which the defendant companies knew or ought to
On July 11, 1996, NAVIDA, et al., filed a have known, had they exercised ordinary care and
Petition for Review on Certiorari in order to assail prudence.
the RTC Order dated May 20, 1996, which was Except for DOW, the other defendant
docketed as G.R. No. 125078. companies filed their respective motions for bill of
The RTC of General Santos City then issued particulars to which ABELLA, et al., filed their
an Order 31 dated August 14, 1996, which merely opposition. DOW and DEL MONTE filed their
noted the incidents still pending in Civil Case No. respective Answers dated May 17, 1996 and June
5617 and reiterated that it no longer had any 24, 1996.
jurisdiction over the case. The RTC of Davao City, however, junked
On August 30, 1996, DOW and OCCIDENTAL Civil Case No. 24,251-96 in its Order dated October
filed their Petition for Review 1, 1996, which, in its entirety, reads:
on Certiorari, 32 challenging the orders of the RTC Upon a thorough review of
of General Santos City dated May 20, 1996, June 4, the Complaint and Amended
1996 and July 9, 1996. Their petition was docketed
Complaint for: Damages filed by the
as G.R. No. 125598. plaintiffs against the defendants Shell
In their petition, DOW and OCCIDENTAL Oil Company, DOW Chemicals
aver that the RTC of General Santos City erred in Company, Occidental Chemical
ruling that it has no jurisdiction over the subject Corporation, Standard Fruit Company,
matter of the case as well as the persons of the Standard Fruit and Steamship, DOLE
defendant companies. Food Company, DOLE Fresh Fruit
Company, Chiquita Brands, Inc.,
In a Resolution 33 dated October 7, 1996, Chiquita Brands International, Del
this Court resolved to consolidate G.R. No. 125598 Monte Fresh Produce, N.A. and Del
with G.R. No. 125078. Monte Tropical Fruits Co., all foreign
CHIQUITA filed a Petition for Review corporations with Philippine
on Certiorari, 34 which sought the reversal of the Representatives, the Court, as
RTC Orders dated May 20, 1996, July 9, 1996 and correctly pointed out by one of the
August 14, 1996. The petition was docketed as G.R. defendants, is convinced that
No. 126018. In a Resolution 35 dated November plaintiffs "would have this Honorable
13, 1996, the Court dismissed the aforesaid petition Court dismiss the case to pave the
for failure of CHIQUITA to show that the RTC way for their getting an affirmance by
committed grave abuse of discretion. CHIQUITA the Supreme Court" (#10 of
filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 36 but the same Defendants' Del Monte Fresh
was denied through a Resolution 37 dated January Produce, N.A. and Del Monte Tropical
27, 1997. Fruit Co., Reply to Opposition dated
July 22, 1996). Consider these:
Civil Case No. 24,251-96 before the
1) In the original Joint
RTC of Davao City and G.R. Nos. Complaint, plaintiffs state
126654, 127856, and 128398 that: defendants have no
properties in the Philippines;
Another joint complaint for damages they have no agents as well
against SHELL, DOW, OCCIDENTAL, DOLE, DEL (par. 18); plaintiffs are suing
MONTE, and CHIQUITA was filed before Branch 16 the defendants for tortuous
of the RTC of Davao City by 155 plaintiffs from acts committed by these
Davao City. This case was docketed as Civil Case foreign corporations on their
No. 24,251-96. These plaintiffs (the petitioners in respective countries, as
G.R. No. 126654, hereinafter referred to as plaintiffs, after having elected
ABELLA, et al.) amended their Joint-Complaint on to sue in the place of
May 21, 1996. 38 defendants' residence, are
Similar to the complaint of NAVIDA, et now compelled by a decision
al., ABELLA, et al., alleged that, as workers in the of a Texas District Court to
banana plantation and/or as residents near the said file cases under torts in this
plantation, they were made to use and/or were jurisdiction for causes of
exposed to nematocides, which contained the actions which occurred
chemical DBCP. According to ABELLA, et al., such abroad (par. 19); a petition
exposure resulted in "serious and permanent was filed by same plaintiffs
injuries to their health, including, but not limited to, against same defendants in

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 the Courts of Texas, USA, action alleged in the
plaintiffs seeking for payment petition do not exist
of damages based on under Philippine laws.
negligence, strict liability, There has been no
conspiracy and international decided case in
tort theories (par. 27); upon Philippine
defendants' Motion to Dismiss Jurisprudence
on Forum non [conveniens], awarding to those
said petition was provisionally adversely affected by
dismissed on condition that DBCP. This means
these cases be filed in the there is no available
Philippines or before 11 evidence which will
August 1995 (Philippine date; prove and disprove
Should the Philippine Courts the relation between
refuse or deny jurisdiction, sterility and DBCP.
the U. S. Courts will reassume
jurisdiction.) 2. Retired Supreme Court
Justice Abraham
11. In the Amended Joint Complaint, Sarmiento opined
plaintiffs aver that: on 11 July that while a class suit
1995, the Federal District is allowed in the
Court issued a Memorandum Philippines the device
and Order conditionally has been employed
dismissing several of the strictly. Mass sterility
consolidated actions including will not qualify as a
those filed by the Filipino class suit injury within
complainants. One of the the contemplation of
conditions imposed was for Philippine statute.
the plaintiffs to file actions in
their home countries or the 3. Retired High Court Justice
countries in which they were Rodolfo Nocom stated
injured . . . . Notwithstanding, that there is simply
the Memorandum and [O]rder an absence of
further provided that should doctrine here that
the highest court of any permits these causes
foreign country affirm the to be heard. No
dismissal for lack of product liability ever
jurisdictions over these filed or tried here.
actions filed by the plaintiffs Case ordered dismissed. 40
in their home countries [or]
the countries where they Docketed as G.R. No. 126654, the petition
were injured, the said for review, filed on November 12, 1996 by
plaintiffs may return to that ABELLA, et al., assails before this Court the above-
court and, upon proper quoted order of the RTC of Davao City.
motion, the Court will resume
jurisdiction as if the case had ABELLA, et al., claim that the RTC of Davao
never been dismissed for City erred in dismissing Civil Case No. 24,251-96 on
forum non conveniens. the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
According to ABELLA, et al., the RTC of
The Court however is
Davao City has jurisdiction over the subject matter
constrained to dismiss the case at bar
of the case since Articles 2176 and 2187 of the Civil
not solely on the basis of the above
Code are broad enough to cover the acts
but because it shares the opinion of
complained of and to support their claims for
legal experts given in the interview
damages. CaEIST
made by the Inquirer in its Special
report "Pesticide Cause Mass ABELLA, et al., further aver that the
Sterility," to wit:  dismissal of the case, based on the opinions of legal
luminaries reported in a newspaper, by the RTC of
1. Former Justice Secretary Davao City is bereft of basis. According to them,
Demetrio Demetria in their cause of action is based on quasi-delict under
a May 1995 opinion Article 2176 of the Civil Code.They also maintain
said: The Philippines that the absence of jurisprudence regarding the
should be an award of damages in favor of those adversely
inconvenient forum to affected by the DBCP does not preclude them from
file this kind of presenting evidence to prove their allegations that
damage suit against their exposure to DBCP caused their sterility and/or
foreign companies infertility.
since the causes of

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 SHELL, DOW, and CHIQUITA each filed their On September 26, 1997, NAVIDA, et
respective motions for reconsideration of the Order al., and ABELLA, et al., filed before this Court a
dated October 1, 1996 of the RTC of Davao City. Consolidated Motion (to Drop Party-
DEL MONTE also filed its motion for reconsideration, Respondents). 45 The plaintiff claimants alleged
which contained an additional motion for the that they had amicably settled their cases with
inhibition of the presiding judge. DOW, OCCIDENTAL, and SHELL sometime in July
1997. This settlement agreement was evidenced by
The presiding judge of Branch 16 then facsimiles of the "Compromise Settlement,
issued an Order 41 dated December 2, 1996, Indemnity, and Hold Harmless Agreement," which
voluntarily inhibiting himself from trying the case. were attached to the said motion. Pursuant to said
Thus, the case was re-raffled to Branch 13 of the agreement, the plaintiff claimants sought to
RTC of Davao City. withdraw their petitions as against DOW,
In an Order 42 dated December 16, 1996, OCCIDENTAL, and SHELL.
the RTC of Davao City affirmed the Order dated DOLE, DEL MONTE and CHIQUITA, however,
October 1, 1996, and denied the respective opposed the motion, as well as the settlement
motions for reconsideration filed by defendant entered into between the plaintiff claimants and
companies. DOW, OCCIDENTAL, and SHELL.
Thereafter, CHIQUITA filed a Petition for The Memoranda of the Parties
Review dated March 5, 1997, questioning the
Orders dated October 1, 1996 and December 16, Considering the allegations, issues, and
1996 of the RTC of Davao City. This case was arguments adduced by the parties, this Court, in a
docketed as G.R. No. 128398. Resolution dated June 22, 1998, 46 required all the
parties to submit their respective memoranda.
In its petition, CHIQUITA argues that the
RTC of Davao City erred in dismissing the CHIQUITA filed its Memorandum on August
case motu proprio as it acquired jurisdiction over 28, 1998; 47 SHELL asked to be excused from the
the subject matter of the case as well as over the filing of a memorandum alleging that it had already
persons of the defendant companies which executed a compromise agreement with the
voluntarily appeared before it. CHIQUITA also plaintiff claimants. 48 DOLE filed its Memorandum
claims that the RTC of Davao City cannot dismiss on October 12, 1998 49 while DEL MONTE filed on
the case simply on the basis of opinions of alleged October 13, 1998. 50 NAVIDA, et al., and
legal experts appearing in a newspaper article. ABELLA, et al., filed their Consolidated
Memorandum on February 3, 1999; 51 and DOW
Initially, this Court in its and OCCIDENTAL jointly filed a Memorandum on
Resolution 43 dated July 28, 1997, dismissed the December 23, 1999. 52
petition filed by CHIQUITA for submitting a
defective certificate against forum shopping. The Motion to Withdraw Petition for
CHIQUITA, however, filed a motion for
Review in G.R. No. 125598
reconsideration, which was granted by this Court in
the Resolution 44 dated October 8, 1997. On July 13, 2004, DOW and OCCIDENTAL
filed a Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review in
On March 7, 1997, DEL MONTE also filed its
G.R. No. 125598, 53 explaining that the said
petition for review on certiorari before this Court
petition "is already moot and academic and no
assailing the above-mentioned orders of the RTC of
longer presents a justiciable controversy" since
Davao City. Its petition was docketed as G.R. No.
they have already entered into an amicable
127856.
settlement with NAVIDA, et al. DOW and
DEL MONTE claims that the RTC of Davao OCCIDENTAL added that they have fully complied
City has jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 24,251-96, with their obligations set forth in the 1997
as defined under the law and that the said court Compromise Agreements.
already obtained jurisdiction over its person by its
DOLE filed its Manifestation dated
voluntary appearance and the filing of a motion for
September 6, 2004, 54 interposing no objection to
bill of particulars and, later, an answer to the
the withdrawal of the petition, and further stating
complaint. According to DEL MONTE, the RTC of
that they maintain their position that DOW and
Davao City, therefore, acted beyond its authority
OCCIDENTAL, as well as other settling defendant
when it dismissed the case motu proprio or without
companies, should be retained as defendants for
any motion to dismiss from any of the parties to the
purposes of prosecuting the cross-claims of DOLE,
case.
in the event that the complaint below is reinstated.
In the Resolutions dated February 10, 1997,
NAVIDA, et al., also filed their Comment
April 28, 1997, and March 10, 1999, this Court
dated September 14, 2004, 55 stating that they
consolidated G.R. Nos. 125078, 125598, 126654,
agree with the view of DOW and OCCIDENTAL that
127856, and 128398.
the petition in G.R. No. 125598 has become moot
The Consolidated Motion to Drop and academic because Civil Case No. 5617 had
already been amicably settled by the parties in
DOW, OCCIDENTAL, and SHELL 1997.
as Party-Respondents filed by
On September 27, 2004, DEL MONTE filed
NAVIDA, et al. and ABELLA, et al. its Comment on Motion to Withdraw Petition for

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Review Filed by Petitioners in G.R. No. respondents Dole, Del
125598, 56 stating that it has no objections to the Monte and
withdrawal of the petition filed by DOW and Chiquita. 58
OCCIDENTAL in G.R. No. 125598.
DISCUSSION
In a Resolution 57 dated October 11, 2004,
this Court granted, among others, the motion to On the issue of jurisdiction
withdraw petition for review filed by DOW and Essentially, the crux of the controversy in
OCCIDENTAL. the petitions at bar is whether the RTC of General
THE ISSUES Santos City and the RTC of Davao City erred in
dismissing Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96,
In their Consolidated Memorandum, respectively, for lack of jurisdiction.
NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., presented the
following issues for our consideration: Remarkably, none of the parties to this
case claims that the courts a quo are bereft of
IN REFUTATION jurisdiction to determine and resolve the above-
stated cases. All parties contend that the RTC of
I. THE COURT DISMISSED THE CASE General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City
DUE TO LACK OF have jurisdiction over the action for damages,
JURISDICTION. specifically for approximately P2.7 million for each
a) The court did not simply of the plaintiff claimants.
dismiss the case NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., argue
because it was filed in that the allegedly tortious acts and/or omissions of
bad faith with defendant companies occurred within Philippine
petitioners intending territory. Specifically, the use of and exposure to
to have the same DBCP that was manufactured, distributed or
dismissed and otherwise put into the stream of commerce by
returned to the Texas defendant companies happened in the Philippines.
court. Said fact allegedly constitutes reasonable basis for
our courts to assume jurisdiction over the case.
b) The court dismissed the
Furthermore, NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et
case because it was
al., assert that the provisions of Chapter 2 of the
convinced that it did
Preliminary Title of the Civil Code, as well as Article
not have jurisdiction.
2176 thereof, are broad enough to cover their claim
IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITION for damages. Thus, NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et
al., pray that the respective rulings of the RTC of
II. THE TRIAL COURT HAS General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City in
JURISDICTION OVER THE Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96 be reversed
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE and that the said cases be remanded to the
CASE. courts a quo for further proceedings. 
a. The acts complained of DOLE similarly maintains that the acts
occurred within attributed to defendant companies constitute
Philippine territory. a quasi-delict, which falls under Article 2176 of
the Civil Code.In addition, DOLE states that if there
b. Art. 2176 of the Civil were no actionable wrongs committed under
Code of the Philippine law, the courts a quo should have
Philippines is broad dismissed the civil cases on the ground that the
enough to cover the Amended Joint-Complaints of NAVIDA, et al., and
acts complained of. ABELLA, et al., stated no cause of action against
the defendant companies. DOLE also argues that if
c. Assumption of jurisdiction
indeed there is no positive law defining the alleged
by the U.S. District
acts of defendant companies as actionable wrong,
Court over
Article 9 of the Civil Code dictates that a judge may
petitioner[s'] claims
not refuse to render a decision on the ground of
did not divest
insufficiency of the law. The court may still resolve
Philippine [c]ourts of
the case, applying the customs of the place and, in
jurisdiction over the
the absence thereof, the general principles of law.
same. cICHTD
DOLE posits that the Philippines is the situs of the
d. The Compromise tortious acts allegedly committed by defendant
Agreement and the companies as NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et
subsequent al., point to their alleged exposure to DBCP which
Consolidated Motion occurred in the Philippines, as the cause of the
to Drop Party sterility and other reproductive system problems
Respondents Dow, that they allegedly suffered. Finally, DOLE adds that
Occidental and Shell the RTC of Davao City gravely erred in relying upon
does not unjustifiably newspaper reports in dismissing Civil Case No.
prejudice remaining 24,251-96 given that newspaper articles are

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hearsay and without any evidentiary value. such other cases in Metro Manila,
Likewise, the alleged legal opinions cited in the where the demand, exclusive of the
newspaper reports were taken judicial notice of, abovementioned items exceeds Two
without any notice to the parties. DOLE, however, hundred thousand pesos
opines that the dismissal of Civil Case Nos. 5617 (P200,000.00). 60
and 24,251-96 was proper, given that plaintiff
claimants merely prosecuted the cases with the Corollary thereto, Supreme Court
sole intent of securing a dismissal of the actions for Administrative Circular No. 09-94, states:
the purpose of convincing the U.S. Federal District 2. The exclusion of the term
Court to re-assume jurisdiction over the cases. "damages of whatever kind" in
In a similar vein, CHIQUITA argues that the determining the jurisdictional amount
courts a quo had jurisdiction over the subject under Section 19 (8) and Section 33
matter of the cases filed before them. The (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended
Amended Joint-Complaints sought approximately by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases
P2.7 million in damages for each plaintiff claimant, where the damages are merely
which amount falls within the jurisdiction of the incidental to or a consequence of the
RTC. CHIQUITA avers that the pertinent matter is main cause of action. However, in
the place of the alleged exposure to DBCP, not the cases where the claim for damages is
place of manufacture, packaging, distribution, the main cause of action, or one of
sale, etc., of the said chemical. This is in the causes of action, the amount of
consonance with the lex loci delicti commisi theory such claim shall be considered in
in determining the situs of a tort, which states that determining the jurisdiction of the
the law of the place where the alleged wrong was court.
committed will govern the action. CHIQUITA and the Here, NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et
other defendant companies also submitted al., sought in their similarly-worded Amended Joint-
themselves to the jurisdiction of the RTC by making Complaints filed before the courts a quo, the
voluntary appearances and seeking for affirmative following prayer:
reliefs during the course of the proceedings. None
of the defendant companies ever objected to the PRAYER
exercise of jurisdiction by the courts a quo over
their persons. CHIQUITA, thus, prays for the remand WHEREFORE, premises
of Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96 to the RTC of considered, it is most respectfully
General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City, prayed that after hearing, judgment
respectively. be rendered in favor of the plaintiffs
ordering the defendants:
The RTC of General Santos City and the RTC
of Davao City have jurisdiction over Civil Case a) TO PAY EACH PLAINTIFF
Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96, respectively moral damages in the amount of One
Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
The rule is settled that jurisdiction over the (P1,500,000.00);
subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is
determined by the allegations in the complaint and b) TO PAY EACH PLAINTIFF
the character of the relief sought, irrespective of nominal damages in the amount of
whether the plaintiffs are entitled to all or some of Four Hundred Thousand Pesos
the claims asserted therein. 59 Once vested by law, (P400,000.00) each;
on a particular court or body, the jurisdiction over
the subject matter or nature of the action cannot be c) TO PAY EACH PLAINTIFF
dislodged by anybody other than by the legislature exemplary damages in the amount of
through the enactment of a law. Six Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P600,000.00);
At the time of the filing of the complaints,
the jurisdiction of the RTC in civil cases under Batas d) TO PAY EACH PLAINTIFF
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act attorneys fees of Two Hundred
No. 7691, was: Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00); and

SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil e) TO PAY THE COSTS of the

cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall suit. 61
exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction: From the foregoing, it is clear that the claim
for damages is the main cause of action and that
xxx xxx xxx the total amount sought in the complaints is
approximately P2.7 million for each of the plaintiff
(8) In all other cases in which claimants. The RTCs unmistakably have jurisdiction
the demand, exclusive of interest, over the cases filed in General Santos City and
damages of whatever kind, attorney's Davao City, as both claims by NAVIDA, et al., and
fees, litigation expenses, and costs or ABELLA, et al., fall within the purview of the
the value of the property in definition of the jurisdiction of the RTC under Batas
controversy exceeds One hundred Pambansa Blg. 129. EaIDAT
thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in

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 Moreover, the allegations in both Amended their subsidiaries or
Joint-Complaints narrate that: affiliates to so warn
plaintiffs;
THE CAUSES OF ACTION
b. Failed to provide plaintiffs
4. The Defendants with information as to
manufactured, sold, distributed, used, what should be
AND/OR MADE AVAILABLE IN reasonably safe and
COMMERCE nematocides containing sufficient clothing and
the chemical dibromochloropropane, proper protective
commonly known as DBCP. THE equipment and
CHEMICAL WAS USED AGAINST the appliances, if any, to
parasite known as the nematode, protect plaintiffs from
which plagued banana plantations, the harmful effects of
INCLUDING THOSE in the Philippines. exposure to DBCP, or
AS IT TURNED OUT, DBCP not only to cause their
destroyed nematodes. IT ALSO subsidiaries or
CAUSED ILL-EFFECTS ON THE HEALTH affiliates to do so;
OF PERSONS EXPOSED TO IT
AFFECTING the human reproductive c. Failed to place adequate
system as well. warnings, in a
language
5. The plaintiffs were understandable to the
exposed to DBCP in the 1970s up worker, on containers
to the early 1980s WHILE (a) they of DBCP-containing
used this product in the banana materials to warn of
plantations WHERE they were the dangers to health
employed, and/or (b) they of coming into
resided within the agricultural contact with DBCP, or
area WHERE IT WAS USED. As a to cause their
result of such exposure, the plaintiffs subsidiaries or
suffered serious and permanent affiliates to do so;
injuries TO THEIR HEALTH, including,
but not limited to, STERILITY and d. Failed to take reasonable
severe injuries to their reproductive precaution or to
capacities. exercise reasonable
care to publish, adopt
6. THE DEFENDANTS WERE and enforce a safety
AT FAULT OR WERE NEGLIGENT plan and a safe
IN THAT THEY MANUFACTURED, method of handling
produced, sold, and/or USED and applying DBCP,
DBCP and/or otherwise, PUT THE or to cause their
SAME into the stream of subsidiaries or
commerce, WITHOUT INFORMING affiliates to do so;
THE USERS OF ITS HAZARDOUS
EFFECTS ON HEALTH AND/OR e. Failed to test DBCP prior to
WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS ON ITS releasing these
PROPER USE AND products for sale, or
APPLICATION. THEY allowed to cause their
Plaintiffs to be exposed to, DBCP- subsidiaries or
containing materials which THEY affiliates to do so; and
knew, or in the exercise of ordinary
care and prudence ought to have f. Failed to reveal the results
known, were highly harmful and of tests conducted on
injurious to the Plaintiffs' health and DBCP to each
well-being. plaintiff,
governmental
7. The Defendants WHO agencies and the
MANUFACTURED, PRODUCED, SOLD, public, or to cause
DISTRIBUTED, MADE AVAILABLE OR their subsidiaries or
PUT DBCP INTO THE STREAM OF affiliate to do so.
COMMERCE were negligent OR AT
FAULT in that they, AMONG OTHERS: 8. The illnesses and injuries of
each plaintiff are also due to the
a. Failed to adequately warn FAULT or negligence of defendants
Plaintiffs of the Standard Fruit Company, Dole Fresh
dangerous Fruit Company, Dole Food Company,
characteristics of Inc., Chiquita Brands, Inc. and
DBCP, or to cause Chiquita Brands International, Inc. in

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 that they failed to exercise effects, injuries and illnesses, specifically to their
reasonable care to prevent each reproductive system.
plaintiff's harmful exposure to DBCP-
Thus, these allegations in the complaints
containing products which defendants
constitute the cause of action of plaintiff claimants
knew or should have known were
— a quasi-delict, which under the Civil Code is
hazardous to each plaintiff in that
defined as an act, or omission which causes
they, AMONG OTHERS:
damage to another, there being fault or negligence.
a. Failed to adequately To be precise, Article 2176 of the Civil
supervise and instruct Code provides:
Plaintiffs in the safe Article 2176.Whoever by act
and proper or omission causes damage to
application of DBCP- another, there being fault or
containing products; negligence, is obliged to pay for the
b. Failed to implement proper damage done. Such fault or
methods and negligence, if there is no pre-existing
techniques of contractual relation between the
application of said parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
products, or to cause governed by the provisions of this
such to be Chapter.
implemented; As specifically enumerated in the amended
c. Failed to warn Plaintiffs of complaints, NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et
the hazards of al., point to the acts and/or omissions of the
exposure to said defendant companies in manufacturing, producing,
products or to cause selling, using, and/or otherwise putting into the
them to be so stream of commerce, nematocides which contain
warned; DBCP, "without informing the users of its hazardous
effects on health and/or without instructions on its
d. Failed to test said products proper use and application." 63
for adverse health
Verily, in Citibank, N.A. v. Court of
effects, or to cause
Appeals, 64 this Court has always reminded that
said products to be
jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of
tested;
the action is determined by the allegations of the
e. Concealed from Plaintiffs complaint, irrespective of whether or not the
information plaintiffs are entitled to recover upon all or some of
concerning the the claims asserted therein. The jurisdiction of the
observed effects of court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses
said products on set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss,
Plaintiffs;  for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would
almost entirely depend upon the defendants. What
f. Failed to monitor the health determines the jurisdiction of the court is the
of plaintiffs exposed nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the
to said products; allegations in the complaint. The averments therein
and the character of the relief sought are the ones
g. Failed to place adequate to be consulted.
labels on containers
of said products to Clearly then, the acts and/or omissions
warn them of the attributed to the defendant companies constitute
damages of said a quasi-delict which is the basis for the claim for
products; and damages filed by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et
al., with individual claims of approximately P2.7
h. Failed to use substitute million for each plaintiff claimant, which obviously
nematocides for said falls within the purview of the civil action
products or to cause jurisdiction of the RTCs.
such substitutes to
[be] Moreover, the injuries and illnesses, which
used. 62 (Emphasis NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., allegedly
supplied and words in suffered resulted from their exposure to DBCP while
brackets ours.) they were employed in the banana plantations
located in the Philippines or while they were
Quite evidently, the allegations in the residing within the agricultural areas also located in
Amended Joint-Complaints of NAVIDA, et al., and the Philippines. The factual allegations in the
ABELLA, et al., attribute to defendant companies Amended Joint-Complaints all point to their cause of
certain acts and/or omissions which led to their action, which undeniably occurred in the
exposure to nematocides containing the chemical Philippines. The RTC of General Santos City and
DBCP. According to NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et the RTC of Davao City obviously have reasonable
al., such exposure to the said chemical caused ill basis to assume jurisdiction over the cases.

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 It is, therefore, error on the part of the voluntarily, unconditionally and knowingly
courts a quo when they dismissed the cases on the appeared and submitted themselves to the
ground of lack of jurisdiction on the mistaken jurisdiction of the courts a quo.
assumption that the cause of action narrated by
Rule 14, Section 20 of the 1997 Rules of
NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., took place
Civil Procedure provides that "[t]he defendant's
abroad and had occurred outside and beyond the
voluntary appearance in the action shall be
territorial boundaries of the Philippines, i.e., "the
equivalent to service of summons." In this
manufacture of the pesticides, their packaging in
connection, all the defendant companies
containers, their distribution through sale or other
designated and authorized representatives to
disposition, resulting in their becoming part of the
receive summons and to represent them in the
stream of commerce," 65 and, hence, outside the
proceedings before the courts a quo. All the
jurisdiction of the RTCs.
defendant companies submitted themselves to the
Certainly, the cases below are not criminal jurisdiction of the courts a quo by making several
cases where territoriality, or the situs of the act voluntary appearances, by praying for various
complained of, would be determinative of affirmative reliefs, and by actively participating
jurisdiction and venue for trial of cases. during the course of the proceedings below.
In personal civil actions, such as claims for
In line herewith, this Court, in Meat Packing
payment of damages, the Rules of Court allow the
Corporation of the Philippines v.
action to be commenced and tried in the
Sandiganbayan, 68 held that jurisdiction over the
appropriate court, where any of the plaintiffs or
person of the defendant in civil cases is acquired
defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident
either by his voluntary appearance in court and his
defendant, where he may be found, at the election
submission to its authority or by service of
of the plaintiff. 66 HCDAcE
summons. Furthermore, the active participation of
In a very real sense, most of the evidence a party in the proceedings is tantamount to an
required to prove the claims of NAVIDA, et al., and invocation of the court's jurisdiction and a
ABELLA, et al., are available only in the Philippines. willingness to abide by the resolution of the case,
First, plaintiff claimants are all residents of the and will bar said party from later on impugning the
Philippines, either in General Santos City or in court or body's jurisdiction. 69
Davao City. Second, the specific areas where they
Thus, the RTC of General Santos City and
were allegedly exposed to the chemical DBCP are
the RTC of Davao City have validly acquired
within the territorial jurisdiction of the courts a
jurisdiction over the persons of the defendant
quo wherein NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et
companies, as well as over the subject matter of
al., initially filed their claims for damages. Third, the
the instant case. What is more, this jurisdiction,
testimonial and documentary evidence from
which has been acquired and has been vested on
important witnesses, such as doctors, co-workers,
the courts a quo, continues until the termination of
family members and other members of the
the proceedings.
community, would be easier to gather in the
Philippines. Considering the great number of It may also be pertinently stressed that
plaintiff claimants involved in this case, it is not far- "jurisdiction" is different from the "exercise of
fetched to assume that voluminous records are jurisdiction." Jurisdiction refers to the authority to
involved in the presentation of evidence to support decide a case, not the orders or the decision
the claim of plaintiff claimants. Thus, these rendered therein. Accordingly, where a court has
additional factors, coupled with the fact that the jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants and
alleged cause of action of NAVIDA, et al., and the subject matter, as in the case of the courts a
ABELLA, et al., against the defendant companies quo, the decision on all questions arising therefrom
for damages occurred in the Philippines, is but an exercise of such jurisdiction. Any error
demonstrate that, apart from the RTC of General that the court may commit in the exercise of its
Santos City and the RTC of Davao City having jurisdiction is merely an error of judgment, which
jurisdiction over the subject matter in the instant does not affect its authority to decide the case,
civil cases, they are, indeed, the convenient fora for much less divest the court of the jurisdiction over
trying these cases. 67 the case. 70
The RTC of General Santos City Plaintiffs' purported bad faith in
and the RTC of Davao City validly filing the subject civil cases in
acquired jurisdiction over the Philippine courts
persons of all the defendant Anent the insinuation by DOLE that the
companies plaintiff claimants filed their cases in bad faith
merely to procure a dismissal of the same and to
It is well to stress again that none of the allow them to return to the forum of their choice,
parties claims that the courts a quo lack jurisdiction this Court finds such argument much too
over the cases filed before them. All parties are one speculative to deserve any merit.
in asserting that the RTC of General Santos City
and the RTC of Davao City have validly acquired It must be remembered that this Court does
jurisdiction over the persons of the defendant not rule on allegations that are unsupported by
companies in the action below. All parties evidence on record. This Court does not rule on
allegations which are manifestly conjectural, as

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these may not exist at all. This Court deals with Incidentally, on April 2, 2007, after the
facts, not fancies; on realities, not appearances. parties have submitted their respective
When this Court acts on appearances instead of memoranda, DEL MONTE filed a Manifestation and
realities, justice and law will be short-lived. 71 This Motion 73 before the Court, stating that similar
is especially true with respect to allegations of bad settlement agreements were allegedly executed by
faith, in line with the basic rule that good faith is the plaintiff claimants with DEL MONTE and
always presumed and bad faith must be proved. 72 CHIQUITA sometime in 1999. Purportedly included
in the agreements were Civil Case Nos. 5617 and
In sum, considering the fact that the RTC of 24,251-96. Attached to the said manifestation were
General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City copies of the Compromise Settlement, Indemnity,
have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the and Hold Harmless Agreement between DEL
amended complaints filed by NAVIDA, et al., and MONTE and the settling plaintiffs, as well as the
ABELLA, et al., and that the courts a quo have also Release in Full executed by the latter. 74 DEL
acquired jurisdiction over the persons of all the MONTE specified therein that there were "only four
defendant companies, it therefore, behooves this (4) plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 5617 who are
Court to order the remand of Civil Case Nos. 5617 claiming against the Del Monte parties" 75 and that
and 24,251-96 to the RTC of General Santos City the latter have executed amicable settlements
and the RTC of Davao City, respectively.   which completely satisfied any claims against DEL
On the issue of the dropping of MONTE. In accordance with the alleged compromise
agreements with the four plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
DOW, OCCIDENTAL and SHELL 5617, DEL MONTE sought the dismissal of the
as respondents in view of their Amended Joint-Complaint in the said civil case.
Furthermore, in view of the above settlement
amicable settlement with NAVIDA, agreements with ABELLA, et al., in Civil Case No.
et al., and ABELLA, et al. 24,251-96, DEL MONTE stated that it no longer
wished to pursue its petition in G.R. No. 127856
NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., are and accordingly prayed that it be allowed to
further praying that DOW, OCCIDENTAL and SHELL withdraw the same.
be dropped as respondents in G.R.
Nos. 125078 and 126654, as well as in Civil Case Having adjudged that Civil Case Nos. 5617
Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96. The non-settling and 24,251-96 should be remanded to the RTC of
defendants allegedly manifested that they intended General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City,
to file their cross-claims against their co-defendants respectively, the Court deems that the
who entered into compromise agreements. Consolidated Motions (to Drop Party-Respondents)
NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., argue that the filed by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., should
non-settling defendants did not aver any cross- likewise be referred to the said trial courts for
claim in their answers to the complaint and that appropriate disposition.
they subsequently sought to amend their answers
Under Article 2028 of the Civil Code, "[a]
to plead their cross-claims only after the settlement
compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by
between the plaintiff claimants and DOW,
making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or
OCCIDENTAL, and SHELL were executed.
put an end to one already commenced." Like any
NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., therefore, assert
other contract, an extrajudicial compromise
that the cross-claims are already barred.
agreement is not excepted from rules and
In their Memoranda, CHIQUITA and DOLE principles of a contract. It is a consensual contract,
are opposing the above motion of NAVIDA, et perfected by mere consent, the latter being
al., and ABELLA, et al., since the latter's Amended manifested by the meeting of the offer and the
Complaints cited several instances of tortious acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are
conduct that were allegedly committed jointly and to constitute the contract. 76 Judicial approval is
severally by the defendant companies. This solidary not required for its perfection. 77 A compromise
obligation on the part of all the defendants has upon the parties the effect and authority of res
allegedly gives any co-defendant the statutory right judicata 78 and this holds true even if the
to proceed against the other co-defendants for the agreement has not been judicially approved. 79 In
payment of their respective shares. Should the addition, as a binding contract, a compromise
subject motion of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et agreement determines the rights and obligations
al., be granted, and the Court subsequently orders of only the parties to it. 80
the remand of the action to the trial court for
In light of the foregoing legal precepts, the
continuance, CHIQUITA and DOLE would allegedly
RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao
be deprived of their right to prosecute their cross-
City should first receive in evidence and examine
claims against their other co-defendants. Moreover,
all of the alleged compromise settlements involved
a third party complaint or a separate trial,
in the cases at bar to determine the propriety of
according to CHIQUITA, would only unduly delay
dropping any party as a defendant therefrom.
and complicate the proceedings. CHIQUITA and
DOLE similarly insist that the motion of NAVIDA, et The Court notes that the Consolidated
al., and ABELLA, et al., to drop DOW, SHELL and Motions (to Drop Party-Respondents) that was filed
OCCIDENTAL as respondents in G.R. by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., only
Nos. 125078 and 126654, as well as in Civil Case pertained to DOW, OCCIDENTAL and SHELL in view
Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96, be denied. of the latter companies' alleged compromise

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agreements with the plaintiff claimants. However, The above right of reimbursement of a
in subsequent developments, DEL MONTE and paying debtor, and the corresponding liability of the
CHIQUITA supposedly reached their own amicable co-debtors to reimburse, will only arise, however, if
settlements with the plaintiff claimants, but DEL a solidary debtor who is made to answer for an
MONTE qualified that it entered into a settlement obligation actually delivers payment to the creditor.
agreement with only four of the plaintiff claimants As succinctly held in Lapanday Agricultural
in Civil Case No. 5617. These four plaintiff Development Corporation v. Court of
claimants were allegedly the only ones who were Appeals, 82 "[p]ayment, which means not only the
asserting claims against DEL MONTE. However, the delivery of money but also the performance, in any
said allegation of DEL MONTE was simply stipulated other manner, of the obligation, is the operative
in their Compromise Settlement, Indemnity, and fact which will entitle either of the solidary debtors
Hold Harmless Agreement and its truth could not be to seek reimbursement for the share which
verified with certainty based on the records corresponds to each of the [other] debtors." 83
elevated to this Court. Significantly, the 336
In the cases at bar, there is no right of
plaintiff claimants in Civil Case No. 5617 jointly filed
reimbursement to speak of as yet. A trial on
a complaint without individually specifying their
the merits must necessarily be conducted
claims against DEL MONTE or any of the other
first in order to establish whether or not
defendant companies. Furthermore, not one
defendant companies are liable for the claims
plaintiff claimant filed a motion for the removal of
for damages filed by the plaintiff claimants,
either DEL MONTE or CHIQUITA as defendants in
which would necessarily give rise to an
Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96. IaDcTC
obligation to pay on the part of the
There is, thus, a primary need to establish defendants.
who the specific parties to the alleged compromise
At the point in time where the proceedings
agreements are, as well as their corresponding
below were prematurely halted, no cross-claims
rights and obligations therein. For this purpose, the
have been interposed by any defendant against
courts a quo may require the presentation of
another defendant. If and when such a cross-claim
additional evidence from the parties. Thereafter, on
is made by a non-settling defendant against a
the basis of the records of the cases at bar and the
settling defendant, it is within the discretion of the
additional evidence submitted by the parties, if
trial court to determine the propriety of allowing
any, the trial courts can then determine who among
such a cross-claim and if the settling defendant
the defendants may be dropped from the said
must remain a party to the case purely in relation
cases.
to the cross claim.
It is true that, under Article 2194 of the Civil
In Armed Forces of the Philippines Mutual
Code, the responsibility of two or more persons who
Benefit Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 84 the
are liable for the same quasi-delict is solidary. A
Court had the occasion to state that "where there
solidary obligation is one in which each of the
are, along with the parties to the compromise,
debtors is liable for the entire obligation, and each
other persons involved in the litigation who have
of the creditors is entitled to demand the
not taken part in concluding the compromise
satisfaction of the whole obligation from any or all
agreement but are adversely affected or feel
of the debtors. 81
prejudiced thereby, should not be precluded from
In solidary obligations, the paying debtor's invoking in the same proceedings an adequate
right of reimbursement is provided for under Article relief therefor." 85
1217 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Relevantly, in Philippine International
Art. 1217. Payment made by Surety Co., Inc. v. Gonzales, 86 the Court upheld
one of the solidary debtors the ruling of the trial court that, in a joint and
extinguishes the obligation. If two or solidary obligation, the paying debtor may file a
more solidary debtors offer to pay, third-party complaint and/or a cross-claim to
the creditor may choose which offer enforce his right to seek contribution from his co-
to accept. debtors.

He who made the payment Hence, the right of the remaining

may claim from his co-debtors only defendant(s) to seek reimbursement in the above
the share which corresponds to each, situation, if proper, is not affected by the
with the interest for the payment compromise agreements allegedly entered into by
already made. If the payment is made NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., with some of the
before the debt is due, no interest for defendant companies. 
the intervening period may be WHEREFORE, the Court
demanded. hereby GRANTS the petitions for review
When one of the solidary on certiorari in G.R. Nos. 125078, 126654, and
debtors cannot, because of his 128398. We REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Order
insolvency, reimburse his share to the dated May 20, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of
debtor paying the obligation, such General Santos City, Branch 37, in Civil Case No.
share shall be borne by all his co- 5617, and the Order dated October 1, 1996 of the
debtors, in proportion to the debt of Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 16, and
each. its subsequent Order dated December 16, 1996

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 denying reconsideration in Civil Case No. 24,251- admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when
96, and REMAND the records of this case to the the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
respective Regional Trial Courts of origin for further specific evidence on which they are based; (8) when
and appropriate proceedings in line with the ruling the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain
herein that said courts have jurisdiction over the relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if
subject matter of the amended complaints in Civil properly considered, would justify a different
Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96. conclusion; and (9) when the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of
The Court likewise GRANTS the motion evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on
filed by Del Monte to withdraw its petition in G.R. record.
No. 127856. In view of the previous grant of the
motion to withdraw the petition in G.R. No. 125598, 2. CIVIL LAW; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS;
both G.R. Nos. 127856 and 125598 are EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS; QUASI-DELICTS;
considered CLOSED AND TERMINATED. ELEMENTS; MUST BE PROVED BY A PREPONDERANCE
OF EVIDENCE BY PLAINTIFF. — In every tort case filed
No pronouncement as to costs.
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, plaintiff has to
SO ORDERED. prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the
damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or
||| (Navida v. Dizon, G.R. Nos. 125078, 125598, negligence of the defendant or some other person for
126654, 127856 & 128398, [May 30, 2011], 664 PHIL whose act he must respond; and (3) the connection of
283-336) cause and effect between the fault or negligence and
the damages incurred.
A. INTRODUCTORY CONCEPTS
REQUISITES 3. ID.;ID.;ID.;ID.;FAULT AND NEGLIGENCE,
DISTINGUISHED. — Fault, in general, signifies a
voluntary act or omission which causes damage to the
right of another giving rise to an obligation on the part
FIRST DIVISION of the actor to repair such damage. Negligence is the
failure to observe for the protection of the interest of
another person that degree of care, precaution and
[G.R. No. 150920. November 25, 2005.] vigilance which the circumstances justly demand. Fault
requires the execution of a positive act which causes
damage to another while negligence consists of the
CHILD LEARNING CENTER, INC.
omission to do acts which result in damage to another.
and SPOUSES EDGARDO L. LIMON
and SYLVIA S. 4. ID.;ID.;ID.;ID.;DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA
LIMON, petitioners,vs.TIMOTHY LOQUITOR; WHEN APPLICABLE; CASE AT BAR. — The
TAGARIO, assisted by his parents fact, however, that Timothy fell out through the window
BASILIO TAGORIO and HERMINIA shows that the door could not be opened from the
TAGORIO, respondents. inside. That sufficiently points to the fact that
something was wrong with the door, if not the door
knob, under the principle of res ipsa loquitor. The
Tomas Z. Roxas, Jr. for petitioners. doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies where (1) the
accident was of such character as to warrant an
Lopez & Rempillo for respondents. inference that it would not have happened except for
the defendant's negligence; (2) the accident must have
been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the
SYLLABUS exclusive management or control of the person
charged with the negligence complained of; and (3) the
accident must not have been due to any voluntary
  action or contribution on the part of the person injured.
Petitioners are clearly answerable for failure to see to it
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY; that the doors of their school toilets are at all times in
FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT, AFFIRMED BY working condition. The fact that a student had to go
THE COURT OF APPEALS, ARE FINAL AND CONCLUSIVE through the window, instead of the door, shows that
AND MAY NOT BE REVIEWED ON APPEAL; EXCEPTIONS. something was wrong with the door.
— Generally, factual findings of the trial court, affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive and 5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DEFENSE OF DUE DILIGENCE
may not be reviewed on appeal. The established IN THE SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF EMPLOYEES;
exceptions are: (1) when the inference made is APPLICABLE WHERE THE EMPLOYER IS BEING HELD
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ACTS OR OMISSIONS OF
there is grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the findings OTHERS UNDER ARTICLE 2180 OF THE CIVIL CODE. —
are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or Due diligence in the selection and supervision of
conjectures: (4) when the judgment of the Court of employees is applicable where the employer is being
Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when held responsible for the acts or omissions of others
the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. In this case, CLC's
of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the liability is under Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
issues of the case and the same is contrary to the premised on the fact of its own negligence in not
ensuring that all its doors are properly maintained.

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 6. COMMERCIAL LAW; CORPORATION LAW; After trial, the court a quo found in favor of
CORPORATION CODE; PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL; respondents and ordered petitioners CLC and Spouses
ELEMENTS. — To disregard the corporate existence, the Limon to pay respondents, jointly and severally,
plaintiff must prove: (1) Control by the individual P200,253.12 as actual and compensatory damages,
owners, not mere majority or complete stock P200,000 as moral damages, P50,000 as exemplary
ownership, resulting in complete domination not only of damages, P100,000 as attorney's fees and the costs of
finances but of policy and business practice in respect the suit. The trial court disregarded the corporate
to a transaction so that the corporate entity as to this fiction of CLC and held the Spouses Limon personally
transaction had at the time no separate mind, will or liable because they were the ones who actually
existence of its own; (2) such control must have been managed the affairs of the CLC.
used by the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to
perpetuate the violation of a statutory or other positive Petitioners CLC and the Spouses Limon
legal duty, or a dishonest and unjust act in appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals.
contravention of the plaintiff's legal right; and (3) the On September 28, 2001, the Court of
control and breach of duty must proximately cause the Appeals 3 affirmed the decision in toto. Petitioners
injury or unjust loss complained of. The absence of elevated the case to this Court under Rule 45 of
these elements prevents piercing the corporate veil. the Rules of Court, after their motion for
The evidence on record fails to show that these reconsideration was denied by Resolution of November
elements are present, especially given the fact that 23, 2001. 4
plaintiffs' complaint had pleaded that CLC is a
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws Petitioners question several factual findings of
of the Philippines. the trial court, which were affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, namely: 5
 
1. That respondent was
allegedly trapped inside the boy's
comfort room located at the third
DECISION floor of the school building on March
5, 1991;

2. That respondent allegedly

AZCUNA, J p: banged and kicked the door of said
comfort room several times to attract
This petition started with a tort case filed with attention and that he allegedly yelled
the Regional Trial Court of Makati by Timothy Tagorio thereat for help which never came;
and his parents, Basilio R. Tagorio and Herminia 3. That respondent was
Tagorio, docketed as Civil Case No. 91-1389. The allegedly forced to open the window
complaint 1 alleged that during the school year 1990- of said comfort room to seek help;
1991, Timothy was a Grade IV student at Marymount
School, an academic institution operated and 4. That the lock set installed
maintained by Child Learning Center, Inc. (CLC).In the at the boy's comfort room located in
afternoon of March 5, 1991, between 1 and 2 the third floor of the school building
p.m.,Timothy entered the boy's comfort room at the on March 5, 1991 was allegedly
third floor of the Marymount building to answer the call defective and that the same lock set
of nature. He, however, found himself locked inside and was involved in previous incidents of
unable to get out. Timothy started to panic and so he alleged malfunctioning;
banged and kicked the door and yelled several times
for help. When no help arrived he decided to open the 5. That petitioner Child
window to call for help. In the process of opening the Learning Center, Inc. allegedly failed
window, Timothy went right through and fell down to install iron grills in the window of
three stories. Timothy was hospitalized and given the boy's comfort room at the third
medical treatment for serious multiple physical injuries. floor of the school building;

An action under Article 2176 of the Civil 6. That petitioner Child

Code was filed by respondents against the CLC, the Learning Center, Inc. allegedly failed
members of its Board of Directors, namely Spouses to exercise the due care of a good
Edgardo and Sylvia Limon, Alfonso Cruz, Carmelo father of a family in the selection and
Narciso and Luningning Salvador, and the supervision of its employees;
Administrative Officer of Marymount School, Ricardo
7. That the proximate cause
Pilao. In its defense, 2 CLC maintained that there was
of respondent's accident was
nothing defective about the locking mechanism of the
allegedly not due to his own
door and that the fall of Timothy was not due to its fault
contributory negligence;
or negligence. CLC further maintained that it had
exercised the due care and diligence of a good father of 8. That there was an alleged
a family to ensure the safety, well-being and basis to apply the legal principle of
convenience of its students. "piercing the veil of corporate entity"
in resolving the issue of alleged

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 liability of petitioners Edgardo L. The trial court found that the lock was defective
Limon and Sylvia S. Limon; on March 5, 1991: 9

9. That there was alleged The door knob was defective.

basis for petitioners to pay After the incident of March 5, 1991,
respondent actual, moral and said door knob was taken off the door
exemplary damages, plus attorney's of the toilet where Timothy was in.
fees; The architect who testified during the
trial declared that although there
10. That there was an alleged were standard specifications for door
basis in not awarding petitioners' knobs for comfort room[s],and he
prayer for moral and exemplary designed them according to that
damages, including attorney's fees. requirement, he did not investigate
whether the door knob specified in his
Generally, factual findings of the trial court,
plans during the construction [was]
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are final and
actually put in place. This is so
conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. The
because he did not verify whether the
established exceptions are: (1) when the inference
door knob he specified w[as] actually
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2)
put in place at the particular comfort
when there is grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the
room where Timothy was barred from
findings are grounded entirely on speculations,
getting outside. (TSN, pp. 19-20,
surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the
December 8, 1994).
Court of Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts;
(5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when The Court of Appeals held that there was no
the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went reason to disturb the factual assessment: 10
beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary
to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) After having perused the
when the findings of fact are conclusions without records, We fail to see any indication
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; of whim or arbitrariness on the part of
(8) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked the trial magistrate in his assessment
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and of the facts of the case. That said, We
which, if properly considered, would justify a different deem it not to be within Our business
conclusion; and (9) when the findings of fact of the to recast the factual conclusions
Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of reached by the court below.
evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on
record. 6 Petitioners would make much of the point that
no direct evidence was presented to prove that the
On the basis of the records of this case, this door knob was indeed defective on the date in
Court finds no justification to reverse the factual question.
findings and consider this case as an exception to the
general rule. ASTcEa The fact, however, that Timothy fell out through
the window shows that the door could not be opened
In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of from the inside. That sufficiently points to the fact that
the Civil Code, plaintiff has to prove by a something was wrong with the door, if not the door
preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered knob, under the principle of res ipsa loquitor.The
by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies where (1) the
defendant or some other person for whose act he must accident was of such character as to warrant an
respond; and (3) the connection of cause and effect inference that it would not have happened except for
between the fault or negligence and the damages the defendant's negligence; (2) the accident must have
incurred. 7 been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the
exclusive management or control of the person
Fault, in general, signifies a voluntary act or charged with the negligence complained of; and (3) the
omission which causes damage to the right of another accident must not have been due to any voluntary
giving rise to an obligation on the part of the actor to action or contribution on the part of the person
repair such damage. Negligence is the failure to injured. 11 Petitioners are clearly answerable for failure
observe for the protection of the interest of another to see to it that the doors of their school toilets are at
person that degree of care, precaution and vigilance all times in working condition. The fact that a student
which the circumstances justly demand. Fault requires had to go through the window, instead of the door,
the execution of a positive act which causes damage to shows that something was wrong with the door. HEDSIc
another while negligence consists of the omission to do
acts which result in damage to another. 8 As to the absence of grills on the window,
petitioners contend that there was no such requirement
In this tort case, respondents contend that CLC under the Building Code. Nevertheless, the fact is that
failed to provide precautionary measures to avoid harm such window, as petitioners themselves point out, was
and injury to its students in two instances: (1) failure to approximately 1.5 meters from the floor, so that it was
fix a defective door knob despite having been notified within reach of a student who finds the regular exit, the
of the problem; and (2) failure to install safety grills on door, not functioning. Petitioners, with the due
the window where Timothy fell from. diligence of a good father of the family, should have
anticipated that a student, locked in the toilet by a non-

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working door, would attempt to use the window to call B. QUASI-DELICT DISTINGUISHED FROM
for help or even to get out. Considering all the Culpa Criminal
circumstances, therefore, there is sufficient basis to
sustain a finding of liability on petitioners' part. Barredo vs Garcia and Almario GR No 48006 July
8 1942
Petitioners' argument that CLC exercised the
due diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its employees is not
EN BANC
decisive. Due diligence in the selection and supervision
of employees is applicable where the employer is being
held responsible for the acts or omissions of others [G.R. No. 48006. July 8, 1942.]
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. 12 In this case,
CLC's liability is under Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
premised on the fact of its own negligence in not FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner, vs.
ensuring that all its doors are properly maintained. SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA
ALMARIO, respondents.
 

Our pronouncement that Timothy climbed out

of the window because he could not get out using the Celedonio P. Gloria and Antonio Barredo for
door, negates petitioners' other contention that the petitioner.
proximate cause of the accident was Timothy's own Jose G. Advincula for respondents.
negligence. The injuries he sustained from the fall were
the product of a natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any intervening cause, that originated
SYLLABUS
from CLC's own negligence.

We, however, agree with petitioners that there

1. DAMAGES; QUASI-DELICT OR "CULPA
was no basis to pierce CLC's separate corporate
AQUILIANA"; PRIMARY AND DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY
personality. To disregard the corporate existence, the
OF EMPLOYERS UNDER ARTICLES 1902-1910 OF
plaintiff must prove: (1) Control by the individual
THE CIVIL CODE. — A head-on collision between a
owners, not mere majority or complete stock
taxi and a carretela resulted in the death of a 16-
ownership, resulting in complete domination not only of
year-old boy, one of the passengers of the
finances but of policy and business practice in respect
carretela. A criminal action was filed against the
to a transaction so that the corporate entity as to this
taxi driver and he was convicted and sentenced
transaction had at the time no separate mind, will or
accordingly. The court in the criminal case granted
existence of its own; (2) such control must have been
the petition that the right to bring a separate civil
used by the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to
action be reserved. Thereafter the parents of the
perpetuate the violation of a statutory or other positive
deceased brought suit for damages against the
legal duty, or a dishonest and unjust act in
proprietor of the taxi, the employer of the taxi
contravention of the plaintiff's legal right; and (3) the
driver, under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
control and breach of duty must proximately cause the
Defendant contended that his liability was
injury or unjust loss complained of. The absence of
governed by the Revised Penal Code, according to
these elements prevents piercing the corporate
which his responsibility was only secondary, but no
veil. 13 The evidence on record fails to show that these
civil action had been brought against the taxi
elements are present, especially given the fact that
plaintiffs' complaint had pleaded that CLC is a driver. Held: That this separate civil action lies, the
employer being primarily and directly responsible in
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws
damages under articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil
of the Philippines.
Code.
On 9th and 10th points raised concerning the
award of damages, the resolution would rest on factual 2. ID.; ID.; ID. — A quasi-delict or "culpa
determinations by the trial court, affirmed by the Court aquiliana" is a separate legal institution under the
of Appeals, and no legal issue warrants our Civil Code, with a substantivity all its own, and
intervention. individuality that is entirely apart and independent
from a delict or crime. Upon this principle, and on
WHEREFORE, the petition is partly granted and
the wording and spirit of article 1903 of the Civil
the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
Code, the primary and direct responsibility of
CA-G.R. CV No. 50961 dated September 28, 2001 and
employers may be safely anchored.
November 23, 2001, respectively, are MODIFIED in that
petitioners Spouses Edgardo and Sylvia Limon are
absolved from personal liability. The Decision and 3. ID.; ID.; ID. — The individuality of cuasi-
Resolution are AFFIRMED in all other respects. No delito or culpa extra- contractual looms clear and
pronouncement as to costs. unmistakable. This legal institution is of ancient
lineage, one of its early ancestors being the Lex
SO ORDERED. Aquilia in the Roman Law. In fact, in Spanish legal
terminology, this responsibility is often referred to
||| (Child Learning Center Inc. v. Tagario, G.R. No. as culpa aquiliana. The Partidas also contributed to
150920, [November 25, 2005], 512 PHIL 618-627 the genealogy of the present fault or negligence

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under the Civil Code: for instance, Law 6, Title 15, apply only to negligence not punishable by
of Partida 7, says: "Tenudo es de fazer emienda, law, culpa aquiliana would have very little
porque, como quier que el non fizo a sabiendas el application in actual life. The literal meaning of the
daño al otro, pero acaescio por su culpa." law will not be used to smother a principle of such
ancient origin and such full-grown development
4. ID.; ID.; ID. — The distinctive nature of as culpa aquiliana.
cuasi-delitos survives in the Civil Code. According
to article 1089, one of the five sources of 10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DEGREE OF PROOF. —
obligations is this legal institution of cuasi-delito There are numerous cases of criminal negligence
or culpa extra- contractual: "los actos . . . en que which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt,
intervenga cualquier genero de culpa o but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
negligencia." Then article 1093 provides that this In such cases, defendant can and should be made
kind of obligation shall be governed by Chapter II of responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to
Title XVI of Book IV, meaning articles 1902-1910. 1910, Civil Code. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
This portion of the Civil Code is exclusively devoted
to the legal institution of culpa aquiliana. 11. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXPEDITIOUS REMEDY.
— The primary and direct responsibility of employer
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; DISTINCTION BETWEEN under article 1903, Civil Code, is more likely to
CRIMES UNDER THE PENAL CODE AND THE "CULPA facilitate remedy for civil wrongs. Such primary and
AQUILIANA" OR "CUASI-DELITO" UNDER THE CIVIL direct responsibility of employers is calculated to
CODE. — A distinction exists between the civil protect society.
liability arising from a crime and the responsibility
for cuasi-delitos or culpa extra-contractual. The 12. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRACTICE OF RELYING
same negligent act causing damages may produce SOLELY ON CIVIL RESPONSIBILITY FOR A CRIME. —
civil liability arising from a crime under article 100 The harm done by such practice is pointed out, and
of the Revised Penal Code, or create an action for the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence
cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual under under articles 1902 et seq., of the Civil Code is
articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Plaintiffs were restored to its full vigor.
free to choose which remedy to enforce. Some of
the differences between crimes under the Penal
Code and the culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito under
the Civil Code are enumerated in the decision. DECISION

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; OPINIONS OF JURISTS. — The

decision sets out extracts from opinions of jurists
on the separate existence of cuasi- delicts and the BOCOBO, J p:
employer's primary and direct liability under article
1903 of the Civil Code. This case comes up from the Court of
Appeals which held the petitioner herein, Fausto
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; SENTENCES OF THE Barredo, liable in damages for the death of Faustino
SUPREME TRIBUNAL OF SPAIN. — The decision cites Garcia caused by the negligence of Pedro
sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed by said Fausto
upholding the principles above set forth: that a Barredo.
cuasi-delict or culpa extra- contractual is a separate
and distinct legal institution, independent from the At about half past one in the morning of
civil responsibility arising from criminal liability, and May 3, 1936, on the road between Malabon and
that an employer is, under article 1903 of the Civil Navotas, Province of Rizal, there was a head-on
Code, primarily and directly responsible for the collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab
negligent acts of his employee. driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided
by Pedro Dimapilis. The carretela was overturned,
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; DECISIONS OF THIS COURT. and one of its passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino
— Decisions of this Court are also cited holding Garcia, suffered injuries from which he died two
that, in this jurisdiction, the separate individuality days later. A criminal action was filed against
of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Fontanilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and
Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even he was convicted and sentenced to an
with regard to a negligent act for which the indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to
wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and two years of prision correccional. The court in the
convicted in a criminal case and for which, after criminal case granted the petition that the right to
such a conviction, he could have been sued for his bring a separate civil action be reserved. The Court
civil liability arising from his crime. of Appeals affirmed the sentence of the lower court
in the criminal case. Severino Garcia and Timotea
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; FOUNDATIONS OF Almario, parents of the deceased, on March 7,
DOCTRINES ABOVE SET FORTH; LITERAL MEANING 1939, brought an action in the Court of First
OF THE LAW. — The Revised Penal Code punishes Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo as the
not only reckless but also simple negligence; if it sole proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and employer
should be held that articles 1902-1910, Civil Code, of Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8, 1939, the Court of

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First Instance of Manila awarded damages in favor this action is not a civil obligation
of the plaintiffs for P2,000 plus legal interest from arising from a felony or a
the date of the complaint. This decision was misdemeanor (the crime of Pedro
modified by the Court of Appeals by reducing the Fontanilla), but an obligation imposed
damages to P1,000 with legal interest from the in article 1903 of the Civil Code by
time the action was instituted. It is undisputed that reason of his negligence in the
Fontanilla's negligence was the cause of the selection or supervision of his servant
mishap, as he was driving on the wrong side of the or employee."
road, and at high speed. As to Barredo's
responsibility, the Court of Appeals found: The pivotal question in this case is whether
the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action
". . . It is admitted that against Fausto Barredo, thus making him primarily
defendant is Fontanilla's employer. and directly responsible under article 1903 of the
There is no proof that he exercised Civil Code as an employer of Pedro Fontanilla. The
the diligence of a good father of a defendant maintains that Fontanilla's negligence
family to prevent the damage. (See p. being punishable by the Penal Code, his
22, appellant's brief.) In fact it is (defendant's) liability as an employer is only
shown he was careless in employing subsidiary, according to said Penal Code, but
Fontanilla who had been caught Fontanilla has not been sued in a civil action and
several times for violation of the his property has not been exhausted. To decide the
Automobile Law and speeding main issue, we must cut through the tangle that
(Exhibit A) — violations which has, in the minds of many, confused and jumbled
appeared in the records of the Bureau together delitos and cuasi delitos, or crimes under
of Public Works available to the public the Penal Code and fault or negligence under
and to himself. Therefore, he must articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. This should be
indemnify plaintiffs under the done, because justice may be lost in a labyrinth,
provisions of article 1903 of the Civil unless principles and remedies are distinctly
Code." envisaged. Fortunately, we are aided in our inquiry
by the luminous presentation of this perplexing
The main theory of the defense is that the subject by renown jurists and we are likewise
liability of Fausto Barredo is governed by the guided by the decisions of this Court in previous
Revised Penal Code; hence, his liability is only cases as well as by the solemn clarity of the
subsidiary, and as there has been no civil action considerations in several sentences of the Supreme
against Pedro Fontanilla, the person criminally Tribunal of Spain.
liable, Barredo cannot be held responsible in this
case. The petitioner's brief states on page 10: Authorities support the proposition that a
quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana" is a separate legal
". . . The Court of Appeals institution under the Civil Code, with a substantivity
holds that the petitioner is being sued all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart
for his failure to exercise all the and independent from a delict or crime. Upon this
diligence of a good father of a family principle, and on the wording and spirit of article
in the selection and supervision of 1903 of the Civil Code, the primary and direct
Pedro Fontanilla to prevent damages responsibility of employers may be safely
suffered by the respondents. In other anchored.
words, the Court of Appeals insists on
applying in this case article 1903 of The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code
the Civil Code. Article 1903 of the and Revised Penal Code are as follows:
Civil Code is found in Chapter II, Title
16, Book IV of the Civil Code. This fact CIVIL CODE
makes said article inapplicable to a
civil liability arising from a crime as in
the case at bar simply because "ART. 1089. Obligations arise
Chapter II of Title 16 of Book IV of the from law, from contracts and quasi-
Civil Code, in the precise words of contracts, and from acts and
article 1903 of the Civil Code itself, is omissions which are unlawful or in
applicable only to "those (obligations) which any kind of fault or negligence
arising from wrongful or negligent intervenes."
acts or omissions not punishable by
law.'" xxx xxx xxx

The gist of the decision of the Court of "ART. 1092. Civil obligations

Appeals is expressed thus: arising from felonies or
misdemeanors shall be governed by
". . . We cannot agree to the the provisions of the Penal Code.
defendant's contention. The liability
sought to be imposed upon him in

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 "ART. 1093. Those which are "Art. 1904.Any person who
derived from acts or omissions in pays for damage caused by his
which fault or negligence, not employees may recover from the
punishable by law, intervenes shall be latter what he may have paid.".
subject to the provisions of Chapter II,
Title XVI of this book." REVISED PENAL CODE

xxx xxx xxx "Art. 100. Civil liability of a

person guilty of felony. — Every
"ART. 1902. Any person who person criminally liable for a felony is
by an act or omission causes damage also civilly liable.
to another by his fault or negligence
shall be liable for the damage so "Art. 101. Rules regarding
done. civil liability in certain cases. — The
exemption from criminal liability
"ART. 1903. The obligation established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5,
imposed by the next preceding article and 6 of article 12 and in subdivision
is enforcible, not only for personal 4 of article 11 of this Code does not
acts and omissions, but also for those include exemption from civil liability,
of persons for whom another is which shall be enforced subject to the
responsible. following rules:

"The father, and, in case of "First. In cases of subdivisions

his death or incapacity, the mother, 1, 2 and 3 of article 12 the civil
are liable for any damages caused by liability for acts committed by any
the minor children who live with imbecile or insane person, and by a
them. person under nine years of age, or by
one over nine but under fifteen years
"Guardians are liable for of age, who has acted without
damages done by minors or discernment, shall devolve upon
incapacitated persons subject to their those having such person under their
authority and living with them. legal authority or control, unless it
appears that there was no fault or
negligence on their part.
"Owners or directors of an
establishment or business are equally
liable for any damages caused by "Should there be no person
their employees while engaged in the having such insane, imbecile or minor
branch of the service in which under his authority, legal
employed, or on occasion of the guardianship, or control, or if such
performance of their duties. person be insolvent, said insane,
imbecile, or minor shall respond with
their own property, excepting
"The State is subject to the property exempt from execution, in
same liability when it acts through a accordance with the civil law.
special agent, but not if the damage
shall have been caused by the official
upon whom properly devolved the "Second. In cases falling
duty of doing the act performed, in within subdivision 4 of article 11, the
which case the provisions of the next persons for whose benefit the harm
preceding article shall be applicable. has been prevented shall be civilly
liable in proportion to the benefit
which they may have received.
"Finally, teachers or directors
of arts and trades are liable for any
damages caused by their pupils or "The courts shall determine,
apprentices while they are under in their sound discretion, the
their custody. proportionate amount for which each
one shall be liable.
"The liability imposed by this
article shall cease in case the persons "When the respective shares
mentioned therein prove that they can not be equitably determined,
exercised all the diligence of a good even approximately, or when the
father of a family to prevent the liability also attaches to the
damage.". Government, or to the majority of the
inhabitants of the town, and, in all
events, whenever the damage has
been caused with the consent of the

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authorities or their agents, intentional, would constitute a grave
indemnification shall be made in the felony, shall suffer the penalty of
manner prescribed by special laws or arresto mayor in its maximum period
regulations. to prision correccional in its minimum
period; if it would have constituted a
"Third. In cases falling within less grave felony, the penalty of
subdivisions 5 and 6 of article 12, the arresto mayor in its minimum and
persons using violence or causing the medium periods shall be imposed.
fear shall be primarily liable and
secondarily, or, if there be no such "Any person who, by simple
persons, those doing the act shall be imprudence or negligence, shall
liable, saving always to the latter that commit an act which would otherwise
part of their property exempt from constitute a grave felony, shall suffer
execution. the penalty of arresto mayor in its
medium and maximum periods; if it
"ART. 102. Subsidiary civil would have constituted a less serious
liability of innkeepers, tavern keepers felony, the penalty of arresto
and proprietors of establishment. — mayor in its minimum period shall be
In default of persons criminally liable, imposed."
innkeepers, tavern keepers, and any
other persons or corporations shall be It will thus be seen that while the terms of
civilly liable for crimes committed in article 1902 of the Civil Code seem to be broad
their establishments, in all cases enough to cover the driver's negligence in the
where a violation of municipal instant case, nevertheless article 1093 limits cuasi-
ordinances or some general or special delitos to acts or omissions "not punishable by law."
police regulation shall have been But inasmuch as article 365 of the Revised Penal
committed by them or their Code punishes not only reckless but even simple
employees. imprudence or negligence, the fault or negligence
under article 1902 of the Civil Code has apparently
"Innkeepers are also been crowded out. It is this overlapping that makes
subsidiarily liable for the restitution of the "confusion worse confounded." However, a
goods taken by robbery or theft closer study shows that such a concurrence of
within their houses from guests scope in regard to negligent acts does not destroy
lodging therein, or for the payment of the distinction between the civil liability arising
the value thereof, provided that such from a crime and the responsibility for cuasi-
guests shall have notified in advance delitos or culpa extra-contractual. The same
the innkeeper himself, or the person negligent act causing damages may produce civil
representing him, of the deposit of liability arising from a crime under article 100 of the
such goods within the inn; and shall Revised Penal Code, or create an action for cuasi-
furthermore have followed the delito or culpa extra-contractual under articles
directions which such innkeeper or 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
his representative may have given
them with respect to the care of and The individuality of cuasi-delito or culpa
vigilance over such goods. No liability extra-contractual looms clear and unmistakable.
shall attach in case of robbery with This legal institution is of ancient lineage, one of its
violence against or intimidation of early ancestors being the Lex Aquilia in the Roman
persons unless committed by the Law. In fact, in Spanish legal terminology, this
innkeeper's employees. responsibility is often referred to as culpa
aquiliana. The Partidas also contributed to the
"ART. 103. Subsidiary civil genealogy of the present fault or negligence under
liability of other persons. — The the Civil Code, for instance, Law 6, Title 15, of
subsidiary liability established in the Partida 7, says: "Tenudo es de fazer emienda,
next preceding article shall also apply porque, como quier que el non fizo a sabiendas el
to employers, teachers, persons, and daño al otro, pero acaescio por su culpa."
corporations engaged in any kind of
industry for felonies committed by The distinctive nature of cuasi-
their servants, pupils, workmen, delitos survives in the Civil Code. According to
apprentices, or employees in the article 1089, one of the five sources of obligations
discharge of their duties." is this legal institution of cuasi-delito or culpa
extra- contractual: "los actos . . . en que intervenga
xxx xxx xxx cualquier genero de culpa o negligencia." Then
article 1093 provides that this kind of obligation
shall be governed by Chapter II of Title XVI of Book
"ART. 365. Imprudence and IV, meaning articles 1902-1910. This portion of the
negligence. — Any person who, by Civil Code is exclusively devoted to the legal
reckless imprudence, shall commit institution of culpa aquiliana.
any act which, had it been

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 Some of the differences between crimes exonerated. The question asked was whether the
under the Penal Code and the culpa aquiliana or Ferrocarril Cantabrico could still bring a civil action
cuasi-delito under the Civil Code are:. for damages against the Ferrocarril del Norte.
Maura's opinion was in the affirmative, stating in
1. That crimes affect the public interest, part (Maura, Dictamenes, Vol. 6, pp. 511-513):
while cuasi-delitos are only of private concern.
"Quedando las cosas asi, a
2. That, consequently, the Penal Code proposito de la realidad pura y neta
punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the Civil de los hechos, todavia menos parece
Code, by means of indemnification, merely repairs sostenible que exista
the damage. cosa juzgada acerca de la obligacion
civil de indemnizar los quebrantos y
menoscabos inferidos por el choque
3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi- de los trenes. El titulo en que se
delicts, because the former are punished only if funda la accion para demandar el
there is a penal law clearly covering them, while resarcimiento, no puede confundirse
the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which con las responsabilidades
"any kind of fault or negligence intervenes." civiles nacidas de delito, siquiera
However, it should be noted that not all violations exista en este, sea el cual sea,
of the penal law produce civil responsibility, such as una culpa rodeada de notas
begging in contravention of ordinances, violation of agravatorias que motivan sanciones
the game laws, infraction of the rules of traffic penales, mas o menos severas. La
when nobody is hurt. (See Colin and Capitant, lesion causada por delito o falta en
"Curso Elemental de Derecho Civil," Vol. 3, p. 728.). los derechos civiles, requiere
restituciones, reparaciones o
Let us now ascertain what some jurists say indemnizaciones, que cual la pena
on the separate existence of quasi-delicts and the misma atañen al orden publico; por
employer's primary and direct liability under article tal motivo vienen encomendadas, de
1903 of the Civil Code. ordinario, al Ministerio Fiscal; y claro
es que si por esta via se enmiendan
Dorado Montero in his essay on los quebrantos y menoscabos, el
"Responsabilidad" in the "Enciclopedia Juridica agraviado excusa procurar el ya
Española" (Vol. XXVII, p. 414) says: conseguido desagravio; pero esta
eventual coincidencia de los efectos,
no borra la diversidad originaria de
"El concepto juridico de la las acciones civiles para pedir
responsabilidad civil abarca diversos indemnizacion.
aspectos y comprende a diferentes
personas. Asi, existe una
responsabilidad civil propiamente "Estas, para el caso actual
dicha, que en ningun caso lleva (prescindiendo de
aparejada responsabilidad criminal culpas contractuales, que no vendrian
alguna, y otra que es consecuencia a cuento y que tienen otro regimen),
indeclinable de la penal que nace de dimanan, segun el articulo 1902 del
todo delito o falta." Codigo Civil, de toda accion u
omision, causante de daños o
perjuicios, en que intervenga culpa o
"The juridical concept of civil negligencia. Es trivial que acciones
responsibility has various aspects and semejantes son ejercitadas ante los
comprises different persons. Thus, Tribunales de lo civil cotidianamente,
there is a civil responsibility, properly sin que la Justicia punitiva tenga que
speaking, which in no case carries mezclarse en los asuntos. Los
with it any criminal responsibility, and articulos 18 al 21 y 121 al 128 del
another which is a necessary Codigo Penal, atentos al espiritu y a
consequence of the penal liability as los fines sociales y politicos del
a result of every felony or mismo, desenvuelven y ordenan la
misdemeanor." materia de responsabilidades
civiles nacidas de delito, en terminos
Maura, an outstanding authority, was separados del regimen por ley comun
consulted on the following case: There had been a de la culpa que se
collision between two trains belonging respectively denomina aquiliana, por alusion a
to the Ferrocarril Cantabrico and the Ferrocarril del precedentes legislativos del Corpus
Norte. An employee of the latter had been Juris. Seria intempestivo un paralelo
prosecuted in a criminal case, in which the entre aquellas ordenaciones, y la de
company had been made a party as subsidiarily la obligacion de indemnizar a titulo de
responsible in civil damages. The employee had culpa civil; pero viene al caso y es
been acquitted in the criminal case, and the necesaria una de las diferenciaciones
employer, the Ferrocarril del Norte, had also been que en el tal paralelo se notarian.

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 "Los articulos 20 y 21 del "As things are, apropos of the
Codigo Penal, despues de distribuir a reality pure and simple of the facts, it
su modo las responsabilidades civiles, seems less tenable that there should
entre los que sean por diversos be res judicata with regard to the civil
conceptos culpables del delito o falta, obligation for damages on account of
las hacen extensivas a las empresas the losses caused by the collision of
y los establecimientos al servicio de the trains. The title upon which the
los cuales estan los delincuentes; action for reparation is based cannot
pero con caracter subsidiario, o sea, be confused with the civil
segun el texto literal, en defecto de responsibilities born of a crime,
los que sean responsables because there exists in the latter,
criminalmente. No coincide en ello el whatever each nature,
Codigo Civil, cuyo articulo 1903, dice; a culpa surrounded with aggravating
La obligacion que impone el articulo aspects which give rise to penal
anterior es exigible, no solo por los measures that are more or less
actos y omisiones propios, sino por severe. The injury caused by a felony
los de aquellas personas de quienes or misdemeanor upon civil rights
se debe responder; personas en la requires restitutions, reparations, or
enumeracion de las cuales figuran los indemnifications which, like the
dependientes y empleados de los penalty itself, affect public order; for
establecimientos o empresas, sea por this reason, they are ordinarily
actos del servicio, sea con ocasion de entrusted to the office of the
sus funciones. Por esto acontece, y se prosecuting attorney; and it is clear
observa en la jurisprudencia, que las that if by this means the losses and
empresas, despues de intervenir en damages are repaired, the injured
las causas criminales con el caracter party no longer desires to seek
subsidiario de su responsabilidad civil another relief; but this coincidence of
por razon del delito, son demandadas effects does not eliminate the
y condenadas directa y aisladamente, peculiar nature of civil actions to ask
cuando se trata de la obligacion, ante for indemnity.
los tribunales civiles.
"Such civil actions in the
"Siendo como se ve, diverso present case (without referring to
el titulo de esta obligacion, y contractual faults which are not
formando verdadero postulado de pertinent and belong to another
nuestro regimen judicial la separacion scope) are derived, according to
entre justicia punitiva y tribunales de article 1902 of the Civil Code, from
lo civil, de suerte que tienen unos y every act or omission causing losses
otros normas de fondo en distintos and damages in which culpa or
cuerpos legales, y diferentes modos negligence intervenes. It is
de proceder, habiendose por unimportant that such actions are
añadidura, abstenido de asistir al every day filed before the civil courts
juicio criminal la Compañia del without the criminal courts interfering
Ferrocarril Cantabrico, que se reservo therewith. Articles 18 to 21 and 121
ejercitar sus acciones, parece to 128 of the Penal Code, bearing in
innegable que la de indemnizacion mind the spirit and the social and
por los daños y perjuicios que le political purposes of that Code,
irrogo el choque, no estuvo sub develop and regulate the matter of
judice ante el Tribunal del Jurado, ni civil responsibilities arising from a
fue sentenciada, sino que permanecio crime, separately from the regime
intacta, al pronunciarse el fallo de 21 under common law, of culpa which is
de marzo. Aun cuando el veredicto no known as aquiliana, in accordance
hubiese sido de inculpabilidad, with legislative precedent of
mostrose mas arriba, que tal accion the Corpus Juris. It would be
quedaba legitimamente reservada unwarranted to make a detailed
para despues del proceso; pero al comparison between the former
declararse que no existio delito, ni provisions and that regarding the
responsabilidad dimanada de delito, obligation to indemnify on account of
materia unica sobre que tenian civil culpa; but it is pertinent and
jurisdiccion aquellos juzgadores, se necessary to point out to one of such
redobla el motivo para la obligacion differences.
civil ex lege, y se patentiza mas y
mas que la accion para pedir su "Articles 20 and 21 of the
cumplimiento permanece incolume, Penal Code, after distributing in their
extraña a la cosa juzgada." own way the civil responsibilities
among those who, for different
reasons, are guilty of felony or

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misdemeanor, make such civil Laurent, a jurist who has written a
responsibilities applicable to monumental work on the French Civil Code, on
enterprises and establishments for which the Spanish Civil Code is largely based and
which the guilty parties render whose provisions on cuasi-delito or culpa extra-
service, but with subsidiary character, contractual are similar to those of the Spanish Civil
that is to say, according to the Code, says, referring to article 1384 of the French
wording of the Penal Code, in default Civil Code which corresponds to article 1903,
of those who are criminally Spanish Civil Code:
responsible. In this regard, the Civil
Code does not coincide because "The action can be brought
article 1903 says: 'The obligation directly against the person
imposed by the next preceding article responsible (for another), without
is demandable, not only for personal including the author of the act. The
acts and omissions, but also for those action against the principal is
of persons for whom another is accessory in the sense that it implies
responsible.' Among the persons the existence of a prejudicial act
enumerated are the subordinates and committed by the employee, but it is
employees of establishments or not subsidiary in the sense that it can
enterprises, either for acts during not be instituted till after the
their service or on the occasion of judgment against the author of the
their functions. It is for this reason act or at least, that it is subsidiary to
that it happens, and it is so observed the principal action; the action for
in judicial decisions, that the responsibility (of the employer) is in
companies or enterprises, after taking itself a principal action." (Laurent,
part in the criminal cases because of Principles of French Civil Law, Spanish
their subsidiary civil responsibility by translation, Vol. 20, pp. 734-735.)
reason of the crime, are sued and
sentenced directly and separately wit
h regard to the obligation, before the Amandi, in his "Cuestionario del Codigo
civil courts. Civil Reformado" (Vol. 4, pp. 429, 430), declares
that the responsibility of the employer is principal
and not subsidiary. He writes:
"Seeing that the title of this
obligation is different, and the
separation between punitive justice "Cuestion 1. La
and the civil courts being a true responsabilidad declarada en el
postulate of our judicial system, so articulo 1903 por las acciones u
that they have different fundamental omisiones de aquellas personas por
norms in different codes, as well as las que se debe responder, es
different modes of procedure, and subsidiaria? es principal? Para
inasmuch as the Compañia del contestar a esta pregunta es
Ferrocarril Cantabrico has abstained necesario saber, en primer lugar, en
from taking part in the criminal case que se funda el precepto legal. Es
and has reserved the right to exercise que realmente se impone una
its actions, it seems undeniable that responsabilidad por una falta ajena?
the action for indemnification for the Asi parece a primera vista; pero
loses and damages caused to it by semejante afirmacion seria contraria
the collision was not sub judice before a la justicia y a la maxima universal,
the Tribunal del Jurado, nor was it the segun la que las faltas son
subject of a sentence, but it remained personales, y cada uno responde de
intact when the decision of March 21 aquellas que le son imputables. La
was rendered. Even if the verdict had responsabilidad de que tratamos se
not been that of acquittal, it has impone con ocasion de un delito o
already been shown that such action culpa, pero no por causa de ellos,
had been legitimately reserved till sino por causa del cuasi delito, esto
after the criminal prosecution; but es, de la imprudencia o de la
because of the declaration of the non- negligencia del padre, del tutor, del
existence of the felony and the non- dueño o director del establecimiento,
existence of the responsibility arising del maestro, etc. Cuando cualquiera
from the crime, which was de las personas que enumera el
the sole subject matter upon which articulo citado (menores de edad,
the Tribunal del Jurado had incapacitados, dependientes,
jurisdiction, there is greater reason aprendices) causan un daño, la ley
for the civil obligation ex lege, and it presume que el padre, el tutor, el
becomes clearer that the action for maestro, etc., han cometido una falta
its enforcement remain intact and is de negligencia para prevenir o evitar
not res judicata." el daño. Esta falta es la que la ley
castiga. No hay, pues,
responsabilidad por un hecho ajeno,

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 sino en la apariencia; en realidad la de entenderse directa, por el tenor
responsabilidad se exige por un del articulo que impone la
hecho propio. La idea de que esa responsabilidad precisamente por los
responsabilidad sea subsidiaria es, actos de aquellas personas de
por lo tanto, completamente quienes se deba responder.'"
inadmisible."
"That is to say, one is not
"Question No. 1. Is the responsible for the acts of others,
responsibility declared in article 1903 because one is liable only for his own
for the acts or omissions of those faults, this being the doctrine of
persons for whom one is responsible, article 1902; but, by exception, one is
subsidiary or principal? In order to liable for the acts of those persons
answer this question it is necessary to with whom there is a bond or tie
know, in the first place, on what the which gives rise to the responsibility.
legal provision is based. Is it true that Is this responsibility direct or
there is a responsibility for the fault subsidiary? In the order of the penal
of another person? It seems so at first law, the Penal Code distinguishes
sight; but such assertion would be between minors and incapacitated
contrary to justice and to the persons on the one hand, and other
universal maxim that all faults are persons on the other, declaring that
personal, and that everyone is liable the responsibility for the former is
for those faults that can be imputed direct (article 19), and for the latter,
to him. The responsibility in question subsidiary (articles 20 and 21); but in
is imposed on the occasion of a crime the scheme of the civil law, in the
or fault, but not because of the same, case of article 1903, the responsibility
but because of the cuasi-delito, that should be understood as direct,
is to say, the imprudence or according to the tenor of that article,
negligence of the father, guardian, for precisely it imposes responsibility
proprietor or manager of the 'for the acts of those persons for
establishment, of the teacher, etc. whom one should be responsible."
Whenever anyone of the persons
enumerated in the article referred to Coming now to the sentences of the
(minors, incapacitated persons, Supreme Tribunal of Spain, that court has upheld
employees, apprentices) causes any the principles above set forth: that a quasi-
damage, the law presumes that the delict or culpa extra-contractual is a separate and
father, guardian, teacher, etc. have distinct legal institution, independent from the civil
committed an act of negligence in not responsibility arising from criminal liability, and that
preventing or avoiding the damage. It an employer is, under article 1903 of the Civil Code,
is this fault that is condemned by the primarily and directly responsible for the negligent
law. It is, therefore, only apparent acts of his employee.
that there is a responsibility for the
act of another; in reality the
responsibility exacted is for one's own One of the most important of those Spanish
act. The idea that such responsibility decisions is that of October 21, 1910. In that case,
is subsidiary is, therefore, completely Ramon Lafuente died as the result of having been
inadmissible." run over by a street car owned by the "Compañia
Electrica Madrileña de Traccion." The conductor
was prosecuted in a criminal case but he was
Oyuelos, in his "Digesto: Principios, acquitted. Thereupon, the widow filed a civil action
Doctrina y Jurisprudencia, Referentes al Codigo Civil against the street car company, praying for
Español," says in Vol. VII, p. 743: damages in the amount of 15,000 pesetas. The
lower court awarded damages; so the company
"Es decir, no se responde de appealed to the Supreme Tribunal, alleging
hechos ajenos, porque se responde violation of articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code
solo de su propia culpa, doctrina del because by final judgment the non-existence of
articulo 1902; mas por excepcion, se fault or negligence had been declared. The
responde de la ajena respecto de Supreme Court of Spain dismissed the appeal,
aquellas personas con las que media saying:.
algun nexo o vinculo, que motiva o
razona la responsabilidad. Esta "Considerando que el primer
responsabilidad, es directa o es motivo del recurso se funda en el
subsidiaria? En el orden penal, el equivocado supuesto de que el
Codigo de esta clase distingue entre Tribunal a quo, al condenar a la
menores e incapacitados y los demas, Compañia Electrica Madrileña al pago
declarando directa la primera del daño causado con la muerte de
(articulo 19) y subsidiaria la segunda Ramon Lafuente Izquierdo, desconoce
(articulos 20 y 21); pero en el orden el valor y efectos juridicos de la
civil, en el caso del articulo 1903, ha

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sentencia absolutoria dictada en la in taking cognizance of the same act
causa criminal que se siguio por el in this latter aspect and in ordering
mismo hecho, cuando es lo cierto que the company, appellant herein, to
de este han conocido las dos pay an indemnity for the damage
jurisdicciones bajo diferentes caused by one of its employees, far
aspectos, y como la de lo criminal from violating said legal provisions, in
declaro dentro de los limites de su relation with article 116 of the Law of
competencia que el hecho de que se Criminal Procedure, strictly followed
trata no era constitutivo de delito por the same, without invading attributes
no haber mediado descuido o which are beyond its own jurisdiction,
negligencia graves, lo que no and without in any way contradicting
excluye, siendo este el unico the decision in that cause." (Italics
fundamento del fallo absolutorio, el supplied.).
concurso de la culpa o negligencia no
calificadas, fuente de obligaciones It will be noted, as to the case just cited:
civiles segun el articulo 1902 del
Codigo Civil, y que alcanzan, segun el
1903, entre otras personas, a los First. That the conductor was not sued in a
Directores de establecimientos o civil case, either separately or with the street car
empresas por los daños causados por company. This is precisely what happens in the
sus dependientes en determinadas present case: the driver, Fontanilla, has not been
condiciones, es manifiesto que la de sued in a civil action, either alone or with his
lo civil, al conocer del mismo hecho employer.
bajo este ultimo aspecto y al
condenar a la Compañia recurrente a Second. That the conductor had been
la indemnizacion del daño causado acquitted of grave criminal negligence, but the
por uno de sus empleados, lejos de Supreme Tribunal of Spain said that this did not
infringir los mencionados textos, en exclude the co-existence of fault or negligence,
relacion con el articulo 116 de la Ley which is not qualified, on the part of the conductor,
de Enjuiciamiento Criminal, se ha under article 1902 of the Civil Code. In the present
atenido estrictamente a ellos, sin case, the taxi driver was found guilty of criminal
invadir atribuciones ajenas a su negligence, so that if he had even sued for his civil
jurisdiccion propia, ni contrariar en lo responsibility arising from the crime, he would have
mas minimo el fallo recaido en la been held primarily liable for civil damages, and
causa." Barredo would have been held subsidiarily liable for
the same. But the plaintiffs are directly suing
"Considering that the first Barredo, on his primary responsibility because of
ground of the appeal is based on the his own presumed negligence — which he did not
mistaken supposition that the trial overcome — under article 1903. Thus, there were
court, in sentencing the Compañia two liabilities of Barredo: first, the subsidiary one
Madrileña to the payment of the because of the civil liability of the taxi driver arising
damage caused by the death of from the latter's criminal negligence; and, second,
Ramon Lafuente Izquierdo, disregards Barredo's primary liability as an employer under
the value and juridical effects of the article 1903. The plaintiffs were free to choose
sentence of acquittal rendered in the which course to take, and they preferred the
criminal case instituted on account of second remedy. In so doing, they were acting
the same act, when it is a fact that within their rights. It might be observed in passing,
the two jurisdictions had taken that the plaintiffs chose the more expeditious and
cognizance of the same act in its effective method of relief, because Fontanilla was
different aspects, and as the criminal either in prison, or had just been released, and
jurisdiction declared within the limits besides, he was probably without property which
of its authority that the act in might be seized in enforcing any judgment against
question did not constitute a felony him for damages.
because there was no grave
carelessness or negligence, and this Third. That inasmuch as in the above
being the only basis of acquittal, it sentence of October 21, 1910, the employer was
does not exclude the co-existence of held liable civilly, notwithstanding the acquittal of
fault or negligence which is not the employee (the conductor) in a previous criminal
qualified, and is a source of civil case, with greater reason should Barredo, the
obligations according to article 1902 employer in the case at bar, be held liable for
of the Civil Code, affecting, in damages in a civil suit filed against him because his
accordance with article 1903, among taxi driver had been convicted. The degree of
other persons, the managers of negligence of the conductor in the Spanish case
establishments or enterprises by cited was less than that of the taxi driver,
reason of the damages caused by Fontanilla, because the former was acquitted in the
employees under certain conditions, previous criminal case while the latter was found
it is manifest that the civil jurisdiction guilty of criminal negligence and was sentenced to

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an indeterminate sentence of one year and one day esta claramente sancionada en el
to two years of prision correccional. articulo 1902 del Codigo Civil, que
obliga por el siguiente a la Compañia
(See also Sentence of February 19, 1902, demandada como ligada con el
which is similar to the one above quoted.). causante de aquellos por relaciones
de caracter economico y de jerarquia
administrativa."
In the Sentence of the Supreme Court of
Spain, dated February 14, 1919, an action was
brought against a railroad company for damages "Considering that the
because the station agent, employed by the sentence in question recognizes, in
company, had unjustly and fraudulently, refused to virtue of the facts which it declares,
deliver certain articles consigned to the plaintiff. in relation to the evidence in the
The Supreme Court of Spain held that this action case: (1) that the invoice issued by
was properly under article 1902 of the Civil Code, the railroad company in favor of the
the court saying: plaintiff contemplated that the empty
receptacles referred to in the
complaint should be returned to the
"Considerando que la consignors with wines and liquors; (2)
sentencia discutida reconoce, en that when the said merchandise
virtud de los hechos que consigna reached their destination, their
con relacion a las pruebas del pleito: delivery to the consignee was refused
1.°, que las expediciones facturadas by the station agent without
por la compañia ferroviaria a la justification and with fraudulent
consignacion del actor de las vasijas intent, and (3) that the lack of
vacias que en su demanda relacionan delivery of these goods when they
tenian como fin el que este las were demanded by the plaintiff
devolviera a sus remitentes con vinos caused him losses and damages of
y alcoholes; 2.°, que llegadas a su considerable importance, as he was a
destino tales mercancias no se wholesale vendor of wines and liquors
quisieron entregar a dicho and he failed to realize the profits
consignatario por el jefe de la when he was unable to fill the orders
estacion sin motivo justificado y con sent to him by the consignors of the
intencion dolosa, y 3.°, que la falta de receptacles:
entrega de estas expediciones al
tiempo de reclamarlas el demandante
le originaron daños y perjuicios en "Considering that upon this
cantidad de bastante importancia basis there is need of upholding the
como expendedor al por mayor que four assignments of error, as the
era de vinos y alcoholes por las original complaint did not contain any
ganancias que dejo de obtener al cause of action arising from non-
verse privado de servir los pedidos fulfilment of a contract of
que se le habian hecho por los transportation, because the action
remitentes en los envases: was not based on the delay of the
goods nor on any contractual relation
between the parties litigant and,
"Considerando que sobre esta therefore, article 371 of the Code of
base hay necesidad de estimar los Commerce, on which the decision
cuatro motivos que integran este appealed from is based, is not
recurso, porque la demanda inicial applicable; but it limits itself to asking
del pleito a que se contrae no for reparation for losses and damages
contiene accion que nazca del produced on the patrimony of the
incumplimiento del contrato de plaintiff on account of the unjustified
transporte, toda vez que no se funda and fraudulent refusal of the carrier
en el retraso de la llegada de las to deliver the goods consigned to the
mercancias ni de ningun otro vinculo plaintiff as stated by the sentence,
contractual entre las partes and the carrier's responsibility is
contendientes, careciendo, por tanto, clearly laid down in article 1902 of
de aplicacion el articulo 371 del the Civil Code which binds, in virtue
Codigo de Comercio, en que of the next article, the defendant
principalmente descansa el fallo company, because the latter is
recurrido, sino que se limita a pedir la connected with the person who
reparacion de los daños y perjuicios caused the damage by relations of
producidos en el patrimonio del actor economic character and by
por la injustificada y dolosa negativa administrative hierarchy." (Emphasis
del porteador a la entrega de las supplied.)
mercancias a su nombre
consignadas, segun lo reconoce la
sentencia, y cuya responsabilidad The above case is pertinent because it
shows that the same act may come under both the

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Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the liable for the damages caused by the
action of the agent was unjustified minors who live with them.
and fraudulent and therefore could have been the
subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held to xxx xxx xxx
be also a proper subject of a civil action under
article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted
that it was the employer and not the employee who " 'Owners or directors of an
was being sued. establishment or enterprise are
equally liable for the damages caused
by their employees in the service of
Let us now examine the cases previously the branches in which the latter may
decided by this Court. be employed or in the performance of
their duties.
In the leading case of Rakes vs. Atlantic
Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359, 362-365 [year xxx xxx xxx
1907]), the trial court awarded damages to the
plaintiff, a laborer of the defendant, because the
latter had negligently failed to repair a tramway, in " 'The liability referred to in
consequence of which the rails slid off while iron this article shall cease when the
was being transported, and caught the plaintiff persons mentioned therein prove that
whose leg was broken. This Court held:. they employed all the diligence of a
good father of a family to avoid the
damage.'"
"It is contended by the
defendant, as its first defense to the
action that the necessary conclusion "As an answer to the
from these collated laws is that the argument urged in this particular
remedy for injuries through action it may be sufficient to point out
negligence lies only in a criminal that nowhere in our general statutes
action in which the official criminally is the employer penalized for failure
responsible must be made primarily to provide or maintain safe
liable and his employer held only appliances for his workmen. His
subsidiarily to him. According to this obligation therefore is one 'not
theory the plaintiff should have punished by the laws' and falls under
procured the arrest of the civil rather than criminal
representative of the company jurisprudence. But the answer may be
accountable for not repairing the a broader one. We should be
track, and on his prosecution a reluctant, under any conditions, to
suitable fine should have been adopt a forced construction of these
imposed, payable primarily by him scientific codes, such as is proposed
and secondarily by his employer. by the defendant, that would rob
some of these articles of effect, would
shut out litigants against their will
"This reasoning misconceived from the civil courts, would make the
the plan of the Spanish codes upon assertion of their rights dependent
this subject. Article 1093 of the Civil upon the selection for prosecution of
Code makes obligations arising from the proper criminal offender, and
faults or negligence not punished by render recovery doubtful by reason of
the law, subject to the provisions of the strict rules of proof prevailing in
Chapter II of Title XVI. Section 1902 of criminal actions. Even if these articles
that chapter reads: had always stood alone, such a
construction would be unnecessary,
" 'A person who by an act or but clear light is thrown upon their
omission causes damage to another meaning by the provisions of the Law
when there is fault or negligence shall of Criminal Procedure of Spain (Ley
be obliged to repair the damage so de Enjuiciamiento Criminal), which,
done. though never in actual force in these
Islands, was formerly given a
" 'SEC. 1903. The obligation suppletory or explanatory effect.
imposed by the preceding article is Under article 111 of this law, both
demandable, not only for personal classes of action, civil and criminal,
acts and omissions, but also for those might be prosecuted jointly or
of the persons for whom they should separately, but while the penal action
be responsible. was pending the civil was suspended.
According to article 112, the penal
action once started, the civil remedy
" 'The father, and on his should be sought therewith, unless it
death or incapacity, the mother, is had been waived by the party injured
or been expressly reserved by him for

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civil proceedings for the future. If the articles 1902 and 1093. More than
civil action alone was prosecuted, this, however, it cannot be said to fall
arising out of a crime that could be within the class of acts unpunished by
enforced only on private complaint, the law, the consequences of which
the penal action thereunder should are regulated by articles 1902 and
be extinguished. These provisions are 1903 of the Civil Code. The acts to
in harmony with those of articles 23 which these articles are applicable
and 133 of our Penal Code on the are understood to be those not
same subject. growing out of pre-existing duties of
the parties to one another. But where
"An examination of this topic relations already formed give rise to
might be carried much further, but duties, whether springing from
the citation of these articles suffices contract or quasi contract, then
to show that the civil liability was not breaches of those duties are subject
intended to be merged in the criminal to articles 1101, 1103, and 1104 of
nor even to be suspended thereby, the same code. A typical application
except as expressly provided in the of this distinction may be found in the
law. Where an individual is civilly consequences of a railway accident
liable for a negligent act or omission, due to defective machinery supplied
it is not required that the injured by the employer. His liability to his
party should seek out a third person employee would arise out of the
criminally liable whose prosecution contract of employment, that to the
must be a condition precedent to the passengers out of the contract for
enforcement of the civil right. passage, while that to the injured
bystander would originate in the
negligent act itself."
"Under article 20 of the Penal
Code the responsibility of an
employer may be regarded as In Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil., 821
subsidiary in respect of criminal (year 1918), the mother of the 8 or 9-year-old child
actions against his employees only Salvador Bona brought a civil action against Moreta
while they are in process of to recover damages resulting from the death of the
prosecution, or in so far as they child, who had been run over by an automobile
determine the existence of the driven and managed by the defendant. The trial
criminal act from which liability court rendered judgment requiring the defendant to
arises, and his obligation under the pay the plaintiff the sum of P1,000 as indemnity:
civil law and its enforcement in the This Court in affirming the judgment, said in part:
civil courts is not barred thereby
unless by the election of the injured "If it were true that the
person. Inasmuch as no criminal defendant, in coming from the
proceeding had been instituted, southern part of Solana Street, had to
growing out of the accident in stop his auto before crossing Real
question, the provisions of the Penal Street, because he had met vehicles
Code can not affect this action. This which were going along the latter
construction renders it unnecessary street or were coming from the
to finally determine here whether this opposite direction along Solana
subsidiary civil liability in penal Street, it is to be believed that, when
actions has survived the laws that he again started to run his auto
fully regulated it or has been across said Real Street and to
abrogated by the American civil and continue its way along Solana Street
criminal procedure now in force in the northward, he should have adjusted
Philippines. the speed of the auto which he was
operating until he had fully crossed
"The difficulty in construing Real Street and had completely
the articles of the code above cited in reached a clear way on Solana Street.
this case appears from the briefs But, as the child was run over by the
before us to have arisen from the auto precisely at the entrance of
interpretation of the words of article Solana Street, this accident could not
1093, 'fault or negligence not have occurred if the auto had been
punished by law,' as applied to the running at a slow speed, aside from
comprehensive definition of offenses the fact that the defendant, at the
in articles 568 and 590 of the Penal moment of crossing Real Street and
Code. It has been shown that the entering Solana Street, in a
liability of an employer arising out of northward direction, could have seen
his relation to his employee who is the child in the act of crossing the
the offender is not to be regarded as latter street from the sidewalk on the
derived from negligence punished by right to that on the left, and if the
the law, within the meaning of accident had occurred in such a way

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 that after the automobile had run "Although the trial judge
over the body of the child, and the made the findings of fact
child's body had already been hereinbefore outlined, he
stretched out on the ground, the nevertheless was led to order the
automobile still moved along a dismissal of the action because of the
distance of about 2 meters, this contributory negligence of the
circumstance shows the fact that the plaintiffs. It is from this point that a
automobile entered Solana Street majority of the court depart from the
from Real Street, at a high speed stand taken by the trial judge. The
without the defendant having blown mother and her child had a perfect
the horn. If these precautions had right to be on the principal street of
been taken by the defendant, the Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening when
deplorable accident which caused the the religious procession was held.
death of the child would not have There was nothing abnormal in
occurred." allowing the child to run along a few
paces in advance of the mother. No
It will be noticed that the defendant in the one could foresee the coincidence of
above case could have been prosecuted in a an automobile appearing and of a
criminal case because his negligence causing the frightened child running and falling
death of the child was punishable by the Penal into a ditch filled with hot water. The
Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of the doctrine announced in the much
same act of negligence being a proper subject- debated case of Rakes vs. Atlantic
matter either of a criminal action with its Gulf and Pacific Co. ([1907], 7 Phil.,
consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of 359), still rule. Article 1902 of the
an entirely separate and independent civil action Civil Code must again be enforced.
for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the The contributory negligence of the
Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate child and her mother, if any, does not
individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana operate as a bar to recovery, but in
under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly its strictest sense could only result in
recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for reduction of the damages."
which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted
and convicted in a criminal case and for which, It is most significant that in the case just
after such a conviction, he could have been sued cited, this Court specifically applied article 1902 of
for this civil liability arising from his crime. the Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V. House
could have been criminally prosecuted for reckless
Years later (in 1930) this Court had another or simple negligence and not only punished but
occasion to apply the same doctrine. In Bernal and also made civilly liable because of his criminal
Enverso vs. House and Tacloban Electric & Ice negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded
Plant, Ltd., 54 Phil., 327, the parents of the five- damages in an independent civil action for fault or
year-old child, Purificacion Bernal, brought a civil negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code.
action to recover damages for the child's death as a
result of burns caused by the fault and negligence In Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes (30 Phil.,
of the defendants. On the evening of April 10, 1925, 624 [year 1915]), the action was for damages for
the Good Friday procession was held in Tacloban, the death of the plaintiff's daughter alleged to have
Leyte. Fortunata Enverso with her daughter been caused by the negligence of the servant in
Purificacion Bernal had come from another driving an automobile over the child. It appeared
municipality to attend the same. After the that the cause of the mishap was a defect in the
procession the mother and the daughter with two steering gear. The defendant Leynes had rented
others were passing along Gran Capitan Street in the automobile from the International Garage of
front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Manila, to be used by him in carrying passengers
Plant, Ltd., owned by defendant J. V. House, when during the fiesta of Tuy, Batangas. Leynes was
an automobile appeared from the opposite ordered by the lower court to pay P1,000 as
direction. The little girl, who was slightly ahead of damages to the plaintiff. On appeal this Court
the rest, was so frightened by the automobile that reversed the judgment as to Leynes on the ground
she turned to run, but unfortunately she fell into that he had shown that he exercised the care of a
the street gutter where hot water from the electric good father of a family, thus overcoming the
plant was flowing. The child died that same night presumption of negligence under article 1903. This
from the burns. The trial court dismissed the action Court said:
because of the contributory negligence of the
plaintiffs. But this Court held, on appeal, that there "As to selection, the
was no contributory negligence, and allowed the defendant has clearly shown that he
parents P1,000 in damages from J. V. House who at exercised the care and diligence of a
the time of the tragic occurrence was the holder of good father of a family. He obtained
the franchise for the electric plant. This Court said the machine from a reputable garage
in part: and it was, so far as appeared, in
good condition. The workmen were
likewise selected from a standard

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 garage, were duly licensed by the is the owner or director of a business
Government in their particular calling, or enterprise and the negligent acts
and apparently thoroughly are committed while the servant is
competent. The machine had been engaged in his master's employment
used but a few hours when the as such owner"
accident occurred and it is clear from
the evidence that the defendant had Another case which followed the decision in
no notice, either actual or Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes was Cuison vs.
constructive, of the defective Norton & Harrison Co., 55 Phil., 18 (year 1930). The
condition of the steering gear." latter case was an action for damages brought by
Cuison for the death of his seven-year-old son
The legal aspect of the case was discussed Moises. The little boy was on his way to school with
by this Court thus:. his sister Marciana. Some large pieces of lumber
fell from a truck and pinned the boy underneath,
"Article 1903 of the Civil Code instantly killing him. Two youths, Telesforo Binoya
not only establishes liability in cases and Francisco Bautista, who were working for Ora,
of negligence, but also provides when an employee of defendant Norton & Harrison Co.,
the liability shall cease. It says: pleaded guilty to the crime of homicide through
reckless negligence and were sentenced
accordingly. This Court, applying articles 1902 and
" 'The liability referred to in 1903, held:
this article shall cease when the
persons mentioned therein prove that
they employed all the diligence of a "The basis of civil law liability
good father of a family to avoid the is not respondent superior but the
damage.'" relationship of pater familias. This
theory bases the liability of the
master ultimately on his own
"From this article two things negligence and not on that of his
are apparent: (1) That when an injury servant." (Bahia vs. Litonjua and
is caused by the negligence of a Leynes [1915], 30 Phil., 624; Cangco
servant or employee there instantly vs. Manila Railroad Co. [1918], 38
arises a presumption of law that there Phil., 768.)
was negligence on the part of the
master or employer either in the
selection of the servant or employee, In Walter A. Smith & Co. vs. Cadwallader
or in supervision over him after the Gibson Lumber Co., 55 Phil., 517 (year 1930) the
selection, or both; and (2) that that plaintiff brought an action for damages for the
presumption is juris tantum and not demolition of its wharf, which had been struck by
juris et de jure, and consequently, the steamer Helen C belonging to the defendant.
may be rebutted. It follows This Court held (p. 526):
necessarily that if the employer
shows to the satisfaction of the court "The evidence shows that
that in selection and supervision he Captain Lasa at the time the plaintiff's
has exercised the care and diligence wharf collapsed was a duly licensed
of a good father of a family, the captain, authorized to navigate and
presumption is overcome and he is direct a vessel of any tonnage, and
relieved from liability. that the appellee contracted his
services because of his reputation as
"This theory bases the a captain, according to F. C.
responsibility of the master ultimately Cadwallader. This being so, we are of
on his own negligence and not on the opinion that the presumption of
that of his servant." liability against the defendant has
been overcome by the exercise of the
care and diligence of a good father of
The doctrine of the case just cited was a family in selecting Captain Lasa, in
followed by this Court in Cerf vs. Medel (33 Phil., 37 accordance with the doctrines laid
[year 1915]). In the latter case, the complaint down by this court in the cases cited
alleged that the defendant's servant had so above, and the defendant is therefore
negligently driven an automobile, which was absolved from all liability."
operated by defendant as a public vehicle, that said
automobile struck and damaged the plaintiff's
motorcycle. This Court, applying article 1903 and It is, therefore, seen that the defendant's
following the rule in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, theory about his secondary liability is negatived by
said in part (p. 41) that: the six cases above set forth. He is, on the
authority of these cases, primarily and directly
responsible in damages under article 1903, in
"The master is liable for the relation to article 1902, of the Civil Code.
negligent acts of his servant where he

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 Let us now take up the Philippine decisions conviction for a crime or
relied upon by the defendant. We study first, City of misdemeanor. (By way of
Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., 52 Phil., 586 (year parenthesis, it may be said further
1928). A collision between a truck of the City of that the statements here made are
Manila and a street car of the Manila Electric Co. offered to meet the argument
took place on June 8, 1925. The truck was damaged advanced during our deliberations to
in the amount of P1,788.27. Sixto Eustaquio, the the effect that article 1902 of the Civil
motorman, was prosecuted for the crime of Code should be disregarded and
damage to property and slight injuries through codal articles 1093 and 1903
reckless imprudence. He was found guilty and applied.)"
sentenced to pay a fine of P900, to indemnify the
City of Manila for P1,788.27, with subsidiary It is not clear how the above case could
imprisonment in case of insolvency. Unable to support the defendant's proposition, because the
collect the indemnity from Eustaquio, the City of Court of Appeals based its decision in the present
Manila filed an action against the Manila Electric case on the defendant's primary responsibility
Company to obtain payment, claiming that the under article 1903 of the Civil Code and not on his
defendant was subsidiarily liable. The main defense subsidiary liability arising from Fontanilla's criminal
was that the defendant had exercised the diligence negligence. In other words, the case of City of
of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., supra, is predicated
The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the on an entirely different theory, which is the
plaintiff. This Court held, in part, that this case was subsidiary liability of an employer arising from a
governed by the Penal Code, saying: criminal act of his employee, whereas the
foundation of the decision of the Court of Appeals in
"With this preliminary point the present case is the employer's primary liability
out of the way, there is no escaping under article 1903 of the Civil Code. We have
the conclusion that the provisions of already seen that this is a proper and independent
the Penal Code govern. The Penal remedy.
Code in easily understandable
language authorizes the Arambulo vs. Manila Electric Co. (55 Phil.,
determination of subsidiary liability. 75), is another case invoked by the defendant. A
The Civil Code negatives its motorman in the employ of the Manila Electric
application by providing that civil Company had been convicted of homicide by
obligations arising from crimes or simple negligence and sentenced, among other
misdemeanors shall be governed by things, to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of
the provisions of the Penal Code. The P1,000. An action was then brought to enforce the
conviction of the motorman was a subsidiary liability of the defendant as employer
misdemeanor falling under article 604 under the Penal Code. The defendant attempted to
of the Penal Code. The act of the show that it had exercised the diligence of a good
motorman was not a wrongful or father of a family in selecting the motorman, and
negligent act or omission not therefore claimed exemption from civil liability. But
punishable by law. Accordingly, the this Court held:
civil obligation connected up with the
Penal Code and not with article 1903
of the Civil Code. In other words, the "In view of the foregoing
Penal Code affirms its jurisdiction considerations, we are of opinion and
while the Civil Code negatives its so hold, (1) that the exemption from
jurisdiction. This is a case of criminal civil liability established in article
negligence out of which civil liability 1903 of the Civil Code for all who
arises and not a case of civil have acted with the diligence of a
negligence." good father of a family, is not
applicable to the subsidiary civil
liability provided in article 20 of the
xxx xxx xxx Penal Code."

"Our deduction, therefore, is The above case is also extraneous to the

that the case relates to the Penal theory of the defendant in the instant case,
Code and not to the Civil Code. because the action there had for its purpose the
Indeed, as pointed out by the trial enforcement of the defendant's subsidiary liability
judge, any different ruling would under the Penal Code, while in the case at bar, the
permit the master to escape scot- plaintiff's cause of action is based on the
free by simply alleging and proving defendant's primary and direct responsibility under
that the master had exercised all article 1903 of the Civil Code. In fact, the above
diligence in the selection and training case destroys the defendant's contention because
of its servants to prevent the that decision illustrates the principle that the
damage. That would be a good employer's primary responsibility under article
defense to a strictly civil action, but 1903 of the Civil Code is different in character from
might or might not be to a civil action his subsidiary liability under the Penal Code.
either as a part of or predicated on

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 In trying to apply the two cases just Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a
referred to, counsel for the defendant has failed to criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable
recognize the distinction between civil liability doubt is required, while in a civil case,
arising from a crime, which is governed by the preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the
Penal Code, and the responsibility for cuasi- defendant pay in damages. There are numerous
delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code, and cases of criminal negligence which can not be
has likewise failed to give due importance to the shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved
latter type of civil action. by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the
defendant can and should be made responsible in a
The defendant-petitioner also cites civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil
Francisco vs. Onrubia (46 Phil., 327). That case Code. Otherwise, there would be many instances of
need not be set forth. Suffice it to say that the unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
question involved was also civil liability arising from
a crime. Hence, it is as inapplicable as the two Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way
cases above discussed. to make defendant's liability effective, and that is,
to sue the driver and exhaust his (the latter's)
The foregoing authorities clearly property first, would be tantamount to compelling
demonstrate the separate individuality of cuasi- the plaintiff to follow a devious and cumbersome
delitos or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code. method of obtaining relief. True, there is such a
Specifically they show that there is a distinction remedy under our laws, but there is also a more
between civil liability arising from criminal expeditious way, which is based on the primary and
negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and direct responsibility of the defendant under article
responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1903 of the Civil Code. Our view of the law is more
1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the same likely to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs, because
negligent act may produce either a civil liability the procedure indicated by the defendant is
arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or a wasteful and productive of delay, it being a matter
separate responsibility for fault or negligence under of common knowledge that professional drivers of
articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Still more taxis and similar public conveyances usually do not
concretely, the authorities above cited render it have sufficient means with which to pay damages.
inescapable to conclude that the employer — in this Why then, should the plaintiff be required in all
case the defendant-petitioner — is primarily and cases to go through this roundabout, unnecessary,
directly liable under article 1903 of the Civil Code. and probably useless procedure? In construing the
laws, courts have endeavored to shorten and
facilitate the pathways of right and justice.
The legal provisions, authors, and cases
already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to
dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are At this juncture, it should be said that the
announcing doctrines that have been little primary and direct responsibility of employers and
understood in the past, it might not be their presumed negligence are principles calculated
inappropriate to indicate their foundations. to protect society. Workmen and employees should
be carefully chosen and supervised in order to
avoid injury to the public. It is the masters or
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article employers who principally reap the profits resulting
365 punishes not only reckless but also simple from the services of these servants and employees.
negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to It is but right that they should guarantee the
1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or latter's careful conduct for the personnel and
negligence not punished by law, according to the patrimonial safety of others. As Theilhard has said,
literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the "they should reproach themselves, at least, some
legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very for their weakness, others for their poor selection
little scope and application in actual life. Death or and all for their negligence." And according to
injury to persons and damage to property through Manresa, "It is much more equitable and just that
any degree of negligence — even the slightest — such responsibility should fall upon the principal or
would have to be indemnified only through the director who could have chosen a careful and
principle of civil liability arising from a crime. In prudent employee, and not upon the injured person
such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain who could not exercise such selection and who
for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to used such employee because of his confidence in
impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring the principal or director." (Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.)
about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are Many jurists also base this primary responsibility of
we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to the employer on the principle of representation of
uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit the principal by the agent. Thus, Oyuelos says in
that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning the work already cited (Vol. 7, p. 747) that before
of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a third persons the employer and employee "vienen a
principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown ser como una sola personalidad, por refundicion de
development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi- la del dependiente en la de quien le emplea y
delito, which is conserved and made enduring in utiliza." ("become as one personality by the
articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code. merging of the person of the employee in that of
him who employs and utilizes him.") All these
observations acquire a peculiar force and

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 significance when it comes to motor accidents, and
there is need of stressing and accentuating the
responsibility of owners of motor vehicles.

Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the

provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil
Code on this subject, which has given rise to the
overlapping or concurrence of spheres already
discussed, and for lack of understanding of the
character and efficacy of the action for culpa
aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice
to seek damages only by virtue of the civil
responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that
there is another remedy, which is by invoking
articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this
habitual method is allowed by our laws, it has
nevertheless rendered practically useless and
nugatory the more expeditious and effective
remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-
contractual. In the present case, we are asked to
help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it
is high time we pointed out to the harm done by
such practice and to restore the principle of
responsibility for fault or negligence under articles
1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is
high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict or
culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel,
so that its waters may no longer be diverted into
that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is
believed, make for the better safeguarding of
private rights because it re- establishes an ancient
and additional remedy, and for the further reason
that an independent civil action, not depending on
the issues, limitations and results of a criminal
prosecution, and entirely directed by the party
wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure
adequate and efficacious redress.

In view of the foregoing, the judgment of

the Court of Appeals should be and is hereby
affirmed, with costs against the defendant-
petitioner.

Yulo, C.J., Moran, Ozaeta and Paras,

JJ., concur.

||| (Barredo v. Garcia, G.R. No. 48006, [July 8, 1942], 73

PHIL 607-621)

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Joseph vs Bautista GR No L-41423 February 23 DECISION
1989

SECOND DIVISION REGALADO, J .:

Petitioner prays in this appeal by certiorari for the

[G.R. No. L-41423. February 23, 1989.] annulment and setting aside of the order, dated July 8,
1975, dismissing petitioner's complaint, as well as the
order, dated August 22, 1975, denying his motion for
LUIS JOSEPH, petitioner, vs. HON.
reconsideration of said dismissal, both issued by
CRISPIN V. BAUTISTA,
respondent Judge Crispin V. Bautista of the former
PATROCINIO PEREZ, ANTONIO
Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch III.
SIOSON, JACINTO PAGARIGAN,
ALBERTO CARDENO and LAZARO Petitioner herein is the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 50-V-73
VILLANUEVA, respondents. entitled "Luis Joseph vs. Patrocinio Perez, Domingo Villa
y de Jesus, Rosario Vargas, Antonio Sioson, Lazaro
Villanueva and Jacinto Pagarigan", filed before the
Jose M . Castillo for petitioner. Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch III, and
presided over by respondent Judge Crispin V. Bautista;
Arturo Z. Sioson for private respondent, Patrocinio while private respondents Patrocinio Perez, Antonio
Perez. Sioson, Jacinto Pagarigan and Lazaro Villanueva are
Cipriano B. Farrales for private respondents except P. four of the defendants in said case. Defendant Domingo
Perez. Villa y de Jesus did not answer either the original or the
amended complaint, while defendant Rosario Vargas
could not be served with summons; and respondent
Alberto Cardeno is included herein as he was
SYLLABUS
impleaded by defendant Patrocinio Perez, one of
respondents herein, in her cross-claim.
1. REMEDIAL LAW; COMPLAINT; "CAUSE OF ACTION",
The generative facts of this case, as culled from the
CONSTRUED. — A cause of action is understood to be
written submission of the parties, are as follows: Cdpr
the delict or wrongful act or omission committed by the
defendant in violation of the primary rights of the Respondent Patrocinio Perez is the owner of a cargo
plaintiff. It is true that a single act or omission can be truck with Plate No. 25-2 YT Phil. '73 for conveying
violative of various rights at the same time, as when cargoes and passengers for a consideration from
the act constitutes juridically a violation of several Dagupan City to Manila. On January 12, 1973, said
separate and distinct legal obligations. However, where cargo truck driven by defendant Domingo Villa was on
there is only one delict or wrong, there is but a single its way to Valenzuela, Bulacan from Pangasinan.
cause of action regardless of the number of rights that Petitioner, with a cargo of livestock, boarded the cargo
may have been violated belonging to one person. The truck at Dagupan City after paying the sum of P9.00 as
singleness of a cause of action lies in the singleness of one-way fare to Valenzuela, Bulacan. While said cargo
the delict or wrong violating the rights of one person. truck was negotiating the National Highway proceeding
Nevertheless, if only one injury resulted from several towards Manila, defendant Domingo Villa tried to
wrongful acts only one cause of action arises. overtake a tricycle likewise proceeding in the same
direction. At about the same time, a pick-up truck with
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; RECOVERY OF PARTY UNDER ONE
Plate No. 45-95 B, supposedly owned by respondents
REMEDY, BARS RECOVERY UNDER THE OTHER. — The
Antonio Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan, then driven by
trial court was, therefore, correct in holding that there
respondent Lazaro Villanueva, tried to overtake the
was only one cause of action involved although the
cargo truck which was then in the process of overtaking
bases of recovery invoked by petitioner against the
the tricycle, thereby forcing the cargo truck to veer
defendants therein were not necessarily identical since
towards the shoulder of the road and to ram a mango
the respondents were not identically circumstanced.
tree. As a result, petitioner sustained a bone fracture in
However, a recovery by the petitioner under one
one of his legs. 1
remedy necessarily bars recovery under the other. This,
in essence, is the rationale for the proscription in our The following proceedings thereafter took place: 2
law against double recovery for the same act or
omission which, obviously, stems from the fundamental Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against
rule against unjust enrichment. respondent Patrocinio Perez, as owner of the cargo
truck, based on a breach of contract of carriage and
3. CIVIL LAW; SOLIDARY OBLIGATIONS; PAYMENT OF against respondents Antonio Sioson and Lazaro
ONE DEBTOR RELEASES THE OTHER DEBTORS FROM Villanueva, as owner and driver, respectively, of the
LIABILITY. — The respondents having been found to be pick-up truck, based on quasi-delict.
solidarily liable to petitioner, the full payment made by
some of the solidary debtors and their subsequent Respondent Sioson filed his answer alleging that he is
release from any and all liability to petitioner inevitably not and never was an owner of the pick-up truck and
resulted in the extinguishment and release from neither would he acquire ownership thereof in the
liability of the other solidary debtors, including herein future.
respondent Patrocinio Perez.

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On September 24, 1973, petitioner, with prior leave of cause of action for breach of contract of carriage, is
court, filed his amended complaint impleading untenable.
respondents Jacinto Pazarigan and a certain Rosario
Vargas as additional alternative defendants. Petitioner A cause of action is understood to be the delict or
apparently could not ascertain who the real owner of wrongful act or omission committed by the defendant
said cargo truck was, whether respondents Patrocinio in violation of the primary rights of the plaintiff. 3 It is
Perez or Rosario Vargas, and who was the real owner of true that a single act or omission can be violative of
said pick-up truck, whether respondents Antonio Sioson various rights at the same time, as when the act
or Jacinto Pagarigan. constitutes juridically a violation of several separate
and distinct legal obligations. However, where there is
Respondent Perez filed her amended answer with only one delict or wrong, there is but a single cause of
cross-claim against her co-defendants for indemnity action regardless of the number of rights that may have
and subrogation in the event she is ordered to pay been violated belonging to one person. 4
petitioner's claim, and therein impleaded cross-
defendant Alberto Cardeno as additional alternative The singleness of a cause of action lies in the
defendant. singleness of the delict or wrong violating the rights of
one person. Nevertheless, if only one injury resulted
On September 27, 1974, respondents Lazaro from several wrongful acts only one cause of action
Villanueva, Alberto Cardeno, Antonio Sioson and Jacinto arises. 5 In the case at bar, there is no question that
Pagarigan, thru their insurer, Insurance Corporation of the petitioner sustained a single injury on his person.
the Philippines, paid petitioner's claim for injuries That vested in him a single cause of action, albeit with
sustained in the amount of P1,300.00. By reason the correlative rights of action against the different
thereof, petitioner executed a release of claim respondents through the appropriate remedies allowed
releasing from liability the following parties, viz: by law.
Insurance Corporation of the Philippines, Alberto
Cardeno, Lazaro Villanueva, Antonio Sioson and Jacinto The trial court was, therefore, correct in holding that
Pagarigan. there was only one cause of action involved although
the bases of recovery invoked by petitioner against the
On December 2, 1974, respondents Lazaro Villanueva, defendants therein were not necessarily identical since
Alberto Cardeno and their insurer, the Insurance the respondents were not identically circumstanced.
Corporation of the Philippines, paid respondent However, a recovery by the petitioner under one
Patrocinio Perez' claim for damages to her cargo truck remedy necessarily bars recovery under the other. This,
in the amount of P7,420.61. dctai in essence, is the rationale for the proscription in our
law against double recovery for the same act or
Consequently, respondents Sioson, Pagarigan, Cardeno omission which, obviously, stems from the fundamental
and Villanueva filed a "Motion to Exonerate and Exclude rule against unjust enrichment.
Defs./Cross defs. Alberto Cardeno, Lazaro Villanueva,
Antonio Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan on the Instant There is no question that the respondents herein are
Case", alleging that respondents Cardeno and solidarily liable to petitioner. On the evidence
Villanueva already paid P7,420.61 by way of damages presented in the court below, the trial court found them
to respondent Perez, and alleging further that to be so liable. It is undisputed that petitioner, in his
respondents Cardeno, Villanueva, Sioson and Pagarigan amended complaint, prayed that the trial court hold
paid P1,300.00 to petitioner by way of amicable respondents jointly and severally liable. Furthermore,
settlement. the allegations in the amended complaint clearly
impleaded respondents as solidary debtors. We cannot
Thereafter, respondent Perez filed her "Opposition to accept the vacuous contention of petitioner that said
Crossdefs.' motion dated Dec. 2, 1974 and Counter allegations are intended to apply only in the event that
Motion" to dismiss. The so-called counter motion to execution be issued in his favor. There is nothing in law
dismiss was premised on the fact that the release of or jurisprudence which would countenance such a
claim executed by petitioner in favor of the other procedure. Cdpr
respondents inured to the benefit of respondent Perez,
considering that all the respondents are solidarity liable  
to herein petitioner. LLpr
The respondents having been found to be solidarily
On July 8, 1975, respondent judge issued the liable to petitioner, the full payment made by some of
questioned order dismissing the case, and a motion for the solidary debtors and their subsequent release from
the reconsideration thereof was denied. Hence, this any and all liability to petitioner inevitably resulted in
appeal, petitioner contending that respondent judge the extinguishment and release from liability of the
erred in declaring that the release of claim executed by other solidary debtors, including herein respondent
petitioner in favor of respondents Sioson, Villanueva Patrocinio Perez.
and Pagarigan inured to the benefit of respondent
Perez; ergo, it likewise erred in dismissing the case. The claim that there was an agreement entered into
between the parties during the pre-trial conference
We find the present recourse devoid of merit. that, after such payment made by the other
respondents, the case shall proceed as against
The argument that there are two causes of action respondent Perez is both incredible and
embodied in petitioner's complaint, hence the unsubstantiated. There is nothing in the records to
judgment on the compromise agreement under the show, either by way of pre-trial order, minutes or a
cause of action based on quasi-delict is not a bar to the transcript of the notes of the alleged pre-trial hearing,
that there was indeed such an agreement.

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WHEREFORE, the challenged orders of the respondent
judge are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, C .J ., Paras, Padilla, and Sarmiento,

JJ ., concur.

||| (Joseph v. Bautista, G.R. No. L-41423, [February 23,

1989], 252 PHIL 560-566)

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Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation vs People of dispositive portion by ordering the defendant Rafael
the Philippines GR No 129029 April 3 2000 Reyes Trucking Corporation subsidiarily liable for all the
damages awarded to the heirs of Francisco Dy, Jr. On
January 6, 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered an
EN BANC amended decision affirming that of the trial court. On
January 31, 1997, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the amended decision. On April 21,
[G.R. No. 129029. April 3, 2000.] 1997, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion
for reconsideration for lack of merit. Hence, this petition
for review. DcCASI
RAFAEL REYES TRUCKING
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. The Supreme Court granted the petition
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and resolving under circumstances pro hac vice to remand
ROSARIO P. DY (for herself and the cases to the trial court for determination of the civil
on behalf of the minors Maria liability of petitioner as employer of the accused driver
Luisa, Francis Edward, Francis in the civil action quasi ex delicto. The Court ruled that
Mark and Francis Rafael, all Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as employer of the
surnamed Dy), respondents. accused who had been adjudged guilty in the criminal
case for reckless imprudence, can not be held
subsidiarily liable because of the filing of the separate
Perpetuo G. Paner for petitioner. civil action based on quasi delict against it. In view of
the reservation to file, and the subsequent filing of the
The Solicitor General for respondents. civil action for recovery of civil liability, the same was
not instituted with the criminal action. Such separate
civil action was for recovery of damages under Article
SYNOPSIS 2176 of the Civil Code, arising from the same act or
omission of the accused. However, petitioner as
defendant in the separate civil action for damages filed
In an information filed before the Regional Trial against it, based on quasi delict, may be held liable
Court of Isabela, Romeo Dunca was charged with the thereon. Thus, the trial court grievously erred in
crime of reckless imprudence resulting in double dismissing plaintiff's civil complaint. And the Court of
homicide and damage to property. The information Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's decision.
stated that Dunca recklessly and negligently drove the Unfortunately private respondents did not appeal from
vehicle registered in the name of Rafael Trucking such dismissal and could not be granted affirmative
Corporation causing the vehicle to hit and bump a relief. The Court, however, in exceptional cases, has
Nissan Pick-up driven by Feliciano Balcita and Francisco relaxed the rules. Invoking this principle, the Court
Dy, Jr. Said accident caused the victims multiple ruled that the trial court erred in awarding civil
injuries, open wounds, abrasions and death to Francisco damages in the criminal case and in dismissing the civil
Dy, Jr. The Pick-up also suffered damages in the action. Apparently satisfied with such award, private
amount of P2,000,000.00. The offended parties respondent did not appeal from the dismissal of the
(Rosario P. Dy and minor children and Angelina M. civil case. However, petitioner did appeal. Hence, this
Balcita and minor son Paolo) made a reservation to file case should be remanded to the trial court so that it
a separate civil action against the accused arising from may render decision in the civil case awarding
the offense charged. On November 29, 1989, the damages as may be warranted by the evidence. The
offended parties actually filed with the Regional Trial award of damages in the criminal case was improper
Court of Isabela, a complaint against petitioner Rafael because the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
Reyes Trucking Corporation, as employer of driver was waived in the criminal action by the filing of a
Romeo Dunca based on quasi delict. The private separate civil action against the employer. The only
respondents opted to pursue the criminal action but did issue brought before the trial court in the criminal
not withdraw the civil case quasi ex delicto they filed action is whether accused Romeo Dunca y de Tumol
against petitioner. On December 15, 1989, private was guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
respondents withdrew the reservation to file a separate and damage to property. The action for recovery of civil
civil action against the accused and manifested that liability is not included therein, but is covered by the
they would prosecute the civil aspect ex delicto in the separate civil action filed against the petitioner as
criminal action. However, they did not withdraw the employer of the accused truck-driver. In this case,
separate civil action based on quasi delict against accused-driver jumped bail pending his appeal from his
petitioner as employer arising from the same act or conviction. Thus, the judgment convicting the accused
omission of the accused driver. On June 6, 1992, the became final and executory, but only insofar as the
trial court rendered a joint decision finding the accused penalty in the criminal action is concerned. The
Romeo Dunca guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the damages awarded in the criminal action was invalid
crime of Double Homicide through Reckless because of its effective waiver. The trial court erred in
Imprudence with violation of the Motor Vehicle Law awarding damages in the criminal case because by
(Rep. Act No. 4136), and appreciating in his favor the virtue of the reservation of the right to bring a separate
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender without civil action or the filing thereof, "there would be no
any aggravating circumstance to offset the same. The possibility that the employer would be held liable
court also ordered the driver to indemnify the heirs of because in such a case there would be no
Francisco Dy, Jr. On October 26, 1992, the trial court pronouncement as to the civil liability of the accused.
rendered a supplemental decision amending the

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 SYLLABUS Thus, the judgment convicting the accused became
final and executory, but only insofar as the penalty in
the criminal action is concerned. The damages awarded
1. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; QUASI in the criminal action was invalid because of its
DELICT; ENFORCEMENT OF CIVIL LIABILITY; RULE. — In effective waiver. The pronouncement was void because
negligence cases, the aggrieved party has the choice the action for recovery of the civil liability arising from
between (1) an action to enforce civil liability arising the crime has been waived in said criminal action.
from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code; and (2) a separate action for quasi delict under 4. ID.; ID.; DOUBLE HOMICIDE THROUGH
Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Once RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE; NO SUCH NOMENCLATURE OF
the choice is made, the injured party can not avail AN OFFENSE UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE. —
himself of any other remedy because he may not Parenthetically, the trial court found the accused "guilty
recover damages twice for the same negligent act or beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Double
omission of the accused. This is the rule against double Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence with violation
recovery. In other words, "the same act or omission can of the Motor Vehicle Law (Rep. Act No. 4136)." There is
create two kinds of liability on the part of the offender, no such nomenclature of an offense under the Revised
that is, civil liability ex delicto, and civil liability quasi Penal Code. Thus, the trial court was misled to
delicto" either of which "may be enforced against the sentence the accused "to suffer two (2) indeterminate
culprit, subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the penalties of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto
Civil Code that the offended party can not recover mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years, six (6) months
damages under both types of liability." In the instant and twenty (20) days of prision correccional, as
case, the offended parties elected to file a separate maximum." This is erroneous because in reckless
civil action for damages against petitioner as employer imprudence cases, the actual penalty for criminal
of the accused, based on quasi delict, under Article negligence bears no relation to the individual willful
2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Private crime or crimes committed, but is set in relation to a
respondents sued petitioner Rafael Reyes Trucking whole class, or series of crimes.
Corporation, as the employer of the accused, to be
vicariously liable for the fault or negligence of the VITUG, J., separate opinion:
latter. Under the law, this vicarious liability of the 1. CIVIL LAW; INDEPENDENT CIVIL
employer is founded on at least two specific provisions ACTIONS; QUASI DELICT; FAILURE TO RECOVER IN CIVIL
of law. LIABILITY EX DELICTO WILL NOT NECESSARILY
2. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PRECLUDE RECOVERY IN CIVIL LIABILITY EX QUASI
WAIVER OF CIVIL ACTIONS; RATIONALE. — The rationale DELICTO. — An early established rule under our law is
behind this rule is the avoidance of multiple suits that an act or omission, extra-contractual in nature,
between the same litigants arising out of the same act causing damage to another, there being fault or
or omission of the offender. The restrictive phraseology negligence can create two separate civil liabilities on
of the section under consideration is meant to cover all the part of the offender, i.e., civil liability ex delicto and
kinds of civil actions, regardless of their source in law, civil liability ex quasi delicto. Either one of these two
provided that the action has for its basis the same act possible liabilities may be sought to be enforced
or omission of the offender. against the offender, subject however, to
the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the
3. CRIMINAL LAW; RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE offended party cannot "recover damages twice for the
RESULTING IN HOMICIDE; AWARD OF DAMAGES IN same act or omission" or under both causes. Outside of
CRIMINAL CASE IMPROPER IN CASE AT BAR. — Invoking this proscription, the two civil liabilities are distinct and
this principle, we rule that the trial court erred in independent of each other; thus, and conversely
awarding civil damages in the criminal case and in against the rule on double recovery, the failure of
dismissing the civil action. Apparently satisfied with recovery in one will not necessarily preclude recovery
such award, private respondent did not appeal from the in the other.
dismissal of the civil case. However, petitioner did
appeal. Hence, this case should be remanded to the 2. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOTWITHSTANDING THE
trial court so that it may render decision in the civil INDEPENDENT NATURE OF THE CIVIL ACTIONS FALLING
case awarding damages as may be warranted by the UNDER ARTICLES 32, 33, 34, AND 2176 OF THE CIVIL
evidence. With regard to the second issue, the award of CODE, THE RIGHT TO INSTITUTE A CIVIL ACTION MUST
damages in the criminal case was improper because STILL HAVE TO BE RESERVED. — In the recently
the civil action for the recovery of civil liability was decided case of San Ildefonso Lines, Inc., vs. Court of
waived in the criminal action by the filing of a separate Appeals, et al., the Supreme Court has ruled that,
civil action against the employer. As enunciated notwithstanding the independent nature of civil actions
in Ramos vs. Gonong, "civil indemnity is not part of the falling under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
penalty for the crime committed." The only issue Code, the right to institute the action must still have to
brought before the trial court in the criminal action is be reserved. In the stern words of the Court: The "past
whether accused Romeo Dunca y de Tumol is guilty of pronouncements that view the reservation requirement
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage as an unauthorized amendment to substantive law, i.e.,
to property. The action for recovery of civil liability is the Civil Code, should no longer be controlling."
not included therein, but is covered by the separate Essentially, I share this view although I also
civil action filed against the petitioner as employer of understand San Ildefonso as merely fortifying a
the accused truck-driver. In this case, accused-driver procedural rule that unless a reservation is made, the
jumped bail pending his appeal from his conviction. court trying the criminal case would not, for instance,
be precluded from taking cognizance of the civil aspect

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of the litigation and that, upon the other hand, the proceedings, nor entitled to take such role, up until he
other court in the civil case might, motu propio or at suddenly finds himself open to a possible subsidiary
the instance of a party, hold in abeyance the liability following the judgment of conviction. ETIDaH
consideration thereof pending the outcome of the
criminal case. In Maniago vs. Court of Appeals, the DAVIDE, JR., C.J., dissenting opinion:
Court has said that the requirement of reservation is CRIMINAL LAW; RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE;
not incompatible with the distinct and separate PETITIONER AS EMPLOYER OF THE OFFENDING DRIVER
character of independent civil actions. Indeed, there is IS SUBSIDIARILY LIABLE FOR DAMAGES; CASE AT BAR.
no incongruence between allowing the trial of civil — I believe that we cannot even suspend the rules to
actions to proceed independently of the criminal accommodate the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Br. 19-424.
prosecution and mandating that, before so proceeding, Such suspension would do much violence to the rules
a reservation to do so should first be made. and open floodgates to dangerous precedents. It is
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF settled that every person criminally liable for a felony is
EMPLOYER; BASIS AND DISTINCTION THEREOF. — also civilly liable. (Article 100, Revised Penal Code).
The vicarious liability of an employer for the fault or Employers are subsidiarily civilly liable for felonies
negligence of an employee is founded on at least two committed by their employees. The aggrieved parties
specific provisions of law. The first is expressed in criminal cases may pursue their claims for damages
in Article 2176, in relation to article 2180, of the Civil either as delictual damages, or quasi-delictual damages
Code which would allow an action predicated on quasi- under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which the Code
delict to be instituted by the injured party against the considers as "entirely distinct and separate from the
employer for an act or omission of the employee and civil liability arising from negligence under the Revised
would necessitate only a preponderance of evidence in Penal Code." However, Article 2177 of the Civil Code
order to prevail. Here, the liability of the employer for expressly provides that "the plaintiffs cannot recover
the negligent conduct of the subordinate is direct and damages twice for the same act or omission of the
primary subject to the defense of due diligence in the defendant." The offended parties filed a separate action
selection and supervision of the employee. The for damages under Article 2176. It must, however, be
enforcement of the judgment against the employer for pointed out that, as can be gathered from the
an action based on Article 2176 does not require the ponencia, only petitioner was made as defendant in
employee to be insolvent since the nature of the that civil case. Part of the first paragraph of page three
liability of the employer with that of the employee, the of the ponencia reads: On November 29, 1989, the
two being statutorily considered joint tortfeasors, offended parties actually filed with the Regional Trial
is solidary. The second, predicated on Article 103 of the Court, Isabela, Branch 19, Cauayan, a complaint
Revised Penal Code, provides that an employer may be against petitioner Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation,
held subsidiarily liable for a felony committed by his as employer of driver Romeo Dunca y de Tumol, based
employee in the discharge of his duty. This liability on quasi-delicts. Obviously then there was no separate
attaches when the employee is convicted of a crime civil action for damages arising from the felony. It was
done in the performance of his work and is found to be then deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal action
insolvent that renders him unable to properly respond against the driver. The civil case against petitioner
to the civil liability adjudged. alone was consolidated with the criminal case where
the civil aspect arising from the delict was impliedly
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; DUE PROCESS DEMANDS THAT instituted against the driver. Hence, there was no legal
THE EMPLOYER BE ACCORDED FULL OPPORTUNITY TO obstacle for the trial court to award damages therein,
BE HEARD TO DISPUTE THE BASIC THESIS UPON WHICH such as indemnity for the death, etc. and pursuant to
THE LIABILITY IS PREMISED. — Normally, the judgment Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, to make
in the criminal case concludes the employer not only petitioner subsidiarily liable for the awards.
with regard to the civil liability but likewise with regard Considering, however, the above-stated proscription in
to its amount since the liability of an employer follows Article 2177 of the Civil Code, the trial court had
that of the employee. Nevertheless, due process dismissed the civil case for damages against petitioner,
demands that the employer be accorded full which was already made subsidiarily liable for the
opportunity to be heard to dispute the basic thesis damages in the criminal case.
upon which that liability is premised, i.e., the existence
of an employer-employee relationship, engagement in MENDOZA, J., dissenting opinion:
an industry by the employer, and commission of the 1. CRIMINAL LAW; SUBSIDIARY CIVIL LIABILITY;
felony by the employee in carrying on his tasks. In REQUISITES. — To establish the subsidiary civil liability
highly meritorious cases, the extent of the liability of of the petitioner, the following must be shown: (1) that
the employer himself, including the amount of petitioner is engaged in an industry; (2) that its
damages, although final and conclusive on the accused, employee (Romeo Dunca) committed the offense in the
may be shown by the employer to be clearly discharge of his duties; and (3) that the employee is
unwarranted or unconscionable to be a valid measure insolvent.
of his own subsidiary liability. In such an instance, there
is little excuse for not allowing the employer due 2. ID.; ID.; A JUDGMENT CONVICTING THE
process and to be given a chance to be heard thereon. ACCUSED IS CONCLUSIVE UPON THE PARTY
The right of the employer to his own day in court, in no SUBSIDIARILY LIABLE. — The second requisite must
way, would amend or nullify the final judgment likewise be deemed to have been established since it is
rendered by the court which stands unaffected insofar settled that, in the absence of any collusion between
as the accused himself is concerned. It bears stressing the accused employee and the offended party, a
that the employer takes no active role in the criminal judgment convicting the former is conclusive upon the

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party subsidiarily liable. Petitioner cannot claim that he DECISION
has been deprived of due process on the ground that it
was not a party to the suit. For as held in Miranda
v. Malate Garage & Taxicab, Inc.: It is true that an
employer, strictly speaking, is not a party to the PARDO, J p:
criminal case instituted against his employee but in
substance and in effect he is, considering the The case is an appeal via certiorari from the
subsidiary liability imposed upon him by law. It is his amended decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 affirming
concern, as well as his employee, to see to it that his the decision and supplemental decision of the trial
interest be protected in the criminal case by taking court, 3 as follows:
virtual participation in the defense of his employee. He
cannot leave him to his own fate because his failure is "IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING,
also his. And if because of his indifference or inaction judgment is hereby rendered
the employee is convicted and damages are awarded dismissing the appeals interposed by
against him, he cannot later be heard to complain, if both accused and Reyes Trucking
brought to court for the enforcement of his subsidiary Corporation and affirming the
liability, that he was not given his day in Decision and Supplemental Decision
court . . . DICcTa dated June 6, 1992 and October 26,
1992 respectively. LLpr
3. ID.; ID.; THE CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED
TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE OF "SO ORDERED." 4
DETERMINING THE SUBSIDIARY CIVIL LIABILITY. — To
relieve petitioner from its subsidiary liability, the Court The facts are as follows:
has to declare the award of damages ex delicto void On October 10, 1989, Provincial Prosecutor
because, by filing a civil action based on quasi delict, Patricio T. Durian of Isabela filed with the Regional Trial
the offended parties allegedly waived the right to bring Court, Isabela, Branch 19, Cauayan an amended
action ex delicto. As already stated, it was the right to information charging Romeo Dunca y de Tumol with
bring an action for quasi delict which was waived as a reckless imprudence resulting in double homicide and
result of the reservation to file a civil action ex delicto. damage to property, reading as follows: LibLex
Hence, as a consequence of the driver's jumping bail,
the judgment finding him liable not only criminally but "That on or about the 20th
also civilly became final. As under Art. 103 of the day of June, 1989, in the Municipality
Revised Penal Code the employer is subsidiarily liable, of Cauayan, Province of Isabela,
there is no way by which petitioner may be absolved Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
from such liability except upon a showing that the of this Honorable Court, the said
driver is not insolvent. Even assuming that the right of accused being the driver and person-
the offended parties to recover damages ex delicto had in-charge of a Trailer Truck Tractor
been waived, the award of such damages by the trial bearing Plate No. N2A-867 registered
court simply constitute an error of judgment. Hence, in the name of Rafael Reyes Trucking
the award of damages ex delicto to the offended Corporation, with a load of 2,000
parties is not void and is now final. The Court has not cases of empty bottles of beer
only set aside a final disposition by declaring it void; it grande, willfully, unlawfully and
has likewise ordered the reopening of a case already feloniously drove and operated the
dismissed with finality on the simplistic reasoning that same while along the National
the rules of procedure may be relaxed "in order to Highway of Barangay Tagaran, in said
promote their objectives and assist the parties in Municipality, in a negligent, careless
obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination and imprudent manner, without due
of every action or proceedings." There is no reason for regard to traffic laws, rules and
doing so in this case since, as already stated, all the ordinances and without taking the
parties herein had been duly heard before the trial necessary precautions to prevent
court rendered its decision. Indeed, for what purpose is injuries to persons and damage to
this case to be remanded to the trial court? So that property, causing by such negligence,
petitioner can present evidence in its defense? But it carelessness and imprudence the
has already done so. For the trial court to re-determine said trailer truck to hit and bump a
the amount of damages? But even under Arts. 2176 Nissan Pick-up bearing Plate No. BBG-
and 2180, the employer is liable for the same amount 957 driven by Feliciano Balcita and
the employee is liable, as the only difference between Francisco Dy, Jr., @ Pacquing, due to
its liability ex delicto and its liability based irreversible shock, internal and
on quasi delict is that the former is subsidiary or external hemorrhage and multiple
secondary to that of the driver while its liability for injuries, open wounds, abrasions, and
quasi delict is primary. I do not think it is worth further causing damages to the heirs
sacrificing legal rules to reach the judgment the of Feliciano Balcita in the amount-of
majority arrives at in this case. The award of P100,000.00 and to the death of
damages ex delicto in the decision of the trial court is Francisco Dy, Jr.; @ Pacquing and
final, just as the dismissal of the case for quasi delict is damages to his Nissan Pick-Up
final. To ignore this fact is to set at naught the policy bearing Plate No. BBG-957 in the total
behind the finality of judicial decisions and deprive amount of P2,000,000.00.
adjudication of stability.

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 "CONTRARY TO LAW. Corporation's memorandum to all its
drivers and helpers to physically
"Cauayan, Isabela, October inspect their vehicles before each trip
10, 1989. (Exh. 15, pars. 4 & 5), the SMC's
Traffic Investigator-Inspector certified
"(Sg
the roadworthiness of this White
d.)
Truck trailer prior to June 20, 1989
FAU
(Exh. 17). In addition to a professional
STO
driver's license, it also conducts a
C.
rigid examination of all driver
CAB
applicants before they are hired. prcd
ANT
AC "In the early morning of June
"Thi 20, 1989, the White Truck driven by
rd Dunca left Tuguegarao, Cagayan
Assi bound to San Fernando, Pampanga
stan loaded with 2,000 cases of empty
t beer "Grande" bottles. Seated at the
Pro front right seat beside him was
vinc Ferdinand Domingo, his truck helper
ial ("pahinante" in Pilipino). At around
Pros 4:00 o'clock that same morning while
ecut the truck was descending at a slight
or" downgrade along the national road at
Tagaran, Cauayan, Isabela, it
Upon arraignment on October 23, 1989, the
approached a damaged portion of the
accused entered a plea of not guilty. On the same
road covering the full width of the
occasion, the offended parties (Rosario P. Dy and minor
truck's right lane going south and
children and Angelina M. Balcita and minor son Paolo)
about six meters in length. These
made a reservation to file a separate civil action
made the surface of the road uneven
against the accused arising from the offense
because the potholes were about five
charged. 5 On November 29, 1989, the offended
to six inches deep. The left lane
parties actually filed with the Regional Trial Court,
parallel to this damaged portion is
Isabela, Branch 19, Cauayan a complaint against
smooth. As narrated by Ferdinand
petitioner Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as
Domingo, before approaching the
employer of driver Romeo Dunca y de Tumol, based
potholes, he and Dunca saw the
on quasi delict. The petitioner settled the claim of the
Nissan with its headlights on coming
heirs of Feliciano Balcita (the driver of the other vehicle
from the opposite direction. They
involved in the accident). The private respondents
used to evade this damaged road by
opted to pursue the criminal action but did not
taking the left lance but at that
withdraw the civil case quasi ex delicto they filed
particular moment, because of the
against petitioner. On December 15, 1989, private
incoming vehicle, they had to run
respondents withdrew the reservation to file a separate
over it. This caused the truck to
civil action against the accused and manifested that
bounce wildly. Dunca lost control of
they would prosecute the civil aspect ex delicto in the
the wheels and the truck swerved to
criminal action. 6 However, they did not withdraw the
the left invading the lane of the
separate civil action based on quasi delict against
Nissan. As a result, Dunca's vehicle
petitioner as employer arising from the same act or
rammed the incoming Nissan
omission of the accused driver. 7
dragging it to the left shoulder of the
Upon agreement of the parties, the trial court road and climbed a ridge above said
consolidated both criminal and civil cases and shoulder where it finally stopped. (see
conducted a joint trial of the same. Exh. A-5. p. 8, record) The Nissan was
severely damage (Exhs. A-7, A-8, A-9
The facts, as found by the trial court, which and A-14, pp. 9-11 record), and its
appear to be undisputed, are as follows: two passengers, namely: Feliciano
Balcita and Francisco Dy, Jr. died
"The defendant Rafael Reyes instantly (Exh. A-19) from external
Trucking Corporation is a domestic and internal hemorrhage and multiple
corporation engaged in the business fractures (pp. 15 and 16, record).
of transporting beer products for the
San Miguel Corporation (SMC for "For the funeral expenses of
short) from the latter's San Fernando, Francisco Dy, Jr. her widow spent
Pampanga plant to its various sales P651,360.00 (Exh. I-3). At the time of
outlets in Luzon. Among its fleets of his death he was 45 years old. He
vehicles for hire is the white truck was the President and Chairman of
trailer described above driven by the Board of the Dynamic Wood
Romeo Dunca y Tumol, a duly Products and Development
licensed driver. Aside from the Corporation (DWPC), a wood

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 processing establishment, from which "1. Finding the accused
he was receiving an income of Romeo Dunca y de Tumol guilty
P10,000.00 a month (Exh. D). In the beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
Articles of Incorporation of the DWPC, of Double Homicide through Reckless
the spouses Francisco Dy, Jr. and Imprudence with violation of the
Rosario Perez Dy appear to be Motor Vehicle Law (Rep. Act No.
stockholders of 10,000 shares each 4136), and appreciating in his favor
with par value of P100.00 per share the mitigating circumstance of
out of its outstanding and subscribed voluntary surrender without any
capital stock of 60,000 shares valued aggravating circumstance to offset
at P6,000,000.00 (Exhs. K-1 & 10-B). the same, the Court hereby
Under its 1988 Income Tax Returns sentences him to suffer two (2)
(Exh. J) the DWPC had a taxable net indeterminate penalties of four
income of P78,499.30 (Exh. J). months and one day of arresto
Francisco Dy, Jr. was a La Salle mayor as minimum to three years, six
University graduate in Business months and twenty days as
Administration, past president of the maximum; to indemnify the Heirs of
Pasay Jaycees, National Treasurer Francisco Dy, Jr. in the amount of
and President of the Philippine P3,000,000.00 as compensatory
Jaycees in 1971 and 1976, damages, P1,000,000.00 as moral
respectively, and World Vice- damages, and P1,030,000.00 as
President of Jaycees International in funeral expenses;
1979. He was also the recipient of
numerous awards as a civic leader "2. Ordering the plaintiff in
(Exh. C). His children were all Civil Case No. Br. 19-424 to pay the
studying in prestigious schools and defendant therein actual damages in
spent about P180,000.00 for their the amount of P84,000.00; and
education in 1988 alone (Exh. H- "3. Ordering the dismissal of
4). dctai the complaint in Civil Case No. Br. 19-
"As stated earlier, the 424.
plaintiffs' procurement of a writ of "No pronouncement as to
attachment of the properties of the costs.
Corporation was declared illegal by
the Court of Appeals. It was shown "SO ORDERED.
that on December 26, 1989, Deputy
Sheriff Edgardo Zabat of the RTC at "Cauayan, Isabela, June 6,
San Fernando, Pampanga, attached 1992.
six units of Truck Tractors and trailers
"
of the Corporation at its garage at
(
San Fernando, Pampanga. These
S
vehicles were kept under PC guard by
g
the plaintiffs in said garage thus
d
preventing the Corporation to operate
.
them. However, on December 28,
1989, the Court of Appeals dissolved )
the writ (p. 30, record) and on
December 29, 1989, said Sheriff A
reported to this Court that the R
attached vehicles were taken by the T
defendant's representative, Melita E
Manapil (Exh. O, p. 31, record). The M
defendant's general Manager I
declared that it lost P21,000.00 per O
day for the non-operation of the six
units during their attachment (p. 31, R
t.s.n., Natividad C. Babaran, .
proceedings on December 10,
1990)." 8 A
On June 6, 1992, the trial court rendered a joint L
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as I
follows: V
I
"WHEREFORE, in view of the A
foregoing considerations judgment is
hereby rendered: "
R

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 e On July 21, 1997, the Court required
g respondents to comment on the petition within ten (10)
i days from notice. 19
o
n On January 27, 1998, the Solicitor General filed
a his comment. 20
l On April 13, 1998, the Court granted leave to
petitioner to file a reply and noted the reply it filed on
T March 11, 1998. 21
r
i We now resolve to give due course to the
a petition and decide the case.
l
Petitioner raises three (3) grounds for
allowance of the petition, which, however, boil down to
J two (2) basic issues, namely:
u
d 1. May petitioner as owner of
g the truck involved in the accident be
e held subsidiarily liable for the
" damages awarded to the offended
  parties in the criminal action against
9 the truck driver despite the filing of a
separate civil action by the offended
On September 3, 1992, petitioner and the parties against the employer of the
accused filed a notice of appeal from the joint truck driver? LibLex
decision. 10
2. May the Court award
On the other hand, private respondents moved damages to the offended parties in
for amendment of the dispositive portion of the joint the criminal case despite the filing of
decision so as to hold petitioner subsidiarily liable for a civil action against the employer of
the damages awarded to the private respondents in the the truck driver; and in amounts
event of insolvency of the accused. 11 exceeding that alleged in the
On October 26, 1992, the trial court rendered a information for reckless imprudence
supplemental decision amending the dispositive portion resulting in homicide and damage to
by inserting an additional paragraph reading as follows: property? 22

"2:A Ordering the defendant We grant the petition, resolving under the

Reyes Trucking Corporation circumstances pro hac vice to remand the cases to the
subsidiarily liable for all the damages trial court for determination of the civil liability of
awarded to the heirs of Francisco Dy, petitioner as employer of the accused driver in the civil
Jr., in the event of insolvency of the action quasi ex delicto re-opened for the purpose.
accused but deducting therefrom the In negligence cases, the aggrieved party has
damages of P84,000.00 awarded to the choice between (1) an action to enforce civil liability
said defendant in the next preceding arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised
paragraph; and . . . " 12 Penal Code; and (2) a separate action for quasi
On November 12, 1992, petitioner filed with the delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the
trial court a supplemental notice of appeal from the Philippines. Once the choice is made, the injured party
supplemental decision. 13 can not avail himself of any other remedy because he
may not recover damages twice for the same negligent
During the pendency of the appeal, the accused act or omission of the accused. 23 This is the rule
jumped bail and fled to a foreign country. By resolution against double recovery. prLL
dated December 29, 1994, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the appeal of the accused in the criminal In other words, "the same act or omission can
case. 14 create two kinds of liability on the part of the offender,
that is, civil liability ex delicto, and civil liability quasi
On January 6, 1997, the Court of Appeals delicto" either of which "may be enforced against the
rendered an amended decision affirming that of the culprit, subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the
trial court, as set out in the opening paragraph of this Civil Code that the offended party can not recover
decision. 15 damages under both types of liability." 24

On January 31, 1997, petitioner filed a motion In the instant case, the offended parties elected
for reconsideration of the amended decision. 16 to file a separate civil action for damages against
petitioner as employer of the accused, based on quasi
On April 21, 1997, the Court of Appeals denied delict, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the
petitioner's motion for reconsideration for lack of Philippines. Private respondents sued petitioner Rafael
merit. 17 Reyes Trucking Corporation, as the employer of the
accused, to be vicariously liable for the fault or
Hence, this petition for review. 18

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negligence of the latter. Under the law, this vicarious It might be argued that private respondents as
liability of the employer is founded on at least two complainants in the criminal case withdrew the
specific provisions of law. reservation to file a civil action against the driver
(accused) and manifested that they would pursue the
The first is expressed in Article 2176 in relation civil liability of the driver in the criminal action.
to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which would allow an However, the withdrawal is ineffective to reverse the
action predicated on quasi-delict to be instituted by the effect of the reservation earlier made because private
injured party against the employer for an act or respondents did not withdraw the civil action against
omission of the employee and would necessitate only a petitioner based on quasi delict. In such a case, the
preponderance of evidence to prevail. Here, the liability provision of Rule 111, Section 1, paragraph 3 of the
of the employer for the negligent conduct of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure is clear that the
subordinate is direct and primary, subject to the reservation to file or the filing of a separate civil action
defense of due diligence in the selection and results in a waiver of other available civil actions arising
supervision of the employee. The enforcement of the from the same act or omission of the accused. Rule
judgment against the employer in an action based on 111, Section 1, paragraph 2 enumerated what are the
Article 2176 does not require the employee to be civil actions deemed waived upon such reservation or
insolvent since the nature of the liability of the filing, and one of which is the civil indemnity under the
employer with that of the employee, the two being Revised Penal Code. Rule 111, Section 1, paragraph 3
statutorily considered joint tortfeasors, is of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure specifically
solidary. 25 The second, predicated on Article 103 of provides: cdrep
the Revised Penal Code, provides that an employer
may be held subsidiarily civilly liable for a felony "A waiver of any of the civil
committed by his employee in the discharge of his actions extinguishes the others. The
duty. This liability attaches when the employee is institution of, or the reservation of the
convicted of a crime done in the performance of his right to file, any of said civil actions
work and is found to be insolvent that renders him separately waives the others."
unable to properly respond to the civil liability
adjudged. 26 The rationale behind this rule is the avoidance
of multiple suits between the same litigants arising out
As regards the first issue, the answer is in the of the same act or omission of the offender. The
negative. Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as restrictive phraseology of the section under
employer of the accused who has been adjudged guilty consideration is meant to cover all kinds of civil actions,
in the criminal case for reckless imprudence, can not be regardless of their source in law, provided that the
held subsidiarily liable because of the filing of the action has for its basis the same act or omission of the
separate civil action based on quasi delict against it. In offender. 29
view of the reservation to file, and the subsequent filing
of the civil action for recovery of civil liability, the same However, petitioner as defendant in the
was not instituted with the criminal action. Such separate civil action for damages filed against it, based
separate civil action was for recovery of damages on quasi delict, may be held liable thereon. Thus, the
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, arising from the trial court grievously erred in dismissing plaintiff's civil
same act or omission of the accused. 27 complaint. And the Court of Appeals erred in affirming
the trial court's decision. Unfortunately private
Pursuant to the provision of Rule 111, Section respondents did not appeal from such dismissal and
1, paragraph 3 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, could not be granted affirmative relief. 30
when private respondents, as complainants in the
criminal action, reserved the right to file the separate The Court, however, in exceptional cases has
civil action, they waived other available civil actions relaxed the rules "in order to promote their objectives
predicated on the same act or omission of the accused- and assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and
driver. Such civil action includes the recovery of inexpensive determination of every action or
indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages proceeding" 31 or exempted "a particular case from
under Articles 32, 33, and 34 of the Civil Code of the the operation of the rules." 32
Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the Invoking this principle, we rule that the trial
accused. 28 court erred in awarding civil damages in the criminal
The intention of private respondents to proceed case and in dismissing the civil action. Apparently
primarily and directly against petitioner as employer of satisfied with such award, private respondent did not
accused truck driver became clearer when they did not appeal from the dismissal of the civil case. However,
ask for the dismissal of the civil action against the latter petitioner did appeal. Hence, this case should be
based on quasi delict. remanded to the trial court so that it may render
decision in the civil case awarding damages as may be
Consequently, the Court of Appeals and the warranted by the evidence. 33
trial court erred in holding the accused civilly liable,
and petitioner-employer of the accused subsidiarily With regard to the second issue, the award of
liable for damages arising from crime (ex delicto) in the damages in the criminal case was improper because
criminal action as the offended parties in fact filed a the civil action for the recovery of civil liability was
separate civil action against the employer based waived in the criminal action by the filing of a separate
on quasi delict resulting in the waiver of the civil civil action against the employer. As enunciated
action ex delicto. in Ramos vs. Gonong, 34 "civil indemnity is not part of
the penalty for the crime committed." The only issue

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brought before the trial court in the criminal action is like; when the strict technical sense is, more
whether accused Romeo Dunca y de Tumol is guilty of accurately, 'reckless imprudence resulting in homicide';
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage or 'simple imprudence causing damages to
to property. The action for recovery of civil liability is property'." 39
not included therein, but is covered by the separate
civil action filed against the petitioner as employer of There is need, therefore, to rectify the
the accused truck-driver. dctai designation of the offense without disturbing the
imposed penalty for the guidance of bench and bar in
In this case, accused-driver jumped bail strict adherence to precedent.
pending his appeal from his conviction. Thus, the
judgment convicting the accused became final and WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition
executory, but only insofar as the penalty in the and SETS ASIDE the amended decision and resolution
criminal action is concerned. The damages awarded in of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14448,
the criminal action was invalid because of its effective promulgated on January 6, 1997, and the joint decision
waiver. The pronouncement was void because the of the Regional Trial Court, Isabela, Branch 19,
action for recovery of the civil liability arising from the Cauayan, in Criminal Case No. Br. 19-311 and Civil Case
crime has been waived in said criminal action. cdphil No. Br. 19-424, dated June 6, 1992.

With respect to the issue that the award of IN LIEU THEREOF, the Court renders judgment
damages in the criminal action exceeded the amount of as follows:
damages alleged in the amended information, the issue (1) In Criminal Case No. Br. 19-311, the Court
is de minimis. At any rate, the trial court erred in declares the accused Romeo Dunca y de Tumol guilty
awarding damages in the criminal case because by beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence
virtue of the reservation of the right to bring a separate
resulting in homicide and damage to property, defined
civil action or the filing thereof, "there would be no and penalized under Article 365, paragraph 2 of the
possibility that the employer would be held liable Revised Penal Code, with violation of the automobile
because in such a case there would be no law (R.A. No. 4136, as amended), and sentences him to
pronouncement as to the civil liability of the suffer two (2) indeterminate penalties of four (4)
accused. 35 months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum,
As a final note, we reiterate that "the policy to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days
against double recovery requires that only one action of prision correccional, as maximum, 40 without
be maintained for the same act or omission whether indemnity, and to pay the costs, and LexLib
the action is brought against the employee or against (2) In Civil Case No. Br. 19-424, the Court
his employer. 36 The injured party must choose which orders the case re-opened to determine the liability of
of the available causes of action for damages he will the defendant Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation to
bring. 37 plaintiffs and that of plaintiffs on defendant's
Parenthetically, the trial court found the counterclaim.
accused "guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime No costs in this instance.
of Double Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence with
violation of the Motor Vehicle Law (Rep. Act No. 4136)." SO ORDERED.
There is no such nomenclature of an offense under the
Revised Penal Code. Thus, the trial court was misled to Bellosillo, Melo, Kapunan, Buena, Gonzaga-
sentence the accused "to suffer two (2) indeterminate Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
penalties of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years, six (6) months Davide, Jr., C.J., see dissenting opinion.
and twenty (20) days of prision correccional, as Puno, J., concur but pro hac vice.
maximum." This is erroneous because in reckless
imprudence cases, the actual penalty for criminal Vitug, J., see separate opinion.
negligence bears no relation to the individual willful
crime or crimes committed, but is set in relation to a Mendoza, J., see dissenting opinion.
whole class, or series of crimes. 38 Panganiban, J., concurs in the result.
Unfortunately, we can no longer correct this Quisumbing, J., concur in separate opinion of J.
judgment even if erroneous, as it is, because it has Vitug.
become final and executory.
Purisima, J., join Justice Mendoza's dissenting
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, opinion.
criminal negligence "is treated as a mere quasi offense,
and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not
a question of classification or terminology. In
intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in Separate Opinions
negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized
is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the DAVIDE, JR., C.J., dissenting:
dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight,
the imprudencia punible. Much of the confusion has
I understand that this is an appeal by an
arisen from the common use of such descriptive phrase
employer from a decision holding it subsidiarily liable
as 'homicide through reckless imprudence', and the
with the driver. The driver's appeal from the judgment

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of conviction was dismissed because the driver jumped The civil case against petitioner alone was
bail. Hence, the decision in the criminal case insofar as consolidated with the criminal case where the civil
the criminal liability is concerned is already firm and aspect arising from the delict was impliedly instituted
final. Accordingly, for this reason alone we cannot against the driver. Hence, there was no legal obstacle
modify the decision as to him. The modifications for the trial court to award damages therein, such as
introduced in the ponencia is very substantial for it indemnity for the death, etc. and pursuant to Article
deletes the award of indemnity. dctai 103 of the Revised Penal Code, to make petitioner
subsidiarily liable for the awards. Considering, however,
Also, the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Br. 19-424 — the abovestated proscription in Article 2177 of the Civil
the action for damages based on quasi-delict — did not Code, the trial court had dismissed the civil case for
appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court damages against petitioner, which was already made
dismissing the case. That decision had long become subsidiarily liable for the damages in the criminal
final and executory. case. cdrep
Since there was no appeal from the dismissal of To recapitulate, both the trial court and the
the civil case to the Court of Appeals, it logically follows Court of Appeals committed no error.
that it was not brought to that Court. Obviously, too, it
was never brought to our jurisdiction. Accordingly, I vote to DENY the petition.
there is nothing to remand to the court of origin for
further proceedings. VITUG, J., separate opinion:
I believe that we cannot even suspend the rules
An early established rule under our law is that
to accommodate the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Br. 19-
an act or omission, extra-contractual in nature, causing
424. Such suspension would do much violence to the
damage to another, there being fault or negligence can
rules and open floodgates to dangerous precedents.
create two separate civil liabilities on the part of the
The simple solution in this case is to sustain the offender, i.e., civil liability ex delicto and civil liability ex
judgment of the trial court, affirmed by the Court of quasi delicto. Either one of these two possible liabilities
Appeals, holding petitioner, as employer of the may be sought to be enforced against the offender
offending driver, subsidiarily liable for the damages subject, however, to the caveat under Article 2177 of
adjudged. the Civil Code that the offended party cannot "recover
damages twice for the same act or omission" or under
It is settled that every person criminally liable both causes. 1 Outside of this proscription, the two civil
for a felony is also civilly liable. (Article 100, Revised liabilities are distinct and independent of each other;
Penal Code). Employers are subsidiarily civilly liable for thus, and conversely against the rule on double
felonies committed by their employees. (Article recovery, the failure of recovery in one will not
103, id.). necessarily preclude recovery in the other.
Procedurally, the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
The aggrieved parties in criminal cases may while reiterating that a civil action under the Civil Code
pursue their claims for damages either may be brought separately from the criminal action,
as delictual damages, or quasi-delictual damages under provides, nevertheless, that the right to bring it must
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which the Code considers be reserved. Rule 111 reads in full: prLL
as "entirely distinct and separate from the civil liability
arising from negligence under the Revised Penal Code." "SECTION 1. Institution Of
However, Article 2177 of the Civil Code expressly Criminal And Civil Actions. — When a
provides that "the plaintiffs cannot recover damages criminal action is instituted, the civil
twice for the same act or omission of the action for the recovery of civil liability
defendant." LLjur is impliedly instituted with the
criminal action, unless the offended
The offended parties filed a separate action for party waives the civil action, reserves
damages under Article 2176. It must, however, be his right to institute it separately, or
pointed out that, as can be gathered from the ponencia institutes the civil action prior to the
only petitioner was made as defendant in that civil criminal action.
case. Part of the first paragraph of page three of
the ponencia reads: "Such civil action includes
recovery of indemnity under the
On November 29, l989, the Revised Penal Code, and damages
offended parties actually filed with under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of
the Regional Trial Court, Isabela, the Civil Code of the Philippines
Branch 19, Cauayan, a complaint arising from the same act or omission
against petitioner Rafael Reyes of the accused.
Trucking Corporation, as employer of
driver Romeo Dunca y de Tumol, "A waiver of any of the civil
based on quasi-delicts. actions extinguishes the others. The
institution of, or the reservation of the
Obviously then there was no separate civil right to file, any of said civil actions
action for damages arising from the felony. It was then separately waives the others.
deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal action
against the driver. The reservation of the right to
institute the separate civil actions

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shall be made before the prosecution extinction proceeds from a
starts to present its evidence and declaration in a final judgment that
under circumstances affording the the fact from which the civil might
offended party a reasonable arise did not exist.
opportunity to make such
reservation. "SECTION 3. When Civil
Action May Proceed Independently. —
In no case may the offended In the cases provided for in articles
party recover damages twice for the 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code
same act or omission of the accused. of the Philippines, the independent
civil action which has been reserved
When the offended party may be brought by the offended
seeks to enforce civil liability against party, shall proceed independently of
the accused by way of moral, the criminal action, and shall require
nominal, temperate or exemplary only a preponderance of
damages, the filing fees for such civil evidence." llcd
action as provided in these Rules
shall constitute a first lien on the In the recently decided case of San Ildefonso
judgment except in an award for Lines, Inc., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 2 the Supreme
actual damages. Court has ruled that, notwithstanding the independent
nature of civil actions falling under Articles 32, 33, 34
In cases wherein the amount and 2176 of the Civil Code, the right to institute the
of damages, other than actual, is action must still have to be reserved. In the stern words
alleged in the complaint or of the Court: The "past pronouncements that view the
information, the corresponding filing reservation requirement as an unauthorized
fees shall be paid by the offended amendment to substantive law, i.e., the Civil Code,
party upon the filing thereof in court should no longer be controlling." Essentially, I share this
for trial. view although I also understand San Ildefonso as
merely fortifying a procedural rule that unless a
"SECTION 2. Institution Of
reservation is made, the court trying the criminal case
Separate Civil Action. — Except in the
would not, for instance, be precluded from taking
cases provided for in Section 3
cognizance of the civil aspect of the litigation and that,
hereof, after the criminal action has
upon the other hand, the other court in the civil case
been commenced, the civil action
might, motu propio or at the instance of a party, hold in
which has been reserved cannot be
abeyance the consideration thereof pending the
instituted until final judgment has
outcome of the criminal case. In Maniago vs. Court of
been rendered in the criminal action.
Appeals, 3 the Court has said that the requirement of
"(a) Whenever the offended reservation is not incompatible with the distinct and
party shall have instituted the civil separate character of independent civil actions. Indeed,
action as provided for in the first there is no incongruence between allowing the trial of
paragraph of Section 1 hereof before civil actions to proceed independently of the criminal
the filing of the criminal action and prosecution and mandating that, before so proceeding,
the criminal action is subsequently a reservation to do so should first be made.
commenced, the pending civil action
In fine —
shall be suspended, in whatever
stage before final judgment it may be First — The civil action is deemed instituted
found, until final judgment in the together with the criminal case except when the civil
criminal action has been rendered. action is reserved. 4 The reservation should be made at
However, if no final judgment has the institution of the criminal case. 5 In independent
been rendered by the trial court in civil actions, not being dependent on the criminal case,
the civil action, the same may be such reservation would be required not for preserving
consolidated with the criminal action the cause of action but in order to allow the civil action
upon application with the court trying to proceed separately from the criminal case in interest
the criminal action. If the application of good order and procedure. 6 Indeed, independent
is granted, the evidence presented civil actions already filed and pending may still be
and admitted in the civil action shall sought to be consolidated in the criminal case before
be deemed automatically reproduced final judgment is rendered in the latter case. 7 When no
in the criminal action, without criminal proceedings are instituted, a separate civil
prejudice to the admission of action may be brought to demand the civil liability, and
additional evidence that any party a preponderance of evidence is sufficient to warrant a
may wish to present. In case of favorable judgment therefor 8 The same rule applies if
consolidation, both the criminal and the information were to be dismissed upon motion of
the civil actions shall be tried and the fiscal. 9
decided jointly. llcd
Second — The pendency of the criminal case
"(b) Extinction of the penal suspends the civil action except —
action does not carry with it
extinction of the civil, unless the

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 (1) When properly reserved, in independent convicted of a crime done in the performance of his
civil actions, such as those cases (a) not arising from work and is found to be insolvent that renders him
the act or omission complained of as a felony unable to properly respond to the civil liability
(e.g. culpa contractual under Art. 31, 10 intentional adjudged. 19
torts under Arts. 32 11 and 34, 12 and culpa
aquiliana under Art. 2176 13 of the Civil Code); or Normally, the judgment in the criminal case
concludes the employer not only with regard to the civil
(b) where the injured party is granted a right to liability but likewise with regard to its amount since the
file an action independent and separate from the liability of an employer follows that of the
criminal action (e.g. Art. 33, 14 Civil Code); and employee. 20 Nevertheless, due process demands that
the employer be accorded full opportunity to be heard
(2) In the case of pre-judicial questions which to dispute the basic thesis upon which that liability is
must be decided before any criminal prosecution may premised, i.e., the existence of an employer-employee
be instituted or may proceed (Art. 36, Civil Code). relationship, engagement in an industry by the
employer, and commission of the felony by the
In the above instances, the civil case may
employee in carrying on his tasks. In highly meritorious
proceed independently and regardless of the outcome
cases, the extent of the liability of the employer
of the criminal case.
himself, including the amount of damages, although
Third — An acquittal in the criminal may bar final and conclusive on the accused, may be shown by
any further separate civil action, except — the employer to be clearly unwarranted or
unconscionable to be a valid measure of his own
(1) In independent civil actions, unless the subsidiary liability. In such an instance, there is little
complainant, not having reserved a separate action, excuse for not allowing the employer due process and
has actively participated and intervened in the criminal to be given a chance to be heard thereon. The right of
case. 15 such active participation and intervention can the employer to his own day in court, in no way, would
only be deemed to be an unequivocal election by the amend or nullify the final judgment rendered by the
complainant to sue under ex-delicto rather than on court which stands unaffected insofar as the accused
another cause of action (arising from the same act or himself is concerned. It bears stressing that the
omission complained of as being ex-delicto). If, employer takes no active role in the criminal
however, the acquittal is predicated on the ground that proceedings, nor entitled to take such role, up until he
guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, suddenly finds himself open to a possible subsidiary
and not upon a finding that the "fact from which the liability following the judgment of conviction. cdrep
civil (action) might arise did not exist," an action for
damages can still be instituted. 16 Finally, it may not be amiss to repeat that in
independent civil actions only a successful recourse in
(2) In independent civil actions where the one would foreclose recovery in the other.
acquittal is premised on a failure of proof beyond
reasonable doubt, which the court shall so declare as I concur, therefore, with the majority in
its basis, a civil action for damages for the same act or remanding the case to the court a quo for the
omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a determination and extent of the subsidiary liability of
preponderance of evidence. Where acquittal is thus the employer conformably with the foregoing opinion.
based on the fact that the crime did not exist or that
the offender did not commit the crime, and not MENDOZA, J., dissenting:
on mere quantum of proof, a civil action based on
such ex delictu of which the accused is already The question in this case is whether petitioner,
acquitted would be improper. 17 as employer of the driver found guilty of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to
The vicarious liability of an employer for the property, can be held subsidiarily liable for damages
fault or negligence of an employee is founded on at awarded in the criminal case considering that a
least two specific provisions of law. The first is separate civil action for quasi-delict had been filed
expressed in Article 2176, in relation to article 2180, of against said petitioner, although the case was later
the Civil Code which would allow an action predicated dismissed. Based on the facts as stated in the majority
on quasi-delict to be instituted by the injured party opinion, the answer is yes. My reasons are
against the employer for an act or omission of the twofold: first, because the filing of the case for quasi-
employee and would necessitate only a preponderance delict against petitioner was without basis, the same
of evidence in order to prevail. Here, the liability of the being contrary to the reservation earlier made by the
employer for the negligent conduct of the subordinate offended parties of their right to file a separate civil
is direct and primary subject to the defense of due action arising from the crime against the driver,
diligence in the selection and supervision of the and, second, because the action for quasi-delict against
employee. The enforcement of the judgment against petitioner was dismissed precisely because the civil
the employer for an action based on Article 2176 does action against petitioner's driver had been re instituted
not require the employee to be insolvent since the in the criminal case against him. Let me explain.
nature of the liability of the employer with that of the
employee, the two being statutorily considered joint As the records show, at the arraignment on
tortfeasors, is solidary. 18 The second, predicated October 23, 1989 of the driver Romeo Dunca, the heirs
on Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, provides that of Francisco Dy, Jr. and Feliciano Balcita reserved in
an employer may be held subsidiarily liable for a felony Criminal Case No. Br. 19-311 their right "to institute a
committed by his employee in the discharge of his separate civil action arising from the offense charged
duty. This liability attaches when the employee is

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against the herein accused." 1 In accordance with Rule December 15, 1969 included their
111, §1 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal right to file a separate civil action
Procedure, 2 such reservation of the right to file a civil against the Rafael Reyes Trucking
action ex-delicto was a waiver of the right to file any Corporation, the accused's employer,
other civil action under Arts. 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the for the reason that under Section 1,
Civil Code for recovery of damages for the same act or Rule 111, actions arising from Article
omission of the accused. Hence, the subsequent filing 2176 of the Civil Code or quasi
by private respondent Rosario P. Dy of a civil action delict are deemed included in the
for quasi-delict, based on Arts. 2176 and 2180 of the waiver. As such, since the latter
Civil Code, against petitioner Rafael Reyes Trucking raised as an affirmative defense the
Corporation was without any basis, the same having defense that the plaintiffs cannot
been waived by the reservation earlier made by her of maintain Civil Case No. [Br.]19-424,
the right to file a separate civil action arising from this Court must have to rule that the
crime. filing of said case was not
proper. Nevertheless, in as much as
Be that as it may, the records further show that the plaintiffs cannot recover damages
on December 15, 1989, private respondent filed a twice for the offense committed by
manifestation in the criminal case that she was the accused, under Article 103 of the
withdrawing the previous reservation made by her to Revised Penal Code, in the event the
institute a separate civil action and that she was accused will be insolvent, the
instead going to prosecute the civil action in the Corporation could be held subsidiarily
criminal case. Hence, she prayed "that the reservation liable for the same damages. 4
to institute separate civil action in this case be ordered
withdrawn and the Heirs of the victims be allowed to On the other hand, because of the subsequent
present evidence in support of the civil liability to the withdrawal of the reservation to file a separate civil
accused in this case." 3 The trial court granted private action the same was reinstituted in the criminal case,
respondent's motion and allowed her to intervene in as though no reservation to file it separately had ever
the criminal case. Consequently, the civil action ex been made. The trial court, therefore, properly included
delicto was merged with the criminal in its decision in the criminal case a finding of the
prosecution. cdasia driver's civil liability, in addition to his criminal liability.

The civil action for quasi-delict against Petitioner and its driver, Romeo Dunca,
petitioner, which had been docketed as Civil Case No. appealed to the Court of Appeals. However, while the
Br. 19-424, was subsequently consolidated and jointly appeal was thus pending, Dunca jumped bail. The
tried with the criminal case (Criminal Case No. Br. 19- decision convicting him and imposing on him civil
311) against the driver. Then, on June 6, 1992, the trial liability ex delicto thereby became final and executory.
court rendered judgment, which was amended on This circumstance allow for the application of Art. 103
October 26, 1992 — of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:

(1) finding the driver Romeo Dunca guilty of Subsidiary and civil liability of
double homicide through reckless imprudence and other persons. — The subsidiary
violation of the Motor Vehicle Law and sentencing him liability established in the next
to two indeterminate penalties of 4 months and 1 day preceding article shall also apply to
of arresto mayor to 3 years, and 6 months and 20 days employers, teachers, persons, and
and to pay the heirs of Francisco Dy, Jr. in the total corporation engaged in any kind of
amount of P5,030,000.00; industry for felonies committed by
their servants, pupils, workmen,
(2) ordering private respondent to pay apprentices, or employees in the
P84,000.00 as damages for wrongful attachment of discharge of their duties. LLpr
petitioner's trucks; and
To establish the subsidiary civil liability of the
(3) dismissing Civil Case No. Br. 19-424 but petitioner, the following must be shown: (1) that
declaring petitioner subsidiarily liable to private petitioner is engaged in an industry; (2) that its
respondent heirs of Francisco Dy, Jr. in the event of employee (Romeo Dunca) committed the offense in the
insolvency of the accused driver. discharge of his duties; and (3) that the employee is
insolvent. 5
It is contended that, as the trial court had
dismissed the action for quasi-delict (Civil Case No. Br. The first requisite has already been established
19-424) and private respondent did not appeal, no considering that petitioner admitted in its answer in the
award of damages can be made in her favor. This trial court that it is engaged in an industry and that
contention has no merit. The civil action for quasi-delict Dunca was its employee at the time of the accident. 6
was dismissed precisely so that petitioner's liability for
its driver's negligence could be determined in the The second requisite must likewise be deemed
criminal case. Thus the trial courts stated: to have been established since it is settled that, in the
absence of any collusion between the accused
Since Civil Case No. Br. 19- employee and the offended party, a judgment
424 was admittedly instituted after convicting the former is conclusive upon the party
the criminal case was filed, the Court subsidiarily liable. 7 Petitioner cannot claim that he has
believes that the waiver made by the been deprived of due process on the ground that it was
Heirs of Francisco Dy, Jr. on

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not a party to the suit. For as held in Miranda v. Malate action. Such separate civil action was
Garage & Taxicab, Inc.: for recovery of damages under Article
2176 of the Civil Code, arising from
It is true that an employer, the same act or omission of the
strictly speaking, is not a party to the accused. 10
criminal case instituted against his
employee but in substance and in With due respect, it is not true that private
effect he is, considering the respondent reserved the right to file a separate civil
subsidiary liability imposed upon him action based on quasi delict and thereby waived the
by law. It is his concern, as well as his right to recover from petitioner civil liability ex
employee, to see to it that his delicto in the event of the insolvency of the driver. The
interest be protected in the criminal offended parties stated very clearly that what they
case by taking virtual participation in were reserving was the right "to institute a separate
the defense of his employee. He civil action arising from the offense charged against the
cannot leave him to his own fate herein accused. "It is, therefore, error to say that what
because his failure is also his. And if was reserved was the right to bring a civil action based
because of his indifference or inaction on quasi delict. LibLex
the employee is convicted and
damages are awarded against him, Following Rule 111, §1, the reservation of the
he cannot latter be heard to right to file a separate civil action ex delicto against the
complain, if brought to court for the driver was a waiver of the offended parties' right to
enforcement of his subsidiary liability, institute a civil action based on quasi delict against
that he was not given his day in court petitioner. The filing of Civil Case No. Br. 19-424 against
. . . 8 petitioner was, therefore, without basis, and its
dismissal by the trial court in its decision was in order.
Indeed, Civil Case No. Br. 19-424 and Criminal On the other hand, as the offended parties had
Case No. Br. 19-311 were jointly tried. All the parties in withdrawn their reservation of the right to file a
the two cases- the prosecution and the defense in the separate civil action against the driver so that they can
criminal case, and the Dys and petitioner Rafael Reyes pursue their action in the criminal case, the trial court
Trucking Corporation in the civil case — were duly correctly determined petitioner's subsidiary civil liability
heard, before the trial court, in its joint decision, for its driver's negligence in the criminal case.
rendered judgment dismissing the civil action for quasi
delict against petitioner and finding it instead It is contended that the offended parties did not
subsidiarily liable in the criminal case. Petitioner and its appeal from the decision of the trial court insofar as it is
driver were in fact represented by the same counsel, dismissed their complaint for quasi delict. That is
who raised all possible defenses that petitioner could because, as they had previously manifested in
raise. 9 The remand of this case to the trial court withdrawing their reservation of the right to file a
should, therefore, be solely for the purpose of separate civil action against the driver, they intended
determining, in the execution of the decision, whether to pursue their action in the criminal case. That
Dunca, the accused driver, is insolvent. cdll included the action to enforce the subsidiary civil
liability of petitioner, as employer, in the event of the
The Court holds, however, that petitioner driver's insolvency.
cannot be held liable in the criminal case on the ground
that the right to file a civil action ex delicto has been To relieve petitioner from its subsidiary liability,
waived and that instead its liability for its driver's the Court has to declare the award of damages ex
negligence must be determined under Arts. 2176 and delicto void because, by filing a civil action based on
2180 of the Civil Code. For this purpose, the Court quasi delict, the offended parties allegedly waived the
orders the reopening of the action for quasi delict (Civil right to bring action ex delicto. As already stated, it was
Case No. Br. 19-424). As basis for its decision, the Court the right to bring an action for quasi delict which was
states: waived as a result of the reservation to file a civil
action ex delicto. Hence, as a consequence of the
In the instant case, the driver's jumping bail, the judgment finding him liable
offended parties elected to file a not only criminally but also civilly became final. As
separate civil action for damages under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code the employer
against petitioner as employer of the is subsidiarily liable, there is no way by which petitioner
accused based on quasi-delict, under may be absolved from such liability except upon a
Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the showing that the driver is not insolvent. dctai
Philippines . . . Rafael Reyes Trucking
Corporation, as employer of the Even assuming that the right of the offended
accused who has been adjudged parties to recover damages ex delicto had been
guilty in the criminal case for reckless waived, the award of such damages by the trial court
imprudence, can not be held simply constitute an error of judgment. Hence, the
subsidiarily liable because of the filing award of damages ex delicto to the offended parties is
of the separate civil action based not void and is now final. The Court has not only set
on quasi delict against it. In view of aside a final disposition by declaring it void; it has
the reservation to file, and the likewise ordered the reopening of a case already
subsequent filing of the civil action dismissed with finality on the simplistic reasoning that
for recovery of civil liability, the same the rules of procedure may be relaxed "in order to
was not instituted with the criminal promote their objectives and assist the parties in

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obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination
of every action or proceedings. "There is no reason for
doing so in this case since, as already stated, all the
parties herein had been duly heard before the trial
court rendered its decision.

Indeed, for what purpose is this case to be

remanded to the trial court? So that petitioner can
present evidence in its defense? But it has already
done so. For the trial court to re-determine the amount
of damages? But even under Arts. 2176 and 2180, the
employer is liable for the same amount the employee is
liable, as the only difference between its liability ex
delicto and its liability based on quasi delict is that the
former is subsidiary or secondary to that of the driver
while its liability for quasi delict is primary. LLpr

I do not think it is worth sacrificing legal rules to

reach the judgment the majority arrives at in this case.
The award of damages ex delicto in the decision of the
trial court is final, just as the dismissal of the case
for quasi delict is final. To ignore this fact is to set at
naught the policy behind the finality of judicial
decisions and deprive adjudication of stability.

Apparently realizing the cost to basic rules of

its decision today, the majority says that it is ordering
the determination of petitioner's liability for quasi delict
only pro hac vice. Apparently, the majority is not willing
to apply its ruling in this case to similar situations
should they arise in the future. For that is what pro hac
vice means — "for this turn; for this one particular
occasion" only. 11 But adjudication cannot be limited
to the immediate parties and declared to have no
precedential value. Adjudication, such as this, is like a
restricted or one-way railroad ticket, good for this day
and train only. 12

For the foregoing reasons, I dissent and vote to

affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals with the
modification that this case should be remanded to the
trial court for the sole purpose of determining the
subsidiary civil liability of petitioner in the event of
insolvency of its driver, the accused Romeo Dunca.

||| (Rafael Reyes Trucking Corp. v. People, G.R. No.

129029, [April 3, 2000], 386 PHIL 41-79)

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Sps. Santos et al vs Pizardo GR No 151452 July 29 a right to file an action independent and distinct from
2005 the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil
Code.Either of these liabilities may be enforced against
the offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of
SECOND DIVISION the Civil Code that the plaintiff cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission of the defendant and
the similar proscription against double recovery under
[G.R. No. 151452. July 29, 2005.] the Rules above-quoted.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN PRESCRIPTION OF ACTION

SPS. ANTONIO C. SANTOS and EX DELICTO WILL OPERATE AS A BAR TO AN ACTION TO
ESPERANZA C. SANTOS, NORA ENFORCE INDEPENDENT CIVIL LIABILITY; PRESENT IN
BARNALO, BELINDA LUMACTAD, CASE AT BAR. — At the time of the filing of the
MARIENELA DY, NIKKA SANTOS complaint for damages in this case, the cause of action
and LEONARDO ex quasi delicto had already prescribed. Nonetheless,
FERRER, petitioners,vs.HON. petitioners can pursue the remaining avenue opened
NORMANDIE B. PIZARDO, as for them by their reservation, i.e., the surviving cause
Presiding Judge, RTC of Quezon of action ex delicto. This is so because the prescription
City, Branch 101, DIONISIO M of the action ex quasi delicto does not operate as a bar
SIBAYAN, and VIRON to an action to enforce the civil liability arising from
TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, crime especially as the latter action had been expressly
INC.,represented by VIRGILIO Q. reserved. The case of Mendoza v. La Mallorca Bus
RONDARIS, Company was decided upon a similar set of facts. . . .
President/Chairman, respondents. We held that the dismissal of the action based on culpa
aquiliana is not a bar to the enforcement of the
subsidiary liability of the employer. Once there is a
Almadro & Lambino Law Firm for conviction for a felony, final in character, the employer
petitioners. becomes subsidiarily liable if the commission of the
crime was in the discharge of the duties of the
Rondaris Rondaris & Associates Law employees. This is so because Article 103 of
Office for private respondents. the Revised Penal Code operates with controlling force
to obviate the possibility of the aggrieved party being
deprived of indemnity even after the rendition of a final
SYLLABUS judgment convicting the employee. Seen in this light,
the trial court should not have dismissed the complaint
1. CRIMINAL LAW; CIVIL LIABILITY; IMPLIEDLY on the ground of prescription, but instead allowed the
INSTITUTED IN THE FILING OF CRIMINAL ACTION; complaint for damages ex delicto to be prosecuted on
EXCEPTIONS. — Our Revised Penal Code provides that the merits, considering petitioners' allegations in their
every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly complaint, opposition to the motion to dismiss and
liable. Such civil liability may consist of restitution, motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal,
reparation of the damage caused and indemnification insisting that the action was to recover civil liability
of consequential damages. When a criminal action is arising from crime. This does not offend the policy that
instituted, the civil liability arising from the offense is the reservation or institution of a separate civil action
impliedly instituted with the criminal action, subject to waives the other civil actions. The rationale behind this
three notable exceptions: first, when the injured party rule is the avoidance of multiple suits between the
expressly waives the right to recover damages from the same litigants arising out of the same act or omission
accused; second, when the offended party reserves his of the offender. However, since the stale action for
right to have the civil damages determined in a damages based on quasi delict should be considered
separate action in order to take full control and waived, there is no more occasion for petitioners to file
direction of the prosecution of his cause; and third, multiple suits against private respondents as the only
when the injured party actually exercises the right to recourse available to them is to pursue damages ex
maintain a private suit against the offender by delicto. This interpretation is also consistent with the
instituting a civil action prior to the filing of the criminal bar against double recovery for obvious reasons.
case. 4. REMEDIAL LAW; RULES OF PROCEDURE;
2. ID.; ID.; TWO SEPARATE CIVIL LIABILITIES WHEN STRICT APPLICATION OF THE RULES MAY BE
ARISING FROM AN ACT OR OMISSION WHICH CAUSED SUSPENDED IN ORDER TO OBTAIN SUBSTANTIAL
DAMAGE TO ANOTHER, EXPLAINED. — An act or JUSTICE; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. — Admittedly,
omission causing damage to another may give rise to petitioners should have appealed the order of dismissal
two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender, of the trial court instead of filing a petition for certiorari
i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of with the Court of Appeals. Such procedural misstep,
the Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent civil however, should be exempted from the strict
liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or application of the rules in order to promote their
omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa fundamental objective of securing substantial justice.
contractual or obligations arising from law under Article We are loathe to deprive petitioners of the indemnity to
31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 which they are entitled by law and by a final judgment
and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of of conviction based solely on a technicality. It is our
the Civil Code; or (b) where the injured party is granted duty to prevent such an injustice.

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 DECISION Improper service of summons was likewise
cited as a ground for dismissal of the complaint as
summons was served through a certain Jessica Ubalde
of the legal department without mentioning her
TINGA, J p: designation or position.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 dated
pointing out yet again that the complaint is not based
March 1, 2002, petitioners assail the Resolutions of the
on quasi delict but on the final judgment of conviction
Court of Appeals dated September 10, 2001 and
in the criminal case which prescribes ten (10) years
January 9, 2002, respectively dismissing their petition
from the finality of the judgment. 6 The trial court
for certiorari and denying their motion for
denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration
reconsideration, arising from the dismissal of their
reiterating that petitioners' cause of action was based
complaint to recover civil indemnity for the death and
on quasi delict and had prescribed under Article 1146
physical injuries of their kin. acEHCD
of the Civil Code because the complaint was filed more
The following facts are matters of record. than four (4) years after the vehicular accident. 7 As
regards the improper service of summons, the trial
In an Information dated April 25, 1994, Dionisio court reconsidered its ruling that the complaint ought
M. Sibayan (Sibayan) was charged with Reckless to be dismissed on this ground.
Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Homicide and Multiple
Physical Injuries in connection with a vehicle collision Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the
between a southbound Viron Transit bus driven by Court of Appeals which dismissed the same for error in
Sibayan and a northbound Lite Ace Van, which claimed the choice or mode of appeal. 8 The appellate court
the lives of the van's driver and three (3) of its also denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration
passengers, including a two-month old baby, and reasoning that even if the respondent trial court judge
caused physical injuries to five (5) of the van's committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
passengers. After trial, Sibayan was convicted and order of dismissal, certiorari is still not the permissible
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for two remedy as appeal was available to petitioners and they
(2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) failed to allege that the petition was brought within the
years and two (2) months. However, as there was a recognized exceptions for the allowance of certiorari in
reservation to file a separate civil action, no lieu of appeal. 9
pronouncement of civil liability was made by the
In this petition, petitioners argue that a rigid
municipal circuit trial court in its decision promulgated
application of the rule that certiorari cannot be a
on December 17, 1998. 2
substitute for appeal will result in a judicial rejection of
On October 20, 2000, petitioners filed a an existing obligation arising from the criminal liability
complaint for damages against Sibayan, Viron Transit of private respondents. Petitioners insist that the
and its President/Chairman, Virgilio Q. Rondaris, with liability sought to be enforced in the complaint arose ex
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, pursuant to delicto and is not based on quasi delict.The trial court
their reservation to file a separate civil action. 3 They allegedly committed grave abuse of discretion when it
cited therein the judgment convicting Sibayan. insisted that the cause of action invoked by petitioners
is based on quasi delict and concluded that the action
Viron Transit moved to dismiss the complaint had prescribed. Since the action is based on the
on the grounds of improper service of summons, criminal liability of private respondents, the cause of
prescription and laches, and defective certification of action accrued from the finality of the judgment of
non-forum shopping. It also sought the dropping of conviction.
Virgilio Q. Rondaris as defendant in view of the
separate personality of Viron Transit from its officers. 4 Assuming that their petition with the appellate
court was procedurally flawed, petitioners implore the
Petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss Court to exempt this case from the rigid operation of
contending, among others, that the right to file a the rules as they allegedly have a legitimate grievance
separate action in this case prescribes in ten (10) years to vindicate, i.e.,damages for the deaths and physical
reckoned from the finality of the judgment in the injuries caused by private respondents for which no
criminal action. As there was no appeal of the decision civil liability had been adjudged by reason of their
convicting Sibayan, the complaint which was filed reservation of the right to file a separate civil action.
barely two (2) years thence was clearly filed within the
prescriptive period. In their Comment 10 dated June 13, 2002,
private respondents insist that the dismissal of the
The trial court dismissed the complaint on the complaint on the ground of prescription was in order.
principal ground that the cause of action had already They point out that the averments in the complaint
prescribed. According to the trial court, actions based make out a cause of action for quasi delict under
on quasi delict,as it construed petitioners' cause of Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.As such, the
action to be, prescribe four (4) years from the accrual prescriptive period of four (4) years should be reckoned
of the cause of action. Hence, notwithstanding the fact from the time the accident took place.
that petitioners reserved the right to file a separate civil
action, the complaint ought to be dismissed on the Viron Transit also alleges that its subsidiary
ground of prescription. 5 liability cannot be enforced since Sibayan was not
ordered to pay damages in the criminal case. It is Viron
Transit's contention that the subsidiary liability of the

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employer contemplated in Article 103 of the Revised right to file, any of said civil actions
Penal Code presupposes a situation where the civil separately waives the others. EcDSHT
aspect of the case was instituted in the criminal case
and no reservation to file a separate civil case was The reservation of the right to
made. institute the separate civil actions
shall be made before the prosecution
Private respondents likewise allege that the starts to present its evidence and
recourse to the Court of Appeals via certiorari was under circumstances affording the
improper as petitioners should have appealed the offended party a reasonable
adverse order of the trial court. Moreover, they point opportunity to make such
out several other procedural lapses allegedly reservation.
committed by petitioners, such as lack of certification
against forum-shopping; lack of duplicate original or In no case may the offended
certified true copy of the assailed order of the trial party recover damages twice for the
court; and non-indication of the full names and same act or omission of the accused.
addresses of petitioners in the petition. When the offended party
Petitioners filed a Reply 11 dated September seeks to enforce civil liability against
14, 2002, while private respondents filed the accused by way of moral,
a Rejoinder 12 dated October 14, 2002, both in nominal, temperate or exemplary
reiteration of their arguments. damages, the filing fees for such
action as provided in these Rules
We grant the petition. shall constitute a first lien on the
judgment except in an award for
Our Revised Penal Code provides that every actual damages.
person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable. 13 Such civil liability may consist of restitution, In cases wherein the amount
reparation of the damage caused and indemnification of damages, other than actual, is
of consequential damages. 14 When a criminal action alleged in the complaint or
is instituted, the civil liability arising from the offense is information, the corresponding filing
impliedly instituted with the criminal action, subject to fees shall be paid by the offended
three notable exceptions: first,when the injured party party upon filing thereof in court for
expressly waives the right to recover damages from the trial.
accused; second,when the offended party reserves his
right to have the civil damages determined in a  
separate action in order to take full control and Petitioners expressly made a reservation of
direction of the prosecution of his cause; their right to file a separate civil action as a result of
and third,when the injured party actually exercises the the crime committed by Sibayan. On account of this
right to maintain a private suit against the offender by reservation, the municipal circuit trial court, in its
instituting a civil action prior to the filing of the criminal decision convicting Sibayan, did not make any
case. pronouncement as to the latter's civil liability.
Notably, it was the 1985 Rules on Criminal Predicating their claim on the judgment of
Procedure, as amended in 1988, which governed the conviction and their reservation to file a separate civil
institution of the criminal action, as well as the action made in the criminal case, petitioners filed a
reservation of the right to file a separate civil action. complaint for damages against Sibayan, Viron Transit
Section 1, Rule 111 thereof states: and its President/Chairman. Petitioners assert that by
Section 1. Institution of the institution of the complaint, they seek to recover
criminal and civil actions.— When a private respondents' civil liability arising from crime.
criminal action is instituted, the civil Unfortunately, based on its misreading of the
action for the recovery of civil liability allegations in the complaint, the trial court dismissed
is impliedly instituted with the the same, declaring that petitioners' cause of action
criminal action, unless the offended was based on quasi delict and should have been
party waives the civil action, reserves brought within four (4) years from the time the cause of
his right to institute it separately, or action accrued, i.e.,from the time of the
institutes the civil action prior to the accident. CcTIDH
criminal action. A reading of the complaint reveals that the
Such civil action includes allegations therein are consistent with petitioners' claim
recovery of indemnity under that the action was brought to recover civil liability
the Revised Penal Code, and arising from crime. Although there are allegations of
damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 negligence on the part of Sibayan and Viron Transit,
and 2176 of the Civil Code of the such does not necessarily mean that petitioners were
Philippines arising from the same act pursuing a cause of action based on quasi
or omission of the accused. delict,considering that at the time of the filing of the
complaint, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had
A waiver of any of the civil already prescribed. Besides, in cases of negligence, the
actions extinguishes the others. The offended party has the choice between an action to
institution of, or the reservation of the enforce civil liability arising from crime under

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the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi opposition to the motion to dismiss 17 and motion for
delict under the Civil Code. reconsideration 18 of the order of dismissal, insisting
that the action was to recover civil liability arising from
An act or omission causing damage to another crime.
may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part
of the offender, i.e.,(1) civil liability ex delicto, under This does not offend the policy that the
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) reservation or institution of a separate civil action
independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not waives the other civil actions. The rationale behind this
arising from an act or omission complained of as a rule is the avoidance of multiple suits between the
felony, e.g.,culpa contractual or obligations arising from same litigants arising out of the same act or omission
law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts of the offender. 19 However, since the stale action for
under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under damages based on quasi delict should be considered
Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) where the injured waived, there is no more occasion for petitioners to file
party is granted a right to file an action independent multiple suits against private respondents as the only
and distinct from the criminal action under Article 33 of recourse available to them is to pursue damages ex
the Civil Code. 15 Either of these liabilities may be delicto.This interpretation is also consistent with the
enforced against the offender subject to the caveat bar against double recovery for obvious
under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the plaintiff reasons. DISEaC
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant and the similar proscription Now the procedural issue. Admittedly,
against double recovery under the Rules above-quoted. petitioners should have appealed the order of dismissal
of the trial court instead of filing a petition
At the time of the filing of the complaint for for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. Such procedural
damages in this case, the cause of action ex quasi misstep, however, should be exempted from the strict
delicto had already prescribed. Nonetheless, petitioners application of the rules in order to promote their
can pursue the remaining avenue opened for them by fundamental objective of securing substantial
their reservation, i.e.,the surviving cause of action ex justice. 20 We are loathe to deprive petitioners of the
delicto.This is so because the prescription of the indemnity to which they are entitled by law and by a
action ex quasi delicto does not operate as a bar to an final judgment of conviction based solely on a
action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime technicality. It is our duty to prevent such an
especially as the latter action had been expressly injustice. 21
reserved. aIDHET
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
The case of Mendoza v. La Mallorca Bus SETTING ASIDE the resolutions of the Court of Appeals
Company 16 was decided upon a similar set of facts. dated September 10, 2001 and January 9, 2002,
Therein, the driver of La Mallorca Bus Company was respectively dismissing the present action and denying
charged with reckless imprudence resulting to damage petitioners' motion for reconsideration, as well as the
to property. The plaintiff made an express reservation orders of the lower court dated February 26, 2001 and
for the filing of a separate civil action. The driver was July 16, 2001. Let the case be REMANDED to the trial
convicted which conviction was affirmed by this Court. court for further proceedings.
Later, plaintiff filed a separate civil action for damages
based on quasi delict which was ordered dismissed by SO ORDERED.
the trial court upon finding that the action was Puno, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Chico-
instituted more than six (6) years from the date of the Nazario, JJ., concur.
accident and thus, had already prescribed.
Subsequently, plaintiff instituted another action, this ||| (Spouses Santos v. Pizardo, G.R. No. 151452, [July
time based on the subsidiary liability of the bus 29, 2005], 503 PHIL 209-220)
company. The trial court dismissed the action holding
that the dismissal of the earlier civil case operated as a
bar to the filing of the action to enforce the bus
company's subsidiary liability.

We held that the dismissal of the action based

on culpa aquiliana is not a bar to the enforcement of
the subsidiary liability of the employer. Once there is a
conviction for a felony, final in character, the employer
becomes subsidiarily liable if the commission of the
crime was in the discharge of the duties of the
employees. This is so because Article 103 of
the Revised Penal Code operates with controlling force
to obviate the possibility of the aggrieved party being
deprived of indemnity even after the rendition of a final
judgment convicting the employee.

Seen in this light, the trial court should not

have dismissed the complaint on the ground of
prescription, but instead allowed the complaint for
damages ex delicto to be prosecuted on the merits,
considering petitioners' allegations in their complaint,

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Manliclic vs Calaunan GR No 150157 January 25 damages against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI before
2007 the RTC of Dagupan City, docketed as Civil Case No. D-
10086. The criminal case was tried ahead of the civil
case. Among those who testified in the criminal case
THIRD DIVISION were respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and
Fernando Ramos. HICSaD

[G.R. No. 150157. January 25, 2007.] In the civil case (now before this Court), the
parties admitted the following:

MAURICIO MANLICLIC and 1. The parties agreed on the

PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, capacity of the parties to sue and be
INC., petitioners, vs. MODESTO sued as well as the venue and the
CALAUNAN, respondent. identities of the vehicles involved;

2. The identity of the drivers

and the fact that they are duly
licensed;
DECISION
3. The date and place of the
vehicular collision;

CHICO-NAZARIO, J p: 4. The extent of the injuries

suffered by plaintiff Modesto
Assailed before Us is the decision 1 of the Court Calaunan and the existence of the
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55909 which affirmed in medical certificate;
toto the decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of 5. That both vehicles were
Dagupan City, Branch 42, in Civil Case No. D-10086, going towards the south; the private
finding petitioners Mauricio Manliclic and Philippine jeep being ahead of the bus;
Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBLI) solidarily liable to pay
damages and attorney's fees to respondent Modesto 6. That the weather was fair
Calaunan. and the road was well paved and
straight, although there was a ditch
The factual antecedents are as follows: on the right side where the jeep fell
The vehicles involved in this case are: (1) into. 3
Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 353 with plate number CVD- When the civil case was heard, counsel for
478, owned by petitioner PRBLI and driven by petitioner respondent prayed that the transcripts of stenographic
Mauricio Manliclic; and (2) owner-type jeep with plate notes (TSNs) 4 of the testimonies of respondent
number PER-290, owned by respondent Modesto Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in
Calaunan and driven by Marcelo Mendoza. the criminal case be received in evidence in the civil
At around 6:00 to 7:00 o'clock in the morning of case in as much as these witnesses are not available to
12 July 1988, respondent Calaunan, together with testify in the civil case.
Marcelo Mendoza, was on his way to Manila from Francisco Tuliao testified that his brother-in-
Pangasinan on board his owner-type jeep. The law, respondent Calaunan, left for abroad sometime in
Philippine Rabbit Bus was likewise bound for Manila November, 1989 and has not returned since then.
from Concepcion, Tarlac. At approximately Kilometer 40 Rogelio Ramos took the stand and said that his brother,
of the North Luzon Expressway in Barangay Lalangan, Fernando Ramos, left for Amman, Jordan, to work.
Plaridel, Bulacan, the two vehicles collided. The front Rosalia Mendoza testified that her husband, Marcelo
right side of the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear left Mendoza, left their residence to look for a job. She
side of the jeep causing the latter to move to the narrated that she thought her husband went to his
shoulder on the right and then fall on a ditch with water hometown in Panique, Tarlac, when he did not return
resulting to further extensive damage. The bus veered after one month. She went to her husband's hometown
to the left and stopped 7 to 8 meters from point of to look for him but she was informed that he did not go
collision. there.
Respondent suffered minor injuries while his The trial court subpoenaed the Clerk of Court of
driver was unhurt. He was first brought for treatment to Branch 8, RTC, Malolos, Bulacan, the court where
the Manila Central University Hospital in Kalookan City Criminal Case No. 684-M-89 was tried, to bring the
by Oscar Buan, the conductor of the Philippine Rabbit TSNs of the testimonies of respondent
Bus, and was later transferred to the Veterans Calaunan, 5 Marcelo Mendoza 6 and Fernando
Memorial Medical Center. Ramos 7 in said case, together with other documentary
By reason of such collision, a criminal case was evidence marked therein. Instead of the Branch Clerk of
filed before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, charging Court, it was Enrique Santos Guevara, Court Interpreter,
petitioner Manliclic with Reckless Imprudence Resulting who appeared before the court and identified the TSNs
in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries, docketed of the three afore-named witnesses and other pertinent
as Crim. Case No. 684-M-89. Subsequently on 2 documents he had brought. 8 Counsel for respondent
December 1991, respondent filed a complaint for wanted to mark other TSNs and documents from the

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said criminal case to be adopted in the instant case, Both Mauricio Manliclic and
but since the same were not brought to the trial court, his driver, Oscar Buan admitted that
counsel for petitioners compromised that said TSNs and the Philippine Rabbit Bus bumped the
documents could be offered by counsel for respondent jeep in question. However, they
as rebuttal evidence. explained that when the Philippine
Rabbit bus was about to go to the left
For the defendants, petitioner Manliclic and bus lane to overtake the jeep, the latter
conductor Oscar Buan testified. The TSN 9 of the jeep swerved to the left because it
testimony of Donato Ganiban, investigator of the PRBLI, was to overtake another jeep in front
in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89 was marked and allowed of it. Such was their testimony before
to be adopted in the civil case on the ground that he the RTC in Malolos in the criminal
was already dead. case and before this Court in the
instant case. [Thus, which of the two
Respondent further marked, among other
versions of the manner how the
documents, as rebuttal evidence, the TSNs 10 of the
collision took place was correct,
testimonies of Donato Ganiban, Oscar Buan and
would be determinative of who
petitioner Manliclic in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89.
between the two drivers was
The disagreement arises from the question: negligent in the operation of their
Who is to be held liable for the collision? respective vehicles.] 11

Respondent insists it was petitioner Manliclic Petitioner PRBLI maintained that it observed
who should be liable while the latter is resolute in and exercised the diligence of a good father of a family
saying it was the former who caused the smash in the selection and supervision of its employee,
up. TEDaAc specifically petitioner Manliclic.

The versions of the parties are summarized by On 22 July 1996, the trial court rendered its
the trial court as follows: decision in favor of respondent Calaunan and against
petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI. The dispositive portion
The parties differed only on of its decision reads:
the manner the collision between the
two (2) vehicles took place. According WHEREFORE, judgment is
to the plaintiff and his driver, the jeep rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
was cruising at the speed of 60 to 70 against the defendants ordering the
kilometers per hour on the slow lane said defendants to pay plaintiff jointly
of the expressway when the and solidarily the amount of
Philippine Rabbit Bus overtook the P40,838.00 as actual damages for the
jeep and in the process of overtaking towing as well as the repair and the
the jeep, the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit materials used for the repair of the
the rear of the jeep on the left side. jeep in question; P100,000.00 as
At the time the Philippine Rabbit Bus moral damages and another
hit the jeep, it was about to overtake P100,000.00 as exemplary damages
the jeep. In other words, the and P15,000.00 as attorney's fees,
Philippine Rabbit Bus was still at the including appearance fees of the
back of the jeep when the jeep was lawyer. In addition, the defendants
hit. Fernando Ramos corroborated the are also to pay costs. 12
testimony of the plaintiff and Marcelo
Petitioners appealed the decision via Notice of
Mendoza. He said that he was on
Appeal to the Court of Appeals. 13
another jeep following the Philippine
Rabbit Bus and the jeep of plaintiff In a decision dated 28 September 2001, the
when the incident took place. He said, Court of Appeals, finding no reversible error in the
the jeep of the plaintiff overtook them decision of the trial court, affirmed it in all respects. 14
and the said jeep of the plaintiff was
followed by the Philippine Rabbit Bus Petitioners are now before us by way of petition
which was running very fast. The bus for review assailing the decision of the Court of
also overtook the jeep in which he Appeals. They assign as errors the following:
was riding. After that, he heard a loud
sound. He saw the jeep of the plaintiff I
swerved to the right on a grassy THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A
portion of the road. The Philippine QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE
Rabbit Bus stopped and they TRIAL COURT'S QUESTIONABLE
overtook the Philippine Rabbit Bus so ADMISSION IN EVIDENCE OF THE
that it could not moved (sic), meaning TSN's AND OTHER DOCUMENTS
they stopped in front of the Philippine PRESENTED IN THE CRIMINAL
Rabbit Bus. He testified that the jeep CASE. EaCSTc
of plaintiff swerved to the right
because it was bumped by the II
Philippine Rabbit bus from behind.

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 THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A strictly speaking, they are not parties to the criminal
QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE cases instituted against their employees. 23
TRIAL COURT'S RELIANCE ON THE
VERSION OF THE RESPONDENT ON Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner PRBLI
HOW THE ACCIDENT SUPPOSEDLY was not a party in said criminal case, the testimonies of
OCCURRED. the three witnesses are still admissible on the ground
that petitioner PRBLI failed to object on their
III admissibility.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A It is elementary that an objection shall be made

QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE at the time when an alleged inadmissible document is
TRIAL COURT'S UNFAIR DISREGARD offered in evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be
OF HEREIN PETITIONER PRBL's treated as waived, since the right to object is merely a
DEFENSE OF EXERCISE OF DUE privilege which the party may waive. Thus, a failure to
DILIGENCE IN THE SELECTION AND except to the evidence because it does not conform to
SUPERVISION OF ITS EMPLOYEES. the statute is a waiver of the provisions of the law.
Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that these
IV documents are inadmissible for being hearsay, but on
account of failure to object thereto, the same may be
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A
admitted and considered as sufficient to prove the facts
QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE
therein asserted. 24 Hearsay evidence alone may be
TRIAL COURT'S QUESTIONABLE
insufficient to establish a fact in a suit but, when no
AWARD OF DAMAGES AND
objection is made thereto, it is, like any other evidence,
ATTORNEY'S FEE.
to be considered and given the importance it
With the passing away of respondent Calaunan deserves. 25
during the pendency of this appeal with this Court, we
In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI did not
granted the Motion for the Substitution of Respondent
object to the TSNs containing the testimonies of
filed by his wife, Mrs. Precila Zarate Vda. De Calaunan,
respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando
and children, Virgilio Calaunan, Carmelita Honeycomb,
Ramos in the criminal case when the same were
Evelyn Calaunan, Marko Calaunan and Liwayway
offered in evidence in the trial court. In fact, the TSNs
Calaunan. 15
of the testimonies of Calaunan and Mendoza were
In their Reply to respondent's Comment, admitted by both petitioners. 26 Moreover, petitioner
petitioners informed this Court of a Decision 16 of the PRBLI even offered in evidence the TSN containing the
Court of Appeals acquitting petitioner Manliclic of the testimony of Donato Ganiban in the criminal case. If
charge 17 of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in petitioner PRBLI argues that the TSNs of the
Damage to Property with Physical Injuries attaching testimonies of plaintiff's witnesses in the criminal case
thereto a photocopy thereof. should not be admitted in the instant case, why then
did it offer the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban which
On the first assigned error, petitioners argue was given in the criminal case? It appears that
that the TSNs containing the testimonies of respondent petitioner PRBLI wants to have its cake and eat it too. It
Calaunan, 18 Marcelo Mendoza 19 and Fernando cannot argue that the TSNs of the testimonies of the
Ramos 20 should not be admitted in evidence for witnesses of the adverse party in the criminal case
failure of respondent to comply with the requisites of should not be admitted and at the same time insist that
Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. the TSN of the testimony of the witness for the accused
be admitted in its favor. To disallow admission in
For Section 47, Rule 130 21 to apply, the evidence of the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan,
following requisites must be satisfied: (a) the witness is Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal
dead or unable to testify; (b) his testimony or case and to admit the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban
deposition was given in a former case or proceeding, would be unfair. ASHEca
judicial or administrative, between the same parties or
those representing the same interests; (c) the former We do not subscribe to petitioner PRBLI's
case involved the same subject as that in the present argument that it will be denied due process when the
case, although on different causes of action; (d) the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza
issue testified to by the witness in the former trial is the and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case are to be
same issue involved in the present case; and (e) the admitted in the civil case. It is too late for petitioner
adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine the PRBLI to raise denial of due process in relation to
witness in the former case. 22 Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as a ground
for objecting to the admissibility of the TSNs. For failure
Admittedly, respondent failed to show the to object at the proper time, it waived its right to object
concurrence of all the requisites set forth by the Rules that the TSNs did not comply with Section 47.
for a testimony given in a former case or proceeding to
be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. In Mangio v. Court of Appeals, 27 this Court,
Petitioner PRBLI, not being a party in Criminal Case No. through Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, 28 admitted
684-M-89, had no opportunity to cross-examine the in evidence a TSN of the testimony of a witness in
three witnesses in said case. The criminal case was another case despite therein petitioner's assertion that
filed exclusively against petitioner Manliclic, petitioner he would be denied due process. In admitting the TSN,
PRBLI's employee. The cases dealing with the the Court ruled that the raising of denial of due process
subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, in relation to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,

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as a ground for objecting to the admissibility of the TSN as shown by pictures to be presented
was belatedly done. In so doing, therein petitioner during the pre-trial and trial of this
waived his right to object based on said ground. case;

Petitioners contend that the documents in the "7. That also as a result of

criminal case should not have been admitted in the said incident, plaintiff sustained
instant civil case because Section 47 of Rule 130 refers bodily injuries which compounded
only to "testimony or deposition." We find such plaintiff's frail physical condition and
contention to be untenable. Though said section speaks required his hospitalization from July
only of testimony and deposition, it does not mean that 12, 1988 up to and until July 22,
documents from a former case or proceeding cannot be 1988, copy of the medical certificate
admitted. Said documents can be admitted they being is hereto attached as Annex "A" and
part of the testimonies of witnesses that have been made an integral part hereof;
admitted. Accordingly, they shall be given the same
weight as that to which the testimony may be "8. That the vehicular
entitled. 29 collision resulting in the total
wreckage of the above-described
On the second assigned error, petitioners motor vehicle as well as bodily (sic)
contend that the version of petitioner Manliclic as to sustained by plaintiff, was solely due
how the accident occurred is more credible than to the reckless imprudence of the
respondent's version. They anchor their contention on defendant driver Mauricio Manliclic
the fact that petitioner Manliclic was acquitted by the who drove his Philippine Rabbit Bus
Court of Appeals of the charge of Reckless Imprudence No. 353 at a fast speed without due
Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries. regard or observance of existing
traffic rules and regulations;
To be resolved by the Court is the effect of
petitioner Manliclic's acquittal in the civil case. "9. That defendant Philippine
Rabbit Bus Line Corporation failed to
From the complaint, it can be gathered that the exercise the diligence of a good
civil case for damages was one arising from, or based father of (sic) family in the selection
on, quasi-delict. 30 Petitioner Manliclic was sued for his and supervision of its drivers; . . ." 31
negligence or reckless imprudence in causing the
collision, while petitioner PRBLI was sued for its failure Can Manliclic still be held liable for the collision
to exercise the diligence of a good father in the and be found negligent notwithstanding the declaration
selection and supervision of its employees, particularly of the Court of Appeals that there was an absence of
petitioner Manliclic. The allegations read: negligence on his part?

"4. That sometime on July 12, In exonerating petitioner Manliclic in the

1988 at around 6:20 A.M. plaintiff was criminal case, the Court of Appeals said:
on board the above-described motor
vehicle travelling at a moderate To the following findings of
speed along the North Luzon the court a quo, to wit: that accused-
Expressway heading South towards appellant was negligent "when the
Manila together with MARCELO bus he was driving bumped the jeep
MENDOZA, who was then driving the from behind"; that "the proximate
same; cause of the accident was his having
driven the bus at a great speed while
"5. That approximately at closely following the jeep"; . . .
kilometer 40 of the North Luzon
Express Way, the above-described We do not agree.
motor vehicle was suddenly bumped The swerving of Calaunan's
from behind by a Philippine Rabbit jeep when it tried to overtake the
Bus with Body No. 353 and with plate vehicle in front of it was beyond the
No. CVD 478 then being driven by control of accused-appellant. ECDaAc
one Mauricio Manliclic of San Jose,
Concepcion, Tarlac, who was then xxx xxx xxx
travelling recklessly at a very fast
speed and had apparently lost control Absent evidence of
of his vehicle; negligence, therefore, accused-
appellant cannot be held liable for
"6. That as a result of the Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
impact of the collision the above- Damage to Property with Physical
described motor vehicle was forced Injuries as defined in Article 365 of
off the North Luzon Express Way the Revised Penal Code. 32
towards the rightside where it fell on
its driver's side on a ditch, and that From the foregoing declaration of the Court of
as a consequence, the above- Appeals, it appears that petitioner Manliclic was
described motor vehicle which maybe acquitted not on reasonable doubt, but on the ground
valued at EIGHTY THOUSAND PESOS that he is not the author of the act complained of which
(P80,000) was rendered a total wreck

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is based on Section 2 (b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Petitioners ask us to give credence to their
Criminal Procedure which reads: version of how the collision occurred and to disregard
that of respondent's. Petitioners insist that while the
(b) Extinction of the penal PRBLI bus was in the process of overtaking
action does not carry with it respondent's jeep, the latter, without warning, suddenly
extinction of the civil, unless the swerved to the left (fast) lane in order to overtake
extinction proceeds from a another jeep ahead of it, thus causing the collision.
declaration in a final judgment that
the fact from which the civil might As a general rule, questions of fact may not be
arise did not exist. raised in a petition for review. The factual findings of
the trial court, especially when affirmed by the
In spite of said ruling, petitioner Manliclic can appellate court, are binding and conclusive on the
still be held liable for the mishap. The afore-quoted Supreme Court. 38 Not being a trier of facts, this Court
section applies only to a civil action arising from crime will not allow a review thereof unless:
or ex delicto and not to a civil action arising from quasi-
delict or culpa aquiliana. The extinction of civil liability (1) the conclusion is a finding
referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111 [now grounded entirely on speculation,
Section 2 (b) of Rule 111], refers exclusively to civil surmise and conjecture; (2) the
liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal inference made is manifestly
Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of
considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is discretion; (4) the judgment is based
not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the
case that the criminal act charged has not happened or findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the
has not been committed by the accused. 33 Court of Appeals went beyond the
issues of the case and its findings are
A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate contrary to the admissions of both
legal institution under the Civil Code with a appellant and appellees; (7) the
substantivity all its own, and individuality that is findings of fact of the Court of
entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime — Appeals are contrary to those of the
a distinction exists between the civil liability arising trial court; (8) said findings of fact are
from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts conclusions without citation of
or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence specific evidence on which they are
causing damages may produce civil liability arising based; (9) the facts set forth in the
from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action petition as well as in the petitioner's
for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the main and reply briefs are not
Civil Code. 34 It is now settled that acquittal of the disputed by the respondents; and
accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, (10) the findings of fact of the Court
does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability of Appeals are premised on the
based on quasi delict. 35 supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on
In other words, if an accused is acquitted based
record. 39
on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civil liability arising
from the crime may be proved by preponderance of After going over the evidence on record, we do
evidence only. However, if an accused is acquitted on not find any of the exceptions that would warrant our
the basis that he was not the author of the act or departure from the general rule. We fully agree in the
omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a finding of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of
final judgment that the fact from which the civil might Appeals, that it was petitioner Manliclic who was
arise did not exist), said acquittal closes the door to negligent in driving the PRBLI bus which was the cause
civil liability based on the crime or ex delicto. In this of the collision. In giving credence to the version of the
second instance, there being no crime or delict to respondent, the trial court has this say:
speak of, civil liability based thereon or ex delicto is not
possible. In this case, a civil action, if any, may be . . . Thus, which of the two
instituted on grounds other than the delict complained versions of the manner how the
of. collision took place was correct,
would be determinative of who
As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict between the two drivers was
or culpa aquiliana, same will not be extinguished by an negligent in the operation of their
acquittal, whether it be on ground of reasonable doubt respective vehicle. aIcSED
or that accused was not the author of the act or
omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a In this regard, it should be
final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability noted that in the statement of
might arise did not exist). The responsibility arising Mauricio Manliclic (Exh. 15) given to
from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely the Philippine Rabbit Investigator CV
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from Cabading no mention was made by
negligence under the Penal Code. 36 An acquittal or him about the fact that the driver of
conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the jeep was overtaking another jeep
the civil case 37 based on quasi-delict or culpa when the collision took place. The
aquiliana. allegation that another jeep was
being overtaken by the jeep of

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Calaunan was testified to by him only was already somewhat parallel to the
in Crim. Case No. 684-M-89 before jeep when the collision took place,
the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, the point of collision on the jeep
Bulacan and before this Court. should have been somewhat on the
Evidently, it was a product of an left side thereof rather than on its
afterthought on the part of Mauricio rear. Furthermore, the jeep should
Manliclic so that he could explain why have fallen on the road itself rather
he should not be held responsible for than having been forced off the road.
the incident. His attempt to veer Useless, likewise to emphasize that
away from the truth was also the Philippine Rabbit was running
apparent when it would be very fast as testified to by Ramos
considered that in his statement which was not controverted by the
given to the Philippine Rabbit defendants. 40
Investigator CV Cabading (Exh. 15),
he alleged that the Philippine Rabbit Having ruled that it was petitioner Manliclic's
Bus bumped the jeep of Calaunan negligence that caused the smash up, there arises the
while the Philippine Rabbit Bus was juris tantum presumption that the employer is
behind the said jeep. In his testimony negligent, rebuttable only by proof of observance of the
before the Regional Trial Court in diligence of a good father of a family. 41 Under Article
Malolos, Bulacan as well as in this 2180 42 of the New Civil Code, when an injury is
Court, he alleged that the Philippine caused by the negligence of the employee, there
Rabbit Bus was already on the left instantly arises a presumption of law that there was
side of the jeep when the collision negligence on the part of the master or employer either
took place. For this inconsistency in the selection of the servant or employee, or in
between his statement and supervision over him after selection or both. The
testimony, his explanation regarding liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and
the manner of how the collision immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse
between the jeep and the bus took against the negligent employee and a prior showing of
place should be taken with caution. It the insolvency of such employee. Therefore, it is
might be true that in the statement of incumbent upon the private respondents to prove that
Oscar Buan given to the Philippine they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family
Rabbit Investigator CV Cabading, it in the selection and supervision of their employee. 43
was mentioned by the former that the In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI maintains
jeep of plaintiff was in the act of that it had shown that it exercised the required
overtaking another jeep when the diligence in the selection and supervision of its
collision between the latter jeep and employees, particularly petitioner Manliclic. In the
the Philippine Rabbit Bus took place. matter of selection, it showed the screening process
But the fact, however, that his that petitioner Manliclic underwent before he became a
statement was given on July 15, regular driver. As to the exercise of due diligence in the
1988, one day after Mauricio Manliclic supervision of its employees, it argues that presence of
gave his statement should not escape ready investigators (Ganiban and Cabading) is
attention. The one-day difference sufficient proof that it exercised the required due
between the giving of the two diligence in the supervision of its employees. DACIHc
statements would be significant
enough to entertain the possibility of In the selection of prospective employees,
Oscar Buan having received legal employers are required to examine them as to their
advise before giving his statement. qualifications, experience and service records. In the
Apart from that, as between his supervision of employees, the employer must formulate
statement and the statement of standard operating procedures, monitor their
Manliclic himself, the statement of implementation and impose disciplinary measures for
the latter should prevail. Besides, in the breach thereof. To fend off vicarious liability,
his Affidavit of March 10, 1989, (Exh. employers must submit concrete proof, including
14), the unreliability of the statement documentary evidence, that they complied with
of Oscar Buan (Exh. 13) given to CV everything that was incumbent on them. 44
Cabading rear its "ugly head" when
he did not mention in said affidavit In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of
that the jeep of Calaunan was trying Appeals, 45 it was explained that:
to overtake another jeep when the
Due diligence in the
collision between the jeep in question
supervision of employees on the
and the Philippine Rabbit bus took
other hand, includes the formulation
place.
of suitable rules and regulations for
xxx xxx xxx the guidance of employees and the
issuance of proper instructions
If one would believe the intended for the protection of the
testimony of the defendant, Mauricio public and persons with whom the
Manliclic, and his conductor, Oscar employer has relations through his or
Buan, that the Philippine Rabbit Bus its employees and the imposition of

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 necessary disciplinary measures upon bus company has been employed to
employees in case of breach or as oversee how its driver should behave
may be warranted to ensure the while operating their vehicles without
performance of acts indispensable to courting incidents similar to the
the business of and beneficial to their herein case. In regard to supervision,
employer. To this, we add that actual it is not difficult to observe that the
implementation and monitoring of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. has
consistent compliance with said rules been negligent as an employer and it
should be the constant concern of the should be made responsible for the
employer, acting through dependable acts of its employees, particularly the
supervisors who should regularly driver involved in this case.
report on their supervisory functions.
We agree. The presence of ready investigators
In order that the defense of after the occurrence of the accident is not enough to
due diligence in the selection and exempt petitioner PRBLI from liability arising from the
supervision of employees may be negligence of petitioner Manliclic. Same does not
deemed sufficient and plausible, it is comply with the guidelines set forth in the cases above-
not enough to emptily invoke the mentioned. The presence of the investigators after the
existence of said company guidelines accident is not enough supervision. Regular supervision
and policies on hiring and of employees, that is, prior to any accident, should
supervision. As the negligence of the have been shown and established. This, petitioner
employee gives rise to the failed to do. The lack of supervision can further be seen
presumption of negligence on the by the fact that there is only one set of manual
part of the employer, the latter has containing the rules and regulations for all the drivers
the burden of proving that it has been of PRBLI. 46 How then can all the drivers of petitioner
diligent not only in the selection of PRBLI know and be continually informed of the rules
employees but also in the actual and regulations when only one manual is being lent to
supervision of their work. The mere all the drivers?
allegation of the existence of hiring
procedures and supervisory policies, For failure to adduce proof that it exercised the
without anything more, is decidedly diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
not sufficient to overcome such and supervision of its employees, petitioner PRBLI is
presumption. held solidarily responsible for the damages caused by
petitioner Manliclic's negligence. ISDHEa
We emphatically reiterate our
holding, as a warning to all We now go to the award of damages. The trial
employers, that "the formulation of court correctly awarded the amount of P40,838.00 as
various company policies on safety actual damages representing the amount paid by
without showing that they were being respondent for the towing and repair of his jeep. 47 As
complied with is not sufficient to regards the awards for moral and exemplary damages,
exempt petitioner from liability same, under the circumstances, must be modified. The
arising from negligence of its P100,000.00 awarded by the trial court as moral
employees. It is incumbent upon damages must be reduced to
petitioner to show that in recruiting P50,000.00. 48 Exemplary damages are imposed by
and employing the erring driver the way of example or correction for the public
recruitment procedures and company good. 49 The amount awarded by the trial court must,
policies on efficiency and safety were likewise, be lowered to P50,000.00. 50 The award of
followed." . . . . P15,000.00 for attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation is in order and authorized by law. 51
The trial court found that petitioner PRBLI
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
the selection but not in the supervision of its petition for review is DENIED. The decision of the Court
employees. It expounded as follows: of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55909 is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that (1) the award of moral
From the evidence of the damages shall be reduced to P50,000.00; and (2) the
defendants, it seems that the award of exemplary damages shall be lowered to
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines has a very P50,000.00. Costs against petitioners.
good procedure of recruiting its driver
as well as in the maintenance of its SO ORDERED.
vehicles. There is no evidence though Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez and Callejo,
that it is as good in the supervision of Sr., JJ., concur.
its personnel. There has been no iota
of evidence introduced by it that ||| (Manliclic v. Calaunan, G.R. No. 150157, [January 25,
there are rules promulgated by the 2007], 541 PHIL 617-641)
bus company regarding the safe
operation of its vehicle and in the way
its driver should manage and operate
the vehicles assigned to them. There
is no showing that somebody in the

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Lumantas vs Calapiz GR No 163753 January 15 thereafter was operated on three times to repair his
2014 damaged urethra.

When his damaged urethra could not be fully

repaired and reconstructed, Hanz's parents brought a
FIRST DIVISION
criminal charge against the petitioner for reckless
imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries. On
[G.R. No. 163753. January 15, 2014.] April 17, 1997, the information 3 was filed in the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Oroquieta City (MTCC),
to which the latter pleaded not guilty on May 22,
DR. ENCARNACION C. LUMANTAS, 1998. 4 Under the order of April 30, 1999, the case was
M.D., petitioner,vs.HANZ CALAPIZ, transferred to the RTC pursuant to Supreme Court
REPRESENTED BY HIS PARENTS, Circular No. 11-99. 5
HILARIO CALAPIZ, JR. and
HERLITA CALAPIZ, respondent. At the trial, the Prosecution presented several
witnesses, including Dr. Rufino Agudera as an expert
witness and as the physician who had operated on
Hanz twice to repair the damaged urethra. Dr. Agudera
DECISION testified that Hanz had been diagnosed to have urethral
stricture and cavernosal injury left secondary to trauma
that had necessitated the conduct of two operations to
strengthen and to lengthen the urethra. Although
BERSAMIN, J p: satisfactorily explaining that the injury to the urethra
had been caused by trauma, Dr. Agudera could not
determine the kind of trauma that had caused the
The acquittal of the accused does not
injury. aDSHIC
necessarily mean his absolution from civil liability.
In his defense, the petitioner denied the charge.
The Case He contended that at the time of his examination of
Hanz on January 16, 1995, he had found an
In this appeal, an accused desires the reversal accumulation of pus at the vicinity of the appendix two
of the decision promulgated on February 20, to three inches from the penis that had required
2003, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the immediate surgical operation; that after performing the
judgment rendered on August 6, 1999 by the Regional appendectomy, he had circumcised Hanz with his
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 13, in Oroquieta City ordering parents' consent by using a Congo instrument, thereby
him to pay moral damages despite his acquittal of the debunking the parents' claim that their child had been
crime of reckless imprudence resulting in serious cauterized; that he had then cleared Hanz on January
physical injuries charged against him. 2 aSTAHD 27, 1995 once his fever had subsided; that he had
found no complications when Hanz returned for his
follow up check-up on February 2, 1995; and that the
Antecedents abscess formation between the base and the shaft of
the penis had been brought about by Hanz's burst
On January 16, 1995, Spouses Hilario Calapiz, appendicitis.
Jr. and Herlita Calapiz brought their 8-year-old son,
Hanz Calapiz (Hanz),to the Misamis Occidental Ruling of the RTC
Provincial Hospital, Oroquieta City, for an emergency
appendectomy. Hanz was attended to by the petitioner,
who suggested to the parents that Hanz also undergo In its decision rendered on August 6,
circumcision at no added cost to spare him the pain. 1999, 6 the RTC acquitted the petitioner of the crime
With the parents' consent, the petitioner performed the charged for insufficiency of the evidence. It held that
coronal type of circumcision on Hanz after his the Prosecution's evidence did not show the required
appendectomy. On the following day, Hanz complained standard of care to be observed by other members of
of pain in his penis, which exhibited blisters. His the medical profession under similar circumstances.
testicles were swollen. The parents noticed that the Nonetheless, the RTC ruled that the petitioner was
child urinated abnormally after the petitioner forcibly liable for moral damages because there was a
removed the catheter, but the petitioner dismissed the preponderance of evidence showing that Hanz had
abnormality as normal. On January 30, 1995, Hanz was received the injurious trauma from his circumcision by
discharged from the hospital over his parents' the petitioner. The decision disposed as follows:
protestations, and was directed to continue taking WHEREFORE, for insufficiency
antibiotics. of evidence, this court renders
On February 8, 1995, Hanz was confined in a judgment acquitting the accused, Dr.
hospital because of the abscess formation between the Encarnacion Lumantas, of reckless
base and the shaft of his penis. Presuming that the imprudence resulting in serious
ulceration was brought about by Hanz's appendicitis, physical injuries, but ordering him to
the petitioner referred him to Dr. Henry Go, an pay Hanz Calapiz P50,000.00 as
urologist, who diagnosed the boy to have a damaged moral damages. No costs.
urethra. Thus, Hanz underwent cystostomy, and SO ORDERED.

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 Ruling of the CA judgment shall determine if the act or omission from
which the civil liability might arise did not
On appeal, the CA affirmed the exist." 11 SDTIaE
RTC, 7 sustaining the award of moral damages. It Conformably with the foregoing, therefore, the
opined that even if the petitioner had been acquitted of acquittal of an accused does not prevent a judgment
the crime charged, the acquittal did not necessarily from still being rendered against him on the civil aspect
mean that he had not incurred civil liability considering of the criminal case unless the court finds and declares
that the Prosecution had preponderantly established that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did
the sufferings of Hanz as the result of the circumcision. not exist.
The petitioner moved for reconsideration, but Although it found the Prosecution's evidence
the CA denied the motion on April 28, 2004. 8 insufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction against
Hence, this appeal. the petitioner for the crime charged, the RTC did not err
in determining and adjudging his civil liability for the
same act complained of based on mere preponderance
Issue of evidence. 12 In this connection, the Court reminds
that the acquittal for insufficiency of the evidence did
Whether the CA erred in affirming the not require that the complainant's recovery of civil
petitioner's civil liability despite his acquittal of the liability should be through the institution of a separate
crime of reckless imprudence resulting in serious civil action for that purpose. 13
physical injuries.
The petitioner's contention that he could not be
held civilly liable because there was no proof of his
Ruling negligence deserves scant consideration. The failure of
the Prosecution to prove his criminal negligence with
The petition for review lacks merit. TAaIDH moral certainty did not forbid a finding against him that
there was preponderant evidence of his negligence to
It is axiomatic that every person criminally hold him civilly liable. 14 With the RTC and the CA both
liable for a felony is also civilly liable. 9 Nevertheless, finding that Hanz had sustained the injurious trauma
the acquittal of an accused of the crime charged does from the hands of the petitioner on the occasion of or
not necessarily extinguish his civil liability. In Manantan incidental to the circumcision, and that the trauma
v. Court of Appeals, 10 the Court elucidates on the two could have been avoided, the Court must concur with
kinds of acquittal recognized by our law as well as on their uniform findings. In that regard, the Court need
the different effects of acquittal on the civil liability of not analyze and weigh again the evidence considered
the accused, viz.: in the proceedings a quo.The Court, by virtue of its not
Our law recognizes two kinds being a trier of facts, should now accord the highest
of acquittal, with different effects on respect to the factual findings of the trial court as
the civil liability of the accused. First affirmed by the CA in the absence of a clear showing by
is an acquittal on the ground that the the petitioner that such findings were tainted with
accused is not the author of the act or arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable error. SCaIcA
omission complained of. This instance Every person is entitled to the physical integrity
closes the door to civil liability, for a of his body. Although we have long advocated the view
person who has been found to be not that any physical injury, like the loss or diminution of
the perpetrator of any act or omission the use of any part of one's body, is not equatable to a
cannot and can never be held liable pecuniary loss, and is not susceptible of exact
for such act or omission. There being monetary estimation, civil damages should be assessed
no delict,civil liability ex delicto is out once that integrity has been violated. The assessment
of the question, and the civil action, if is but an imperfect estimation of the true value of one's
any, which may be instituted must be body. The usual practice is to award moral damages for
based on grounds other than the physical injuries sustained. 15 In Hanz's case, the
the delict complained of. This is the undesirable outcome of the circumcision performed by
situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the petitioner forced the young child to endure several
the Rules of Court. The second other procedures on his penis in order to repair his
instance is an acquittal based on damaged urethra. Surely, his physical and moral
reasonable doubt on the guilt of the sufferings properly warranted the amount of
accused. In this case, even if the guilt P50,000.00 awarded as moral damages. DHTCaI
of the accused has not been
satisfactorily established, he is not Many years have gone by since Hanz suffered
exempt from civil liability which may the injury. Interest of 6% per annum should then be
be proved by preponderance of imposed on the award as a sincere means of adjusting
evidence only. the value of the award to a level that is not only
reasonable but just and commensurate. Unless we
The Rules of Court requires that in case of an make the adjustment in the permissible manner by
acquittal, the judgment shall state "whether the prescribing legal interest on the award, his sufferings
evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove would be unduly compounded. For that purpose, the
the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his reckoning of interest should be from the filing of the
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the

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criminal information on April 17, 1997, the making of
the judicial demand for the liability of the petitioner.

WHEREFORE,the Court AFFIRMS the decision

promulgated on February 20, 2003, with the
modification that legal interest of 6% per annum to
start from April 17, 1997 is imposed on the award of
P50,000.00 as moral damages; and ORDERS the
petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J.,Leonardo-de Castro, Villarama,

Jr. and Reyes, JJ., concur.

||| (Lumantas v. Calapiz, G.R. No. 163753, [January 15,

2014], 724 PHIL 248-256)

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 Culpa Contractual At around 12:00 noon, the truck driven by
Rufo Reynaldo Lapesura (NSF-391) was found
Torres-Madrid Brokerage vs FEB Mitsui GR No abandoned along the Diversion Road in Filinvest,
194121 July 11 2016 Alabang, Muntinlupa City. 6 Both the driver and the
shipment were missing.
Later that evening, BMT's Operations
SECOND DIVISION Manager Melchor Manalastas informed Victor
Torres, TMBI's General Manager, of the
development. 7 They went to Muntinlupa together
[G.R. No. 194121. July 11, 2016.]
to inspect the truck and to report the matter to the
police. 8
TORRES-MADRID BROKERAGE, Victor Torres also filed a complaint with the
INC., petitioner, vs. FEB MITSUI National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) against
MARINE INSURANCE CO., INC. and Lapesura for "hijacking." 9 The complaint resulted
BENJAMIN P. MANALASTAS, doing in a recommendation by the NBI to the Manila City
business under the name of BMT Prosecutor's Office to prosecute Lapesura for
TRUCKING SERVICES, respondents. qualified theft. 10
TMBI notified Sony of the loss through a
letter dated October 10, 2000. 11 It also sent BMT
DECISION a letter dated March 29, 2001, demanding payment
for the lost shipment. BMT refused to pay, insisting
that the goods were "hijacked."
In the meantime, Sony filed an insurance
BRION, J p:
claim with the Mitsui, the insurer of the goods. After
We resolve the petition for review evaluating the merits of the claim, Mitsui paid
on certiorari challenging the Court of Sony PHP7,293,386.23 corresponding to the
Appeals' (CA) October 14, 2010 decision in CA-G.R. value of the lost goods. 12 acEHCD
CV No. 91829. 1
After being subrogated to Sony's rights,
The CA affirmed the Regional Trial Mitsui sent TMBI a demand letter dated August 30,
Court's (RTC) decision in Civil Case No. 01-1596, 2001 for payment of the lost goods. TMBI refused to
and found petitioner Torres-Madrid Brokerage, pay Mitsui's claim. As a result, Mitsui filed a
Inc. (TMBI) and respondent Benjamin P. Manalastas complaint against TMBI on November 6, 2001.
jointly and solidarily liable to respondent FEB Mitsui
TMBI, in turn, impleaded Benjamin
Marine Insurance Co., Inc. (Mitsui) for damages
Manalastas, the proprietor of BMT, as a third-party
from the loss of transported cargo.
defendant. TMBI alleged that BMT's driver,
Antecedents Lapesura, was responsible for the theft/hijacking of
the lost cargo and claimed BMT's negligence as the
On October 7, 2000, a shipment of various proximate cause of the loss. TMBI prayed that in
electronic goods from Thailand and Malaysia the event it is held liable to Mitsui for the loss, it
arrived at the Port of Manila for Sony Philippines, should be reimbursed by BMT.
Inc. (Sony). Previous to the arrival, Sony had
engaged the services of TMBI to facilitate, process, At the trial, it was revealed that BMT and
withdraw, and deliver the shipment from the port to TMBI have been doing business with each other
its warehouse in Biñan, Laguna. 2 since the early 80's. It also came out that there had
been a previous hijacking incident involving Sony's
TMBI — who did not own any delivery cargo in 1997, but neither Sony nor its insurer filed
trucks — subcontracted the services of Benjamin a complaint against BMT or TMBI. 13
Manalastas' company, BMT Trucking
Services (BMT), to transport the shipment from the On August 5, 2008, the RTC found TMBI and
port to the Biñan warehouse. 3 Incidentally, TMBI Benjamin Manalastas jointly and solidarily liable to
notified Sony who had no objections to the pay Mitsui PHP7,293,386.23 as actual damages,
arrangement. 4 attorney's fees equivalent to 25% of the amount
claimed, and the costs of the suit. 14 The RTC held
Four BMT trucks picked up the shipment that TMBI and Manalastas were common carriers
from the port at about 11:00 a.m. of October 7, and had acted negligently.
2000. However, BMT could not immediately
undertake the delivery because of the truck ban Both TMBI and BMT appealed the RTC's
and because the following day was a Sunday. Thus, verdict.
BMT scheduled the delivery on October 9, 2000.
TMBI denied that it was a common carrier
In the early morning of October 9, 2000, required to exercise extraordinary diligence. It
the four trucks left BMT's garage for maintains that it exercised the diligence of a good
Laguna. 5 However, only three trucks arrived at father of a family and should be absolved of liability
Sony's Biñan warehouse. because the truck was "hijacked" and this was a
fortuitous event.

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 BMT claimed that it had representative to accompany the shipment. 26 BMT
exercised extraordinary diligence over the lost further blamed TMBI for the latter's failure to adopt
shipment, and argued as well that the loss resulted security measures to protect Sony's cargo. 27
from a fortuitous event.
Mitsui's Comment
On October 14, 2010, the CA affirmed the
Mitsui counters that neither TMBI nor BMT
RTC's decision but reduced the award of attorney's
alleged or proved during the trial that the taking of
fees to PHP200,000.
the cargo was accompanied with grave or
The CA held: (1) that "hijacking" is not irresistible threat, violence, or force. 28 Hence, the
necessarily a fortuitous event because the term incident cannot be considered "force majeure" and
refers to the general stealing of cargo during TMBI remains liable for breach of contract.
transit; 15 (2) that TMBI is a common carrier
Mitsui emphasizes that TMBI's theory —
engaged in the business of transporting goods for
that force or intimidation must have been used
the general public for a fee; 16 (3) even if
because Lapesura was never found — was only
the "hijacking" were a fortuitous event, TMBI's
raised for the first time before this Court. 29 It also
failure to observe extraordinary diligence in
discredits the theory as a mere conjecture for lack
overseeing the cargo and adopting security
of supporting evidence.
measures rendered it liable for the loss; 17 and (4)
even if TMBI had not been negligent in the Mitsui adopts the CA's reasons to conclude
handling, transport and the delivery of the that TMBI is a common carrier. It also points out
shipment, TMBI still breached its contractual Victor Torres' admission during the trial that TMBI's
obligation to Sony when it failed to deliver the brokerage service includes the eventual delivery of
shipment. 18 the cargo to the consignee. 30
TMBI disagreed with the CA's ruling and Mitsui invokes as well the legal
filed the present petition on December 3, 2010. presumption of negligence against TMBI, pointing
out that TMBI simply entrusted the cargo to BMT
The Arguments
without adopting any security measures despite:
TMBI's Petition (1) a previous hijacking incident when TMBI lost
Sony's cargo; and (2) TMBI's knowledge that the
TMBI insists that the hacking of the truck cargo was worth more than 10 million pesos. 31
was a fortuitous event. It contests the CA's finding
that neither force nor intimidation was used in the Mitsui affirms that TMBI breached the
taking of the cargo. Considering Lapesura was contract of carriage through its negligent handling
never found, the Court should not discount the of the cargo, resulting in its loss.
possibility that he was a victim rather than a
The Court's Ruling
perpetrator. 19
A brokerage may be considered a
TMBI denies being a common carrier
common carrier if it also undertakes to
because it does not own a single truck to transport
deliver the goods for its customers
its shipment and it does not offer transport services
to the public for compensation. 20 It emphasizes Common carriers are persons, corporations,
that Sony knew TMBI did not have its own vehicles firms or associations engaged in the business of
and would subcontract the delivery to a third-party. transporting passengers or goods or both, by land,
water, or air, for compensation, offering their
Further, TMBI now insists that the service it
services to the public. 32 By the nature of their
offered was limited to the processing of paperwork
business and for reasons of public policy, they are
attendant to the entry of Sony's goods. It denies
bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the
that delivery of the shipment was a part of its
vigilance over the goods and in the safety of their
obligation. 21
passengers. 33
TMBI solely blames BMT as it had full
In A.F. Sanchez Brokerage, Inc. v. Court of
control and custody of the cargo when it was
Appeals, 34 we held that a customs broker —
lost. 22 BMT, as a common carrier, is presumed
whose principal business is the preparation of the
negligent and should be responsible for the
correct customs declaration and the proper
loss. SDHTEC
shipping documents — is still considered a common
BMT's Comment carrier if it also undertakes to deliver the goods for
its customers. The law does not distinguish
BMT insists that it observed the required between one whose principal business activity is
standard of care. 23 Like the petitioner, BMT the carrying of goods and one who undertakes this
maintains that the hijacking was a fortuitous event task only as an ancillary activity. 35 This ruling has
— a force majeure — that exonerates it from been reiterated in Schmitz Transport & Brokerage
liability. 24 It points out that Lapesura has never Corp. v. Transport Venture, Inc., 36 Loadmasters
been seen again and his fate remains a mystery. Customs Services, Inc. v. Glodel Brokerage
BMT likewise argues that the loss of the cargo Corporation, 37 and Westwind Shipping
necessarily showed that the taking was with the Corporation v. UCPB General Insurance Co.,
use of force or intimidation. 25 Inc. 38 AScHCD
If there was any attendant negligence, BMT
points the finger on TMBI who failed to send a

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 Despite TMBI's present denials, we find that Simply put, the theft or the robbery of the
the delivery of the goods is an integral, albeit goods is not considered a fortuitous event or
ancillary, part of its brokerage services. TMBI a force majeure. Nevertheless, a common carrier
admitted that it was contracted to facilitate, may absolve itself of liability for a resulting loss: (1)
process, and clear the shipments from the customs if it proves that it exercised extraordinary diligence
authorities, withdraw them from the pier, then in transporting and safekeeping the goods; 44 or
transport and deliver them to Sony's warehouse in (2) if it stipulated with the shipper/owner of the
Laguna. 39 goods to limit its liability for the loss, destruction, or
deterioration of the goods to a degree less than
Further, TMBI's General Manager Victor extraordinary diligence. 45 AcICHD
Torres described the nature of its services as
follows: However, a stipulation diminishing or
dispensing with the common carrier's liability for
ATTY. VIRTUDAZO: Could you acts committed by thieves or robbers who do not
please tell the court what is the act with grave or irresistible threat, violence, or
nature of the business of [TMBI]? force is void under Article 1745 of the Civil
Witness MR. Victor Torres of Code for being contrary to public
Torres Madrid: We are engaged in policy. 46 Jurisprudence, too, has expanded Article
customs brokerage business. We 1734's five exemptions. De Guzman v. Court of
acquire the release documents Appeals 47 interpreted Article 1745 to mean that a
from the Bureau of Customs robbery attended by "grave or irresistible threat,
and eventually deliver the violence or force" is a fortuitous event that
cargoes to the consignee's absolves the common carrier from liability.
warehouse and we are engaged in In the present case, the shipper, Sony,
that kind of business, sir. 40 engaged the services of TMBI, a common carrier, to
That TMBI does not own trucks and has to facilitate the release of its shipment and deliver the
subcontract the delivery of its clients' goods, is goods to its warehouse. In turn, TMBI subcontracted
immaterial. As long as an entity holds itself to the a portion of its obligation — the delivery of the
public for the transport of goods as a business, it is cargo — to another common carrier, BMT.
considered a common carrier regardless of whether Despite the subcontract, TMBI remained
it owns the vehicle used or has to actually hire responsible for the cargo. Under Article 1736, a
one. 41 common carrier's extraordinary responsibility over
Lastly, TMBI's customs brokerage services the shipper's goods lasts from the time these goods
— including the transport/delivery of the cargo — are unconditionally placed in the possession of, and
are available to anyone willing to pay its fees. received by, the carrier for transportation, until
Given these circumstances, we find it undeniable they are delivered, actually or constructively,
that TMBI is a common carrier. by the carrier to the consignee. 48

Consequently, TMBI should be held That the cargo disappeared during transit
responsible for the loss, destruction, or while under the custody of BMT — TMBI's
deterioration of the goods it transports unless it subcontractor — did not diminish nor terminate
results from: TMBI's responsibility over the cargo. Article 1735 of
the Civil Code presumes that it was at fault.
(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, Instead of showing that it had acted
lightning, or other natural with extraordinary diligence, TMBI simply argued
disaster or calamity; that it was not a common carrier bound to observe
extraordinary diligence. Its failure to successfully
(2) Act of the public enemy in war, establish this premise carries with it the
whether international or civil; presumption of fault or negligence, thus rendering
it liable to Sony/Mitsui for breach of contract.
(3) Act of omission of the shipper or Specifically, TMBI's current theory — that
owner of the goods; the hijacking was attended by force or intimidation
— is untenable.
(4) The character of the goods or First, TMBI alleged in its Third Party
defects in the packing or in Complaint against BMT that Lapesura was
the containers; responsible for hijacking the shipment. 49 Further,
Victor Torres filed a criminal complaint against
(5) Order or act of competent public Lapesura with the NBI. 50 These actions constitute
authority. 42 direct and binding admissions that Lapesura stole
the cargo. Justice and fair play dictate that TMBI
should not be allowed to change its legal theory on
For all other cases — such as theft or
appeal.
robbery — a common carrier is presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless it Second, neither TMBI nor BMT succeeded in
can prove that it observed extraordinary substantiating this theory through evidence. Thus,
diligence. 43 the theory remained an unsupported allegation no

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better than speculations and conjectures. The CA In the present case, Mitsui's action is solely
therefore correctly disregarded the defense premised on TMBI's breach of contract. Mitsui did
of force majeure. not even sue BMT, much less prove any negligence
on its part. If BMT has entered the picture at all, it
TMBI and BMT are not solidarily liable is because TMBI sued it for reimbursement for the
to Mitsui liability that TMBI might incur from its contract of
We disagree with the lower courts' ruling carriage with Sony/Mitsui. Accordingly, there is no
that TMBI and BMT are solidarily liable to Mitsui for basis to directly hold BMT liable to Mitsui for quasi-
the loss as joint tortfeasors. The ruling was based delict.
on Article 2194 of the Civil Code: TAIaHE BMT is liable to TMBI for breach of their
Art. 2194. The responsibility of two contract of carriage
or more persons who are liable We do not hereby say that TMBI must
for quasi-delict is solidary. absorb the loss. By subcontracting the cargo
Notably, TMBI's liability to Mitsui does not delivery to BMT, TMBI entered into its own contract
stem from a quasi-delict (culpa aquiliana) but from of carriage with a fellow common carrier.
its breach of contract (culpa contractual). The tie The cargo was lost after its transfer to
that binds TMBI with Mitsui is contractual, albeit BMT's custody based on its contract of carriage
one that passed on to Mitsui as a result of TMBI's with TMBI. Following Article 1735, BMT is presumed
contract of carriage with Sony to which Mitsui had to be at fault. Since BMT failed to prove that it
been subrogated as an insurer who had paid Sony's observed extraordinary diligence in the
insurance claim. The legal reality that results from performance of its obligation to TMBI, it is liable to
this contractual tie precludes the application of
TMBI for breach of their contract of carriage.
quasi-delict based Article 2194.
In these lights, TMBI is liable to Sony
A third party may recover from a (subrogated by Mitsui) for breaching the contract of
common carrier for quasi-delict but must carriage. In turn, TMBI is entitled to reimbursement
prove actual negligence from BMT due to the latter's own breach of its
We likewise disagree with the finding that contract of carriage with TMBI. The proverbial buck
BMT is directly liable to Sony/Mitsui for the loss of stops with BMT who may either: (a) absorb the loss,
the cargo. While it is undisputed that the cargo was or (b) proceed after its missing driver, the
lost under the actual custody of BMT (whose suspected culprit, pursuant to Article 2181. 55
employee is the primary suspect in the hijacking or WHEREFORE, the Court
robbery of the shipment), no direct contractual hereby ORDERS petitioner Torres-Madrid
relationship existed between Sony/Mitsui and BMT. Brokerage, Inc. to pay the respondent FEB Mitsui
If at all, Sony/Mitsui's cause of action against BMT Marine Insurance Co., Inc. the following:
could only arise from quasi-delict, as a third party
suffering damage from the action of another due to a. Actual damages in the amount of
the latter's fault or negligence, pursuant to Article PHP7,293,386.23 plus legal interest
2176 of the Civil Code.51 from the time the complaint was
filed until it is fully paid;
We have repeatedly distinguished between
an action for breach of contract (culpa b. Attorney's fees in the amount of
contractual) and an action for quasi-delict (culpa PHP200,000.00; and
aquiliana).
c. Costs of suit. cDHAES
In culpa contractual, the plaintiff only needs
Respondent Benjamin P. Manalastas is in
to establish the existence of the contract and the
turn ORDERED to REIMBURSE Torres-Madrid
obligor's failure to perform his obligation. It is not
Brokerage, Inc. of the above-mentioned amounts.
necessary for the plaintiff to prove or even allege
that the obligor's non-compliance was due to fault SO ORDERED.
or negligence because Article 1735 already
presumes that the common carrier is negligent. The ||| (Torres-Madrid Brokerage, Inc. v. FEB Mitsui Marine
common carrier can only free itself from liability by Insurance Co., Inc., G.R. No. 194121, [July 11, 2016],
proving that it observed extraordinary diligence. It 789 PHIL 413-429)
cannot discharge this liability by shifting the blame
on its agents or servants. 52
On the other hand, the plaintiff in culpa
aquiliana must clearly establish the defendant's
fault or negligence because this is the very basis of
the action. 53 Moreover, if the injury to the plaintiff
resulted from the act or omission of the defendant's
employee or servant, the defendant may absolve
himself by proving that he observed the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent the
damage. 54

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Ochoa vs G&S Transport GR No 170071 March 9 employee and authorized driver
2011 Bibiano Padilla, Jr. on his way home to
Teacher's Village, Diliman, Quezon
City.
FIRST DIVISION
At about 11:00 p.m., the
taxicab was cruising along Epifanio
[G.R. No. 170071. March 9, 2011.] delos Santos Avenue [EDSA], in front
of Camp Aguinaldo in Quezon City at
high speed. While going up the Boni
HEIRS OF JOSE MARCIAL K. Serrano (Santolan) fly-over, it
OCHOA namely: RUBY B. OCHOA, overtook another cab driven by Pablo
MICAELA B. OCHOA and JOMAR B. Clave and tried to pass another
OCHOA, petitioners, vs. G & S vehicle, a ten-wheeler cargo truck.
TRANSPORT Because of the narrow space between
CORPORATION, respondent. the left side railing of the fly-over and
the ten-wheeler truck, the Avis cab
was unable to pass and because of its
[G.R. No. 170125. March 9, 2011.] speed, its driver (Padilla) was unable
to control it. To avoid colliding with
the truck, Padilla turned the wheel to
G & S TRANSPORT the left causing his taxicab to ram the
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HEIR railing throwing itself off the fly-over
S OF JOSE MARCIAL K. OCHOA and fell on the middle surface of
namely: RUBY B. OCHOA, EDSA below. The forceful drop of the
MICAELA B. OCHOA and JOMAR B. vehicle on the floor of the road broke
OCHOA, respondents. and split it into two parts. Both driver
Padilla and passenger Jose Marcial K.
Ochoa were injured and rushed to the
hospital. At the East Avenue Medical
DECISION Center, Ochoa was not as lucky as
Padilla who was alive. He was
declared dead on arrival from the
accident. The death certificate issued
DEL CASTILLO, J p: by the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Quezon City cited the cause of his
An accident which claimed the life of a death as vehicular accident. 3
passenger is the root of these two petitions — one
brought before us by the common carrier and the On May 13, 1999, Jose Marcial's wife, Ruby
other by the heirs of the deceased. HSaCcE Bueno Ochoa, and his two minor children, Micaela
B. Ochoa and Jomar B. Ochoa (the heirs), through
These consolidated Petitions for Review counsel, sent G & S a letter 4 demanding that the
on Certiorari assail the Court of Appeals' (CA) latter indemnify them for Jose Marcial's death, his
Decision 1 dated June 29, 2005 in CA-G.R. CV No. loss of earning capacity, and funeral expenses in
75602 which affirmed with modification the the total amount of P15,000,000.00. As G & S failed
December 21, 2001 Decision and March 5, 2002 to heed the same, the heirs filed a Complaint 5 for
Order of the trial court. Likewise assailed is the Damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Resolution 2 dated October 12, 2005 denying the Pasig City which was raffled to Branch 164 of said
parties' respective Motions for Reconsideration court. acCTIS
thereto.
The heirs alleged that G & S, as a common
Factual Antecedents carrier, is under legal obligation to observe and
exercise extraordinary diligence in transporting its
Jose Marcial K. Ochoa (Jose Marcial) died on
passengers to their destination safely and securely.
the night of March 10, 1995 while on board an Avis
However, G & S failed to observe and exercise this
taxicab owned and operated by G & S Transport
extraordinary diligence because its employee failed
Corporation (G & S), a common carrier. As narrated
to transport Jose Marcial to his destination safely.
by the trial court, the circumstances attending Jose
They averred that G & S is liable to them for having
Marcial's death are as follows:
breached the contract of common carriage. As an
It appears that sometime in alternative cause of action, they asserted that G &
the evening of March 10, 1995, at the S is likewise liable for damages based on quasi-
Manila Domestic Airport, the late Jose delict pursuant to Article 2180 6 in relation to
Marcial K. Ochoa boarded and rode a Article 2176 7 of the Civil Code.The heirs thus
taxicab with Plate No. PKR-534, a prayed for G & S to pay them actual damages,
passenger vehicle for hire owned and moral damages, exemplary damages, and
operated by defendant corporation attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
under the business name "Avis
In its Answer with Compulsory
Coupon Taxi" (Avis) and driven by its
Counterclaims, 8 G & S claimed that Jose Marcial

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boarded an Avis taxicab driven by its employee, provides that in contracts and quasi-contracts, the
Bibiano Padilla (Padilla), at the Domestic Airport to court may award exemplary damages if the
bring him to Teacher's Village in Quezon City. While defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
passing the Santolan fly-over, however, the Avis oppressive or malevolent manner. And, since
taxicab was bumped by an on-rushing delivery van Padilla was declared by the trial court to have been
at the right portion causing the taxicab to veer to grossly negligent in driving the taxicab, the heirs
the left, ram through the left side of the railings of claimed that they are likewise entitled to exemplary
the fly-over and fall to the center of the island damages. IHCacT
below. The taxicab was split into two and Jose
After G & S filed its Opposition (to Plaintiffs'
Marcial was thrown 10 meters away. G & S posited
Motion for Partial Reconsideration), 15 the trial
that the proximate cause of Jose Marcial's death is
court issued an Order 16 on March 5, 2002. It found
a fortuitous event and/or the fault or negligence of
merit in the heirs' Motion for Partial
the driver of the delivery van that hit the taxicab. It
Reconsideration and thus declared them entitled to
likewise claimed that it exercised the diligence
moral and exemplary damages, viz.:
required of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of its employees including Padilla. WHEREFORE, the decision
By way of compulsory counterclaim, G & S sought dated December 27, 2001 is hereby
to recover from the heirs the amount of modified so as to order defendant
P300,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs of suit. Corporation to pay plaintiffs the
amount of P300,000.00 as moral
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
damages and P50,000.00 as
On December 27, 2001, the trial court exemplary damages. The dispositive
rendered a Decision 9 finding the vehicular mishap portion of said decision is hereby
not caused by a fortuitous event but by the amended to read as follows:
negligence of Padilla. It likewise found the evidence
adduced by G & S to show that it exercised the 'WHEREFORE,
diligence of a good father of a family in the defendant is hereby adjudged
selection and supervision of its employees as guilty of breach of contract of
insufficient. Hence, the trial court declared G & S carriage and is ordered to pay
civilly liable to the heirs. However, for lack of plaintiffs the following
receipts or any proof of funeral expenses and other amounts:
actual damages, the trial court denied the heirs' 1. P50,000.00 as civil
claim for actual damages. It also denied them indemnity for the death of the
moral and exemplary damages for lack of legal deceased Jose Marcial K.
basis. The dispositive portion of said Decision Ochoa;
reads:
2. P6,537,244.96 for
WHEREFORE, defendant is
the loss of earning capacity of
hereby adjudged guilty of breach of
the deceased;
contract of carriage and is ordered to
pay plaintiffs the following amounts: 3. P300,000.00 as
moral damages;
1. P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity for the 4. P50,000.00 as
death of deceased exemplary damages;
Jose Marcial K. Ochoa;
5. P100,000.00 for
2. P6,537,244.96 for the loss attorney's fees;
of earning capacity of
the deceased; 6. And the costs of
litigation.'
3. P100,00.00 for attorney's
fees; SO ORDERED. 17

4. And the cost of litigation. Because of this, G & S filed another Notice of
Appeal 18 and same was given due course by the trial
SO ORDERED. 10 court in an Order 19 dated April 23, 2002.
G & S filed a Notice of Appeal 11 while the Ruling of the Court of Appeals
heirs filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration. 12 The heirs averred that they are Before the CA, G & S continued to insist
entitled to moral damages pursuant to Article that it exercised the diligence of a good father of
1764 13 in relation to Article 2206 (3) 14 of the family in the selection and supervision of its
the Civil Code.They also cited applicable employees. It averred that it has been carrying out
jurisprudence providing that moral damages are not only seminars for its drivers even before they
recoverable in a damage suit predicated upon a were made to work, but also periodic evaluations
breach of contract of carriage where the mishap for their performance. Aside from these, it has also
results in the death of the passenger. With respect been conducting monthly check-up of its
to their claim for exemplary damages, the heirs automobiles and has regularly issued rules
relied upon Article 2232 of the Civil Code which regarding the conduct of its drivers. G & S claimed

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that it was able to establish a good name in the Marcial pursuant to Article 1759 of the Civil
industry and maintain a clientele. Code which provides: STcHEI
In an effort to build up Padilla's character as ART. 1759. Common carriers
an experienced and careful driver, G & S averred are liable for the death of or injuries
that: (1) before G & S employed Padilla, he was a to passengers through the negligence
delivery truck driver of Inter Island Gas Service for or willful acts of the former's
11 years; (2) Padilla has been an employee of G & S employees, although such employees
from 1989 to 1996 and during said period, there may have acted beyond the scope of
was no recorded incident of his being a negligent their authority or in violation of the
driver; (3) despite his qualifications, G & S still orders of the common carriers.
required Padilla to submit an NBI clearance, driver's
license and police clearance; (4) Padilla's being a This liability of the common
good driver-employee was manifest in his years of carriers does not cease upon proof
service with G & S, as in fact, he has received that they exercised all the diligence
congratulatory messages from the latter as shown of a good father of a family in the
by the inter-office memos dated August 23, 1990 selection and supervision of their
and February 1, 1993; and that (5) Padilla attended employees.
a seminar at the Pope Pius Center sometime in In sum, the heirs prayed that the appeal be
December 1999 as part of the NAIA Taxi Operation dismissed for lack of merit and the assailed
Program. Decision and Order of the trial court be affirmed in
G & S also argued that the proximate cause toto.
of Jose Marcial's death is a fortuitous event and/or
In a Decision 21 dated June 29, 2005, the
the fault or negligence of another and not of its CA ruled in favor of the heirs. The appellate court
employee. According to G & S, the collision was gave weight to their argument that in order for a
totally unforeseen since Padilla had every right to fortuitous event to exempt one from liability, it is
expect that the delivery van would just overtake necessary that he committed no negligence or
him and not hit the right side of the taxicab. misconduct that may have occasioned the loss. In
Therefore, what transpired was beyond Padilla's this case, the CA noted that Padilla failed to employ
control. There was no negligence on his part but on reasonable foresight, diligence and care needed to
the part of the driver of the delivery van. For this exempt G & S from liability for Jose Marcial's death.
reason, G & S opined that it was not liable to the Said court also quoted pertinent portions of the
heirs.  MTC decision convicting Padilla of reckless
On the other hand, the heirs maintained imprudence resulting in homicide to negate G & S'
that Padilla was grossly negligent in driving the Avis claim that the proximate cause of the accident was
taxicab on the night of March 10, 1995. They the fault of the driver of the delivery van who
claimed that Padilla, while running at a very high allegedly hit the right side of the taxicab. And just
speed, acted negligently when he tried to overtake like the trial court, the CA found insufficient the
a ten-wheeler truck at the foot of the fly-over. This evidence adduced by G & S to support its claim that
forced him to swerve to the left and as a it exercised due diligence in the selection and
consequence, the Avis taxicab hit the center of the supervision of its employees.
railing and was split into two upon hitting the With respect to the award of P6,537,244.96
ground. The manner by which Padilla drove the for Jose Marcial's loss of earning capacity, the CA
taxicab clearly showed that he acted without declared the same unwarranted. It found the
regard to the safety of his passenger. Certification 22 issued by Jose Marcial's employer,
The heirs also averred that in order for a the United States Agency for International
fortuitous event to exempt one from liability, it is Development (USAID) through its Chief of Human
necessary that he has committed no negligence or Resources Division Jonas Cruz (Cruz), as self-
conduct that may have occasioned the loss. Thus, serving, unreliable, and biased. While said
to be exempt from liability for the death of Jose certification states that Jose Marcial was earning an
Marcial on this ground, G & S must clearly show annual salary of P450,844.49 at the time of his
that the proximate cause of the casualty was untimely demise, the CA noted that same is
entirely independent of human will and that it was unsupported by competent evidence such as
impossible to avoid. And since in the case at bar it income tax returns or receipts. This is in view of the
was Padilla's inexcusable poor judgment, utter lack ruling in People v. Ereño 23 where it was held that
of foresight and extreme negligence which were "there must be unbiased proof of the deceased's
the immediate and proximate causes of the average income." Anent moral damages, the CA
accident, same cannot be considered to be due to a found the award of P300,000.00 excessive and thus
fortuitous event. This is bolstered by the fact that reduced the same to P200,000.00 as to make it
the court trying the case for criminal negligence proportionate to the award of exemplary damages
arising from the same incident convicted Padilla for which is P50,000.00. The dispositive portion of said
said charge. 20 Decision reads:

At any rate, the heirs contended that WHEREFORE, the assailed

regardless of whether G & S observed due diligence Decision dated December 27, 2001
in the selection of its employees, it should and Order dated March 5, 2002 are
nonetheless be held liable for the death of Jose AFFIRMED with the following

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 MODIFICATION: appellant is ordered SELECTION AND SUPERVISION
to pay appellees the sum of OF ITS EMPLOYEES
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the PARTICULARLY MR. BIBIANO
death of the deceased Jose Marcial K. PADILLA. 27
Ochoa, P200,000.00 as moral
damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary G & S reiterates its arguments that the
damages, P100,000.00 for attorney's proximate cause of the accident is a fortuitous
fees and the costs of litigation. The event and/or the negligence of the driver of the
trial court's award of P6,537,244.96 delivery van which bumped the right portion of its
for the loss of earning capacity of the taxicab and, that it exercised the diligence of a
deceased is DELETED for lack of good father of a family in the selection and
basis. supervision of its employees. It faults the CA when
it overlooked the fact that the MTC Decision
SO ORDERED. convicting Padilla of reckless imprudence has
already been reversed on appeal by the RTC with
Both parties moved for Padilla having been accordingly acquitted of the
reconsideration 24 but the CA denied their crime charged. Moreover, it claims that the
respective motions for reconsideration in a appellate court erred in according respect to the
Resolution 25 dated October 12, 2005. testimony of the lone prosecution witness, Pablo
Hence, G & S and the heirs filed their Clave (Clave), when it concluded that Padilla was
respective Petitions for Review on Certiorari before driving negligently at the time of the accident. It
this Court. The heirs' petition was docketed as G.R. asserts that Clave is not a credible witness and so
No. 170071 and that of G & S as G.R. No. 170125. is his testimony. Thus, G & S prays that the assailed
These petitions were later consolidated pursuant to CA Decision and Resolution be reversed and set
this Court's Resolution of November 21, 2005. 26 aside.

G.R. No. 170125 On the other hand, the heirs posit that the
determination of the issues raised by G & S
G & S anchors its petition on the following necessarily entails a re-examination of the factual
grounds: findings which this Court cannot do in this petition
for review on certiorari. At any rate, they maintain
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
that the trial court itself is convinced of Clave's
APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
credibility. They stress the settled rule that the
NOT RULING THAT THE
evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is a matter
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF DEATH
that particularly falls within the authority of the trial
OF MR. JOSE MARCIAL K.
court because it had the opportunity to observe the
OCHOA WAS A FORTUITOUS
demeanor of the witnesses on the stand.
EVENT AND/OR WAS DUE TO
THE FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE The heirs assert that fortuitous event was
OF ANOTHER AND SHOULD not the proximate cause of the mishap. They point
THUS EXEMPT THE out that as correctly found by the trial court, Padilla
PETITIONER FROM was running at an extremely high speed. This was
LIABILITY. CSaITD why the impact was so strong when the taxicab
rammed the fly-over railings and was split into two
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF when it hit the ground. Also, while it is true that the
APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN MTC Decision in the criminal case for reckless
NOT TAKING NOTE OF THE imprudence has been reversed by the RTC, this
FACT THAT THE PETITIONER'S does not excuse G & S from its liability to the heirs
EMPLOYEE HAD BEEN because its liability arises from its breach of
ACQUITTED OF THE CRIME OF contract of carriage and from its negligence in the
RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE selection and supervision of its employees. Also,
RESULTING (IN) HOMICIDE. since the acquittal of Padilla is based on reasonable
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF doubt, same does not in any way rule out his
APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN negligence as this may merely mean that the
UPHOLDING THE TESTIMONY prosecution failed to meet the requisite quantum of
OF A WITNESS WHO evidence to sustain his conviction. Therefore, G & S
SURFACED MONTHS AFTER cannot bank on said acquittal to disprove its
THE INCIDENT WHILE liability.
DISREGARDING THAT OF AN G.R. No. 170071
EYEWITNESS WHO WAS
PRESENT AT THE TIME AND The heirs, on the other hand, advance the
PLACE OF THE ACCIDENT. following grounds in support of their petition:

IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN MANIFESTLY AND GRAVELY ERRED IN
NOT RULING THAT THE COMPLETELY DELETING THE TRIAL
PETITIONER EXERCISED THE COURT'S AWARD FOR THE LOSS OF
DILIGENCE OF A GOOD EARNING CAPACITY OF THE
FATHER OF A FAMILY IN THE DECEASED.

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 THE COURT OF APPEALS For its part, G & S avers that the
MANIFESTLY AND GRAVELY ERRED IN Certification issued by USAID is self-serving
REDUCING THE TRIAL COURT'S because the USAID officer who issued it has not
AWARD FOR MORAL DAMAGES. 28 been put on the witness stand to validate the
contents thereof. Moreover, said Certification was
The focal point of the heirs' petition is the not supported by competent evidence such as
CA's deletion of the award of P6,537,244.96 for Jose income tax returns and receipts. G & S likewise
Marcial's loss of earning capacity as well as the finds the reduction of the award of moral damages
reduction of the award of moral damages from appropriate in view of the settled rule that moral
P300,000.00 to P200,000.00. damages are not meant to enrich the complainant
The heirs aver that the appellate court at the expense of the defendant. Hence, it prays
gravely erred in relying upon Ereño as said case is that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.
not on all fours with the present case. They contend Our Ruling
that in Ereño, this Court disallowed the award for
loss of income because the only proof presented We shall first tackle the issues raised by G & S
was a handwritten statement of the victim's spouse in its petition.
stating the daily income of the deceased as a self-
The first, third and fourth issues raised
employed fish vendor. The heirs argue that the
by G & S involve questions of fact
reason why this Court declared said handwritten
statement as self-serving is because the one who We have reviewed said issues and we find
prepared it, the deceased's wife, was also the one that the determination of the first, third and fourth
who would directly and personally benefit from issues raised entails re-examination of the evidence
such an award. 29 This cannot be said in the case presented because they all involve questions of
at bar since the same bias and personal interest fact. In Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp,
cannot be attributed to Jose Marcial's employer, the Inc., 32 we held that:
USAID. Unlike in Ereño, USAID here does not stand
to be benefited by an award for Jose Marcial's loss Once it is clear that the issue
of earning capacity. Clearly, the Certification issued invites a review of the evidence
by it is far from being self-serving. At any rate, the presented, the question posed is one
heirs contend that Ereño has already been of fact. If the query requires a re-
superseded by Pleyto v. Lomboy 30 where this evaluation of the credibility of
Court held that in awarding damages for loss of witnesses, or the existence or
earning capacity, "mere testimonial evidence relevance of surrounding
suffices to establish a basis for which the court can circumstances and their relation to
make a fair and reasonable estimate of the loss of each other, the issue in that query is
earning capacity". In addition, the heirs point out factual. Our ruling in Paterno v.
that the authenticity and accuracy of said Paterno is illustrative on this point:
Certification was neither questioned by G & S nor Such questions as
discredited by any controverting evidence. In fact, whether certain items of
its admission by the trial court was not even evidence should be accorded
assigned by G & S as an error in their appeal before probative value or weight, or
the CA. HSaCcE  rejected as feeble or spurious,
As to the reduction of moral damages, the or whether or not the proof on
heirs claim that since the CA agreed with the one side or the other are
factual circumstances of the case as found by the clear and convincing and
trial court, there is therefore no reason for it to alter adequate to establish a
the award of damages arising from such factual proposition in issue, are
circumstances. They aver that the CA may only without doubt questions of
modify the damages awarded by the trial court fact. Whether or not the body
when it is excessive and scandalous as held of proofs presented by a
in Meneses v. Court of Appeals. 31 Here, they claim party, weighed and analyzed
that the award of moral damages in the amount of in relation to contrary
P300,000.00 cannot be considered as excessive evidence submitted by
and unreasonable but only commensurate to the adverse party, may be said to
sufferings caused by the incident to a wife who be strong, clear and
became a young widow at the age of 33 and to two convincing; whether or not
minor children who lost a father. Moreover, the certain documents presented
heirs aver that the CA should not have reduced the by one side should be
award of moral damages just to make said amount accorded full faith and credit
proportionate to the exemplary damages awarded. in the face of protests as to
This is because there is no such rule which dictates their spurious character by
that the amount of moral damages should be the other side; whether or not
proportionate to that of the exemplary damages. inconsistencies in the body of
The heirs pray that the assailed CA Decision and proofs of a party are of such a
Resolution be reversed and set aside insofar as gravity as to justify refusing
they deleted the award for loss of earning capacity to give said proofs weight —
and reduced the award for moral damages.

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 all these are issues of fact. and the CA found that the accident which led to
(Citations omitted) Jose Marcial's death was due to the reckless driving
and gross negligence of G & S' driver, Padilla,
In this case, the said three issues boil down thereby holding G & S liable to the heirs of Jose
to the determination of the following Marcial for breach of contract of carriage.
questions: What is the proximate cause of the
death of Jose Marcial? Is the testimony of The acquittal of Padilla in the criminal
prosecution witness Clave credible? Did G & S case is immaterial to the instant case for
exercise the diligence of a good father of a family breach of contract
in the selection and supervision of its This thus now leaves us with the remaining
employees? Suffice it to say that these are all issue raised by G & S, that is, whether the CA
questions of fact which require this Court to inquire gravely erred in not taking note of the fact that
into the probative value of the evidence presented Padilla has already been acquitted of the crime of
before the trial court. As we have consistently held, reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, a
"[t]his Court is not a trier of facts. It is not a charge which arose from the same incident subject
function of this court to analyze or weigh evidence. of this case.
When we give due course to such situations, it is
solely by way of exception. Such exceptions apply Article 31 of the Civil Code provides, viz.:
only in the presence of extremely meritorious
When the civil action is based
circumstances." 33 Here, we note that although G
on an obligation not arising from the
& S enumerated in its Consolidated
act or omission complained of as a
Memorandum 34 the exceptions 35 to the rule that
felony, such civil action may proceed
a petition for review on certiorari should only raise
independently of the criminal
questions of law, it nevertheless did not point out
proceedings and regardless of the
under what exception its case falls. And, upon
result of the latter.
review of the records of the case, we are convinced
that it does not fall under any. Hence, we cannot Thus, in Cancio, Jr. v. Isip, 39 we declared:
proceed to resolve said issues and disturb the
findings and conclusions of the CA with respect In the instant case, it must be
thereto. As we declared in Diokno v. Cacdac: 36 stressed that the action filed by
petitioner is an independent civil
It is aphoristic that a re- action, which remains separate and
examination of factual findings distinct from any criminal prosecution
cannot be done through a petition for based on the same act. Not being
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of deemed instituted in the criminal
the Rules of Court because as earlier action based on culpa criminal, a
stated, this Court is not a trier of ruling on the culpability of the
facts; it reviews only questions of law. offender will have no bearing on
The Supreme Court is not duty-bound said independent civil action
to analyze and weigh again the based on an entirely different
evidence considered in the cause of action, i.e., culpa
proceedings below. This is already contractual." (Emphasis supplied;
outside the province of the instant Citations omitted.)
Petition for Certiorari. [Citations
omitted.] DAHSaT In this case, the action filed by the heirs is
primarily for the recovery of damages arising from
There is a contract of carriage between breach of contract of carriage allegedly committed
G & S and Jose Marcial by G & S. Clearly, it is an independent civil action
What is clear from the records is that there arising from contract which is separate and distinct
existed a contract of carriage between G & S, as from the criminal action for reckless imprudence
the owner and operator of the Avis taxicab, and resulting in homicide filed by the heirs against
Jose Marcial, as the passenger of said vehicle. As a Padilla by reason of the same incident. Hence,
common carrier, G & S "is bound to carry [Jose regardless of Padilla's acquittal or conviction in said
Marcial] safely as far as human care and foresight criminal case, same has no bearing in the
can provide, using the utmost diligence of very resolution of the present case. There was therefore
cautious persons, with due regard for all the no error on the part of the CA when it resolved this
circumstances." 37 However, Jose Marcial was not case without regard to the fact that Padilla has
able to reach his destination safely as he died already been acquitted by the RTC in the criminal
during the course of the travel. "In a contract of case. Moreover, while the CA quoted some portions
carriage, it is presumed that the common carrier is of the MTC Decision in said criminal case, we
at fault or is negligent when a passenger dies or is however find that those quoted portions were only
injured. In fact, there is even no need for the court meant to belie G & S' claim that the proximate
to make an express finding of fault or negligence cause of the accident was the negligence of the
on the part of the common carrier. This statutory driver of the delivery van which allegedly hit the
presumption may only be overcome by evidence Avis taxicab. Even without those quoted portions,
that the carrier exercised extraordinary the appellate court's ultimate finding that it was
diligence." 38 Unfortunately, G & S miserably failed Padilla's negligence which was the proximate cause
to overcome this presumption. Both the trial court of the mishap would still be the same. This is

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because the CA has, in fact, already made this down in Caraig, we deleted the award for
declaration in the earlier part of its assailed compensatory damages for loss of earning capacity
Decision. The fact that the MTC Decision from as same was awarded by the lower courts only on
which the subject quoted portions were lifted has the basis of the husband's testimony that the
already been reversed by the RTC is therefore deceased was 39 years of age and a Section Chief
immaterial. TaHDAS of the Bureau of Internal Revenue with a salary of
P83,088.00 per annum at the time of her death.
In view of the foregoing, we deny G & S' This same rule was also applied in the 2008 case
petition for lack of merit. of Licyayo v. People. 47  
The denial by the CA of the heirs' claim In all of the cases mentioned except
for lost earnings is unwarranted for Ereño, the sole basis for the claim for loss of
Going now to the petition filed by the heirs, earning capacity were the testimonies of the
we note at the outset that the issues of whether the claimants. This is not the case here. Just like
CA erred in deleting the award for loss of earning in Ereño where the testimony of the mother of the
capacity and in reducing the award for moral deceased was accompanied by a handwritten
damages made by the trial court likewise raise estimate of her daughter's alleged income as a fish
questions of fact as they "involve an examination of vendor, the testimony of Jose Marcial's wife that he
the probative value of the evidence presented by was earning around P450,000.00 a year was
the parties". 40 However, we find that the heirs' corroborated by a Certification issued by the USAID.
case falls under one of the exceptions because the However in Ereño, we declared as self-serving the
findings of the CA conflict with the findings of the handwritten estimate submitted by the mother
RTC. 41 Since the heirs properly raised the hence we denied the claim for such award. Based
conflicting findings of the lower courts, it is proper on said ruling, the CA in this case deleted the
for this Court to resolve such contradiction. 42 award for lost income after it found the USAID
Certification to be self-serving and unreliable.
In Ereño, we denied the claim for loss of
income because the handwritten estimate of the We disagree. The CA sweepingly concluded
deceased's daily income as a self-employed vendor that the USAID Certification is self-serving and
was not supported by competent evidence like unreliable without elaborating on how it was able to
income tax returns or receipts. This was in view of arrive at such a conclusion. A research on USAID
the rule that compensation for lost income is in the reveals that it is the "principal [United States]
nature of damages and as such requires due proof agency to extend assistance to countries
of damages suffered. We reiterated this rule recovering from disaster, trying to escape poverty,
in People v. Yrat 43 where we likewise denied the and engaging in democratic reforms." 48 It is an
same claim because the only evidence presented to "independent federal government agency that
show that the deceased was earning P50,000.00 a receives over-all foreign policy guidance from the
month was the testimony of the wife. There we Secretary of the State [of the United
stated that for lost income due to death, there must States]." 49 Given this background, it is highly
be unbiased proof of the deceased's average improbable that such an agency will issue a
income. Self-serving, hence, unreliable statement is certification containing unreliable information
not enough. In People v. Caraig, 44 we declared regarding an employee's income. Besides, there
that "documentary evidence should be presented exists a presumption that official duty has been
to substantiate the claim for damages for loss of regularly performed. 50 Absent any showing to the
earning capacity. By way of exception, damages contrary, it is presumed that Cruz, as Chief of
therefor may be awarded despite the absence of Human Resources Division of USAID, has regularly
documentary evidence, provided that there is performed his duty relative to the issuance of said
testimony that the victim was either "(1) self- certification and therefore, the correctness of its
employed earning less than the minimum wage contents can be relied upon. This presumption
under current labor laws, and judicial notice may remains especially so where the authenticity, due
be taken of the fact that in the victim's line of work execution and correctness of said certification have
no documentary evidence is available; or not been put in issue either before the trial court or
(2) employed as a daily-wage worker earning less the CA. As to its being self-serving, our discussion
than the minimum wage under current labor laws". on "self-serving evidence" in Heirs of Pedro
However, we subsequently ruled in Pleyto v. Clemeña y Zurbano v. Heirs of Irene B. Bien 51 is
Lomboy 45 that "failure to present documentary enlightening, viz.:
evidence to support a claim for loss of earning 'Self-serving evidence,'
capacity of the deceased need not be fatal to its perhaps owing to its descriptive
cause. Testimonial evidence suffices to establish a formulation, is a concept much
basis for which the court can make a fair and misunderstood. Not infrequently, the
reasonable estimate of the loss of earning term is employed as a weapon to
capacity". Hence, we held as sufficient to establish devalue and discredit a party's
a basis for an estimate of damages for loss of testimony favorable to his cause.
earning capacity the testimony of the victim's That, it seems, is the sense in which
widow that her husband was earning a monthly petitioners are using it now. This is a
income of P8,000.00. Later, in Victory Liner, Inc. v. grave error. "Self-serving evidence" is
Gammad, 46 after finding that the deceased's not to be taken literally to mean any
earnings does not fall within the exceptions laid evidence that serves its proponent's

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 interest. The term, if used with provisions of Articles 1764 and 2206 (3) which
any legal sense, refers only to provide:
acts or declarations made by a
Art. 1764. Damages in cases
party in his own interest at some
comprised in this Section shall be
place and time out of court . . . .
awarded in accordance with Title
(Citations omitted; emphasis
XVIII of this Book, concerning
supplied.)
Damages. — Articles 2206 shall also
Verily, the USAID certification cannot be said to be apply to the death of a passenger
self-serving because it does not refer to an act or caused by the breach of contract by a
declaration made out of court by the heirs common carrier.
themselves as parties to this case. IcTaAH
Art. 2206. . . .
Clearly, the CA erred in deleting the award
for lost income on the ground that the USAID (3) The spouse, legitimate
Certification supporting such claim is self-serving and illegitimate descendants and the
and unreliable. On the contrary, we find said ascendants of the deceased may
certification sufficient basis for the court to make a demand moral damages for mental
fair and reasonable estimate of Jose Marcial's loss anguish by reason of the death of the
of earning capacity just like in Tamayo v. deceased.
Señora 52 where we based the victim's gross Here, there is no question that the heirs are
annual income on his pay slip from the Philippine likewise entitled to moral damages pursuant to the
National Police. Hence, we uphold the trial court's above provisions, considering the mental anguish
award for Jose Marcial's loss of earning capacity.
suffered by them by reason of Jose Marcial's
While the trial court applied the formula untimely death, as can be deduced from the
generally used by the courts to determine net earning following testimony of his wife Ruby: aASDTE
capacity which is, to wit: Atty. Suarez:
Net Earning Capacity = life expectancy* x Q: How would you describe Jose
(gross annual income - reasonable Marcial Ochoa?
living expenses), 53
* Life expectancy = 2/3 (80 — age of the (Ruby)
deceased) A: My husband was a very loving
we, however, find incorrect the amount of husband, faithful husband, a
P6,537,244.96 arrived at. The award should be very [good] provider[.] I
P6,611,634.59 as borne out by the following depended on him so much
computation: financially [and]
emotionally[.] He was
Net earning 2 (80 - 36) 54 x 450,844.49 55 -
= practically my life then.
capacity 50% 56 
       ———— Q: How is he as a father?
             3
  = 88 x 225,422.25 A: A very good father, he is very
    — committed to Micaela[. H]e
     3 has always time for her[. H]e
  = 29.33 x 225,422.25 is a family man, so it's really
  = P6,611,634.59 a great [loss] to me and to
Micaela.

The award of moral damages should be Q: What was your reaction upon
modified learning of your husband's
death?
While we deemed it proper to modify the
amount of moral damages awarded by the trial A: Immediately after I learned of his
court as discussed below, we nevertheless agree death, I tried very hard to
with the heirs that the CA should not have pegged keep a clear mind for my little
said award in proportion to the award of exemplary girl, she was 3 1/2 and she
damages. Moral and exemplary damages are based could not grasp what death is,
on different jural foundations. 57 They are different so I found [it] so hard to
in nature and require separate explain to her [at] that time
determination. 58 The amount of one cannot be what happened [e]specially
made to depend on the other. [because] she just talked to
her father from the airport
In Victory Liner Inc. v. Gammad 59 we telling her that he is coming
awarded P100,000.00 by way of moral damages to home, tapos hindi na pala.
the husband and three children of the deceased, a
39-year old Section Chief of the Bureau of Internal Q: How did it affect you?
Revenue, to compensate said heirs for the grief
caused by her death. This is pursuant to the

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A: It was a painful struggle everyday Q: If you would assign that pain and
just to get up and move on suffering that you suffered as
when someone who [you] a result of the death of your
really really love and [who] is husband, what will be the
important to you . . . it is very monetary
hard to move on and [it is consideration? AICHaS
even] harder to move on
[when] I found out that I was A: I struggled with that kasi. . . .I can
pregnant with my second honestly say no amount of
child, parang tinabunan ka money can ever repay the
[ng] lahat eh[. I]t's [too] hard [loss] that my children
to find happiness, you're suffered, future nila yan eh,
pregnant, when you and my son was not given a
know wala naman chance to get to know his
talagang father yung father, so I cannot
bata later on . . . imagine kung ano yung
sinasabi n'yong amount that
xxx xxx xxx will compensate the suffering
that I have to go through and
Q: How did this affect your family? my children will go
through, 'yon and mahirap
A: Yung effect kay Micaela, she
bayaran. 60
[used] to be a gregarious
child, yung happy ganyan, Under this circumstance, we thus find as
but nung wala na sufficient and "somehow proportional to and in
yong father niya that time, approximation of the suffering inflicted" 61 an
[during] award of moral damages in an amount similar to
graduation ng nursery that that awarded in Victory which is P100,000.00.
time naging very very
[quiet] siya, so a lot of From the above discussion, we, thus, partly
emotional support from my grant the heirs' petition.
own family was given to her WHEREFORE, the petition for review
at the time para makacope- on certiorari in G.R. No. 170071 is PARTLY
up siya sa loss kasi she is GRANTED while the petition in G.R. No. 170125
very close to the father. is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution
Q: Financially, how did it affect you? dated June 29, 2005 and October 12, 2005 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 75602
A: I had to make do of what was left are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that G
by my husband, I couldn't & S is ordered to pay the heirs of Jose Marcial K.
also work so much at the time Ochoa the sum of P6,611,634.59 for loss of earning
because I was. . . .and hirap capacity of the deceased and P100,000.00 as moral
eh, I cannot find enthusiasm damages.
in what I
SO ORDERED.
do, tapos pregnant pa ako,
and hirap talaga. ||| (Heirs of Ochoa v. G & S Transport Corp., G.R. Nos.
170071 & 170125, [March 9, 2011], 660 PHIL 387-418)
Q: How else did it affect you?

A: We had to move houses like we

used to live in Quezon City at
(the) time of his death, tapos
kinuha kami ni Gorjie my
brother-in-law sa compound 
nila para hindi. . . [to] support
us emotionally (at that
time) kasi nga I was pregnant
and then I also decided to
move (to make it easy for
me) to
adjust yung lifestyle ng mga
bata, because I cannot cope
[here] financially on my own
[.N]ahihirapan na ako
dito because the living
expenses here are quite high
compared sa probinsiya so I
decided to move.

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G&S Transport vs Ochoa GR No 170125 March 9 employee and authorized driver
2011 Bibiano Padilla, Jr. on his way home to
Teacher's Village, Diliman, Quezon
City.
FIRST DIVISION
At about 11:00 p.m., the
taxicab was cruising along Epifanio
[G.R. No. 170071. March 9, 2011.] delos Santos Avenue [EDSA], in front
of Camp Aguinaldo in Quezon City at
high speed. While going up the Boni
HEIRS OF JOSE MARCIAL K. Serrano (Santolan) fly-over, it
OCHOA namely: RUBY B. OCHOA, overtook another cab driven by Pablo
MICAELA B. OCHOA and JOMAR B. Clave and tried to pass another
OCHOA, petitioners, vs. G & S vehicle, a ten-wheeler cargo truck.
TRANSPORT Because of the narrow space between
CORPORATION, respondent. the left side railing of the fly-over and
the ten-wheeler truck, the Avis cab
was unable to pass and because of its
[G.R. No. 170125. March 9, 2011.] speed, its driver (Padilla) was unable
to control it. To avoid colliding with
the truck, Padilla turned the wheel to
G & S TRANSPORT the left causing his taxicab to ram the
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HEIR railing throwing itself off the fly-over
S OF JOSE MARCIAL K. OCHOA and fell on the middle surface of
namely: RUBY B. OCHOA, EDSA below. The forceful drop of the
MICAELA B. OCHOA and JOMAR B. vehicle on the floor of the road broke
OCHOA, respondents. and split it into two parts. Both driver
Padilla and passenger Jose Marcial K.
Ochoa were injured and rushed to the
hospital. At the East Avenue Medical
DECISION Center, Ochoa was not as lucky as
Padilla who was alive. He was
declared dead on arrival from the
accident. The death certificate issued
DEL CASTILLO, J p: by the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Quezon City cited the cause of his
An accident which claimed the life of a death as vehicular accident. 3
passenger is the root of these two petitions — one
brought before us by the common carrier and the On May 13, 1999, Jose Marcial's wife, Ruby
other by the heirs of the deceased. HSaCcE Bueno Ochoa, and his two minor children, Micaela
B. Ochoa and Jomar B. Ochoa (the heirs), through
These consolidated Petitions for Review counsel, sent G & S a letter 4 demanding that the
on Certiorari assail the Court of Appeals' (CA) latter indemnify them for Jose Marcial's death, his
Decision 1 dated June 29, 2005 in CA-G.R. CV No. loss of earning capacity, and funeral expenses in
75602 which affirmed with modification the the total amount of P15,000,000.00. As G & S failed
December 21, 2001 Decision and March 5, 2002 to heed the same, the heirs filed a Complaint 5 for
Order of the trial court. Likewise assailed is the Damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Resolution 2 dated October 12, 2005 denying the Pasig City which was raffled to Branch 164 of said
parties' respective Motions for Reconsideration court. acCTIS
thereto.
The heirs alleged that G & S, as a common
Factual Antecedents carrier, is under legal obligation to observe and
exercise extraordinary diligence in transporting its
Jose Marcial K. Ochoa (Jose Marcial) died on
passengers to their destination safely and securely.
the night of March 10, 1995 while on board an Avis
However, G & S failed to observe and exercise this
taxicab owned and operated by G & S Transport
extraordinary diligence because its employee failed
Corporation (G & S), a common carrier. As narrated
to transport Jose Marcial to his destination safely.
by the trial court, the circumstances attending Jose
They averred that G & S is liable to them for having
Marcial's death are as follows:
breached the contract of common carriage. As an
It appears that sometime in alternative cause of action, they asserted that G &
the evening of March 10, 1995, at the S is likewise liable for damages based on quasi-
Manila Domestic Airport, the late Jose delict pursuant to Article 2180 6 in relation to
Marcial K. Ochoa boarded and rode a Article 2176 7 of the Civil Code.The heirs thus
taxicab with Plate No. PKR-534, a prayed for G & S to pay them actual damages,
passenger vehicle for hire owned and moral damages, exemplary damages, and
operated by defendant corporation attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
under the business name "Avis
In its Answer with Compulsory
Coupon Taxi" (Avis) and driven by its
Counterclaims, 8 G & S claimed that Jose Marcial

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boarded an Avis taxicab driven by its employee, provides that in contracts and quasi-contracts, the
Bibiano Padilla (Padilla), at the Domestic Airport to court may award exemplary damages if the
bring him to Teacher's Village in Quezon City. While defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
passing the Santolan fly-over, however, the Avis oppressive or malevolent manner. And, since
taxicab was bumped by an on-rushing delivery van Padilla was declared by the trial court to have been
at the right portion causing the taxicab to veer to grossly negligent in driving the taxicab, the heirs
the left, ram through the left side of the railings of claimed that they are likewise entitled to exemplary
the fly-over and fall to the center of the island damages. IHCacT
below. The taxicab was split into two and Jose
After G & S filed its Opposition (to Plaintiffs'
Marcial was thrown 10 meters away. G & S posited
Motion for Partial Reconsideration), 15 the trial
that the proximate cause of Jose Marcial's death is
court issued an Order 16 on March 5, 2002. It found
a fortuitous event and/or the fault or negligence of
merit in the heirs' Motion for Partial
the driver of the delivery van that hit the taxicab. It
Reconsideration and thus declared them entitled to
likewise claimed that it exercised the diligence
moral and exemplary damages, viz.:
required of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of its employees including Padilla. WHEREFORE, the decision
By way of compulsory counterclaim, G & S sought dated December 27, 2001 is hereby
to recover from the heirs the amount of modified so as to order defendant
P300,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs of suit. Corporation to pay plaintiffs the
amount of P300,000.00 as moral
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
damages and P50,000.00 as
On December 27, 2001, the trial court exemplary damages. The dispositive
rendered a Decision 9 finding the vehicular mishap portion of said decision is hereby
not caused by a fortuitous event but by the amended to read as follows:
negligence of Padilla. It likewise found the evidence
adduced by G & S to show that it exercised the 'WHEREFORE,
diligence of a good father of a family in the defendant is hereby adjudged
selection and supervision of its employees as guilty of breach of contract of
insufficient. Hence, the trial court declared G & S carriage and is ordered to pay
civilly liable to the heirs. However, for lack of plaintiffs the following
receipts or any proof of funeral expenses and other amounts:
actual damages, the trial court denied the heirs' 1. P50,000.00 as civil
claim for actual damages. It also denied them indemnity for the death of the
moral and exemplary damages for lack of legal deceased Jose Marcial K.
basis. The dispositive portion of said Decision Ochoa;
reads:
2. P6,537,244.96 for
WHEREFORE, defendant is
the loss of earning capacity of
hereby adjudged guilty of breach of
the deceased;
contract of carriage and is ordered to
pay plaintiffs the following amounts: 3. P300,000.00 as
moral damages;
1. P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity for the 4. P50,000.00 as
death of deceased exemplary damages;
Jose Marcial K. Ochoa;
5. P100,000.00 for
2. P6,537,244.96 for the loss attorney's fees;
of earning capacity of
the deceased; 6. And the costs of
litigation.'
3. P100,00.00 for attorney's
fees; SO ORDERED. 17

4. And the cost of litigation. Because of this, G & S filed another Notice of
Appeal 18 and same was given due course by the trial
SO ORDERED. 10 court in an Order 19 dated April 23, 2002.
G & S filed a Notice of Appeal 11 while the Ruling of the Court of Appeals
heirs filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration. 12 The heirs averred that they are Before the CA, G & S continued to insist
entitled to moral damages pursuant to Article that it exercised the diligence of a good father of
1764 13 in relation to Article 2206 (3) 14 of the family in the selection and supervision of its
the Civil Code.They also cited applicable employees. It averred that it has been carrying out
jurisprudence providing that moral damages are not only seminars for its drivers even before they
recoverable in a damage suit predicated upon a were made to work, but also periodic evaluations
breach of contract of carriage where the mishap for their performance. Aside from these, it has also
results in the death of the passenger. With respect been conducting monthly check-up of its
to their claim for exemplary damages, the heirs automobiles and has regularly issued rules
relied upon Article 2232 of the Civil Code which regarding the conduct of its drivers. G & S claimed

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that it was able to establish a good name in the Marcial pursuant to Article 1759 of the Civil
industry and maintain a clientele. Code which provides: STcHEI
In an effort to build up Padilla's character as ART. 1759. Common carriers
an experienced and careful driver, G & S averred are liable for the death of or injuries
that: (1) before G & S employed Padilla, he was a to passengers through the negligence
delivery truck driver of Inter Island Gas Service for or willful acts of the former's
11 years; (2) Padilla has been an employee of G & S employees, although such employees
from 1989 to 1996 and during said period, there may have acted beyond the scope of
was no recorded incident of his being a negligent their authority or in violation of the
driver; (3) despite his qualifications, G & S still orders of the common carriers.
required Padilla to submit an NBI clearance, driver's
license and police clearance; (4) Padilla's being a This liability of the common
good driver-employee was manifest in his years of carriers does not cease upon proof
service with G & S, as in fact, he has received that they exercised all the diligence
congratulatory messages from the latter as shown of a good father of a family in the
by the inter-office memos dated August 23, 1990 selection and supervision of their
and February 1, 1993; and that (5) Padilla attended employees.
a seminar at the Pope Pius Center sometime in In sum, the heirs prayed that the appeal be
December 1999 as part of the NAIA Taxi Operation dismissed for lack of merit and the assailed
Program. Decision and Order of the trial court be affirmed in
G & S also argued that the proximate cause toto.
of Jose Marcial's death is a fortuitous event and/or
In a Decision 21 dated June 29, 2005, the
the fault or negligence of another and not of its CA ruled in favor of the heirs. The appellate court
employee. According to G & S, the collision was gave weight to their argument that in order for a
totally unforeseen since Padilla had every right to fortuitous event to exempt one from liability, it is
expect that the delivery van would just overtake necessary that he committed no negligence or
him and not hit the right side of the taxicab. misconduct that may have occasioned the loss. In
Therefore, what transpired was beyond Padilla's this case, the CA noted that Padilla failed to employ
control. There was no negligence on his part but on reasonable foresight, diligence and care needed to
the part of the driver of the delivery van. For this exempt G & S from liability for Jose Marcial's death.
reason, G & S opined that it was not liable to the Said court also quoted pertinent portions of the
heirs.  MTC decision convicting Padilla of reckless
On the other hand, the heirs maintained imprudence resulting in homicide to negate G & S'
that Padilla was grossly negligent in driving the Avis claim that the proximate cause of the accident was
taxicab on the night of March 10, 1995. They the fault of the driver of the delivery van who
claimed that Padilla, while running at a very high allegedly hit the right side of the taxicab. And just
speed, acted negligently when he tried to overtake like the trial court, the CA found insufficient the
a ten-wheeler truck at the foot of the fly-over. This evidence adduced by G & S to support its claim that
forced him to swerve to the left and as a it exercised due diligence in the selection and
consequence, the Avis taxicab hit the center of the supervision of its employees.
railing and was split into two upon hitting the With respect to the award of P6,537,244.96
ground. The manner by which Padilla drove the for Jose Marcial's loss of earning capacity, the CA
taxicab clearly showed that he acted without declared the same unwarranted. It found the
regard to the safety of his passenger. Certification 22 issued by Jose Marcial's employer,
The heirs also averred that in order for a the United States Agency for International
fortuitous event to exempt one from liability, it is Development (USAID) through its Chief of Human
necessary that he has committed no negligence or Resources Division Jonas Cruz (Cruz), as self-
conduct that may have occasioned the loss. Thus, serving, unreliable, and biased. While said
to be exempt from liability for the death of Jose certification states that Jose Marcial was earning an
Marcial on this ground, G & S must clearly show annual salary of P450,844.49 at the time of his
that the proximate cause of the casualty was untimely demise, the CA noted that same is
entirely independent of human will and that it was unsupported by competent evidence such as
impossible to avoid. And since in the case at bar it income tax returns or receipts. This is in view of the
was Padilla's inexcusable poor judgment, utter lack ruling in People v. Ereño 23 where it was held that
of foresight and extreme negligence which were "there must be unbiased proof of the deceased's
the immediate and proximate causes of the average income." Anent moral damages, the CA
accident, same cannot be considered to be due to a found the award of P300,000.00 excessive and thus
fortuitous event. This is bolstered by the fact that reduced the same to P200,000.00 as to make it
the court trying the case for criminal negligence proportionate to the award of exemplary damages
arising from the same incident convicted Padilla for which is P50,000.00. The dispositive portion of said
said charge. 20 Decision reads:

At any rate, the heirs contended that WHEREFORE, the assailed

regardless of whether G & S observed due diligence Decision dated December 27, 2001
in the selection of its employees, it should and Order dated March 5, 2002 are
nonetheless be held liable for the death of Jose AFFIRMED with the following

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 MODIFICATION: appellant is ordered SELECTION AND SUPERVISION
to pay appellees the sum of OF ITS EMPLOYEES
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the PARTICULARLY MR. BIBIANO
death of the deceased Jose Marcial K. PADILLA. 27
Ochoa, P200,000.00 as moral
damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary G & S reiterates its arguments that the
damages, P100,000.00 for attorney's proximate cause of the accident is a fortuitous
fees and the costs of litigation. The event and/or the negligence of the driver of the
trial court's award of P6,537,244.96 delivery van which bumped the right portion of its
for the loss of earning capacity of the taxicab and, that it exercised the diligence of a
deceased is DELETED for lack of good father of a family in the selection and
basis. supervision of its employees. It faults the CA when
it overlooked the fact that the MTC Decision
SO ORDERED. convicting Padilla of reckless imprudence has
already been reversed on appeal by the RTC with
Both parties moved for Padilla having been accordingly acquitted of the
reconsideration 24 but the CA denied their crime charged. Moreover, it claims that the
respective motions for reconsideration in a appellate court erred in according respect to the
Resolution 25 dated October 12, 2005. testimony of the lone prosecution witness, Pablo
Hence, G & S and the heirs filed their Clave (Clave), when it concluded that Padilla was
respective Petitions for Review on Certiorari before driving negligently at the time of the accident. It
this Court. The heirs' petition was docketed as G.R. asserts that Clave is not a credible witness and so
No. 170071 and that of G & S as G.R. No. 170125. is his testimony. Thus, G & S prays that the assailed
These petitions were later consolidated pursuant to CA Decision and Resolution be reversed and set
this Court's Resolution of November 21, 2005. 26 aside.

G.R. No. 170125 On the other hand, the heirs posit that the
determination of the issues raised by G & S
G & S anchors its petition on the following necessarily entails a re-examination of the factual
grounds: findings which this Court cannot do in this petition
for review on certiorari. At any rate, they maintain
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
that the trial court itself is convinced of Clave's
APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
credibility. They stress the settled rule that the
NOT RULING THAT THE
evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is a matter
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF DEATH
that particularly falls within the authority of the trial
OF MR. JOSE MARCIAL K.
court because it had the opportunity to observe the
OCHOA WAS A FORTUITOUS
demeanor of the witnesses on the stand.
EVENT AND/OR WAS DUE TO
THE FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE The heirs assert that fortuitous event was
OF ANOTHER AND SHOULD not the proximate cause of the mishap. They point
THUS EXEMPT THE out that as correctly found by the trial court, Padilla
PETITIONER FROM was running at an extremely high speed. This was
LIABILITY. CSaITD why the impact was so strong when the taxicab
rammed the fly-over railings and was split into two
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF when it hit the ground. Also, while it is true that the
APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN MTC Decision in the criminal case for reckless
NOT TAKING NOTE OF THE imprudence has been reversed by the RTC, this
FACT THAT THE PETITIONER'S does not excuse G & S from its liability to the heirs
EMPLOYEE HAD BEEN because its liability arises from its breach of
ACQUITTED OF THE CRIME OF contract of carriage and from its negligence in the
RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE selection and supervision of its employees. Also,
RESULTING (IN) HOMICIDE. since the acquittal of Padilla is based on reasonable
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF doubt, same does not in any way rule out his
APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN negligence as this may merely mean that the
UPHOLDING THE TESTIMONY prosecution failed to meet the requisite quantum of
OF A WITNESS WHO evidence to sustain his conviction. Therefore, G & S
SURFACED MONTHS AFTER cannot bank on said acquittal to disprove its
THE INCIDENT WHILE liability.
DISREGARDING THAT OF AN G.R. No. 170071
EYEWITNESS WHO WAS
PRESENT AT THE TIME AND The heirs, on the other hand, advance the
PLACE OF THE ACCIDENT. following grounds in support of their petition:

IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN MANIFESTLY AND GRAVELY ERRED IN
NOT RULING THAT THE COMPLETELY DELETING THE TRIAL
PETITIONER EXERCISED THE COURT'S AWARD FOR THE LOSS OF
DILIGENCE OF A GOOD EARNING CAPACITY OF THE
FATHER OF A FAMILY IN THE DECEASED.

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 THE COURT OF APPEALS For its part, G & S avers that the
MANIFESTLY AND GRAVELY ERRED IN Certification issued by USAID is self-serving
REDUCING THE TRIAL COURT'S because the USAID officer who issued it has not
AWARD FOR MORAL DAMAGES. 28 been put on the witness stand to validate the
contents thereof. Moreover, said Certification was
The focal point of the heirs' petition is the not supported by competent evidence such as
CA's deletion of the award of P6,537,244.96 for Jose income tax returns and receipts. G & S likewise
Marcial's loss of earning capacity as well as the finds the reduction of the award of moral damages
reduction of the award of moral damages from appropriate in view of the settled rule that moral
P300,000.00 to P200,000.00. damages are not meant to enrich the complainant
The heirs aver that the appellate court at the expense of the defendant. Hence, it prays
gravely erred in relying upon Ereño as said case is that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.
not on all fours with the present case. They contend Our Ruling
that in Ereño, this Court disallowed the award for
loss of income because the only proof presented We shall first tackle the issues raised by G & S
was a handwritten statement of the victim's spouse in its petition.
stating the daily income of the deceased as a self-
The first, third and fourth issues raised
employed fish vendor. The heirs argue that the
by G & S involve questions of fact
reason why this Court declared said handwritten
statement as self-serving is because the one who We have reviewed said issues and we find
prepared it, the deceased's wife, was also the one that the determination of the first, third and fourth
who would directly and personally benefit from issues raised entails re-examination of the evidence
such an award. 29 This cannot be said in the case presented because they all involve questions of
at bar since the same bias and personal interest fact. In Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp,
cannot be attributed to Jose Marcial's employer, the Inc., 32 we held that:
USAID. Unlike in Ereño, USAID here does not stand
to be benefited by an award for Jose Marcial's loss Once it is clear that the issue
of earning capacity. Clearly, the Certification issued invites a review of the evidence
by it is far from being self-serving. At any rate, the presented, the question posed is one
heirs contend that Ereño has already been of fact. If the query requires a re-
superseded by Pleyto v. Lomboy 30 where this evaluation of the credibility of
Court held that in awarding damages for loss of witnesses, or the existence or
earning capacity, "mere testimonial evidence relevance of surrounding
suffices to establish a basis for which the court can circumstances and their relation to
make a fair and reasonable estimate of the loss of each other, the issue in that query is
earning capacity". In addition, the heirs point out factual. Our ruling in Paterno v.
that the authenticity and accuracy of said Paterno is illustrative on this point:
Certification was neither questioned by G & S nor Such questions as
discredited by any controverting evidence. In fact, whether certain items of
its admission by the trial court was not even evidence should be accorded
assigned by G & S as an error in their appeal before probative value or weight, or
the CA. HSaCcE  rejected as feeble or spurious,
As to the reduction of moral damages, the or whether or not the proof on
heirs claim that since the CA agreed with the one side or the other are
factual circumstances of the case as found by the clear and convincing and
trial court, there is therefore no reason for it to alter adequate to establish a
the award of damages arising from such factual proposition in issue, are
circumstances. They aver that the CA may only without doubt questions of
modify the damages awarded by the trial court fact. Whether or not the body
when it is excessive and scandalous as held of proofs presented by a
in Meneses v. Court of Appeals. 31 Here, they claim party, weighed and analyzed
that the award of moral damages in the amount of in relation to contrary
P300,000.00 cannot be considered as excessive evidence submitted by
and unreasonable but only commensurate to the adverse party, may be said to
sufferings caused by the incident to a wife who be strong, clear and
became a young widow at the age of 33 and to two convincing; whether or not
minor children who lost a father. Moreover, the certain documents presented
heirs aver that the CA should not have reduced the by one side should be
award of moral damages just to make said amount accorded full faith and credit
proportionate to the exemplary damages awarded. in the face of protests as to
This is because there is no such rule which dictates their spurious character by
that the amount of moral damages should be the other side; whether or not
proportionate to that of the exemplary damages. inconsistencies in the body of
The heirs pray that the assailed CA Decision and proofs of a party are of such a
Resolution be reversed and set aside insofar as gravity as to justify refusing
they deleted the award for loss of earning capacity to give said proofs weight —
and reduced the award for moral damages.

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 all these are issues of fact. and the CA found that the accident which led to
(Citations omitted) Jose Marcial's death was due to the reckless driving
and gross negligence of G & S' driver, Padilla,
In this case, the said three issues boil down thereby holding G & S liable to the heirs of Jose
to the determination of the following Marcial for breach of contract of carriage.
questions: What is the proximate cause of the
death of Jose Marcial? Is the testimony of The acquittal of Padilla in the criminal
prosecution witness Clave credible? Did G & S case is immaterial to the instant case for
exercise the diligence of a good father of a family breach of contract
in the selection and supervision of its This thus now leaves us with the remaining
employees? Suffice it to say that these are all issue raised by G & S, that is, whether the CA
questions of fact which require this Court to inquire gravely erred in not taking note of the fact that
into the probative value of the evidence presented Padilla has already been acquitted of the crime of
before the trial court. As we have consistently held, reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, a
"[t]his Court is not a trier of facts. It is not a charge which arose from the same incident subject
function of this court to analyze or weigh evidence. of this case.
When we give due course to such situations, it is
solely by way of exception. Such exceptions apply Article 31 of the Civil Code provides, viz.:
only in the presence of extremely meritorious
When the civil action is based
circumstances." 33 Here, we note that although G
on an obligation not arising from the
& S enumerated in its Consolidated
act or omission complained of as a
Memorandum 34 the exceptions 35 to the rule that
felony, such civil action may proceed
a petition for review on certiorari should only raise
independently of the criminal
questions of law, it nevertheless did not point out
proceedings and regardless of the
under what exception its case falls. And, upon
result of the latter.
review of the records of the case, we are convinced
that it does not fall under any. Hence, we cannot Thus, in Cancio, Jr. v. Isip, 39 we declared:
proceed to resolve said issues and disturb the
findings and conclusions of the CA with respect In the instant case, it must be
thereto. As we declared in Diokno v. Cacdac: 36 stressed that the action filed by
petitioner is an independent civil
It is aphoristic that a re- action, which remains separate and
examination of factual findings distinct from any criminal prosecution
cannot be done through a petition for based on the same act. Not being
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of deemed instituted in the criminal
the Rules of Court because as earlier action based on culpa criminal, a
stated, this Court is not a trier of ruling on the culpability of the
facts; it reviews only questions of law. offender will have no bearing on
The Supreme Court is not duty-bound said independent civil action
to analyze and weigh again the based on an entirely different
evidence considered in the cause of action, i.e., culpa
proceedings below. This is already contractual." (Emphasis supplied;
outside the province of the instant Citations omitted.)
Petition for Certiorari. [Citations
omitted.] DAHSaT In this case, the action filed by the heirs is
primarily for the recovery of damages arising from
There is a contract of carriage between breach of contract of carriage allegedly committed
G & S and Jose Marcial by G & S. Clearly, it is an independent civil action
What is clear from the records is that there arising from contract which is separate and distinct
existed a contract of carriage between G & S, as from the criminal action for reckless imprudence
the owner and operator of the Avis taxicab, and resulting in homicide filed by the heirs against
Jose Marcial, as the passenger of said vehicle. As a Padilla by reason of the same incident. Hence,
common carrier, G & S "is bound to carry [Jose regardless of Padilla's acquittal or conviction in said
Marcial] safely as far as human care and foresight criminal case, same has no bearing in the
can provide, using the utmost diligence of very resolution of the present case. There was therefore
cautious persons, with due regard for all the no error on the part of the CA when it resolved this
circumstances." 37 However, Jose Marcial was not case without regard to the fact that Padilla has
able to reach his destination safely as he died already been acquitted by the RTC in the criminal
during the course of the travel. "In a contract of case. Moreover, while the CA quoted some portions
carriage, it is presumed that the common carrier is of the MTC Decision in said criminal case, we
at fault or is negligent when a passenger dies or is however find that those quoted portions were only
injured. In fact, there is even no need for the court meant to belie G & S' claim that the proximate
to make an express finding of fault or negligence cause of the accident was the negligence of the
on the part of the common carrier. This statutory driver of the delivery van which allegedly hit the
presumption may only be overcome by evidence Avis taxicab. Even without those quoted portions,
that the carrier exercised extraordinary the appellate court's ultimate finding that it was
diligence." 38 Unfortunately, G & S miserably failed Padilla's negligence which was the proximate cause
to overcome this presumption. Both the trial court of the mishap would still be the same. This is

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because the CA has, in fact, already made this down in Caraig, we deleted the award for
declaration in the earlier part of its assailed compensatory damages for loss of earning capacity
Decision. The fact that the MTC Decision from as same was awarded by the lower courts only on
which the subject quoted portions were lifted has the basis of the husband's testimony that the
already been reversed by the RTC is therefore deceased was 39 years of age and a Section Chief
immaterial. TaHDAS of the Bureau of Internal Revenue with a salary of
P83,088.00 per annum at the time of her death.
In view of the foregoing, we deny G & S' This same rule was also applied in the 2008 case
petition for lack of merit. of Licyayo v. People. 47  
The denial by the CA of the heirs' claim In all of the cases mentioned except
for lost earnings is unwarranted for Ereño, the sole basis for the claim for loss of
Going now to the petition filed by the heirs, earning capacity were the testimonies of the
we note at the outset that the issues of whether the claimants. This is not the case here. Just like
CA erred in deleting the award for loss of earning in Ereño where the testimony of the mother of the
capacity and in reducing the award for moral deceased was accompanied by a handwritten
damages made by the trial court likewise raise estimate of her daughter's alleged income as a fish
questions of fact as they "involve an examination of vendor, the testimony of Jose Marcial's wife that he
the probative value of the evidence presented by was earning around P450,000.00 a year was
the parties". 40 However, we find that the heirs' corroborated by a Certification issued by the USAID.
case falls under one of the exceptions because the However in Ereño, we declared as self-serving the
findings of the CA conflict with the findings of the handwritten estimate submitted by the mother
RTC. 41 Since the heirs properly raised the hence we denied the claim for such award. Based
conflicting findings of the lower courts, it is proper on said ruling, the CA in this case deleted the
for this Court to resolve such contradiction. 42 award for lost income after it found the USAID
Certification to be self-serving and unreliable.
In Ereño, we denied the claim for loss of
income because the handwritten estimate of the We disagree. The CA sweepingly concluded
deceased's daily income as a self-employed vendor that the USAID Certification is self-serving and
was not supported by competent evidence like unreliable without elaborating on how it was able to
income tax returns or receipts. This was in view of arrive at such a conclusion. A research on USAID
the rule that compensation for lost income is in the reveals that it is the "principal [United States]
nature of damages and as such requires due proof agency to extend assistance to countries
of damages suffered. We reiterated this rule recovering from disaster, trying to escape poverty,
in People v. Yrat 43 where we likewise denied the and engaging in democratic reforms." 48 It is an
same claim because the only evidence presented to "independent federal government agency that
show that the deceased was earning P50,000.00 a receives over-all foreign policy guidance from the
month was the testimony of the wife. There we Secretary of the State [of the United
stated that for lost income due to death, there must States]." 49 Given this background, it is highly
be unbiased proof of the deceased's average improbable that such an agency will issue a
income. Self-serving, hence, unreliable statement is certification containing unreliable information
not enough. In People v. Caraig, 44 we declared regarding an employee's income. Besides, there
that "documentary evidence should be presented exists a presumption that official duty has been
to substantiate the claim for damages for loss of regularly performed. 50 Absent any showing to the
earning capacity. By way of exception, damages contrary, it is presumed that Cruz, as Chief of
therefor may be awarded despite the absence of Human Resources Division of USAID, has regularly
documentary evidence, provided that there is performed his duty relative to the issuance of said
testimony that the victim was either "(1) self- certification and therefore, the correctness of its
employed earning less than the minimum wage contents can be relied upon. This presumption
under current labor laws, and judicial notice may remains especially so where the authenticity, due
be taken of the fact that in the victim's line of work execution and correctness of said certification have
no documentary evidence is available; or not been put in issue either before the trial court or
(2) employed as a daily-wage worker earning less the CA. As to its being self-serving, our discussion
than the minimum wage under current labor laws". on "self-serving evidence" in Heirs of Pedro
However, we subsequently ruled in Pleyto v. Clemeña y Zurbano v. Heirs of Irene B. Bien 51 is
Lomboy 45 that "failure to present documentary enlightening, viz.:
evidence to support a claim for loss of earning 'Self-serving evidence,'
capacity of the deceased need not be fatal to its perhaps owing to its descriptive
cause. Testimonial evidence suffices to establish a formulation, is a concept much
basis for which the court can make a fair and misunderstood. Not infrequently, the
reasonable estimate of the loss of earning term is employed as a weapon to
capacity". Hence, we held as sufficient to establish devalue and discredit a party's
a basis for an estimate of damages for loss of testimony favorable to his cause.
earning capacity the testimony of the victim's That, it seems, is the sense in which
widow that her husband was earning a monthly petitioners are using it now. This is a
income of P8,000.00. Later, in Victory Liner, Inc. v. grave error. "Self-serving evidence" is
Gammad, 46 after finding that the deceased's not to be taken literally to mean any
earnings does not fall within the exceptions laid evidence that serves its proponent's

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 interest. The term, if used with provisions of Articles 1764 and 2206 (3) which
any legal sense, refers only to provide:
acts or declarations made by a
Art. 1764. Damages in cases
party in his own interest at some
comprised in this Section shall be
place and time out of court . . . .
awarded in accordance with Title
(Citations omitted; emphasis
XVIII of this Book, concerning
supplied.)
Damages. — Articles 2206 shall also
Verily, the USAID certification cannot be said to be apply to the death of a passenger
self-serving because it does not refer to an act or caused by the breach of contract by a
declaration made out of court by the heirs common carrier.
themselves as parties to this case. IcTaAH
Art. 2206. . . .
Clearly, the CA erred in deleting the award
for lost income on the ground that the USAID (3) The spouse, legitimate
Certification supporting such claim is self-serving and illegitimate descendants and the
and unreliable. On the contrary, we find said ascendants of the deceased may
certification sufficient basis for the court to make a demand moral damages for mental
fair and reasonable estimate of Jose Marcial's loss anguish by reason of the death of the
of earning capacity just like in Tamayo v. deceased.
Señora 52 where we based the victim's gross Here, there is no question that the heirs are
annual income on his pay slip from the Philippine likewise entitled to moral damages pursuant to the
National Police. Hence, we uphold the trial court's above provisions, considering the mental anguish
award for Jose Marcial's loss of earning capacity.
suffered by them by reason of Jose Marcial's
While the trial court applied the formula untimely death, as can be deduced from the
generally used by the courts to determine net earning following testimony of his wife Ruby: aASDTE
capacity which is, to wit: Atty. Suarez:
Net Earning Capacity = life expectancy* x Q: How would you describe Jose
(gross annual income - reasonable Marcial Ochoa?
living expenses), 53
* Life expectancy = 2/3 (80 — age of the (Ruby)
deceased) A: My husband was a very loving
we, however, find incorrect the amount of husband, faithful husband, a
P6,537,244.96 arrived at. The award should be very [good] provider[.] I
P6,611,634.59 as borne out by the following depended on him so much
computation: financially [and]
emotionally[.] He was
Net earning 2 (80 - 36) 54 x 450,844.49 55 -
= practically my life then.
capacity 50% 56 
       ———— Q: How is he as a father?
             3
  = 88 x 225,422.25 A: A very good father, he is very
    — committed to Micaela[. H]e
     3 has always time for her[. H]e
  = 29.33 x 225,422.25 is a family man, so it's really
  = P6,611,634.59 a great [loss] to me and to
Micaela.

The award of moral damages should be Q: What was your reaction upon
modified learning of your husband's
death?
While we deemed it proper to modify the
amount of moral damages awarded by the trial A: Immediately after I learned of his
court as discussed below, we nevertheless agree death, I tried very hard to
with the heirs that the CA should not have pegged keep a clear mind for my little
said award in proportion to the award of exemplary girl, she was 3 1/2 and she
damages. Moral and exemplary damages are based could not grasp what death is,
on different jural foundations. 57 They are different so I found [it] so hard to
in nature and require separate explain to her [at] that time
determination. 58 The amount of one cannot be what happened [e]specially
made to depend on the other. [because] she just talked to
her father from the airport
In Victory Liner Inc. v. Gammad 59 we telling her that he is coming
awarded P100,000.00 by way of moral damages to home, tapos hindi na pala.
the husband and three children of the deceased, a
39-year old Section Chief of the Bureau of Internal Q: How did it affect you?
Revenue, to compensate said heirs for the grief
caused by her death. This is pursuant to the

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A: It was a painful struggle everyday Q: If you would assign that pain and
just to get up and move on suffering that you suffered as
when someone who [you] a result of the death of your
really really love and [who] is husband, what will be the
important to you . . . it is very monetary
hard to move on and [it is consideration? AICHaS
even] harder to move on
[when] I found out that I was A: I struggled with that kasi. . . .I can
pregnant with my second honestly say no amount of
child, parang tinabunan ka money can ever repay the
[ng] lahat eh[. I]t's [too] hard [loss] that my children
to find happiness, you're suffered, future nila yan eh,
pregnant, when you and my son was not given a
know wala naman chance to get to know his
talagang father yung father, so I cannot
bata later on . . . imagine kung ano yung
sinasabi n'yong amount that
xxx xxx xxx will compensate the suffering
that I have to go through and
Q: How did this affect your family? my children will go
through, 'yon and mahirap
A: Yung effect kay Micaela, she
bayaran. 60
[used] to be a gregarious
child, yung happy ganyan, Under this circumstance, we thus find as
but nung wala na sufficient and "somehow proportional to and in
yong father niya that time, approximation of the suffering inflicted" 61 an
[during] award of moral damages in an amount similar to
graduation ng nursery that that awarded in Victory which is P100,000.00.
time naging very very
[quiet] siya, so a lot of From the above discussion, we, thus, partly
emotional support from my grant the heirs' petition.
own family was given to her WHEREFORE, the petition for review
at the time para makacope- on certiorari in G.R. No. 170071 is PARTLY
up siya sa loss kasi she is GRANTED while the petition in G.R.
very close to the father. No. 170125 is DENIED. The assailed Decision and
Q: Financially, how did it affect you? Resolution dated June 29, 2005 and October 12,
2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
A: I had to make do of what was left 75602 are AFFIRMED with the
by my husband, I couldn't MODIFICATIONS that G & S is ordered to pay the
also work so much at the time heirs of Jose Marcial K. Ochoa the sum of
because I was. . . .and hirap P6,611,634.59 for loss of earning capacity of the
eh, I cannot find enthusiasm deceased and P100,000.00 as moral damages.
in what I
SO ORDERED.
do, tapos pregnant pa ako,
and hirap talaga. Corona, C.J., Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de
Castro and Perez, JJ., concur.
Q: How else did it affect you?
||| (Heirs of Ochoa v. G & S Transport Corp., G.R. Nos.
A: We had to move houses like we
170071 & 170125, [March 9, 2011], 660 PHIL 387-418)
used to live in Quezon City at
(the) time of his death, tapos
kinuha kami ni Gorjie my
brother-in-law sa compound 
nila para hindi. . . [to] support
us emotionally (at that
time) kasi nga I was pregnant
and then I also decided to
move (to make it easy for
me) to
adjust yung lifestyle ng mga
bata, because I cannot cope
[here] financially on my own
[.N]ahihirapan na ako
dito because the living
expenses here are quite high
compared sa probinsiya so I
decided to move.

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Gutierrez vs Gutierrez 56 Phil 177 On February 2, 1930, a passenger truck and
an automobile of private ownership collided while
attempting to pass each other on the Talon bridge
EN BANC on the Manila South Road in the municipality of Las
Pinas, Province of Rizal. The truck was driven by the
chauffeur Abelardo Velasco, and was owned by
[G.R. No. 34840. September 23, 1931.] Saturnino Cortez. The automobile was being
operated by Bonifacio Gutierrez, a lad 18 years of
age, and was owned by Bonifacio's father and
NARCISO GUTIERREZ, plaintiff- mother, Mr. and Mrs. Manuel Gutierrez. At the time
appellee, vs. BONIFACIO of the collision, the father was not in the car, but
GUTIERREZ, MARIA V. DE the mother, together with several other members
GUTIERREZ, MANUEL GUTIERREZ, of the Gutierrez family, seven in all, were
ABELARDO VELASCO, and accommodated therein. A passenger in the
SATURNINO CORTEZ, defendants- autobus, by the name of Narciso Gutierrez, was en
appellants. route from San Pablo, Laguna, to Manila. The
collision between the bus and the automobile
resulted in Narciso Gutierrez suffering a fractured
L. D. Lockwood, for appellants Velasco and right leg which required medical attendance for a
Cortez. considerable period of time, and which even at the
date of the trial appears not to have healed
San Agustin & Roxas, for other appellants.
properly.
Ramon Diokno, for appellee.
It is conceded that the collision was caused
by negligence pure and simple. The difference
SYLLABUS between the parties is that, while the plaintiff
blames both sets of defendants, the owner of the
passenger truck blames the automobile, and the
1. DAMAGES; MASTER AND SERVANT; owner of the automobile, in turn, blames the truck.
MOTOR VEHICLES; LIABILITY OF HEAD OF HOUSE We have given close attention to these highly
FOR ACTS OF DRIVER WHO IS HIS MINOR CHILD. — debatable points, and having done so, a majority of
The head of a house, the owner of an automobile, the court are of the opinion that the findings of the
who maintains it for the general use of his family, is trial judge on all controversial questions of fact find
liable for its negligent operation by one of his sufficient support in the record, and so should be
children, whom he designates or permits to run it, maintained. With this general statement set down,
where the car is occupied and being used at the we turn to consider the respective legal obligations
time of the injury for the pleasure of other of the defendants.
members of the owner's family than the child
driving it.
In amplification of so much of the above
pronouncement as concerns the Gutierrez family, it
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — One G, may be explained that the youth Bonifacio was an
a passenger in a truck, recovers damages in the incompetent chauffeur, that he was driving at an
amount of P5,000 from the owner of a private excessive rate of speed, and that, on approaching
automobile not in the car, the machine being the bridge and the truck, he lost his head and so
operated by a son 18 years of age, with other contributed by his negligence to the accident. The
members of the family accommodated therein, and guaranty given by the father at the time the son
from the chauffeur and owner of the truck which was granted a license to operate motor vehicles
collided with the private automobile on a bridge, made the father responsible for the acts of his son.
causing physical injuries to G as a result of the Based on these facts, pursuant to the provisions of
automobile accident. article 1903 of the Civil Code, the father alone and
not the minor or the mother, would be liable for the
damages caused by the minor.

DECISION
We are here dealing with the civil law
liability of parties for obligations which arise from
fault or negligence. At the same time, we believe
that, as has been done in other cases, we can take
MALCOLM, J p: cognizance of the common law rule on the same
subject. In the United States, it is uniformly held
This is an action brought by the plaintiff in that the head of a house, the owner of an
the Court of First Instance of Manila against the five automobile, who maintains it for the general use of
defendants, to recover damages in the amount of his family is liable for its negligent operation by one
P10,000, for physical injuries suffered as a result of of his children, whom he designates or permits to
an automobile accident. On judgment being run it, where the car is occupied and being used at
rendered as prayed for by the plaintiff, both sets of the time of the injury for the pleasure of other
defendants appealed. members of the owner's family than the child
driving it. The theory of the law is that the running

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of the machine by a child to carry other members Avancena, C.J., Johnson, Street, Villamor,
of the family is within the scope of the owner's Ostrand, Romualdez and Imperial, JJ., concur.
business, so that he is liable for the negligence of
the child because of the relationship of master and Villa-Real, J., I vote for an indemnity of
servant. (Huddy On Automobiles, 6th ed., sec. 660; P7,500.
Missell vs. Hayes [1914], 91 Alt., 322.)
||| (Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 34840, [September
The liability of Saturnino Cortez, the owner 23, 1931], 56 PHIL 177-181)
of the truck, and of his chauffeur Abelardo Velasco
rests on a different basis, namely, that of contract
which, we think, has been sufficiently demonstrated
by the allegations of the complaint, not
controverted, and the evidence. The reason for this
conclusion reaches to the findings of the trial court
concerning the position of the truck on the bridge,
the speed in operating the machine, and the lack of
care employed by the chauffeur. While these facts
are not as clearly evidenced as are those which
convict the other defendant, we nevertheless
hesitate to disregard the points emphasized by the
trial judge. In its broader aspects, the case is one of
two drivers approaching a narrow bridge from
opposite directions, with neither being willing to
slow up and give the right of way to the other, with
the inevitable result of a collision and an accident.

The defendants Velasco and Cortez further

contend that there existed contributory negligence
on the part of the plaintiff, consisting principally of
his keeping his foot outside the truck, which
occasioned his injury. In this connection, it is
sufficient to state that, aside from the fact that the
defense of contributory negligence was not
pleaded, the evidence bearing out this theory of the
case is contradictory in the extreme and leads us
far afield into speculative matters.

The last subject for consideration relates to

the amount of the award. The appellee suggests
that the amount could justly be raised to P16,517,
but naturally is not serious in asking for this sum,
since no appeal was taken by him from the
judgment. The other parties unit in challenging the
award of P10,000, as excessive. All facts
considered, including actual expenditures and
damages for the injury to the leg of the plaintiff,
which may cause him permanent lameness, in
connection with other adjudications of this court,
lead us to conclude that a total sum for the plaintiff
of P5,000 would be fair and reasonable. The
difficulty in approximating the damages by
monetary compensation is well elucidated by the
divergence of opinion among the members of the
court, three of whom have inclined to the view that
P3,000 would be amply sufficient, while a fourth
member has argued that P7,500 would be none too
much.

In consonance with the foregoing rulings,

the judgment appealed from will be modified, and
the plaintiff will have judgment in his favor against
the defendants Manuel Gutierrez, Abelardo Velasco,
and Saturnino Cortez, jointly and severally, for the
sum of P5,000, and the costs of both instances.

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Philippine School of Business Administration et al the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets
vs CA GR No 84698 January 4 1992 are flying or grenades exploding in the air or where
there looms around the school premises a constant
threat to life and limb. Necessarily, the school must
SECOND DIVISION ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain
peace and order within the campus premises and to
prevent the breakdown thereof.
[G.R. No. 84698. February 4, 1992.]
3. ID.; QUASI-DELICTS; OBLIGATIONS ARISING FROM
QUASI-DELICTS OR TORTS ARISE ONLY BETWEEN
PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS PARTIES NOT BOUND BY CONTRACT. — Because the
ADMINISTRATION, JUAN D. LIM, circumstances of the present case evince a contractual
BENJAMIN P. PAULINO, ANTONIO relation between the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the
M. MAGTALAS, COL. PEDRO rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. A perusal of
SACRO, AND LT. M. Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-
SORIANO, petitioners, vs. COURT delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual
OF APPEALS, HON. REGINA obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise
ORDOÑEZ-BENITEZ, in her bound by contract, whether express or implied.
capacity as Presiding Judge of
Branch 47, Regional Trial Court, 4. ID.; ID.; VIEW THAT LIABILITY FROM TORT MAY EXIST
Manila, SEGUNDA R. BAUTISTA, EVEN IF THERE IS A CONTRACT. — In Air France
and ARSENIA D. vs. Carroscoso (124 Phil. 722), the private respondent
BAUTISTA, respondents. was awarded damages for his unwarranted expulsion
from a first-class seat aboard the petitioner airline. It is
noted, however, that the Court referred to the
Balgos and Perez for petitioners. petitioner-airline's liability as one arising from tort, not
one arising from a contract of carriage. In effect, Air
Collantes, Ramirez & Associates for private France is authority for the view that liability from tort
respondents. may exist even if there is a contract, for the act that
breaks the contract may be also a tort. (Austro-America
S.S. Co. vs. Thomas, 248 Fed. 231).
SYLLABUS 5. ID.; ID.; AN ACT WHICH BREACHES A CONTRACT IN
BAD FAITH AND IN VIOLATION OF ART. 21
1. CIVIL LAW; QUASI-DELICTS; DOCTRINE OF IN LOCO CONSTITUTES QUASI-DELICT. — Air France penalized
PARENTIS. — Article 2180, in conjunction with Article the racist policy of the airline which emboldened the
2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule in in loco petitioner's employee to forcibly oust the private
parentis. This Court discussed this doctrine in the afore- respondent to cater to the comfort of a white man who
cited cases of Exconde, (101 Phil. 843) Mendoza, (101 allegedly "had a better right to the seat." In Austro-
Phil. 414), Palisoc (G.R. No. L-29025, 4 American, supra, the public embarrassment caused to
October, 1971, 41 SCRA 548) and, more recently, the passenger was the justification for the Circuit Court
in Amadora vs. Court of Appeals, (G.R. No. L-47745, 15 of Appeals, (Second Circuit), to award damages to the
April 1988, 160 SCRA 315). In all such cases, it had latter. From the foregoing, it can be concluded that
been stressed that the law (Article 2180) plainly should the act which breaches a contract be done in
provides that the damage should have been caused or bad faith and be violative of Article 21, then there is a
inflicted by pupils or students of the educational cause to view the act as constituting a quasi-delict.
institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its 6. ID.; ID.; CONTRACTUAL RELATION, A
pupils or students while in its custody. CONDITION SINE QUA NON TO SCHOOL'S LIABILITY. —
2. ID.; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; CONTRACTS A contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the
RESULTING IN BILATERAL OBLIGATIONS ESTABLISHED school's liability. The negligence of the school cannot
WHEN ACADEMIC INSTITUTION ACCEPTS STUDENTS exist independently on the contract, unless the
FOR ENROLLMENT. — When an academic institution negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in
accepts students for enrollment, there is established Article 21 of the Civil Code.
a contract between them, resulting in bilateral 7. ID.; ID.; ID.; SCHOOL MAY STILL AVOID LIABILITY BY
obligations which both parties are bound to comply PROVING THAT THE BREACH OF CONTRACTUAL
with. For its part, the school undertakes to provide the OBLIGATION TO STUDENTS WAS NOT DUE TO ITS
student with an education that would presumably NEGLIGENCE. — Conceptually a school, like a common
suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills carrier, cannot be an insurer of its students
to pursue higher education or a profession. On the against all risks. It would not be equitable to expect of
other hand, the student covenants to abide by the schools to anticipate all types of violent trespass upon
school's academic requirements and observe its rules their premises, for notwithstanding the security
and regulations. Institutions of learning must also meet measures installed, the same may still fail against an
the implicit or "built-in" obligation of providing their individual or group determined to carry out a nefarious
students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists deed inside school premises and environs. Should this
in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting be the case, the school may still avoid liability by
knowledge. Certainly, no student can absorb the proving that the breach of its contractual obligation to
intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore the students was not due to its negligence.

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8. ID.; ID.; NEGLIGENCE; DEFINED. — Negligence is "Article 2180 (formerly Article 1903)
statutorily defined to be the omission of that degree of of the Civil Code is an adoptation
diligence which is required by the nature of the from the old Spanish Civil Code. The
obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of comments of Manresa and learned
persons, time and place. authorities on its meaning should give
way to present day changes. The law
is not fixed and flexible (sic); it must
be dynamic. In fact, the greatest
DECISION value and significance of law as a rule
of conduct in (sic) its flexibility to
adopt to changing social conditions
and its capacity to meet the new
PADILLA, J p: challenges of progress.

Construed in the light of modern day

A stabbing incident on 30 August 1985 which caused
educational systems, Article 2180
the death of Carlitos Bautista while on the second-floor
cannot be construed in its narrow
premises of the Philippine School of Business
concept as held in the old case
Administration (PSBA) prompted the parents of the
of Exconde vs.
deceased to file suit in the Regional Trial Court of
Capuno 2 and Mercado vs. Court of
Manila (Branch 47) presided over by Judge (now Court
Appeals 3 ; hence, the ruling in
of Appeals justice) Regina Ordoñez-Benitez, for
the Palisoc 4 case that it should apply
damages against the said PSBA and its corporate
to all kinds of educational institutions,
officers. At the time of his death, Carlitos was enrolled
academic or vocational.
in the third year commerce course at the PSBA. It was
established that his assailants were not members of the At any rate, the law holds the
schools academic community but were elements from teachers and heads of the school staff
outside the school. liable unless they relieve themselves
of such liability pursuant to the last
Specifically, the suit impleaded the PSBA and the
paragraph of Article 2180 by 'proving
following school authorities: Juan D. Lim (President),
that they observed all the diligence to
Benjamin P. Paulino (Vice-President), Antonio M.
prevent damage.' This can only be
Magtalas (Treasurer/Cashier), Col. Pedro Sacro (Chief of
done at a trial on the merits of the
Security) and a Lt. M. Soriano (Assistant Chief of
case." 5
Security). Substantially, the plaintiffs (now private
respondents) sought to adjudge them liable for the While we agree with the respondent appellate court
victim's untimely demise due to their alleged that the motion to dismiss the complaint was
negligence, recklessness and lack of security correctly denied and the complaint should be tried
precautions, means and methods before, during and on the merits, we do not however agree with the
after the attack on the victim. During the proceedings a premises of the appellate court's ruling.
quo, Lt. M. Soriano terminated his relationship with the
other petitioners by resigning from his position in the Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the
school. Civil Code, establishes the rule of in loco parentis. This
Court discussed this doctrine in the afore-cited cases
Defendants a quo (now petitioners) sought to have the of Exconde, Mendoza, Palisoc and, more recently,
suit dismissed, alleging that since they are presumably in Amadora vs. Court of Appeals. 6 In all such cases, it
sued under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the complaint had been stressed that the law (Article 2180) plainly
states no cause of action against them, as provides that the damage should have been caused or
jurisprudence on the subject is to the effect inflicted by pupils or students of the educational
that academic institutions, such as the PSBA, are institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its
beyond the ambit of the rule in the afore-stated article. pupils or students while in its custody. However, this
material situation does not exist in the present case for,
The respondent trial court, however, overruled as earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not
petitioners' contention and thru an order dated 8 students of the PSBA, for whose acts the school could
December 1987, denied their motion to dismiss. A be made liable.
subsequent motion for reconsideration was similarly
dealt with by an order dated 25 January 1988.  
Petitioners then assailed the trial court's dispositions
before the respondent appellate court which, in a However, does the appellate court's failure to consider
decision * promulgated on 10 June 1988, affirmed the such material facts mean the exculpation of the
trial court's orders. On 22 August 1988, the respondent petitioners from liability? It does not necessarily follow.
appellate court resolved to deny the petitioners' motion When an academic institution accepts students for
for reconsideration. Hence, this petition. enrollment, there is established a contract between
At the outset, it is to be observed that the respondent them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both
appellate court primarily anchored its decision on the parties are bound to comply with. 7 For its part, the
law of quasi-delicts, as enunciated in Articles 2176 and school undertakes to provide the student with an
2180 of the Civil Code. 1 Pertinent portions of the education that would presumably suffice to equip him
appellate court's now assailed ruling state: with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher
education or a profession. On the other hand, the

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student covenants to abide by the school's academic is contrary to morals, good customs
requirements and observe its rules and regulations. or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage." (emphasis
Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or supplied)
"built-in" obligation of providing their students with an
atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its Air France penalized the racist policy of the airline
primary undertaking of imparting knowledge. Certainly, which emboldened the petitioner's employee to forcibly
no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or oust the private respondent to cater to the comfort of a
higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts white man who allegedly "had a better right to the
and other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades seat." In Austro-American, supra, the public
exploding in the air or where there looms around the embarrassment caused to the passenger was the
school premises a constant threat to life and limb. justification for the Circuit Court of Appeals, (Second
Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate Circuit), to award damages to the latter. From the
steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the foregoing, it can be concluded that should the act
campus premises and to prevent the breakdown which breaches a contract be done in bad faith and be
thereof. violative of Article 21, then there is a cause to view the
act as constituting a quasi-delict.
Because the circumstances of the present case evince
a contractual relation between the PSBA and Carlitos In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar,
Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really however, there is, as yet, no finding that the contract
govern. 8 A perusal of Article 2176 shows that between the school and Bautista had been breached
obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known thru the former's negligence in providing proper
as extra-contractual obligations, arise only between security measures. This would be for the trial court to
parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether determine. And, even if there be a finding of
express or implied. However, this impression has not negligence, the same could give rise generally to a
prevented this Court from determining the existence of breach of contractual obligation only. Using the test
a tort even when there obtains a contract. In Air France of Cangco, supra, the negligence of the school would
vs. Carroscoso (124 Phil. 722), the private respondent not be relevant absent a contract. In fact, that
was awarded damages for his unwarranted expulsion negligence becomes material only because of the
from a first-class seat aboard the petitioner airline. It is contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. In
noted, however, that the Court referred to the other words, a contractual relation is a condition sine
petitioner-airline's liability as one arising from tort, not qua non to the school's liability. The negligence of the
one arising from a contract of carriage. In effect, Air school cannot exist independently on the contract,
France is authority for the view that liability from tort unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances
may exist even if there is a contract, for the act that set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.
breaks the contract may be also a tort. (Austro-America
S.S. Co. vs. Thomas, 248 Fed. 231). This Court is not unmindful of the attendant difficulties
posed by the obligation of schools, above-mentioned,
This view was not all that revolutionary, for even as for conceptually a school, like a common carrier, cannot
early as 1918, this Court was already of a similar mind. be an insurer of its students against all risks. This is
In Cangco vs. Manila Railroad (38 Phil. 780), Mr. Justice specially true in the populous student communities of
Fisher elucidated thus: the so-called "university belt" in Manila where there
have been reported several incidents ranging from
"The field of non-contractual gang wars to other forms of hooliganism. It would not
obligation is much more broader than be equitable to expect of schools to anticipate all types
that of contractual obligation, of violent trespass upon their premises, for
comprising, as it does, the whole notwithstanding the security measures installed, the
extent of juridical human relations. same may still fail against an individual or group
These two fields, figuratively determined to carry out a nefarious deed inside school
speaking, concentric; that is to say, premises and environs. Should this be the case, the
the mere fact that a person is bound school may still avoid liability by proving that the
to another by contract does not breach of its contractual obligation to the students was
relieve him from extra-contractual not due to its negligence, here statutorily defined to be
liability to such person. When such a the omission of that degree of diligence which is
contractual relation exists the obligor required by the nature of the obligation and
may break the contract under such corresponding to the circumstances of persons, time
conditions that the same act which and place. 9
constitutes a breach of the contract
would have constituted the source of As the proceedings a quo have yet to commence on the
an extra-contractual obligation had substance of the private respondents' complaint, the
no contract existed between the record is bereft of all the material facts. Obviously, at
parties." this stage, only the trial court can make such a
determination from the evidence still to unfold.
Immediately what comes to mind is the chapter of the
Civil Code on Human Relations, particularly Article 21, WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the
which provides: petition is DENIED. The Court of origin (RTC, Manila, Br.
47) is hereby ordered to continue proceedings
"Any person who wilfully causes loss consistent with this ruling of the Court. Costs against
or injury to another in a manner that the petitioners.

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SO ORDERED. the questions of fact because, by statute, only
questions of law may be raised in an appeal by
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., certiorari from a judgment of the Court of Appeals,
concur. which judgment is conclusive as to the facts.
6. ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF AFFIRMANCE BY
Air France vs Carrascoso 18 SCRA 155 COURT OF APPEALS OF TRIAL COURT'S DECISION.
— When the Court of Appeals affirms a judgment of
the trial court, and the findings of fact of said
EN BANC appellate court are not in any way at war with
those of the trial court, nor is said affirmance upon
a ground or grounds different from those which
[G.R. No. L-21438. September 28, 1966.] were made the basis of the trial court's conclusions,
such judgment of affirmance is (1) a determination
by the Court of Appeals that the proceeding in the
AIR
lower court was free from prejudicial error; (7) that
FRANCE, petitioner, vs. RAFAEL
all questions raised by the assignments of error and
CARRASCOSO and THE
all questions that might have been so raised have
HONORABLE COURT OF
been finally adjudicated as free from all error.
APPEALS, respondents.
7. ID.; COMPLAINT; SPECIFIC MENTION OF
THE TERM "BAD FAITH" IN THE COMPLAINT NOT
Lichauco, Picazo & Agcaoili for petitioner. REQUIRED. — Although there is no specific mention
of the term bad faith in the complaint, the inference
Bengzon, Villegas & Zarraga for respondent of bad faith may be drawn from the facts and
R. Carrascoso. circumstances set forth therein. 8. EVIDENCE;
FINDING OF COURT OF APPEALS THAT
RESPONDENT WAS ENTITLED TO A FIRST CLASS
SYLLABUS SEAT. — The Court of Appeals properly found that a
first class-ticket holder is entitled to first class seat,
given the fact that seat availability in specific
1. JUDGMENT; FINDINGS OF FACT; flights is therein confirmed; otherwise, an air
REQUIREMENT OF LAW. — Courts of justice are not passenger will be placed in the hollow of the hands
burdened with the obligation to specify in the of an airline, because it will always be easy for an
sentence every bit and piece of evidence presented airline to strike out the very stipulations in the
by the parties upon the issues raised. The law ticket and say that there was verbal agreement to
solely insists that a decision state the "essential the contrary. If only to achieve stability in the
ultimate facts" upon which the court's conclusion is relations between passenger and air carrier,
drawn. adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; APPEAL AND ERROR; 9. ID.; LACK OF SPECIFIC AVERMENT OF
FAILURE TO MAKE FINDINGS ON EVIDENCE AND BAD FAITH CURED BY NOTICE TO DEFENDANT OF
CONTENTIONS OF ONE PARTY, EFFECT OF; WHAT PLAINTIFF INTENDS TO PROVE AND BY
DECISION NOT TO BE CLOGGED WITH DETAILS. — EVIDENCE PRESENTED WITHOUT OBJECTION;
The mere failure to make specific findings of fact on AMENDMENT OF COMPLAINT TO CONFORM TO
the evidence presented for the defense or to EVIDENCE UNNECESSARY. — If there was lack of
specify in the decision the contentions of the specific averment of bad faith in the complaint,
appellant and the reasons for refusing to believe such deficiency was cured by notice, right at the
them is not sufficient to hold the same contrary to start of the trial, by plaintiff's counsel to defendant
the requirement of the law and the Constitution. as to what plaintiff intended to prove: while in the
There is no law that so requires. A decision is not to plane in Bangkok, plaintiff was ousted by
be clogged with details such that prolixity, if not defendant's manager who gave his seat to a white
confusion, may result. man; and by evidence of bad faith in the fulfillment
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; FINDINGS OF FACT BY of the contract presented without objection on the
COURTS DEFINED. — Findings of fact may be part of the defendant. An amendment of the
defined as the written statement of the ultimate complaint to conform to the evidence is not even
facts as found by the court and essential to support required.
the decision and judgment rendered thereon; they 10. ID.; ADMISSIBILITY OF TESTIMONY ON
consist of the court's "conclusions with respect to AN ENTRY IN A NOTEBOOK; TESTIMONY NOT
the determinative facts on issue." COVERED BY BEST EVIDENCE RULE. — The
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; QUESTION OF LAW testimony of a witness that the purser made an
EXPLAINED. — A question of law is "one which does entry in his notebook reading "First Class passenger
not call for an examination of the probative value of was forced to go to the tourist class against his will
the evidence presented by the parties." and that the captain refused to intervene," is
competent and admissible because the subject of
5. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; APPEAL; WHAT the inquiry is not the entry but the ouster incident.
MAY BE RAISED ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF It does not come within the prescription of the best
APPEALS. — It is not appropriately the business of evidence rule.
the Supreme Court to alter the facts or to review

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 11. CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE; QUASI- DECISION
DELICT; LIABILITY OF COMMON CARRIERS; CASE AT
BAR. — Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's
employees could give ground for an action for
damages. Damages here are proper because the SANCHEZ, J p:
stress of respondent's action is placed upon his
wrongful expulsion, which is a violation of a public The Court of First Instance of
duty by petitioner-aircarrier — a case of quasi- Manila 1 sentenced petitioner to pay respondent
delict. Rafael Carrascoso P25,000.00 by way of moral
12. ID.; ID.; ID.; AWARD OF MORAL damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages;
DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT. — Award of P393.20 representing the difference in fare
moral damages is proper, despite petitioner's between first class and tourist class for the portion
argument that respondent's action is planted upon of the trip Bangkok-Rome, these various amounts
breach of contract, where the stress of the action is with interest at the legal rate, from the date of the
put on wrongful expulsion, the contract having filing of the complaint until paid; plus P3,000.00 for
been averred only to establish the relation between attorneys' fees; and the costs of suit.
the parties. On appeal, 2 the Court of Appeals slightly
13. ID.; ID.; ID.; EMPLOYER IS RESPONSIBLE reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso's
FOR TORTIOUS ACTS OF HIS EMPLOYEE; CASE AT plane ticket from P393.20 to P383.10, and voted to
BAR. — The responsibility of an employer for the affirm the appealed decision "in all other respects",
tortious act of his employees is well settled in law. with costs against petitioner.
(Art. 2130, Civil Code). Petitioner-aircarrier must The case is now before us for review on
answer for the willful, malevolent act of its certiorari.
manager.
The facts declared by the Court of Appeals
14. ID.; ID.; ID.; LIABILITY FOR EXEMPLARY as "fully supported by the evidence of record", are:
DAMAGES; POWER OF COURTS TO GRANT; CASE AT
BAR. — The Civil Code gives the court ample power "Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was
to grant exemplary damages, the only condition a member of a group of 48 Filipino
being that defendant should have "acted in a pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or on March 30, 1958.
malevolent manner." As the manner of ejectment of
On March 28, 1958, the
plaintiff from his first class seat fits into this legal
defendant, Air France, through its
precept, exemplary damages are well awarded, in
authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines,
addition to moral damages.
Inc., issued to plaintiff a 'first class'
15. ID.; ID.; LIABILITY FOR ATTORNEY'S round trip airplane ticket from Manila
FEES; COURT DISCRETION WELL EXERCISED to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok,
SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED. — The grant of plaintiff traveled in 'first class', but at
exemplary damages justifies a similar judgment for Bangkok, the Manager of the
attorney's fees. The court below felt that it is but defendant airline forced plaintiff to
just and equitable that attorney's fees be given and vacate the 'first class' seat that he
the Supreme Court does not intend to break faith was occupying because, in the words
with the tradition that discretion well-exercised — of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento,
as it is here should not be disturbed. there was a 'white man', who, the
Manager alleged, had a 'better right
16. ID.; RIGHTS OF PASSENGERS. — to the seat. When asked to vacate his
Passengers do not contract merely for 'first class' seat, the plaintiff, as was
transportation. They have a right to be treated by to be expected, refused, and told
the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, defendant's Manager that his seat
courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled would be taken over his dead body; a
to be protected against personal misconduct, commotion ensued, and, according to
injurious language, indignities and abuses from said Ernesto G. Cuento, many of the
such employees. So, any rude or discourteous Filipino passengers got nervous in the
conduct on the part of employees towards a tourist class; when they found out
passenger gives the latter an action for damages that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot
against the carrier. (4 R. C. L-1174-1175). discussion with the white man
17. ID.; BREACH OF CONTRACT MAY BE A [manager], they came all across to
TORT. — Although the relation of passenger and Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr.
carrier is contractual both in origin and nature, Carrascoso to give his seat to the
nevertheless, the act that breaks the contract may 'white man' (Transcript, p. 12,
also be a tort. Hearing of May 26, 1959); and
plaintiff reluctantly gave his 'first
18. WORDS AND PHRASES; BAD FAITH class' seat in the plane." 3
DEFINED. — "Bad faith", as understood in law,
contemplates a state of mind affirmatively 1. The thrust of the relief petitioner now
operating with furtive design or with some motive seeks is that we review "all the findings" 4 of
of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purpose respondent Court of Appeals. Petitioner charges

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that respondent court failed to make complete probative value of the evidence presented by the
findings of fact on all the issues properly laid before parties." 18
it. We are asked to consider facts favorable to
2. By statute, "only questions of law may be
petitioner, and then, to overturn the appellate
raised" in an appeal by certiorari from a judgment
court's decision.
of the Court of Appeals 19 That judgment is
Coming into focus is the constitutional conclusive as to the facts. It is not appropriately the
mandate that "No decision shall be rendered by any business of this Court to alter the facts or to review
court of record without expressing therein clearly the questions of fact. 20
and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
With these guideposts, we now face the
based". 5 This is echoed in the statutory demand
problem of whether the findings of fact of the Court
that a judgment determining the merits of the case
of Appeals support its judgment.
shall state "clearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which it is based", 6 and that "Every 3. Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class
decision of the Court of Appeals shall contain seat he claims?
complete findings of fact on all issues properly
raised before it." 7 It is conceded in all quarters that on March
28, 1958 he paid to and received from petitioner a
A decision with absolutely nothing to first class ticket. But petitioner asserts that said
support it is a nullity. It is open to direct ticket did not represent the true and complete
attack. 8 The law, however, solely insists that a intent and agreement of the parties; that said
decision state the "essential ultimate facts" upon respondent knew that he did not have confirmed
which the court's conclusion is drawn. 9 A court of reservations for first class on any specific flight,
justice is not hidebound to write in its decision although he had tourist class protection; that,
every bit and piece of evidence 10 presented by accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket was
one party and the other upon the issues raised. no guarantee that he would have a first class ride,
Neither is it to be burdened with the obligation "to but that such would depend upon the availability of
specify in the sentence the facts" which a party first class seats.
"considered as proved". 11 This is but a part of the
mental process from which the Court draws the These are matters which petitioner has
essential ultimate facts. A decision is not to be so thoroughly presented and discussed in its brief
clogged with details such that prolixity, if not before the Court of Appeals under its third
confusion, may result. So long as the decision of assignment of error, which reads: "The trial court
the Court of Appeals contains the necessary facts erred in finding that plaintiff had confirmed
to warrant its conclusions, it is no error for said reservations for, and a right to, first class seats on
court to withhold therefrom "any specific finding of the 'definite' segments of his journey, particularly
facts with respect to the evidence for the defense". that from Saigon to Beirut." 21
Because, as this Court well observed, "There is no And, the Court of Appeals disposed of this
law that so requires". 12 Indeed, "the mere failure contention thus:
to specify (in the decision) the contentions of the
appellant and the reasons for refusing to believe "Defendant seems to
them is not sufficient to hold the same contrary to capitalize on the argument that the
the requirements of the provisions of law and the issuance of a first-class ticket was no
Constitution". It is in this setting that in Manigque, guarantee that the passenger to
it was held that the mere fact that the findings whom the same had been issued,
"were based entirely on the evidence for the would be accommodated in the first-
prosecution without taking into consideration or class compartment, for as in the case
even mentioning the appellant's side in the of plaintiff he had yet to make
controversy as shown by his own testimony", would arrangements upon arrival at every
not vitiate the judgment. 13 If the court did not station for the necessary first class
recite in the decision the testimony of each witness reservation. We are not impressed by
for, or each item of evidence presented by, the such a reasoning. We cannot
defeated party, it does not mean that the court has understand how a reputable firm like
overlooked such testimony or such item of defendant airplane company could
evidence. 14 At any rate, the legal presumptions have the indiscretion to give out
are that official duty has been regularly performed, ticket it never meant to honor at all. It
and that all the matters within an issue in a case received the corresponding amount in
were laid before the court and passed upon by payment of first-class tickets end yet
it. 15 it allowed the passenger to be at the
mercy of its employees. It is more in
Findings of fact, which the Court of Appeals keeping with the ordinary course of
is required to make, may be defined as "the written business that the company should
statement of the ultimate facts as found by the know whether or not the tickets it
court . . . and essential to support the decision and issues are to be honored or not." 22
judgment rendered thereon". 16 They consist of
the court's "conclusions with respect to Not that the Court of Appeals is alone. The
the determinative facts in issue" 17 A question of trial court similarly disposed of petitioner's
law, upon the other hand, has been declared as contention, thus:
"one which does not call for an examination of the

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 "On the fact that plaintiff paid by the assignments of error and all questions that
for, and was issued a 'First class might have been so raised are to be regarded as
ticket, there can be no question. finally adjudicated against the appellant". So also,
Apart from his testimony, see the judgment affirmed "must be regarded as free
plaintiffs Exhibits 'A', 'A-1' 'B', 'B-1', from all error" 25 We reached this policy
'B-2', 'C' and 'C-1', and defendant's construction because nothing in the decision of the
own witness, Rafael Altonaga, Court of Appeals on this point would suggest that
confirmed plaintiff's testimony and its findings of fact are in any way at war with those
testified as follows: of the trial court. Nor was said affirmance by the
Court of Appeals upon a ground or grounds
Q. In these tickets there different from those which were made the basis of
are marks 'O.K.' the conclusions of the trial court. 26
From what you
know, what If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-
does this O.K. ticket holder is not entitled to a first class seat,
mean? notwithstanding the fact that seat availability in
specific flights is therein confirmed, then an air
A. That the space is passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands of an
confirmed. airline. What security then can a passenger have? It
will always be an easy matter for an airline aided
Q. Confirmed for first by its employees, to strike out the very stipulations
class? in the ticket, and say that there was a verbal
A. Yes, 'first class'. agreement to the contrary. What if the passenger
(Transcript, p. had a schedule to fulfill? We have long learned that,
169) as a rule, a written document speaks a uniform
language; that spoken word could be notoriously
xxx xxx xxx unreliable. If only to achieve stability in the
relations between passenger and air carrier,
"Defendant tried to prove by adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable. Such
the testimony of its witnesses Luis is the case here. The lower courts refused to
Zaldariaga and Rafael Altonaga that believe the oral evidence intended to defeat the
although plaintiff paid for, and was covenants in the ticket.
issued a 'first class' airplane ticket,
the ticket was subject to confirmation The foregoing are the considerations which
in Hongkong. The court cannot give point to the conclusion that there are facts upon
credit to the testimony of said which the Court of Appeals predicated the finding
witnesses. Oral evidence cannot that respondent Carrascoso had a first class ticket
prevail over written evidence, and and was entitled to a first class seat at Bangkok,
plaintiff's Exhibits 'A', 'A1', 'B', 'B-1', which is a stopover in the Saigon to Beirut leg of
'C' and 'C- 1' belie the testimony of the flight, 27 We perceive no "welter of distortions
said witnesses, and clearly show that by the Court of Appeals of petitioner's statement of
the plaintiff was issued, and paid for, its position", as charged by petitioner. 28 Nor do
a first class ticket without any we subscribe to petitioners accusation that
reservation whatever. respondent Carrascoso "surreptitiously took a first
class seat to provoke an issue". 29 And this
Furthermore, as hereinabove because, as petitioner states, Carrascoso went to
shown, defendant's own witness see the Manager at his office in Bangkok "to
Rafael Altonaga testified that the confirm my seat and because from Saigon I was
reservation for a 'first class' told again to see the Manager. 30 Why, then, was
accommodation for the plaintiff was he allowed to take a first class seat in the plane at
confirmed. The court cannot believe Bangkok, if he had no seat? Or, if another had a
that after such confirmation better right to the seat?
,defendant had a verbal
understanding with plaintiff that the 4. Petitioner assails respondent court's
'first class' ticket issued to him by award of moral damages. Petitioner's trenchant
defendant would be subject to claim is that Carrascoso's action is planted upon
confirmation in Hongkong." 23 breach of contract; that to authorize an award for
moral damages there must be an averment of fraud
We have heretofore adverted to the fact or bad faith; 31 and that the decision of the Court
that except for a slight difference of a few pesos in of Appeals fails to make a finding of bad faith. The
the amount refunded on Carrascoso's ticket, the pivotal allegations in the complaint bearing on this
decision of the Court of First Instance was affirmed issue are:
by the Court of Appeals in all other respects. We
"3. That . . . plaintiff entered
hold the view that such a judgment of affirmance
into a contract of air carriage with the
has merged the judgment of the lower
Philippine Air Lines for a valuable
court. 24 Implicit in that affirmance is a
consideration, the latter acting as
determination by the Court of Appeals that the
general agents for and in behalf of
proceeding in the Court of First Instance was free
the defendant, under which aid
from prejudicial error and that 'all questions raised

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 contract, plaintiff was entitled to, as may be drawn from the facts and circumstances set
defendant agreed to furnish plaintiff, forth therein. 34 The contract was averred to
First Class passage on defendant's establish the relation between the parties. But the
plane during the entire duration of stress of the action is put on wrongful expulsion.
plaintiff's tour of Europe with
Quite apart from the foregoing is that (a)
Hongkong as starting point up to and
right at the start of the trial, respondent's counsel
until plaintiff's return trip to Manila, . .
placed petitioner on guard on what Carrascoso
.
intended to prove: That while sitting in the plane in
4. That during the first two Bangkok, Carrascoso was ousted by petitioner's
legs of the trip from Hongkong to manager who gave his seat to a white man; 35 and
Saigon and from Saigon to Bangkok, (b) evidence of bad faith in the fulfillment of the
defendant furnished to the plaintiff contract was presented without objection on the
First Class accommodation but only part of the petitioner. It is, therefore, unnecessary
after protestations, arguments and/or to inquire as to whether or not there is sufficient
insistence were made by the plaintiff averment in the complaint to justify an award for
with defendant's employees. moral damages. Deficiency in the complaint, if any,
was cured by the evidence. An amendment thereof
5. That finally, to conform to the evidence is not even
defendant failed to provide First Class required. 36 On the question of bad faith, the Court
passage, but instead furnished of Appeals declared:
plaintiff only Tourist
Class accommodations from Bangkok "That the plaintiff was forced
to Teheran and/or Casablanca, . . . out of his seat in the first class
the plaintiff has been compelled by compartment of the plane belonging
defendant's employees to leave the to the defendant Air France while at
First Class accommodation berths at Bangkok, and was transferred to the
Bangkok after he was already seated. tourist class not only without his
consent but against his will, has been
6. That consequently, the sufficiently established by plaintiff in
plaintiff, desiring no repetition of the his testimony before the court,
inconvenience and embarrassments corroborated by the corresponding
brought by defendant's breach of entry made by the purser of the plane
contract was forced to take a Pan in his notebook which notation reads
American World Airways plane on his as follows:
return trip from Madrid to Manila. 32

xxx xxx xxx 'First-class

passenger was forced to
2. That likewise, as a result of go to the tourist class
defendant's failure to furnish First against his will and that
Class accommodations aforesaid, the captain refused to
plaintiff suffered inconveniences, intervene',
embarrassments, and humiliations,
thereby causing plaintiff mental and by the testimony of an eye-
anguish, serious anxiety, wounded witness Ernesto G. Cuento, who
feelings, social humiliation, and the was a co-passenger. The
like injury, resulting in moral captain of the plane who was
damages in the amount of asked by the manager of
P30,000.00." 33 defendant company at Bangkok
to intervene even refused to do
xxx xxx xxx
so. It is noteworthy that no one
The foregoing, in our opinion, substantially on behalf of defendant ever
aver: First, That there was a contract to furnish contradicted or denied this
plaintiff a first class passage covering, amongst evidence for the plaintiff. It
others, the Bangkok-Teheran leg; Second, That said could have been easy for
contract was breached when petitioner failed to defendant to present its
furnish first class transportation at Bangkok; manager at Bangkok to testify
and Third, That there was bad faith when at the trial of the case, or yet to
petitioner's employee compelled Carrascoso to secure his deposition; but
leave his first class accommodation berth "after he defendant did neither. 37
was already seated" and to take a seat in the
tourist class, by reason of which he suffered The Court of Appeals further stated —
inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations,
thereby causing him mental anguish, serious "Neither is there evidence as
anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, to whether or ,not a prior reservation
resulting in moral damages. It is true that there is was made by the white man. Hence,
no specific mention of the term bad faith in the if the employees of the defendant at
complaint. But, the inference of bad faith is there; it Bangkok sold a first-class ticket to

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 him when all the seats had already circumstances, the Court is
been taken, surely the plaintiff should constrained to find, as it does find,
not have been picked out as the one that the Manager of the defendant
to suffer the consequences and to be airline in Bangkok not merely asked
subjected to the humiliation and but threatened the plaintiff to throw
indignity of being ejected from his him out of the plane if he did not give
seat in the presence of others. up his 'first class' seat because the
Instead of explaining to the white said Manager wanted to
man the improvidence committed by accommodate using the words of the
defendant's employees, the manager witness Ernesto G. Cuento, the 'white
adopted the more drastic step of man'." 38
ousting the plaintiff who was then
safely ensconced in his rightful seat. It is really correct to say that the Court of
We are strengthened in our belief Appeals in the quoted portion first transcribed did
that this probably was what not use the term "bad faith". But can it be doubted
happened there, by the testimony of that the recital of facts therein points to bad faith?
defendant's witness Rafael Altonaga The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from
who, when asked to explain the enjoying his right to a first class seat; worse, he
meaning of the letters 'O.K., imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him
appearing on the tickets of plaintiff, from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of
said that 'the space is confirmed' for having to go to the tourist class compartment —
first class. Likewise, Zenaida just to give way to another passenger whose right
Faustino, another witness for thereto has not been established. Certainly, this is
defendant, who was the chief of the bad faith. Unless, of course, bad faith has assumed
Reservation Office of defendant, a meaning different from what is understood in law.
testified as follows: For, "bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind
affirmatively operating with furtive design or with
'Q. How does the some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior
person in the purposes." 39
ticket-issuing
And if the foregoing were not yet sufficient,
office know
there is the express finding of bad faith in the
what
judgment of the Court of First Instance, thus:
reservation the
passenger has "The evidence shows that
arranged with defendant violated its contract of
you? transportation with plaintiff in bad
faith, with the aggravating
A. They call us up by circumstances that defendant's
phone and ask Manager in Bangkok went to the
for the extent of threatening the plaintiff in
confirmation.' the presence of many passengers to
(t.s.n., p. 247, have him thrown out of the airplane
June 19, 1959) to give the 'first class' seat that he
In this connection, we quote with approval was occupying to, again using the
what the trial Judge has said on this point: words of witness Ernesto G. Cuento, a
'white man' whom he (defendant's
'Why did the, using the words Manager) wished to accommodate,
of witness Ernesto G. Cuento, 'white and the defendant has not proven
man' have a 'better right' to the seat that this 'white man' had any 'better
occupied by Mr. Carrascoso? The right' to occupy the 'first class' seat
record is silent. The defendant airline that the plaintiff was occupying, duly
did not prove 'any better', nay, any paid for, and for which the
right on the part of the 'white man' to corresponding 'first class' ticket was
the 'First class' seat that the plaintiff issued by the defendant to him." 40
was occupying and for which he paid
and was issued a corresponding 'first 5. The responsibility of an employer for the
class' ticket. tortuous act of its employees-need not be essayed.
It is well settled in law. 41 For the willful malevolent
'If there was a justified reason act of petitioner's manager, petitioner's his
for the action of the defendant's employer, must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code
Manager in Bangkok, the defendant says:
could have easily proven it by having
taken the testimony of the said "Art. 21. Any person who
Manager by deposition, but defendant willfully causes loss or injury to
did not do so; the presumption is that another in a manner that is contrary
evidence willfully suppressed would to morals, good customs or public
be adverse if produced [Sec. 69, par. policy shall compensate the latter for
(e) Rules of Court]; and, under the the damage."

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 In parallel circumstances, we applied the A. When we left already
foregoing legal precept; and, we held that upon the — that was
provisions of Article 2219 (10), Civil Code, moral already in the
damages are recoverable. 42 trip — I could
not help it. So
6. A contract to transport passengers is one of the flight
quite different in kind and degree from any other attendants
contractual relation. 43 And this, because of the approached me
relation which an air-carrier sustains with the and requested
public. Its business is mainly with the travelling from me my
public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and ticket and I
advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage, said, What for?
therefore, generates a relation attended with a and she said,
public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's 'We will note
employees, naturally, could give ground for an that you were
action for damages. transferred to
Passengers do not contract merely for the tourist
transportation. They have a light to be treated by class'. I said,
the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, 'Nothing of that
courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled kind. That is
to be protected against personal misconduct, tantamount to
injurious language, indignities and abuses from accepting my
such employees. So it is, that any rude or transfer.' And I
discourteous conduct on the part of employees also said, You
towards a passenger gives the latter an action for are not going to
damages against the carrier. 44 note anything
there because I
Thus, "Where a steamship company 45 had am protesting
accepted a passenger's check, it was a breach of to this transfer.
contract and a tort, giving a right of action for its
agent in the presence of third persons to falsely Q. Was she able to note
notify her that the check was worthless and it?
demand payment under threat of ejection, though
the language used was not insulting and she was A. No, because I did not
not ejected. 46 And this, because, altho the relation give my ticket.
of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in Q. About that purser?
origin and nature" nevertheless "the act that breaks
the contract may be also a tort". 47 And in another A. Well, the seats there
case, "Where a passenger on a railroad train, when are so close
the conductor came to collect his fare, tendered that you feel
him the cash fare to a point where the train was uncomfortable
scheduled not to stop, and told him that as soon as and you don't
the train reached such point he would pay the cash have enough
fare from that point to destination, there was leg room, I
nothing in the conduct of the passenger which stood up and I
justified the conductor in using insulting language went to the
to him, as by calling him a lunatic," 48 and the pantry that was
Supreme Court of South Carolina there held the next to me and
carrier liable for the mental suffering of said the purser was
passenger. there. He told
me, 'I have
Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one
recorded the
attended with public duty. The stress of
incident in my
Carrascoso's action as we have said, is placed upon
notebook.' He
his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public
read it and
duty by the petitioner-air carrier — a case of quasi-
translated it to
delict. Damages are proper.
me — because
7. Petitioner draws our attention to it was recorded
respondent Carrascoso's testimony, thus — in French —
'First class
"Q. You mentioned passenger was
about an forced to go to
attendant. Who the tourist class
is that against his will,
attendant and and that the
purser? captain refused
to intervene.'

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 MR. VALTE — that it is but just and equitable that attorneys' fees
be given. 55 We do not intend to break faith with
 I move to strike out the the tradition that discretion well exercised — as it
last part of the was here —should not be disturbed.
testimony of
the witness 10. Questioned as excessive are the
because the amounts decreed by both the trial court and the
best evidence Court of Appeals, thus: P25,000.00 as moral
would be the damages; P10,000.00, by way of exemplary
notes. Your damages, and P3,000.00 as attorney's fees. The
Honor. task of fixing these amounts is primarily with the
trial-court. 56 The Court of Appeals did not
COURT — interfere with the same. The dictates of good sense
suggest that we give our imprimatur thereto.
 I will allow that as part Because, the facts and circumstances point to the
of his reasonableness thereof. 57
testimony." 49
On balance, we say that the judgment of
Petitioner charges that the finding of the the Court of Appeals does not suffer from reversible
Court of Appeals that the purser made an entry in error. We accordingly vote to affirm the same.
his notebooks reading "First class passenger was Costs against petitioner. So ordered.
forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and
that the captain refused to intervene" is predicated Concepcion, C.J., Reyes J.B.L., Barrera,
upon evidence [Carrascoso's testimony above] Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar and Castro,
which is incompetent. We do not think so. The JJ., concur.
subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster Bengzon, J.P., J., did not take part.
incident. Testimony of the entry does not come
within the proscription of the best evidence rule. ||| (Air France v. Carrascoso, G.R. No. L-21438,
Such testimony is admissible. 49 [September 28, 1966], 124 PHIL 722-742)
Besides, from a reading of the transcript
just quoted, when the dialogue happened, the
impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh
and continued to be felt. The excitement had not as
yet died down. Statements then, in this
environment, are admissible as part of the res
gestae. 50 For, they grow "out of the nervous
excitement and mental and physical condition of
the declarant". 51 The utterance of the purser
regarding his entry in the notebook was
spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of
the ouster incident. Its trustworthiness has been
guaranteed. 52 It thus escapes the operation of the
hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae.
At all events, the entry was made outside
the Philippines. And, by an employee of petitioner.
It would have been an easy matter for petitioner to
have contradicted Carrascoso's testimony. If it were
really true that no such entry was made, the
deposition of the purser could have cleared up the
matter.
We, therefore, hold that the transcribed
testimony of Carrascoso is admissible in evidence.
8. Exemplary damages are well awarded.
The Civil Code gives the Court ample power to
grant exemplary damages — in contracts and
quasi-contracts. The only condition is that
defendant should have "acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
manner". 53 The manner of ejectment of
respondent Carrascoso from his first class seat fits
into this legal precept. And this, in addition to moral
damages. 54
9. The right to attorneys' fees is fully
established. The grant of exemplary damages
justifies a similar judgment for attorneys' fees. The
least that can be said is that the courts below felt

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Regino vs Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Revolution," the proceeds of which were to go to the
Technology GR No 156109 November 18 2004 construction of the school's tennis and volleyball courts.
Each student was required to pay for two tickets at the
price of P100 each. The project was allegedly
THIRD DIVISION implemented by recompensing students who
purchased tickets with additional points in their test
scores; those who refused to pay were denied the
[G.R. No. 156109. November 18, 2004.] opportunity to take the final examinations.

Financially strapped and prohibited by her

KHRISTINE REA M. REGINO, religion from attending dance parties and celebrations,
Assisted and Represented by Regino refused to pay for the tickets. On March 14 and
ARMANDO REGINO, petitioner, vs. March 15, 2002, the scheduled dates of the final
PANGASINAN COLLEGES OF examinations in logic and statistics, her teachers —
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, Respondents Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa Baladad —
RACHELLE A. GAMUROT and allegedly disallowed her from taking the tests.
ELISSA BALADAD, respondents. According to petitioner, Gamurot made her sit out her
logic class while her classmates were taking their
examinations. The next day, Baladad, after announcing
to the entire class that she was not permitting
DECISION petitioner and another student to take their statistics
examinations for failing to pay for their tickets,
allegedly ejected them from the classroom. Petitioner's
pleas ostensibly went unheeded by Gamurot and
PANGANIBAN, J p: Baladad, who unrelentingly defended their positions as
compliance with PCST's policy. ScCDET
Upon enrolment, students and their school
On April 25, 2002, petitioner filed, as a pauper
enter upon a reciprocal contract. The students agree to
litigant, a Complaint 5 for damages against PCST,
abide by the standards of academic performance and
Gamurot and Baladad. In her Complaint, she prayed for
codes of conduct, issued usually in the form of manuals
P500,000 as nominal damages; P500,000 as moral
that are distributed to the enrollees at the start of the
damages; at least P1,000,000 as exemplary damages;
school term. Further, the school informs them of the
P250,000 as actual damages; plus the costs of litigation
itemized fees they are expected to pay. Consequently,
and attorney's fees.
it cannot, after the enrolment of a student, vary the
terms of the contract. It cannot require fees other than On May 30, 2002, respondents filed a Motion to
those it specified upon enrolment. Dismiss 6 on the ground of petitioner's failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. According to
The Case respondents, the question raised involved the
determination of the wisdom of an administrative policy
Before the Court is a Petition for Review under of the PCST; hence, the case should have been initiated
Rule 45, 1 seeking to nullify the July 12, 2002 2 and the before the proper administrative body, the Commission
November 22, 2002 3 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Higher Education (CHED).
(RTC) of Urdaneta City, Pangasinan (Branch 48) in Civil In her Comment to respondents' Motion,
Case No. U-7541. The decretal portion of the first petitioner argued that prior exhaustion of
assailed Order reads: administrative remedies was unnecessary, because her
"WHEREFORE, the Court action was not administrative in nature, but one purely
GRANTS the instant motion to dismiss for damages arising from respondents' breach of the
for lack of cause of action." 4 laws on human relations. As such, jurisdiction lay with
the courts.
The second challenged Order denied
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. On July 12, 2002, the RTC dismissed the
Complaint for lack of cause of action.

The Facts
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

Petitioner Khristine Rea M. Regino was a first

year computer science student at Respondent In granting respondents' Motion to Dismiss, the
Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology (PCST). trial court noted that the instant controversy involved a
Reared in a poor family, Regino went to college mainly higher institution of learning, two of its faculty
through the financial support of her relatives. During members and one of its students. It added that Section
the second semester of school year 2001–2002, she 54 of the Education Act of 1982 vested in the
enrolled in logic and statistics subjects under Commission on Higher Education (CHED) the
Respondents Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa Baladad, supervision and regulation of tertiary schools. Thus, it
respectively, as teachers. ruled that the CHED, not the courts, had jurisdiction
over the controversy. 7
In February 2002, PCST held a fund raising
campaign dubbed the "Rave Party and Dance

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 In its dispositive portion, the assailed Order damages, a remedy beyond the domain of the CHED
dismissed the Complaint for "lack of cause of action" and well within the jurisdiction of the courts. 11
without, however, explaining this ground.
Petitioner is correct. First, the doctrine of
Aggrieved, petitioner filed the present Petition exhaustion of administrative remedies has no bearing
on pure questions of law. 8 on the present case. In Factoran Jr. v. CA, 12 the Court
had occasion to elucidate on the rationale behind this
Issues doctrine:

"The doctrine of exhaustion of

In her Memorandum, petitioner raises the administrative remedies is basic.
following issues for our consideration: Courts, for reasons of law, comity,
and convenience, should not
"Whether or not the principle entertain suits unless the available
of exhaustion of administrative administrative remedies have first
remedies applies in a civil action been resorted to and the proper
exclusively for damages based on authorities have been given the
violation of the human relation appropriate opportunity to act and
provisions of the Civil Code, filed by a correct their alleged errors, if any,
student against her former school. committed in the administrative
"Whether or not there is a forum. . . . 13
need for prior declaration of invalidity Petitioner is not asking for the reversal of the
of a certain school administrative policies of PCST. Neither is she demanding it to allow
policy by the Commission on Higher her to take her final examinations; she was already
Education (CHED) before a former enrolled in another educational institution. A reversal of
student can successfully maintain an the acts complained of would not adequately redress
action exclusively for damages in her grievances; under the circumstances, the
regular courts. consequences of respondents' acts could no longer be
"Whether or not the undone or rectified.
Commission on Higher Education Second, exhaustion of administrative remedies
(CHED) has exclusive original is applicable when there is competence on the part of
jurisdiction over actions for damages the administrative body to act upon the matter
based upon violation of the Civil Code complained of. 14 Administrative agencies are not
provisions on human relations filed by courts; they are neither part of the judicial system, nor
a student against the school." 9 are they deemed judicial tribunals. 15 Specifically, the
All of the foregoing point to one issue — CHED does not have the power to award
whether the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative damages. 16 Hence, petitioner could not have
remedies is applicable. The Court, however, sees a commenced her case before the Commission.
second issue which, though not expressly raised by Third, the exhaustion doctrine admits of
petitioner, was impliedly contained in her Petition: exceptions, one of which arises when the issue is purely
whether the Complaint stated sufficient cause(s) of legal and well within the jurisdiction of the trial
action. court. 17 Petitioner's action for damages inevitably
calls for the application and the interpretation of the
The Court's Ruling Civil Code, a function that falls within the jurisdiction of
the courts. 18
The Petition is meritorious. cAEDTa
Second Issue:
First Issue: Cause of Action
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Sufficient Causes of Action Stated
Respondents anchored their Motion to Dismiss in the Allegations in the Complaint
on petitioner's alleged failure to exhaust administrative
remedies before resorting to the RTC. According to As a rule, every complaint must sufficiently
them, the determination of the controversy hinge on allege a cause of action; failure to do so warrants its
the validity, the wisdom and the propriety of PCST's dismissal. 19 A complaint is said to assert a sufficient
academic policy. Thus, the Complaint should have been cause of action if, admitting what appears solely on its
lodged in the CHED, the administrative body tasked face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the
under Republic Act No. 7722 to implement the state relief prayed for. Assuming the facts that are alleged to
policy to "protect, foster and promote the right of all be true, the court should be able to render a valid
citizens to affordable quality education at all levels and judgment in accordance with the prayer in the
to take appropriate steps to ensure that education is complaint. 20
accessible to all." 10
A motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of
Petitioner counters that the doctrine finds no action hypothetically admits the truth of the alleged
relevance to the present case since she is praying for facts. In their Motion to Dismiss, respondents did not

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dispute any of petitioner's allegations, and they paid the tickets would not be
admitted that ". . . the crux of plaintiff's cause of action allowed to participate in the
is the determination of whether or not the assessment examination, for which threat
of P100 per ticket is excessive or oppressive." 21 They and intimidation many
thereby premised their prayer for dismissal on the students were eventually
Complaint's alleged failure to state a cause of action. forced to make payments;
Thus, a reexamination of the Complaint is in
order. aITECA "16. Because plaintiff could not afford
to pay, defendant Rachelle A.
The Complaint contains the following factual Gamurot inhumanly made
allegations: plaintiff sit out the class but
the defendant did not allow
"10. In the second week of February her to take her final
2002, defendant Rachelle A. examination in 'Logic;'
Gamurot, in connivance with
PCST, forced plaintiff and her "17. On March 15, 2002 just before
classmates to buy or take two the giving of the final
tickets each, . . .; examination in the subject
'Statistics,' defendant Elissa
  Baladad, in connivance with
defendants Rachelle A.
"11. Plaintiff and many of her
Gamurot and PCST,
classmates objected to the
announced in the classroom
forced distribution and selling
that she was not allowing
of tickets to them but the said
plaintiff and another student
defendant warned them that
to take the examination for
if they refused [to] take or
their failure and refusal to
pay the price of the two
pay the price of the tickets,
tickets they would not be
and thenceforth she ejected
allowed at all to take the final
plaintiff and the other student
examinations;
from the classroom;
"12. As if to add insult to injury,
"18. Plaintiff pleaded for a chance to
defendant Rachelle A.
take the examination but all
Gamurot bribed students with
defendants could say was
additional fifty points or so in
that the prohibition to give
their test score in her subject
the examinations to non-
just to unjustly influence and
paying students was an
compel them into taking the
administrative decision;
tickets;
"19. Plaintiff has already paid her
"13. Despite the students' refusal,
tuition fees and other
they were forced to take the
obligations in the school;
tickets because [of]
defendant Rachelle A. "20. That the above-cited incident
Gamurot's coercion and act of was not a first since PCST
intimidation, but still many of also did another forced
them including the plaintiff distribution of tickets to its
did not attend the dance students in the first semester
party imposed upon them by of school year 2001–
defendants PCST and 2002; . . ." 22
Rachelle A. Gamurot;
The foregoing allegations show two causes of
"14. Plaintiff was not able to pay the action; first, breach of contract; and second, liability for
price of her own two tickets tort.
because aside from the fact
that she could not afford to
pay them it is also against her Reciprocity of the
religious practice as a School-Student Contract
member of a certain religious
congregation to be attending In Alcuaz v. PSBA, 23 the Court characterized
dance parties and the relationship between the school and the student as
celebrations; a contract, in which "a student, once admitted by the
school is considered enrolled for one
"15. On March 14, 2002, before semester." 24 Two years later, in Non v. Dames
defendant Rachelle A. II, 25 the Court modified the "termination of contract
Gamurot gave her class its theory" in Alcuaz by holding that the contractual
final examination in the relationship between the school and the student is not
subject 'Logic' she warned only semestral in duration, but for the entire period the
that students who had not latter are expected to complete it." 26 Except for the

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variance in the period during which the contractual contractual obligation to afford its students a fair
relationship is considered to subsist, opportunity to complete the course they seek to
both Alcuaz and Non were unanimous in characterizing pursue.
the school-student relationship as contractual in
nature. CTHDcE We recognize the need of a school to fund its
facilities and to meet astronomical operating costs; this
The school-student relationship is also is a reality in running it. Crystal v. Cebu International
reciprocal. Thus, it has consequences appurtenant to School 31 upheld the imposition by respondent school
and inherent in all contracts of such kind — it gives rise of a "land purchase deposit" in the amount of P50,000
to bilateral or reciprocal rights and obligations. The per student to be used for the "purchase of a piece of
school undertakes to provide students with education land and for the construction of new buildings and
sufficient to enable them to pursue higher education or other facilities . . . which the school would transfer [to]
a profession. On the other hand, the students agree to and occupy after the expiration of its lease contract
abide by the academic requirements of the school and over its present site."
to observe its rules and regulations. 27
The amount was refundable after the student
The terms of the school-student contract are graduated or left the school. After noting that the
defined at the moment of its inception — upon imposition of the fee was made only after prior
enrolment of the student. Standards of academic consultation and approval by the parents of the
performance and the code of behavior and discipline students, the Court held that the school committed no
are usually set forth in manuals distributed to new actionable wrong in refusing to admit the children of
students at the start of every school year. Further, the petitioners therein for their failure to pay the "land
schools inform prospective enrollees the amount of fees purchase deposit" and the 2.5 percent monthly
and the terms of payment. surcharge thereon.

In practice, students are normally required to In the present case, PCST imposed the assailed
make a down payment upon enrollment, with the revenue-raising measure belatedly, in the middle of the
balance to be paid before every preliminary, midterm semester. It exacted the dance party fee as a condition
and final examination. Their failure to pay their for the students' taking the final examinations, and
financial obligation is regarded as a valid ground for the ultimately for its recognition of their ability to finish a
school to deny them the opportunity to take these course. The fee, however, was not part of the school-
examinations. student contract entered into at the start of the school
year. Hence, it could not be unilaterally imposed to the
The foregoing practice does not merely ensure prejudice of the enrollees. SIcCEA
compliance with financial obligations; it also underlines
the importance of major examinations. Failure to take a Such contract is by no means an ordinary one.
major examination is usually fatal to the students' In Non, we stressed that the school-student contract "is
promotion to the next grade or to graduation. imbued with public interest, considering the high
Examination results form a significant basis for their priority given by the Constitution to education and the
final grades. These tests are usually a primary and an grant to the State of supervisory and regulatory powers
indispensable requisite to their elevation to the next over all educational institutions." 32 Sections 5 (1) and
educational level and, ultimately, to their completion of (3) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution provide:
a course.
"The State shall protect and
Education is not a measurable commodity. It is promote the right of all citizens to
not possible to determine who is "better educated" quality education at all levels and
than another. Nevertheless, a student's grades are an shall take appropriate steps to make
accepted approximation of what would otherwise be an such declaration accessible to all.
intangible product of countless hours of study. The
importance of grades cannot be discounted in a setting "Every student has a right to
where education is generally the gate pass to select a profession or course of study,
employment opportunities and better life; such grades subject to fair, reasonable and
are often the means by which a prospective employer equitable admission and academic
measures whether a job applicant has acquired the requirements."
necessary tools or skills for a particular profession or The same state policy resonates in Section 9(2)
trade. of BP 232, otherwise known as the Education Act of
Thus, students expect that upon their payment 1982:
of tuition fees, satisfaction of the set academic "Section 9. Rights of Students
standards, completion of academic requirements and in School. — In addition to other
observance of school rules and regulations, the school rights, and subject to the limitations
would reward them by recognizing their "completion" of prescribed by law and regulations,
the course enrolled in. students and pupils in all schools
The obligation on the part of the school has shall enjoy the following rights:
been established in Magtibay P. Garcia, 28 Licup v.
University of San Carlos 29 and Ateneo de Manila xxx xxx xxx
University v. Garcia, 30 in which the Court held that,
barring any violation of the rules on the part of the
students, an institution of higher learning has a

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 (2) The right to freely choose or other personal
their field of study subject to condition."
existing curricula and to
continue their course therein Generally, liability for tort arises only between
up to graduation, except in parties not otherwise bound by a contract. An academic
cases of academic deficiency, institution, however, may be held liable for tort even if
or violation of disciplinary it has an existing contract with its students, since the
regulations." act that violated the contract may also be a tort. We
ruled thus in PSBA vs. CA, 34 from which we quote:
Liability for Tort ". . . A perusal of Article 2176
[of the Civil Code] shows that
In her Complaint, petitioner also charged that obligations arising from quasi-delicts
private respondents "inhumanly punish students . . . by or tort, also known as extra-
reason only of their poverty, religious practice or lowly contractual obligations, arise only
station in life, which inculcated upon [petitioner] the between parties not otherwise bound
feelings of guilt, disgrace and unworthiness;" 33 as a by contract, whether express or
result of such punishment, she was allegedly unable to implied. However, this impression has
finish any of her subjects for the second semester of not prevented this Court from
that school year and had to lag behind in her studies by determining the existence of a tort
a full year. The acts of respondents supposedly caused even when there obtains a contract.
her extreme humiliation, mental agony and In Air France v. Carrascoso (124 Phil.
"demoralization of unimaginable proportions in 722), the private respondent was
violation of Articles 19, 21 and 26 of the Civil Code. awarded damages for his
These provisions of the law state thus: unwarranted expulsion from a first-
class seat aboard the petitioner
"Article 19. Every person airline. It is noted, however, that the
must, in the exercise of his rights and Court referred to the petitioner-
in the performance of his duties, act airline's liability as one arising from
with justice, give everyone his due, tort, not one arising form a contract
and observe honesty and good faith." of carriage. In effect, Air France is
authority for the view that liability
"Article 21. Any person who from tort may exist even if there is a
wilfully causes loss or injury to contract, for the act that breaks the
another in a manner that is contrary contract may be also a tort. . . . This
to morals, good customs or public view was not all that revolutionary,
policy shall compensate the latter for for even as early as 1918, this Court
the damage." was already of a similar mind.
  In Cangco v. Manila Railroad (38 Phil.
780), Mr. Justice Fisher elucidated
"Article 26. Every person shall thus: '. . . . When such a contractual
respect the dignity, personality, relation exists the obligor may break
privacy and peace of mind of his the contract under such conditions
neighbors and other persons. The that the same act which constitutes a
following and similar acts, though breach of the contract would have
they may not constitute a criminal constituted the source of an extra-
offense, shall produce a cause of contractual obligation had no
action for damages, prevention and contract existed between the
other relief: parties.' HSDIaC

(1) Prying into the privacy of "Immediately what comes to

another's residence; mind is the chapter of the Civil Code
on Human Relations, particularly
(2) Meddling with or Article 21 . . ." 35
disturbing the private
life or family relations
Academic Freedom
of another;

(3) Intriguing to cause In their Memorandum, respondents harp on

another to be their right to "academic freedom." We are not
alienated from his impressed. According to present jurisprudence,
friends; academic freedom encompasses the independence of
an academic institution to determine for itself (1) who
(4) Vexing or humiliating may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall
another on account of teach, and (4) who may be admitted to
his beliefs, lowly study. 36 In Garcia v. the Faculty Admission
station in life, place of Committee, Loyola School of Theology, 37 the Court
birth, physical defect, upheld the respondent therein when it denied a female
student's admission to theological studies in a seminary

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for prospective priests. The Court defined the freedom
of an academic institution thus: "to decide for itself
aims and objectives and how best to attain them . . .
free from outside coercion or interference save possibly
when overriding public welfare calls for some
restraint." 38

In Tangonan P. Paño, 39 the Court upheld, in

the name of academic freedom, the right of the school
to refuse readmission of a nursing student who had
been enrolled on probation, and who had failed her
nursing subjects. These instances notwithstanding, the
Court has emphasized that once a school has, in the
name of academic freedom, set its standards, these
should be meticulously observed and should not be
used to discriminate against certain students. 40 After
accepting them upon enrollment, the school cannot
renege on its contractual obligation on grounds other
than those made known to, and accepted by, students
at the start of the school year.

In sum, the Court holds that the Complaint

alleges sufficient causes of action against respondents,
and that it should not have been summarily dismissed.
Needless to say, the Court is not holding respondents
liable for the acts complained of. That will have to be
ruled upon in due course by the court a quo.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED,

and the assailed Orders REVERSED. The trial court is
DIRECTED to reinstate the Complaint and, with all
deliberate speed, to continue the proceedings in Civil
Case No. U-7541. No costs. HASDcC

SO ORDERED.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio Morales and Garcia,

JJ ., concur.

Corona, J ., is on leave.

||| (Regino v. Pangasinan Colleges of Science and

Technology, G.R. No. 156109, [November 18, 2004],
485 PHIL 446-465)

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Manila Railroad Co. vs La Compania Trasatlantica accidents due to any hidden defect in the lifting
GR No 11318 October 26 1918 apparatus or other unforeseen occurrence. There
was no express reservation with regard to damage
attributable to the negligence of the contracting
EN BANC company, or its agents in the lifting operations. In
the course of discharging the boilers, serious
damage was done to one of them by reason of the
[G.R. No. 11318. October 26, 1918.] negligence of the person in charge of the lifting
operations. Held: That the contracting company
was liable for the damage thus done in the
THE MANILA RAILROAD performance of its contract and could not be
CO., plaintiff-appellant, vs. LA exempted by- reason of the fact that it had used
COMPAÑIA due care in selecting the servant whom it had
TRASATLANTICA, defendant- placed in charge of the work.
appellee, and THE ATLANTIC, GULF
& PACIFIC CO., defendant-appellant.
4. ID.; "CULPA CONTRACTUAL" AND "CULPA
AQUILIANA" DISTINGUISHED. — Negligence incident
to the performance of a contractual obligation
William A. Kincaid & Thomas L.
(culpa contractual) is entirely distinct from
Hartigan, for plaintiff and appellant.
negligence considered as an independent source of
Lawrence, Ross & Block, for defendant and liability in the absence of special relation. The latter
appellant Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co. species of negligence is the culpa aquiliana of the
civil law; and liability arising therefrom is governed
Gilbert, Cohn & Fisher, for defendant and by articles 1902-1904 of the Civil Code; while the
appellee Compañia Trasatlantica. liability incident to the performance of contractual
obligations is governed by articles 1101 et seq. and
other special provisions relative to contractual
SYLLABUS obligations.

5. ID.; LIABILITY OF OFFICIOUS MEDDLER

1. CARRIERS; CONTRACTS; LIABILITY FOR
(GESTOR OFICIOSO). — A party who, in the absence
DAMAGE DONE IN DISCHARGING CARGO. — A
of any contract whatever, officiously undertakes to
steamship company is liable upon its contract of
do a service with respect to the property of
carriage for damage resulting to cargo by reason of
another, as in moving it from one place to another,
the negligence of a contracting company in
is liable for any damage resulting thereto by reason
discharging the freight from the ship's hold; and the
of negligence on his part or that of his servants in
circumstance that the steamship company had
performing such service.
used due diligence in selecting a competent person
to discharge the cargo does not exempt the ship's
company from liability. The failure to comply with a 6. CONTRACTS; PRIVITY OF CONTRACT;
contractual obligation cannot be excused by proof ACTION BY OWNER FOR DAMAGE IN DISCHARGE OF
that the damage was due to the negligence of one FREIGHT. — A contracting company which
whom the contracting party has selected to undertakes to remove freight from a ship's hold,
perform the contract. subject to certain conditions defined in a contract
made with the steamship company, is not liable to
the owner of freight for damage done thereto in the
2. NEGLIGENCE; EXEMPTION FROM
lifting operations. In such case the owner of the
LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES. — A contract exempting a
freight must look for redress to the ship's company
party from liability for the damages consequent
and for lack of privity cannot maintain an action on
upon accidents occurring in the course of certain
the contract made between the ship's company and
operations will not be construed to extend to
the other.
damages resulting from the negligence of the
contracting party or its servants in conducting such
operations, unless the contract is so explicit as to
leave no room for doubt that the parties so
DECISION
intended. Contracts against liability for negligence
are not favored in the law and should be strictly
construed, with every intendment against the party
claiming the benefit of the exemption from such
liability. STREET, J p:

3. ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — A contracting In March, 1914, the steamship Alicante,

company was employed by a steamship company belonging to the Compañia Trasatlantica de
to lift a number of heavy steamboilers from the Barcelona, arrived at Manila with two locomotive
ship's hold and place them on a lighter alongside, boilers aboard, the property of The Manila Railroad
with the understanding that while the contracting Company. The equipment of the ship for
company would use due care in getting the boilers discharging heavy cargo was not sufficiently strong
out, no responsibility would be assumed by it for to handle these boilers, and it was therefore

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necessary for the Steamship Company to procure The mishap was undoubtedly due, as the
assistance in the port of Manila. lower court found, to the negligence of one Leyden,
the foreman in charge; and we may add that the
The Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Company evidence tends to show that his negligence was of
(hereafter called the Atlantic Company) was a type which may without exaggeration be
accordingly employed by the Steamship Company, denominated gross. The sling was in the first place
as having probably the best equipment for this improperly adjusted, and the attention of Leyden
purpose of any contracting company in the city. was at once called to this by the man in charge of
The service to be performed by the Atlantic the stevedores. Nevertheless he proceeded and,
Company consisted in bringing its floating crane instead of lowering the boiler when it was seen that
alongside the Alicante, lifting the boilers out of the it could not readily pass through the hatch, he
ship's hold, and transferring them to a barge which attempted to force it through; and the ship's tackle
would be placed ready to receive them. was brought into use to assist in this maneuver.
The second fall was, it appears, caused by the
weakening of the bolt at the head of the derrick
Upon the arrival of the Alicante, the Atlantic boom, due to the shock incident to the first
Company sent out its crane in charge of one accident. This defect was possibly such as not to be
Leyden. In preparing to hoist the first boiler the patent to external observation but we are of the
sling was unfortunately adjusted near the middle of opinion that a person of sufficient skill to be trusted
the boiler, and it was thus raised nearly in an with the operation of machinery of this character
horizontal position. The boiler was too long to clear should have known that the crane had possibly
the hatch in this position, and after one end of the been weakened by the jar received in the first
boiler had emerged on one side of the hatch, the accident. The foreman was therefore guilty of
other still remained below on the other side. When negligence in attempting to hoist the boiler the
the boiler had been gotten into this position and second time under the conditions that had thus
was being hoisted still further, a rivet near the head developed. It should be noted that the operation
of the boiler was caught under the edge of the was at all its stages entirely under Leyden's control;
hatch. The weight on the crane was thus increased and, although in the first lift he utilized the ship's
by a strain estimated at fifteen tons with the result tackle to aid in hoisting the boiler, everything was
that the cable of the sling parted and the boiler fell done under his immediate supervision. There is no
to the bottom of the ship's hold. The sling was evidence tending to show that the first fall of the
again adjusted to the boiler but instead of being boiler might have been due to any hidden defect in
placed near the middle it was now slung nearer one the lifting apparatus; and if it had not been for the
of the ends, as should have been done at first. The additional strain caused by one end of the boiler
boiler was again lifted; but as it was being brought catching under the hatch, the operation would
up, the bolt at the end of the derrick boom broke, doubtless have been accomplished without
and again the boiler fell. difficulty. The accident is therefore to be attributed
to the failure of Leyden to exercise the degree of
The crane was repaired and the boiler care which an ordinarily competent and prudent
discharged, but it was found to be so badly person would have exhibited under the
damaged that it had to be reshipped to England circumstances which then confronted him. This
where it was rebuilt, and afterwards was returned conclusion of fact cannot be refuted; and, indeed,
to Manila. The Railroad Company's damage by no attempt is here made by the appellant to
reason of the cost of repairs, expenses, and loss of reverse this finding of the trial court.
the use of the boiler proved to be P22,343.29; and
as to the amount of the damage so resulting there Three questions are involved in the case,
is practically no dispute. To recover these damages namely: (1) Is the Steamship Company liable to the
the present action was instituted by the Railroad plaintiff by reason of having delivered the boiler in
Company against the Steamship Company. The question in a damaged condition? (2) Is the Atlantic
latter caused the Atlantic Company to be brought in Company liable to be made to respond to the
as a codefendant, and insisted that whatever steamship company for the amount the latter may
liability existed should be fixed upon the Atlantic be required to pay to the plaintiff for the damage
Company as an independent contractor who had done ? (3) Is the Atlantic Company directly liable to
undertaken to discharge the boilers and had the plaintiff, as the trial court held?
become responsible for such damage as had been
done.
It will be observed that a contractual
relation existed between the Railroad Company and
The judge of the Court of First Instance the Steamship Company; and the duties of the
gave judgment in favor of the plaintiff against the latter with respect to the carrying and delivery of
Atlantic Company, but absolved the Steamship the boilers are to be discovered by considering the
Company from the complaint. The plaintiff has terms and legal effect of that contract. A
appealed from the action of the court in failing to contractual relation also existed between the
give judgment against the Steamship Company, Steamship Company and the Atlantic Company;
while the Atlantic Company has appealed from the and the duties owing by the latter to the former
judgment against it. with respect to the lifting and the transferring of
the boilers are likewise to be discovered by
considering the terms and legal effect of the

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contract between these parties. On the other hand, Steamship Company was notified that the service
no contractual relation existed directly between the would only be rendered upon the distinct
Railroad Company and the Atlantic Company. understanding that the Atlantic Company would not
be responsible for damage. In this connection the
We are all agreed, that, under the contract president of the company testified that he
for transportation from England to Manila, the stipulated that the company would assume no
Steamship Company is liable to the plaintiff for the responsibility for any damage which might be done
injury done to the boiler while it was being to the lifts or to the steamer or to its contents or to
discharged from the ship. The obligation to individuals during the progress of making these
transport the boiler necessarily involves the duty to lifts, from any source whatever in connection with
convey and deliver it in a proper condition the breaking of the lifting equipment. The vice-
according to its nature, and conformably with good president of the Atlantic Company testified that he
faith, custom, and the law (art. 1258, Civ. Code). was present upon the occasion when the agent of
The contract to convey imports the duty to convey the Steamship Company made arrangements for
and deliver safely and securely with reference to the discharge of the boilers and he heard the
the degree of care which, under the circumstances, conversation between the president and said agent.
are required by law and custom applicable to the According to this witness the substance of the
case. The duty to carry and to carry safely is all agreement was that, while the Atlantic Company
one. would use all due care in getting the boilers out, no
responsibility was assumed for damage done either
to ship or cargo. The intermediary who acted as
Such being the contract of the Steamship agent for the Steamship Company in arranging for
Company, said company is necessarily liable, under the performance of this service stoutly denied that
articles 1103 and 1104 of the Civil Code, for the any such terms were announced by the officials or
consequences of the omission of the care anybody else connected with the Atlantic Company
necessary to the proper performance of its at any time while the arrangements were pending.
obligation. The contract to transport and deliver at
the port of Manila a locomotive boiler, which was
received by it in proper condition, is not complied In the conflict of the evidence, we recognize
with by delivery at the port of destination of a mass that, by a preponderance of the evidence, some
of iron the utility of which had been destroyed. reservation or other was made as to the
responsibility of the Atlantic Company; and though
the agent who acted on behalf of the Steamship
Nor does the Steamship Company escape Company possibly never communicated this
liability by reason of the fact that it employed a reservation to his principal, the latter should
competent independent contractor to discharge the nevertheless be held bound thereby. It thus
boilers. The law applicable to this feature of the becomes necessary to discover what the exact
case will be more fully discussed further on in this terms of this supposed reservation were.
opinion. At this point we merely observe that in the
performance of this service the Atlantic Company
was no more than a servant or employee of the We think that we must put aside at once
Steamship Company, and it has never yet been the words of studied precision with which the
held that the failure to comply with a contractual president of the Atlantic Company would exclude
obligation can be excused by showing that such the possibility of any liability attaching to his
delinquency was due to the negligence of one to company, though we may accept his statement as
whom the contracting party had committed the showing that the excepted risk contemplated
performance of the contract. breakage of the lifting equipment. There is
undoubtedly a larger element of truth in the more
reasonable statement by the vice-president of the
Coming to the question of the liability of the company. According to this witness the contract
Atlantic Company to respond to the Steamship combined two features. namely, an undertaking on
Company for the damages which the latter will be the part of the Atlantic Company to use all due
compelled to pay to the plaintiff, we observe that care, combined with a reservation concerning the
the defense of the Atlantic Company comprises two company's liability for damage.
contentions, to-wit, first, that by the terms of the
engagement in accordance with which the Atlantic
Company agreed to render the service, all risk The Atlantic Company offered in evidence a
incident to the discharge of the boilers was number of letters which had been written by it at
assumed by the Steamship Company; and different times, extending over a period of years, in
secondly, that the Atlantic Company should be response to inquiries made by other firms and
absolved under the last paragraph of article 1903 persons in Manila concerning the terms upon which
of the Civil Code, inasmuch as it had used due care the Atlantic Company would make heavy lifts.
in the selection of the employee whose negligent These letters tend to show that the Atlantic
act caused the damage in question. Company was not accustomed to assume the risk
incident to such work and required the parties for
whom the service might be rendered either to carry
At the hearing in first instance the Atlantic the risk or insure against it. One such letter, dated
Company introduced four witnesses to prove that at nearly four years prior to the occurrence which
the time said company agreed to lift the boilers out gave rise to this lawsuit, was addressed to
of the Alicante, as upon other later occasions, the the Compañia Trasatlantica de Barcelona one of the

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defendants in this case. It was stated in this whatever may have been its precise words, had
communication that the company's derrick would reference to disasters which might result from
be subject to inspection prior to making the lift but some inherent hidden defect in the lifting apparatus
that the Atlantic Company would not assume or other unforeseen occurrence not directly
responsibility for any damage that might occur attributable to negligence of the company in the
either to ship or cargo from any cause whatsoever. lifting operations. Neither party could have
The Steamship Company rejected the services of supposed for a moment that it was intended to
the Atlantic Company in that instance as being too absolve the Atlantic Company from its duty to use
onerous. due care in the work.

The letters directed to third parties, it may It is not pretended that negligence on the
be observed, would not, generally speaking, be part of the Atlantic Company or its employees was
admissible as against the plaintiff for the purpose of expressly included in the excepted risk, and we are
proving that a similar reservation was inserted in of the opinion that the contract should not be
the contract with it on this occasion; but if understood as covering such an exemption. It is a
knowledge of such custom is brought home to the rudimentary principle that the contractor is
Steamship Company, the fact that such reservation responsible for the work executed by persons
was commonly made is of some probative force. whom he employs in its performance, and this is
Reference to a number of these letters will show expressed in the Civil Code in the form of a positive
that no particular formula was used by the Atlantic rule of law (art. 1596). It is also expressly declared
Company in defining its exemption, and the tenor by law that liability arising from negligence is
of these various communications differs materially. demandable in the fulfillment of all kinds of
We think, however, that some of the letters are of obligations (art. 1103, Civil Code). Every contract
value as an aid in interpreting the reservation for the prestation of service therefore has annexed
which the Atlantic Company may have intended to to it, as an inseparable implicit obligation, the duty
make. We therefore quote from some of these to exercise due care in the accomplishment of the
letters as follows: work; and no reservation whereby the person
rendering the services seeks to escape from the
"We will use our best consequences of a violation of this obligation can
endeavors to carry out the work be viewed with favor.
successfully and will ask you to
inspect our plant but we wish it "Contracts against liability for
distinctly understood that we cannot negligence are not favored by the
assume responsibility for damage law. In some instances, such as
which may occur . . . while the lift is common carriers, they are prohibited
being made." (To Rear Admiral, U. S. as against public policy. In all cases
N., Oct. 4, 1909.) such contracts should be construed
strictly, with every intendment
"Our quotation is based on against the party seeking its
the understanding that we assume no protection." (Crew vs. Bradstreet
responsibility whatever from any Company, 134 Pa. St., 161; 7 L. R. A.,
accident which may happen during 661; 19 Am. St. Rep., 681.)
our operations. We always insert this
clause as a precautionary measure, The strictness with which contracts
but we have never had to avail conferring such an unusual exemption are
ourselves of it as yet and do not construed is illustrated in Bryan vs. Eastern &
expect to now." (To "El Varadero de Australian S. S. Co. (28 Phil. Rep., 310). The
Manila," Nov. 1, 1913.) decision in that case is not precisely applicable to
the case at bar, since the court was there applying
"As is customary in these the law of a foreign jurisdiction, and the question at
cases, we will use all precautions issue involved a doctrine peculiar to contracts of
necessary to handle the gun in a common carriers. Nevertheless the case is
proper manner. Our equipment has instructive as illustrating the universal attitude of
been tested and will be again, before courts upon the right of a contracting party to
making the lift, but we do not assume stipulate against the consequences of his own
any responsibility for damage to the negligence. It there appeared that the plaintiff had
gun ship, or cargo." (To Warner, purchased from the defendant company a ticket for
Barnes & Co., June 7, 1909.) the transportation of himself and baggage from
Hongkong to Manila. By the terms of the contract
printed in legible type upon the back of the ticket it
The idea expressed in these letters is, we was provided that the company would not hold
think, entirely consonant with the interpretation itself responsible for any loss or damage to
which the vice-president of the company placed luggage, under any circumstances whatsoever,
upon the contract which was made with the unless it had been paid for as freight. It was held
Steamship Company upon this occasion, that is the that this limitation upon the liability of the
company recognized its duty to exercise due defendant company did not relieve it from liability
supervisory care; and the exemption from liability, for negligence of its servants by which the baggage

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of the passenger was lost. Said the court: one-sided manner. The two features of the
"Ordinarily this language would seem to be broad engagement, namely, the promise to use due care
enough to cover every possible contingency, and the exemption from liability for damage should
including the negligent act of the defendant's be so construed as to give some legal effect to
servants. To so hold, however, would run counter to both. The result is, as already indicated, that the
the established law of England and the United Atlantic Company was bound by its undertaking to
States on that subject. The court then quoted the use due care and that the exemption was intended
following proposition from the decision of the King's to cover accidents due to hidden defects in the
Bench Division in Price & Co. vs. Union Lighterage apparatus or other unforeseeable occurrences not
Co. ( [1903], 1 K. B. D., 750, 754): having their origin in the immediate personal
negligence of the party in charge of the operations.
" 'An exemption in general
words not expressly relating to We now proceed to consider the contention
negligence, even though the words that the Atlantic Company should be absolved from
are wide enough to include loss by liability to the Steamship Company under the last
negligence or default of carriers' paragraph of article 1903 of the Civil Code, which
servants, must be construed as declares that the liability there referred to shall
limiting the liability of the carrier as cease when the persons mentioned therein prove
assurer, and not as relieving him from that they employed all the diligence of a good
the duty of exercising reasonable skill father of a family to avoid the damage. In this
and care.' " connection the conclusion of fact must be conceded
in favor of the Atlantic Company that it had used
Even admitting that, generally speaking, a proper care in the selection of Leyden and that, so
person may stipulate against liability for the far as the company was aware, he was a person to
consequences of negligence, at least in those cases whom might properly be committed the task of
where the negligence is not gross or wilful, the discharging the boilers. The answer to the
contract conferring such exemption must be so contention, however, is that the obligation of the
clear as to leave no room for the operation of the Atlantic Company was created by contract, and
ordinary rules of liability consecrated by experience article 1903 is not applicable to negligence arising
and sanctioned by the express provisions of law. in the course of the performance of a contractual
obligation. Article 1903 is exclusively concerned
with cases where the negligence arises in the
If the exemption should be understood in absence of agreement.
the sense which counsel for the Atlantic Company
now insists it should bear, that is, as an absolute
exemption from all responsibility for negligence, it In discussing the liability of the Steamship
is evident that the agreement was a most Company to the plaintiff Railroad Company we have
inequitable and unfair one, and hence it is one that already shown that a party is bound to the full
the Steamship Company can not be lightly assumed performance of his contractual engagements under
to have made. Understood in that sense it is the articles 1101 et seq. of the Civil Code, and other
equivalent of licensing the Atlantic Company to special provisions of the Code relative to
perform its tasks in any manner and fashion that it contractual obligations; and if he falls short of
might please, and to hold it harmless from the complete performance by reason of his own
consequences. negligence or that of any person to whom he may
commit the work, he is liable for the damages
resulting therefrom. What was there said is also
It is true that, in these days, insurance can applicable with reference to the liability of the
usually be obtained in the principal ports of Atlantic Company upon its contract with the
commerce by parties circumstanced as was the Steamship Company, and the same need not be
steamship company in the case now before us. But here repeated. It is desirable, however, in this
the best insurance against disasters of this kind is connection, to bring out somewhat more fully the
found in the exercise of due care; and the chief distinction between negligence in the performance
incentive to the exercise of care is a feeling of of a contractual obligation (culpa contractual) and
responsibility on the part of him who undertakes negligence considered as an independent source of
the work. Naturally the courts are little inclined to obligation between parties not previously bound
aid in the efforts of contractors to evade this (culpa aquiliana).
responsibility.
This distinction is well established in legal
There may have been in the minds of the jurisprudence and is fully recognized in the
officials of the Atlantic Company an idea that the provisions of the Civil Code. As illustrative of this,
promise to use due care in the lifting operations we quote the following passage from the opinion of
was not accompanied by a legal obligation, such this Court in the well-known case of Rakes vs.
promise being intended merely for its moral effect Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co. (7 Phil. Rep., 359, 365),
as an assurance to the steamship company that the and in this quotation we reproduce the first
latter might rely upon the competence and paragraph of the passage from Manresa chiefly for
diligence of the employees of the Atlantic Company the purpose of here presenting a more correct
to accomplish the work in a proper way. The English version of said passage.
contract can not be permitted to operate in this

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 "The acts to which these What has been said suffices in our opinion
articles are applicable are understood to demonstrate that the Atlantic Company is liable
to be those not growing out of to the Steamship Company for the damages
preexisting duties of the parties to brought upon the latter by the failure of the Atlantic
one another. But where relations Company to use due care in discharging the boiler,
already formed give rise to duties, regardless of the fact that the damage was caused
whether springing from contract or by the negligence of an employee who was
quasi contract, then breaches of qualified for the work and who had been chosen by
those duties are subject to articles the Atlantic Company with due care.
1101, 1103, and 1104 of the same
code. A typical application of this This brings us to the last question here to
distinction may be found in the be answered, which is; Can the Atlantic Company
consequences of a railway accident be held directly liable to the Railroad Company? In
due to defective machinery supplied other words, can the judgment entered in the trial
by the employer. His liability to his court directly in favor of the plaintiff against the
employee would arise out of the Atlantic Company be sustained? To answer this it is
contract of employment, that to the necessary to examine carefully the legal relations
passengers out of the contract for existing between the Atlantic Company and the
passage, while that to the injured by- Railroad Company with reference to this affair; and
stander would originate in the we shall for a moment ignore the existence of the
negligent act itself. This distinction is contract between the Steamship Company and the
thus clearly set forth by Manresa in Atlantic Company, to which the railroad company
his commentary on article 1033: was not a party.

"'We see with reference to Having regard then to the bare fact that the
such obligations, that culpa, or Atlantic Company undertook to remove the boiler
negligence, may be understood in from the ship's hold and for this purpose took the
two different senses, either as culpa, property into its power and control, there arose a
substantive and independent, which duty to the owner to use due care in the
of itself constitutes the source of an performance of that service and to avoid damaging
obligation between two persons not the property in the course of such operation. This
formerly bound by any other duty was obviously in existence before the
obligation; or as an incident in the negligent act was done which resulted in damage,
performance of an obligation which and said negligent act may, if we still ignore the
already existed, which can not be existence of the express contract, be considered as
presumed to exist without the other, an act done in violation of this duty.
and which increases the liability
arising from the already existing
obligation.'" The duty thus to use due care is an implied
obligation, of a quasi contractual nature, since it is
created by implication of law in the absence of
Justice Tracey, the author of the opinion express agreement. The conception of liability with
from which we have quoted, proceeds to observe which we are here confronted is somewhat similar
that Manresa, in commenting on articles 1102 and to that which is revealed in the case of the
1104, has described these two species of depositary, or commodatary, whose legal duty with
negligence as contractual and extra-contractual, respect to the property committed to their care is
the latter being the culpa aquiliana of the Roman defined by law even in the absence of express
law. "This terminology is unreservedly accepted by contract; and it can not be doubted that a person
Sanchez Roman (Derecho Civil, fourth section, who takes possession of the property of another for
chapter XI, article II, No. 12), and the principle the purpose of moving or conveying it from one
stated is supported by decisions of the supreme place to another, or for the purpose of performing
court of Spain, among them those of November 20, any other service in connection therewith (locatio
1896 (80 Jurisprudencia Civil, No. 151), and June operis faciendi), owes to the owner a positive duty
27, 1894 (75 Jurisprudencia Civil, No. 182.)" to refrain from damaging it, to the same extent as if
an agreement for the performance of such service
The principle that negligence in the had been expressly made with the owner. The
performance of a contract is not governed by obligation here is really a species of contract le,
article 1903 of the Civil Code but rather by article and it has its source and explanation in the vital
1104 of the same Code was directly applied by this fact that the active party has taken upon himself to
court in the case of Baer Senior & Co.'s do something with or to the property and has taken
Successors vs. Compañia Maritima (6 Phil. Rep., it into his power and control for the purpose of
215); and the same idea has been impliedly if not performing such service. (Compare art. 1889, Civil
expressly recognized in other cases (N. T. Hashim & Code.)
Co. vs. Rocha & Co., 18 Phil. Rep., 315; Tan Chiong
Sian vs. Inchausti & Co., 22 Phil. Rep., 152). In the passage which we have already
quoted from the decision in the Rakes case this
Court recognized the fact that the violation of a

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quasi contractual duty is subject to articles 1101, The conclusion must therefore be that if
1103, and 1104 of the Civil Code and not within the there had been no contract of any sort between the
purview of article 1903. Manresa also, in the Atlantic Company and the Steamship Company, an
paragraph reproduced above, is of the opinion that action could have been maintained by the Railroad
negligence, considered as a substantive and Company, as owner, against the Atlantic Company
independent source of liability, does not include to recover the damages sustained by the former.
cases where the parties are previously bound by Such damages would have been demandable under
any other obligation. Again, it is instructive in this article 1103 of the Civil Code and the action would
connection to refer to the contents of article 1103 not have been subject to the qualification
of the Civil Code, where it is declared that the expressed in the last paragraph of article 1903.
liability proceeding from negligence is demandable
in the fulfillment of all kinds of obligations. These The circumstance that a contract was made
words evidently comprehend both forms of positive between the Atlantic Company and the Steamship
obligations, whether arising from express contract Company introduces, however, an important, and in
or from implied contract (quasi contract). our opinion, controlling factor into this branch of
the case. It cannot be denied that the Steamship
In this connection it is instructive to recall Company had possession of this boiler in the
the celebrated case of Coggs vs. Bernard (2 Ld. capacity of carrier and that, as such, it was
Raym, 909), decided in the court of the King's authorized to make a contract with the Atlantic
Bench of England in the year 1703. The action was Company to discharge the same from the ship.
brought by the owner of certain casks of brandy to Indeed, it appears in evidence that even before the
recover damages from a person who had contract of affreightment was made the Railroad
undertaken to transport them from one place to Company was informed that it would be necessary
another. It was alleged that in so doing the for the Steamship Company to procure the services
defendant so negligently and improvidently put of some contractor in the port of Manila to effect
them down that one of the casks was staved and the discharge, as the ship's tackle was inadequate
the brandy lost. The complaint did not allege that to handle heavy cargo. It is therefore to be
the defendant was a common carrier or that he was assumed that the Railroad Company had in fact
to be paid for his services. It was therefore assented to the employment of a contractor to
considered that the complaint did not state facts perform this service.
sufficient to support an action for breach of any
express contract. This made it necessary for the Now, it cannot be admitted that a person
court to go back to fundamental principles and to who contracts to do a service like that rendered by
place liability on the ground of a violation of the the Atlantic Company in this case incurs a double
legal duty incident to the mere fact of carriage. responsibility upon entering upon performance,
Said Powell, J.: "An action indeed will not lie for not namely, a responsibility to the party with whom he
doing the thing, for want of a sufficient contracted, and another entirely different
consideration; but yet if the bailee will take the responsibility to the owner, based on an implied
goods into his custody, he shall be answerable for contract. The two liabilities can not in our opinion
them; for the taking of the goods into his custody is coexist. It is a general rule that an implied contract
his own act." So Gould, J.: " . . . any man that never arises where an express contract has been
undertakes to carry goods is liable to an action, be made.
he a common carrier or whatever he is, if through
his neglect they are lost or come to any damage: . .
.." Behind these expressions was an unbroken line If double responsibility existed in such a
of ancient English precedents holding persons liable case as this, it would result that a person who had
for damage inflicted by reason of a misfeasance in limited his liability by express stipulation might find
carrying out an undertaking. The principle himself liable to the owner without regard to the
determined by the court in the case cited is limitation which he had seen fit to impose by
expressed in the syllabus in these words: "If a man contract. There appears to be no possibility of
undertakes to carry goods safely and securely, he reconciling the conflict that would be developed in
is responsible for any damage they may sustain in attempting to give effect to those inconsistent
the carriage through his neglect, though he was not liabilities. The contract which was in fact made, in
a common carrier and was to have nothing for the our opinion, determines not only the character and
carriage." Though not stated in so many words, this extent of the liability of the Atlantic Company but
decision recognizes that from the mere fact that a also the person or entity by whom the obligation is
person takes the property of another into his exigible. It is of course quite clear that if the
possession and control there arises an obligation in Atlantic Company had refused to carry out its
the nature of an assumpsit that he will use due care agreement to discharge the cargo, the plaintiff
with respect thereto. This must be considered a could not have enforced specific performance and
principle of universal jurisprudence, for it is could not have recovered damages for non-
consonant with justice and common sense and as performance. (Art. 1257, Civil Code; Donaldson,
we have already seen harmonizes with the doctrine Sim & Co. vs. Smith, Bell & Co., 2 Phil. Rep., 766;
above deduced from the provisions of the Civil Uy Tam and Uy Yet vs. Leonard, 30 Phil. Rep., 471.)
Code. In view of the preceding discussion it is equally
obvious that, for lack of privity with the contract,
the Railroad Company can have no right of action
to recover damages from the Atlantic Company for

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the wrongful act which constituted the violation of by the lower court; (4) That while the Atlantic, Gulf
said contract. The rights of the plaintiff can only be & Pacific Company attempted to show, during the
made effective through the Compañia Trasatlantica trial of the cause, that it and its employees
de Barcelona with whom the contract of exercised due care and diligence, it admitted in this
affreightment was made. court that its employees had perhaps been
negligent in the performance of their duties.
The judgment entered in the Court of First
Instance must, therefore, be reversed not only with Considering that the relations between
respect to the judgment entered in favor of the the Compañia Trasatlantica and the Atlantic, Gulf &
plaintiff directly against the Atlantic Company but Pacific Company were contractual, it becomes
also with respect to the absolution of the Steamship important to ascertain what were the terms of the
Company and the further failure of the court to contract, in order to properly understand the rights
enter judgment in favor of the latter against the and liabilities of the parties thereto, in relation to
Atlantic Company. The Compañia Trasatlantica de the admission of the Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific
Barcelona should be and is hereby adjudged to pay Company that its employees had perhaps been
to the Manila Railroad Company the sum of twenty guilty of negligence in the discharge of said boiler.
two thousand three hundred forty three pesos and
twenty nine centavos (P22,343.29), with interest The contract was not wholly reduced to
from May 11, 1914, until paid; and when this writing; it was partly written and partly oral.
judgment is satisfied, the Compañia Trasatlantica The Compania Trasatlantica alleged that under the
de Barcelona is declared to be entitled to recover terms of the contract the Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific
the same amount from the Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Company was to discharge said boilers from the
Company, against whom judgment is to this end steamship Alicante, using its tackle and apparatus
hereby rendered in favor of the Compañia therefor, and that no condition of any character
Trasatlantica de Barcelona. No express adjudication was imposed, while the Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific
of costs of either instance will be made. So ordered. Company alleged that it agreed to discharge said
boilers and to use its tackle and equipment for that
Arellano, C.J., Torres, purpose, but with the express condition that it was,
Araullo and Avanceña, JJ., concur. under no circumstances or conditions, to assume
any responsibility for any damage whatever which
might be occasioned thereby, either to the cargo,
Separate Opinions ship or persons.

In support of the allegation of

JOHNSON, J., dissenting: the Compañia Trasatlantica, it really presented but
one witness, while the Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific
The only question presented by the Company presented several witnesses, including its
appellant, the Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Company, is president, vice-president and several others,
whether or not it is liable, either to the Manila together with a number of documents showing that
Railroad Company, or to the Compañia the contract was in conformity with its usual
Trasatlantica, for the damage caused to a certain custom in making similar contracts. The Atlantic,
locomotive boiler while being discharged at the port Gulf & Pacific Company also showed that
of Manila. the Compañia Trasatlantica had actual knowledge
of such custom.
The essential facts important for a decision
upon the rights and liabilities of the Atlantic, Gulf & A careful examination of the proof, in our
Pacific Company may be stated as follows: opinion, clearly shows by a large preponderance,
that the contract in question was as the Atlantic,
(1) That the Manila Railroad Company Gulf & Pacific Company alleged and that by its
purchased certain locomotive boilers in Europe and terms said company (A. G. & P.) was relieved "of
contracted with the Compañia Trasatlantica to any responsibility for any damage which might
transport the same to Manila by its occur either to the ship, cargo or persons, from any
steamship Alicante; (2) That the tackle and cause whatsoever."
equipment of the steamship Alicante being
insufficient to discharge said locomotive boilers, The contract is the law governing the rights
the Compañia Trasatlantica entered into a contract and obligations of the parties, subject to certain
with the Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Company by virtue well defined exceptions. Persons have a right to
of the terms of which the latter company agreed to enter into any contract with any clauses, or
discharge the said locomotive boilers from the said conditions, or limitations which they may deem
steamship Alicante by using its tackle and convenient and advisable so long as such clauses
equipment for that purpose; (3) That in the effort of or conditions do not conflict with the existing laws,
the Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Company to discharge morals or public order. (Art. 1255, Civil Code.)
the said locomotive boilers from the said There are some well defined exceptions to that
steamship, the apparatus used, broke and one of rule, the most notable of which are contracts with
the boilers was discharged in the manner described common carriers. (Hartford F. Ins. Co., vs. Chicago,
in the complaint and damaged to the amount found M. & St. P. Railway Co., 175 U. S., 91, 97.) The

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Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Company, so far as the cause damage, and to avoid possible lawsuits
record shows, is not a common carrier, and the growing out of the alleged negligent acts.
exception, therefore, just noted does not apply to
it. Neither was the contract between the Compañia The question which we are discussing is not
Trasatlantica and the Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific a new one in jurisprudence. The courts have been
Company a contract for the carriage of called upon many times to interpret contracts with
merchandise. It was a contract for services of an conditions like those contained in the contract
entirely different character from that of a common before us. (Coup vs. Wabash, St. Louis & Pac.
carrier. Railway Co., 56 Mich., 111; 56 Am. Rep., 374;
Mann vs. Pere Marquette R. Co., 135 Mich., 210;
If then, generally speaking, persons may Stephens vs. Southern Pacific Co., 109 Cal., 86; 29
enter into contractual relations with any clauses or L. R. A., 751; Quimby vs. Boston & Maine R., 150
conditions which they may deem advisable and Mass., 365; 5 L. R. A., 846; Pittsburgh, etc. Railway
convenient, which do not conflict with existing laws, Co. vs. Mahoney, 148 Ind., 196; Russell vs.
morals or public order, we may ask: Is a contract of Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co., 157 Ind., 305; 55 L. R. A.,
the character of that before us in which one of the 253; Hartford Fire Ins. Co. vs. Chicago, M. & St. P.
parties stipulates "that he will not assume any Railway Co., 175 U. S., 91, 97; Baltimore, etc.
responsibility for any damage which may occur Railway Co. vs. Voigt, 176 U. S., 498; Osgood vs.
from any cause whatsoever" in the execution of Railway Co., 77 Vermont, 334; 70 L. R. A., 930.)
said contract, contrary to the laws, morals or public
order? In the case of the Hartford Insurance
Company vs. Chicago, M. & St. P. Railway Co. (175
The contract in question was not one which U. S., 91, 97, supra). a contract was made by which
the parties were obliged to enter into. In that one of the parties was relieved from all liability for
respect, it differed from contracts with common damage, et cetera, et cetera, even the liability for
carriers, wherein the latter have no option, damage which might result "from the carelessness
generally speaking. In the present case, the or negligence of employees or agents of said
Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Company had a perfect right railway company," and the Supreme Court of the
to refuse to enter into the contract in question until United States held that such a condition in
and unless its terms were satisfactory and contracts of that character was not void as against
acceptable. The parties being at perfect liberty to public policy, or public morals or contrary to law.
enter into the contract or to refuse so to do, they (Baltimore, etc. Railway Co. vs. Voigt, 176 U. S.,
must be bound by the law which they themselves 498; Osgood vs. Central Vermont R. Co., 77
have made for themselves. Having voluntarily Vermont, 334; 70 L. R. A., 930.)
made the law (contract), they must abide by its
terms until it can be shown that the same is Courts must not forget that they are not to
contrary to the laws, morals or public order. extend, arbitrarily, those rules which say that a
given contract is void as being against public
It is a fundamental rule of the law that what policy, or public laws, because if there is one thing
one may refuse to do entirely, he may agree to do which more than another public policy requires, it is
upon such terms as he pleases so long as he does that men of full age and competent understanding
not contravene the laws, morals or public order. shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and
The Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Company having had that their contracts when entered into freely and
the right to refuse absolutely to enter into the voluntarily, shall be held sacred and must be
contract, it must have had the right to refuse to enforced in courts of justice. Courts should not
enter into it except upon just such terms and lightly interfere with the freedom of contracts.
conditions as it saw fit to require. The Atlantic, Gulf (Baltimore, etc., Railway Co. vs. Voigt, 176 U. S.,
& Pacific Company, therefore, had a right to refuse 498; Printing, etc. Company vs. Sampson, Law
to enter into the contract in question until and Reps., 19 Equity, 465; Osgood vs. Central Vermont
unless the Compañia Trasatlantica agreed to R. Co., 77 Vermont, 334.)
relieve it of all responsibility for any damages which
might occur either to the ship, cargo or persons The record shows that the Atlantic, Gulf &
from any cause whatsoever. By the terms of the Pacific Company had, at various times, discharged
contract the Compañia Trasatlantica assumed all other freight from steamships in Manila Bay of
responsibility for damages in the discharge of the much greater weight than the boiler in question, by
said locomotive boilers. That must be true means of the same tackle and equipment and by
considering that, by the terms of the contract, the the same employees which were used in the
Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Company was relieved from present case. The record also shows that the tackle
any and all damages whatsoever which might and equipment was ample and that the men in
occur. charge were experienced in the work they were to
perform. The record further shows that the Atlantic,
The only purpose on the part of the Gulf & Pacific Company undertook the discharge of
Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Company, in imposing the said boilers at a very low price, for the very reason
condition above-mentioned, was to avoid the that they were relieved of all liability whatsoever
consequences of the negligence of its agents or for damages in the discharge of the same. The
employees or of any act or accident which might record further shows that the representative of

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the Compañia Trasatlantica, who made the contract 1903 of the Civil Code. We do not believe that the
in question, was requested to and did make a provisions of said article can be invoked when the
casual examination of the tackle and equipment rights and liabilities of parties to an action depend
which were to be used in the discharge of the upon a contract. The rights of parties are defined
boilers. The record further shows that said by the contract and there is no occasion to invoke
company, after receiving the information that the the statute. The argument employed by the
tackle and equipment and employees of the Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Company, if valid, would also
Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Company had discharged, on relieve the Compañia Trasatlantica from all liability.
various occasions, other and heavier freight without Certainly, the Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Company
accident or mishap, and after having made a casual would not deny that the Compañia
examination of such equipment, voluntarily and Trasatlantica had not exercised the care of a good
willingly and without any objection or protest for father of a family in selecting it for the discharge of
and on behalf of the Compañia Trasatlantica, said boilers. Neither do we believe that the
entered into the contract as above described, provisions of article 1902 of the Civil Code can be
accepting fully and without protest the conditions invoked in favor of the Compañia Trasatlantica, for
imposed by the Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Company. the reason that the contract governs the rights and
Having entered into the contract in question and liabilities and by the terms of the contract the
the same not being in contravention of the laws, Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Company is relieved from all
morals or public order, the Compañia liability whatsoever. A relief from all liability is a
Trasatlantica is bound by its terms. relief from any liability caused by negligence,
especially so when the action is based upon a
The rule above announced may seem to be contract. Whether or not that rule should be
a hard one, but when we remember that the right followed in an action of tort growing out of wilful
to enter into contracts carries with it the freedom to negligence, quaere?
impose such conditions as the parties may see fit to
impose, subject to specific limitations, the hardship, From all of the foregoing, we are persuaded
if any, is one self-imposed by the parties. that the judgment of the lower court should be
modified and that the Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific
An example may serve to make the rule Company should be relieved from all liability under
which we have announced plainer: the complaint.

A is the owner of an automobile at Manila Malcolm, J., concurs.

which he desires to deliver at Baguio. B is the
owner of a garage at Manila and has in his employ ||| (Manila Railroad Co. v. La Compañia Trasatlantica,
experienced chauffeurs. A desires to employ B to G.R. No. 11318, [October 26, 1918], 38 PHIL 875-901)
take the automobile to Baguio and offers a certain
price for the services. B accepts A's proposition
with the condition that he will assume no
responsibility whatever for any damages which
might occur to the said automobile in the course of
its delivery. In passing the zigzag on the way to
Baguio, an unforeseen accident happens through
the casual neglect or lack of care on the part of the
chauffeur and the automobile is damaged. Can B be
held liable, in an action upon the contract, for the
damages in the face of the fact that A had relieved
him of all liability for any damages which might
occur? The cases which we have cited above,
together with many others which might be cited, all
answer that question in the negative. That question
is answered in the negative upon the theory that A,
by the terms of his contract, relieved B, in an action
upon the contract, from all liability whatsoever.

It must not be forgotten that what we have

said relates to actions upon the contract with the
conditions mentioned and not to actions for
damages in an action ex delicto resulting from the
negligent performance of duties and obligations
assumed.

The appellant, the Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific

Company, contends that inasmuch as it had
exercised the care of a good father of a family in
selecting its employees, that it should be relieved
from all liability by virtue of the provisions of article

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Calalas vs CA GR No 122039 May 31 2000 SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; TORTS AND DAMAGES; QUASI-

SECOND DIVISION
DELICT AND BREACH OF CONTRACT; DISTINGUISHED;
CASE AT BAR. — The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was
[G.R. No. 122039. May 31, 2000.] whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable
for quasi-delict for the damage caused to petitioner's
jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in this case is
VICENTE CALALAS, petitioner, vs. whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage.
COURT OF APPEALS, ELIZA The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa
JUJEURCHE SUNGA and aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its source
FRANCISCO SALVA, respondents. the negligence of the tortfeasor. The second, breach of
contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon the
negligence in the performance of a contractual
Leo B. Diocos for petitioner. obligation. Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence
or fault should be clearly established because it is the
Enrique S. Empleo for E.J. Sunga. basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the
action can be prosecuted merely by proving the
Eduardo T. Sedillo for F. Salva.
existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor,
in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his
passenger safely to his destination. In case of death or
SYNOPSIS injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code
provides that common carriers are presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they
Sunga filed a complaint for damages against
prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as
Calalas, alleging violation of the contract of carriage by
defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This
the former in failing to exercise the diligence required
provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the
of him as a common carrier. Calalas, on the other hand,
burden of proof.
filed a third-party complaint against Francisco Salva,
the owner of the Isuzu truck that bumped their 2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DOCTRINE OF PROXIMATE
passenger jeepney. The lower court rendered judgment CAUSE; NOT APPLICABLE IN ACTIONS INVOLVING
against Salva as third-party defendant and absolved BREACH OF CONTRACT; RATIONALE. — The doctrine of
Calalas of liability, holding that it was the driver of the proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-
Isuzu truck who was responsible for the accident. It delict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The
took cognizance of another case (Civil Case No. 3490), doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person
filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena for quasi- where there is no relation between him and another
delict, in which Branch 37 of the same court held Salva party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law
and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual
damage to his jeepney. On appeal, the Court of Appeals relation between the parties, it is the parties
reversed the ruling of the lower court on the ground themselves who create the obligation, and the function
that Sunga's cause of action was based on a contract of of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus
carriage, not quasi-delict, and that the common carrier created. Insofar as contracts of carriage are concerned,
failed to exercise the diligence required under the Civil some aspects regulated by the Civil Code are those
Code. The appellate court dismissed the third-party respecting the diligence required of common carriers
complaint against Salva and adjudged Calalas liable for with regard to the safety of passengers as well as the
damages to Sunga. Hence, this petition. presumption of negligence in cases of death or injury to
passengers.
It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the
collision between the jeepney and the truck was the 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASO FORTUITO; DEFINED;
negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of REQUIREMENTS THEREOF. — A caso fortuito is an event
proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi- which could not be foreseen, or which, though
delict, not in actions involving breach of contract. In the foreseen, was inevitable. This requires that the
case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the following requirements be present: (a) the cause of the
presumption of negligence at once arose, and it breach is independent of the debtor's will; (b) the event
became the duty of petitioner to prove that he had is unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event is such
observed extraordinary diligence in the care of his as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his
passengers. The fact that Sunga was seated in an obligation in a normal manner, and (d) the debtor did
"extension seat" placed her in a peril greater than that not take part in causing the injury to the creditor.
to which the other passengers were exposed. Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of parking
Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to overcome his jeepney with its body protruding two meters into
the presumption of negligence imposed on him for the the highway.
injury sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence
showed he was actually negligent in transporting 4. ID.; DAMAGES; MORAL DAMAGES; WHEN IT
passengers. The decision of the Court of Appeals was, MAY BE RECOVERED. — As a general rule, moral
affirmed, with the modification that the award of moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages
damages was deleted. predicated on a breach of contract for it is not one of
the items enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil
Code. As an exception, such damages are recoverable:

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(1) in cases in which the mishap results in the death of On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the ruling of
a passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art. the lower court was reversed on the ground that
2206 (3) of the Civil Code; and (2) in the cases in which Sunga's cause of action was based on a contract of
the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as provided in carriage, not quasi-delict, and that the common carrier
Art. 2220. SCDaET failed to exercise the diligence required under the Civil
Code. The appellate court dismissed the third-party
complaint against Salva and adjudged Calalas liable for
damages to Sunga. The dispositive portion of its
DECISION decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision

appealed from is hereby REVERSED
MENDOZA, J p: and SET ASIDE, and another one is
entered ordering defendant-appellee
Vicente Calalas to pay plaintiff-
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
appellant:
decision 1 of the Court of Appeals, dated March 31,
1991, reversing the contrary decision of the Regional (1) P50,000.00 as actual and
Trial Court, Branch 36, Dumaguete City, and awarding compensatory damages;
damages instead to private respondent Eliza Jujeurche
Sunga as plaintiff in an action for breach of contract of (2) P50,000.00 as moral
carriage. prLL damages;

The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are (3) P10,000.00 as attorney's

as follows: fees; and

At 10 o'clock in the morning of August 23, (4) P1,000.00 as expenses of

1989, private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga, then litigation; and
a college freshman majoring in Physical Education at
the Siliman University, took a passenger jeepney (5) to pay the costs.
owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As SO ORDERED.
the jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24
passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor an Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that
"extension seat," a wooden stool at the back of the the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 that the negligence of
door at the rear end of the vehicle. Verena was the proximate cause of the accident
negates his liability and that to rule otherwise would be
On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros to make the common carrier an insurer of the safety of
Occidental, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. its passengers. He contends that the bumping of the
As she was seated at the rear of the vehicle, Sunga jeepney by the truck owned by Salva was a caso
gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was fortuito. Petitioner further assails the award of moral
doing so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and damages to Sunga on the ground that it is not
owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion supported by evidence. prLL
of the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured. She
sustained a fracture of the "distal third of the left tibia- The petition has no merit.
fibula with severe necrosis of the underlying skin."
Closed reduction of the fracture, long leg circular The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling
casting, and case wedging were done under sedation. in Civil Case No. 3490 finding the driver and the owner
Her confinement in the hospital lasted from August 23 of the truck liable for quasi-delict ignores the fact that
to September 7, 1989. Her attending physician, Dr. she was never a party to that case and, therefore, the
Danilo V. Oligario, an orthopedic surgeon, certified she principle of res judicata does not apply.
would remain on a cast for a period of three months
Nor are the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in
and would have to ambulate in crutches during said
the present case the same. The issue in Civil Case No.
period. dctai
3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena were
On October 9, 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused to
damages against Calalas, alleging violation of the petitioner's jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in
contract of carriage by the former in failing to exercise this case is whether petitioner is liable on his contract
the diligence required of him as a common carrier. of carriage. The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa
Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party complaint aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its source
against Francisco Salva, the owner of the Isuzu truck. the negligence of the tortfeasor. The second, breach of
contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon the
The lower court rendered judgment, against negligence in the performance of a contractual
Salva as third-party defendant and absolved Calalas of obligation.
liability, holding that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck
who was responsible for the accident. It took Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or
cognizance of another case (Civil Case No. 3490), filed fault should be clearly established because it is the
by Calalas against Salva and Verena, for quasi-delict, in basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the
which Branch 37 of the same court held Salva and his action can be prosecuted merely by proving the
driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor,
his jeepney. in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his

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passenger safely to his destination. 2 In case of death and it became the duty of petitioner to prove that he
or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code had to observe extraordinary diligence in the care of his
provides that common carriers are presumed to have passengers.
been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they
prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as Now, did the driver of jeepney carry Sunga
defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This "safely as far as human care and foresight could
provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
burden of proof. persons, with due regard for all the circumstances" as
required by Art. 1755? We do not think so. Several
There is, thus, no basis for the contention that factors militate against petitioner's contention.
the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490, finding Salva and his
driver Verena liable for the damage to petitioner's First, as found by the Court of Appeals, the
jeepney, should be binding on Sunga. It is immaterial jeepney was not properly parked, its rear portion being
that the proximate cause of the collision between the exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of
jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the truck the highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a
driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable diagonal angle. This is a violation of the R.A. No. 4136,
only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving as amended, or the Land Transportation and Traffic
breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for Code, which provides:
imputing liability to a person where there is no relation SECTION 54. Obstruction of
between him and another party. In such a case, the Traffic. — No person shall drive his
obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a motor vehicle in such a manner as to
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it obstruct or impede the passage of
is the parties themselves who create the obligation, any vehicle, nor, while discharging or
and the function of the law is merely to regulate the taking on passengers or loading or
relation thus created. Insofar as contracts of carriage unloading freight, obstruct the free
are concerned, some aspects regulated by the Civil passage of other vehicles on the
Code are those respecting the diligence required of highway. LLpr
common carriers with regard to the safety of
passengers as well as the presumption of negligence in Second, it is undisputed that petitioner's driver
cases of death or injury to passengers. It provides: llcd took in more passengers than the allowed seating
capacity of the jeepney, a violation of §32(a) of the
ARTICLE 1733. Common same law. It provides:
carriers, from the nature of their
business and for reasons of public Exceeding registered
policy, are bound to observe capacity. — No person operating any
extraordinary diligence in the motor vehicle shall allow more
vigilance over the goods and for the passengers or more freight or cargo
safety of the passengers transported in his vehicle than its registered
by them, according to all the capacity.
circumstances of each case.
The fact that Sunga was seated in an
Such extraordinary diligence "extension seat" placed her in a peril greater than that
in the vigilance over the goods is to which the other passengers were exposed.
further expressed in Articles 1734, Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to overcome
1735, and 1746, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, the presumption of negligence imposed on him for the
while the extraordinary diligence for injury sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows
the safety of the passengers is further he was actually negligent in transporting passengers.
set forth in Articles 1755 and
1756. LLjur We find it hard to give serious thought to
petitioner's contention that Sunga's taking an
ARTICLE 1755. A common "extension seat" amounted to an implied assumption of
carrier is bound to carry the risk. It is akin to arguing that the injuries to the many
passengers safely as far as human victims of the tragedies in our seas should not be
care and foresight can provide, using compensated merely because those passengers
the utmost diligence of very cautious assumed a greater risk of drowning by boarding an
persons, with due regard for all the overloaded ferry. This is also true of petitioner's
circumstances. contention that the jeepney being bumped while it was
improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito. A caso
ARTICLE 1756. In case of fortuito is an event which could not be foreseen, or
death of or injuries to passengers, which, though foreseen, was inevitable. 3 This requires
common carriers are presumed to that the following requirements be present: (a) the
have been at fault or to have acted cause of the breach is independent of the debtor's will;
negligently, unless they prove that (b) the event is unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the
they observed extraordinary diligence event is such as to render it impossible for the debtor
as prescribed by Articles 1733 and to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner, and (d) the
1755. debtor did not take part in causing the injury to the
In the case at bar, upon the happening of the creditor. 4 Petitioner should have foreseen the danger
accident, the presumption of negligence at once arose, of parking his jeepney with its body protruding two
meters into the highway. dctai

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 Finally, petitioner challenges the award of WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of
moral damages alleging that it is excessive and without Appeals, dated March 31, 1995, and its resolution,
basis in law. We find this contention well taken. dated September 11, 1995, are AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages is
In awarding moral damages, the Court of DELETED.
Appeals stated:
SO ORDERED.
Plaintiff-appellant at the time
of the accident was a first-year Bellosillo and Buena, JJ., concur.
college student in that school year
1989-1990 at the Siliman University, Quisumbing and De Leon, Jr., JJ., are on leave.
majoring in Physical Education. ||| (Calalas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122039, [May
Because of the injury, she was not 31, 2000], 388 PHIL 146-155)
able to enroll in the second semester
of that school year. She testified that Construction Development Corporation of the
she had no more intention of Philippines vs Estrella GR No 147791 September
continuing with her schooling, 8 2006
because she could not walk and
decided not to pursue her degree,
major in Physical Education "because
of my leg which has a defect
already." FIRST DIVISION

Plaintiff-appellant likewise
testified that even while she was [G.R. No. 147791. September 8, 2006.]
under confinement, she cried in pain
because of her injured left foot. As a CONSTRUCTION DEVELOPMENT
result of her injury, the Orthopedic CORPORATION OF THE
Surgeon also certified that she has PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
"residual bowing of the fracture side." REBECCA G. ESTRELLA, RACHEL E.
She likewise decided not to further FLETCHER, PHILIPPINE PHOENIX
pursue Physical Education as her SURETY & INSURANCE INC.,
major subject, because "my left leg . . BATANGAS LAGUNA TAYABAS
. has a defect already." LLphil BUS CO., and WILFREDO
Those are her physical pains DATINGUINOO, respondents.
and moral sufferings, the inevitable
bedfellows of the injuries that she
suffered. Under Article 2219 of the
Civil Code, she is entitled to recover DECISION
moral damages in the sum of
P50,000.00, which is fair, just and
reasonable.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:
As a general rule, moral damages are not
recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a This petition for review assails the March 29,
breach of contract for it is not one of the items 2001 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code. 5 As an No. 46896, which affirmed with modification the
exception, such damages are recoverable: (1) in cases February 9, 1993 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court
in which the mishap results in the death of a passenger, of Manila, Branch 13, in Civil Case No. R-82-2137,
as provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2206(3) of finding Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. (BLTB) and
the Civil Code; and (2) in the cases in which the carrier Construction Development Corporation of the
is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as provided in Art. Philippines (CDCP) liable for damages.
2220. 6
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding
moral damages since there was no factual finding by On December 29, 1978, respondents Rebecca
the appellate court that petitioner acted in bad faith in G. Estrella and her granddaughter, Rachel E. Fletcher,
the performance of the contract of carriage. Sunga's boarded in San Pablo City, a BLTB bus bound for Pasay
contention that petitioner's admission in open court City. However, they never reached their destination
that the driver of the jeepney failed to assist her in because their bus was rammed from behind by a
going to a nearby hospital cannot be construed as an tractor-truck of CDCP in the South Expressway. The
admission of bad faith. The fact that it was the driver of strong impact pushed forward their seats and pinned
the Isuzu truck who took her to the hospital does not their knees to the seats in front of them. They regained
imply that petitioner was utterly indifferent to the plight consciousness only when rescuers created a hole in the
of his injured passenger. If at all, it is merely implied bus and extricated their legs from under the seats.
recognition by Verena that he was the one at fault for They were brought to the Makati Medical Center where
the accident. LLpr the doctors diagnosed their injuries to be as follows:

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 Medical Certificate of Rebecca P79,254.43 as actual damages and to
Estrella pay the sum of P10,000.00 as
attorney's fees or a total of
Fracture, left tibia mid 3rd P89,254.43;
Lacerated wound, chin 2. In addition, defendant
Construction and Development
Contusions with abrasions, left lower
Corporation of the Philippines and
leg
defendant Espiridion Payunan, Jr.,
Fracture, 6th and 7th ribs, right 3 shall pay the plaintiffs the amount of
Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos to
Medical Certificate of Rachel Fletcher plaintiff Rachel Fletcher and Twenty
Five Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos to
Extensive lacerated wounds, right leg plaintiff Rebecca Estrella;
posterior aspect popliteal area
and antero-lateral aspect mid lower 3. On the counterclaim of
leg with severance of muscles. BLTB Co. and Wilfredo Datinguinoo —
Partial amputation BK left leg with
severance of gastro-soleus and Dismissing the counterclaim;
antero-lateral compartment of lower
4. On the crossclaim against
leg.
Construction and Development
Fracture, open comminuted, both
Corporation of the Philippines (now
tibial 4
PNCC) and Espiridion Payunan, Jr. —
Thereafter, respondents filed a Complaint 5 for
Dismissing the crossclaim;
damages against CDCP, BLTB, Espiridion Payunan, Jr.
and Wilfredo Datinguinoo before the Regional Trial 5. On the counterclaim of
Court of Manila, Branch 13. They alleged (1) that Construction and Development
Payunan, Jr. and Datinguinoo, who were the drivers of Corporation of the Philippines (now
CDCP and BLTB buses, respectively, were negligent and PNCC) —
did not obey traffic laws; (2) that BLTB and CDCP did
not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in Dismissing the counterclaim;
the selection and supervision of their employees; (3)
that BLTB allowed its bus to operate knowing that it 6. On the crossclaim against
lacked proper maintenance thus exposing its BLTB —
passengers to grave danger; (4) that they suffered Dismissing the crossclaim;
actual damages amounting to P250,000.00 for Estrella
and P300,000.00 for Fletcher; (5) that they suffered 7. On the Third Party
physical discomfort, serious anxiety, fright and mental Complaint by Construction and
anguish, besmirched reputation and wounded feelings, Development Corporation of the
moral shock, and lifelong social humiliation; (6) that Philippines against Philippine Phoenix
defendants failed to act with justice, give respondents Surety and Insurance, Incorporated —
their due, observe honesty and good faith which
entitles them to claim for exemplary damage; and (7) Dismissing the Third Party
that they are entitled to a reasonable amount of Complaint.
attorney's fees and litigation expenses. TaEIAS
SO ORDERED. 8
CDCP filed its Answer 6 which was later
The trial court held that BLTB, as a common
amended to include a third-party complaint against
carrier, was bound to observe extraordinary diligence in
Philippine Phoenix Surety and Insurance, Inc.
the vigilance over the safety of its passengers. It must
(Phoenix). 7
carry the passengers safely as far as human care and
On February 9, 1993, the trial court rendered a foresight provide, using the utmost diligence of very
decision finding CDCP and BLTB and their employees cautious persons, with a due regard for all the
liable for damages, the dispositive portion of which, circumstances. Thus, where a passenger dies or is
states: injured, the carrier is presumed to have been at fault or
has acted negligently. BLTB's inability to carry
WHEREFORE, judgment is respondents to their destination gave rise to an action
rendered: for breach of contract of carriage while its failure to
rebut the presumption of negligence made it liable to
In the Complaint — respondents for the breach. 9
1. In favor of the plaintiffs and Regarding CDCP, the trial court found that the
against the defendants BLTB, tractor-truck it owned bumped the BLTB bus from
Wilfredo Datinguinoo, Construction behind. Evidence showed that CDCP's driver was
and Development Corporation of the reckless and driving very fast at the time of the
Philippines (now PNCC) and Espiridion incident. The gross negligence of its driver raised the
Payunan, Jr., ordering said presumption that CDCP was negligent either in the
defendants, jointly and severally to selection or in the supervision of its employees which it
pay the plaintiffs the sum of

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failed to rebut thus making it and its driver liable to WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF
respondents. 10 APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
AWARDING EXCESSIVE OR
Unsatisfied with the award of damages and UNFOUNDED DAMAGES, ATTORNEY'S
attorney's fees by the trial court, respondents moved FEES AND LEGAL INTEREST TO
that the decision be reconsidered but was denied. RESPONDENTS FLETCHER AND
Respondents elevated the case 11 to the Court of ESTRELLA.
Appeals which affirmed the decision of the trial court
but modified the amount of damages, the dispositive III
portion of which provides:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF
WHEREFORE, the assailed APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
decision dated October 7, 1993 of the HOLDING RESPONDENT PHOENIX
Regional Trial Court, Branch 13, LIABLE UNDER ITS INSURANCE
Manila is hereby AFFIRMED with the POLICY ON THE GROUND OF
following MODIFICATION: PRESCRIPTION.

1. The interest of six (6) The issues for resolution are as follows: (1)
percent per annum on the actual whether BLTB and its driver Wilfredo Datinguinoo are
damages of P79,354.43 should solely liable for the damages sustained by respondents;
commence to run from the time the (2) whether the damages, attorney's fees and legal
judicial demand was made or from interest awarded by the CA are excessive and
the filing of the complaint on unfounded; (3) whether CDCP can recover under its
February 4, 1980; CIScaA insurance policy from Phoenix.

2. Thirty (30) percent of the Petitioner contends that since it was made
total amount recovered is hereby solidarily liable with BLTB for actual damages and
awarded as attorney's fees; attorney's fees in paragraph 1 of the trial court's
decision, then it should no longer be held liable to pay
3. Defendants-appellants the amounts stated in paragraph 2 of the same
Construction and Development decision. Petitioner claims that the liability for actual
Corporation of the Philippines (now damages and attorney's fees is based on culpa
PNCC) and Espiridion Payunan, Jr. are contractual, thus, only BLTB should be held liable. As
ordered to pay plaintiff-appellants regards paragraph 2 of the trial court's decision,
Rebecca Estrella and Rachel Fletcher petitioner claims that it is ambiguous and arbitrary
the amount of Twenty Thousand because the dispositive portion did not state the basis
(P20,000.00) each as exemplary and nature of such award.
damages and P80,000.00 by way of
moral damages to Rachel Fletcher. Respondents, on the other hand, argue that
petitioner is also at fault, hence, it was properly joined
SO ORDERED. 12 as a party. There may be an action arising out of one
incident where questions of fact are common to all.
The Court of Appeals held that the actual or
Thus, the cause of action based on culpa aquiliana in
compensatory damage sought by respondents for the
the civil suit they filed against it was valid. CacHES
injuries they sustained in the form of hospital bills were
already liquidated and were ascertained. Accordingly, The petition lacks merit.
the 6% interest per annum should commence to run
from the time the judicial demand was made or from The case filed by respondents against
the filing of the complaint and not from the date of petitioner is an action for culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict
judgment. The Court of Appeals also awarded under Article 2176 of the Civil Code.13 In this regard,
attorney's fees equivalent to 30% of the total amount Article 2180 provides that the obligation imposed by
recovered based on the retainer agreement of the Article 2176 is demandable for the acts or omissions of
parties. The appellate court also held that respondents those persons for whom one is responsible.
are entitled to exemplary and moral damages. Finally, Consequently, an action based on quasi-delict may be
it affirmed the ruling of the trial court that the claim of instituted against the employer for an employee's act
CDCP against Phoenix had already prescribed. or omission. The liability for the negligent conduct of
the subordinate is direct and primary, but is subject to
Hence, this petition raising the following issues: the defense of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of the employee. 14 In the instant case, the
I
trial court found that petitioner failed to prove that it
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT the selection and supervision of Payunan, Jr.
HOLDING RESPONDENTS BLTB
 
AND/OR ITS DRIVER WILFREDO
DATINGUINOO SOLELY LIABLE FOR The trial court and the Court of Appeals found
THE DAMAGES SUSTAINED BY HEREIN petitioner solidarily liable with BLTB for the actual
RESPONDENTS FLETCHER AND damages suffered by respondents because of the
ESTRELLA. injuries they sustained. It was established that
II

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Payunan, Jr. was driving recklessly because of the skid to produce the same
marks as shown in the sketch of the police investigator. injury. 16 (Emphasis supplied)

It is well-settled in Fabre, Jr. v. Court of In a "joint" obligation, each obligor answers

Appeals, 15 that the owner of the other vehicle which only for a part of the whole liability; in a "solidary" or
collided with a common carrier is solidarily liable to the "joint and several" obligation, the relationship between
injured passenger of the same. We held, thus: the active and the passive subjects is so close that
each of them must comply with or demand the
The same rule of liability was fulfillment of the whole obligation. In Lafarge Cement v.
applied in situations where the Continental Cement Corporation, 17 we reiterated that
negligence of the driver of the bus on joint tort feasors are jointly and severally liable for the
which plaintiff was riding concurred tort which they commit. Citing Worcester v.
with the negligence of a third party Ocampo, 18 we held that:
who was the driver of another
vehicle, thus causing an accident. . . . The difficulty in the
In Anuran v. Buño, Batangas Laguna contention of the appellants is that
Tayabas Bus Co. v. Intermediate they fail to recognize that the basis of
Appellate Court, and Metro Manila the present action is tort. They fail to
Transit Corporation v. Court of recognize the universal doctrine that
Appeals, the bus company, its each joint tort feasor is not only
driver, the operator of the other individually liable for the tort in which
vehicle and the driver of the he participates, but is also jointly
vehicle were jointly and severally liable with his tort feasors. . . .
held liable to the injured
passenger or the latter's heirs. It may be stated as a general
The basis of this allocation of liability rule that joint tort feasors are all the
was explained in Viluan v. Court of persons who command, instigate,
Appeals, thus: promote, encourage, advise,
countenance, cooperate in, aid or
Nor should it make any abet the commission of a tort, or who
difference that the liability of approve of it after it is done, if done
petitioner [bus owner] springs for their benefit. They are each liable
from contract while that of as principals, to the same extent and
respondents [owner and driver of in the same manner as if they had
other vehicle] arises from quasi- performed the wrongful act
delict. As early as 1913, we already themselves. . . .
ruled in Gutierrez vs. Gutierrez, 56
Phil. 177, that in case of injury to a Joint tort feasors are jointly
passenger due to the negligence of and severally liable for the tort which
the driver of the bus on which he was they commit. The persons injured
riding and of the driver of another may sue all of them or any number
vehicle, the drivers as well as the less than all. Each is liable for the
owners of the two vehicles are jointly whole damages caused by all, and all
and severally liable for damages. . . . together are jointly liable for the
whole damage. It is no defense for
xxx xxx xxx one sued alone, that the others who
participated in the wrongful act are
As in the case of BLTB, not joined with him as defendants;
private respondents in this case and nor is it any excuse for him that his
her co-plaintiffs did not stake out participation in the tort was
their claim against the carrier and the insignificant as compared to that of
driver exclusively on one theory, the others. . . .
much less on that of breach of
contract alone. After all, it was Joint tort feasors are not
permitted for them to allege liable pro rata. The damages can not
alternative causes of action and be apportioned among them, except
join as many parties as may be among themselves. They cannot
liable on such causes of action so insist upon an apportionment, for the
long as private respondent and purpose of each paying an aliquot
her co-plaintiffs do not recover part. They are jointly and severally
twice for the same injury. What is liable for the whole amount. . . .
clear from the cases is the intent of
the plaintiff there to recover from A payment in full for the
both the carrier and the driver, thus damage done, by one of the joint tort
justifying the holding that the carrier feasors, of course satisfies any claim
and the driver were jointly and which might exist against the others.
severally liable because their There can be but satisfaction. The
separate and distinct acts concurred release of one of the joint tort feasors

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 by agreement generally operates to one party or impoverish another but
discharge all. . . . to serve as a deterrent against or as
a negative incentive to curb socially
Of course the court during deleterious actions.
trial may find that some of the
alleged tort feasors are liable and Regarding attorney's fees, we held in Traders
that others are not liable. The courts Royal Bank Employees Union-Independent v. National
may release some for lack of Labor Relations Commission, 27 that:
evidence while condemning others of
the alleged tort feasors. And this is There are two commonly
true even though they are charged accepted concepts of attorney's fees,
jointly and severally. 19 the so-called ordinary and
extraordinary. In its ordinary concept,
Petitioner's claim that paragraph 2 of the an attorney's fee is the reasonable
dispositive portion of the trial court's decision is compensation paid to a lawyer by his
ambiguous and arbitrary and also entitles respondents client for the legal services he has
to recover twice is without basis. In the body of the trial rendered to the latter. The basis of
court's decision, it was clearly stated that petitioner this compensation is the fact of his
and its driver Payunan, Jr., are jointly and solidarily employment by and his agreement
liable for moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 with the client.
to respondent Fletcher and P25,000.00 to respondent
Estrella. 20 Moreover, there could be no double In its extraordinary
recovery because the award in paragraph 2 is for moral concept, an attorney's fee is an
damages while the award in paragraph 1 is for actual indemnity for damages ordered
damages and attorney's fees. DICcTa by the court to be paid by the
losing party in a litigation. The
Petitioner next claims that the damages, basis of this is any of the cases
attorney's fees, and legal interest awarded by the Court provided by law where such award
of Appeals are excessive. can be made, such as those
authorized in Article 2208, Civil Code,
Moral damages may be recovered in quasi- and is payable not to the lawyer
delicts causing physical injuries. 21 The award of moral but to the client, unless they
damages in favor of Fletcher and Estrella in the amount have agreed that the award shall
of P80,000.00 must be reduced since prevailing pertain to the lawyer as
jurisprudence fixed the same at P50,000.00. 22 While additional compensation or as
moral damages are not intended to enrich the plaintiff part thereof. 28 (Emphasis
at the expense of the defendant, the award should supplied)
nonetheless be commensurate to the suffering
inflicted. 23 In the instant case, the Court of Appeals
correctly awarded attorney's fees and other expenses
The Court of Appeals correctly awarded of litigation as they may be recovered as actual or
respondents exemplary damages in the amount of compensatory damages when exemplary damages are
P20,000.00 each. Exemplary damages may be awarded awarded; when the defendant acted in gross and
in addition to moral and compensatory evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's
damages. 24 Article 2231 of the Civil Code also states valid, just and demandable claim; and in any other case
that in quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be where the court deems it just and equitable that
granted if the defendant acted with gross attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be
negligence. 25 In this case, petitioner's driver was recovered. 29
driving recklessly at the time its truck rammed the
BLTB bus. Petitioner, who has direct and primary Regarding the imposition of legal interest at the
liability for the negligent conduct of its subordinates, rate of 6% from the time of the filing of the complaint,
was also found negligent in the selection and we held in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of
supervision of its employees. In Del Rosario v. Court of Appeals, 30 that when an obligation, regardless of its
Appeals, 26 we held, thus: source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts or
quasi-delicts is breached, the contravenor can be held
ART. 2229 of the Civil liable for payment of interest in the concept of actual
Code also provides that such and compensatory damages, 31 subject to the
damages may be imposed, by way of following rules, to wit —
example or correction for the public
good. While exemplary damages 1. When the obligation is
cannot be recovered as a matter of breached, and it consists in the
right, they need not be proved, payment of a sum of money, i.e., a
although plaintiff must show that he loan or forbearance of money, the
is entitled to moral, temperate or interest due should be that which
compensatory damages before the may have been stipulated in writing.
court may consider the question of Furthermore, the interest due shall
whether or not exemplary damages itself earn legal interest from the time
should be awarded. Exemplary it is judicially demanded. In the
Damages are imposed not to enrich absence of stipulation, the rate of

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 interest shall be 12% per annum to ruled that defendant-appellant
be computed from default, i.e., from CDCP's claim against Phoenix already
judicial or extrajudicial demand under prescribed pursuant to Section 384 of
and subject to the provisions of P.D. 612, as amended, which
Article 1169 of the Civil Code. IEaATD provides:

  Any person having

any claim upon the policy
2. When an obligation, not issued pursuant to this
constituting a loan or forbearance of chapter shall, without any
money, is breached, an interest on unnecessary delay, present to
the amount of damages awarded may the insurance company
be imposed at the discretion of the concerned a written notice of
court at the rate of 6% per annum. claim setting forth the nature,
No interest, however, shall be extent and duration of the
adjudged on unliquidated claims or injuries sustained as certified
damages except when or until the by a duly licensed physician.
demand can be established with Notice of claim must be filed
reasonable certainty. Accordingly, within six months from date
where the demand is established with of the accident, otherwise,
reasonable certainty, the interest the claim shall be deemed
shall begin to run from the time the waived. Action or suit for
claim is made judicially or recovery of damage due to
extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) loss or injury must be brought
but when such certainty cannot be so in proper cases, with the
reasonably established at the time Commissioner or Courts
the demand is made, the interest within one year from denial of
shall begin to run only from the the claim, otherwise, the
date the judgment of the court is claimant's right of action shall
made (at which time the prescribe. (As amended by PD
quantification of damages may 1814, BP 874.) 34
be deemed to have been
reasonably ascertained). The The law is clear and leaves no room for
actual base for the computation of interpretation. A written notice of claim must be filed
legal interest shall, in any case, be on within six months from the date of the accident. Since
the amount finally adjudged. petitioner never made any claim within six months from
the date of the accident, its claim has already
3. When the judgment of prescribed.
the court awarding a sum of
money becomes final and WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.
executory, the rate of legal The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
interest, whether the case falls 46896 dated March 29, 2001, which modified the
under paragraph 1 or paragraph Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
2, above, shall be 12% per annum 13, in Civil Case No. R-82-2137, is AFFIRMED with the
from such finality until its MODIFICATIONS that petitioner is held jointly and
satisfaction, this interim period severally liable to pay (1) actual damages in the
being deemed to be by then an amount of P79,354.43; (2) moral damages in the
equivalent to a forbearance of amount of P50,000.00 each for Rachel Fletcher and
credit. 32 (Emphasis supplied) Rebecca Estrella; (3) exemplary damages in the
amount of P20,000.00 each for Rebecca Estrella and
Accordingly, the legal interest of 6% shall begin Rachel Fletcher; and (4) thirty percent (30%) of the
to run on February 9, 1993 when the trial court total amount recovered as attorney's fees. The total
rendered judgment and not on February 4, 1980 when amount adjudged shall earn interest at the rate of 6%
the complaint was filed. This is because at the time of per annum from the date of judgment of the trial court
the filing of the complaint, the amount of the damages until finality of this judgment. From the time this
to which plaintiffs may be entitled remains unliquidated Decision becomes final and executory and the
and unknown, until it is definitely ascertained, assessed judgment amount remains unsatisfied, the same shall
and determined by the court and only upon earn interest at the rate of 12% per annum until its
presentation of proof thereon. 33 From the time the satisfaction.
judgment becomes final and executory, the interest
rate shall be 12% until its satisfaction. SO ORDERED.

Anent the last issue of whether petitioner can Panganiban, C.J., Austria-Martinez, Callejo,
recover under its insurance policy from Phoenix, we Sr. and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
affirm the findings of both the trial court and the Court
of Appeals, thus: ||| (Construction Development Corp. of the Philippines
v. Estrella, G.R. No. 147791, [September 8, 2006], 532
As regards the liability of PHIL 671-688)
Phoenix, the court a quo correctly

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