Property Case Doctrines

Atty. Anthony Goquingco

Prepared by: Dianne D. Salto & Areeya Flores

I.

CLASSIFICATION
OF
PROPERTY; ARTICLES 414426

a. Star Two SPV-AMC Inc. vs.

Paper Corporation of the
Philippines
Repeatedly, the parties stipulated that
the properties mortgaged by Paper City
to RCBC are various parcels of land
including the buildings and existing
improvements thereon as well as the
machineries and equipments, which as
stated in the granting clause of the
original mortgage, are "more particularly
described and listed that is to say, the
real and personal properties listed in
Annexes A and B.
The
plain
language
and
literal
interpretation of the MTIs must be
applied.
The
petitioner,
other
creditor banks and Paper City
intended
from
the
very
first
execution of the indentures that the
machineries
and
equipments
enumerated in Annexes "A" and "B"
are included. Obviously, with the
continued increase in the amount of the
loan, totaling hundreds of millions of
pesos, Paper City had to offer all
valuable properties acceptable to the
creditor banks.
b. Laurel vs. Abrogar
Personal property under the Revised
Penal Code must be considered in
tandem with the word "take" in the law.
The statutory definition of "taking" and
movable property indicates that, clearly,
not all personal properties may be the
proper subjects of theft. The general
rule is that, only movable properties
which have physical or material
existence
and
susceptible
of
occupation by another are proper
objects of theft. Only those movable
properties which can be taken and
carried from the place they are found are
proper subjects of theft.

Intangible properties such as rights and

ideas are not subject of theft because
the same cannot be "taken" from the
place it is found and is occupied or
appropriated. movable properties under
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code
should be distinguished from the rights
or interests to which they relate. A naked
right existing merely in contemplation of
law, although it may be very valuable to
the person who is entitled to exercise it,
is not the subject of theft or larceny.
Such rights or interests are intangible
and cannot be "taken" by another.
c. BPI Family Bank vs. Franco
d. Leung
Yee
vs.
Strong
Machinery
The building made out of strong
materials is real property. The mere fact
that the parties dealt with it as separate
and apart from the land (or as personal
property) does not change its character
as real property. In this case, it follows
that neither the original registry in the
chattel mortgage of the building and the
machinery installed therein, nor the
annotation in the registry of the sale of
the mortgaged property had any legal
effect.
However, since the facts disclose that
the purchase by Leung Yee and the
inscription on the sheriffs certificate of
sale were not made in good faith, it must
be held that SMC is the owner of the
property pursuant to the third (3rd)
paragraph of Article 1473 of the NCC,
should there be no entry, the property
shall belong to the person who first took
possession of it in good faith, and in the
absence thereof, to the person who
presents the oldest title, provided there
is good faith.
e. Prudential Bank vs. Panis
In the enumeration of properties under
Article 415 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, this Court ruled that, "it is
obvious that the inclusion of "building"
separate and distinct from the land, in
said provision of law can only mean that
a building is by itself an immovable
property.

Property Case Doctrines

Atty. Anthony Goquingco
Prepared by: Dianne D. Salto & Areeya Flores

Thus, while it is true that a mortgage of

land necessarily includes, in the absence
of stipulation of the improvements
thereon, buildings, still a building by
itself may be mortgaged apart from
the land on which it has been built.
Such a mortgage would be still a
real
estate
mortgage
for
the
building would still be considered
immovable property even if dealt
with separately and apart from the
land (Leung Yee vs. Strong Machinery
Co., 37 Phil. 644). In the same manner,
this Court has also established that
possessory rights over said properties
before title is vested on the grantee,
may be validly transferred or conveyed
as in a deed of mortgage (Vda. de
Bautista vs. Marcos, 3 SCRA 438
[1961]).

f.

Sergs
Products
Leasing

vs.

PCI

In the present case, the machines that

were the subjects of the Writ of Seizure
were placed by petitioners in the factory
built on their own land. Indisputably,
they were essential and principal
elements of their chocolate-making
industry. Hence, although each of them
was movable or personal property on its
own, all of them have become
immobilized by destination because
they are essential and principal elements
in the industry. In that sense,
petitioners are correct in arguing that
the said machines are real, not personal,
property pursuant to Article 415 (5) of
the Civil Code.
But the Court disagree with the
submission of the petitioners that the
said machines are not proper subjects of
the Writ of Seizure. It has held that
contracting parties may validly stipulate
that a real property be considered as
personal.
After agreeing
to such
stipulation,
they
are
consequently
estopped from claiming otherwise.
Under the principle of estoppel, a party
to a contract is ordinarily precluded from
denying the truth of any material fact
found therein. In the present case, the
Lease Agreement clearly provides that

the machines in question are to be

considered as personal property.

g. Evangelista vs. ALTO Surety &

Insurance Co.
The court ruled that the house is not
personal property, much less a debt,
credit or other personal property not
capable
of
manual
delivery,
but
immovable property. As held in Laddera
vs. Hodges (48 OG 5374), "a true
building is immovable or real property,
whether it is erected by the owner of the
land or by a usufructuary or lessee.
The opinion that the house of Rivera
should have been attached, as "personal
property capable of manual delivery, by
taking and safely keeping in his
custody",
for
it
declared
that
"Evangelista could not have validly
purchased Ricardo Rivera's house from
the sheriff as the latter was not in
possession thereof at the time he sold it
at a public auction is untenable. Parties
to a deed of chattel mortgage may agree
to consider a house as personal property
for purposes of said contract. However,
this view is good only insofar as the
contracting parties are concerned. It is
based, partly, upon the principle of
estoppel. Neither this principle, nor said
view, is applicable to strangers to said
contract
h. Davao Sawmill vs. Castillo
As a rule, the machinery should be
considered as personal, since it was not
placed on the land by the owner of the
said land. Immobilization by destination
or purpose cannot generally be made by
a person, whose possession of the
property is only temporary, otherwise we
will be forced to presume that he
intended
to
give
the
property
permanently away in favor of the owner
of the premises.
In the case at bar, when Davao Saw
placed the machinery in a building
erected on land belonging to another,
with
the
understanding
that
the
machinery was not included in the
improvements which would pass to the

Property Case Doctrines

Atty. Anthony Goquingco
Prepared by: Dianne D. Salto & Areeya Flores

lessor on the expiration or abandonment

of the land leased, it in effect shows that
the lessee also treated the machinery as
personal property by executing chattel
mortgages in favor of third persons. The
machinery was levied upon by the sheriff
as personalty pursuant to a writ of
execution obtained without any protest
being
registered,
therefore
the
machinery must be classified as personal
property.
Machinery which is movable in its nature
only becomes immobilized when placed
in a plant by the owner of the property
or plant, but not when so placed by a
tenant, a usufructuary, or any person
having only a temporary right, unless
such person acted as the agent of the
owner.
i.

Tsai vs. Court of Appeals

The nature of the disputed machineries,

i.e., that they were heavy, bolted or
cemented
on
the
real
property
mortgaged does not make them ipso
facto immovable under Article 415 (3)
and (5) of the New Civil Code. While it is
true that the properties appear to be
immobile, a perusal of the contract of
Real and Chattel Mortgage executed by
the parties herein reveal their intent,
that is - to treat machinery and
equipment as chattels.
In the first mortgage contract, reflective
of the true intention of PBCOM and
EVERTEX was the typing in capital
letters, immediately following the printed
caption of mortgage, of the phrase "real
and chattel." So also, the "machineries
and equipment" in the printed form of
the bank had to be inserted in the blank
space of the printed contract and
connected with the word "building" by
typewritten slash marks. Now, then, if
the machineries in question were
contemplated to be included in the real
estate mortgage, there would have been
no necessity to ink a chattel mortgage
specifically mentioning as part III of
Schedule A a listing of the machineries
covered thereby. It would have sufficed
to list them as immovables in the Deed
of Real Estate Mortgage of the land and
building involved. As regards the second

contract, the intention of the parties is

clear and beyond question. It refers
solely to chattels. The inventory list of
the
mortgaged
properties
is
an
itemization of 63 individually described
machineries while the schedule listed
only machines and 2,996,880.50 worth
of finished cotton fabrics and natural
cotton fabrics.
j.

Mindanao Bus
Assessor

Co. vs. City

The Supreme Court decided otherwise

and held that said machineries and
equipments are not subject to the
assessment of real estate tax.
Said equipments are not considered
immobilized
as
they
are
merely
incidental, not esential and principal to
the business of the petitioner. The
transportation business could be carried
on without repair or service shops of its
rolling equipment as they can be
repaired or services in another shop
belonging to another, so said equipment
may not be considered real estate within
the meaning of Article 415 (c) of the Civil
Code.

k. MERALCO vs. Central Board of

Assessment Appeals
The road lots in a private subdivision
are private property, hence, the local
government should first acquire them by
donation, purchase, or expropriation, if
they are to be utilized as a public road
(Abellana, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, ).
Otherwise, they remain to be private
properties of the owner-developer.
The use of the subdivision roads by the
general public does not strip it of its
private character. The road is not
converted into public property by mere
tolerance of the subdivision owner of the
public's passage through it. The local
government should first acquire them by
donation, purchase, or expropriation, if
they are to be utilized as a public road.
Since no donation has been made in
favor of any local government and the
title to the road lot is still registered in

Property Case Doctrines

Atty. Anthony Goquingco
Prepared by: Dianne D. Salto & Areeya Flores

the name of ARB, the disputed property

remains private.

l.

LO vs. KJS Eco-Formwork

System
m. Woodridge School, Inc. vs.
ARB Construction Co.
The road lots in a private subdivision
are private property, hence, the local
government should first acquire them by
donation, purchase, or expropriation, if
they are to be utilized as a public road
(Abellana, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, ).
Otherwise, they remain to be private
properties of the owner-developer.
The use of the subdivision roads by the
general public does not strip it of its
private character. The road is not
converted into public property by mere
tolerance of the subdivision owner of the
public's passage through it. The local
government should first acquire them by
donation, purchase, or expropriation, if
they are to be utilized as a public road.
Since no donation has been made in
favor of any local government and the
title to the road lot is still registered in
the name of ARB, the disputed property
remains private.

n. Zarate vs. Director of Lands

Subject lands
were
released
as
alienable and disposable only in 1973.
The application for registration was filed
in 1976. Thus, the applicant and/or
private oppositors possessed the land for
only 3 years prior to the filing of
application and the 30-year requirement
imposed by CA 141 (Public Land Act) was
not met.
The applicant (and oppositors) failed to
show evidence that they have complied
with the requisites provided by law 1)
the land applied for was alienable and
disposable. 2) the applicant and his
predecessors-in-interest had occupied
and
possessed
the
land
openly,
continuously, exclusively, and adversely
for 30 years immediately preceding the
filing of application. More than 1/2 of the

total area applied for are not in the

possession of the applicant and thus, he
cannot claim exclusive and notorious
possession under the claim of ownership,
nor can he support his claim of title
through acquisitive prescription.
A positive act of government is needed
to convert forest land into alienable or
disposable land. Possession of forest
lands, which are incapable of private
appropriation, no matter how long
cannot ripen into private ownership.
o. Secretary of DENR vs. Yap
To prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable,
the applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order, an
administrative
action,
investigative
reports of the Bureau of Lands
investigators, and a legislative act or
statute.
A positive act declaring land as alienable
and disposable is required. In keeping
with the presumption of state ownership,
the
Court
has
time
and
again
emphasized that there must be a
positive act of the government, such as
an official proclamation, declassifying
inalienable public land into disposable
land for agricultural or other purposes.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all
lands of the public domain belong to the
State, that the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership of land and
charged with the conservation of such
patrimony.
All lands not otherwise appearing to be
clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Thus,
all lands that have not been acquired
from the government, either by purchase
or by grant, belong to the State as part
of the inalienable public domain.

p. Republic
Paranaque

vs.

City

of

Property Case Doctrines

Atty. Anthony Goquingco
Prepared by: Dianne D. Salto & Areeya Flores

Yes it is a Government Instrumentality.

However, it is not a GOCC. When the law
vests in a government instrumentality
corporate powers, the instrumentality
does
not
necessarily
become
a
corporation. Unless the government
instrumentality is organized as a stock or
non-stock corporation, it remains a
government instrumentality exercising
not
only
governmental
but
also
corporate powers.

sheriff would always be responsible for

wrongfully taking the property of
another.
The right of action given by the general
principles of law to the person whose
property has wrongfully been taken from
him, either to recover damages or the
possession of the property, is a right
which can be transferred by him, and his
transferee can maintain either one of
these actions against the wrongdoer.
c. DepEd vs. Onate

q. Heirs
of
Republic

Malabanan

vs.

Alienable public land held by a

possessor, either personally or through
his
predecessors-in-interest,
openly,
continuously and exclusively during the
prescribed statutory period is converted
to private property by the mere lapse or
completion of the period.
To be clear, then, the requirement that
the land should have been classified as
alienable and disposable agricultural
land at the time of the application for
registration is necessary only to dispute
the presumption that the land is
inalienable.
r.
II.

Republic vs. Vda de Joson

Ownership;
439

Articles

427-

a. Estate of Edward Miller

Grimm vs. Estate of
Charles Parsons
b. Waite vs. Peterson
If property of a person is taken by the
sheriff upon an execution against
another person, the sheriff is liable
thereof in the absence of statute, as any
private person would be. When ones
property is wrongfully taken by another,
the former has a right of action against
the person who interfered with his
property, whether for the recovery of the
property itself or for damages for its
taking, and he has his choice of these
remedies. If section 451 did not exist, by
the general principles of the law the

The second element of laches was

likewise proven. No evidence was
presented to show that respondent or his
predecessors-in-interest ever took any
action, administrative or judicial, nor
either party questioned or protested the
Municipality's adverse occupation of a
portion of Lot 6849. As petitioner had
demonstrated laches by persuasive and
credible evidence, it is incumbent upon
respondent
to
show
that
his
predecessors-in-interest
indeed
protected their rights of ownership over
the lot.
Thus, as early as 1940, when the first
Seva
type
school
building
was
constructed over a portion of the
disputed lot, now Lot 6849-A, respondent
must prove that his predecessors-ininterest indeed undertook activities to
contest the occupation of the portion of
the lot by the Municipality and
subsequently
by
petitioner
DECS.
Unfortunately, respondent failed to
substantiate such defense of ownership
and possession of the lot and even
skirted this issue.
d. MWSS vs. Act Theater
Concededly, the petitioner, as the
owner of the utility providing water
supply to certain consumers including
the respondent, had the right to exclude
any person from the enjoyment and
disposal thereof. However, the exercise
of rights is not without limitations.
Having the right should not be confused
with the manner by which such right is
to be exercised.

Property Case Doctrines

Atty. Anthony Goquingco
Prepared by: Dianne D. Salto & Areeya Flores

When a right is exercised in a manner

which discards these norms resulting in
damage to another, a legal wrong is
committed for which actor can be held
accountable.9 In this case, the petitioner
failed to act with justice and give the
respondent what is due to it when the
petitioner unceremoniously cut off the
respondents water service connection.
e. PNB
vs.
Appeals

Court

of

Thus,
in Barican
v.
Intermediate
Appellate Court, we held that the
obligation of a court to issue an exparte writ of possession in favor of the
purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure
sale ceases to be ministerial once it
appears that there is a third party in
possession of the property who is
claiming a right adverse to that of the
debtor/mortgagor. The same principle
was inversely applied in a more recent
case, where we ruled that a writ of
possession may be issued in an
extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate
mortgage, only if the debtor is in
possession and no third party had
intervened. Although the factual nuances
of this case may slightly differ from the
aforecited
cases,
the
availing
circumstances are undeniably similar
party in possession of the foreclosed
property is asserting a right adverse to
the debtor/mortgagor and is a stranger
to the foreclosure proceedings in which
the ex-parte writ of possession was
applied for.
One who claims to be the owner of a
property possessed by another must
bring the appropriate judicial action for
its physical recovery. The term "judicial
process" could mean no less than an
ejectment suit or reinvindicatory action,
in which the ownership claims of the
contending parties may be properly
heard and adjudicated.

f.

Calub
vs.
Appeals

Court

of

Since there was a violation of the

Revised Forestry Code and the seizure

was in accordance with law, in our view

the subject vehicles were validly deemed
in custodia legis. It could not be subject
to an action for replevin. For it is
property lawfully taken by virtue of legal
process and considered in the custody of
the law, and not otherwise.
The writ of replevin has been repeatedly
used by unscrupulous plaintiffs to
retrieve their chattel earlier taken for
violation of the Tariff and Customs Code,
tax
assessment,
attachment
or
execution. Officers of the court, from the
presiding judge to the sheriff, are
implored to be vigilant in their execution
of the law otherwise, as in this case,
valid seizure and forfeiture proceedings
could easily be undermined by the
simple devise of a writ of replevin.
g. Superlines
Transportation
Company, Inc. vs. PNCC
In a complaint for replevin, the claimant
must convincingly show that he is either
the owner or clearly entitled to the
possession of the object sought to be
recovered, and that the defendant, who
is in actual or legal possession thereof,
wrongfully detains the same.

h. Suarez
vs.
Emboy, Jr.

Spouses

Carmencita had not amply alleged and

proven that all the requisites for unlawful
detainer are present in the case at bar.
Without a doubt, the registered owner
of real property is entitled to its
possession. However, the owner cannot
simply wrest possession thereof from
whoever is in actual occupation of the
property. To recover possession, he must
resort to the proper judicial remedy and,
once he chooses what action to file, he is
required to satisfy the conditions
necessary for such action to prosper.
Without a doubt, the registered owner
of real property is entitled to its
possession. However, the owner cannot
simply wrest possession thereof from
whoever is in actual occupation of the
property. To recover possession, he must

Property Case Doctrines

Atty. Anthony Goquingco
Prepared by: Dianne D. Salto & Areeya Flores

resort to the proper judicial remedy and,

once he chooses what action to file, he is
required to satisfy the conditions
necessary for such action to prosper.
In a complaint for unlawful detainer, the
following key jurisdictional facts must be
alleged
and
sufficientlyestablished.
(1
)

(2
)

(3
)

(4
)

initially, possession of property by

the defendant was by contract
with or by tolerance of the
plaintiff;
eventually,
such
possession
became illegal upon notice by
plaintiff to defendant of the
termination of the latters right of
possession;
thereafter,
the
defendant
remained in possession of the
property and deprived the plaintiff
of the enjoyment thereof; and
within one year from the last
demand on defendant to vacate
the
property,
the
plaintiff
instituted
the
complaint
for
ejectment.

Again, this Court stresses that to give

the court jurisdiction to effect the
ejectment of an occupant or deforciant
on the land, it is necessary that the
complaint must sufficiently show such a
statement of facts as to bring the party
clearly within the class of cases for which
the statutes provide a remedy, without
resort to parol testimony, as these
proceedings are summary in nature. In
short, the jurisdictional facts must
appear on the face of the complaint.
When the complaint fails to aver facts
constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful
detainer, as where it does not state how
entry was effected or how and when
dispossession
started,
the
remedy
should
either
be
an accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.

i.

Asis vs. Asis

At the outset, it must here be stressed

that the resolution of this particular issue
concerns and applies only to forcible

entry and unlawful detainer cases where

the issue of possession is intimately
intertwined with the issue of ownership.
It finds no proper application where it is
otherwise, that is, where ownership is
not in issue, or where the principal and
main issue raised in the allegations of
the complaint as well as the relief prayed
for make out not a case for ejectment
but one for recovery of ownership.

j.

Republic
of
the
Philippines vs. Sunvar
Realty Devt Corp.

Under the Rules of Court, lessors

against whom possession of any land is
unlawfully withheld after the expiration
of the right to hold possession may by
virtue of any express or implied contract,
and within one year after the unlawful
deprivation bring an action in the
municipal trial court against the person
unlawfully withholding possession, for
restitution of possession with damages
and costs. Unless otherwise stipulated,
the action of the lessor shall commence
only after a demand to pay or to comply
with the conditions of the lease and to
vacate is made upon the lessee; or after
a written notice of that demand is served
upon the person found on the premises,
and the lessee fails to comply therewith
within 15 days in the case of land or 5
days in the case of buildings.
On the other hand, accion publiciana is
the plenary action to recover the right of
possession which should be brought in
the proper regional trial court when
dispossession has lasted for more than
one year. It is an ordinary civil
proceeding to determine the better right
of possession of realty independently of
title. In other words, if at the time of
the filing of the complaint, more
than one year had elapsed since
defendant had turned plaintiff out
of
possession
or
defendants
possession had become illegal, the
action will be, not one of forcible
entry
or
illegal
detainer,
but
an accion publiciana.

Property Case Doctrines

Atty. Anthony Goquingco
Prepared by: Dianne D. Salto & Areeya Flores

The one-year period to file an unlawful

detainer case is not counted from the
expiration of the lease contract on 31
December
2002.
Indeed,
the last
demand for petitioners to vacate is the
reckoning period for determining the
one-year period in an action for unlawful
detainer. Such one year period should be
counted from the date of plaintiffs last
demand on defendant to vacate the real
property, because only upon the lapse of
that period does the possession become
unlawful.
k. Bongato vs. Malvar
First, in forcible entry, one employs
force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth to deprive another of physical
possession of land or building. Thus, the
plaintiff must allege and prove prior
physical possession of the property in
litigation
until
deprived
thereof
by the defendant. This requirement impli
es that the possession of the disputed
land by the latter was unlawful from the
beginning. The
sole
question
for
resolution hinges on the physical or
material
possession
(possession de
facto) of the property. Neither a claim of
juridical
possession
(possession de
jure) nor an averment of ownership by
the defendant can outrightly prevent the
court from taking cognizance of the
case. Ejectment
cases
proceed
independently of any claim of ownership,
and the plaintiff needs merely to prove
prior possession de facto and undue
deprivation thereof.
It is wise to be reminded that forcible
entry is a quieting process, and that the
restrictive time bar is prescribed to
complement the summary nature of
such process. Indeed, the one-year
period within which to bring an action for
forcible entry is generally counted from
the date of actual entry to the
land. However, when entry is made
through stealth, then the one-year
period is counted from the time the
plaintiff learned about it. After the lapse
of the one-year period, the party
dispossessed of a parcel of land may file
either an accion publiciana, which is a
plenary action to recover the right of

possession;
or
an accion
reivindicatoria, which is an action to
recover ownership as well as possession.
On the basis of the foregoing facts, it is
clear that the cause of action for forcible
entry filed by respondents had already
prescribed when they filed the Complaint
for ejectment on July 10, 1992. Hence,
even if Severo Malvar may be the owner
of the land, possession thereof cannot be
wrested through a summary action for
ejectment of petitioner, who had been
occupying it for more than one (1) year.
Respondents should have presented
their suit before the RTC in an accion
publiciana or
an accion reivindicatoria, not before the
MTCC in summary proceedings for
forcible entry. Their cause of action for
forcible entry had prescribed already,
and the MTCC had no more jurisdiction to
hear and decide it.

l.

Sarmiento vs. Court of

Appeals

What determines the cause of action is

the nature of defendant's entry into the
land. If the entry is illegal, then the
action which may be filed against the
intruder within one year therefrom is
forcible entry. If, on the other hand, the
entry is legal but the possession
thereafter became illegal, the case is
one of unlawful detainer which must be
filed within one year from the date of the
last demand.
If private respondent is indeed the owner
of the premises subject of this suit and
she was unlawfully deprived of the real
right of possession or the ownership
thereof, she should present her claim
before the regional trial court in
an accion
publiciana or
an accion
reivindicatoria, and not before the
municipal trial court in a summary
proceeding of unlawful detainer or
forcible entry. For even if one is the
owner of the property, the possession
thereof cannot be wrested from another
who had been in the physical or material
possession of the same for more than
one year by resorting to a summary

Property Case Doctrines

Atty. Anthony Goquingco
Prepared by: Dianne D. Salto & Areeya Flores

action for ejectment. This is especially

true where his possession thereof was
not obtained through the means or held
under the circumstances contemplated
by the rules on summary ejectment.
We have held that in giving recognition
to the action of forcible entry and
unlawful detainer, the purpose of the law
is to protect the person who in fact has
actual possession; and in case of a
controverted proprietary right, the law
requires
the
parties
to
preserve
the status quo until one or the other
sees fit to invoke the decision of a court
of competent jurisdiction upon the
question of ownership.
m. Jose vs. Alfuerto
We already ruled that a complaint which
fails to positively aver any overt act on
the
plaintiffs
part
indicative
of
permission to occupy the land, or any
showing of such fact during the trial is
fatal for a case for unlawful detainer. As
the Court then explained, a case for
unlawful detainer alleging tolerance
must definitely establish its existence
from the start of possession; otherwise, a
case for forcible entry can mask itself as
an action for unlawful detainer and
permit it to be filed beyond the required
one-year prescription period from the
time of forcible entry.
n. Caro vs. Sucaldito
Under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court, every action must be prosecuted
or defended in the name of the real
party-in-interest, or one who stands to
be benefited or injured by the judgment
in the suit. Corollarily, legal standing has
been defined as a personal and
substantial interest in the case, such that
the party has sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result of the challenged
act. Interest means a material interest in
issue that is affected by the questioned
act or instrument, as distinguished from
a mere incidental interest in the question
involved.
Clearly then, a suit filed by one who is
not
a
party-in-interest
must
be
dismissed. In this case, the petitioner,

not being the owner of the disputed

property but a mere applicant for a free
patent, cannot thus be considered as a
party-in-interest with personality to file
an action for reconveyance. The Court,
citing several of its holdings, expounded
on this doctrine in Tankiko v. Cezar.

o. Canezo vs. Apolinario

The present case, while inaccurately
captioned as an action for a Writ of
Demolition with Damages is in reality
an action to recover a parcel of land or
an accion reivindicatoria under Article
434
of
the
Civil
Code.
Accion
reivindicatoria seeks the recovery of
ownership and includes the jus utendi
and the jus fruendi brought in the proper
regional trial court. Accion reivindicatoria
is an action whereby plaintiff alleges
ownership over a parcel of land and
seeks recovery of its full possession.
The testimony and the relocation survey
plan both show that the spouses Bautista
were aware of the encroachment upon
their lot by the owner of Lot 15 and thus
they
made
a
corresponding
encroachment upon the lot of the
spouses Caezo. This awareness of the
two encroachments made the spouses
Bautista builders in bad faith. The
spouses Caezo are entitled to the
issuance of a writ of demolition in their
favor and against the spouses Bautista,
in accordance with Article 450 of the
Civil Code.

p. Emilia vs. Bado

Long divorced from doubt is the doctrine
that where legal title is disputed and the
possessor asserts ownership over the
land in controversy, no injunction can
issue to dispossess him.6 Reason for this
is that before the issue of ownership is
determined by evidence, justice and
equity demand that the parties be
maintained in their status quoso that no
advantage may be given to one to the
prejudice of the other.

Property Case Doctrines

Atty. Anthony Goquingco
Prepared by: Dianne D. Salto & Areeya Flores

Given the fact that there is the

debatable question of where the house
was being erected, we say that
adherence to the precept just enunciated
is a forbidding obstacle to the grant of
injunction.
To be sure, there are recognized
exceptions to the rule, as where
defendant is clearly a mere intruder,8 or
where the action seeks to prevent a
purchaser at an auction sale from
molesting the debtor's co-owners whose
rights have not been affected by the
sale.9 But these, generally upon hearing
and not upon ex parte application for
injunction.
Upon well-entrenched jurisprudence,
plaintiff's principal suit for injunction
cannot, at bottom, prosper because
there is an adequate remedy in law open
to her. It is elementary to the point of
triteness that the special remedy of
injunction may not issue where there is a
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.
Where "there exists the ordinary remedy
of action for property of possession,
which may be either plenary or
summary, according to the method by
which she may have been deprived of
her alleged possession."
q. Valdez vs.
Appeals

Court

of

The issuance of the title in the name

solely of one spouse is not determinative
of the conjugal nature of the property,
since there is no showing that it was
acquired during the marriage of the
Spouses Carlos Valdez, Sr. and Josefina L.
Valdez. The presumption under Article
160 of the New Civil Code, that property
acquired during marriage is conjugal,
does not apply where there is no
showing as to when the property alleged
to be conjugal was acquired. The
presumption cannot prevail when the
title is in the name of only one spouse
and the rights of innocent third parties
are involved. Moreover, when the
property is registered in the name of
only one spouse and there is no showing

as to when the property was acquired by

same spouse, this is an indication that
the property belongs exclusively to the
said spouse.
In this case, there is no evidence to
indicate when the property was acquired
by petitioner Josefina. Thus, we agree
with petitioner Josefinas declaration in
the deed of absolute sale she executed
in favor of the respondent that she was
the absolute and sole owner of the
property. We are convinced that the
declaration in the deed of extrajudicial
settlement of the estate of the late
Carlos Valdez, Sr., that the property
formed part of his estate and that his
children waived their rights and claims
over the property in favor of their
mother, was done merely to facilitate the
issuance of a torrens title over the
property in petitioner Josefinas name
with her marital status as widow.

III.

Ownership
Accessions;
Quieting of Title; Ruinous
Building
and
Trees
in
Danger of Falling; Articles
440-483, 546 & 548

a. Galang vs. Reyes

If indeed a property was the former bed
of a creek that changed its course and
passed through the property of the
claimant, then, pursuant to Article 461,
the ownership of the old bed left to dry
by
the
change
of
course
was
automatically
acquired
by
the
claimant.18 Before such a conclusion
can be reached, the fact of natural
abandonment of the old course must be
shown, that is, it must be proven that
the creek indeed changed its course
without
artificial
or
man-made
intervention. Thus, the claimant, in this
case the Reyeses, must prove three key
elements by clear and convincing
evidence. These are: (1) the old course
of the creek, (2) the new course of the
creek, and (3) the change of course of
the creek from the old location to the
new location by natural occurrence.

Property Case Doctrines

Atty. Anthony Goquingco
Prepared by: Dianne D. Salto & Areeya Flores

b. Gulla vs. Heirs of Labrador

The trial court, the RTC and the CA were
one in ruling that the 562-square-meter
property, Lot A, is part of the public
domain, hence, beyond the commerce of
men and not capable of registration. In
fact, the land is within the salvage zone
fronting the China Sea as well as the
property covered by OCT No. P-13350 in
the name of respondents. The provision
relied upon is Article 440 of the New Civil
Code, which states that "[t]he ownership
of property gives the right by accession
to everything which is produced thereby,
or which is incorporated or attached
thereto, either naturally or artificially."
The provision, however, does not apply
in this case, considering that Lot A is a
foreshore land adjacent to the sea which
is alternately covered and left dry by the
ordinary flow of the tides. Such property
belongs to the public domain and is not
available for private ownership until
formally declared by the government to
be no longer needed for public use.
Respondents thus have no possessory
right over the property unless upon
application, the government, through the
then Bureau of Lands, had granted them
a permit.

right of accession. Consequently and

ordinarily, the rentals that fell due from
the time of the perfection of the sale to
petitioner until its rescission by final
judgment should belong to the owner of
the property during that period. Not
having been the owner, Equatorial
cannot be entitled to the civil fruits of
ownership like rentals of the thing sold.
d. Sulo ng Nayon,
Nayong Pilipino

Inc.

vs.

Article 448 is manifestly intended to

apply only to a case where one builds,
plants, or sows on land in which he
believes himself to have a claim of title,
and not to lands where the only interest
of the builder, planter or sower is that of
a holder, such as a tenant.
In the case at bar, petitioners have no
adverse claim or title to the land. In fact,
as lessees, they recognize that the
respondent is the owner of the land.
What petitioners insist is that because of
the
improvements,
which
are
of
substantial value that they have
introduced on the leased premises with
the permission of respondent, they
should be considered builders in good
faith who have the right to retain
possession
of
the
property
until
reimbursement by respondent.

c. Equatorial Realty and Devt

vs. Mayfair Theater Inc.
In the case, there was no right of
ownership transferred from Carmelo to
Equatorial in view of a patent failure to
deliver the property to the buyer. From
the peculiar facts of this case, it is clear
that petitioner never took actual control
and possession of the property sold, in
view of respondents timely objection to
the sale and the continued actual
possession of the property. While the
execution of a public instrument of sale
is recognized by law as equivalent to the
delivery of the thing sold, such
constructive or symbolic delivery, being
merely presumptive, is deemed negated
by the failure of the vendee to take
actual possession of the land sold.
Rent is a civil fruit that belongs to the
owner of the property producing it by

e. PNB vs. De Jesus

A builder in good faith can, under the
foregoing
provisions,
compel
the
landowner to make a choice between
appropriating the building by paying the
proper indemnity or obliging the builder
to pay the price of the land. The choice
belongs to the owner of the land, a rule
that accords with the principle of
accession, i.e., that the accessory follows
the principal and not the other way
around.[2] Even as the option lies with
the landowner, the grant to him,
nevertheless, is preclusive. He much
choose one. He cannot, for instance,
compel the owner of the building to
instead remove it from the land.[3] In
order, however, that the builder can
invoke that accruing benefit and enjoy

Property Case Doctrines

Atty. Anthony Goquingco
Prepared by: Dianne D. Salto & Areeya Flores

his corresponding right to demand that a

choice be made by the landowner, he
should be able to prove good faith on his
part.

f.

Macasaet vs. Macasaet

This Court has consistently held that

those who occupy the land of another at
the latters tolerance or permission,
without any contract between them, are
necessarily bound by an implied promise
that the occupants will vacate the
property upon demand. A summary
action for ejectment is the proper
remedy
to
enforce
this
implied
obligation. The unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession is to be
counted from the date of the demand to
vacate.
We hold that the facts of the present
case rule out the finding of possession
by mere tolerance. Petitioners were able
to establish that respondents had invited
them to occupy the subject lots in order
that they could all live near one other
and help in resolving family problems. By
occupying
those
lots,
petitioners
demonstrated their acceptance of the
invitation. Hence, there was a meeting of
minds, and an agreement regarding
possession of the lots impliedly arose
between the parties.
Based on the aforecited special cases,
Article 448 applies to the present factual
milieu. The established facts of this case
show that respondents fully consented to
the
improvements
introduced
by
petitioners. In fact, because the children
occupied the lots upon their invitation,
the parents certainly knew and approved
of the construction of the improvements
introduced thereon. Thus, petitioners
may be deemed to have been in good
faith when they built the structures on
those lots.

g. Pleasantville
Corporation
Appeals

Development
vs.
Court
of

Article 527 of the Civil Code provides the

presumption that petitioner has the
burden of proving that Kee was a builder
in bad faith. Kee may be made liable for
the violation of the contract with CTTEI
but this may not be used as a basis of
bad faith and as a sufficient ground to
negate the presumption of good faith.
Jardinico is presently only allowed to file
a complaint for unlawful detainer. Good
faith is based on the belief of the builder
that the land he is building on is his and
his ignorance of any flaw or defect in is
title. Since at the time when Kee
constructed his improvements on Lot 8,
he was not aware that it was actually Lot
9 that was delivered to him.
h. Reynante vs. Court of Appeals
Accretion does not automatically become
registered
land
Granting
without
conceding that lots 1 and 2 were created
by alluvial formation and while it is true
that accretions which the banks of rivers
may gradually receive from the effect of
the current become the property of the
owner of the banks (Article 457), such
accretion to registered land does not
preclude acquisition of the additional
area
by
another
person
through
prescription.
It was held that "an accretion does not
automatically become registered land
just because the lot which receives such
accretion is covered by a Torrens Title.
Ownership of a piece of land is one
thing; registration under the Torrens
system of that ownership is another.
Ownership over the accretion received
by the land adjoining a river is governed
by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of
registered land is provided in the
registration law. Registration under the
Land Registration and Cadastral Act does
not vest or give title to the land, but
merely confirms and, thereafter, protects
the title already possessed by the owner,
making it imprescriptible by occupation
of third parties. But to obtain this
protection, the land must be placed
under the operation of the registration
laws, wherein certain judicial procedures
have been provided."

Property Case Doctrines

Atty. Anthony Goquingco
Prepared by: Dianne D. Salto & Areeya Flores

i.

Agustin
vs.
Appellate Court

Intermediate

Accretion benefits a riparian owner when

the following requisites are present: (1)
that the deposit be gradual and
imperceptible; (2) that it resulted from
the effects of the current of the water;
and (3) that the land where accretion
takes place is adjacent to the bank of a
river (Republic vs. CA, 132 SCRA 514). In
the present case, the accretion on the
western bank of the Cagayan River had
been going on from 1919 up to 1968 or
for a period of 49 years. It was gradual
and imperceptible. Only when Lot 3351,
with an original area of 5 hectares
described in the free patent that was
issued to Macario Melad in June 1956,
was resurveyed in 1968 did it become
known that 6.6 hectares had been added
to it. Lot 3351, covered by a homestead
patent issued in June 1950 to Pablo
Binayug, grew from its original area of 18
hectares, by an additional 50 hectares
through alluvium as the Cagayan River
gradually moved to the east. These
accretions belong to riparian owners
upon whose lands the alluvial deposits
were made (Roxas vs. Tuason, 9 Phil.
408; Director of Lands vs. Rizal, 87 Phil.
806).

j.

Celestial vs. Cachopero

Since property of public dominion is

outside the commerce of man and not
susceptible to private appropriation and
acquisitive prescription, the adverse
possession which may be the basis of a
grant of title in the confirmation of an
imperfect title refers only to alienable or
disposable portions of the public domain.
It is only after the Government has
declared the land to be alienable and
disposable agricultural land that the year
of entry, cultivation and exclusive and
adverse possession can be counted for
purposes of an imperfect title.

k. Morandarte
Appeals

vs.

Court

of

It is a settled rule that unless a public

land is shown to have been reclassified
as alienable or actually alienated by the
State to a private person, that piece of
land remains part of the public domain.
Hence,
Antonio
A.
Morandartes
occupation
thereof,
however
long,
cannot ripen into private ownership.

l.

Jagualing vs. Court of Appeals

The CA did not err in applying Article 465

of the Civil Code. Under this provision,
the island belongs to the owner of the
land along the nearer margin as sole
owner thereof; or more accurately,
because the island is longer than the
property of Eduave, they are deemed
ipso jure to be the owners of that portion
which corresponds to the length of their
property along the margin of the river.
Lands formed by accretion belong to the
riparian owner. This preferential right is,
under Article 465, also granted the
owners of the land located in the margin
nearest the formed island for the reason
that they are in the best position to
cultivate and attend to the exploitation
of the same. In fact, no specific act of
possession
over
the
accretion
is
required. If, however, the riparian owner
fails to assert his claim thereof, the same
may yield to the adverse possession of
third parties, as indeed even accretion to
land titled under the Torrens system
must itself still be registered.

m. Office of the City Mayor vs.

Mario Ebio

ART. 84. Accretions deposited gradually

upon lands contiguous to creeks,
streams, rivers, and lakes, by accessions
or sediments from the waters thereof,
belong to the owners of such lands.
Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining
the banks of rivers belong the accretion
which they gradually receive from the
effects of the current of the waters.

Property Case Doctrines

Atty. Anthony Goquingco
Prepared by: Dianne D. Salto & Areeya Flores

It is therefore explicit from the foregoing

provisions that alluvial deposits along
the banks of a creek do not form part of
the public domain as the alluvial
property automatically belongs to the
owner of the estate to which it may have
been
added. The
only
restriction
provided for by law is that the owner of
the adjoining property must register the
same
under
the Torrens system;
otherwise, the alluvial property may be
subject
to
acquisition
through
prescription by third persons.
In contrast, properties of public dominion
cannot be acquired by prescription. No
matter how long the possession of the
properties has been, there can be no
prescription against the State regarding
property of public domain. Even a city or
municipality cannot acquire them by
prescription as against the State.

n. Lucasan vs. PDIC

To avail of the remedy of quieting of title,

two (2) indispensable requisites must
concur, namely:

the plaintiff or complainant has a

legal or an equitable title to or
interest in the real property
subject of the action; and
the deed, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding claimed to be casting
a cloud on his title must be shown
to be in fact invalid or inoperative
despite
its
prima
facie
appearance of validity or legal
efficacy Stated differently, the
plaintiff must show that he has a
legal or at least an equitable title
over the real property in dispute,
and
that
some
deed
or
proceeding beclouds its validity
or efficacy.

o. Lasquite vs. Victory Hills, Inc.

p. Tandog vs. Macapagal

As a general rule, a cloud which may be

removed by suit to quiet title is not
created by mere verbal or parol
assertion of ownership of or an interest
in property. This rule is subject to
qualification, where there is a written or
factual basis for the asserted right. Thus,
a claim of right based on acquisitive
prescription or adverse possession has
been held to constitute a removable
cloud on title.
It is important that petitioners must first
establish their legal or equitable title to,
or interest in the real property which is
the subject matter of the action.

q. Rumarate vs. Hernandez

Action for quieting of title is aimed to
determine the respective rights of the
parties
and
to
prevent
future
disturbances thereon; it is merely a
confirmation
proceeding
and;
is
imprescriptible.
The requisites for an action for quieting
of title are:
a. Plaintiff has legal or equitable
title to or interest in the subject
property.
b. The deed, claim, incumberance,
or proceeding casts cloud on his
title even if it appears to be valid
or legally efficient but was really
invalid.

r.

Metrobank vs. Alejo

A cloud on a title is defined as a

semblance of title which appears in
some legal form but which is in fact
unfounded. Where a title was previously
held null and void already, an action to
quiet title is not the proper remedy
because the TCT (as basis of the right) is
not, on its face or otherwise, valid in the
first place.

s. Saligumba vs. Palanog

Property Case Doctrines

Atty. Anthony Goquingco
Prepared by: Dianne D. Salto & Areeya Flores

t. Clado-Reyes vs. Limpe

An action for quieting of title originated

in equity jurisprudence to secure an
adjudication that a claim of title to or an
interest in property, adverse to that of
the complainant, is invalid, so that the
complainant and those claiming under
him may be forever free from any
danger of hostile claim. Thus, our courts
are tasked to determine the respective
rights of the contending parties, not only
to put things in their proper places, but
also to benefit both parties, so that he
who has the right would see every cloud
of doubt over the property dissipated,
and he could afterwards without fear
introduce the improvements he may
desire, to use and even to abuse the
property as he may deem best.

u. Tanenglian vs. Lorenzo

v. Santos vs. Heirs of Lustre

Plaintiff Cecilia Macaspac in Civil Case

No. 1330 filed the complaint seeking the
reconveyance of the property to her, and
not to Dominga Lustre or her heirs. This
is a clear act of repudiation of the coownership which would negate a
conclusion that she acted in privity with
the other heirs or that she filed the
complaint in behalf of the co-ownership.
In contrast, respondents were evidently
acting for the benefit of the coownership when they filed the complaint
in Civil Case No.
Yes. The action for reconveyance on the
ground that the certificate of title was
obtained by means of a fictitious deed of
sale is virtually an action for the
declaration of its nullity, which does not
prescribe. Moreover, a person acquiring
property through fraud becomes, by
operation of law, a trustee of an implied
trust for the benefit of the real owner of
the property. An action for reconveyance
based on an implied trust prescribes in
ten years. And in such case, the
prescriptive period applies only if there is
an actual need to reconvey the property

as when the plaintiff is not in possession

of the property. Otherwise, if plaintiff is
in
possession
of
the
property,
prescription does not commence to run
against him. Thus, when an action for
reconveyance is nonetheless filed, it
would be in the nature of a suit for
quieting of title, an action that is
imprescriptible
w. Heirs of Valeriano S. Concha,
Sr. vs. Lumocso
x. Iglesia
ni
Cristo
vs.
Penferrada
A cloud is said to be a semblance of a
title, either legal or equitable, or a cloud
of an interest in land appearing in some
legal form but which is, in fact,
unfounded, or which it would be
inequitable to enforce. An action for
quieting of title is imprescriptible until
the claimant is ousted of his possession.
Admittedly, respondents interposed the
alternative reinvindicatory action against
petitioner. It bears stressing that
an accion reinvindicatoria is a remedy
seeking the recovery of ownership and
includes jus possidendi, jus utendi,
and jus fruendi as well. It is an action
whereby a party claims ownership over a
parcel of land and seeks recovery of its
full possession. Thus, the owner of real
property
in
actual
and
material
possession thereof may file an accion
reinvindicatoria against another seeking
ownership over a parcel of land
including jus vindicandi, or the right to
exclude defendants from the possession
thereof.
Since respondents were in actual or
physical possession of the property when
they filed their complaint against
petitioner on October 24, 2001, the
prescriptive
period
for
the
reinvindicatory action had not even
commenced to run, even if petitioner
was able to secure TCT No. 321744 over
the property in 1984.
IV.

Co-Ownership,
Articles
484-501 ; Condominium
Act

Property Case Doctrines

Atty. Anthony Goquingco
Prepared by: Dianne D. Salto & Areeya Flores

a. Acre vs. Yuttiki

Under Art. 148 of the Family Code,
properties acquired by the parties
through their actual joint contribution
belong to the co-ownership. Wages and
salaries earned by each party belong to
him or her exclusively. Then too,
contributions in the form or care of the
home, children and household, or
spiritual or moral inspiration, are
excluded in this regime.

Under Art. 493 of the civil code, each coowner shall have the full ownership of
his part of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore
alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
substitute
another
person
in
its
enjoyment, except when personal rights
are involved. But the effect of the
alienation or the mortgage, with respect
to the co-owners, shall be limited to the
portion, which may be allotted to him in
the division upon the termination of coownership.

b. PNB vs. Heirs of Militar

In co-ownership, a co-owner may or coheir may bring such action without
necessarily joining all the other coheirs
as co-plaintiffs because the suit is
deemed to be instituted for the benefit
of all.
c. Santos vs. Heirs of Lustre
A co-owner may bring an action to
recover co-owned property without the
necessity of joining all the other coowners as co-plaintiffs because the suit
is deemed to be instituted for the benefit
of all. In such case, the other heirs are
merely necessary parties.

d. Iglesia
ni
Ponferrada

Cristo

vs.

A co-owner may bring an action to

recover the co-owned property without
the necessity of joining all the other coowners as co-plaintiffs as long as they
share a common interest over the
property because the suit is deemed to
be instituted for the benefit of all.
e. Sps. Cruz vs Leis

f.

Oesmer
vs.
Development Corp.

Paraiso

Article 493 of the Civil Code provides

that "Each co-owner shall have the full
ownership of his part and of the fruits
and benefits pertaining thereto and he
may therefore alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and even substitute another
person in its enjoyment, except when
personal rights are involved. But the
effect of the alienation or the mortgage,
with respect to the co'owners, shall be
limited to the portion which may be
allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership/' Hence
being owners of their respective
undivided
shares
in
the
subject
properties, any coowners can dispose of
their shares even without the consent of
all the co-heir or co-owners.
g. Gapacan vs. Omipet
A property owner whose property rights
were being disturbed may ask a
competent
court
for
a
proper
determination of the respective rights of
the party-claimants, not only to place
things in their proper place, that is, to
require the one who has no right to
refrain from. acts injurious to the
peaceful enjoyment of the property not
only of the rightful owner but also for the
benefit of both with the view of
dissipating any cloud of doubt over the
property.
h. Basa vs. Aguilar
To deny to the petitioners the right of
redemption recognized in Art. 1620 of
the Civil Code is to defeat the purpose of

Property Case Doctrines

Atty. Anthony Goquingco
Prepared by: Dianne D. Salto & Areeya Flores

minimizing
co-ownership
and
to
contravene the public policy in this
regard.
i.

Del Blanco vs. IAC

With the distribution agreed upon each

of the co-owner is a co-owner of the
whole, and in this sense, over the whole
he exercises the right of dominion, but
he is at the same time the sole owner of
a portion, in the instant case, a 1/4
portion (for each group of co-owners) of
the Island which is truly abstract,
because until physical division is
effected such portion is merely an Ideal
share, not concretely determined.
j.

Paz Galvez vs. CA

To sustain a plea for prescription, it must

always Cleary appear that one who was
originally a joint owner has repudiated
the claims of his co-owners, and that his
co-owners were appraised or should
have been appraised if his claim if
adverse and exclusive ownership before
the alleged prescriptive period began to
run.

k. Deiparine vs. CA
A mere tax declaration does not vest
ownership of the property upon the
declarant. Neither do tax receipts not
declarations of ownership for taxation
purposes constitute adequate evidence
of ownership or of the right to possess
realty. The subdivision plan prepared at
the
instance
of
the
petitioners
predecessor-in-interest cannot likewise
be considered in their favor, the same
being self-serving

l.

Heirs of Cesar Marasigan vs.

Marasigan
m. Sec. 5 of Rule 69 should be read
in conjunction with Art. 494 and
495 of the NCC. Evidently, the
Civil Code provisions and the ROC
must be interpreted so as to give
effect to the very purpose
thereof, which is to put an end to
co-ownership in a manner most

beneficial and fair to all the coowners.

n. Quimpo vs. Vda. De Beltran

A deed of sale, in which the stated
consideration has not been, in fact, paid
is a false contract; that is void ab initio

o. Maglucot-aw vs. Maglucot

Under the present rule, the proceedings
of the commissioners w/o being
confirmed by the court are not binding
upon the parties. However, this ruled
does not apply in case where the parties
themselves actualized the supposedly
unconfirmed sketch/subdivision plan.
The purpose of court approval is to give
effect to the sketch/subdivision plan.

p. Austria vs. Lichauco

q. Vda. De Daffon vs. CA
In a complaint for partition, the plaintiff
seeks, first, a declaration that he is a coowner of the subject properties; and
second the conveyance of his lawful
shares.
r.

Balo vs. CA

An action for partition is at once an

action for declaration of co-ownership
and for segregation and conveyance of a
determined portion of the properties
involved.

s. Sepulveda vs. Pelaez

The absence of an indispensable party
renders all subsequent actions of the
court null and void for want of authority
to act, not only as to the absent parties
but even as to those present.

t. Alejandrino vs. CA

Although the right of an heir over the

property of the decedent is inchoate as

Property Case Doctrines

Atty. Anthony Goquingco
Prepared by: Dianne D. Salto & Areeya Flores

long as the estate has not been fully

settled and partitioned, the law allows a
co-owner to exercise rights of ownership
over such inchoate right.

the alienation or mortgage shall be

limited only to the portion of the
property, which may be allotted to him
upon termination of the co-ownership.
y. Heirs of Abalos vs. Bucal

u. Valmonte vs. CA
As Lourdes is a non-resident who is not
found in the PH, services of summons on
her must be in accordance with Rule 14,
17/ Such service, to be effective outside
the PH, must be made either 1) personal
service; 2) by publication in a newspaper
of general circulation in such places and
for such time as the court may order in
which case a copy of the summons and
order of the court should be sent by
registered mail to the last known address
the defendant; or 3) in any other manner
which the court may deem sufficient.

In a complaint for partition, the plaintiff

seeks, first, a declaration that he is a coowner of the subject properties; and
second, the conveyance of his lawful
shares. An action for partition is at once
an action for declaration of co-ownership
and for segregation and conveyance of a
determinate portion of the properties
involved. In actions for partition, the
court cannot properly issue an order to
divide the property unless it first makes
a determination as to the existence of
co-ownership. The court must initially
settle the issue of ownership, the first
stage in an action for partition.
z. GOAL, INC. vs. CA

v. Arriola vs. Arriola

The family home shall continue despite
the death of one or both spouses or of
the unmarried head of the family for a
period of ten years or for as long as
there is a minor beneficiary, and the
heirs cannot partition the same unless
the court finds compelling reasons
therefor. This rule shall apply regardless
of whoever owns the property or
constituted the family home.
w. Panganiban vs. Oamil
Under a co-ownership, the ownership of
an undivided thing or right belongs to
different persons. During the existence
of the coownership, no individual can
claim title to any definite portion of the
community property until the partition
thereof; and prior to the partition, all
that the co-owner has is an ideal or
abstract quota or proportionate share in
the entire land or thing.
x. Reyes vs. Hon. Concepcion
The law does not prohibit a co-owner
from selling, alienating or mortgaging his
ideal share in the property held in
common. The law merely provides that

Petitioner can hardly be excused for its

failure to comply with the provisions of
P.O. 957 by claiming ignorance of the
requirements of the decree and that a
mistake upon a doubtful or difficult
question of law may be the basis of good
faith. Being engaged in a business
affected by P.O. 957, petitioner should be
aware of its provisions and its mandates
which, as can be readily perceived, are
clear, simple and unmistakable.
aa.Yamane
vs.
Lepanto
Condominium Corporation
Condo Corp are generally exempt from
local business taxation under the LGC,
irrespective of any local ordinance that
seeks to declare otherwise.
ab.Sunset View Condominium
Corporation vs. Campos, Jr.
The share of stock appurtenant to the
unit will be transferred accordingly to the
purchaser of the unit only upon full
payment of the purchase price at which
he will also become the owner of the
unit. Consequently, even under the
contract, it is only the owner of a unit
who is a shareholder of the Condo Corp.
Inasmuch as the owners is conveyed
only upon full payment of the purchase

Property Case Doctrines

Atty. Anthony Goquingco
Prepared by: Dianne D. Salto & Areeya Flores

price, it necessarily follows that a

purchaser of a unit who has not paid the
full purchase price thereof is not the
owner of the unit and consequently is nit
a share holder of the Condo. Corp.

ac. Skyworld
Condominium
Owners Assoc., Inc. vs. SEC
The indispensable requirement that all
incorporators
of
a
condominium
corporation
must
be
shareholders
thereof was not satisfactorily complied
with by the SCOAl at the time a
certificate of registration was applied for.
To be a shareholder, one must
necessarily
be
an
owner
of
a
condominium unit.

ad.Hulst vs. PR Builders, Inc.

While Sheriff must only levy properties of
PR Builders that have equivalent amount
with
the
judgment
debt,
gross
inadequacy of price does not nullify an
execution sale when there is a right to
redeem because judgment debtor can
re-acquire the property.