TREASON

People vs. Perez

G.R. No. L-856 (April 18, 1949)
Facts: Seven counts of treason were filed against Susano Perez aka Kid Perez, the
accused, for recruiting, apprehending, and commandeering women (Eriberta Ramo,
Eduarda Daohog, Eutiquia Lamay, and Flaviana Bonalos) against their will to satisfy the
immoral purpose and sexual desire of Colonel Mini, and other Japanese of Officers.
Only counts 1,2,4,5,6 were substantiated. In the 4th and 5th counts, the accused
personally assaulted and abused two of the offended girls. Susano Perez was convicted
of treason and sentenced to death by electrocution by the Peoples Court.
Issue: Whether or not the acts of the accused constitute a crime of treason
Held : NO. There is a dilemma in trying to draw a line between treasonable and
untreasonable assistance, since the scope of adherence to the enemy is
comprehensive, and its requirement indeterminate, but as a general rule acts providing
aid and comfort to the enemies are considered treasonable when the aid and comfort
rendered are directed to them as enemies not as mere individuals. To lend or give
money to an enemy as a friend so that he may buy personal necessities is not
technically traitorous, but to lend or give money to an enemy to enable him to buy arms
or ammunition to use against the government of the giver is treason.
The act of the accused of providing the enemies with women and entertainment,
boosting their (the enemies) morale and making their lives more pleasant, is not
treason. Sexual and social relations with the Japanese did not directly and materially
tend to improve their war efforts or weaken the power of the government. Any favourable
effect toward the Japanese that the accused might have made was trivial, imperceptible
and unintentional. Intent of disloyalty is a vital ingredient in the crime of treason, which in
the absence of admission may be gathered from the nature and circumstances of each
case. In this particular case, it was not evident that the intent of the accused in providing
the enemies with women was to help them overthrow the government.
People v. Adriano
G.R. No. L-477 (June 30, 1947)
FACTS: Appeal from decision of the Peoples Court sentencing Apolinario Adriano to life
imprisonment and a fine of PhP 10,000 plus costs. Adriano was charged with treason for
being a Makapili and for bearing arms and assisting the Japanese Army in its operations
in the Gapan-San Leonardo Area from Jan.-Apr. 1945. The Peoples Court established
that: Adriano was a Makapili; he performed sentry duties in the Japanese garrison in
Gapan, Nueva Ecija; he carried a rifle in drills led by Japanese commanders; he
surrendered to the Americans with rifle in hand.
ISSUE: W/N Adriano is guilty of treason
HELD/RATIO: No. The Philippine law on treason follows the two-witness test derived
from the Anglo-American law on treason. This test requires the concurrence of two
witnesses to an overt act of treason. In this case, each of the overt acts imputed to
Adriano failed the test. Although mere membership in the Makapili organization is a

treasonous act in itself (indicative of adherence and giving aid and comfort to the
enemy), such membership is an overt act which should be proven by at least two
witnesses. In this case, no two witnesses saw Adriano doing the same single act as a
Makapili.
Hilado, J. dissenting:
Membership being a continuous and indivisible act, it is not necessary that two
witnesses have ascertained that Adriano was a Makapili on the same day. The
witnesses agree on the fact that Adriano is a Makapili, hence he should be convicted.
PEOPLE vs.CARMELITO VICTORIA
G.R. No. L-369 (March 13, 1947)
FACTS:
Appellant was sentenced by the lower court to supreme penalty of death and fine of
P20,000. His crime: Treason (in violation of duty of allegiance, wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and treasonably did knowingly adhere to their enemy, the Empire of Japan
and the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines, with which the United States and
the Commonwealth of the Philippines were then at war, giving to said enemy aid and/or
comfort) in the following events:
1.
October 6, 1944: joined an armed enemy patrol composed of about 8 spies and a
Japanese soldier, which went to the house of Federico Unson in Lucena, accused
Unson of hiding guerrillas. But then, when the enemy was about to arrest Unson,
guerrillas showed up and killed one of the spies. The Jap patrol left, but came back
afternoon of the same day, arrested Unson and two others (Perez and Godoy), tortured
them, and set fire to the house of Unson. Perez and Unson sustained numerous bayonet
wounds - mutilated and were found rotting in the vicinity of the house. Unson was tied to
a tree, and disembowelled by several bayonet wounds, while Perez was mutilated and
appeared ankle-less. Godoy was never heard of. It appears he was taken to Lucena and
was killed there.
o Version of Defense: Although admitting his presence in the raid, he did not come
along with party that conducted the afternoon raid in which the actual arrest of Unson,
Perez and Godoy took place.
o Lower courts decision: Guilty. Defense doesnt have enough weight to prevail over
that of the prosecuting witnesses.
2.
December 21, 1944: accompanied other Japanese spies to the house of Jose
Unson, arrested said Jose Unson and brought him to the Japanese garrison on the
charge that he had a short wave radio; that he was furnishing radio information to the
guerrillas and at the same time supporting them; that said Unson was released on the
same day, but on the next day he was again arrested and brought to the Japanese
garrison at Lucena, Tayabas; that said Jose Unson never returned. The last that was
seen of Jose Unson, was his skull as exhumed in a school yard in Lukban, several
months after the arrest.
o Defense: He admitted to have taken part in the raid but claims that he tried to save
Unson.
o Lower court: Only the latter (act of saving?) was accepted by the lower court, in view
of appellant's behaviour as recalled by witnesses Mercedes Unson, Alejandro Unson,
and Eugenio Ramon Unson. Guilty as well.
3.
February 10, 1945: accompanied armed members of the Intelligence Unit of the
Kempei Tai to the house of Felixberto Romulo in San Pablo, Laguna, placed him under

arrest as a guerrilla suspect, and turned him over to the Japanese Military Police who on
that occasion were concealing themselves near the house of Romulo; and that, since the
arrest of said Romulo, nothing was heard of him.
o Defense: Alibi - he was in Gagalagin, Manila.
o Lower court: Guilty.
4.
December 21, 1944 (5AM): accompanied two Japanese Military Police and two
undercover operatives to the house of Hermogenes Calauag in Lucena, Tayabas, and
apprehended said Calauag, conducted a search of the house and afterwards brought
Calauag to the Japanese garrison where he was subjected to inhuman torture on the
charge being pro-American and adviser of the Hunters ROTC Guerrillas.
o Defense: He alleged that he was merely asked by the Japanese kempei to
accompany them in the raid, admitted that he was present throughout the investigation
and torture of Caluag who, according to the accused himself, was tied suspended in the
air for fully twenty minutes.
o Lower court: Guilty. Considered the account of the defense as corroborative of the
facts alleged in the information and proved by the witnesses for the prosecution.
5.
March 9, 1944 (5AM): acting as an informer of the Japanese Kempei Tai, caused
the Japanese Military police to arrest and apprehend Antonio San Agustin, a guerrilla
officer, who was thereupon brought to Fort Santiago and there torture and unlawfully
detained.
o Not proven.
6.
June, 1944: accompanied by an armed group of undercover operatives to the
house of Melecio Labalan, Sr., and arrested and brought him to the Japanese garrison in
Lucena, Tayabas, where he was tortured on the charge of being a guerrilla.
o Defendant: Feigned ignorance of the arrest.
o Lower court: Guilty. Accused himself testified that he promised to see what he could
do about Labalan and accepted three chickens from the latter's wife which he gave to
the interpreter at the kempei office.
7.
February, 1945: that as a member of the Ganap, a pro-Japanese party, he joined
the Makapili organization designed to support the Imperial Japanese Forces in levying
war against their enemies; that he took military training from the Japanese and bore
arms and joined the enemy forces as a Makapili soldier, taking orders from the
Japanese; that he participated in the raid and burning of the barrio of Bautista, San
Pablo, Laguna, upon orders of the Japanese; that he carried ammunitions and foodstuffs
for the Japanese Army; that he performed sentry duty
o Not proven.
In all of these instances, appellant maintains that he is not a spy, and was only forced to
be one. He also claims to be a guerrilla and that he tried to help Filipino prisoners.
Aggravating circumstances (lower court): treachery, the aid of armed persons to insure
or afford impunity, and deliberately augmenting the crimes by causing other wrongs not
necessary in the commission thereof.
ISSUES:

Whether or not the accused is guilty of counts 1,2,3,4 and 6? If guilty, whether or
not his act of saving some Filipinos justify or mitigate his criminal responsibility?

Whether or not the penalty should be death, considering the aggravating

circumstances
HELD: Guilty.
RATIO: Appellants 130-page brief failed completely to point out any specific error in the
conclusions of fact of the lower court,

o The fact that he helped some Filipinos does not relieve him from criminal
responsibility for the acts he had committed. The performance of righteous action, no
matter how meritorious they may be is not a justifying, exempting, or mitigating
circumstance in the commission of wrongs.

Sentence is reclusion perpetua.

RATIO: The voters are divided as to what the sentence should be. Majority is of the
opinion that the sentence should be death while the ponente is of the opinion that the
circumstances in question are essential elements of the treason appellant has
committed. There being no unanimity of all the members of the Court in the imposition of
the death penalty, the People's Court's decision is modified, and appellant is sentenced
to reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P15,000 and costs.
PIRACY
People v. Lol-lo and Saraw
GR No. 17958 (Feb. 27, 1922)
FACTS: Days after leaving Matuta, Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) on Jun. 30, 1920,
two boats carrying 12 Dutch nationals (1 person in one boat, 11 men, women and
children in another) were boarded by 24 armed Moros (including the accused Lol-lo and
Saraw) at around 7:00 PM. The Moros took all the cargo from the Dutch. They also
raped and abducted the two women on board. The Moros poked holes in the boat and
left the rest of the Dutch in it (they were later rescued). The two women were able to
escape once the Moros docked in the island of Maruro (also a Dutch possession). Lol-lo
and Saraw were arrested after returning to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-tawi. They
were charged w/ Piracy before the Sulu CFI and were found guilty, with punishment of
life imprisonment; and to return the stolen 39 sacks of copra plus 924 rupees in
damages, plus costs.
ISSUES: 1) W/N the Sulu CFI has jurisdiction over the crime
2) W/N the defendants are guilty
HELD: 1) Yes 2) Yes
RATIO:
1) Piracy is a crime against all mankind. The jurisdiction of piracy has no territorial limits,
pirates being hostes humani generis (enemies of mankind). Piracy may be prosecuted in
any court where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried.
2) The provisions of the Spanish Penal Code on piracy (Arts. 153-154) remained in force
after the American takeover, by virtue of Pres. McKinleys Instructions. Art. 154 specified
that piracy with rape shall be punished by cadena perpetua to death. Lol-lo, who was
proven to have taken part in the rape of the two women, should therefore be put to death
- the crime being aggravated by cruelty, ignominy, and abuse of superior strength (rape
of the women, abandonment of the other victims, 24 armed men vs. 12 men, women &
children) with the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction.
DECISION: Judgment affirmed with respect to Saraw, modified with respect to Lol-lo.

WARRANTLESS SEARCH
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESvs.NG YIK BUN et. al
G.R. No. 180452 (January 10, 2011)
FACTS: On August 24, 2000, around 9pm, Capt. Danilo Ibon of Task Force Aduana
received information from an operative that there was an ongoing shipment of
contraband in Barangay Bignay II, Sariaya, Quezon Province. Upon instructions from his
superior, Major Carlo Magno Tabo, Capt. Ibon formed a team in coordination with a PNP
detachment, and, along with the operative, the team then proceeded to Villa Vicenta
Resort in Barangay Bignay II, Sariaya.
The members of the team were able to observe the goings-on at the resort from
a distance of around 50 meters. They spotted six Chinese-looking men loading bags
containing a white substance into a white van. Having been noticed, Capt. Ibon identified
his team and asked accused-appellant Chua Shilou Hwan (Hwan) what they were
loading on the van. Hwan replied that it was shabu and pointed to accused-appellant
Raymond Tan as the leader. A total of 172 bags of suspected shabu were then
confiscated.
A laboratory report prepared later by Police Inspector Mary Jean Geronimo on
samples of the 172 confiscated bags showed the white substance to be shabu.
On January 10, 2001, an Amended Information for violation of Sec. 16, Article III of RA
6425 was filed against accused-appellants, who entered a plea of not guilty upon rearraignment.
RTC convicted accused-appellants of the crime charged. In questioning the RTC
Decision before the CA, accused-appellants alleged that the trial court erred when it held
as valid the warrantless search, seizure and subsequent arrest of the accusedappellants despite the non-concurrence of the requisite circumstances that justify a
warrantless arrest. CA affirmed decision of RTC. Hence this appeal to the SC. Accusedappellants claim that no valid in flagrante delicto arrest was made prior to the seizure
and that the police officers placed accused-appellants under arrest even when there was
no evidence that an offense was being committed. Since there was no warrant of arrest,
they argue that the search sans a search warrant subsequently made on them was
illegal. They contend that a seizure of any evidence as a result of an illegal search is
inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose.
ISSUE: Whether there was a valid warrantless search.
RULING: YES. Art. III, SEC. 2 of the Constitution provides that The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
A settled exception to the right guaranteed in the aforequoted provision is that of an
arrest made during the commission of a crime, which does not require a warrant. Such
warrantless arrest is considered reasonable and valid under Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which states:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;XX
The foregoing proviso refers to arrest in flagrante delicto. In the instant case, contrary to
accused-appellants contention, there was indeed a valid warrantless arrest in flagrante
delicto.
Consider the circumstances immediately prior to and surrounding the arrest of accusedappellants: (1) the police officers received information from an operative about an
ongoing shipment of contraband; (2) the police officers, with the operative, proceeded to
Villa Vicenta Resort in Barangay Bignay II, Sariaya, Quezon; (3) they observed the
goings-on at the resort from a distance of around 50 meters; and (4) they spotted the six
accused-appellants loading transparent bags containing a white substance into a white
L-300 van.
The arresting police officers had probable cause to suspect that accused-appellants
were loading and transporting contraband, more so when Hwan, upon being accosted,
readily mentioned that they were loading shabu and pointed to Tan as their leader. Thus,
the arrest of accused-appellantswho were caught in flagrante delicto of possessing,
and in the act of loading into a white L-300 van, shabu, a prohibited drug under RA 6425
is valid.
In People v. Alunday, we held that when a police officer sees the offense, although at a
distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby, and proceeds at once to the scene,
he may effect an arrest without a warrant on the basis of Sec. 5(a), Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court, as the offense is deemed committed in his presence or within his view. In
the instant case, it can be argued that accused-appellants were committing the offense
of possessing shabu and were in the act of loading them in a white van when the police
officers arrested them. As aptly noted by the appellate court, the crime was committed in
the presence of the police officers with the contraband, inside transparent plastic
containers, in plain view and duly observed by the arresting officers.
The Court also notes that accused-appellants are deemed to have waived their
objections to their arrest for not raising the issue before entering their plea.
Moreover, present in the instant case are all the elements of illegal possession of drugs:
(1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited
drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and
consciously possesses the said drug. Accused-appellants were positively identified in
court as the individuals caught loading and possessing illegal drugs. They were found to
be in possession of prohibited drugs without proof that they were duly authorized by law
to possess them. Having been caught in flagrante delicto, there is, therefore, a prima
facie evidence of animus possidendi on the part of accused-appellants. There is, thus,
no merit to the argument of the defense that a warrant was needed to arrest accusedappellants.
Accused-appellants were not able to show that there was any truth to their allegation of
a frame-up in rebutting the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. They relied on
mere denials, in contrast with the testimony of Capt. Ibon, who testified that he and his
team saw accused-appellants loading plastic bags with a white crystalline substance into
an L-300 van at the Villa Vicenta Resort. Accused-appellants, except for Tan, claimed
that they were ordered by the police officers to act like they were loading bags onto the

van. Accused-appellant Tan told a different tale and claims he was arrested inside a
restaurant. But as the trial court found, the persons who could have corroborated their
version of events were not presented in court. The only witness presented by Tan, a
tricycle driver whose testimony corroborated Tans alone, was not found by the trial court
to be credible.
As no ill motive can be imputed to the prosecutions witnesses, we uphold the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties and affirm the trial courts
finding that the police officers testimonies are deserving of full faith and credit. Appellate
courts generally will not disturb the trial courts assessment of a witness credibility
unless certain material facts and circumstances have been overlooked or arbitrarily
disregarded.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED.
REBELLION
People v Hernandez
99 Phil. 515 (May 30, 1964)
Facts: This refers to the petition for bail filed by defendant appellant Amado Hernandez
on June 26, 1954, and renewed on December 22, 1955. The prosecution maintains that
Hernandez is charged with, and has been convicted of, rebellion complexed with
murders, arsons and robberies, for which the capital punishment, it is claimed, may be
imposed, although the lower court sentenced him merely to life imprisonment. On the
other hand, the defense contends, among other things, that rebellion can not be
complexed with murder, arson, or robbery.
The amended Information contained the allegation that on or about March 15, 1945, and
for some time before the said date and continuously thereafter until the present time, in
the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring, confederating, and
cooperating with each other, as well as with the 31 other defendants, being then officers
and/or members of, or otherwise associated with the Congress of Labor Organizations
(CLO), formerly known as the Committee on Labor Organization (CLO), did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously help, support, promote, maintain, cause, direct
and/or command the 'Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan' (HMB) or the Hukbalahaps
(Huks) to rise publicly and take arms against the Republic of the Philippines, or
otherwise participate in such armed public uprising, for the purpose of removing the
territory of the Philippines from the allegiance to the government and laws thereof, as in
fact the said Huks have risen publicly and taken arms to attain the said purpose by then
and there making armed raids, sorties and ambushes, attacks against police,
constabulary and army detachments as well as innocent civilians, and as a necessary
means to commit the crime of rebellion, in connection therewith and in furtherance
thereof, have then and there committed acts of murder, pillage, looting, plunder, arson,
and planned destruction of private and public property to create and spread chaos,
disorder, terror, and fear so as to facilitate the accomplishment of the aforesaid purpose.
Issue: Can Rebellion be made into a complex crime?
Held: No, it cannot.

Wherefore, the aforementioned motion for bail of defendant-appellant Amado V.

Hernandez is hereby granted and, upon the filing of a bond, with sufficient sureties, in
the sum of P30,000, and its approval by the court, let said defendant-appellant be
provisionally released. It is so ordered.
Ratio: Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that: "When a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary
means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed,
the same to be applied in its maximum period."
Pursuant to Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code "any person, merely participating or
executing the commands of others in a rebellion shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor
in its minimum period."
The penalty is increased to prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P20,000 for "any
person who promotes, maintains or heads a rebellion or insurrection or who, while
holding any public office or employment, takes part therein":
1. "engaging in war against the forces of the government",
2. "destroying property", or
3. "committing serious violence",
4. "exacting contributions or"
5. "diverting public funds from the lawful purpose for which they have been
appropriated".
Whether performed singly or collectively, these five (5) classes of acts constitute only
one offense, and no more, and are, altogether, subject to only one penalty prision
mayor and a fine not to exceed P20,000.
One of the means by which rebellion may be committed, in the words of said Article 135,
is by "engaging in war against the forces of the government" and "committing serious
violence" in the prosecution of said "war". These expressions imply everything that war
connotes, namely; resort to arms, requisition of property and services, collection of taxes
and contributions, restraint of liberty, damage to property, physical injuries and loss of
life, and the hunger, illness and unhappiness that war leaves in its wake except that,
very often, it is worse than war in the international sense, for it involves internal struggle,
a fight between brothers, with a bitterness and passion or ruthlessness seldom found in
a contest between strangers. Being within the purview of "engaging in war" and
"committing serious violence", said resort to arms, with the resulting impairment or
destruction of life and property, constitutes not two or more offense, but only one crime
that of rebellion plain and simple. Inasmuch as the acts specified in said Article 135
constitute, one single crime, it follows
necessarily that said acts offer no occasion for the application of Article 48, which
requires therefor the commission of, at least, two crimes.
Political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as such
common crimes as may be committed to achieve a political purpose. The decisive factor
is the intent or motive. If a crime usually regarded as common like homicide, is
perpetrated for the purpose of removing from the allegiance "to the Government the
territory of the Philippines Islands or any part thereof," then said offense becomes
stripped of its "common" complexion, inasmuch as, being part and parcel of the crime of
rebellion, the former acquires the political character of the latter.

There is one other reason and a fundamental one at that why Article 48 of our
Penal Code cannot be applied in the case at bar: If murder were not complexed with
rebellion, and the two crimes were punished separately (assuming that this could be
done), the following penalties would be imposable upon the movant, namely: (1) for the
crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in the corresponding
period, depending upon the modifying circumstances present, but never exceeding 12
years of prision mayor; and (2) for the crime of murder, reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death, depending upon the modifying circumstances present. In
other words, in the absence of aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty could not
be imposed upon him. However, under Article 48, said penalty would have to be meted
out to him, even in the absence of a single aggravating circumstance. Thus, said
provision, if construed in conformity with the theory of the prosecution, would be
unfavorable to the movant. Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted for the
purpose of favoring the culprit, not of sentencing him to a penalty more severe than that
which would be proper if the several acts performed by him were punished separately.
Enrile vs Salazar
186 SCRA 217 June 5, 1990
FACTS: In February 1990, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested for the crime of
rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder. The warrant of arrest was issued
by Judge Jaime Salazar. Said crime arose from the failed coup attempts against then
president Corazon Aquino. There was no bail set for Enrile due to the seriousness of the
crime charged against him. Enrile was then brought to Camp Karingal. Enrile later filed a
petition for habeas corpus questioning his detention and alleging that the crime being
charged against him is nonexistent. He insists that there is no such crime as rebellion
with murder and multiple frustrated murder. Enrile invoked the ruling in the landmark
case of People vs Hernandez where it was ruled that rebellion cannot be complexed with
common crimes such as murder; as such, the proper crime that should have been
charged against him is simple rebellion which is bailable.
Enrile also questioned the regularity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest against him.
He claimed that it only took Judge Salazar one hour and twenty minutes (from
the raffling of the case to him) to issue the warrant. Enrile claimed that such period is so
short that it was impossible for the judge to have been able to examine the voluminous
record of the case from the prosecutions office that being, the constitutional provision
that a judge may only issue a warrant of arrest after personally determining the
existence of probable cause has not been complied with.
For the prosecution, the Solicitor General argued that the Hernandez ruling
should be abandoned and that it should be ruled that rebellion cannot absorb more
serious crimes like murder.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Hernandez ruling should be abandoned.
2. Whether or not Judge Salazar personally determined probable cause in the case at
bar.
HELD:
1. No, the said case is still good law. The Supreme Court also noted that there was
actually a previous law (P.D. 942) which sought to abandon the Hernandez doctrine. The
said law provided that graver crimes may not be complexed with rebellion. However,

President Corazon Aquino repealed said law (by virtue of the power granted to her by
the 1986 Freedom Constitution). That being, the Hernandez doctrine, which reflects the
rebellion law under the Revised Penal Code, still stands. The courts cannot change this
because courts can only interpret laws. Only Congress can change the rebellion law
(which the SC suggested in order to strengthen the rebellion law). But as it stands, Enrile
is correct, there is no such crime as rebellion with murder. Common crimes such as
murder are absorbed. He can only be charged with rebellion which is bailable.
2. Yes. There is nothing irregular on the fact that Judge Salazar only took an hour and
twenty minutes to issue the warrant from the time the case was raffled to him despite the
fact that the prosecution transmitted quite a voluminous record from the preliminary
investigation it conducted. It is sufficient that the judge follows established procedure by
personally evaluating the report and the supporting documents submitted by the
prosecutor. Just because Judge Salazar had what some might consider only a relatively
brief period within which to comply with that duty, gives no reason to assume that he had
not, or could not have, so complied; nor does that single circumstance suffice to
overcome the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.