The Largest Nuclear Weapons
The Largest Nuclear Weapons
Contents:
Russia's R-36M2 Voyevoda (SS-18 Mod 6) with a 20 mt warhead (possibly 5 deployed). (The UR-100N version (SS-19 Mod
2) with a 5 mt warhead may no longer be deployed.)
PRC's DF-5A (CSS-4) with a 5 mt warhead (about 24 deployed).
There is still considerable uncertainty on some of the issues discussed here. While much information on U.S. nuclear warhead history
is available, information is still scanty on some high-yield nuclear weapons. Information now available on the former Soviet/current
Russian arsenal is limited regarding its largest weapons, and considerable inconsistencies in available information remain.
The following graphs provide estimates of the total numbers and yield of U.S./Soviet/Russian high-yield weapons (those with
individual yields over 4.5 megatons). Note that these estimates are based on models of stockpile history, and that total stockpile
numbers and yields may not correspond to other figures on this web site.
The U.S. and U.S.S.R. have conducted a total of 23 nuclear tests of at least 4 megatons each. The U.S. from 1952 to 1962 detonated 11
such devices above ground plus one underground in 1971. The total yield of these was 105 mt for an average of 9 mt each. The largest
of these was a 15 mt test in 1954. In turn, the U.S.S.R. detonated 12 such multi-megaton devices above ground in 1961 and 1962, plus
one underground in 1973. Their total yield was 200 mt, for an average of 15 mt each. The largest Soviet test was a 58 mt test in 1961.
The total fission yield of all 22 above ground tests was about 124 mt (54 mt from U.S. tests and 70 mt from Soviet tests).
type of
system
stock
entry
IOC
off alert
retired
warhead
type
weight
(kg)
yield
(mt)
no. built
EC14
NGB
Feb 1954
13133
6.9
EC16
NGB
Mar 1954
~17000?
7.5
EC17
NGB
May 1954
18900
11
Mk-17
NGB
Oct 1954
Oct 1954
1957
18900
~12.5
200
B21
NGB
Dec 1955
1956
1957
Nov 1957
7000
4.5
275
EC24
NGB
Apr 1954
18900
13.5
10
Mk-24
NGB
Oct 1954
Oct 1954
1956
18900
~15
105
B27
NGB
Nov 1958
1958
1964
Jul 1964
1430
~5
700
NGB
Apr 1956
1956
~1961
Jan 1962
NGB
Sep 1960
1960
1976
Jul 1976
NGB
Aug 1962
~Oct
1962
1997
2006
B36 Y1
B36 Y2
B41 Y1
B41 Y2
B53 Y1
7900
4840
4010
9.5
6
~25
~9.3
9
940
500
340
B53 Y2
Jun 1964
~1964
3860
May
1987
~1988
2-stage TN
3690
60
1290
~4.8
39
ICBM
Dec 1962
Apr 1963
W71 (Spartan)
ABM
Jul 1974
Explanation: IOC=initial operational capability, NGB=nuclear gravity bomb, ICBM=intercontinental ballistic missile,
ABM=antiballistic missile, TN=thermonuclear, clean/dirty refers to low/high fission yield fraction, respectively. See text for sources.
emergency capability versions he gives 11 mt for the EC17 and 13.5 mt for the EC24)[3]; NRDC reports 10-15 mt.[4] Nuclear test
yields include 11 mt for the EC17 in shot Castle Romeo on 27 March 1954 and 13.5 mt for the EC24 in shot Castle Yankee on 5 May
1954.[5] Based on this the best estimates here are yields of 11 mt for the EC17, ~12.5 mt for the Mk-17, 13.5 mt for the EC24, and
~15 mt for the Mk-24.
The Mk-41 was the only three-stage thermonuclear weapon ever deployed by the U.S. It weighed 4,840 kilograms and was 3.8 meters
long.[6] It could be carried by the B-52 or the B-47.[7] While about 500 were built from September 1960 to June 1962, retirement
began in November 1963 and the last B41s withdrawn in July 1976.[6]
Best estimate here is that the B41 was produced in at least two versions, one of which had a yield of 25 mt--the highest yield weapon
ever built by the U.S. It is likely that only a small fraction of the weapons built were the high yield version, and that these were the
first ones retired (in the 1960s). These conclusions are based on the following:
In 1962 DOE declassified the statement "The U.S. has a nuclear weapon in stockpile with a yield of approximately 25
megatons." [8]
A 25 mt yield for the B41 would give it a yield-to-weight ratio of 5.2 kilotons/kilogram. While this would require a far greater
efficiency than any other U.S. weapon (at least 40% efficiency in a fusion fuel of lithium deuteride), this was apparently
attainable. In 1963 DOE declassified statements that the U.S. had the technological capability of deploying a 35 mt warhead on
the Titan II, or a 50-60 mt gravity bomb on B-52s.[8] Neither weapon was pursued (the Titan II was deployed with a 9 mt
warhead), but either would require yield-to-weight ratios superior to a 25-mt B41.
While in 1989 Chuck Hansen gave a yield of "less than 10 megatons" for the B41,[1] he gave two yields in 1995: "less than 10
megatons" and "25 MT...the highest-yield weapon ever stockpiled [by the U.S.]".[6] His discussion suggests that two versions
were developed: a high yield "dirty" version and a low yield "clean" version. The NRDC gives a yield of 10 mt.[4]
A TX-41 prototype was tested in shot Hardtack Poplar with a yield of 9.3 mt.[5] This may correspond to the low yield Mk-41
version.
DOE has released cumulative stockpile data, including numbers of stockpiled warheads each fiscal year and total stockpile
yield each fiscal year.[9] This data is inconsistent with all B41s having a 25 mt yield, but are consistent with limited numbers
of a high yield version which were then retired early.
Development of the B53 was ordered as a replace for the B41.[10] This may be interpreted as a continuation of the shift away
from high-yield and/or dirty weapons. Note that with the exceptions of the B41 and B53, all other multi-megaton strategic
bombs were retired by 1964.
The B21 weighed about 7,000 kg and was produced in both clean and dirty versions;[3, 15] a clean version was tested in shot
Redwing Navajo on 11 July 1956 at a yield of 4.5 mt.[5] From December 1955 to July 1956 about 275 units were produced. They
were all converted to B36-Y1 weapons from June to November 1957.[15]
The B27 weighed 1,430 kg and had a yield of about 5 mt. About 700 were produced between November 1958 and June 1959. All were
retired between November 1962 and July 1964.[86]
The 7,900 kg B36 NGB was also produced in a dirty version (B36-Y1) and clean version (B36-Y2). The B36-Y1 had a yield of about
9.5 mt, while that of the B36-Y2 was 6 mt; most of the 940 units built were probably the high yield, dirty version.[16, 17]
In January 1963 the U.S. began development of a two-layered anti-ballistic missile system which would eventually be named
Safeguard, with the two ABMs being Spartan and Sprint. The first layer, the Spartan missile, was an exo-atmospheric ABM using a
high-yield thermonuclear warhead (the W71) to intercept incoming warheads outside the atmosphere. The second was Sprint, an endoatmospheric high-acceleration ABM using a low-yield warhead to intercept surviving warheads within the atmosphere.[26]
The W71's yield was too large for underground testing at the Nevada Test Site, so Amchitka Island in the Alaskan Aleutians was
selected as a site. To evaluate concerns over this site, a test of 1.2 megatons was conducted at Amchitka on 2 October 1969 (Milrow).
Political opposition to the W71 test (and the Safeguard ABM system in general) included an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court
attempting to block the test on the scheduled day; the Court rejected the appeal 4-3, allowing the test to procede.[27] On 6 November
1971 the Spartan's warhead, the W71, was tested at full yield in shot Cannikin of Operation Grommet. At the bottom of a 1.76 kmdeep shaft,[27] the warhead's yield was reported as "approximately" 5 mt[26] or "less than 5 megatons"[27], estimated here as about
4.8 megatons.
The first W71 units were completed in July 1974, and full production ran from October 1974 to July 1975 [26] by which time 39
warheads had been built.[28] The W71 warhead was "tailored": using a layer of gold around the thermonuclear secondary, the output
of x-rays was maximized to achieve a more efficient kill of targeted warheads.[26]
The SALT I treaty, signed 26 May 1972, limited the U.S. and U.S.S.R. each to a pair of 100-missile ABM sites; an additional protocol
signed 3 July 1974 reduced this to one such site each. The U.S. selected a site near Grand Forks AFB in North Dakota for the
Safeguard site, named the Stanley R. Mickelsen Safeguard Complex,[29] which would provide limited protection to the Grand Forks
AFB Minuteman ICBM field.
The first ABMs were emplaced at Grand Forks in late 1974. The first ABMs were placed on alert in April 1975, with 8 Spartans and
28 Sprints operational. The full complement of 30 Spartans and 70 Sprints became operational on 1 October 1975, with all 30 Spartans
at the MSR site near Nekoma, North Dakota.[30]
The following day, 2 October 1975, the
down the Safeguard site. The U.S. Senate
1975, and that month the Safeguard site
site began 10 February 1976.[31, 32, 33]
The Spartan missiles and warheads were retained in inactive storage until the 1990s. The warheads were dismantled in 1995.[34]
complete disassmblies of remaining W56 and W79 warheads from October 2001 to September 2003.[41, 42, 43, 44, 45] In 2002 it
was reported that the last B53s, about 35, were to be soon dismantled.[46, 47] DOE documents suggest that some issues still had to be
worked out (including transportation from temporary storage at Kirtland Air Force Base in New Mexico[49, 50]), plus disassembly
efforts remained concentrated on other warheads (including the W70[51]). Funds for B53 disassembly were included in the
FY2004[49] and FY2005[52] budgets and were requested for FY2006[51], but it appears that disassembly efforts remain suspended
pending resolution of safety and logistics issues.[48] Plans were then to resume B53 disassemblies after completion of W76 and W80
disassemblies (planned completion in September 2007), along with implementation of the Seamless Safety 21 or SS-21 program for
the B53.[54] These SS-21 plans were still being developed as of December 2007,[87] and the first W80 disassembly under SS-21 was
not completed until the last week of October 2007.[88] As of August 2008, SS-21 disassemblies of the remaining B53s are scheduled
to begin in September 2009.[100] In early 2009, it was reported that the first B53 disassemblies under SS-21 would be delayed until
December 2009, which would push back completion of B53 disassemblies until after September 2010 without more resources.[101,
102]
Following removal of the B53 from service, the highest yield U.S. weapon is the variable yield B83, with a maximum yield of 1.2 mt.
[53]
type
stock
entry
IOC
weight
(kg)
yield
(mt)
no. built
ICBM
1950
~6
0-320
R-9A (SS-8)
ICBM
1800
~5
23-46
ICBM
7000
18
140-290
ICBM
1966
7000
25
140-290
1980
[8F675]
R-36O 8K69 Tsiklon (SS-9 Mod 3)
FOBS
5000
~20
0-20
ICBM
1977
3500
~5
10-30
ICBM
7500
24
20-60
ICBM
1976
7300
20
20-60
ICBM
Aug 1990
9000
20
20
ICBM
1977
3500
~5
60
NGB
27000
~150
0-5
NGB
50
0-20
NGB
~20
0-120
~5
NGB
1984
1990
~5000?
The yield of the 30 October 1961 test remains the subject of some debate. Best estimate here is that the actual yield was 57-58 mt,
based on the following:
The U.S. estimate of 57-58 mt was based on bhangmeter (high-speed photometer) observations and other data from a USAF
KC-135 flown near the blast--apparently to within 45 km--as analyzed by the Foreign Weapons Evaluation Panel (or Bethe
Panel) to determine the yield.[63, 96, 97]
A yield of 58 mt has been affirmed in scientific publications by Russian experts on the Soviet testing program.[99]
Nikita Khrushchev in his memoirs claims that the device yield was estimated before the test as 50 mt, and that the actual yield
proved greater at 57 mt.[91]
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, official Russian sources (e.g. the Russian atomic energy ministry) have released
information on Soviet nuclear tests, reporting a yield of 50 mt.[66, 92] In many cases, discrepancies between the new Russian
data and older Western estimates represent the large uncertainties involved in Western intelligence efforts to estimate yields
from remote observation. In this case the U.S. data was acquired from close at hand (sufficiently close that the U.S. KC-135
suffered scorching on the fuselage from the flash[96]). Discrepancies with Russian data may represent continued Russian
secrecy (e.g. exact yields for several high yield Soviet tests are still unannounced by Russia [92]), combined with the desire to
minimize the issue of fallout associated with the test. The current Russian figures for the Tsar Bomba test, 50 mt yield at 4000
m altitude, place it safely 9% above the Russian agency's threshold defining "air explosions," where "the expanding fireball
does not touch the ground surface" [98], whereas the Western data of 57-58 mt yield at 3500 m altitude place it 9% below this
threshold.
Thus the issue regarding the test yield is plausibly explained by the test exceeding its predicted yield by 15% (still close to design
yield, given U.S. test experience) at an actual yield of 57-58 mt, with the current Russian government finding various reasons to prefer
the 50 mt yield figure.
Another device tested the following year had a nominal yield of 50 mt. Tested at a reduced yield of 24.2 mt on 24 December 1962 at
Novaya Zemlya, it was designed at Chelyabinsk-70 (as opposed to Arzamas-16 for the RDS-220)[66].
Whether either of these weapons was operational is unknown. The RDS-220 was probably never operational: only the single specially
modified Tu-95V could carry it, and when doing so it would have been particularly vulnerable to anti-aircraft action. The 50-mt
Chelyabinsk-70 device might have weighed 10-15 metric tons, based on comparison to other Soviet warheads of the time. Thus it was
probably deliverable by unmodified Tu-95M Bear bombers, which could carry 15 metric tons of payload (albeit to a reduced range).
[68] Any operational deployment was probably only for a short time since bomber forces were converting to cruise missiles, but the
weapons could have remained in the stockpile as late as the 1980s, given the apparent slow pace of Soviet warhead disassembly.
The Soviets briefly considered developing an ICBM capable of carrying the 150-mt RDS-220 warhead or a similarly large warhead.
Of several proposed missiles, only the UR-500 reached the flight stage, by which time any nuclear-armed version was abandoned in
favor of using the UR-500 exclusively as a space launch vehicle.[69]
The final version, the R-36P (Western designation SS-9 Mod 4) carried 3 warheads, not independently targetable. Each warhead had a
yield between 2 and 5 mt.[70, 71]
The R-36 went on alert on 9 November 1966, and 268 of all four versions were deployed in underground silos. All were retired by
1978 except for some R-36O versions. The R-36O FOBS version, which went on alert 25 August 1969, was retained in small numbers
until January 1983, when the SALT II treaty was completed and barred their deployment.[70, 71]
Mod 6), with the 15F175 warhead providing a 20-mt yield, was deployed in small numbers begining in August 1990.[72, 73] The
single-warhead R-36M2 is the highest yield nuclear weapon currently deployed by any nation.
MULTIMEGATON TESTS
The Largest Nuclear Tests
by Wm. Robert Johnston
2 February 2008
Contents:
location
lat/long
name
HOB (m)
type
yield
(mt)
device
% fission
notes
31 Oct 1952
1915
IVY-Mike
Eniwetok
11.669N, 162.196E
11
surface
10.4
experimental
60%
1.9 km crater
28 Feb 1954
1845
CASTLE-Bravo
Bikini
11.69N, 165.27E
2
surface
15
TX-21
67%
2.0 km crater
26 Mar 1954
1830
CASTLE-Romeo
Bikini
11.69N, 165.27E
4
barge
11
EC17
64%
25 Apr 1954
1810
CASTLE-Union
Bikini
11.68N, 165.39E
4
barge
6.9
EC14
72%
04 May 1954
CASTLE-Yankee
1810
Bikini
11.68N, 165.39E
4
barge
13.5
EC24
52%
10 Jul 1956
1756
REDWING-Navajo
Bikini
11.68N, 165.39E
6
barge
4.5
TX-21C
5%
20 Jul 1956
1746
REDWING-Tewa
Bikini
11.68N, 165.34E
5
barge
5.01
TX-41?
87%
1.2 km crater
28 Jun 1958
1930
HARDTACK I-Oak
Eniwetok
11.606N, 162.108E
2
barge
8.9
TX-46/53?
56%
1.75 km crater
12 Jul 1958
HARDTACK I-Poplar
Bikini
9.3
TX-41
0.9 km crater
330
11.69N, 165.27E
barge
5%
27 Jun 1962
1519
DOMINIC I-Bighorn
Christmas Island
1.3N, 157.3W
3700
airdrop
7.65
experimental
30 Oct 1962
1602
DOMINIC II-Housatonic
Johnston Atoll
13.5N, 172W
3700
airdrop
8.3
experimental?
06 Nov 1971
2200
GROMMET-Cannikin
Amchitka Island
-1791
4.8
51.4719N, 179.1069E underground
W-71
low?
1.1 km crater
Explanation: GMT=Greenwich Mean Time, lat/long=latitude and longitude, HOB=height of burst above ground/water surface
(negative height indicates depth below surface), % fission=percentage of yield from fission, notes includes crater diameter if
applicable, "barge" indicates detonation on off-shore barge, "experimental" indicates device not closely related to a warhead design.
See text for sources.
in the series and was a test of the "Shrimp" TX-21 device, with a predicted yield of 6 megatons. The device had been placed at the end
of a causeway extending onto the reef 970 meters from the southwest tip of Namu island in Bikini Atoll. It was detonated at 6:45 AM
on 1 March local time (18:45 28 February Universal Time). Designers had significantly underestimated the efficiency of reactions
involving lithium-7 in the lithium deuteride solid fuel (one of the design innovations being tested); the actual yield was 15 megatons,
67% from fission.[2]
The higher-than-predicted yield combined with a wind shift shortly after detonation to cause casualties from fallout. On two U.S.
ships, 37 U.S. naval personnel--21 on the USS Philip and 16 on the USS Bairoko--received beta burns from fallout particles,
producing lesions which all healed without complications.[3] A Japanese fishing boat, the Fukuryu Maru (Lucky Dragon) was just
outside the 130-km radius restricted zone and received heavy fallout beginning about 1.5 hours after detonation. The 23 crewmembers
did not recognize the falling material as hazardous and made little effort to minimize their exposure to it; some crew members tasted
the fallout. Some crew members began developing radiation sickness within three days, and the entire crew developed acute radiation
sickness before the boat returned to Japan on 14 March. On return to Japan, the boat's owner recognized the crew was ill and called a
hospital, which referred the men for treatment the following day. One member of the Fukuryu Maru crew died of a liver disorder, a
complication from radiation sickness, on 23 September 1954.[4, 5]
Significant fallout also fell on inhabited islands west of Bikini under U.S. jurisdiction, exposing native islanders on Rongerik,
Rongelap, Ailinginae, and Utirik atolls, all of which were evacuated on 3 March. The highest doses were to the 64 inhabitants of
Rongelap Atoll (about 170 km from ground zero), some of whom received 175 rads before their evacuation 44 hours after the
detonation. Some reports indicate that Rongelap inhabitants (unaware of the nature of the fallout) did little to minimize exposure,
including inadvertent ingestion of fallout, contributing to acute radiation injury. Some evacuated inhabitants of downwind atolls later
developed thyroid hypofunction; thyroid exposure for some who were children at time of exposure is estimated at 700-1,400 rad and
at 325 rad for some adults. Those who were children at Rongelap show high frequencies of thyroid anomalies, and one 19-year old
male died in 1972 of leukemia (age 1 year at time of exposure).[4, 5, 6, 7, 8]
The W71 was the high-yield warhead developed for the Spartan ABM. The W71's yield was too large for underground testing at the
Nevada Test Site, so Amchitka Island in the Alaskan Aleutians was selected as a site. To evaluate concerns over this site, a test of 1.2
megatons was conducted at Amchitka on 2 October 1969 (Milrow). Political opposition to the W-71 test (and the Safeguard ABM
system in general) included an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court attempting to block the test on the scheduled day; the Court rejected
the appeal 4-3, allowing the test to procede.[9] On 6 November 1971 the Spartan's warhead, the W71, was tested at full yield in shot
Cannikin of Operation Grommet. At the bottom of a 1.76 km-deep shaft,[9] the warhead's yield was reported as "approximately" 5
mt[10] or "less than 5 megatons"[9], estimated here as about 4.8 megatons.
location
lat/long
HOB (m)
type
yield
device
notes
(mt) % fission
06 Oct 1961
0700:12.2
113
NZNTS-MB
74.3N, 51.6E
2700
atmospheric
23 Oct 1961
1030:48.0
123
NZNTS
70.70N, 54.56E
3500
airdrop
12.5
30 Oct 1961
0833:27.8
130
NZNTS
73.8N, 53.5E
3500
airdrop
58
31 Oct 1961
0829:17.2
131
NZNTS
73.6N, 56.2E
2200
atmospheric
05 Aug 1962
147
0908:45.8
NZNTS
74.2N, 52.5E
3600
atmospheric
21.1
25 Aug 1962
158
0900
NZNTS
73N, 55E
2980
atmospheric
10?
RDS-220
3%
27 Aug 1962
158
0900:50.9
NZNTS
74.7N, 50.3E
3000
atmospheric
4.2
19 Sep 1962
1100:56.4
168
NZNTS
73.8N, 53.8E
3280
atmospheric
10?
25 Sep 1962
1302:31.7
173
NZNTS
73.7N, 55.0E
4090
atmospheric
19.1
27 Sep 1962
0803:16.4
174
NZNTS
74.3N, 52.4E
3900
atmospheric
20?
22 Oct 1962
0906:10.1
183
NZNTS
73.4N, 54.9E
3230
atmospheric
8.2
24 Dec 1962
1111:42.0
219
NZNTS
73.6N, 57.5E
3750
atmospheric
24.2
27 Oct 1973
0700:00.61
392
NZNTS-SS
-1900?
4?
70.780N, 54.035E underground
clean?
(A test on 4 October reported by MINATOM as 1.5 to 10 mt has been estimated as about 3 mt.)
The 30 October test was that of the RDS-220 and was the highest yield nuclear detonation ever conducted. The largest nuclear weapon
ever developed by any nuclear power was the Soviet RDS-220,[14] also nicknamed "Big Ivan", "Vanya" or "Tsar Bomba" (King of
Bombs). It was a three-stage weapon weighing 24.8 metric tons and was 8 meters long. Its 2-meter diameter required a specially
modified version of the Tu-95 Bear bomber for delivery. The single such Tu-95V carried the RDS-220 partially protruding from the
bomb bay.[15, 16] The U.S.S.R. tested this design in an airdrop over Novaya Zemlya on 30 October 1961 at a yield of about 58
megatons.[17, 18, 22] However, this was a reduced yield "clean" version: the uranium sleeve on the tertiary stage was replaced with
lead, and the fission yield was only 3% of the total yield.[15] The full yield version had a yield variously reported as 100 mt [16] or
150 mt [14]. About 80% of the fallout from the "Tsar Bomba" test was deposited as global fallout.[19]
Some sources report the burst altitude as 3500 m[12], while Russian sources give the burst altitude as 4000 m[20]. It was dropped
from the Tu-95V bomber from an altitude of 10,500 m by parachute, allowing the bomber to reach a distance of 45 km before
detonation. Reportedly buildings were damaged by the blast "hundreds of kilometers" from ground zero.[21]
The yield of the 30 October 1961 test remains the subject of some debate. Best estimate here is that the actual yield was 57-58 mt,
based on the following:
The U.S. estimate of 57-58 mt was based on bhangmeter (high-speed photometer) observations and other data from a USAF
KC-135 flown near the blast--apparently to within 45 km--as analyzed by the Foreign Weapons Evaluation Panel (or Bethe
Panel) to determine the yield.[15, 23, 24]
A yield of 58 mt has been affirmed in scientific publications by Russian experts on the Soviet testing program.[29]
Nikita Khrushchev in his memoirs claims that the device yield was estimated before the test as 50 mt, and that the actual yield
proved greater at 57 mt.[26]
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, official Russian sources (e.g. the Russian atomic energy ministry) have released
information on Soviet nuclear tests, reporting a yield of 50 mt.[20, 25] In many cases, discrepancies between the new Russian
data and older Western estimates represent the large uncertainties involved in Western intelligence efforts to estimate yields
from remote observation. In this case the U.S. data was acquired from close at hand (sufficiently close that the U.S. KC-135
suffered scorching on the fuselage from the flash[23]). Discrepancies with Russian data may represent continued Russian
secrecy (e.g. exact yields for several high yield Soviet tests are still unannounced by Russia [20]), combined with the desire to
minimize the issue of fallout associated with the test. The current Russian figures for the Tsar Bomba test, 50 mt yield at 4000
m altitude, place it safely 9% above the Russian agency's threshold defining "air explosions," where "the expanding fireball
does not touch the ground surface" [27], whereas the Western data of 57-58 mt yield at 3500 m altitude place it 9% below this
threshold.
Thus the issue regarding the test yield is plausibly explained by the test exceeding its predicted yield by 15% (still close to design
yield, given U.S. test experience) at an actual yield of 57-58 mt, with the current Russian government finding various reasons to prefer
the 50 mt yield figure.
The 1962 test series included up to eight tests over 4 mt (the yield of several are uncertain). These high yield tests were all conducted
at Novaya Zemlya. MINATOM-reported burst height and yield and Western yield estimates are:
The 19 September and (probably) the 27 September tests were competing designs for a high-yield warhead, probably for ICBM
delivery. Andrei Sakharov describes his unsuccessful efforts to stop the test of the competing design on the grounds that it would
unnessecarily increase global fallout.[28] The last multimegaton test, that on 24 December, was a reduced yield version of the
Chelyabinsk high-yield weapon design (yield of the full-yield version was 50 mt).[12, 25]
Two high yield tests were conducted underground at the southern island of Novaya Zemlya in 1973. At least one probably exceeded 4
mt in yield. The yield of these and other Soviet underground tests were the subject of debate in the West for years, with some sources
suggesting that published yield estimates were too high. Based on recent information from Russian sources, it appears if anything that
the Western estimates had been too low. MINATOM has reported a total yield of 7.8 mt for the two 1973 tests at Novaya Zemlya. The
first test, on 12 September, involved a salvo detonation of one device reported as 1.5 to 10 mt in yield plus two with yields between
0.15 and 1.5 mt. The total yield for this test was about 4 mt. The test on 27 October is reported by MINATOM as between 1.5 and 10
mt in yield. Western estimates have ranged from 2.8 to 4.9 mt; recent reports place the yield at 3.5 mt. If this is correct, the 12
September test yield was about 4.2 mt, of which about 3-3.5 mt was the larger device.[12, 13, 25, 30, 31, 32] Both tests were probably
reduced yield versions of warheads for ICBMs nearing deployment.
blast
flash
prompt radiation
50% fatal 50% fatal
50% fatal
(km)
(km)
(km)
0.01
0.15
0.074
0.30
0.1
0.32
0.22
0.54
0.3
0.46
0.37
0.70
0.69
0.64
0.87
1.0
1.0
1.0
10
1.5
1.7
1.2
20
1.9
2.2
1.4
50
2.5
3.0
1.6
100
3.2
3.9
1.7
200
4.0
4.9
1.8
500
5.5
6.4
2.0
1000
6.9
7.8
2.1
3000
10
10
2.3
20000
19
15
2.8
150000 37
22
3.2
(kt)
(m)
(km)
(m)
0.01
0.023
46
0.1
19
0.080
100
0.3
26
0.15
140
37
0.28
210
52
0.52
310
10
74
1.0
460
20
91
1.5
580
50
120
2.5
790
100
150
3.6
1000
200
180
5.3
1200
500
240
8.7
1700
1000
300
13
2100
3000
410
23
3100
20000
730
66
5800
200
11300
150000 1300
yield
5 psi overpressure,
50% fatalities
1 psi overpressure,
some injuries
slant range GZ range arrival time slant range GZ range arrival time slant range GZ range arrival time
(kt)
(km)
(km)
(s)
(km)
(km)
(s)
(km)
(km)
(s)
0.01
0.070
0.053
0.084
0.15
0.14
0.30
0.38
0.37
1.0
0.1
0.15
0.11
0.18
0.32
0.30
0.64
0.81
0.81
2.1
0.3
0.22
0.16
0.26
0.46
0.44
0.92
1.2
1.2
3.0
0.32
0.24
0.39
0.69
0.66
1.4
1.8
1.7
4.6
0.47
0.35
0.56
1.0
0.95
2.0
2.5
2.5
6.6
10
0.70
0.53
0.84
1.5
1.4
3.0
3.8
3.7
10
20
0.88
0.66
1.1
1.9
1.8
3.7
4.8
4.7
12
50
1.2
0.90
1.4
2.5
2.4
5.1
6.4
6.4
17
100
1.5
1.1
1.8
3.2
3.0
6.4
8.1
8.1
21
200
1.9
1.4
2.3
4.0
3.8
8.1
10
10
27
500
2.6
1.9
3.1
5.5
5.2
11
14
14
36
1000
3.2
2.4
3.9
6.9
6.6
14
18
17
46
3000
4.7
3.5
5.6
10
9.5
20
25
25
66
20000
8.8
6.6
11
19
18
37
48
47
120
150000 17
13
21
37
35
73
93
92
240
time to
time for 80% ignition of cardboard/wood 50% third degree burns 50% first degree burns
maximum thermal
intensity
of thermal
release
slant range
GZ range
slant range
GZ range
(s)
(s)
(km)
(km)
(km)
(km)
(kt)
(km)
0.01
0.005
0.03
0.045
N/A
0.074
0.058
0.13
0.12
0.1
0.015
0.08
0.14
0.10
0.22
0.20
0.39
0.38
0.3
0.025
0.13
0.23
0.18
0.37
0.34
0.64
0.62
0.042
0.22
0.41
0.35
0.64
0.60
1.1
1.1
0.068
0.35
0.69
0.62
1.0
0.97
1.7
1.7
10
0.12
0.60
1.2
1.1
1.7
1.6
2.6
2.6
20
0.16
0.81
1.6
1.5
2.2
2.1
3.4
3.4
50
0.23
1.2
2.3
2.2
3.0
2.9
4.6
4.5
100
0.32
1.6
3.0
2.8
3.9
3.7
5.6
5.5
200
0.43
2.2
3.8
3.6
4.9
4.7
6.9
6.8
500
0.64
3.3
5.1
4.8
6.4
6.2
8.8
8.6
1000
0.87
4.5
6.3
5.9
7.8
7.5
10
10
3000
1.4
7.4
7.7
7.0
10
9.7
13
13
20000
3.3
17
12
10
15
14
19
18
150000 7.9
41
17
13
22
18
25
23
ignition of cardboard/wood 50% third degree burns 50% first degree burns
slant range
GZ range
slant range
GZ range
(km)
(km)
(km)
(km)
(kt)
(km)
0.01
0.045
N/A
0.075
0.06
0.13
0.12
0.1
0.14
0.10
0.22
0.20
0.40
0.39
0.3
0.24
0.19
0.38
0.35
0.67
0.66
0.43
0.38
0.68
0.64
1.2
1.2
0.73
0.66
1.1
1.1
1.9
1.9
10
1.3
1.2
1.9
1.8
3.3
3.3
20
1.8
1.7
2.6
2.5
4.4
4.4
50
2.8
2.6
3.9
3.8
6.5
6.5
100
3.8
3.6
5.3
5.2
8.7
8.6
200
5.1
5.0
7.1
7.0
12
12
500
7.6
7.4
10
10
17
16
1000
10
10
14
14
21
21
3000
14
13
21
21
31
31
20000
26
25
39
39
54
54
150000 46
45
67
66
86
85
assumed fission
yield fraction
(kt)
1500 rad prompt radiation, 450 rad prompt radiation, 100 rad prompt radiation,
100% fatal
50% fatal
some radiation sickness
slant range
GZ range
slant range
GZ range
slant range
GZ range
(km)
(km)
(km)
(km)
(km)
(km)
(%)
0.01
100
0.20
0.19
0.30
0.30
0.44
0.44
0.1
100
0.38
0.37
0.54
0.53
0.75
0.74
0.3
100
0.53
0.51
0.70
0.69
0.91
0.90
100
0.70
0.67
0.87
0.84
1.1
1.1
100
0.85
0.79
1.0
1.0
1.3
1.3
10
100
1.0
0.93
1.2
1.2
1.5
1.5
20
100
1.2
1.0
1.4
1.2
1.7
1.6
50
100
1.3
1.1
1.6
1.3
1.9
1.7
100
100
1.4
1.1
1.7
1.4
2.0
1.8
200
85
1.6
1.0
1.8
1.4
2.2
1.8
500
75
1.7
0.26
2.0
1.0
2.3
1.6
1000
50
1.8
N/A
2.1
N/A
2.5
1.2
3000
50
2.0
N/A
2.3
N/A
2.7
N/A
20000
50
2.5
N/A
2.8
N/A
3.1
N/A
150000 50
3.0
N/A
3.2
N/A
3.7
N/A
Part 3: Russia
Part 4: United Kingdom, France, and P.R. China
Part 5: Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran
Part 6: Summary data
These tables summarize world strategic and theater nuclear forces. In addition to forces traditionally classified as strategic,
information on theater nuclear forces (range in excess of 500 km) are included, since many of these forces are (or could be) assigned
strategic missions (in contrast to tactical, or battlefield, missions). Numbers of deployed systems are given for January 1992 (end of
the Cold War), January 2000, March 2008 (present), and December 2012 (approximate culmination of START retirements).
These pages are under construction.
Strategic systems include:
These tables summarize world strategic and theater nuclear forces. In addition to forces traditionally classified as strategic,
information on theater nuclear forces (range in excess of 500 km) are included, since many of these forces are (or could be) assigned
strategic missions (in contrast to tactical, or battlefield, missions). Numbers of deployed systems are given for January 1992 (end of
the Cold War), January 2000, March 2008 (present), and December 2012 (approximate culmination of START retirements).
These pages are under construction. Please refer to the Introduction for further details, explanation of table and abbreviations, and
sources.
United States
type
system
ICBM
Minuteman II
warhead
1 x 1.2 mt
W56 (tn)
cep range
(m) (km)
number deployed
Jan Jan Mar Dec
1992 2000 2008 2012
450 13000
450
190 13000
200
200
notes
sources
C84a, N92a,
N00a, N06a
1 x 170 kt
W62 (bf?)
190 .
30
1 x 300 kt
W87 (tn)
100 .
120
200
3 x 335 kt
W78 (tn?)
190 11300
300
300
150
2 x 335 kt
W78 (tn?)
190 .
150
50
1 x 335 kt
W78 (tn?)
190 .
200
MX Peacekeeper
10 x 300 kt
W87-0 (tn)
80
11000
50
50
Minuteman IV
1x?
13000? 0
IOC in 2018?
N06a
16 per Lafayette/James
Madison/Benjamin
Franklin-class SSBN;
IOC Mar 1971, off alert
Oct 1991, retired Aug
1992
C84a, N92a
Minuteman III Mk
12A
SLBM
Poseidon
Trident I
10 x 40 kt
W68 (bf)
8 x 100 kt
W76 (bf?)
460 4600
160
300 7400
192
A98a, C84a,
N00a, N06a
C84a, N06a
A98a, C84a,
N92a, N00a,
N06a
A98a, C84a,
N00a, N06a
.
16 per James
Madison/Benjamin
C84a, N92a
Franklin-class SSBN;
IOC Oct 1979, retired
1994
Trident II Mk 4
Trident II Mk 4A
Trident II Mk 5
8 x 100 kt
W76 (bf?)
300 7400
192
192
8 x 100 kt
W76 (bf?)
150 .
46
168
6 x 100 kt
W76 (bf?)
150 .
270
4 x 100 kt
W76 (bf?)
150 .
120
6 x 100 kt
W76-1 (bf?)
150 .
4 x 100 kt
W76-1 (bf?)
150 .
120
8 x 475 kt
W88 (tn-s?)
120 7400
50
48
6 x 475 kt
W88 (tn-s?)
120 .
64
4 x 475 kt
120 .
96
N92a, N00a,
N06a
N06a
N92a, N00a,
N06a
N00a, N06a
N00a, N06a
N06a
.
W88 (tn-s?)
Trident II Mk5 E2
4 x 400 kt?
RWW-1
50
10000
45
retired 1992
conventional
10000
40
SB
B-52G Stratofortress
N06a
N92a
<20 x ALCM
12000
80
56
56
56
as of 2008 based at
Barksdale AFB, LA (38), N92a, N00a,
and Minot AFB, ND (18); N06a
currently not on alert
conventional
12000
15
38
38
B-52H Stratofortress
B-1B Lancer
16 x NGB/ALCM
9000
84
non-nuclear
9000
13
94
81
67
B-2A Spirit
NGB
16
15
20
B-2A Spirit
conventional
ALCM-B
1 x 150 kt
W80-1, variable
yield 5-150 kt
30
2400
1600 400
400
400
ACM
1 x 150 kt
W80-1, variable
yield 5-150 kt
30
3000
100
460
A98a, N06a
JECM
1 x 150 kt?
possible ALCM
replacement
N06a
B53 Y1
1 x 9 mt
(tn-d)
B61-6/7
1 x 500 kt
(tn) yield
selectable from
10/100/345/500
kt
ALCM
NGB
B61-11
1 x 350 kt
(tn) yield
N00a, N06a
150 0
800
N06a
150 0
128
120
160
N06a
selectable from
10/100/350 kt
1 x 1.2 mt
(tn) yield
variable low1200 kt
B83-1
type
system
warhead
1 x 200 kt
SLCM Tomahawk TLAM/N W80-0 (tn)
variable yield
150 0
cep range
(m) (km)
20
2500
700
128
120
160
IOC 1984
N06a
number deployed
Jan Jan Mar Dec
1992 2000 2008 2012
notes
sources
TB
2 x B61-3/4/10
80
80
80
80
F-16A/B
1 x B61-3/4
40
40
40
40
A98a, K05a,
aircraft carrying US
weapons; as of 2008
based at Kleine Brogel
AB, Belgium (20), and
Volkel AB, Netherlands
(20), none on alert
N04a
F-16C/D
2 x B61-3/4/10
125
100
45
40
F-35 JSF
1 x B61
10
IOC 2012
40
K05a, N04a,
N06a
K05a, N04a,
Tornado PA-200
1 x B61-3/4
B61-3
1 x 170 kt
(tn) yield
selectable from
0.3, 1.5, 60, 170
kt
150 0
220
150
95
95
B61-4
1 x 45 kt
150 0
220
150
95
95
NGB
60
40
40
N06a
B61-10
(tn) yield
selectable from
0.3, 1.5, 10, 45
kt
forward based in
Belgium, Germany, Italy,
Netherlands, Turkey, UK
(see above)
N06a
1 x 80 kt
(tn) yield
selectable from
0.3, 5, 10, 80 kt
K05a, N04a,
N06a
150 0
70
140
140
Part 3: Russia
under construction
compiled by Wm. Robert Johnston
last modified 19 April 2008
140
These tables summarize world strategic and theater nuclear forces. In addition to forces traditionally classified as strategic,
information on theater nuclear forces (range in excess of 500 km) are included, since many of these forces are (or could be) assigned
strategic missions (in contrast to tactical, or battlefield, missions). Numbers of deployed systems are given for January 1992 (end of
the Cold War), January 2000, March 2008 (present), and December 2012 (approximate culmination of START retirements).
These pages are under construction. Please refer to the Introduction for further details, explanation of table and abbreviations, and
sources.
Russia
warhead
cep
(m)
range
(km)
number deployed
type
system
ICBM
UR-100K
(SS-11 Mod 2 Sego)
1 x 1.3 mt
1100 12000
15F842 (tn)
P01a, Z02a
UR-100U
(SS-11 Mod 3 Sego)
3 x 350 kt
MRV
900
200
P01a, Z02a
RT-2P
(SS-13 Mod 2 Savage)
1 x 1 mt
15F1
1500 10200
40
P01a, Z02a
MR UR-100UTTH
(SS-17 Mod 3 Spanker)
4 x 550 kt
15F161
400
11000
40
P01a, Z02a
R-36MUTTH
(SS-18 Mod 4 Satan)
10 x 550 kt
15F183
400
11500
222
117
20
10600
notes
notes
in 5000-psi silos;
N00b, P01a,
IOC Sep 1979 (Mod P06a, Z02a
R-36M2 Voevoda
(SS-18 Mod 5 Satan)
10 x 750 kt
220
15F173/175
11000
76
58
50
40
R-36M2 Voevoda
(SS-18 Mod 6 Satan)
1 x 20 mt
(tn)
220
16000
10
UR-100N
(SS-19 Mod 2 Stiletto)
1 x 5 mt
(tn)
9650
10
10
UR-100NUTTH
(SS-19 Mod 3 Stiletto)
6 x 550 kt
400
10000
290
140
95
95
220
11000
56
10
rail-mobile basing;
IOC Dec 1987,
retired in 2005
P01a, Z02a
1 x 550 kt
220
11000
36
36
220
11000
306
360
201
120
P01a, Z02a
P01a, P06a,
Z02a
on road-mobile
N00b, P01a,
TELs; IOC Jul 1985, P06a, P06d,
being retired; as of Z02a
2008 based at
Vypolzovo (18),
Teykovo (12),
Yoshkar-Ola (27),
Nizhniy Tagil (36),
Novosibirsk (45),
Irkutsk (27), and
Barnaul (36)
1 x 1 mt
11000
20
48
72
N05b
1 x 1 mt
350
11000
20
on road-mobile
TELs; IOC Dec
2006; as of 2008
based at Teykovo
3x?
350
11000
on road-mobile
TELs
N05b
RS-24 Yars
(SS-X-29?)
10? x ?
10000? 0
10
on road-mobile
TELs?; IOC 2009?
N05b
R-27 Zyb
(SS-N-6 Mod 2)
2 x 500 kt
(tn), MRV
2500
96
1 x 1 mt
(tn)
9000
204
RT-2PM2 Topol-M
(SS-27 Sickle)
SLBM
350
R-29D
(SS-N-8 Mod 2 Sawfly)
R-29R Volna
(SS-N-18 Mod 1)
1 x 1 mt
(tn)
9000
64
3 x 500 kt
900
6500
224
192
16 per Project
P06b
667BDR (Delta III)-
R-29K Volna
(SS-N-18 Mod 3)
4 x 200 kt
900
6500
96
class SSBN; as of
2006 home ported at
Rybachiy,
Vladivostok (4
P06b
SSBN), and
Gadzhiyevo,
Murmansk (2
SSBN)
20 per Project 941
Akula (Typhoon)class SSBN; as of
2006 two laid up,
one SSBN in refit
for Bulava
R-39 Rif-Ma
(SS-N-20 Mod 2)
10 x 200 kt
500
8300
120
60
40
R-29RM Shtil
(SS-N-23)
4 x 200 kt
350
8300
112
112
80
32
R-29RM Sineva
(SS-N-23)
10 x 250 kt
350
8300
16
64
Bulava
6 x 250 kt
350
20
16 per Project
P06b
667BDRM (Delta
IV)-class SSBN;
IOC 1986; Sineva
IOC 2007; 6 SSBN
at Gadzhiyevo,
Murmansk,
including 2 in
P06b
refit/conversion to
Sineva; average 1 on
patrol but others can
launch missiles from
port
20 per Project 941
P06b
(SS-NX-30)
6 x 250 kt
SB
16
48
16 per Borey-class
SSBN; IOC 2008
P06b
Tupolev-95K-22
(Bear G)
2 x Kh-22
and 4 x NGB
9800
45
Tupolev-95MS6
(Bear H6)
6 x Kh-55
52
32
32
32
Tupolev-95MS16
(Bear H16)
16 x Kh-55
32
32
32
32
12 x Kh-55SM
15
15
based at Ukrainka,
Khabarovsk Kray
P05a
24 x Kh-15A
based at Ukrainka
4? x NGB
based at Ukrainka
Tupolev-160
(Blackjack)
Kh-55 (AS-15A)
*
based at Ukrainka,
Khabarovsk Kray
(40), Engels,
Saratov (18), and
Ryazan (6)
P05a
P05a
1 x 250 kt
50
3000
824
704
704
704
P05a
1 x 250 kt
50
72
72
180
180
P05a
Kh-102
1 x 250 kt
50
IOC ?
P05a
Kh-15A
(AS-16)
1 x 300 kt
300
ASM
350
NGB
type
Kh-22 Burya
(AS-4)
1 x 1 mt
1000 .
90
1 x 1 mt
180
system
RKP-55 Granat
(SS-N-21)
SLCM
TB
cep
(m)
warhead
1 x 250 kt
P-750 Meteorit
(SS-N-24)
1 x 1 mt
Tupolev-22M3
(Backfire C)
2x
50
range
(km)
3000
number deployed
notes
80
80
notes
80
5000
12
12 per 667M
Andromeda
(Yankee)-class
SSGN; 1 SSGN
completed in 1984,
retired 1994, but
may have never
been operational
300
130
116
100
These tables summarize world strategic and theater nuclear forces. In addition to forces traditionally classified as strategic,
information on theater nuclear forces (range in excess of 500 km) are included, since many of these forces are (or could be) assigned
strategic missions (in contrast to tactical, or battlefield, missions). Numbers of deployed systems are given for January 1992 (end of
the Cold War), January 2000, March 2008 (present), and December 2012 (approximate culmination of START retirements).
These pages are under construction. Please refer to the Introduction for further details, explanation of table and abbreviations, and
sources.
United Kingdom
type
system
Polaris A3TK
SLBM
warhead
number deployed
cep range
(m) (km) Jan Jan Mar Dec
1992 2000 2008 2012
2 x 40 kt
900 4700
TK-100?, MRV
64
4 x 100 kt
150 7400
36
36
36
1 x 10 kt
150 11000 0
12
12
12
1300
72
NGB
France
notes
N94a, N01a,
N05c
N94a, N05c
Trident II
TB
notes
N94a, N01a,
N05c
WE-177A
1 x 200 kt
36
N94a, N05c
WE-177B
1 x 400 kt
36
N94a, N05c
type
SLBM
system
notes
notes
M-4A
6 x 150 kt
330 4000
TN-70 (tn)
16
16
M-4B
6 x 150 kt
300 5000
TN-71 (tn)
48
16
M-45
6 x 110 kt
TN-75
200 6000
32
64
16
N94a
M-51.1
6 x 110 kt
TN-75
200 6000
48
M-51.2
6 x 100 kt?
200 6000
TNO
1 x 1.2 mt
.
TN-61 (tn)
3500
18
N94a
700
20
10
10
N94a
Mirage IVP
1 x ASMP
1500
18
N94a
Mirage 2000N
1 x ASMP
1300
42
60
60
IOC Jul 1988; as of 2006 based at Luxeuilles-Bains (40) and Istres (20)
N94a
Mirage 2000N
K3
1 x ASMP-A
1300
30
IOC 2007?
warhead
number deployed
cep range
(m) (km) Jan Jan Mar Dec
1992 2000 2008 2012
ASM
Rafale M F3
1 x ASMP-A
ASMP TN-80
1100
30
IOC 2007?
N94a
1 x 300 kt
380 300
TN-80 (tn)
20
10
10
N94a
ASMP TN-81
1 x 300 kt
380 300
TN-81 (tn)
60
60
60
N94a
ASMP-A
1 x 300 kt?
.
TNA
60
IOC 2010?
450
P.R. China
type
system
Dong Feng 5
(CSS-4 Mod 1)
Dong Feng 5A
(CSS-4 Mod 2)
ICBM
Dong Feng 31
(CSS-X-10)
warhead
cep
(m)
number deployed
range
(km) Jan Jan Mar Dec
1992 2000 2008 2012
notes
notes
1 x 5 mt
500
12000 4
1 x 5 mt
500
13000 4
18
20
20
4 x 650 kt
500
13000 0
1 x 1 mt
450
8000
10
30
IOC 2005
A98a, N94a
450
12000 0
10
IOC 2008
N94a
450
12000 0
A98a, N94a
A98a, N94a
Julang 1
(CSS-NX-3)
SLBM
Julang 2
(CSS-NX-4)
Dong Feng 3A
(CSS-2)
1 x 300 kt
1700
12
12
12
12
1 x 1 mt
8000
16
16
N94a
3 x 250 kt
8000
16
N94a
40
A98a, N94a
1 x 3.3 mt
1000 2900
50
40
40
MRBM
Dong Feng 4
(CSS-3)
1 x 3.3 mt
IRBM
SRBM
Dong Feng 15
(M-9)
TB
Hong 6
(B-6)
?
1 x 3.3 mt
NGB
1400 5500
20
20
12
12
36
48
48
60
A98a, N94a
N94a
1800
600
15
35
45
1 x NGB
3100
120
120
120
75
A98a, N94a
2? x ALCM
3100
25
120
120
120
75
1 x 10 kt
450
ALCM
YJ-63
1 x 250 kt? .
50
These tables summarize world strategic and theater nuclear forces. In addition to forces traditionally classified as strategic,
information on theater nuclear forces (range in excess of 500 km) are included, since many of these forces are (or could be) assigned
strategic missions (in contrast to tactical, or battlefield, missions). Numbers of deployed systems are given for January 1992 (end of
the Cold War), January 2000, March 2008 (present), and December 2012 (approximate culmination of START retirements).
These pages are under construction. Please refer to the Introduction for further details, explanation of table and abbreviations, and
sources.
Israel
type
system
number deployed
cep range
(m) (km) Jan Jan Mar Dec
1992 2000 2008 2012
warhead
notes
sources
1 x 200 kt
(bf)
3000
30
1 x 200 kt
(bf)
1500
20
40
1 x 200 kt
(bf)
2000
50
50
SRBM
Ya-1 (Jericho I)
1 x 60 kt
1000 500
50
50
50
20
SLCM
Popeye Turbo
1 x 60 kt
1500
15
25
F-16
1 x NGB
1600
20
20
20
F-15I Ra'am
1 x NGB
4450
20
25
25
1 x 20 kt?
10
20
20
IOC 1968?
1 x 200 kt? .
10
20
25
IOC 1985?
IRBM
TB
NGB
(bf)
India
type
system
warhead
number deployed
cep range
(m) (km) Jan Jan Mar Dec
1992 2000 2008 2012
notes
sources
ICBM
Surya
1x?
12000 0
SLBM
Sagarika
1x?
1000
IOC 2010+
1 x 20 kt
3500
Agni I
1 x 20 kt
1500
Agni II
1 x 200 kt? .
2000
15
Jaguar IS/IB
1 x NGB
800
10
10
10
10
based at Ambala? .
1800
10
10
based at Gwalior? .
10
10
20
20
TB
NGB
1 x 35 kt?
Pakistan
type
system
number deployed
cep range
warhead
(m) (km) Jan Jan Mar Dec
1992 2000 2008 2012
notes
sources
MRBM Ghauri 3
1x?
3000
IRBM
Ghauri 1
1 x 20 kt
200 1400
10
IOC 1998?
SRBM
Shaheen 1
1 x 20 kt
(M-9)
700
10
TB
F-16A/B
1 x NGB
1600
10
10
10
based at Sargodha AB .
NGB
1 x 35 kt? .
10
10
10
North Korea
type
ICBM
SLBM
MRBM
IRBM
Iran
system
(Taepodong 2)
number deployed
cep range
warhead
(m) (km) Jan Jan Mar Dec
1992 2000 2008 2012
1 x 50 kt .
6200
notes
sources
(Taepodong 2, 3-stage) 1 x 50 kt .
15000 0
IOC 2015+
(R-27)
1 x 30 kt .
3500
(R-27)
1 x 30 kt .
3500
IOC 2005
(Taepodong 1)
1 x 30 kt .
2300
IOC 2000?
(Nodong)
1 x 30 kt .
1500
type
system
number deployed
cep range
warhead
(m) (km) Jan Jan Mar Dec
1992 2000 2008 2012
notes
sources
These tables summarize world strategic and theater nuclear forces. In addition to forces traditionally classified as strategic,
information on theater nuclear forces (range in excess of 500 km) are included, since many of these forces are (or could be) assigned
strategic missions (in contrast to tactical, or battlefield, missions). Numbers of deployed systems are given for January 1992 (end of
the Cold War), January 2000, March 2008 (present), and December 2012 (approximate culmination of START retirements).
These pages are under construction. Please refer to the Introduction for further details, explanation of table and abbreviations, and
sources.
ICBMs
2450
2000
900
500
ICBMs
1094
554
292
161
SLBMs
5440
3264
2016
1344
SLBMs
598
470
346
278
bombers 3205
1116
640
720
bombers 1540
327
246
308
total
6380
3556
2564
total
1351
884
747
11095
3232
ICBMs
6774
3445
1535
1287
ICBMs
4021
2162
1088
826
SLBMs
2780
1624
1480
1056
SLBMs
1030
498
315
258
bombers 1166
776
884
884
bombers 494
194
221
221
total
5845
3899
3227
total
2854
1624
1305
10720
5545
UK
200
156
156
156
UK
26.7
14.5
14.5
14.5
France
482
454
454
444
France
103
70.9
63.2
60.2
PRC
246
273
313
438
PRC
681
702
712
635
Israel
90
135
160
Israel
9.2
15.7
19.3
India
10
15
30
India
0.4
0.5
3.8
Pakistan
15
30
Pakistan
0.2
0.5
0.8
North Korea 0
North Korea 0
0.1
0.2
Iran
Iran
total
1033
1050
1150
total
821
804
814
USA
11605
6820
3886
2894
USA
3285
1394
916
779
Russia
11412
6185
4211
3507
Russia
5727
2939
1702
1375
total, all
24050
14055
9247
total, all
9833
5137
3432
0.1
1.
Images and video footage of the NASR missile emerging from the launcher tube at an angle of 40[SUP]0[/SUP]-45[SUP]0[/SUP] to the horizontal similar to Figure 2 are available.The TEL dimensions therefore
hold the clue for determining the missile dimensions. The Chinese version of the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) equivalent to the Russian Smerch system is referred to as A-100. The Chinese modified it
and sold the AR1A also referred to as the A100-E to Pakistan. The A100-E chassis with the modified launching tube system is adapted for launching the NASR missile. The obvious similarity between the two
carrier vehicles can be seen in Figure 3
Similarities include the number of axles, the cabin, cabin mounting steps, front bumper, rear cabin ladder/ladder location and the box just ahead of the 3rd axle. The Smerch carrier was fitted with MLRS for
carrying/launching twelve missiles of 300 mm calibre. The Chinese A100-E system given to Pakistan featured ten missiles of 300 mm calibre. Based on this, it appears that Zahir Kazmi has concluded the NASR's
diameter to be 300 mm.
What Pakistan has done is to use the A100-E TEL chassis but totally replaced the multi-launch tubes, initially with a two tube system and subsequently with a 4 tube system as shown in Figures 4 and 5. It
should be possible to guess the missile dimensions using these images and the known dimensions. An examination of figures 4 and 5 indicates that:
o
o
o
o
o
The missile is slender (most missiles of this class can be expected to be so) and is fin stabilised
The launch barrel is square in shape
The missile is loaded into the tube with the fins fitting diagonally (at 45[SUP]0[/SUP])
There must be launch rails inside the tube (not visible in figure 4)
The launch angle is close to 40[SUP]0[/SUP]
The dimensions and other features of the AR 1A/A100-E TEL are indicated in Table 1.
The rear axle and the end of the vehicle are covered by the missile exhaust gases and hence is not visible. Therefore using the known length of the vehicle for proportionately determining the missile length is
not possible. Consequently, the possibility of arriving at the dimensions using the width of the vehicle was examined. Detailed dimensions of the WS 2500 TEL in use by the Pakistani defence services are
available. The width of the trailer is 3.05 m, close enough to the 3 m width of the A100-E shown in table 1. The wheel span for the WS 2500 is known to be 2.375 m and the same span can be assumed for A100E. A close up view of the aft potion of the missile, launcher tube and trailer is shown in Figure 6, from which some details can be gleaned.
It can be seen that the side of the tube is in line with the fender centre line and it can therefore be assumed that the twin tubes with the gap between them have a width equal to the wheel base. This
information is to be supplemented with additional data to get a handle on the missile dimensions. Figure 7 is a video grab taken from YouTube. From the image, the following information is evident:
o
o
o
o
o
Making allowances for the width of the trunnion mounting plate, for the thickness of the side wall and the gap between the tubes, the dimension of inside of the tube is estimated as 766 mm. From figure 5, it
can be seen that the missile body diameter is approximately equal to the fin semi-span, which means the diagonal of the tube section can be equally divided into three parts to represent the fins and the
missile body. From this consideration, the missile diameter is estimated to be 361 mm. From figure 5, the length to diameter ratio of the missile is estimated to be 15, from which the missile length is found to
be 5416 mm. One joint is discernible just above the 'NASR' logo and this is the connection between the missile power plant and the warhead. This joint is located 1600 mm from the nose tip. The finally
derived dimensions of the missile are shown in figure 8.
The NASR warhead section has been estimated to have a cylindrical section which is 940 mm long and a conical portion which is 660 mm long. It can be seen that with the exception of W-55 and W-79, all the
warheads can fit within the NASR warhead dimensions. The questions that need to be pondered over are (a) has Pakistan miniaturised a weapon system to this level, (b) has it been tested and (c) in the
absence of tests, how reliable is the weapon system. Most importantly, in the absence of demonstrated reliability, how confident will Pakistan be in fielding it?
In the May 1998 tests, Pakistan had tested only HEU based devices. There is wide discrepancy between the Pakistani claims of the weapon yield and the international estimates. In the interview after the tests,
AQ Khan had claimed "four of the devices were small tactical weapons of low yield. Tipped on small missiles, they can be used in the battlefield against concentration of troops". The international assessment
of the yield from the Pakistani tests was 8-12 kT for the 28 May shot and 4-6 kT for the 30 May shot. Even if we accept the AQ Khan statement on tactical weapons, we are not wiser on its size; the smallest
ballistic missile tested, when AQ Khan made the statement was the Hatf- 1 which was 560 mm in diameter and had a range of 80 km. If a weapon system had been designed for Hatf-1 as claimed by Khan, it
would be too large to fit into the envelope available with NASR.
Further miniaturisation to fit into the NASR class of missiles can probably come with a Plutonium based linear implosion device. A linear implosion allows for a low density, elongated non-spherical (rugby ball
shaped) mass to be compressed into a supercritical configuration without using symmetric implosion designs. This assembly is accomplished by embedding an elliptical shaped mass in a cylinder of explosive.
The explosive is detonated on both ends, and an inert wave shaping device is required in front of the detonation points. Such a device is shown schematically in Figure 9.
Such a device requires larger quantity - almost double - of plutonium as opposed to the requirement in spherical compression. A Pakistani design of such a device can be expected to weigh at least 100 kg. In
the United States, extensive experimentation was needed to create a workable form, but this design enables the use of Plutonium as well as Uranium. The HEU device will obviously be heavier. Pakistan can at
best work on the explosive + detonator combination with surrogate material, which is not the same as testing with the actual material. In the end, what Pakistan will have is an untested device.
Type
Width
(in.)
28
Length
(in.)
120
Weight
(lb.)
8,900
Yield(s)
15 - 16 Kt
Fuzing
Airburst
Deployment
Status
Comments
Used in combat in
1945, never
stockpiled; only 5 Gun-assembly HEU bomb;
bomb assemblies "Little Boy" dropped on
completed, all
Hiroshima
retired by Nov
1950
Mk-I
Bomb
Mk-II
Bomb
Theoretical
design, never
produced
Mk-III
Bomb
60.25
128
10,300
18, 20-23,
37, 49 Kt
Used in combat in
1945; mass
Plutonium implosion bomb;
production 4/47"Fat Man", Model 1561;
4/49, 120
Mods 0, 1, 2
produced; all
retired late 1950
Mk-4
Bomb
60
128
10,800 10,900
Airburst
Entered service
3/49; produced
3/49-5/51; 550
produced (all
mods);
Retired 7/52-5/53
Low-efficiency plutonium
implosion bomb
Atomic
T-1 / TXDemolition About 8
1
Munition
W-4
Warhead
60
90
About 150
6,500
Mk-5
Bomb
43.75
W-5
Warhead
39; 44
76
Airburst
Entered service,
withdrawn, late
1940s
Developed at Picatinny
Arsenal for the U.S. Army.
The only U.S. nuclear
weapon ever developed
outside of the nuclear
laboratory system. Gunassembly HEU weapon.
Canceled 1951
(Matador)
produced
Mk-6
Bomb
61
128
183
7,600 - 8,500
1,645 - 1,700
8, 26, 80,
Airburst or
154, 160 Kt contact
Improved high-yield
Manufactured
lightweight Mk-4; 7 mods;
from 7/51 to early
some Mk-4Ds were
1955; 1100
converted Mk-6 Mod 0;
bombs (all mods)
early mods had 32 lens
produced; last
implosion system, Mod 2
retired 1962
and later had 60 lens system
Manufactured
7/52 - 2/63; in
service July
1952-1967; 1700
- 1800 produced
W-7 warhead
manufacture
begun 12/53;
BOAR:
stockpiled 1956 1963, 225
produced;
Corporal:
stockpiled 1955 1965, 300
produced;
Honest John:
stockpiled 1954 1960, 300
produced;
Multipurpose warhead
- BOAR air-surface rocket,
the Corporal (M-2) and
Honest John (M-3) ballistic
missiles, ADM, Betty Mk 90
ASW depth bomb, Nike
Hercules SAM missile
warhead (W-7-X1/X2); 7
yields, 4 mods; Corporal
yield 2-40 Kt (several
options), ADM yield low (90
T?), Betty yield 32 Kt
Mk-7
Bomb
30.5
W-7
Warhead
ADM: stockpiled
1955-1963, 300
produced;
Betty: stockpiled
6/55 - 1960, 225
produced;
Nike Hercules:
canceled 1956
Mk-8
Bomb
14.5
Pyrotechnic
delay
Manufactured
Earth penetrating weapon,
11/51 - 5/53; in gun-assembly HEU bomb,
service 1/52 nicknamed "Elsie" (for LC 6/57; 40 produced light case), 2 mods; replaced
(all mods)
by the Mk-11
Gun-assembly warhead,
intended for use as a
cratering warhead for the
Regulus missile
Warhead
Canceled May
1955
W-9
Artillery
Shell
Mechanical
time delay
airburst
Mk-9 /
T-4
Atomic
Demolition
Munition
Time delay
Mk-10
Bomb
Airburst
Canceled May
W-8
11.02
54.8
(280 mm)
803; 850
15 Kt
120 - 200
12
1,750; 1,500
12 - 15 Kt
Mk-11
Bomb
14
Mk-12
Bomb
22
W-12
Warhead
22
MK-13 Bomb
W-13
Warhead
TX /
Bomb
MK-14
61
147
155
128
1952
Pyrotechnic
delay
Manufactured
1/56 - 1957; in
service 1/56 1960; 40
produced
Timer or
contact
Manufactured
12/54 - 2/57;
Retired 7/58 7/62; 250
produced
High-speed fighter-bomber
weapon; 92-point implosion
weapon; nicknamed "Brok";
probably first weapon using
beryllium tamper; 4 versions
stockpiled - 2 prototypes, 2
mods
900
Low Kt
Airburst
Canceled Nov
1955
Talos (Navy)/Talos-W
(Army) surface-air missile
warhead
7,400
32 Kt
(Upshot Knothole
Harry shot)
Airburst or
contact
Canceled Aug
1954
Airburst or
contact
Canceled Sept
1954
Airburst
3,210 - 3,500
58
100
6,000 - 6,500
61.4
222 223.5
28,954 29,851;
Union shot)
5 produced
1.69 Mt
Airburst,
(Castle
contact (F/F
Nectar), 3.8
or rtd),
Mt (Redwing
laydown
Cherokee)
Manufactured
4/55 - 2/57;
Retired 8/61 4/65; 1200
produced (all
mods)
6,400 - 6,560
Canceled Feb
1957
39,000 42,000
6 - 8 Mt
First deployed
Stockpiled 1/54 - thermonuclear weapon;
4/54;
weaponized version of Ivy
5 produced
Mike device; only cryogenic
TN weapon ever deployed
11 Mt (Castle
Airburst
Romeo shot)
31,000
MK-15 Bomb
W-15
TX-16
EC-17
Warhead
Bomb
34.4 34.7; 35
34.5
61.4
296.7
Bomb
61.4
224.9
39,600
MK-17 Bomb
61.4
296.7
41,400 42,000
10 - 15 Mt
Airburst
"Emergency Capability"
Stockpiled 4/54 - weapon (deployed
10/54; 5 produced prototype); used natural
lithium; free fall bomb
Airburst or Manufactured
contact (Mod 7/54 - 11/55;
2 only)
Retired 11/56 8/57; 200
produced
MK-18 Bomb
60
128
8,600
W-19
Artillery
Shell
11.02
54
(280 mm)
600
Mk-20
Bomb
60
6,400
Mk-21
Bomb
128
15,000 17,700
Mechanical
time delay
airburst
Production began
Used in T-315 atomic
7/55;
projectile; improved W-9;
Retired 1963; 80
gun-assembly HEU weapon
produced
15 - 20 Kt
4 - 5 Mt
Airburst,
contact,
laydown
Canceled Aug
1954
Manufactured
12/55 - 7/56;
Retired 6/57 1//57; 275
produced (all
mods)
Redesigned Shrimp TN
device with 95% enriched
Li-6 fuel; 3 mods, all
"dirty"; "clean" version
tested, never deployed; Mod
1 contact fused; Mod 2 also
had w/boosted primary;
Retired by conversion to
Mk-36-Y1 Mod 1
W-21
Mk-22
W-23
EC 24
Warhead
Bomb
Artillery
Shell
Bomb
52;
145
51
16
61
15,000 16,000
18,000
64
225
Mk-24
Bomb
61.4
296
W-25
Warhead
17.35 17.4
25.7 26.6
1 Mt
Mechanical
time delay
airburst
1,500; 1,900
15 - 20 Kt
39,600
13.5 Mt
(Castle
Airburst
Yankee shot)
41,400 42,000
10 - 15 Mt
Airburst
218 - 221
1.7 Kt
Time delay
Canceled
Canceled April
1954
Production began
10/56;
Retired 10/62;
50 produced
"Emergency Capability"
Stockpiled 4/54 weapon (deployed
10/54;
prototype); used enriched
10 produced
Li-6; free fall bomb
Manufactured
7/54 - 11/55;
Retired 9/56 10/56;
105 produced
Manufactured
5/57 - 5/60;
Mod 0 retired
8/61 - 1965, all
retired by 12/84;
Mk-26
Mk-27
Bomb
Bomb
56.2
30.2
150
15,000 17,700
Airburst or
contact
W-27
Warhead
30.25 - 31 75
2,800
Mk-28
Bomb
20; 22
96 - 170
2 Mt
Airburst or
contact
3150 produced
(all mods)
Canceled 1956
Manufactured
11/58 - 6/59;
Retired 11/62 7/65; 700 (all
mods) produced
Manufactured
9/58 - 6/59;
retired 8/62 7/65;
20 produced
70 Kt - 1.45 Airburst or
Mt
contact
Manufactured
8/58 - 5/66,
entered service
(Hound Dog)
1959 and (Mace)
1960;
Hound Dog
retired 1/64 1976, Mace
retired 1970;
production - 900
(Hound Dog),
100 (Mace)
Canceled Aug
1955
W-28
Warhead
20
60
1,500 - 1,725
W-29
Warhead
52; 35
145
3,500
48
TADM:
stockpiled 1961 1966, 300
300 T; 500 T
produced;
Airburst,
(Talos and
Talos:
438; 490; 450
contact, time
TADM); 4.7
manufactured
delay
Kt; 19 Kt
2/59 - 1/65,
retired 1/62 3/79; 300
produced
W-30
Warhead
22
Multipurpose warhead:
Talos SAM/SSM, XW-30X1 TADM (Tactical Atomic
Demolition Munition)
warhead; Talos - 1 yield, 3
mods; TADM - 2 yields
stockpiled
W-31
Warhead
28 - 29;
30
W-32
Artillery
Shell
9.45 (240
mm)
W-33
W-34
Honest John:
manufactured
10/59 - 12/61,
retired 7/67 1987, 1650
produced;
Nike Hercules:
1, 2, 12, 20, Airburst,
manufactured
40 Kt
timer, surface
10/58 - 12/61,
retired 7/67 9/89, 2550
produced;
ADM: stockpiled
9/60 - 1965, 300
produced
Canceled May
1955
400; 450
Mechanical
5 - 10 Kt, 40
time delay
Kt (Y2)
airburst
Artillery
Shell
8 (203
mm)
37
240 - 243
ASW
warhead /
Bomb
17
32
Manufactured
1/57 - 1/65;
Retired 9/92;
2000 produced
Hydrostatic, ASW:
laydown,
Manufactured
impact
8/58 - 12/62;
W-35
Warhead
20; 28
Mk-36
Bomb
56.2; 58;
150
59
W-37
Warhead
30
17,500;
17,700
900; 940
9 - 10 Mt
F/F or
retarded
airburst or
contact
Canceled Aug
1958
Manufactured
4/56 - 6/58;
Retired 8/61 1/62; 940
produced (all
mods)
Two-stage TN strategic
bomb; Y1 "dirty," Y2
"clean", each in two mods;
parachutes 1x5 ft, 1x24 ft
ribbon; all Mk-21s
converted to Mk-36 in 1957;
Retired in favor of Mk-41; at
retirement this weapon
represented almost half of
the megatonnage of the U.S.
arsenal
Canceled Sept
Intended to be a high-yield
W-38
Mk-39
Warhead
Bomb
32
35, 44
(tail
section)
82.5
3,080
3.75 Mt
3-4 Mt (2
136 - 140 6,650 - 6,750 yields, Y1
and Y2)
W-39
Warhead
34.5 - 35 105.7
3.8 Mt (2
6,230 - 6,400 yields, Y1
and Y2)
W-40
Warhead
17.9
31.64
Airburst or
contact
1956
multipurpose companion to
the W-31; XW-37 was
redesignated XW-31Y2
Manufactured
5/61 - 1/63;
retired 1/65 5/65; Production:
110 (Atlas), 70
(Titan)
Manufactured
Airburst,
2/57 - 3/59;
contact; mod
Retired 1/62 to
w/low-level
11/66; 700
retarded
produced (all
laydown
mods)
Redstone:
Warhead for Snark cruise
stockpiled 7/58 - missile, Redstone MRBM,
1963, 60
B-58 weapon pod;
produced;
Versions: Redstone MkSnark:
39Y1 Mod 1 and Mk-39Y2
manufactured
Mod 1, Snark Mk-39Y1
4/58 - 7/58,
Mod 1; W-39 identical to
retired 8/62 Mk-39 except for fuzing
9/65, 30 produced system
Airburst or
contact
Bomarc:
manufactured
9/59 - 5/62,
retired by 11/72,
Mk-41
Bomb
52
W-41
Warhead
50
W-42
Warhead
13 - 14
148
10,500 10,670
25 Mt
350 produced;
Lacrosse:
manufactured
9/59 - 5/62,
retired 10/63 1964, 400
produced
Canceled July
1957
9,300
18.5
75 - 92
Proximity
Mk-43
Bomb
18
F/F or
70 Kt - 1 Mt; retarded,
150 - 164 2,060 - 2,125 Y1: 1 Mt,
airburst or
Y5: 500 Kt contact,
laydown
W-44
ASW
warhead
13.75
25.3
170
10 Kt
Hydrostatic
Canceled June
1961
Manufactured
4/61 - 10/65;
retirement (early
mods) began
12/72, last retired
4/91;
1000 produced
(all mods)
Manufactured
5/61 - 3/68;
retired 6/74 -
9/89;
575 produced
W-45
Warhead
11.5
Mk-46
Bomb
37
27
Terrier:
manufactured
4/62 - 6/66,
retired 7/67 9/88, 750
produced;
MADM:
manufactured
1/62 - 6/66,
retired 7/67 Airburst,
1984, 350
150;
500 T; 1, 5, surface, time produced;
MADM: 350 8, 10, 15 Kt delay,
Bullpup:
command
manufactured
1/62 - 1963,
retired 7/67 1978, 100
produced;
Little John:
manufactured
9/61 - 6/66,
retired 7/67 1970, 500
produced
6,400
Mt range
Canceled Oct
1958
Multipurpose UCRL
designed tactical warhead;
small implosion design; Y1
(1 Kt): Little John SSM,
Terrier SAM, MADM
(Medium ADM); Y2: Little
John, MADM; Y3
(unboosted): GAM-83B
Bullpup ASM, MADM; Y4
(boosted, 1 Kt): Bullpup,
Little John, Terrier, MADM
W-46
W-47
Warhead
Warhead
35-40
Canceled April
1958
18
EC-47
Polaris SLBM TN warhead;
manufactured
breakthrough in compact,
4/60 - 6/60,
light high yield design;
retired 6/60, 300 integral warhead/beryllium
produced;
re-entry vehicle; 3 versions:
W-47
EC-47, W-47Y1, W-47Y2;
manufactured
several severe reliability
6/60 - 7/64,
problems required repeated
retired 7/61 modification and
11/74, 1060
remanufacture (in 1966 75%
produced (Y1 and of the stockpiled Y2s were
Y2) - only 300 in inoperable, correction took
service at a time until 10/67)
46.6
W-48
Artillery
Shell
6.1 (155
mm)
33.3
118 - 128
W-49
Warhead
20
54.3 -
72 T
Manufactured
10/63 - 3/68;
Mechanical retirement (135
time delay or Mod 0s) 1/65 proximity
1969, all 925
airburst, or Mod 1s retired
contact
1992; 1060
produced (all
mods)
Airburst or
LASL developed
Manufactured
57.9
W-50
W-51
Warhead
15.4
44
contact
409 - 410
Warhead
950
22 T
Became XW-54
Jan 1959
200 Kt
Manufactured
5/62 - 4/66;
retired 3/74 8/78;
300 produced
Y1: 60 Kt;
Airburst or
Y2: 200 Kt;
contact
Y3: 400 Kt
W-52
Warhead
24
56.7
Mk-53
Bomb
50
Airburst or
contact
airburst or
contact,
laydown
W-53
W-54
Warhead
Warhead
37
10.75
Mk-54
Warhead
10.75
Mk-54
SADM
Atomic
16
Demolition
Munition
(ADM)
103
15.7
6,200
50 - 51
9 Mt
250 T
retirement (early
mods) began
7/67, last 50
retired from
active service
(but retained in
permanent
stockpile) early
1997; 350
produced, 50 still
in stockpile
Airburst or
contact
Contact or
proximity
Manufactured
4/61 - 2/65;
retired 7/67 4/72; 1000 - 2000
produced
GAR-11/AIM-26A Falcon
AAM warhead; originally
called "Wee Gnat";
adaptation of Mk-54
Time delay
Manufactured
4/61 - 2/65;
retired 7/67 1971;
400 produced
Manufactured
8/64 - 6/66;
retired 1967 1989;
300 produced
M-129/M-159 SADM
(Special Atomic Demolition
Munition) used a Mk-54
warhead package very
similar to Davy Crockett; 2
17.6
50 - 55
10, 20 T
24
150
(complete);
59 (W-54
only)
SADM:
W-55
W-56
Mk-57
ASW
Warhead
Bomb
13
17.4
14.75
39.4
47.3
118
470
600; 680
490 - 510
mods; mechanical
combination lock PAL
Mid Kiloton
Hydrostatic
Range
Manufactured
1/64 - 3/68, 3/70 - SUBROC (UUM-44A)
4/74;
ASW missile thermonuclear
retired 6/83 warhead; based on the 202
9/90;
Kt Hardtack I Olive device
285 produced
1.2 Mt
Airburst or
surface
Manufactured
Minuteman I and II
3/63 - 5/69;
warhead, based on UCRL
retired 9/66 (early W-47, competitor with the
mods), Mod-4
W-59 for Minuteman; 4
retired 1991-93; mods, retrofit of early mods
1000 produced required to fix reliability
(all mods), 455 problem, blast and radiation
Mod-4s produced hardening added later
5 - 20 Kt
Retarded
airburst,
retarded
laydown, F/F
contact,
hydrostatic
Manufactured
1/63 - 5/67;
retirement (early
mods) started
6/75, last retired
6/93; 3,100
produced
W-58
Warhead
15.6
40.3
257
200 Kt
Airburst or
contact
W-59
Warhead
16.3
47.8
550 - 553
1 Mt
Airburst or
Manufactured
W-60
Warhead
MK/B 61 Bomb
W-62
Warhead
W-63
Warhead
13
13.3
RV Body:
21 in;
Warhead:
19.7 in
20
141.64
RV Body:
72 in;
Warhead:
39.3 in
contact
6/62 - 7/63;
retired 12/64 6/69;
150 produced
Proximity
Canceled Dec
1963
115 - 150
Very low
695 - 716
Variable (4
yields), 0.3 340 Kt;
Mod 3: 0.3 - FUFO:
170 Kt;
retarded and
Mod 4: 0.3 - F/F, contact
45 Kt;
or airburst,
Mod 7/11: 10 laydown
- 340 Kt;
Mod 10: 0.3
- 80 Kt
Warhead/RV:
700-800 lb;
170 Kt
Warhead: 253
lb
Airburst or
contact
Multipurpose
tactical/strategic bomb; basic
design adapted to many
other weapon systems; 4
Manufactured
yields; 11 mods, 5 in
10/66 - early 90s;
service; PAL B, D, F; uses
early mods retired
IHE in primary; parachute:
70s - 80s; 3150
1x17 ft or 1x24 ft ribbon;
produced, 1350 in
longest production run of
service
any U.S. nuclear weapon,
oldest design in service; part
of the U.S. "enduring
stockpile"
Manufactured
Minuteman III/Mk-12 RV
3/70 - 6/76;
warhead; remaining W-62s
early mods retired part of U.S. "enduring
starting 4/80;
stockpile", but will be
1725 produced, removed from active service
610 in active
under START II (to be
service;
replaced by W-88s)
Canceled Nov
1966
favor of W-70
W-64
Warhead
W-65
Warhead
W-66
Warhead
W-67
Warhead
W-68
Warhead
W-69
Warhead
18
15
35
30
150
Canceled Sep
1964
Mt range
Canceled Jan
1968
Kt range
Manufactured
6/74 - 3/75;
retired from
Sprint ABM warhead, ER
service 8/75, ret.
("neutron bomb") warhead
from stockpile
1985;
70 produced
150 Kt
Canceled Dec
1967
367
40 - 50 Kt
Airburst or
contact
Manufactured
6/70 - 6/75;
retired 9/77 1991; 5250
produced
275
Manufactured
10/71 - 8/76;
W-70
Warhead
18
41
270
Mods 0,1, 2:
variable from Airburst or
1-100 Kt;
contact
Mod 3: 1 Kt
W-71
Warhead
42
101
2,850
5 Mt
Manufactured
7/74 - 7/75;
Airburst
retired from
Spartan ABM warhead, used
(command & service 1975, ret. thermal x-rays for
delay timer) from stockpile
exoatmospheric RV kill
9/92;
30 produced
W-72
Warhead
15
79
825
ca. 600 T
Contact
Manufactured
8/70 - 4/72;
retired 7/79 9/79;
300 produced
Canceled Sept
1970
W-73
Warhead
<17
W-74
Artillery
Shell
6.1 (155
mm)
2 yields
(both >100
T)
Canceled June
1973
W-75
Artillery
Shell
8 (203
mm)
>100 T
Canceled 1973
100 Kt
Manufactured
6/78 - 7/87;
active service;
approx. 3000
produced
Variable, Kt
FUFO
to Mt range
Canceled Dec
1977
Manufactured
8/79 - 10/82;
active service;
Minuteman III/Mk-12A RV
warhead; LANL design
derived from W-50 with a
W-76
Warhead
363
B-77
Bomb
18
144
2,400
W-78
Warhead
21.25
67.7
400 - 600
Airburst or
contact
1083 produced,
920 in service
W-79
Artillery
Shell
W-80-0 Warhead
11.8
W-80-1 Warhead
11.8
W-81
<13.5
Warhead
44
31.4
31.4
200
290
290
Variable: 5
Airburst or
Kt and 170contact
200 Kt
Manufactured
12/83 - 9/90;
active service;
367 produced
Variable: 5
Airburst or
Kt and 150contact
170 Kt
Manufactured
1/81 - 9/90;
active service;
1750 produced,
1400 in service
2 - 4 Kt
Canceled 1986
W-82
Artillery
Shell
B-83
Bomb
W-83
Warhead
W-84
Warhead
W-85;
alternate Warhead
image
6.1 (155
mm)
18
34
145
Airburst
95
<2 Kt
2,400
FUFO: F/F or
Manufactured
retarded,
Variable, low
6/83 - 1991;
airburst or
Kt to 1.2 Mt
active service;
contact,
650 produced
laydown
1,700 - 1,900
13
12.5
34
42
388
880
Variable: 5 - Airburst or
80 Kt
contact
Manufactured
2/83 - 7/86;
retired 1988 3/91;
120 produced
W-86
W-87
Warhead
Warhead
Canceled Sept
1980
Manufactured
7/86 - 12/88;
active service;
525 produced
Peacekeeper (MX)
ICBM/Mk-21 RV TN
warhead (missile carries 10);
RV/warhead weighs 800 lb;
LLNL design; primary uses
IHE and fire resistant pit;
yield upgradeable by adding
HEU rings to secondary;
part of the U.S. "enduring
stockpile"; after MX
retirement, will equip
Minuteman III
Timer
(w/path
Manufactured
length
9/88 - 11/89;
correction)
active service;
and proximity
400 produced
airburst;
contact
Trident II Mk-5 RV
warhead; does not use IHE;
uses HEU jacket with
secondary stage; production
terminated by FBI raid on
Rocky Flats; part of the U.S.
"enduring stockpile"
Airburst or
contact
Delayed
21.8
68.9
Timer or
300 Kt;
proximity
500 - 600; 440 upgradeable
airburst,
to 475 Kt
contact
W-88
Warhead
21.8
68.9
<800
475 Kt
W-89
Warhead
13.3
40.8
324
200 Kt
Canceled Sept
1991
ASW missile
B 90
W-91
Bomb
Warhead
13.3
118
780
310
Abbreviations:
AAM Air-to-Air Missile
ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile
ACM Advanced Cruise Missile
ADM Atomic Demolition Munition
AFAP Artillery Fired Atomic Projectile
ALCM Air Launched Cruise Missile
ASM Air-Surface Missile
ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare
ER Enhanced Radiation ("neutron bomb")
200 Kt
10, 100 Kt
retarded
airburst,
retarded
contact, F/F Canceled 1991
airburst, F/F
contact,
hydrostatic
Canceled Sept
1991
EC Emergency Capability
F/F Freefall
FRP Fire Resistant Pit
FUFO Full-fuzing Options
HEU Highly Enriched Uranium
ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
IFI In-Flight Insertion
IHE Insensitive High Explosive
IRBM Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile
Kt Kilotons
LANL Los Alamos National Laboratory (nee LASL)
LASL Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory
LLNL Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (nee LRL)
LRL Lawrence Radiation Laboratory (nee UCRL)
MK Mark
MRBM Medium-Range Ballistic Missile
Mt megatons
PAL Permissive Action Link
Pu Plutonium
RV Re-entry Vehicle
SAM Surface-to-Air Missile
Rtd Parachute-retarded
SLBM Sea-Launched Cruise Missile
SSM Surface-to-Surface Missile
T tons
TN Thermonuclear
UCRL University of California Radiation Laboratory
USN US Navy
From the enormous Tsar Bomba, detonated with the force of 3,800 Hiroshima explosions, to the Mk-41, the biggest thermonuclear device ever built by the US, army-technology.com lists the worlds most powerful nuclear
bombs based on explosive power (or yield).
The hydrogen bomb was air dropped by a Tu-95 bomber using huge fall-retardation parachute. The detonation occurred 4km above the ground producing a yield of 50Mt, which is believed to be equivalent to the explosive
power from the simultaneous detonation of 3,800 Hiroshima bombs.
Tsar Bomba contained three stages, unlike normal thermonuclear weapons that explode in just two stages. While the addition of third stage increased the explosive power of the thermonuclear, the bomb's actual yield of 100Mt
was reduced by 50% to limit radioactive dust.
The procurement for the TX-14 programme was approved in September 1952. The TX-14s in emergency-capability configuration were inducted into service in February 1954. The Mk-14s retired in October 1954 and some of
them were recycled into the Mk-17 weapons by September 1956.
B-36 and B-47 bombers were used to carry TX-14s, and the rate of fall was decelerated by employing the parachute drop method.
Does having smaller, more flexible nuclear weapons mean that nukes are more
likely to be used?
According to an article in The New York Times, critics of the Obama Administration's nuclear weapons policy believe that a new generation of nuclear weapons will prove to be a
destabilizing force. The smaller explosive yield of the "new" B61-12 nuclear bomb could blur the lines between nuclear and conventional weapons, making them less
controversial and more "useable," they argue. Critics also believe a planned new nuclear cruise missile is both unnecessary and expensive.
The U.S. military's B61 series of tactical nuclear bombs have been in service for decades, starting in 1968. While many nuclear weapons are mounted on air, land, and seabased missiles, the B61 is an old-fashioned gravity bomb dropped from an aircraft like any other bomb. The new B61-12 will arm the B-2A Spirit bomber, the F-15E Strike Eagle,
F-16 Falcon, F-35A Joint Strike Fighter, and Tornado bomber. Here's a U.S. Air Force video of the B61-12 being test dropped from an F-15E Strike Eagle.
The B61-12 will be America's first nuclear standoff bombmeaning one designed to be delivered against targets at a distance safe for the aircraft doing the bombingthanks
to a pair of steerable fins that allow warplanes to lob the bomb from afar. An internal guidance system which doesn't use GPSgives the B61-12 an accuracy of around 30
meters. After release, a pair of stabilizing rockets (see picture above ) fire to induce spin.
The B61 is unique in having a "dial-a-yield", meaning that ground crews can select the explosive power of the bomb. The bomb can be set to 300 tons (equivalent to three
hundred 2,000-pound high explosive bombs), 1.5 kilotons, 10 kilotons (approximately two-thirds the explosive power of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima), or 50 kilotonsthree
times the explosive power of Hiroshima.
The U.S. government is building B61-12s by taking the four earlier versions of the bomb and upgrading them to the -12 standard. Washington contends that the weapons must
undergo a "service life extension" in order for them to remain reliable. The total cost of the program is estimated at $8 billion, producing approximately 400 to 500 bombs.
All of these featuresthe standoff capability, new level of accuracy, and ability to set the bomb to a low explosive yieldhas critics charging that the new version of the bomb is
not just a "life extension program" for the B61, but a new weapon in a time when slowing or stopping the development of nukes worldwide is in everyone's best
interest. Furthermore, the criticsincluding former U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perrybelieve that policymakers, including the President, could talk themselves into using
such a precise, low-yield nuclear weapon.
Since the end of World War II, there's been a psychological barrier to using nuclear weapons. Their raw destructive power and the possibility of starting a nuclear war create a
powerful psychological deterrent towards using them. The new B61-12, on the other hand, can deliver a small nuclear explosion at a precise location, limiting its impact on
civilians. More powerful than conventional weapons, the B61-12 could be used against North Korea's nuclear facilities, especially those heavily protected or buried underground,
and the U.S. could argue the case for using it on the grounds it could get the job done more effectively. The use of any nuclear weapon in combat for the first time since
1945 would lower the psychological barrier, making their use by other nuclear powers more likely, critics argue. It would also run the risk of adversaries and potential adversaries
retaliating in kind with their own nuclear weapons, starting a chain reaction leading to nuclear war.
Advocates for arms control also believe that Washington's plans for a new nuclear-tipped cruise missile are a mistake. Cruise missiles, which fly to targets at low altitude, are
difficult for air defense systems to detect. This makes them candidates for leading a nuclear-first strike. The United States was so concerned about Russian submarine-launched
cruise missiles being used against Washington D.C. it deployed the JLENS aerostat-based radar system.
Andrew C. Weber, former assistant secretary of defense and former director of t he Nuclear Weapons Council believes the missile is "unaffordable and unneeded." Weber
contends that the U.S. could lead the way on a ban on nuclear cruise missiles, which are also deployed by Russia and China. Such a ban would, according to him, reduce the
risks of nuclear war.
The introduction of the B61-12 and a new nuclear cruise missile is seen by advocates as giving policymakers safer, more reliable options in an increasingly dangerous, complex
world. Their opponents believe the weapons are unnecessary, unaffordable, make nuclear weapons more useable, and are dangerously destabilizing. Given the civilizationending potential of nukes, it's a worthy debate.
1956
atomic testing. The Limited Test Ban Treaty, signed in 1963 by the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain, prohibited
open-air and underwater nuclear testing.
Big Ivan, better known as Tsar Bomba, was 57 Megatons of Soviet might. That's 1,400 times Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined and ten times the entire combined fire
power expended in WWII. In one bomb. One explosion. And, incredibly, that's only half of what it could have done.
In July 1961, Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (and leader of the USSR) decided that he had had enough of the unspoken
nuclear testing moratorium that his country, the US, and the UK had been abiding by since 1958. The 22nd Congress of the Communist Party would convene that October,
providing the perfect venue to show off the USSR's military muscle. With the world's eyes on Moscow, what better way to show the West who was boss than with a "testing
spectacular" setting off the largest man-made explosion of all time?
Problem was, they didn't have a bomb nearly big enough for Khrushchev. Up to that point, the largest hydrogen bomb the Soviets had detonated was the puny 3 MT RDS-37
(albeit the first true hydrogen bomb they built) but Khrushchev demanded something much, much biggerenough to make America's 15 MT Castle Bravo test in 1954 wilt.
And he wanted it built in time for the Congress. And since telling Nikita Khrushchev "no" simply didn't happen, a four man development teamVictor Adamskii, Yuri
Babaev, Yuri Smirnov, and Yuri Trutnevdesigned and simultaneously built the 24-foot long, three-stage thermonuclear device in just 15 weeks.
Officially designated as AN602 hydrogen bomb, the Tsar Bomba used the common three-stage Teller-Ulam design wherein the primary fission reaction is used to compress
a secondary mixed fission/fusion fuel layer, which in turn compresses a large, tertiary thermonuclear payloadessentially stringing a pair of hydrogen fission reactions
together in order to generate enough energy to instigate fusion in a uranium payload.
Since the project was so rushed, only one such weapon was ever built and even then just barely. At 27 tons, it weighed nearly as much as the Tu-95that carried it and was so
big that crews had to cut off the plane's bomb-bay doors in order to fit it in. Even so, at 11:32 am on October 30, 1961, theTsar Bomba exited Andrei Durnovtsev's plane at a
height of 6.5 miles and slowly parachuted towards Mityushikha Bay test range in Novaya Zemlya (giving the drop plane just 188 seconds to escape). At 2.5 miles high, Big
Ivan went boom.
The resulting fireball had a radius of nearly 10,000 vertical feet and its 210,000 foot tall mushroom cloud reached into the stratosphere. The light generated by the reaction
could be seen from over a 1,000 km and the force of its explosion registered a 5.0 on the Richter scale. The shock wave generated air pressures topping 300 PSI, circled the
Earth thrice, and cracked windows 900 km away in Norway and Finland. Buildings in the abandoned town of Severny 55 km away were leveledall of themand upon later
inspection, ground zero was reportedly the texture of a skating rink.
As one observer recalled,
The clouds beneath the aircraft and in the distance were lit up by the powerful flash. The sea of light spread under the hatch and even clouds began to glow and became
transparent. At that moment, our aircraft emerged from between two cloud layers and down below in the gap a huge bright orange ball was emerging. The ball was powerful
and arrogant like Jupiter. Slowly and silently it crept upwards.... Having broken through the thick layer of clouds it kept growing. It seemed to suck the whole earth into it.
The spectacle was fantastic, unreal, supernatural.
This utter destruction is only half of what the Tsar Bomba was capable of. It was designed and built to deliver a staggering 100 megaton payload. The Tsar was supposed to
utilize fast-fissioning uranium tampers on the second and third stages of the bomb, which would have allowed for a bigger reaction and subsequent energy release. However,
just before the test was to take place, Soviet leadership ordered the tampers swapped out with lead replacements in order to prevent nuclear fallout from reaching populated
areas of the USSR.
These lead tampers cut the bomb's yield by 50 percent but they also eliminated 97 percent of the resulting fallout. As such the Tsar Bomba, the largest, most destructively
powerful device ever built by man also holds the notable distinction of being the relatively "cleanest" nuclear weapon ever tested. Luckily, that record was only important for
two years until the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty which brought an end to above-ground nuclear weapons tests.