9/15/2016 G.R.No.

L38969

TodayisThursday,September15,2016

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila

ENBANC

G.R.No.L3896970February9,1989

PEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINES,plaintiffappellee,
vs.
FELICIANOMUOZ,alias"Tony",etal.,accused,MARVINMILLORA,TOMASTAYABA,alias"Tamy
Tayaba"andJOSEMISLANG,defendantsappellants.

TheSolicitorGeneralforplaintiffappellee.

ManuelB.MilloraforappellantMarvinMillora.

AbelardoP.FerminforappellantJoseMislang.

AquilinoD.BaniquedforappellantTomasTayaba.

CRUZ,J.:

Ofthefourpersonsconvictedinthiscase,onehasnotappealedandthusimpliedlyacceptedhissentence.The
others have questioned their conviction and insist that they are innocent. The prosecution did not think so, and
neitherdoestheSolicitorGeneralnow.Thebrieffortheappelleewouldaffirmthefindingofguiltandinfacteven
increasethepenalty.

Theprosecutionpresentedabizarrecaseofarbitrarycondemnationandinstantpunishmentmetedoutbywhat
appeartobethemembersofaprivatearmy.Elevenpersons,mostofthembodyguardsofthetownmayor,went
outinajeepatthebehestofoneofthemwhohadcomplainedofhavingbeenvictimizedbycattlerustlers.Having
foundtheirsupposedquarry,theyproceededtoexecuteeachoneofthemincoldbloodwithoutfurtheradoand
without mercy. One was shot in the mouth and died instantly as his son and daughter looked on in horror. The
secondwasforcedtoliedownonthegroundandthenshottwice,alsointhehead,beforehisterrifiedwifeand
son.Thethird,whowasonlysixteenyearsold,waskickedintheheaduntilhebledbeforehetoohadhisbrains
blown out. To all appearances, the unfortunate victims were only innocent farmers and not the dangerous
criminalstheywerepronouncedtobe.

Bizarrebuttrue,asthetrialcourtagreed.

Of the eleven persons who were charged with murder in three separate informations, the four who stood trial
were found guilty. 1 The other seven have yet to be identified and tried. The sentence of Feliciano Muoz, who did not
appeal, has long become final and executory and is now being served. 2 We deal here only with the appeals of the other
convicts,namely,MarvinMillora,TomasTayaba,andJoseMislang,whoallaskforareversal.

ThekillingsoccurredinthemorningofJune30,1972,inBaliteSur,SanCarlosCity,Pangasinan.3

Asestablishedbytheprosecution,FelicianoMuoz,MarvinMillora,TomasTayaba,JoseMislang,andtheother
sevenunidentifiedmenwenttothehouseofMauroBulataoandaskedfortheaddressofhissonArsenic.Allfour
of them went inside while the rest surrounded the house. All eleven men were armed. Mauro, who was then
bathing his horse, was called by the accused. As he approached and while under his house, he was met by
Millorawhosimplyshothimatarm'slengthwitha"longfirearm,"hittinghiminthemouthandkillinghimashefell.
Atthatprecisetime,Muoz,TayabaandMislangwerestandingbyMillora,evidentlygivinghimarmedsupport.
Noneofthemmadeanymovetorestrainordissuadehim.4

AfterkillingMauro,thefouraccuseddraggedoutofthehousehissixteenyearoldson,Aquilino,andknockedhim
down.Muozkickedhimseveraltimesintheheadashelayonthegroundwhiletheotherslookedoninsilent
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approval or at least without objection. They then took the bleeding man with them to look for their third target,
AlejandroBulatao.5

In Alejandro's house, the group forced his wife, Juana to go with them and direct them to her husband. They
foundhimtendingtotheircowswithhissonPedro.MuozorderedAlejandroandhiswifetoliedownandthen,
evenasPedropleadedforhisfather'slife,shotAlejandrotwiceinthehead,killinghiminstantly.Millora,Tayaba
andMislang,alongwiththeircompanions,merelystoodbyasthebrutalactwascommitted.Juanawatchedher
husband'sdeathinterrorandthe12yearoldboymadeadesperaterunforhislifeasoneoftheaccusedfiredat
himandmissed.6

Thesecondvictimhavingbeenmurderedasthefirst,theaccusedthenventedtheirviolenceonAquilino,whom
Muozagainbrutallykickedastheotherslookedon.Aquilinowasentirelydefenseless.Finally,Muozendedthe
boy'sagonyandshothimtodeath,hittinghimintheheadandbody.MuozandMinorathenpickedupallthe
emptyshellsandfledwiththerestoftheircompanions,leavingtheterrifiedJuanawiththetwogrislycorpses.7

The above events were narrated at the trial by Melecia Bulatao, 8 Mauro's daughter and Aquilino's sister Jose
Bulatao, 9 Mauro's son and Aquilino's brother Juana Bulatao, 10 Alejandro's wife and Pedro Bulatao, 11 their son. Their
testimonywascorroboratedbyDr.JuanitadeVera,12whoperformedtheautopsyonthethreevictims.

MeleciaandJosetestifiedonthekillingoftheirfatherbyMarvinMinoraastheotheraccusedstoodbyandthe
maulingoftheirbrotherAquilinobeforehewasdraggedawaybythegroup.Thetrialcourtespeciallynotedthe
straightforwardaccountgivenbyJose,whopositivelyidentifiedMinoraasthekilleranddescribedtheparticipation
oftheothers,includingthesavagekickingofhisbrotherbyMuoz. 13MeleciaearlierpointedtoMislangastheone
who had shot her father but changed her mind later on crossexamination and named Millora as the actual killer. She
explained her turnabout by confessing that she had earlier agreed to exonerate Minora in exchange for the sum of
P3,000.00promisedbyhisfatheralthoughsheactuallydidnotreceivethemoney. 14Forherpart,Juanarelatedhowshe
was threatened with death unless she accompanied the accused to where her husband was. She narrated in detail how
Alejandro was killed before her very eyes and how Aquilino was later kicked and then also shot to death, also by Muoz,
while the other accused stood by. 15 Her testimony was corroborated by Pedro, her son, whom the accused had also
thought of killing because he was "talkative" and indeed was shot at when he successfully escaped after his father's
murder.16

Thedefensemakesmuchofthefactthatitwasonlymonthsafterthekillingsthatitoccurredtothesewitnessesto
denouncetheaccusedandsuggeststhatthisdelayshouldimpugntheircredibility.Ascorrectlypointedoutbythe
trial judge, however, these witnesses were naturally deterred from doing so for fear that they would meet the
same fate that befell their relatives. These were humble barrio folk whose timidity did not allow them to report
their grievances beyond the barrio officials they knew, more so since the higher authorities appeared to be
indifferentandgavenoattention,muchlessencouragement,totheircomplaints.

Itistruethattherewereseveralinconsistenciesinthetestimonyofthesewitnessesaspainstakinglypointedout
bytheappellants, 17buttheseareminorflawsthatdonotdetractfromtheessentialtruthfulnessoftheiraccountsofthe
ruthlesskillings.18

The brutality of the murders and the veracity of the testimony of the said witnesses are emphasized by the
medicalreports19oftheinjuriessustainedbythevictims,asfollows:

MauroBulatao:

1. Thru and thru gunshot wound with point of entrance at the upper lip left side around 1 cm. in
diameterandwiththeexitatthemiddleofthebackoftheheadaround11/2cm.indiameter.

2.Gunshotwoundatthelowerlipleftsideofthemouth.

AlejandroBulatao:

1.Laceratedgunshotwoundatthelefteyewiththewholeeyepracticallylacerated.

2. Lacerated gunshot wound of the right eye and the forehead practically opened with the brain
tissueoutside.

AquilineBulatao:

1.Thruandthrugunshotwoundwithpointofentranceattheupperrightjawbonearound11/2cm.
indiameterandwiththeexitatthemiddleofthebackoftheheadaround2cm.indiameter.

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2.Gunshotwoundattheupperleftshoulderoutthemiddleoftheleftclaviclearound11/2inchesin
diameter.

Thethreeappellantsinvokedindividualdefenseswhichthetrialcourtcorrectlyrejectedasfalseandunbelievable.
All claimed the Bulataos were killed as a result of an exchange of gunfire with a rather hazy group and each
claimedhewasnotinvolvedintheshootout.

TestifyingforMilloraontheallegedencounterbetweentheBulataosandtheiradversaries,VictorianoBacanisaid
that the latter included Tayaba, Mislang and five others who fled from the scene in a jeep. 20 Graciano Muoz,
corroborating Bacani, said he himself saw seven men in a jeep coming from the sound of the gunfire after he had paid
MauroP400.00toredeemhisstolencarabao.21AnotherwitnessforMillora,OrlandodelosSantos,testifiedtohavingseen
theencounterbetweentheBulataosandtheothergroupanddeclaredthattheformerwerearmedwithcarbinesandGarand
rifles.22

ThetrialcourtrejectedBacani'stestimonybecauseheappearedhesitantandsuspiciousonthestandanddidnot
givetheimpressionthathewastellingthetruth. 23Moreover,ittookhimallofoneyeartoreporttheallegedshooting
encounter,whichhealsodidnotmentionthatsameafternoonwhenhevisitedMauro'sfamilytocondolewiththem. 24It is
alsonotbelievablethatthegroupwouldfleebecausetheyhadnomorebulletswhentheirsupposedthreeadversarieswere
already dead in the field. The alleged redemption made by Muoz was described by the trial court as preposterous,
especiallysincenoshredofevidencehadbeenpresentedtoshowthatMaurowasacattlerustler,letalonehis16yearold
son. 25 As for De los Santos, no firearms were discovered beside the dead bodies of the Bulataos, including Mauro, who
wasfoundnotinthesupposedbattlegroundbutunderhishouse,astestifiedtobyDr.DeVera.26

Millora's own defense was that he was in Dagupan City at the time of the killings, having gone there in the
eveningofJune29,1972.Heclaimedhehadstayedthereovernightwithafemalecompanionafterdrinkingbeer
withAtty.AntonioResngitreturningtoSanCarlosCityonlybetween8and9o'clockthefollowingmorningorJune
30,1972.27Thelawyercorroboratedhim,28buthecannotbemorecrediblethanMauro'sownchildren,JoseandMelecia,
who positively identified Millora as the person who actually shot their father in the face and killed him instantly. Such a
traumatic experience could not have been forgotten by these witnesses who saw their father murdered without warning or
mercynorcouldtheirmemoryoftheheartlesskillerhavebeeneasilywipedoutfromtheirminds.

It is stressed that Juana Bulatao and her son Pedro also categorically declared that Millora was with the group
thatshetooktothefieldwhereherhusbandandAquilinowerekilledbyMuoz.29

Tayaba and Mislang offered a common defense, also of alibi. Both claimed that Mislang having complained of
cattlerustlers,agroupofpolicemen,includingTayaba,stayedintheformer'shousethewholenightofJune29,
1972,leavingonlyat8o'clockthefollowingmorningofJune30,1972,afterMislanghadservedthembreakfast.
30 Significantly, however, barrio Bacnar where Mislang's house was located, is only two kilometers from Balite Sur. 31
Moreover, the trial court doubted the testimony given by Sgt. Lomibao, who corroborated them and spoke of having heard
thegunfirenarratedbyMillora'switnesses.ThedecisionnotedthatLomibaowasmysteriouslyabsentwhenthepolicechief
andDr.deVerawenttothesceneofthecrimeat9o'clockthatmorningtoinvestigatethekillings.Infact,itexpressedthe
suspicion that Lomibao and Patrolman Liwanag, who also testified for the accused, might have been among the seven
unidentifiedpersonswhowerewithMuozandthethreeappellantshereinwhentheBulataosweremurdered.32

Alltold,weaffirmthefindingsofthetrialjudge,whohadtheopportunitytoobservethewitnessesatthetrialand
assesstheircredibility.Aswesaidinapreviouscase:

We see no reason to reverse the factual findings of the trial judge, who had the opportunity to
observe the demeanor of the witnesses and to assess their credibility. The written record will not
show that nuance of tone or voice, the meaningful contrast between the hesitant pause and the
prompt reply, and the expression or color or tilt of face that will affirm the truth or expose the
fabrication.Allthesesubtlefactorscouldbeconsideredbythetrialjudgeinweighingtheconflicting
declarationsbeforehim,andwedonotfindthathehaserred.33

We agree that the three appellants, together with Muoz and their seven other companions, participated in the
killingsofthethreeBulataosinthemannerdescribedbythewitnessesfortheprosecution.Thedefensesofthe
herein appellants should be, as they properly were, rejected as undeserving of belief in the light of the more
convincingandtellingevidencesubmittedbythegovernment.

However, we do not accept the different degrees of participation assigned by the court a quo to each of the
appellantsineachofthethreeoffensesimputedtothem.InCriminalCaseNo.0176,Millorawasfoundguiltyas
principal and Muoz and the other two herein appellants only as accomplices, and in Criminal Case Nos. 0177
and0178,Muozwasfoundguiltyasprincipalandthehereinappellantsonlyasaccomplices. 34Insupportofthis
finding,thetrialcourtsaidthattherewasnoevidenceofconspiracytojustifyholdingeachoftheaccusedequallyliablefor
thethreemurders.

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Weholdthattherewas.Indeed,itisclearthatfromtheverystart,whentheelevenmenwentouttolookforthe
suspected cattle rustlers, there was already an agreement among them to ferret out and punish the Bulataos
whom they had condemned beforehand. They knew whom they were looking for. They knew where to look for
them. They sought each of them with drawn and ready weapons. When they reached Mauro Bulatao's house,
fourofthemwentinsidewhiletherestdeployedthemselvesinstrategicpositions.WhenMillorashotMauro,the
appellantsandtheothersstoodbywithgunsattheready.Nobodymovedtodissuadeorstophim.Togetherthey
draggedAquilinofromthehouseandtherestwatchedwhileMuozkickedhimintheheadwhilehelplessonthe
ground.Together,theytookhimwiththemandthenforcedJuanaBulataotoleadthemtoherhusband.Therest
stoodbywiththeirweaponsasMuozshotAlejandrointhehead.Nooneintercededtostophimfromalsokilling
Aquilino. There is no question that the group moved in concert, pursuing a common design previously agreed
upon,thatmadeeachofthempartofaconspiracy. 35Assuch,eachofthemisliableinequaldegreewiththeothers
for each of the three killings. Each member of the conspiracy to commit the crime of murder is guilty as a coprincipal,
regardlessofwhoactuallypulledthetriggerthatkilledthethreevictims.Itissettledthatinaconspiracytheactofoneis
theactofall.36

Each of the three killings constituted the crime of murder, qualified by alevosia. There was treachery because
everyoneofthethreevictimswascompletelyhelplessanddefenselesswhenshotandkilledbytheaccusedwith
norisktothemselves.Maurowascompletelytakenbysurprisewhenhewasshotintheface.Alejandrowaslying
downwhenhewasshotinthehead.Aquilinowasseatedwhenhewasshotintheheadandshoulders.Noneof
thethreevictimshadachancetoresist.

The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code was reclusion temporal in its maximum
periodtodeath,butthiswasmodifiedbyArticleIII,Section19(l)ofthe1987Constitutionprovidingasfollows:

Excessivefinesshallnotbeimposed,norcruel,degradingorinhumanpunishmentinflictedNeither
shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the
Congresshereafterprovidesforit.Anydeathpenaltyalreadyimposedshallbereducedtoreclusion
perpetua.

Conformably, the Court has since February 2, 1987 not imposed the death penalty whenever it was called for
underthesaidarticlebutinsteadreducedthesametoreclusionperpetuaasmandatedbytheaboveprovision.
The maximum period of the penalty was thus in effect lowered to the medium, the same period applied, as
before, where the offense was not attended by any modifying circumstance, with the minimum period, i. e.,
reclusion temporal maximum, being still applicable in all other cases. The threegrade scheme of the original
penalty,includingdeath,wasthusmaintainedexceptthatthemaximumperiodwasnotimposedbecauseofthe
constitutionalprohibition.

InPeople v. Gavarra 37 Justice Pedro L. Yap declared for the Court that "in view of the abolition of the death penalty
underSection19,ArticleIIIofthe1987Constitution,thepenaltythatmaybeimposedformurderisreclusiontemporalin its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua" thereby eliminating death as the original maximum period. Later, without
categorically saying so, the Court, through Justice Ameurfina MelencioHerrera in People v. Masangkay 38 and through
JusticeAndresR.NarvasainPeoplev.Atencio39divided the modified penalty into three new periods, the limits of which
werespecifiedbyJusticeEdgardoL.ParasinPeoplev.Intino,40asfollows:thelowerhalfofreclusiontemporal maximum
astheminimumtheupperhalfofreclusiontemporalmaximumasthemediumandreclusionperpetuaasthemaximum.

The Court has reconsidered the above cases and, after extended discussion, come to the conclusion that the
doctrineannouncedthereindoesnotreflecttheintentionoftheframersasembodiedinArticleIII,Section19(l)of
theConstitution.Thisconclusionisnotunanimous,tobesure.Indeed,thereismuchtobesaidoftheopposite
view,whichwasinfactsharedbymanyofthosenowvotingforitsreversal.ThemajorityoftheCourt,however,is
ofthebeliefthattheoriginalinterpretationshouldberestoredasthemoreacceptablereadingoftheconstitutional
provisioninquestion.

The advocates of the Masangkay ruling argue that the Constitution abolished the death penalty and thereby
limitedthepenaltyformurdertotheremainingperiods,towit,theminimumandthemedium.Theseshouldnow
bedividedintothreenewperiodsinkeepingwiththethreegradeschemeintendedbythelegislature.Thosewho
disagree feel that Article III, Section 19(l) merely prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and has not, by
reducing it to reclusion perpetua, also correspondingly reduced the remaining penalties. These should be
maintainedintact.

AreadingofSection19(l)ofArticleIIIwillreadilyshowthatthereisreallynothingthereinwhichexpresslydeclares
theabolitionofthedeathpenalty.Theprovisionmerelysaysthatthedeathpenaltyshallnotbeimposedunless
for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the Congress hereafter provides for it and, if already imposed,
shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The language, while rather awkward, is still plain enough. And it is a
settled rule of legal hermeneutics that if the language under consideration is plain, it is neither necessary nor
permissibletoresorttoextrinsicaids,liketherecordsoftheconstitutionalconvention,foritsinterpretation.41

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Atthat,theCourtfindsthatsuchresort,evenifmade,wouldnotbeofmuchassistanceeitherinthecaseatbar.
Acceptingarguendothatitwastheintentionoftheframerstoabolishthedeathpenalty,wearestillnotconvinced
fromthedebatesintheConstitutionalCommissionthattherewasalsoarequirementtoadjustthetworemaining
periods by dividing them into three shorter periods. This is not a necessary consequence of the provision as
worded. The following exchange cited by those in favor of Masangkay is at best thoughtprovoking but not
decisiveofthequestion:

FR. BERNAS: The effect is the abolition of the death penalty from those statutesonly
thedeathpenalty.Thestatuteisnotabolished,butthepenaltyisabolished.

MR.MAAMBONG:ThatiswhatIamworriedabout,becausethestatutes,especiallyin
theGeneralCriminalLaw,whichistheRevisedPenalCode,donotnecessarilypunish
directlywithdeath.Sometimesithasarangeofreclusiontemporaltodeathorreclusion
perpetuatodeath.Andwhatwouldbetheeffectonthejudges,forexample,iftherange
isreclusiontemporaltodeathandhecannolongerimposethedeathpenalty?Hewill
havedifficultyincomputingthedegrees.

Couldthecommitteeenlightenusonhowthejudgewilllookatthespecificsituation.

FR.BERNAS:Igrantthatthejudgeswillhavedifficulty,butIsupposethatthejudgeswill
beequaltotheirtasks.Theonlythingis,ifthereisarange,therangecannotgoasfar
asdeath(Record,CONCOM,July18,1986,Vol.I,749).

FR.BERNAS:Certainly,thepenaltieslowerthandeathremain.

MR. REGALADO: That would be reclusion perpetua. But the range of the penalty for
murderconsistsofthreeperiods.Themaximumperiodofreclusiontemporalunderthe
presentstatusistheminimumperiodforthepenaltyformurder.Themediumperiodis
reclusionperpetua.Themaximumperiodisdeath.Ifwenowremovethedeathpenalty,
wewill,therefore,havearangeofpenaltyof17years,4monthsand1dayto20years
ofreclusiontemporaluptoreclusionperpetua.Youcannotdividereclusionperpetuainto
two.Whileithasadurationof30years,itisanindivisiblepenalty.Wheredowegetthe
medium period now until such time that Congress gets around to accommodate this
amendment?

FR.BERNAS:AsIsaid,thisisamatterwhichlawyerscanarguewithjudgesabout.All
we are saying is, the judges cannot impose the death penalty (Record, CONCOM July
18,1986,Vol.I,p.750).

Sotherewehaveit"thisisamatterwhichlawyerscanarguewithjudgesabout."AssumingthatCommissioner
Bernas's answer reflected the consensus of the body, we are still not persuaded that it was the intention of the
framers to lower not only the maximum period but also the other periods of the original penalty. That is not
necessarily inferable from his statement that "the judges will be equal to their task," especially so since he also
said and we think with more definitenessthat "all we are saying is that the judges cannot impose the death
penalty"(Emphasissupplied).Weunderstandthistomeanthattheywerenotsayingmore.

Thequestionasweseeitisnotwhethertheframersintendedtoabolishthedeathpenaltyormerelytopreventits
imposition.Whatevertheintentionwas,whatweshoulddetermineiswhetherornottheyalsomeanttorequirea
correspondingmodificationintheotherperiodsasaresultoftheprohibitionagainstthedeathpenalty.

Itisdefinitethatsucharequirement,iftherereallywasone,isnotatallexpressedinArticleIII,Section19(l)of
theConstitutionorindicatedthereinbyatleastclearandunmistakableimplication.Itwouldhavebeensoeasy,
assumingsuchintention,tostateitcategoricallyandplainly,leavingnodoubtastoitsmeaning.Onesearchesin
vainforsuchastatement,expressorevenimplied.Thewriterofthisopinionmakesthepersonalobservationthat
thismightbestillanotherinstancewheretheframersmeantonethingandsaidanotherorstrangely,considering
theirloquacityelsewheredidnotsayenough.

TheoriginalrulingasappliedintheGavarra,Masangkay,AtencioandIntino cases represented the unanimous

thinkingoftheCourtasitwasthenconstituted.Allbuttwomembers 42atthattimestillsitontheCourttoday.Ifwe
haveseenfittotakeasecondlookatthedoctrineonwhichwewereallagreedbefore,itisnotbecauseofachangeinthe
compositionofthisbody.ItisvirtuallythesameCourtthatischangingitsmindafterreflectingonthequestionagaininthe
light of new perspectives. And well it might, and can, for the tenets it lays down are not immutable. The decisions of this
Courtarenotpetrifiedrulesgrownrigidoncepronouncedbutvital,growingthingssubjecttochangeasalllifeis.Whilewe
are told that the trodden path is best, this should not prevent us from opening a fresh trial or exploring the other side or
testinganewideainaspiritofcontinuinginquiry.

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Accordingly, with the hope that "as judges, (we) will be equal to (our) tasks," whatever that means, we hereby
reverse the current doctrine providing for three new periods for the penalty for murder as reduced by the
Constitution. Instead, we return to our original interpretation and hold that Article III, Section 19(l) does not
changetheperiodsofthepenaltyprescribedbyArticle248oftheRevisedPenalCodeexceptonlyinsofarasit
prohibitstheimpositionofthedeathpenaltyandreducesittoreclusionperpetua.Therangeofthemediumand
minimumpenaltiesremainsunchanged.

TheCourtreliesthatthisinterpretationmayleadtocertaininequitiesthatwouldnothavearisenunderArticle248
of the Revised Penal Code before its modification. Thus, a person originally subject to the death penalty and
another who committed the murder without the attendance of any modifying circumstance will now be both
punishable with the same medium period although the former is concededly more guilty than the latter. True
enough.ButthatisthewillnotofthisCourtbutoftheConstitution.Thatisaquestionofwisdom,notconstruction.
OfsomerelevanceperhapsistheparableintheBibleoftheworkmanwhowaspaidthestipulateddailywageof
onepennyalthoughhehadworkedlongerthanothershiredlaterinthedayalsopaidthesameamount.Whenhe
complainedbecausehefeltunjustlytreatedbythehouseholder,thelatterreplied:"Friend,Idoyounowrong.Did
younotagreewithmeforapenny?'

TheprobleminanyeventisaddressednottothisCourtbuttotheCongress.Penaltiesareprescribedbystatute
and are essentially and exclusively legislative. As judges, we can only interpret and apply them and have no
authority to modify them or revise their range as determined exclusively by the legislature. We should not
encroachonthisprerogativeofthelawmakingbody.

Coming back to the case at bar, we find that there being no generic aggravating or mitigating circumstance
attendingthecommissionoftheoffenses,theapplicablesentenceisthemediumperiodofthepenaltyprescribed
byArticle248oftheRevisedPenalCodewhich,conformablytothenewdoctrinehereadoptedandannounced,is
stillreclusionperpetua.Thisisthepenaltyweimposeonalltheaccusedappellantsforeachofthethreemurders
theyhavecommittedinconspiracywiththeothers.Theawardofcivilindemnityfortheheirsofeachofthevictims
isaffirmedbuttheamountthereofisherebyincreasedtoP30,000.00inlinewiththepresentpolicy.

Itremainstoobservethatthecrimesinflicteduponthehumblefarmerswouldhaveremainedunpunishedwereit
notforthevigilanceofcertainresponsibleofficials,especiallythepoliceandtheprosecutingofficer,whotookup
thecudgelsforthevictims'families.Thecourageandconscientiousnesstheydisplayedarestillthemostpotent
weaponsagainstthosewho,intheirarrogance,believethattheycanfloutthelawandfrustratejusticebecause
theyhavetheprotectionofpowerfulpatrons.

WHEREFORE,theappealeddecisionisMODIFIEDandalltheaccusedappellantsareherebydeclaredguiltyas
principalsinCriminalCaseNos.0176,0177and0178.Eachofthemissentencedtosufferthree(3)penaltiesof
reclusionperpetua,andtopaysolidarilytotheheirsoftheirvictimscivilindemnityinthesumofP30,000.00for
eachofthedeceased,oratotalindemnityofP90,000.00,withcosts.

SOORDERED.

Fernan,C.J.,Gutierrez,Jr.,Feliciano,Gancayco,Padilla,Bidin,GrioAquinoandMedialdea,JJ.,concur.

SeparateOpinions

MELENCIOHERRERA,J.,concurringanddissenting:

Concurrenceisexpressedinsofarasconvictionoftheappellantsisconcerned.

Dissentisregistered,however,astothepenaltyimposedwhich,inourview,shouldadheretothatprovidedinthe
Gavarra, followed by Masangkay, Atencio and Intino cases, which is more reflective of the true intent of the
framersofthe1987Constitution.

Simplyput,thequestionis:didSection19(1),ArticleIIIofthe1987Constitution,abolishthedeathpenaltyornot?
Thepertinentportionthereofprovides:

... Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes
theCongresshereafterprovidesforit.

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