MGI Making It in America Executive Summary
MGI Making It in America Executive Summary
JUNE 2017
RESEARCH PREVIEW
A SPECIAL INITIATIVE FOR THE
2017 ASPEN IDEAS FESTIVAL
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Since its founding in 1990, the McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) has sought
to develop a deeper understanding of the evolving global economy. As the
business and economics research arm of McKinsey & Company, MGI aims
to provide leaders in the commercial, public, and social sectors with the facts
and insights on which to base management and policy decisions. For the
second year running, the LauderInstitute at the University of Pennsylvania
ranked MGI the worlds number-one private-sector think tank in its 2016
GlobalThink TankIndex.
RESEARCH PREVIEW
A SPECIAL INITIATIVE FOR THE
2017 ASPEN IDEAS FESTIVAL
9 12 20 55 60 70
The future of production is digital
As global demand rises and fragments, manufacturers need agilityand technologies such
as analytics, the Internet of Things, advanced robotics, and 3-D printing can provide it.
Optimized, autonomous factories will connect with supplier networks in a fully digitized and tightly
integrated value chain. Real-time data will run from product design through customer usage,
enabling new services and business models.
Real value added is at 10- to 20-year lows for a range of Compound annual
US manufacturing industries1 growth rate
Index: 100 = 1980 Vehicles and heavy machinery %
160
156 1.3 1.0 0.3
140 Locally
processed goods
145 1.0 0.6 0.8
120
Resource-intensive 118 0.5 0.1 0.9
commodities
100
Basic
consumer goods 78 0.7 1.0 2.6
80
1980 1990 2000
1980 1990 2000 2010 2016 2016 2016
1 Chart does not include technology-driven products (e.g., pharma and computers), where value added has increased by 7.7x since 1980.
The middle class has slipped back 2% of workers, Some industries have felt more pain
or 3 million
to labor income levels of the 1990s people, earn more than others in terms of wage growth
than $200,000
Evolution of real labor income Average real hourly wages by industry
(Index 1990=100) $200K (Index 1990=100)
150 150
Highest quintile Finance
140 140
Avg. wage
RECESSION RECESSION
$169,195
130 130
120 120
Avg. wage
Manufacturing Retail
$35,629
110 110
Middle quintiles
100 100
Construction Transportation
90 90
1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010
$100K
98% of workers, or Lawyers
158 million people, Software developers, managers
earn less than $200,000 $90K Engineers
$80K
$70K
85% of workers, or Registered nurses; accountants and auditors
136 million people, 18% Elementary school teachers;
earn less than $75,000 $60K first-line supervisors
Electricians
$50K
Truck drivers
67% of workers, or $40K Office clerks
107 million people, 30% Retail salespersons
earn less than $45,000 $30K Home health aides;
childcare workers
$20K
37% of workers, or Cashiers;
59 million people, 37% food prep workers;
earn less than $20,000 $10K wait staff
$5K2
1 Wage statistics based on 2015 compensation data reported by the employer on W-2 forms. Occupational information from
US Bureau of Labor Statistics Occupational Employment Survey.
2 All brackets, but especially those at the bottom, may include part-time workers and people who did not work the full year.
The United States always assumed that its forward momentum would carry the next
generation toward greater prosperity, just as it took for granted that its technical prowess
in manufacturing would guarantee its global market share. But now those assumptions
have been upended. Although unemployment is down and wages are finally ticking up
again, these indicators can distract from the bigger picture. Tens of millions of workers
are struggling to make it in America, and even a full-time job does not guarantee a decent
standard of living.
Manufacturing is not the only sector with poor wage growth, nor is it the largest. But it was
once the backbone of the middle class, and its erosion is symptomatic of broader shifts
in the economy. Part1 of this research preview looks at how this unfoldedand outlines
how the sector could exploit changes in technology and value chains to compete for new
market opportunities. Part2 traces what has happened to wages across the economy more
broadly and considers what caused these pressures. Finally, Part3 opens what we hope will
be an ongoing conversation about solutions that can lead to more inclusive growth.
Today demand, global value chains, and technology are evolving in ways that play to US
strengths. The United States can capitalize on these shifts to boost output and narrow
its trade deficit, particularly in advanced manufacturing industries. The first promising
factor is rising consumption in emerging economies, combined with the fact that the
United States itself remains one of the worlds largest and most lucrative markets. Factor
costs are changing, too, to the benefit of many US-based producers. Wages are rising
in emerging economies, automation weakens the case for labor arbitrage, and the shale
boom has made energy cheap and abundant in the United States. More of the worlds
production is up for grabs; global value chains are shifting as firms emphasize service-
based business models and proximity to markets, suppliers, and innovation partners.
The new world of digital manufacturing represents a profound shift toward higher
productivity and the agility needed to meet fragmenting demand. Technologies such as
the Internet of Things, analytics, advanced robotics, and 3D printing are transforming
factory floors into flexible, self-maintaining operations. Companies will soon be able to
connect their entire value chain with a seamless flow of data, unlocking efficiencies and
new service offerings.
The growth opportunities for US manufacturing are real, but it would be nave to minimize
the challenges of turning around two decades of negative trends. This effort has to start
with stimulating a wave of investment from both domestic and foreign sourcesnot just
with tax incentives but through targeted strategies to bring the industries of the future
to communities that have been left behind. The second critical priority is revitalizing
the domestic supplier base, which has been hollowed out in the past two decades.
Most US manufacturing firms are small companies that need financial, technology, and
advisory support; large firms can take a step toward building their own collaborative
supplier networks by helping smaller firms modernize and become more innovative.
Third, the jobs at stake in 21st-century manufacturing may be service roles or positions
requiring digital skills, which means that workforce training will be an important piece of
the puzzle. Larger companies will have to do more to develop the capabilities they need
by offering their own training, partnering with education providers and industry groups,
or establishing workforce platforms. Finally, the United States needs a comprehensive
strategy to boost net exports and regain global market shareone that encourages
more small firms to participate, bringing the benefits of globalization to more workers.
US manufacturing can achieve a turnaround if the public and private sectors treat it
as a national priority. But it is important to recognize that a successful revitalization
will not produce a return to 1960s-style manufacturing employment. For decades
the sector provided economic mobility to workers with less education, and nothing
else has emerged to take its place. Part2 of this report looks at the broader trend of
narrowing opportunities.
A longer view shows that household incomes have been under pressure for more
than three decades. This is ultimately a wage storyand only workers at the top of the
distribution have been bringing home bigger paychecks. The top quintile almost doubled
its wages and benefits in real terms since 1983, but everyone else remains stuck at
roughly the levels of the 1990s. There is now a yawning pay gap between workers with
post-secondary education and those without it. While a small number of high-growth
metros have bounced back strongly in the recovery, real median household incomes
remain below their pre-2000 peaks in almost two-thirds of US counties. Meanwhile, the
costs of maintaining a middle-class life have continued to climb.
All of the forces described above have played a role in depressing wages. In addition
to exploring these aspects, this research focuses on another potential contributing
factor that is often overlooked in discussions of US income inequality: the changing
environment facing companies and industries. There has been an extraordinary
escalation of competitive pressures, including foreign competition in tradable sectors
as well as price competition and declining returns in many asset-heavy sectors.
Furthermore, profits are shifting to asset-light sectors and a small number of superstar
firms that employ relatively few people. Some struggling firms have responded with
cost-cutting measures such as squeezing suppliers or opting for automation, offshoring,
or contract work. In real terms, wages remain below their 1983 levels in some large,
asset-heavy sectors such as retail, transportation, and construction. The trends in these
sectors alone mean that at least one-fifth of the US workforce has not advanced in more
than three decades.
Workers now have fewer options when their pay stagnates. Rapidly falling costs of
automation and the availability of lower-cost global labor have created more options for
companies. As the nature of work has changed, the relationship between companies
and workers has weakened. Temporary work arrangements and outsourcing are
becoming more commonplace, and firms are better able to predict demand and
schedule labor in smaller and more erratic increments. Workers now have decreased
mobility, and the decline of union membership has weakened their bargaining power.
Large segments of the labor force lack the skills that the marketplace values.
Shifting the economy into higher gear is a critical first step. The United States has to
jumpstart growth and move forward on long-recognized priorities such as restoring
business dynamism, investing in infrastructure, improving productivity, and revamping
education and training. And the nation will have to do a better job of executing on these
But economic growth alone may not be enough; growth also has to be more inclusive.
We see four priority areas: reinvesting, retraining, removing barriers, and reimagining
work. First, communities in distress need targeted investment from public, private, and
foreign sources to bounce back. Second, continuous technological change means
that mid-career workers need systems of lifelong learning to adaptand currently
the United States spends far less than other countries on helping displaced workers
transition into new roles. Third, we can remove barriers that keep workers from seeking
out better opportunities, such as non-compete agreements, excessive occupational
licensing requirements, inadequate child and family support, and affordable housing
shortages in booming job markets. Finally, we need to reimagine work with more flexible
models, a more sustainable version of the gig economy, and more creative options for
older workers.
The United States can do better, and there are many levers it has yet to pull. Workers are not
just a pool of labor; they are citizens and potential consumers. Raising incomes would juice
a latent source of demandand doing so could set off a virtuous cycle of growth. Lifting up
the millions who have been left behind can elevate the broader economy in the process.
Manufacturing the future: The next era of global growth and innovation
(November2012)
Manufacturing remains a critical force in both advanced and developing
economies. But the sector has changed, bringing new opportunities and
challenges to business leaders and policy makers.
@McKinsey_MGI
McKinseyGlobalInstitute