MANAY et al vs. CEBU AIR, INC. Cebu Pacific appealed to the RTC, which was subsequently dismissed.

GR No. 210621 Cebu Pacific appealed to the CA, arguing that it was not at fault for the damages caused to the
passengers.

FACTS: On December 13, 2013, the CA rendered the Decision granting the appeal and reversing the
Decisions of the MeTC and the RTC.
On June 13, 2008, Carlos S. Jose (Jose) purchased 20 Cebu Pacific round-trip tickets from Manila
to Palawan for himself and on behalf of his relatives and friends. Jose alleged that he specified According to it, the extraordinary diligence expected of common carriers only applies to the
to Alou, the Cebu Pacific ticketing agent that his preferred date and time of departure from carriage of passengers and not to the act of encoding the requested flight schedule. It was
Manila to Palawan should be on July 20, 2008 at 8:20 a.m. and that his preferred date and time incumbent upon the passenger to exercise ordinary care in reviewing flight details and checking
for their flight back to Manila should be on July 22, 2008 at 4:15 p.m. schedules.

After paying for the tickets, Alou printed the tickets, which consisted of three (3) pages, and Cebu Pacifics counterclaim, however, was denied since there was no evidence that Jose and his
recapped only the first page to him. Since the first page contained the details he specified to companions filed their Complaint in bad faith and with malice.
Alou, he no longer read the other pages of the flight information.
After their trip or on the afternoon of July 22, 2008, the group proceeded to the airport for ISSUE:
their flight back to Manila. During the processing of their boarding passes, they were informed
by Cebu Pacific personnel that nine (9) of them could not be admitted because their tickets Whether respondent Cebu Air, Inc. is liable for damages for the issuance of a plane ticket with
were for the 10:05 a.m. flight earlier that day. an allegedly erroneous flight schedule

Jose informed the ground personnel that he personally purchased the tickets and specifically
instructed the ticketing agent that all 20 of them should be on the 4:15 p.m. flight to Manila. RULLING:
Upon checking the tickets, they learned that only the first two (2) pages had the schedule Jose
specified. NO.

They were left with no other option but to rebook their tickets. They then learned that their Common carriers are required to exercise extraordinary diligence in the performance of its
return tickets had been purchased as part of the promo sales of the airline, and the cost to obligations under the contract of carriage. This extraordinary diligence must be observed not
rebook the flight would be 7,000.00 more expensive than the promo tickets. The sum of the only in the transportation of goods and services but also in the issuance of the contract of
new tickets amounted to 65,000.00. carriage, including its ticketing operations.

They offered to pay the amount by credit card but were informed by the ground personnel that The obligation of the airline to exercise extraordinary diligence commences upon
they only accepted cash. They then offered to pay in dollars, since most of them were the issuance of the contract of carriage. Ticketing, as the act of issuing the contract of
balikbayans and had the amount on hand, but the airline personnel still refused. Eventually, carriage, is necessarily included in the exercise of extraordinary diligence. Once a plane ticket is
they pooled enough cash to be able to buy tickets for five (5) of their companions. issued, the common carrier binds itself to deliver the passenger safely on the date and time
stated in the ticket. The contractual obligation of the common carrier to the passenger is
The other four (4) were left behind in Palawan and had to spend the night at an inn, incurring
governed principally by what is written on the contract of carriage.
additional expenses.
The common carriers obligation to exercise extraordinary diligence in the issuance of the
Upon his arrival in Manila, Jose immediately purchased four (4) tickets for the companions they
contract of carriage is fulfilled by requiring a full review of the flight schedules to be given to a
left behind, which amounted to 5,205.
prospective passenger before payment. Based on the information stated on the contract of
Later in July 2008, Jose went to Cebu Pacifics ticketing office in Robinsons Galleria to complain carriage, all three (3) pages were recapped to petitioner Jose. The only evidence petitioners
about the allegedly erroneous booking and the rude treatment that his group encountered have in order to prove their true intent of having the entire group on the 4:15 p.m. flight is
from the ground personnel in Palawan. Jose and his companions were unsatisfied with Cebu petitioner Joses self-serving testimony that the airline failed to recap the last page of the
Pacifics response so they filed a Complaint for Damages against Cebu Pacific before Branch 59 tickets to him. They have neither shown nor introduced any other evidence before the
of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong. Metropolitan Trial Court, Regional Trial Court, Court of Appeals, or this Court.
The Complaint prayed for actual damages in the amount of 42,955.00, moral damages in the Even assuming that the ticketing agent encoded the incorrect flight information, it is incumbent
amount of 45,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of 50,000.00, and attorneys fees. upon the purchaser of the tickets to at least check if all the information is correct before
making the purchase. Once the ticket is paid for and printed, the purchaser is presumed to have
The Metropolitan TC rendered its Decision ordering Cebu Pacific to pay Jose and his
agreed to all its terms and conditions.
companions 41,044.50 in actual damages and 20,000.00 in attorneys fees with costs of suit.
Considering that respondent was entitled to deny check-in to passengers whose names do not
match their photo identification, it would have been prudent for petitioner Jose to check if all
the names of his companions were encoded correctly. Since the tickets were for 20 passengers,
he was expected to have checked each name on each page of the tickets in order to see if all
the passengers names were encoded and correctly spelled. Had he done this, he would have
noticed that there was a different flight schedule encoded on the third page of the tickets since
the flight schedule was stated directly above the passengers names. Moreover, the tickets
were issued 37 days before their departure from Manila and 39 days from their departure from
Palawan. There was more than enough time to correct any alleged mistake in the flight
schedule.

Petitioners, in failing to exercise the necessary care in the conduct of their affairs,
were without a doubt negligent. Thus, they are not entitled to damages.

FINAL NOTE:

The Air Passenger Bill of Rights recognizes that a contract of carriage is a contract of adhesion,
and thus, all conditions and restrictions must be fully explained to the passenger before the
purchase of the ticket.
It acknowledges that while a passenger has the option to buy or not to buy the service, the
decision of the passenger to buy the ticket binds such passenger. Thus, the airline is mandated
to place in writing all the conditions it will impose on the passenger.
However, the duty of an airline to disclose all the necessary information in the contract of
carriage does not remove the correlative obligation of the passenger to exercise ordinary
diligence in the conduct of his or her affairs.
The passenger is still expected to read through the flight information in the contract of carriage
before making his or her purchase. If he or she fails to exercise the ordinary diligence expected
of passengers, any resulting damage should be borne by the passenger.
 DSR-SENATOR LINES AND C.F SHARP AND COMPANY, INC., RULLING:

vs Article 1734 of the Civil Code provides:

"Art. 1734. Common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the
FERAL PHOENIX ASSURANCE CO., INC.,
goods, unless the same is due to any of the following causes only:
GR No. 135377 October 7, 2003
(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity;
(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
FACTS:
(3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
Berde Plants, Inc. (Berde Plants) delivered 632 units of artificial trees to C.F. Sharp and
Company, Inc. (C.F. Sharp), the General Ship Agent of DSR-Senator Lines, a foreign shipping (4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers;
corporation, for transportation and delivery to the consignee, Al-Mohr International Group, in (5) Order or act of competent public authority."
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. C.F. Sharp issued International Bill of Lading No. SENU MNL-26548 for the
cargo with an invoice value of $34,579.60. Fire is not one of those enumerated under the above provision which exempts a carrier from
liability for loss or destruction of the cargo.
Under the Bill of Lading, the port of discharge for the cargo was at the Khor Fakkan port and the
port of delivery was Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, via Port Dammam. The cargo was loaded in M/S In Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, we ruled that since the peril of
"Arabian Senator." Federal Phoenix Assurance Company, Inc. (Federal Phoenix Assurance) fire is not comprehended within the exceptions in Article 1734, then the common carrier shall
insured the cargo against all risks in the amount of P941,429.61. On June 7, 1993, M/S "Arabian be presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless it proves that it has
Senator" left the Manila South Harbor for Saudi Arabia with the cargo on board. observed the extraordinary diligence required by law.

When the vessel arrived in Khor Fakkan Port, the cargo was reloaded on board DSR-Senator Even if fire were to be considered a natural disaster within the purview of Article 1734, it is
Lines feeder vessel, M/V "Kapitan Sakharov," bound for Port Dammam, Saudi Arabia. However, required under Article 1739 of the same Code that the natural disaster must have been the
while in transit, the vessel and all its cargo caught fire. proximate and only cause of the loss, and that the carrier has exercised due diligence to prevent
or minimize the loss before, during or after the occurrence of the disaster.
We have held that a common carriers duty to observe the requisite diligence in the shipment of
ISSUE: goods lasts from the time the articles are surrendered to or unconditionally placed in the
Whether or not the liability of Dsr-Senator Lines and C.F Sharp was extinguished when the possession of, and received by, the carrier for transportation until delivered to or until the lapse
vessel was gutted with fire. of a reasonable time for their acceptance by the person entitled to receive them.
When the goods shipped either are lost or arrive in damaged condition, a presumption arises
against the carrier of its failure to observe that diligence, and there need not be an express
finding of negligence to hold it liable.
Common carriers are obliged to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods
transported by them. Accordingly, they are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently if the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated.
There are very few instances when the presumption of negligence does not attach and these
instances are enumerated in Article 1734. In those cases where the presumption is applied, the
common carrier must prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence in order to overcome the
presumption.

Respondent Federal Phoenix Assurance raised the presumption of negligence

against petitioners. However, they failed to overcome it by sufficient proof of
extraordinary diligence.
 G.R. No. 161730 January 28, 2005 RULLING:

JAPAN AIRLINES, petitioner vs.

MICHAEL ASUNCION and JEANETTE ASUNCION, respondents. JAL did not breach its contract of carriage with respondents. It may be true that JAL has the
duty to inspect whether its passengers have the necessary travel documents, however, such
duty does not extend to checking the veracity of every entry in these documents.
FACTS: JAL could not vouch for the authenticity of a passport and the correctness of the entries
On March 27, 1992, respondents Michael and Jeanette Asuncion left Manila on board Japan therein. Moreover, the power to admit or not an alien into the country is a sovereign act which
Airlines (JAL) Flight 742 bound for Los Angeles. Their itinerary included a stop-over in Narita cannot be interfered with even by JAL. This is not within the ambit of the contract of carriage
and an overnight stay at Hotel Nikko Narita. entered into by JAL and herein respondents.

Upon arrival at Narita, Mrs. Noriko Etou-Higuchi of JAL endorsed their applications for shore Under Article 1755 of the Civil Code, a common carrier such as JAL is bound to carry its
pass and directed them to the Japanese immigration official. A shore pass is required of a passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of
foreigner aboard a vessel or aircraft who desires to stay in the neighborhood of the port of call very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances. When an airline issues a ticket
for not more than 72 hours. to a passenger, confirmed for a particular flight on a certain date, a contract of carriage arises.

During their interview, the Japanese immigration official noted that Michael appeared shorter JAL or any of its representatives have no authority to interfere with or influence the
than his height as indicated in his passport. Because of this inconsistency, respondents were immigration authorities. The most that could be expected of JAL is to endorse
denied shore pass entries and were brought instead to the Narita Airport Rest House where respondents applications,
they were billeted overnight.
If the passenger is not so transported or if in the process of transporting he dies or is injured,
Mr. Atsushi Takemoto of the International Service Center (ISC), the agency tasked by Japans the carrier may be held liable for a breach of contract of carriage.
Immigration Department to handle passengers who were denied shore pass entries, brought
respondents to the Narita Airport Rest House where they stayed overnight until their departure
the following day for Los Angeles.
Respondents were charged US$400.00 each for their accommodation, security service and
meals.

ISSUE:

Is Japan Airlines liable for breach of contract?

 PLANTERS PRODUCTS VS. CA the cargo delivered was indeed short of 94.839 M/T and about 23 M/T were rendered unfit for
commerce, having been polluted with sand, rust and dirt. Consequently, PPI sent a claim letter
(GR 101503, 15 September 1993) dated 18 December 1974 to Soriamont Steamship Agencies (SSA), the resident agent of the
carrier, KKKK, for P245,969.31 representing the cost of the alleged shortage in the goods
shipped and the diminution in value of that portion said to have been contaminated with dirt.
FACTS: SSA explained that they were not able to respond to the consignees claim for payment because,
Planters Products, Inc. (PPI), purchased from Mitsubishi International Corporation of according to them, what they received was just a request for shortlanded certificate and not a
New York, USA, 9,329.7069 metric tons (M/T) of Urea 46% fertilizer which the latter shipped in formal claim, and that this request was denied by them because they had nothing to do with
bulk on 16 June 1974 aboard the cargo vessel M/V Sun Plum owned by Kyosei Kisen Kabushiki the discharge of the shipment.
Kaisha (KKKK) from Kenai, Alaska, USA, to Poro Point, San Fernando, La Union, Philippines, as On 18 July 1975, PPI filed an action for damages with the Court of First Instance of
evidenced by Bill of Lading KP-1 signed by the master of the vessel and issued on the date of Manila. The court a quo however sustained the claim of PPI against the carrier for the value of
departure. the goods lost or damaged.
On 17 May 1974, or prior to its voyage, a time charter-party on the vessel M/V Sun On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court and absolved the carrier
Plum pursuant to the Uniform General Charter was entered into between Mitsubishi as from liability for the value of the cargo that was lost or damaged. PPI appealed by way of
shipper/charterer and KKKK as shipowner, in Tokyo, Japan. Riders to the aforesaid charter-party petition for review.
starting from paragraph 16 to 40 were attached to the pre-printed agreement. Addenda 1, 2, 3
and 4 to the charter-party were also subsequently entered into on the 18th, 20th, 21st and 27th of The Supreme Court dismissed the petition; affirmed the assailed decision of the Court of
May 1974, respectively. Before loading the fertilizer aboard the vessel, 4 of her holds were all Appeals, which reversed the trial court; and consequently, dismissed Civil Case 98623 of the
presumably inspected by the charterers representative and found fit to take a load of urea in then CFI, now RTC, of Manila; with costs against PPI.
bulk pursuant to paragraph 16 of the charter-party.
1. Charter party definedA charter-party is defined as a contract by which an entire ship,
After the Urea fertilizer was loaded in bulk by stevedores hired by and under the or some principal part thereof, is let by the owner to another person for a specified time or
supervision of the shipper, the steel hatches were closed with heavy iron lids, covered with 3 use; a contract of affreightment by which the owner of a ship or other vessel lets the
layers of tarpaulin, then tied with steel bonds. The hatches remained closed and tightly sealed whole or a part of her to a merchant or other person for the conveyance of goods, on a
throughout the entire voyage. Upon arrival of the vessel at her port of call on 3 July 1974, the particular voyage, in consideration of the payment of freight.
steel pontoon hatches were opened with the use of the vessels boom. PPI unloaded the cargo
2. Types of charter parties Charter parties are of two types: (a) contract of affreightment
from the holds into its steel-bodied dump trucks which were parked alongside the berth, using
which involves the use of shipping space on vessels leased by the owner in part or as a
metal scoops attached to the ship, pursuant to the terms and conditions of the charter-party
whole, to carry goods for others; and, (b) charter by demise or bareboat charter, by the
(which provided for an FIOS clause). The hatches remained open throughout the duration of the
terms of which the whole vessel is let to the charterer with a transfer to him of its entire
discharge. Each time a dump truck was filled up, its load of Urea was covered with tarpaulin
command and possession and consequent control over its navigation, including the master
before it was transported to the consignees warehouse located some 50 meters from the
and the crew, who are his servants.
wharf.
3. Kinds of contract of affreightmentContract of affreightment may either be time charter,
Midway to the warehouse, the trucks were made to pass through a weighing scale
wherein the vessel is leased to the charterer for a fixed period of time, or voyage charter,
where they were individually weighed for the purpose of ascertaining the net weight of the
wherein the ship is leased for a single voyage. In both cases, the charter-party provides for
cargo. The port area was windy, certain portions of the route to the warehouse were sandy and
the hire of the vessel only, either for a determinate period of time or for a single or
the weather was variable, raining occasionally while the discharge was in progress. PPIs
consecutive voyage, the shipowner to supply the ships stores, pay for the wages of the
warehouse was made of corrugated galvanized iron (GI) sheets, with an opening at the front
master and the crew, and defray the expenses for the maintenance of the ship.
where the dump trucks entered and unloaded the fertilizer on the warehouse floor. Tarpaulins
and GI sheets were placed in-between and alongside the trucks to contain spillages of the 4. Common or public carrier defined; Scope of definitionThe term common or public
fertilizer. It took 11 days for PPI to unload the cargo, from 5 July to 18 July 1974 (except July 12th, carrier is defined in Article 1732 of the Civil Code. The definition extends to carriers either
14th and 18th). A private marine and cargo surveyor, Cargo Superintendents Company Inc. (CSCI), by land, air or water which hold themselves out as ready to engage in carrying goods or
was hired by PPI to determine the outturn of the cargo shipped, by taking draft readings of transporting passengers or both for compensation as a public employment and not as a
the vessel prior to and after discharge. casual occupation.
The survey report submitted by CSCI to the consignee (PPI) dated 19 July 1974 5. Distinction between common or public carrier, and private or special carrierThe
revealed a shortage in the cargo of 106.726 M/T and that a portion of the Urea fertilizer distinction between a common or public carrier and a private or special carrier lies in
approximating 18 M/T was contaminated with dirt. The same results were contained in a the character of the business, such that if the undertaking is a single transaction, not a part
Certificate of Shortage/Damaged Cargo dated 18 July 1974 prepared by PPI which showed that
 of the general business or occupation, although involving the carriage of goods for a fee, goods of one and of several persons. Where the ship herself is let to a charterer, so that he
the person or corporation offering such service is a private carrier. takes over the charge and control of her, the case is different; the shipowner is not then a
carrier. But where her services only are let, the same grounds for imposing a strict
6. Extraordinary diligence required of common carriers (Article 1733); Ordinary diligence
responsibility exist, whether he is employed by one or many. The master and the crew are
required of private carriersArticle 1733 of the New Civil Code mandates that common in each case his servants, the freighter in each case is usually without any representative
carriers, by reason of the nature of their business, should observe extraordinary diligence on board the ship; the same opportunities for fraud or collussion occur; and the same
in the vigilance over the goods they carry. In the case of private carriers, however, the difficulty in discovering the truth as to what has taken place arises . . .
exercise of ordinary diligence in the carriage of goods will suffice.
13. Burden of proof in an action for recovery of damages against a common carrierIn an
7. Common carriers presumed negligent in case of loss, etc. of goods; No presumption in
action for recovery of damages against a common carrier on the goods shipped, the
private carriersIn case of loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods, common carriers shipper or consignee should first prove the fact of shipment and its consequent loss or
are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, and the burden of damage while the same was in the possession, actual or constructive, of the carrier.
proving otherwise rests on them. On the contrary, no such presumption applies to private Thereafter, the burden of proof shifts to respondent to prove that he has exercised
carriers, for whosoever alleges damage to or deterioration of the goods carried has the extraordinary diligence required by law or that the loss, damage or deterioration of the
onus of proving that the cause was the negligence of the carrier. cargo was due to fortuitous event, or some other circumstances inconsistent with its
8. Kyosei Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha a common carrier, remained as so in charter partyKyosei liability.
Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha, in the ordinary course of business, operates as a common carrier, 14. Carrier has sufficiently overcome, by clear and convincing proof, the prima facie
transporting goods indiscriminately for all persons. When PPI chartered the vessel M/V presumption of negligence(1) The master of the carrying vessel, Captain Lee Tae Bo, in
Sun Plum, the ship captain, its officers and compliment were under the employ of the his deposition taken on 19 April 1977 before the Philippine Consul and Legal Attache in the
shipowner and therefore continued to be under its direct supervision and control. Philippine Embassy in Tokyo, Japan, testified that before the fertilizer was loaded, the 4
Considering that the steering of the ship, the manning of the decks, the determination of hatches of the vessel were cleaned, dried and fumigated. After completing the loading of
the course of the voyage and other technical incidents of maritime navigation were all the cargo in bulk in the ships holds, the steel pontoon hatches were closed and sealed
consigned to the officers and crew who were screened, chosen and hired by the with iron lids, then covered with 3 layers of serviceable tarpaulins which were tied with
shipowner, the charterer is a stranger to the crew and to the ship. Thus, a public carrier steel bonds. The hatches remained close and tightly sealed while the ship was in transit as
shall remain as such, notwithstanding the charter of the whole or portion of a vessel by the weight of the steel covers made it impossible for a person to open without the use of
one or more persons, provided the charter is limited to the ship only, as in the case of a the ships boom. (2) It was also shown during the trial that the hull of the vessel was in
time-charter or voyage-charter. Indubitably, a shipowner in a time or voyage charter good condition, foreclosing the possibility of spillage of the cargo into the sea or seepage
retains possession and control of the ship, although her holds may, for the moment, be the of water inside the hull of the vessel. When M/V Sun Plum docked at its berthing place,
property of the charterer. representatives of the consignee boarded, and in the presence of a representative of the
9. When charter party converts common carrier to private carrierIt is only when the shipowner, the foreman, the stevedores, and a cargo surveyor representing CSCI, opened
charter includes both the vessel and its crew, as in a bareboat or demise that a common the hatches and inspected the condition of the hull of the vessel. The stevedores unloaded
carrier becomes private, at least insofar as the particular voyage covering the charter-party the cargo under the watchful eyes of the shipmates who were overseeing the whole
is concerned. operation on rotation basis. Verily, the presumption of negligence on the part of
respondent carrier has been efficaciously overcome by the showing of extraordinary zeal
10. Reliance on case of Home Insurance vs. American Steamship misplacedThe carriers and assiduity exercised by the carrier in the care of the cargo.
heavy reliance on the case of Home Insurance Co. v. American Steamship Agencies is
misplaced for the reason that the meat of the controversy therein was the validity of a 15. Period which carrier was to observe degree of diligence; Limitation clause of FIOS
stipulation in the charter-party exempting the shipowner from liability for loss due to the meaningThe period during which the carrier was to observe the degree of diligence
negligence of its agent, and not the effects of a special charter on common carriers. required of it as a public carrier began from the time the cargo was unconditionally placed
in its charge after the vessels holds were duly inspected and passed scrutiny by the
11. American rule as to shipper carrying special cargo not applicable in the Philippines; Stricter shipper, up to and until the vessel reached its destination and its hull was re-examined by
interpretation of admiralty lawsThe rule in the United States that a ship chartered by a the consignee, but prior to unloading. This is clear from the limitation clause agreed upon
single shipper to carry special cargo is not a common carrier, does not find application in by the parties in the Addendum to the standard GENCON time charter-party which
Philippine jurisdiction, for the Court has observed that the growing concern for safety in provided for an F.I.O.S., meaning, that the loading, stowing, trimming and discharge of the
the transportation of passengers and/or carriage of goods by sea requires a more exacting cargo was to be done by the charterer, free from all risk and expense to the carrier.
interpretation of admiralty laws, more particularly, the rules governing common carriers. Moreover, a shipowner is liable for damage to the cargo resulting from improper stowage
only when the stowing is done by stevedores employed by him, and therefore under his
12. Observations of Raoul Colinvaux, the learned barrister-at-lawAs a matter of principle, it
control and supervision, not when the same is done by the consignee or stevedores under
is difficult to find a valid distinction between cases in which a ship is used to convey the
the employ of the latter.
16. When common carriers not liable for loss, destruction or deterioration of goodsArticle the risk of loss or damage; more so, with a variable weather condition prevalent during its
1734 of the New Civil Code provides that common carriers are not responsible for the loss, unloading. This is a risk the shipper or the owner of the goods has to face.
destruction or deterioration of the goods if caused by the character of the goods or
defects in the packaging or in the containers. The Code of Commerce also provides that all
losses and deteriorations which the goods may suffer during the transportation by reason
of fortuitous event, force majeure, or the inherent defect of the goods, shall be for the
account and risk of the shipper, and that proof of these accidents is incumbent upon the
carrier. The carrier, nonetheless, shall be liable for the loss and damage resulting from the
preceding causes if it is proved, as against him, that they arose through his negligence or
by reason of his having failed to take the precautions which usage has established among
careful persons.
17. Characteristics of ureaUrea is a chemical compound consisting mostly of ammonia and
carbon monoxide compounds which are used as fertilizer. Urea also contains 46% nitrogen
and is highly soluble in water. However, during storage, nitrogen and ammonia do not
normally evaporate even on a long voyage, provided that the temperature inside the hull
does not exceed 80 degrees centigrade.
18. Expected risks of bulk shipping(1) In unloading fertilizer in bulk with the use of a clamped
shell, losses due to spillage during such operation amounting to one percent (1%) against
the bill of lading is deemed normal or tolerable. The primary cause of these spillages is
the clamped shell which does not seal very tightly. Also, the wind tends to blow away
some of the materials during the unloading process. (2) The dissipation of quantities of
fertilizer, or its deterioration in value, is caused either by an extremely high temperature in
its place of storage, or when it comes in contact with water. When Urea is drenched in
water, either fresh or saline, some of its particles dissolve. But the salvaged portion which
is in liquid form still remains potent and usable although no longer saleable in its original
market value. (3) The probability of the cargo being damaged or getting mixed or
contaminated with foreign particles was made greater by the fact that the fertilizer was
transported in bulk, thereby exposing it to the inimical effects of the elements and the
grimy condition of the various pieces of equipment used in transporting and hauling it.
19. Hull of vessel in good condition; Improbable that sea water seep in vessels holdIt was
highly improbable for sea water to seep into the vessels holds during the voyage since the
hull of the vessel was in good condition and her hatches were tightly closed and firmly
sealed, making the M/V Sun Plum in all respects seaworthy to carry the cargo she was
chartered for. If there was loss or contamination of the cargo, it was more likely to have
occurred while the same was being transported from the ship to the dump trucks and
finally to the consignees warehouse. This may be gleaned from the testimony of the
marine and cargo surveyor of CSCI who supervised the unloading. He explained that the 18
M/T of alleged bad order cargo as contained in their report to PPI was just an
approximation or estimate made by them after the fertilizer was discharged from the
vessel and segregated from the rest of the cargo.
20. Variable weather condition a risk of loss or damage which owner or shipper of goods has
to faceHerein, it was in the month of July when the vessel arrived port and unloaded her
cargo. It rained from time to time at the harbor area while the cargo was being discharged
according to the supply officer of PPI, who also testified that it was windy at the
waterfront and along the shoreline where the dump trucks passed enroute to the
consignees warehouse. Bulk shipment of highly soluble goods like fertilizer carries with it
 WILLIAM TIU VS ARRIESGADO RULLING:

Laspias was driving at a very fast speed before the bus owned by petitioner Tiu collided with
respondent Condors stalled truck.
FACTS:

A cargo truck was loaded with firewood. Just as the truck passed over a bridge, one of its rear
tires exploded. Petitioner Laspias was negligent in driving the Ill-fated bus.

Pedrano, the driver, left his helper, Jose Mitante, Jr. to keep watch over the stalled vehicle, and A man must use common sense, and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be
instructed the latter to place a spare tire six fathoms away behind the stalled truck to serve as a cautious, careful and prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of recurring punishment.
warning for oncoming vehicles. The trucks tail lights were also left on. It was about 12:00 a.m. He is responsible for such results as anyone might foresee and for acts which no one would
have performed except through culpable abandon. Otherwise, his own person, rights and
Las pinas, driver of a D Rough Riders passenger bus rummed into the trucks left rear. The property, and those of his fellow beings, would ever be exposed to all manner of danger and
impact damaged the right side of the bus and left several passengers injured. Pedro Arriesgado injury.27
lost consciousness and suffered a fracture in his right colles. His wife died.
By his own admission, he had just passed a bridge and was traversing the highway of
Arriesgado filed a complaint for breach of contract of carriage against the bus operator and his
driver.
Compostela, Cebu at a speed of 40 to 50 kilometers per hour before the collision
occurred. The maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge is only 30 kilometers per
RTC ruled in favor of Arriesgado. hour. And, as correctly pointed out by the trial court, petitioner Laspias also violated
CA affirmed. Section 35 of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, Republic Act No. 4136, as
amended:
Sec. 35. Restriction as to speed. (a) Any person driving a motor vehicle on a highway
ISSUE:
shall drive the same at a careful and prudent speed, not greater nor less than is
W/N Tiu and driver liable to Arriesgado reasonable and proper, having due regard for the traffic, the width of the highway,
and or any other condition then and there existing; and no person shall drive any
motor vehicle upon a highway at such speed as to endanger the life, limb and
property of any person, nor at a speed greater than will permit him to bring the
vehicle to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead.30
Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the
time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.31

Petitioner Tiu failed to Overcome the presumption of negligence against him as one engaged
in the business Of common carriage
In actions for breach of contract, only the existence of such contract, and the fact that
the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his
destination are the matters that need to be proved. This is because under the said contract of
carriage, the petitioners assumed the express obligation to transport the respondent and his
wife to their destination safely and to observe extraordinary diligence with due regard for all
circumstances.37 Any injury suffered by the passengers in the course thereof is immediately
attributable to the negligence of the carrier.38 Upon the happening of the accident, the
presumption of negligence at once arises, and it becomes the duty of a common carrier to
prove that he observed extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers.39 It must be
stressed that in requiring the highest possible degree of diligence from common carriers and in
creating a presumption of negligence against them, the law compels them to curb the
recklessness of their drivers.40
 CENTRAL SHIPPING COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs. RULLING:

INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA, respondent. From the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, common carriers are bound
to observe extraordinary diligence over the goods they transport, according to all the
circumstances of each case.10
FACTS: In the event of loss, destruction or deterioration of the insured goods, common carriers are
A cargo vessel commenced to voyage to Manila sunk. The cargo was totally lost. responsible; that is, unless they can prove that such loss, destruction or deterioration was
brought about -- among others -- by "flood, storm, earthquake, lightning or other natural
The RTC was unconvinced that the sinking of M/V Central Bohol had been caused by the disaster or calamity."11
weather or any other caso fortuito.
In all other cases not specified under Article 1734 of the Civil Code, common carriers are
It noted that monsoons, which were common occurrences during the months of July to presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they
December, could have been foreseen and provided for by an ocean-going vessel. observed extraordinary diligence.12
Applying the rule of presumptive fault or negligence against the carrier, the trial court held In the present case, petitioner disclaims responsibility for the loss of the cargo by claiming the
petitioner liable for the loss of the cargo. occurrence of a "storm" under Article 1734(1).
CA affirmed. Nonetheless, to our mind it would not be sufficient to categorize the weather condition at
the time as a "storm" within the absolutory causes enumerated in the law.

ISSUE: Significantly, no typhoon was observed within the Philippine area of responsibility during
that period. 25 Consequently, the strong winds accompanying the southwestern monsoon
Whether the carrier is liable for the loss of the cargo; and whether the doctrine of limited could not be classified as a "storm." Such winds are the ordinary vicissitudes of a sea
liability is applicable voyage.26
Hence, if a common carrier fails to exercise due diligence -- or that ordinary care that the
circumstances of the particular case demand -- to prevent or minimize the loss before, during
and after the occurrence of the natural disaster, the carrier shall be deemed to have been
negligent. The loss or injury is not, in a legal sense, due to a natural disaster under Article
1734(1).
After carefully studying the records, we are inclined to believe that the logs did indeed shift,
and that they had been improperly loaded.
The doctrine of limited liability under Article 587 of the Code of Commerce36 is not applicable to
the present case. This rule does not apply to situations in which the loss or the injury is due to
the concurrent negligence of the shipowner and the captain.37
It has already been established that the sinking of M/V Central Bohol had been caused by the
fault or negligence of the ship captain and the crew, as shown by the improper stowage of the
cargo of logs. "Closer supervision on the part of the ship owner could have prevented this fatal
miscalculation."38 As such, the shipowner was equally negligent. It cannot escape liability by
virtue of the limited liability rule.
 [G.R. No. 137775. March 31, 2005] RULLING:

FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, SAN The common carrier is liable for blatant negligence of the crewmembers of the barge such that
MIGUEL CORPORATION, and ESTATE OF ANG GUI, represented by LUCIO, JULIAN, the Insurance company cannot be held to answer for the loss of the SMC goods.
and JAIME, all surnamed ANG, and CO TO, respondents. As the two vessels arrived at the port of San Jose, Antique, signs of the impending storm were
already manifest. Since it is the duty of the defendant to exercise and observe extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the cargo of the plaintiff, the patron or captain of M/T ANCO,
representing the defendant could have placed D/B Lucio in a very safe location before they left
knowing or sensing at that time the coming of a typhoon. The presence of big waves and dark
FACTS:
clouds could have warned the patron or captain of M/T ANCO to insure the safety of D/B Lucio
Anco Enterprises Company (ANCO) was a partnership owned by Ang Gui and Co To. It was including its cargo.
engaged in the shipping business. The partnership owns one barge (D/B Lucio) and one tugboat
Had the patron or captain of M/T ANCO, the representative of the defendants observed
(M/T ANCO). The barge has no engine of its own so the tugboat is used to tow it for it to be
extraordinary diligence in placing the D/B Lucio in a safe place, the loss to the cargo of the
moved from one place to another in carrying its clients goods.
plaintiff could not have occurred.
San Miguel Corporation (SMC) availed of the services of ANCO for shipment of its goods to
Antique. A substantial portion of the goods to be transported was insured by FGU Insurance
Corporation. Extraordinary diligence in vigilance over the goods is further expressed in Articles 1734, 1735,
and 1745 Nos. 5, 6, and 7 . . .
When the boat arrived in the port of destination, the clouds were already dark and the waves
began to get bigger. Only a few of the goods were unloaded or delivered to the custody of the Art. 1739. In order that the common carrier may be exempted from responsibility, the
arrastre operator. The rest was still in the barge. natural disaster must have been the proximate and only cause of the loss.
The consignee of the goods advised the captain to seek shelter for fear that the barge cannot However, the common carrier must exercise due diligence to prevent or minimize loss
withstand the big waves. The captain of the barge did not heed the advice. The tugboat before, during and after the occurrence of flood, storm, or other natural disaster in order
nonetheless, did. As a result, the barge run aground and was broken and the cargoes of beer in that the common carrier may be exempted from liability for the loss, destruction, or
the barge were swept away. deterioration of the goods .

ISSUE:

Is the common carrier liable?

 LEAMER vs. Malayan insurance inc. RULLING:

Petition has no merit.

FACTS: Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of
carrying or transporting passengers or goods, or both -- by land, water, or air -- when this
Ilian Silica Mining entered into a contract of carriage with Lea Mer Industries, Inc., for the service is offered to the public for compensation. Petitioner is clearly a common carrier,
shipment of 900 metric tons of silica sand valued at P565,000. Consigned to Vulcan Industrial because it offers to the public its business of transporting goods through its vessels. The finding
and Mining Corporation, the cargo was to be transported from Palawan to Manila. During the of the RTC that petitioner became a private carrier when Vulcan chartered it is incorrect.
voyage, the vessel sank, resulting in the loss of the cargo.
Charter parties are classified as contracts of demise (or bareboat) and affreightment.
Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., as insurer, paid Vulcan the value of the lost cargo after which they A demise or bareboat charter indicates a business undertaking that is private in
demanded reimbursement from Lea Mer who refused to comply. character. Consequently, the rights and obligations of the parties to a contract of
This led Malayan to institute a Complaint in the RTC of Makati for collection of sum of money. private carriage are governed principally by their stipulations, not by the law on
common carriers.
The Contract in the present case was one of affreightment. Necessarily, petitioner
RTC: was a common carrier, and the pertinent law governs the present factual
Dismissed the complaint after finding that the loss was due to a fortuitous event brought about circumstances.
by typhoon Trining. Common carriers are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in their vigilance over the goods
The court ruled that petitioner had no advance knowledge of the incoming typhoon, and and the safety of the passengers they transport, as required by the nature of their business and
that the vessel had been cleared by the Philippine Coast Guard to travel from Palawan to for reasons of public policy. Extraordinary diligence requires rendering service with the
Manila. greatest skill and foresight to avoid damage and destruction to the goods entrusted
for carriage and delivery. Common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have
acted negligently for loss or damage to the goods that they have transported. This presumption
CA: can be rebutted only by proof that they observed extraordinary diligence, or that the loss or
damage was occasioned by any of the following causes:
Reversed the decision of RTC and held that the vessel was not seaworthy when it sailed for
Manila. (1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity;
(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
ISSUE: (3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
W/N the loss of the cargo was due to a fortuitous event or not (4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers;
(5) Order or act of competent public authority.
With regards to fortuitous event, for a common carrier to be excused fully of any liability, the
fortuitous event must have been the proximate and only cause of the loss. Moreover, it
should have exercised due diligence to prevent or minimize the loss before, during and after
the occurrence of the fortuitous event.

Lea Mer claimed that the loss of the cargo was due to the bad weather condition
brought about by Typhoon Trining. On October 25, 1991, the date on which the
voyage commenced and the barge sank, Typhoon Trining was allegedly far from
Palawan, where the storm warning was only Signal No. 1. The evidence presented
by petitioner in support of its defense of fortuitous event was sorely insufficient.
 LOADSTAR SHIPPING CO. VS CA, MANILA INSURANCE CO. (MIC) RULLING:

We hold that LOADSTAR is a common carrier.

FACTS: It is not necessary that the carrier be issued a certificate of public convenience, and this
public character is not altered by the fact that the carriage of the goods in question was
LOADSTAR received on board its M/V Cherokee goods for shipment. periodic, occasional, episodic or unscheduled.
The goods, amounting to P6,067,178, were insured for the same amount with MIC against The Civil Code defines common carriers in the following terms:
various risks including TOTAL LOSS BY TOTAL LOSS OF THE VESSEL.
Article 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in
The vessel, in turn, was insured by Prudential Guarantee & Assurance, Inc. (hereafter PGAI). the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air
On its way to Manila, the Vessel sank off. for compensation, offering their services to the public.

MIC filed a complaint against LOADSTAR and PGAI, alleging that the sinking of the vessel was
due to the fault and negligence of LOADSTAR and its employees. It also prayed that PGAI be M/V Cherokee was not seaworthy when it embarked on its voyage on 19 November 1984.
ordered to pay the insurance proceeds from the loss of the vessel directly to MIC, said amount The vessel was not even sufficiently manned at the time.
to be deducted from MICs claim from LOADSTAR.
For a vessel to be seaworthy, it must be adequately equipped for the voyage and manned
RTC and CA rendered judgment in favor of MIC. with a sufficient number of competent officers and crew. The failure of a common carrier
to maintain in seaworthy condition its vessel involved in a contract of carriage is a clear
breach of its duty prescribed in Article 1755 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:

1) M/V "Cherokee" is a private or a common carrier

2) Loadstar observe due and/or ordinary diligence Three kinds of stipulations have often been made in a bill of lading.
1) The first is one exempting the carrier from any and all liability for loss or damage
occasioned by its own negligence.
2) The second is one providing for an unqualified limitation of such liability to an agreed
valuation.
3) And the third is one limiting the liability of the carrier to an agreed valuation unless
the shipper declares a higher value and pays a higher rate of freight.
According to an almost uniform weight of authority, the first and second kinds of stipulations
are invalid as being contrary to public policy, but the third is valid and enforceable. [21]
Since the stipulation in question is null and void, it follows that when MIC paid the shipper,
it was subrogated to all the rights which the latter has against the common carrier,
LOADSTAR.
 MARITO T. BERNALES, PETITIONER, VS. NORTHWEST AIRLINES, RESPONDENT. RULLING:

G.R. No. 182395 | 2015-10-05 Yes.

The petitioner paints the dismal picture that he was forced to use the public comfort rooms and
sleep on the floor like "the beggars of Quiapo and Baclaran." He fails to mention though that
FORTUITOUS EVENT the 1,500 other stranded passengers had to endure the same discomforts that he experienced;
FACTS: NWA did not maliciously single him out. All the stranded passengers suffered the same
experience because of Typhoon Higos. NWA did the next best thing it could and provided the
The petitioner Marito T. Bernales is a lawyer, a university dean, and a board member of the passengers with blankets, snacks, and other comforts available under the circumstances.
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Camarines Sur. On 1 October 2002, he and several other
prominent personalities from Bicol were on their way to Honolulu, Hawaii, as the delegates of a
trade and tourism mission for the province. They were economy class passengers of Northwest The arrival of Typhoon Higos was an extraordinary and unavoidable event. Its occurrence made
Airlines Flight No. 10 from Manila to Honolulu via Narita, Japan. it impossible for NWA to bring the petitioner to Honolulu in time for his commitments. We
At around 6:00 p.m., a typhoon hit Japan, leading to the cancellation of most flights, including cannot hold the respondent liable for a breach of contract resulting from a fortuitous event.
NWA Flight No. 10. However, NWA did not cancel Flight No. 22, also bound for Honolulu later Moreover, we find that NWA did not act in bad faith or in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, or
that night, to minimize delays and to accommodate stranded passengers in case the typhoon oppressive manner. On the contrary, it exerted its best efforts to accommodate the petitioner
would subside. on Flight No. 22 and to lessen the petitioner's discomfort when he and the other passengers
The passengers of Flight 22 were called for boarding at around 11:00 p.m. and the delegates were left to pass the night at the terminal. Thus, the CA did not err in dismissing the complaint.
boarded the shuttle taking them to the airplane. But before the shuttle bus could leave, NWA
Customer Service Agent Tsuruki Ohashi entered the shuttle and informed the petitioner that he
could not take Flight 22 as no available seat was left for him.
The petitioner filed a complaint for moral and exemplary damages against the respondent NWA
for breach of their contract of carriage. The petitioner alleged that Ohashi's rude treatment, his
ejection from the shuttle bus, the resulting missed obligations due to the flight's delay, and the
humiliation from the ordeal caused him immense mental anguish and moral shock.

ISSUE:

Whether the storm is an event in which NWA can be exempt from liabilities.
 PHILIPPINE CHARTER INSURANCE CORPORATION VS. CHEMOIL LIGHTERAGE HITE The petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court.
GOLD CORPORATION
G.R. No. 136888. June 29, 2005 ISSUES:

1) Whether or not the Notice of Claim was filed within the required period.
FACTS: 2) Whether or not the damage to the cargo was due to the fault or negligence of the
respondent.
Philippine Charter Insurance Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of
non-life insurance.
RULLING:
Respondent Chemoil Lighterage Corporation is also a domestic corporation engaged in the
transport of goods. Article 366 of the Code of Commerce has profound application in the case at bar, which
provides that;
On 24 January 1991, Samkyung Chemical Company, Ltd., based in South Korea, shipped 62.06
metric tons of the liquid chemical DIOCTYL PHTHALATE (DOP) on board MT TACHIBANA which Within twenty-four hours following the receipt of the merchandise a claim may be
was valued at US$90,201.57 and another 436.70 metric tons of DOP valued at US$634,724.89 made against the carrier on account of damage or average found upon opening the
to the Philippines. packages, provided that the indications of the damage or average giving rise to the
claim cannot be ascertained from the exterior of said packages, in which case said claim
The consignee was Plastic Group Phils., Inc. in Manila. PGP insured the cargo with Philippine
shall only be admitted at the time of the receipt of the packages.
Charter Insurance Corporation against all risks. The insurance was under Marine Policies No.
MRN-30721 dated 06 February 1991. Marine Endorsement No. 2786 dated 11 May 1991 was After the periods mentioned have elapsed, or after the transportation charges have been paid,
attached and formed part of MRN-30721, amending the latters insured value to P24, no claim whatsoever shall be admitted against the carrier with regard to the condition in which
667,422.03, and reduced the premium accordingly. the goods transported were delivered.
The ocean tanker MT TACHIBANA unloaded the cargo to the tanker barge, which shall
transport the same to Del Pan Bridge in Pasig River and haul it by land to PGPs storage tanks in
Calamba, Laguna. As to the first issue, the petitioner contends that the notice of contamination was given by
PGP employee, to Ms. Abastillas, at the time of the delivery of the cargo, and therefore, within
Upon inspection by PGP, the samples taken from the shipment showed discoloration the required period.
demonstrating that it was damaged. PGP then sent a letter where it formally made an
insurance claim for the loss it sustained. The respondent, however, claims that Ms. Abastillas denied the supposed notice given by PGP
over the telephone.
Petitioner requested the GIT Insurance Adjusters, Inc. (GIT), to conduct a Quantity and
Condition Survey of the shipment which issued a report stating that DOP samples taken were The Court of Appeals declared: that a telephone call made to defendant-company could
discolored. Inspection of cargo tanks showed manhole covers of ballast tanks ceilings loosely constitute substantial compliance with the requirement of notice. However, it must be pointed
secured and that the rubber gaskets of the manhole covers of the ballast tanks re-acted to the out that compliance with the period for filing notice is an essential part of the requirement, i.e..
chemical causing shrinkage thus, loosening the covers and cargo ingress. Immediately if the damage is apparent, or otherwise within twenty-four hours from
receipt of the goods, the clear import being that prompt examination of the goods must be
Petitioner paid PGP the full and final payment for the loss and issued a Subrogation Receipt.
made to ascertain damage if this is not immediately apparent.
Meanwhile, PGP paid the respondent the as full payment for the latters services.
We have examined the evidence, and We are unable to find any proof of compliance with the
On 15 July 1991, an action for damages was instituted by the petitioner-insurer against
required period, which is fatal to the accrual of the right of action against the carrier.
respondent-carrier before the RTC, Br.16, City of Manila.
Nothing in the trial courts decision stated that the notice of claim was relayed or filed with
Respondent filed an answer which admitted that it undertook to transport the shipment, but
the respondent-carrier immediately or within a period of twenty-four hours from the time
alleged that before the DOP was loaded into its barge, the representative of PGP, Adjustment
the goods were received.
Standard Corporation, inspected it and found the same clean, dry, and fit for loading, thus
accepted the cargo without any protest or notice. As carrier, no fault and negligence can be The Court of Appeals made the same finding. Having examined the entire records of the
attributed against respondent as it exercised extraordinary diligence in handling the cargo. case, we cannot find a shred of evidence that will precisely and ultimately point to the
conclusion that the notice of claim was timely relayed or filed.
After due hearing, the trial court rendered a Decision in favor of plaintiff.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision reversing the trial court.
The requirement that a notice of claim should be filed within the period stated by Article 366 of
the Code of Commerce is not an empty or worthless proviso.
The object sought to be attained by the requirement of the submission of claims in pursuance
of this article is to compel the consignee of goods entrusted to a carrier to make prompt
demand for settlement of alleged damages suffered by the goods while in transport, so that the
carrier will be enabled to verify all such claims at the time of delivery or within twenty-four
hours thereafter, and if necessary fix responsibility and secure evidence as to the nature and
extent of the alleged damages to the goods while the matter is still fresh in the minds of the
parties.
The filing of a claim with the carrier within the time limitation therefore actually constitutes a
condition precedent to the accrual of a right of action against a carrier for loss of, or damage to,
the goods.
The shipper or consignee must allege and prove the fulfillment of the condition. If it fails to do
so, no right of action against the carrier can accrue in favor of the former. The aforementioned
requirement is a reasonable condition precedent; it does not constitute a limitation of action.
We do not believe so. As discussed at length above, there is no evidence to confirm that the
notice of claim was filed within the period provided for under Article 366 of the Code of
Commerce. Petitioners contention proceeds from a false presupposition that the notice of
claim was timely filed.
Considering that we have resolved the first issue in the negative, it is therefore unnecessary to
make a resolution on the second issue.
 BACARRO VS. CASTANO RULLING:

(GR L-34597, 5 November 1982) (1) YES.

The fact is, petitioner-driver Montefalcon did not slacken his speed but instead continued
to run the jeep at about forty (40) kilometers per hour even at the time the overtaking
FACTS: cargo truck was running side by side for about twenty (20) meters and at which time he
Respondent Castano boarded a jeep driven by Petitioner Montefalcon who thereafter drove it even shouted to the driver of the truck.
at around 40 kilometers per hour. Thus, had Montefalcon slackened the speed of the jeep at the time the truck was
While approaching Sumasap Bridge at the said speed, a cargo truck coming from behind, overtaking it, instead of running side by side with the cargo truck, there would have been
blowing its horn to signal its intention to overtake the jeep. The jeep, without changing its no contact and accident. He should have foreseen that at the speed he was running, the
speed, gave way by swerving to the right, such that both vehicles ran side by side for a distance vehicles were getting nearer the bridge and as the road was getting narrower the truck
of around 20 meters. would be to close to the jeep and would eventually sideswiped it. Otherwise stated, he
should have slackened his jeep when he swerved it to the right to give way to the truck
Thereafter as the jeep was left behind, its driver was unable to return it to its former lane and because the two vehicles could not cross the bridge at the same time.
instead it obliquely or diagonally ran down an inclined terrain towards the right until it fell into
a ditch pinning down and crushing Castanos right leg in the process.
Castano filed a case for damages against Rosita Bacarro, William Sevilla, and Felario (2) YES.
Montefalcon. The fact is, there was a contract of carriage between the private respondent and the
Defendants alleged that the jeepney was sideswiped by the overtaking cargo truck. herein petitioners in which case the Court of Appeals correctly applied Articles 1733, 1755
and 1766 of the Civil Code which require the exercise of extraordinary diligence on the
After trial, the CFI of Misamis Oriental ordered Bacarro, et.al. to jointly and severally pay part of petitioner Montefalcon.
Castano.
Indeed, the hazards of modern transportation demand extraordinary diligence. A common
It was affirmed by the CA upon appeal. carrier is vested with public interest. Under the new Civil Code, instead of being required
to exercise mere ordinary diligence a common carrier is exhorted to carry the passengers
safely as far as human care and foresight can provide "using the utmost diligence of very
ISSUES: cautious persons." (Article 1755). Once a passenger in the course of travel is injured, or
1) Whether or not there was a contributory negligence on the part of the jeepney driver. does not reach his destination safely, the carrier and driver are presumed to be at fault.
2) Whether or not extraordinary diligence is required of the jeepney driver.
3) Whether or not the sideswiping is a fortuitous event.
(3) The third assigned error of the petitioners would find fault upon respondent court in not
freeing petitioners from any liability, since the accident was due to a fortuitous event.
But, We repeat that the alleged fortuitous event in this case - the sideswiping of the
jeepney by the cargo truck, was something which could have been avoided considering the
narrowness of the Sumasap Bridge which was not wide enough to admit two vehicles. As
found by the Court of Appeals, Montefalcon contributed to the occurrence of the mishap.
 GV FLORIDA TRANSPORT, INC. V BATTUNG (2015) Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard
GR No. 208802, October 14, 2015 for all the circumstances.
In this relation, Article 1756 of the Civil Code provides that "[i]n case of death of or injuries to
FACTS: passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently,
unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and
Battung boarded the bus of petitioner in Delfin Albano, Isabela, bound for Manila. He was 1755." This disputable presumption may also be overcome by a showing that the accident was
seated at the first row behind the driver and slept during the ride. Battung was seated at the caused by a fortuitous event.
first row behind the driver and slept during the ride. When the bus reached the Philippine
Carabao Center in Muoz, Nueva Ecija, the bus driver, Duplio, stopped the bus and alighted to The foregoing provisions notwithstanding, it should be pointed out that the law does not make
check the tires. At this point, a man who was seated at the fourth row of the bus stood up, shot the common carrier an insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers.
Battung at his head, and then left with a companion. The bus conductor, Daraoay, notified
While the law requires the highest degree of diligence from common carriers in the safe
Duplio of the incident and thereafter, brought Romeo to the hospital, but the latter was
transport of their passengers and creates a presumption of negligence against them, it does
pronounced dead on arrival. Hence, respondents filed a complaint on July 15, 2008 for damages
not, however, make the carrier an insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers.
in the aggregate amount of P1,826,000.00 based on a breach of contract of carriage against
petitioner, Duplio, and Baraoay (petitioner, et al.) before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 22- Article 1755 of the Civil Code qualifies the duty of extraordinary care, vigilance[,] and
1103. precaution in the carriage of passengers by common carriers to only such as human care and
foresight can provide. What constitutes compliance with said duty is adjudged with due regard
to all the circumstances.
ISSUE:
Article 1756 of the Civil Code, in creating a presumption of fault or negligence on the part of the
Whether petitioner is liable for damages arising from culpa contractual common carrier when its passenger is injured, merely relieves the latter, for the time being,
from introducing evidence to fasten the negligence on the former, because the presumption
stands in the place of evidence. Being a mere presumption, however, the same is rebuttable by
RULLING: proof that the common carrier had exercised extraordinary diligence as required by law in the
performance of its contractual obligation, or that the injury suffered by the passenger was
No.
solely due to a fortuitous event.
Where, as in the instant case, the injury sustained by the petitioner was in no way due to any
In fine, we can only infer from the law the intention of the Code Commission and Congress to
defect in the means of transport or in the method of transporting or to the negligent or wilful
curb the recklessness of drivers and operators of common carriers in the conduct of their
acts of [the common carrier'sl employees, and therefore involving no issue of negligence in its
business.
duty to provide safe and suitable [care] as well as competent employees, with the injury arising
wholly from causes created by strangers over which the carrier had no control or even Thus, it is clear that neither the law nor the nature of the business of a transportation company
knowledge or could not have prevented, the presumption is rebutted and the carrier is not and makes it an insurer of the passenger's safety, but that its liability for personal injuries sustained
ought not to be held liable. To rule otherwise would make the common carrier the insurer of by its passenger rests upon its negligence, its failure to exercise the degree of diligence that the
the absolute safety of its passengers which is not the intention of the lawmakers. (Emphasis law requires.
and underscoring supplied)
Therefore, it is imperative for a party claiming against a common carrier under the above-said
The case involves the death of Battung wholly caused by the surreptitious act of a co-passenger provisions to show that the injury or death to the passenger/s arose from the negligence of the
who, after consummating such crime, hurriedly alighted from the vehicle. common carrier and/or its employees in providing safe transport to its passengers.
The law exacts from common carriers (i.e., those persons, corporations, firms, or associations In Pilapil v. CA, the Court clarified that where the injury sustained by the passenger was in no
engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, way due
or air, for compensation, offering their services to the public) the highest degree of diligence
(i.e., extraordinary diligence) in ensuring the safety of its passengers. (1) to any defect in the means of transport or in the method of transporting, or (2) to the
negligent or willful acts of the common carrier's employees with respect to the foregoing
Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code state:
such as when the injury arises wholly from causes created by strangers which the carrier had no
Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, control of or prior knowledge to prevent there would be no issue regarding the common
are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety carrier's negligence in its duty to provide safe and suitable care, as well as competent
of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case. employees in relation to its transport business; as such, the presumption of fault/negligence
foisted under Article 1756 of the Civil Code should not apply:
First, as stated earlier, the presumption of fault or negligence against the carrier is only a
disputable presumption.[The presumption] gives in where contrary facts are established
proving either that the carrier had exercised the degree of diligence required by law or the
injury suffered by the passenger was due to a fortuitous event.
Since Battung's death was caused by a co-passenger, the applicable provision is Article 1763 of
the Civil Code, which states that:
"A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the willful
acts or negligence of other passengers or of stranges, if the common carrier's employees
through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or
stopped the act or omission."
Notably, for this obligation, the law provides a lesser degree of diligence, i.e., diligence of a
good father of a family, in assessing the existence of any culpability on the common carrier's
part.
Case law states that the concept of diligence of a good father of a family "connotes reasonable
care consistent with that which an ordinarily prudent person would have observed when
confronted with a similar situation.
The test to determine whether negligence attended the performance of an obligation is:
Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution
which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is
guilty of negligence."
At bar, no danger i.e. intelligent reports from law enforcement agents that certain lawless
elements were planning to hijack and burn some of its buses, as to impel petitioner or its
employees to implement heightened security measures to ensure the safety of its passengers.
There was also no showing that during the course of the trip, Battung's killer made suspicious
actions which would have forewarned petitioner's employees of the need to conduct thorough
checks on him or any of the passengers.
Relevantly, the Court, in Nocum v. Laguna Tayabas Bus Company, has held that common
carriers should be given sufficient leeway in assuming that the passengers they take in will not
bring anything that would prove dangerous to himself, as well as his co-passengers, unless
there is something that will indicate that a more stringent inspection should be made. Not to be
lightly considered must be the right to privacy to which each passenger is entitled. He cannot
be subjected to any unusual search, when he protests the innocuousness of his baggage and
nothing appears to indicate the contrary, as in the case at bar.
In compelling the passenger to submit to more rigid inspection, after the passenger had already
declared that the box contained mere clothes and other miscellaneous, could not have justified
invasion of a constitutionally protected domain.
 ISAAC v A.L. AMMEN TRANS. CO. RULING + RATIO:
1. YES. The Bus Driver exercised extra-ordinary diligence, which redounds to the benefit of
the passenger Isaac.
DOCTRINE:
a. Based on art. 1733, 1755 and 1756 of the civil code, the following principles governing
A carrier is presumed to be at fault or to have acted negligently in case of death of, or injury the liability of the common carrier can be gleaned:
to, passengers, it being its duty to prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence
i. The liability of a carrier is contractual and arises upon breach of its obligation;
there is breach if it fails to exert extraordinary diligence according to all the
FACTS: circumstances of each case

AL Ammen Transportation was engaged in transporting passengers. ii. Carrier is obliged to carry its passenger with the utmost diligence of a very
cautious person, having due regard for all the circumstances
Cesar Isaac boarded a passenger bus of AL Ammen, paying the required fare from Albay bound
for Camarines Sur, but before reaching the destination, the bus collided with a pick-up type iii. A carrier is presumed to be at fault or to have acted negligently in case of death
vehicle coming from the opposite direction. of, or injury to, passengers, it being its duty to prove that it exercised
extraordinary diligence.
As a result of which, Isaacs left arm was completely severed and the severed portion fell
inside the bus. iv. Carrier is not an insurer against all risks of travel

Isaac was rushed to a hospital in Iriga, Cam Sur where he was given blood transfusion to save b. The Bus Driver exercised extraordinary diligence when upon seeing the Pickup Truck,
his life. After several transfers to other hospitals and treatments for several months, Isaac which was heading towards them at full speed, he swerved the bus to the very right
incurred expenses amounting to P623.40, excluding medical fees which were paid by AL of the road until its front and rear wheels have gone over the pile of stones or gravel
Ammen. situated on the rampart of the road. Said driver could not move the bus farther right
and run over a greater portion of the pile, the peak of which was about 3 feet high,
Isaac then filed an action against AL Ammenfor damages on the ground that the collision was without endangering the safety of his passengers. And notwithstanding all these
caused by the incompetence and recklessness of the driver of the bus and that AL Ammen efforts, the pick-up car hit the rear left side of the bus.
breached the contract of carriage for failure to transport Isaac safely to his destination.
c. Isaacs contention that that the bus driver should have stopped and waited for the
Isaac prayed for Moral damages, loss of earnings, attorneys fees, medical expenses and vehicle from the opposite direction to pass is not correct: (Emergency Rule)
the cost of the artificial arm.
i. Where a carriers employee is confronted with a sudden emergency, the fact
AL Ammenon the other hand alleges that the injury suffered was due entirely to the fault or that he is obliged to act quickly and without a chance for deliberation must be
negligence of the driver of the pick-up car and to the contributory negligence of Isaac himself. taken into account, and he is not held to the same degree of care as any ordinary
AL Ammenfurther claims that the accident, which resulted in the injury of plaintiff, is one prudent person would exercise only such care as any ordinary prudent person
which defendant could not foresee or, though foreseen, was inevitable. would exercise under like circumstances and conditions, and the failure on his
part to exercise the best judgment the case renders possible does not establish
Trial Court: dismissed complaint; in favor of AL Ammen; the collision occurred due to the lack of care and skill on his part which renders the company, liable
negligence of the driver of the pick-up car and not to that of the driver of the bus it appearing
that the latter did everything he could to avoid the same but that notwithstanding his efforts, d. Considering the attendant circumstances, the driver of the bus has done what a
he was not able to avoid it. Hence, this appeal. prudent man could have done to avoid the collision and relieves the defendant from
liability

ISSUES:
2. There was contributory negligence on the part of Isaac which mitigates his position.
1. WON AL Ammen is liable observed extraordinary diligence or the utmost diligence
of every cautious person. a. Upon boarding, Isaac placed himself in such a position as to expose his arm to injury,
which is the position he was in when the collision happened. He rest his arm on the
2. WON there was contributory negligence on the part of Isaac
window sill but with his left elbow outside the window. Had he not placed his left arm
on the window sill with a portion thereof protruding outside, perhaps the injury
would have been avoided as is the case with the other passenger. It is to be noted
that appellant was the only victim of the collision.
 b. Notably, it is only the plaintiff who was the victim of the collision
c. It has been held that:
i. It is negligence per se for a passenger on a railroad voluntarily or inadvertently
to protrude his arm, hand, elbow, or any other part of his body through the
window of a moving car beyond the outer edge of the window or outer surface
of the car, so as to come in contact with objects or obstacles near the track, and
that no recovery can be had for an injury which but for such negligence would
not have been sustained

DISPOSITION: Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with cost against appellant.
 Del Prado v. Meralco RULLING:

(1) We may observe at the outset that there is no obligation on the part of a street railway
company to stop its cars to let on intending passengers at other points than those
FACTS: appointed for stoppage.
Teodorico Florenciano, Meralcos motorman, was driving the companys street car along Nevertheless, although the motorman of this car was not bound to stop to let the plaintiff
Hidalgo Street. on, it was his duty to do no act that would have the effect of increasing the plaintiff's peril
Plaintiff Ignacio Del Prado ran across the street to catch the car. while he was attempting to board the car. The premature acceleration of the car was, in
our opinion, a breach of this duty.
The motorman eased up but did not put the car into complete stop.
Plaintiff was able to get hold of the rail and step his left foot when the car accelerated. As a
result, plaintiff slipped off and fell to the ground. His foot was crushed by the wheel of the car. (2) The relation between a carrier of passengers for hire and its patrons is of a contractual
nature; and a failure on the part of the carrier to use due care in carrying its passengers
He filed a complaint for culpa contractual. safely is a breach of duty (culpa contractual). Furthermore, the duty that the carrier of
passengers owes to its patrons extends to persons boarding the cars as well as to those
alighting therefrom.
ISSUES:
Where liability arises from a mere tort (culpa aquiliana), not involving a breach of positive
1) Whether the motorman was negligent obligation, an employer, or master, may exculpate himself by proving that he had
2) Whether Meralco is liable for breach of contract of carriage exercised due diligence to prevent the damage; whereas this defense is not available if the
3) Whether there was contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff liability of the master arises from a breach of contractual duty (culpa contractual).
In the case before us the company pleaded as a special defense that it had used all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage suffered by the plaintiff; and
to establish this contention the company introduced testimony showing that due care had
been used in training and instructing the motorman in charge of this car in his art.
But this proof is irrelevant in view of the fact that the liability involved was derived from a
breach of obligation.

(3) It is obvious that the plaintiff's negligence in attempting to board the moving car was not
the proximate cause of the injury. The direct and proximate cause of the injury was the act
of appellant's motorman in putting on the power prematurely.
Again, the situation before us is one where the negligent act of the company's servant
succeeded the negligent act of the plaintiff, and the negligence of the company must be
considered the proximate cause of the injury.
The rule here applicable seems to be analogous to, if not identical with that which is
sometimes referred to as the doctrine of "the last clear chance." In accordance with this
doctrine, the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the action if it be
shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have
avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured party.
The negligence of the plaintiff was, however, contributory to the accident and must be
considered as a mitigating circumstance.
 PNR VS COURT OF APPEALS RULLING:

(G.R. No. L-55347 October 4, 1985) The appellate court found, the petitioner does not deny, that the train boarded by the
deceased Winifredo Tupang was so over-crowded that he and many other passengers had no
choice but to sit on the open platforms between the coaches of the train.
FACTS: It is likewise undisputed that the train did not even slow down when it approached the Iyam
Winifredo Tupang, husband of respondent Rosario Tupang, boarded 'Train No. 516 of petitioner Bridge which was under repair at the time, Neither did the train stop, despite the alarm raised
at Libmanan, Camarines Sur, as a paying passenger bound for Manila. by other passengers that a person had fallen off the train at lyam Bridge.

Due to some mechanical defect, the train stopped at Sipocot, Camarines Sur, for repairs, taking The petitioner has the obligation to transport its passengers to their destinations and to
some two hours before the train could resume its trip to Manila. observe extraordinary diligence in doing so. Death or any injury suffered by any of its
passengers gives rise to the presumption that it was negligent in the performance of its
Unfortunately, upon passing Iyam Bridge at Lucena, Quezon, Winifredo Tupang fell off the train obligation under the contract of carriage. Thus, as correctly ruled by the respondent court, the
resulting in his death. petitioner failed to overthrow such presumption of negligence with clear and convincing
The train did not stop despite the alarm raised by the other passengers that somebody fell evidence.
from the train. Instead, the train conductor Perfecto Abrazado, called the station agent at But while petitioner failed to exercise extraordinary diligence as required by law, 8 it appears
Candelaria, Quezon, and requested for verification of the information. Police authorities of that the deceased was chargeable with contributory negligence. Since he opted to sit on the
Lucena City were dispatched to the Iyam Bridge where they found the lifeless body of open platform between the coaches of the train, he should have held tightly and tenaciously on
Winifredo Tupang. the upright metal bar found at the side of said platform to avoid falling off from the speeding
Upon complaint filed by the deceased's widow, Rosario Tupang, the then Court of First Instance train.
of Rizal, after trial, held the petitioner PNR liable for damages for breach of contract of carriage Such contributory negligence, while not exempting the PNR from liability, nevertheless justified
and ordered "to pay the plaintiff the sum of P12,000,00 for the death of Winifredo Tupang, plus the deletion of the amount adjudicated as moral damages. By the same token, the award of
P20,000.00 for loss of his earning capacity and the further sum of P10,000.00 as moral exemplary damages must be set aside.
damages, and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees, and costs.
Exemplary damages may be allowed only in cases where the defendant acted in a wanton,
On appeal, the Appellate Court sustained the holding of the trial court that the PNR did not fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. There being no evidence of fraud,
exercise the utmost diligence required by law of a common carrier. It further increased the malice or bad faith on the part of petitioner, the grant of exemplary damages should be
amount adjudicated by the trial court by ordering PNR to pay the plaintiff an additional sum of discarded.
P5,000.00 as exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate court is hereby modified by eliminating
therefrom the amounts of P10,000.00 and P5,000.00 adjudicated as moral and exemplary
ISSUE: damages, respectively. No costs.

Whether or not petitioner is liable as a common carrier.