[G.R. No. L-25316. February 28, 1979.

]
4. ID.; ID.; WRIT UNAVAILABLE IN DOUBTFUL CASES. The
KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA MANILA RAILROAD writ never issues in doubtful cases. It neither confers powers
COMPANY CREDIT UNION, INC., Petitioner-Appellant, v. nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a
MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, Respondent-Appellee. power already possessed and to perform a duty already
Gregorio E. Fajardo for Appellant. imposed. The latest reported case, Province of Pangasinan v.
Gregorio Baroque for Appellee. Reparations Commission, L-27448, Nov. 29, 1977, reiterated a
well-settled doctrines: "It has also been held that it is
SYNOPSIS essential to the issuance of the writ of mandamus that the
plaintiff should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded,
Petitioner-appellant seeks the reversal of a decision of the and it must be the imperative duty of the defendant to
lower court dismissing a mandamus petition, contending it perform the act required. It never issues in doubtful
had a clear legal right of priority in the payroll collection from cases."cralaw virtua1aw library
the respondents employees wages and salaries.
5. ID.; INSTANT PETITION TO BE DISMISSED. The petition
The Supreme Court ruled that pars. 1 and 2 of Sec. 62 of RA for mandamus does not lie as petitioner-appellant was unable
2023 are unequivocal. The law merely compels the employer to show a clear legal right. The very law on which he would
to deduct from the salaries or wages payable to members of base his action fails to supply any basis for this petition.
the employees cooperative credit unions the employees
debts to the union and to pay the same to the credit union. It
does not convert the credit unions credit into a first priority DECISION
credit thus, the petition for mandamus was rightly dismissed FERNANDO, J.:
as petitioner-appellant was unable to show a clear legal right
therefor. In this mandamus petition dismissed by the lower court,
petitioner-appellant would seek a reversal of such decision
Judgment affirmed. relying on what it considered to be a right granted by Section
62 of the Republic Act No. 2023, more specifically the first
SYLLABUS two paragraphs thereof: . . . (1) A member of a cooperative
Of the Ruling of the Court may, notwithstanding the provisions of existing laws, execute
an agreement in favor of the cooperative authorizing his
1.constitutional law; statutes; interpretation of; ra 2023; employer to deduct from the salary or wages payable to him
credit UNIONS CREDIT NOT A PRIORITY CREDIT. The by the employer such amount as may be specified in the
mandatory character of Rep. Act. 2023 is only to compel the agreement and to pay the amount so deducted to the co-
employer to make the deduction of the employees debt from operative in satisfaction of any debt or other demand owing
the latters salary and turn this over to the employees credit from the member to the co-operative. (2) Upon the execution
union but this mandatory character does not convert the of such agreement the employer shall, if so required by the
credit unions credit into a first priority credit. If the legislative co-operative by a request in writing and so long as such debt
intent in enacting pars. 1 and 2 of Sec. 62 of Rep. Act 2023 or other demand or any part of it remains unpaid, make that
were to give first priority in the matter of payments to the deduction in accordance with the agreement and remit fort-
obligations of employees in favor of their credit unions, then, with the amount so deducted to the co-operative." 1
the law would have so expressly declared. Thus, the express
provision of the New Civil Code, Arts. 2241, 2242 and 2244 To show that such reliance is futile, the appealed decision,
show the legislative intent on preference of credits. quoted in the brief for petitioner-appellant, stated the
following: "Then petitioner contends that under the above
2. ID.; ID.; WHEN THERE IS NO AMBIGUITY, THE LAW SHOULD provisions of Rep. Act 2023, the loans granted by credit
BE APPLIED AS WORDED. Where the statutory norm speaks unions its members enjoy firs priority in the payroll collection
unequivocally, there is nothing for the courts to do except to from the respondents employees wages and salaries. As can
apply it. The law, leaving no doubt as to the scope of its be clearly seen, there is nothing in the provision of Rep. Act
operation, must be obeyed. 2023 hereinabove quoted which provides that obligation of
laborers and employees payable to credit unions shall enjoy
3. MANDAMUS; WHEN REMEDY IS PROPER. Mandamus in first priority in the deduction from the employees wages and
the proper remedy if it could be shown that there was neglect salaries. The only effect of Rep. Act 2023 is to compel the
on the part of a tribunal in the performance of an act, which employer to deduct from the salaries or wages payable to
specifically the law enjoins as a duty or an unlawful exclusion members of the employees cooperative credit unions the
of a party from the use and enjoyment of a right to which he employees debts to the union and to pay the same to the
is entitled. Only specific legal rights may be enforced by credit union. In other words, if Rep. Act 2023 had been
mandamus if they are clear and certain. If the legal rights of enacted, the employer could not be compelled to act as the
the petitioner are not well defined, clear, and certain, the collecting agent of the employees credit union for the
petition must be dismissed. employees debt to his credit union but to contend that the
debt of a member of the employees cooperative credit union to former Chief Justice Moran, "only specific legal rights may
as having first priority in the matter of deduction, is to write be enforced by mandamus if they are clear and certain. If the
something into the law which does not appear therein. In legal rights of the petitioner are not well defined, clear, and
other words, the mandatory character of Rep. Act 2023 is certain, the petition must be dismissed. In support of the
only to compel the employer to make the deduction of the above view, Viuda e Hijos de Crispulo Zamora v. Wright was
employees debt from the latters salary and turn this over to cited. As was there categorically stated: This court has held
the employees credit union but this mandatory character that it is fundamental that the duties to be enforced by
does not convert the credit unions credit into a first priority mandamus must be those which are clear and enjoined by
credit. If the legislative intent in enacting pars. 1 and 2 of Sec. law or by reason of official station, and that petitioner must
62 of Rep. Act 2023 were to give first priority in the matter of have a clear, legal right to the thing demanded and that it
payments to the obligations of employees in favor of their must be the legal duty of the defendant to perform the
credit unions, then, the law would have so expressly declared. required act. As expressed by the then Justice Recto in a
Thus, the express provisions of the New Civil Code, Arts. 2241, subsequent opinion: It is well established that only specific
2242 and 2244 show the legislative intent on preference of legal rights are enforceable by mandamus, that the right
credits." 2 sought to be enforced must be certain and clear, and that the
writ not issue in cases where the right is doubtful. To the
Such an interpretation, as could be expected, found favor same effect is the formulation of such doctrine by former
with the respondent-appellee, which, in its brief, succinctly Justice Barrera: Stated otherwise, the writ never issues in
pointed out "that there is nothing in said provision from doubtful cases. It neither confers powers nor imposes duties.
which it could be implied that it gives top priority to It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed
obligations of the nature of that payable to petitioner, and and to perform a duty already imposed." 8 So it has been
that, therefore, respondent company, in issuing the since then. 9 The latest reported case. Province of Pangasinan
documents known as Exhibit 3 and Exhibit P, which v. Reparations Commission, 10 this Court speaking through
establish the order of priority of payment out of the salaries Justice Concepcion Jr., reiterated such a well settled doctrine:
of the employees of respondent-appellee, did not violate the "It has also been held that it is essential to the issuance of the
above-quoted Section 62 of Republic Act 2023. In writ of mandamus that the plaintiff should have a clear legal
promulgating Exhibit 3, [and] Exhibit P, respondent, in right to the thing demanded, and it must be the imperative
effect, implemented the said provision of law." 3 duty of the defendant to perform the act required. It never
issues in doubtful cases." 11
This petition being one for mandamus and the provision of
law relied upon being clear on its face, it would appear that WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is affirmed. No
no favorable action can be taken on this appeal. We pronouncement as to costs.
affirm.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Barredo, Antonio, Concepcion Jr., Santos and Abad Santos, JJ.,
1. The applicable provision of Republic Act No. 2023 concur.
quoted earlier, speaks for itself. There is no ambiguity. As thus
worded, it was so applied. Petitioner-appellant cannot Aquino, J., took no part.
therefore raise any valid objection. For the lower court to
view it otherwise would have been to alter the law. That
cannot be done by the judiciary. That is a function that
properly appertains to the legislative branch. As was pointed
out in Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals: 4 "It has been repeated
time and time again that where the statutory norm speaks
unequivocally, there is nothing for the courts to do except to
apply it. The law, leaving no doubt as to the scope of its
operation, must be obeyed. Our decisions have consistently
been to that effect." 5

2. Clearly, then, mandamus does not lie. Petitioner-

appellant was unable to show a clear legal right. The very law
on which he would base his action fails to supply any basis for
this petition. A more rigorous analysis would have prevented
him from instituting a suit of this character. In J.R.S. Business
Corporation v. Montesa, 6 this Court held. "Mandamus is the
proper remedy if it could be shown that there was neglect on
the part of a tribunal in the performance of an act, which
specifically the law enjoins as a duty or an unlawful exclusion
of a party from the use and enjoyment of a right to which he
is entitled." 7 The opinion continued in this wise. "According
[G.R. No. L-27760. May 29, 1974.] principally on the ground that there was no reservation for
the filing thereof in the City Court of Ozamis. It was argued by
CRISPIN ABELLANA and FRANCISCO ABELLANA, Petitioners, v. them that it was not allowable at the stage where the
HONORABLE GERONIMO R. MARAVE, Judge, Court of First criminal case was already on appeal. 7
Instance of Misamis Occidental, Branch II; and GERONIMO
CAMPANER, MARCELO LAMASON, MARIA GURREA, Respondent Judge was not persuaded. On April 28, 1967, he
PACIENCIOSA FLORES and ESTELITA NEMEO, Respondents. issued the following order: "This is a motion to dismiss this
case or the ground that in Criminal Case No. OZ-342 which
Prud, V. Villafuerte, for Petitioners. was decided by the City Court and appealed to this Court, the
offended parties failed to expressly waive the civil action or
Hon. Geronimo R. Marave in his own behalf. reserve their right to institute it separately in said City Court,
as required in Section 1, Rule 111, Rules of Court. From the
DECISION Records of Criminal Case No. OZ-342, it appears that the City
Court convicted the accused. On appeal to this Court, the
FERNANDO, J.: judgment of the City Court was vacated and a trial de novo
will have to be conducted. This Court has not as yet begun
This petition for certiorari is characterized by a rather trying said criminal case. In the meantime, the offended
vigorous insistence on the part of petitioners Crispin Abellana parties expressly waived in this Court the civil action impliedly
and Francisco Abellana that an order of respondent Judge was instituted with the criminal action, and reserve their right to
issued with grave abuse of discretion. It is their contention institute a separate action as in fact, they did file. The Court is
that he ought to have dismissed an independent civil action of the opinion that at this stage, the offended parties may still
filed in his court, considering that the plaintiffs, as offended waive the civil action because the judgment of the City Court
parties, private respondents here, 1 failed to reserve their is vacated and a trial de novo will have to be had. In view of
right to institute it separately in the City Court of Ozamis City, this waiver and reservation, this Court would be precluded
when the criminal case for physical injuries through reckless from judging civil damages against the accused and in favor of
imprudence was commenced. Such a stand of petitioners was the offended parties. [Wherefore], the motion to dismiss is
sought to be bolstered by a literal reading of Sections 1 and 2 hereby denied. . . ." 8 There was a motion for reconsideration
of Rule 111. 2 It does not take into account, however, the rule which was denied. Hence this petition.
as to a trial de novo found in Section 7 of Rule 123. 3 What is
worse, petitioners appear to be oblivious of the principle that The only basis of petitioners for the imputation that in the
if such an interpretation were to be accorded the applicable issuance of the challenged order there was a grave abuse of
Rules of Court provisions, it would give rise to a grave discretion, is their reading of the cited Rules of Court
constitutional question in view of the constitutional grant of provision to the effect that upon the institution of a criminal
power to this Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, action "the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising
practice, and procedure being limited in the sense that they from the offense charge is impliedly instituted with the
"shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights." 4 criminal action, unless the offended party . . . reserves his
It thus appears clear that the petition for certiorari is without right to institute it separately." 9 Such an interpretation, as
merit. noted, ignores the de novo aspect of appealed cases from city
courts. 10 It does likewise, as mentioned, give rise to a
The relevant facts were set forth in the petition and admitted constitutional question to the extent that it could yield a
in the answer. The dispute had its origins in a prosecution of meaning to a rule of court that may trench on a substantive
petitioner Francisco Abellana of the crime of physical injuries right. Such an interpretation is to be rejected. Certiorari, to
through reckless imprudence in driving his cargo truck, hitting repeat, clearly does not lie.
a motorized pedicab resulting in injuries to its passengers,
namely, private respondents Marcelo Lamason, Maria Gurrea, 1. In the language of the petition, this is the legal proposition
Pacienciosa Flores, and Estelita Nemeo. The criminal case submitted for the consideration of this Court: "That a
was filed with the city court of Ozamis City, which found the separate civil action can be legally filed and allowed by the
accused Francisco Abellana guilty as charged, damages in court only at the institution, or the right to file such separate
favor of the offended parties likewise being awarded. The civil action reserved or waived, at such institution of the
accused, now petitioner, Francisco Abellana appealed such criminal action, and never on appeal to the next higher
decision to the Court of First Instance. 5 At this stage, the court." 11 It admits of no doubt that an independent civil
private respondents as the offended parties filed with action was filed by private respondents only at the stage of
another branch of the Court of First Instance of Misamis appeal. Nor was there any reservation to that effect when the
Occidental, presided by respondent Judge, a separate and criminal case was instituted in the city court of Ozamis.
independent civil action for damages allegedly suffered by Petitioners would then take comfort from the language of the
them from the reckless driving of the aforesaid Francisco aforesaid Section 1 of Rule 111 for the unwarranted
Abellana. 6 In such complaint, the other petitioner, Crispin conclusion that absent such a reservation, an independent
Abellana, as the alleged employer, was included as defendant. civil action is barred. In the first place, such an inference does
Both of them then sought the dismissal of such action not per se arise from the wording of the cited rule. It could be
looked upon plausibly as a non-sequitur. Moreover, it is function if through an ingenious construction sought to be
vitiated by the grievous fault of ignoring what is so explicitly fastened on a legal norm, particularly a procedural rule, there
provided in Section 7 of Rule 123: "An appealed case shall be is placed an impediment to a litigant being given an
tried in all respects anew in the Court of First Instance as if it opportunity of vindicating an alleged right. 23 The
had been originally instituted in that court." 12 Unlike commitment of this Court to such a primordial objective has
petitioners, respondent Judge was duly mindful of such a been manifested time and time again." 24
norm. This Court has made clear that its observance in
appealed criminal cases is mandatory. 13 In a 1962 decision, WHEREFORE, this petition for certiorari is dismissed Costs
People v. Carreon, 14 Justice Barrera, as ponente, could trace against petitioners.
such a rule to a 1905 decision, Andres v. Wolfe. 15 Another
case cited by him is Crisostomo v. Director of Prisons, 16 Zaldivar (Chairman), Barredo, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ.,
where Justice Malcolm emphasized how deeply-rooted in concur.
Anglo-American legal history is such a rule. In the latest case
in point, People v. Jamisola, 17 this Court, through Justice Antonio, J., concurs on the bases of par, nos. 2 & 3 of opinion.
Dizon, reiterated such a doctrine in these words: "The rule in
this jurisdiction is that upon appeal by the defendant from a
judgment of conviction by the municipal court, the appealed
decision is vacated and the appealed case `shall be tried in all
respects anew in the court of first instance as if it had been
originally instituted in that court." 18 So it is in civil cases
under Section 9 of Rule 40. 19 Again, there is a host of
decisions attesting to its observance. 20 It cannot be said then
that there was an error committed by respondent Judge,
much less a grave abuse of discretion, which is indispensable
if this petition were to prosper.

2. Nor is the above the only ground for rejecting the

contention of petitioners. The restrictive interpretation they
would place on the applicable rule does not only result in its
emasculation but also gives rise to a serious constitutional
question. Article 33 of the Civil Code is quite clear: "In cases
of . . . physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be
brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence." 21 That is a substantive
right, not to be frittered away by a construction that could
render it nugatory, if through oversight, the offended parties
failed at the initial stage to seek recovery for damages in a
civil suit. As referred to earlier, the grant of power to this
Court, both in the present Constitution and under the 1935
Charter, does not extend to any diminution, increase or
modification of substantive right. 22 It is a well-settled
doctrine that a court is to avoid construing a statute or legal
norm in such a manner as would give rise to a constitutional
doubt. Unfortunately, Petitioners, unlike respondent Judge,
appeared to lack awareness of the undesirable consequence
of their submission. Thus is discernible another insuperable
obstacle to the success of this suit.

3. Nor is this all that needs to be said. It is understandable for

any counsel to invoke legal propositions impressed with a
certain degree of plausibility if thereby the interest of his
client would be served. That is though, merely one aspect of
the matter. There is this other consideration. He is not to
ignore the basic purpose of a litigation, which is to assure
parties justice according to law. He is not to fall prey, as
admonished by Justice Frankfurter, to the vice of literalness.
The law as an instrument of social control will fail in its
[G.R. No. 123169. November 4, 1996.] The subject provision of the Local Government Code provides:
DANILO E. PARAS, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, "SEC. 74. Limitations on Recall. (a) Any elective local official
Respondent. may be the subject of a recall election only once during his
term of office for loss of confidence
RESOLUTION
(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date
FRANCISCO, J.: of the officials assumption to office or one (1) year
immediately preceding a regular local election."
Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay [Emphasis added.]
of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won during the last regular
barangay election in 1994. A petition for his recall as Punong It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the
Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the barangay. statute must be interpreted with reference to the context,
Acting on the petition for recall, public respondent i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to approve the together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the
petition, scheduled the petition signing on October 14, 1995, general intent of the whole enactment. 4 The evident intent
and set the recall election on November 13, 1995.1 At least of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall
29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, well election once during his term of office. Paragraph (b)
above the 25% requirement provided by law. The COMELEC, construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the
however, deferred the recall election in view of petitioners period when such elective local official may be subject of a
opposition. On December 6, 1995, the COMELEC set anew the recall election, that is, during the second year of his term of
recall election, this time on December 16, 1995. To prevent office. Thus, subscribing to petitioners interpretation of the
the holding of the recall election, petitioner filed before the phrase regular local election to include the SK election will
Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City a petition for unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the Local
injunction, docketed as SP Civil Action No. 2254-AF, with the Government Code on recall, a mode of removal of public
trial court issuing a temporary restraining order. After officers by initiation of the people before the end of his term.
conducting a summary hearing, the trial court lifted the And if the SK election which is set by R.A. No. 7808 to be held
restraining order, dismissed the petition and required every three years from May 1996 were to be deemed within
petitioner and his counsel to explain why they should not be the purview of the phrase "regular local election", as
cited for contempt for misrepresenting that the barangay erroneously insisted by petitioner, then no recall election can
recall election was without COMELEC approval. 2 be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the
Local Government Code.
In a resolution dated January 5, 1996, the COMELEC, for the
third time, re-scheduled the recall election on January 13, In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with
1996; hence, the instant petition for certiorari with urgent the assumption that the legislature intended to enact an
prayer for injunction. On January 12, 1996, the Court issued a effective law, and the legislature is not presumed to have
temporary restraining order and required the Office of the done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. 5 An
Solicitor General, in behalf of public respondent, to comment interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under which a
on the petition. In view of the Office of the Solicitor Generals statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as
manifestation maintaining an opinion adverse to that of the otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated,
COMELEC, the latter through its law department filed the repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant,
required comment. Petitioner thereafter filed a reply. 3 meaningless, inoperative or nugatory. 6

Petitioners argument is simple and to the point. Citing It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a
Section 74 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as statute should be interpreted in harmony with the
the Local Government Code, which states that "no recall shall Constitution. 7 Thus, the interpretation of Section 74 of the
take place within one (1) year from the date of the officials Local Government Code, specifically paragraph (b) thereof,
assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a should not be in conflict with the Constitutional mandate of
regular local election", petitioner insists that the scheduled Section 3 of Article X of the Constitution to enact a local
January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred as the government code which shall provide for a more responsive
Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set by Republic Act and accountable local government structure instituted
No. 7808 on the first Monday of May 1996, and every three through a system of decentralization with effective
years thereafter. In support thereof, petitioner cites mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum . . ."
Associated Labor Union v. Letrondo-Montejo, 237 SCRA 621,
where the Court considered the SK election as a regular local Moreover, petitioners too literal interpretation of the law
election. Petitioner maintains that as the SK election is a leads to absurdity which we cannot countenance. Thus, in a
regular local election, hence no recall election can be had for case, the Court made the following admonition
barely four months separate the SK election from the recall
election. We do not agree. "We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this
is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the
intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in Muslim Mindanao. These are the only local elective officials
the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth . . ." 8 deemed recognized by Section 2(2) of Article IX-C of the
Constitution, which provides:
The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its
construction; hence, a statute, as in this case, must be read SEC 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the
according to its spirit and intent. following powers and functions:
x x x
Finally, recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal (2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests
working of the local government unit necessitating additional relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all
expenses, hence the prohibition against the conduct of recall elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate
election one year immediately preceding the regular local jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal
election. The proscription is due to the proximity of the next officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or
regular election for the office of the local elective official involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of
concerned. The electorate could choose the officials limited jurisdiction
replacement in the said election who certainly has a longer
tenure in office than a successor elected through a recall A regular election, whether national or local, can only refer to
election. It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the an election participated in by those who possess the right of
intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular suffrage, are not otherwise disqualified by law, and who are
local election as one referring to an election where the office registered voters. One of the requirements for the exercise of
held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be suffrage under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution is that
contested and be filled by the electorate. Nevertheless, recall the person must be at least 18 years of age, and one requisite
at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation before he can vote is that he be a registered voter pursuant to
stated under Section 74 (b) of the Code considering that the the rules on registration prescribed in the Omnibus Election
next regular election involving the barangay office concerned Code (Section 113-118)
is barely seven (7) months away, the same having been
scheduled on May 1997. 9 Under the law, the SK includes the youth with ages ranging
from 15 to 21 (Sec. 424, Local Government Code of 1991).
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed for having Accordingly, they include many who are not qualified to vote
become moot and academic. The temporary restraining order in a regular election, viz., those from ages 15 to less than 18.
issued by the Court on January 12, 1996, enjoining the recall In no manner then may SK elections be considered a regular
election should be as it is hereby made permanent. election (whether national or local).

SO ORDERED. Indeed the Sangguniang Kabataan is nothing more than a

youth organization, and although fully recognized in the Local
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Government Code and vested with certain powers and
Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Hermosisima, Jr., functions, its elective officials have not attained the status of
Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., concur. local elective officials. So, in Mercado v. Board of Election
Supervisors (243 SCRA 422 [1995]), this Court ruled that
Separate Opinions although the SK Chairman is an ex-officio member of the
sangguniang barangay an elective body that fact does
DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library not make him "an elective barangay official," since the law
specifically provides who comprise the elective officials of the
I concur with Mr. Justice Ricardo J. Francisco in his ponencia. sangguniang barangay, viz., the punong barangay and the
seven (7) regular sangguniang barangay members elected at
However, I wish to add another reason as to why the SK large by those qualified to exercise the right of suffrage under
election cannot be considered a "regular local election" for Article V of the Constitution, who are likewise registered
purposes of recall under Section 74 of the Local Government voters of the barangay. This shows further that the SK election
Code of 1991. is not a regular local election for purposes of recall under
Section 74 of the Local Government Code.
The term "regular local election" must be confined to the
regular election of elective local officials, as distinguished
from the regular election of national officials. The elective
national officials are the President, Vice-President, Senators
and Congressmen. The elective local officials are Provincial
Governors, Vice-Governors of provinces, Mayors and Vice-
Mayors of cities and municipalities, Members of the
Sanggunians of provinces, cities and municipalities, punong
barangays and members of the sangguniang barangays, and
the elective regional officials of the Autonomous Region of
EN BANC
"Datu Sumaguina Macarandang shall personally report to me
[G.R. No. L-12088. December 23, 1959.] from time to time all activities and whereabouts of lawless
and wanted elements roaming in the Municipal District of
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MORO Marantao, as well as all matters affecting tranquility therein
SUMAGUINA MACARANDANG, Defendant-Appellant. existing."
It may be true that, as held by the trial court, the Governor
Valerio V. Rovira for Appellant. has no authority to issue any firearm license or permit; but
section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides, as
Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Assistant shown at least by the subject matter thereof, that "peace
Solicitor General Florencio Villamor for Appellee. officers" are exempted from the requirements relating to the
issuance of license to possess firearms. The appointment of
SYLLABUS the accused as secret agent to assist in the maintenance of
peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes,
1. CRIMINAL LAW; ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS; sufficiently put him within the category of a "peace officer"
SECRET AGENTS; EXEMPTION FROM FIREARM LICENSE OR equivalent even to a member of the municipal police
PERMIT. Section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code expressly covered by section 879.
provides, as shown at least by the subject matter thereof, that
"peace officers" are exempted from the requirements relating Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed and the
to the issuance of license to possess firearms. The accused acquitted, with costs de oficio. So ordered.
appointment of the accused as secret agent to assist in the
maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador and
crimes, sufficiently put him within the category of a "peace Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.
officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police
expressly covered by section 879.

DECISION

PARAS, C.J. :
Moro Sumaguina Macarandang was accused and, after trial,
convicted of the crime of illegal possession of firearms in the
Court of First Instance of Lanao under the following
information:

"That on or about June 8, 1954, in the Municipality of

Marantao, Province of Lanao, Republic of the Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously keep and have in his custody and control one Riot
Gun, Winchester, 12 GA. SN-942131 and (8) rounds of
ammunitions, without first having obtained the proper license
or permit therefor from competent authority."
In the present appeal the accused, admitting the ownership
and possession of the firearm and ammunitions in question,
invokes as his legal excuse or authority therefor, the
appointment issued him by Governor Dimakuta as secret
agent on October 1, 1953, which reads as follows:

"TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

"For having shown good faith by previously surrendering to

this Office a firearm, Datu Sumaguina Macarandang of
Kamalig, Marantao, Lanao, has been appointed SECRET
AGENT of this Office without compensation, to assist in the
maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of
crimes. Accordingly, he is hereby authorized to hold and carry
in his possession one (1) Riot Winchester Shotgun, 12 GA.
Serial No. 942131 with twenty (20) rounds of ammunitions for
the successful execution of his hazardous missions.
[G.R. No. L-22301. August 30, 1967.] Republic Act No. 4, committed as follows: That on or about
the 13th day of August, 1962, in the City of Manila,
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARIO Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully and
MAPA Y MAPULONG, Defendant-Appellant. unlawfully have in his possession and under his custody and
control one home-made revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22, without
Francisco P. Cabigao for defendant and Appellant. serial number, with six (6) rounds of ammunition, without first
Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Asst. Solicitor General F .R. having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from
Rosete and Solicitor O. C. Hernandez for plaintiff and the corresponding authorities. Contrary to law."
appellee.
When the case was called for hearing on September 3, 1963,
SYLLABUS the lower court at the outset asked the counsel for the
1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; DUTY OF COURTS TO APPLY accused: "May counsel stipulate that the accused was found
THE LAW; WHEN A LAW SHOULD BE CONSTRUED AND in possession of the gun involved in this case, that he has
INTERPRETED. The first and fundamental duty of courts is neither a permit or license to possess the same and that we
to apply the law. Construction and interpretation come only can submit the same on a question of law whether or not an
after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible agent of the governor can hold a firearm without a permit
or inadequate without them. issued by the Philippine Constabulary." After counsel sought
from the fiscal an assurance that he would not question the
2. ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS; LICENSE authenticity of his exhibits, the understanding being that only
REQUIREMENT; SECRET AGENT NOT EXEMPT; CASE AT BAR. a question of law would be submitted for decision, he
As secret agent is not included in the enumeration in Section explicitly specified such question to be "whether or not a
897 of the Revised Administrative Code of persons who are secret agent is not required to get a license for his firearm."
not prohibited in Section 878, Revised Administrative Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 4, from possessing "any Upon the lower court stating that the fiscal should examine
firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, the documents so that he could pass on their authenticity, the
or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used fiscal asked the following question: "Does the accused admit
in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or that this pistol cal. 22 revolver with six rounds of ammunition
ammunition," appellant is not exempt from the requirement mentioned in the information was found in his possession on
of license. August 13, 1962, in the City of Manila without first having
secured the necessary license or permit thereof from the
3. ID.; ID.; DOCTRINE IN PEOPLE V. MACARANDANG correspondent authority?" The accused now the appellant,
OVERRULED. Reliance of the accused in the case at bar on answered categorically: "Yes, Your Honor." Upon which, the
People v. Macarandang, 106 Phil. 713, where a secret agent lower court made a statement: "The accused admits, Yes, and
was acquitted on appeal on the assumption that the his counsel Atty. Cabigao also affirms that the accused
appointment "of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the admits."
maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of
crimes, sufficiently put him within the category of a `peace Forthwith, the fiscal announced that he was "willing to submit
officer equivalent even to a member of the municipal police the same for decision." Counsel for the accused on his part
expressly covered by section 897," is misplaced. It is not presented four (4) exhibits consisting of his appointment as
within the power of the Supreme Court to set aside the clear secret agent of the Hon. Feliciano Leviste, then Governor of
and explicit mandate of a statutory provision. Batangas, dated June 2, 1962; 1 another document likewise
issued by Gov. Leviste also addressed to the accused directing
DECISION him to proceed to Manila, Pasay and Quezon City on a
confidential mission; 2 the oath of office of the accused as
FERNANDO, J.: such secret agent; 3 a certificate dated March 11, 1963, to the
effect that the accused "is a secret agent" of Gov. Leviste. 4
The sole question in this appeal from a judgment of Counsel for the accused then stated that with the
conviction by the lower court is whether or not the presentation of the above exhibits he was "willing to submit
appointment to and the holding of the position of a secret the case on the question of whether or not a secret agent
agent to the provincial governor would constitute a sufficient duly appointed and qualified as such of the provincial
defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of governor is exempt from the requirement of having a license
firearm and ammunition. We hold that it does not. of firearm." The exhibits were admitted and the parties were
given time to file their respective memoranda.
The accused in this case was indicted for the above offense in
an information dated August 14, 1962 reading as follows: Thereafter on November 27, 1963, the lower court rendered a
"The undersigned accuses MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG of a decision convicting the accused "of the crime of illegal
violation of Section 878 in connection with Section 2692 of possession of firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate
the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by penalty of from one year and one day to two years and to pay
Commonwealth Act No. 56 and as further amended by the costs. The firearm and ammunition confiscated from him
are forfeited in favor of the Government."cralaw virtua1aw
library

The only question being one of law, the appeal was taken to
this Court. The decision must be affirmed.

The law is explicit that except as thereafter specially allowed,

"it shall be unlawful for any person to . . . possess any firearm,
detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any
instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the
manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition." 5
The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition
regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or
marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the
Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the
Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors,
lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal
treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial
prisoners and jails," are not covered" when such firearms are
in possession of such officials and public servants for use in
the performance of their official duties." 6

The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a

secret agent. As such he is not exempt. Our task is equally
clear. The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the
law. "Construction and interpretation come only after it has
been demonstrated that application is impossible or
inadequate without them." 7 The conviction of the accused
must stand. It cannot be set aside. Accused however would
rely on People v. Macarandang, 8 where a secret agent was
acquitted on appeal on the assumption that the appointment
"of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance
of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes,
sufficiently put him within the category of a peace officer
equivalent even to a member of the municipal police
expressly covered by section 879." Such reliance is misplaced.
It is not within the power of this Court to set aside the clear
and explicit mandate of a statutory provision. To the extent
therefore that this decision conflicts with what was held in
People v. Macarandang, it no longer speaks with authority.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J .B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon,

J .P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-22291 November 15, 1976 (1) year and one (1) day nor more than five (5) years, or both
such imprisonment and a fine of not less than one thousand
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JESUS pesos (P1,000.00) or more than five thousand pesos
SANTAYANA Y ESCUDERO, Defendant-Appellant. (P5,000.00).
From the foregoing, it is evident that the jurisdiction of the
Ernesto C. Hidalgo and Enrique Jocson for appellant. Solicitor Municipal Courts over Criminal Cases in which the penalty
General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. provided by law is imprisonment for not more than six (6)
de Castro and Trial Attorney Josefina Domingo de Leon for months or fine of not more than two hundred (P200.00)
appellee. pesos or both such imprisonment and fine is exclusive and
original to said courts. But considering that the offense of
CONCEPCION, JR., J: illegal possession of firearms with which the appellant was
charged is penalized by imprisonment for a period of not less
Accused, Jesus Santayana y Escudero, was found guilty of the than one (1) year and one (1) day or more than five (5) years,
crime of illegal possesion of firearms and sentenced to an or both such imprisonment and a fine of not less than one
indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year and one (1) day to thousand (P1,000.00) pesos or more than five thousand
two (2) years and to pay the costs. (P5,000.00) pesos (Republic Act No. 4), the offense, therefore,
does not fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
The essential facts are not in dispute. On February 19, 1962, Municipal Court. The Court of First Instance has concurrent
accused Jesus Santayana, was appointed as "Special Agent" 1 jurisdiction over the same.
by then Colonel Jose C. Maristela, Chief of the CIS. On March
9, 1962, a Memorandum Receipt 2 for equipment was issued As to the second issue to be resolved, there is no question
in the name of the accused regarding one pistol Melior SN- that appellant was appointed as CIS secret agent with the
122137 with one (1) mag and stock. Col. Maristela likewise authority to carry and possess firearms. 4 Indeed, appellant
issued an undated certification 3 to the effect that the was issued a firearm in the performance of his official duties
accused was an accredited member of the CIS and the pistol and for his personal protection. 5 It also appears that
described in the said Memorandum Receipt was given to him appellant was informed by Col. Maristela that it was not
by virtue of his appointment as special agent and that he was necessary for him to apply for a license or to register the said
authorized to carry and possess the same in the performance firearm because it was government property and therefore
of his official duty and for his personal protection. On October could not legally be registered or licensed in appellant's
29, 1962, the accused was found in Plaza Miranda in name. 6 Capt. Adolfo M. Bringas from whom appellant
possession of the above-described pistol with four rounds of received the firearm also informed the latter that no permit
ammunition, cal. 25, without a license to possess them. An to carry the pistol was necessary "because you are already
investigation was conducted and thereupon, a corresponding appointed as CIS agent."
complaint was filed against the accused. The case underwent
trial after which the accused was convicted of the crime At the time of appellant's apprehension, the doctrine then
charged with its corresponding penalty. Hence, the case was prevailing is enunciated in the case of People vs.
appealed to US and the accused assigned three errors Macarandang 7 wherein We held that the appointment of a
allegedly committed by the trial court in disposing of this civilian as "secret agent to assist in the maintenace of peace
case. and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently puts
Of these assigned errors, the two main issued posed are him within the category of a 'peace officer' equivalent even to
whether or not the present subject matter falls within the a member of the municipal police expressly covered by
exclusive jurisdiction of the municipal court pursuant to Section 879." The case of People vs. Mapa 8 revoked the
Republic Act No. 2613; and whether or not the appointment doctrine in the Macarandang case only on August 30, 1967.
of the appellant as special agent of the CIS which apparently Under the Macarandang rule therefore obtaining at the time
authorizes him to carry and posses firearms exempts him of appellant's appointment as secret agent, he incurred no
from securing a license or permit corresponding thereto. criminal liability for possession of the pistol in question.
Wherefore, and conformably with the recommendation of the
Resolving the issue of jurisdiction, there is no doubt that Solicitor General, the decision appealed from is hereby
under Section 87 of Republic Act No. 286, as amended by reversed and appellant Jesus Santayana y Escudero is hereby
Republic Act No. 2613, the justice over cases of illegal acquitted. The bond for his provisional release is cancelled.
possession of firearms. But equally the Court of First Instance Costs de oficio.chanrobles virtual law library
of Manila, which took cognizance of this case had jurisdiction SO ORDERED.
over the offense charged because under Section 44 of Barredo (Actg. Chairman), Antonio, Aquino and Martin, JJ.,
Republic Act No. 296, Court of First Instance have original concur.chanrobles virtual law library
jurisdiction "in all criminal cases in which the penalty
provided by law is imprisonment for more than six (6) Fernando, J., took no part.
months, or a fine of more than two hundred pesos
(P200.00)"; and the offense charged in the information is
punishable by imprisonment for a period of not less than one