BADUA VS CA Our ruling in Cabatbat-Lim vs.

Intermediate Appellate
Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in the impugned decision
Petitioner tried to prove that she is the only legitimate is apropos, viz.:
child of the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel
Chipongian. She submitted documentary evidence, Petitioners' recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code
among others: [now Article 170 of the Family Code] is not well-taken.
(1) her Certificate of Live Birth This legal provision refers to an action to impugn
(2) Baptismal Certificate; legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case because this is
(3) Income Tax Returns and Information Sheet for not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an
Membership with the GSIS of the late Vicente naming her action of the private respondents to claim their
as his daughter and inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt.
(4) School Records. They do not claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is
She also testified that the said spouses reared an an illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is not
continuously treated her as their legitimate daughter. the decedent's child at all. Being neither legally adopted
child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a child by
On the other hand, private respondents tried to prove, legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal
mostly thru testimonial evidence, that the said spouses heir of the deceased
failed to beget a child during their marriage; that the late
Isabel, then thirty six (36) years of age, was even referred
to Dr. Constantino Manahan, a noted obstetrician-
gynecologist, for treatment. Their primary witness,
Victoria Benitez-Lirio, elder sister of the late Vicente,
then 77 years of age,2 categorically declared that
petitioner was not the biological child of the said spouses
who were unable to physically procreate.

A careful reading of the above articles will show that they

do not contemplate a situation, like in the instant case,
where a child is alleged not to be the child of nature or
biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these articles
govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies
as his own a child of his wife.

Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can

impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving:
(1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual
intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the
300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the
child; (2) that for biological or other scientific reasons,
the child could not have been his child; (3) that in case of
children conceived through artificial insemination, the
written authorization or ratification by either parent was
obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation
or undue influence.

Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as they

speak of the prescriptive period within which
the husband or any of his heirs should file the action
impugning the legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then,
the appellate court did not err when it refused to apply
these articles to the case at bench. For the case at bench
is not one where the heirs of the late Vicente are
contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel.
Rather, their clear submission is that petitioner was not
born to Vicente and Isabel.
BABIERA VS CATOTAL While it is true that an official document such as
petitioners Birth Certificate enjoys the presumption of
regularity, the specific facts attendant in the case at bar,
1. Petitioner contends that respondent has no as well as the totality of the evidence presented during
standing to sue, because Article 171[8] of the trial, sufficiently negate such presumption.
Family Code states that the child's filiation can
be impugned only by the father or, in special First, there were already irregularities regarding the
circumstances, his heirs. She adds that the Birth Certificate itself. It was not signed by the local civil
legitimacy of a child is not subject to a collateral registrar.[14] More important, the Court of Appeals
attack. observed that the mothers signature therein was
different from her signatures in other documents
This argument is incorrect. Respondent has the requisite presented during the trial.
standing to initiate the present action. Section 2, Rule 3
of the Rules of Court, provides that a real party in interest Second, the circumstances surrounding the birth of
is one "who stands to be benefited or injured by the petitioner show that Hermogena is not the former's real
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of mother. For one, there is no evidence of Hermogenas
the suit."[9] The interest of respondent in the civil status pregnancy, such as medical records and doctors
of petitioner stems from an action for partition which the prescriptions, other than the Birth Certificate itself. In
latter filed against the former.[10] The case concerned the fact, no witness was presented to attest to the pregnancy
properties inherited by respondent from her parents. of Hermogena during that time. Moreover, at the time of
her supposed birth, Hermogena was already 54 years
Moreover, Article 171 of the Family Code is not old. Even if it were possible for her to have given birth at
applicable to the present case. A close reading of this such a late age, it was highly suspicious that she did so in
provision shows that it applies to instances in which the her own home, when her advanced age necessitated
father impugns the legitimacy of his wifes child. The proper medical care normally available only in a hospital.
provision, however, presupposes that the child was the
undisputed offspring of the mother. The present case The most significant piece of evidence, however, is the
alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give birth to deposition of Hermogena Babiera which states that she
petitioner. In other words, the prayer herein is not to did not give birth to petitioner, and that the latter was
declare that petitioner is an illegitimate child of not hers nor her husband Eugenios.
Hermogena, but to establish that the former is not the
latter's child at all. Verily, the present action does not
impugn petitioners filiation to Spouses Eugenio and
Hermogena Babiera, because there is no blood relation
to impugn in the first place.

2. Petitioner next contends that the action to

contest her status as a child of the late
Hermogena Babiera has already prescribed.
She cites Article 170 of the Family Code which
provides the prescriptive period for such action

This argument is bereft of merit. The present action

involves the cancellation of petitioners Birth Certificate;
it does not impugn her legitimacy. Thus, the prescriptive
period set forth in Article 170 of the Family Code does
not apply. Verily, the action to nullify the Birth Certificate
does not prescribe, because it was allegedly void ab
initio.

3. Petitioner argues that the evidence presented,

especially Hermogenas testimony that
petitioner was not her real child, cannot
overcome the presumption of regularity in the
issuance of the Birth Certificate.
DE JESUS VS HEIRS OF DIZON August 1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of a
child would no longer be legally feasible and the status
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and
children, is established by unassailable.[12]
(1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgment; or Succinctly, in an attempt to establish their illegitimate
(2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public filiation to the late Juan G. Dizon, petitioners, in effect,
document or a private handwritten instrument and would impugn their legitimate status as being children of
signed by the parent concerned. Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus. This step
cannot be aptly done because the law itself establishes
In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by the legitimacy of children conceived or born during the
(1) the open and continuous possession of the status of marriage of the parents.
a legitimate child; or
(2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for
special laws.[4] the child born in wedlock, and only the father,[13] or
in exceptional instances the latters heirs,[14] can
The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of a
record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the
record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned
consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, that the paternity of the husband can be rejected.
and no further court action is required.[5] In fact, any
authentic writing is treated not just a ground for
compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary
recognition that does not require a separate action for
judicial approval.[6] Where, instead, a claim for
recognition is predicated on other evidence merely
tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of
birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or
an authentic writing, judicial action within the
applicable statute of limitations is essential in order
to establish the child’s acknowledgment.

A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners

were born during the marriage of their parents. The
certificates of live birth would also identify Danilo de
Jesus as being their father.

There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly

established and founded on sounder morality and more
convincing reason than the presumption that children
born in wedlock are legitimate.[8]This presumption
indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that
there is physical impossibility of access between the
spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately precedes the birth of the child due to
(a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual
intercourse with his wife;
(b) the fact that the husband and wife are living
separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not
possible; or
(c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely
prevents sexual intercourse.[9]

Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set

forth in Article 170,[10] and in proper cases Article
171,[11] of the Family Code (which took effect on 03
LIYAO, JR. VS TANHOTI-LIYAO under the conditions set forth under Article 262 of the
Civil Code.[27]Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a
strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional
Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one
during a valid marriage is presumed to be directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which
legitimate.[22] The presumption of legitimacy of children the infidelity of his wife produces and he should be the
does not only flow out from a declaration contained in one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose
the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural it in view of the moral and economic interest
justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The involved.[28]It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs
presumption is grounded in a policy to protect innocent are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these
offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.[23] cases, none - even his heirs - can impugn legitimacy; that
would amount o an insult to his memory.[29]
The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is
not conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown by It is settled that a child born within a valid marriage
evidence to the contrary. Hence, Article 255 of the New is presumed legitimate even though the mother may
Civil Code[24]provides: have declared against its legitimacy or may have
been sentenced as an adulteress.[30] We cannot allow
Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty petitioner to maintain his present petition and subvert
days following the celebration of the marriage, and before the clear mandate of the law that only the husband, or in
three hundred days following its dissolution or the exceptional circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the
separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimacy of a child born in a valid and subsisting
legitimate. marriage. The child himself cannot choose his own
filiation. If the husband, presumed to be the father does
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of
other than that of the physical impossibility of the husband the child is fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be the
having access to his wife within the first one hundred and child of his mothers alleged paramour. On the other
twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth hand, if the presumption of legitimacy is overthrown, the
of the child. child cannot elect the paternity of the husband who
successfully defeated the presumption.[31]
This physical impossibility may be caused:
1) By the impotence of the husband; It is only in exceptional cases that the heirs of the
2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately husband are allowed to contest the legitimacy of the
in such a way that access was not possible; child. There is nothing on the records to indicate that
3) By the serious illness of the husband. Ramon Yulo has already passed away at the time of the
birth of the petitioner nor at the time of the initiation of
Petitioner insists that his mother, Corazon Garcia, had this proceedings. Notably, the case at bar was initiated by
been living separately for ten (10) years from her petitioner himself through his mother, Corazon Garcia,
husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time that she cohabited with and not through Enrique and Bernadette Yulo.
the late William Liyao and it was physically impossible
for her to have sexual relations with Ramon Yulo when It is settled that the legitimacy of the child can be
petitioner was conceived and born. To bolster his claim, impugned only in a direct action brought for that
petitioner presented a document entitled, Contract of purpose, by the proper parties and within the period
Separation,[25] executed and signed by Ramon Yulo limited by law.Considering the foregoing, we find no
indicating a waiver of rights to any and all claims on any reason to discuss the sufficiency of the evidence
property that Corazon Garcia might acquire in the presented by both parties on the petitioners claim of
future.[26] alleged filiation with the late William Liyao. In any event,
there is no clear, competent and positive evidence
The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately presented by the petitioner that his alleged father had
from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time petitioner admitted or recognized his paternity.
was conceived and born is of no moment. While physical
impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse
with his wife is one of the grounds for impugning the
legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that the
grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child
mentioned in Article 255 of the Civil Code may only be
invoked by the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs
CONCEPCION VS CA Here, during the period that Gerardo and Ma. Theresa
were living together in Fairview, Quezon City, Mario was
The status and filiation of a child cannot be living in Loyola Heights which is also in Quezon City.
compromised.[19] Article 164 of the Family Code is clear. Fairview and Loyola Heights are only a scant four
A child who is conceived or born during the marriage of kilometers apart.
his parents is legitimate.[20]
Not only did both Ma. Theresa and Mario reside in the
Article 167. The child shall be considered legitimate same city but also that no evidence at all was presented
although the mother may have declared against its to disprove personal access between them. Considering
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. these circumstances, the separation between Ma.
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be Theresa and her lawful husband, Mario, was
made in favor of legitimacy.[22] certainly not such as to make it physically impossible
for them to engage in the marital act.
We explained the rationale of this rule in the recent case
of Cabatania v. Court of Appeals[23]: Sexual union between spouses is assumed. Evidence
The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of sufficient to defeat the assumption should be presented
a declaration in the statute but is based on the broad by him who asserts the contrary. There is no such
principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of evidence here. Thus, the presumption of legitimacy in
the mother. It is grounded on the policy to protect the favor of Jose Gerardo, as the issue of the marriage
innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy. between Ma. Theresa and Mario, stands.

Gerardo invokes Article 166 (1)(b)[24] of the Family Gerardo relies on Ma. Theresas statement that she never
Code. He cannot. He has no standing in law to dispute the lived with Mario. He claims this was an admission that
status of Jose Gerardo. Only Ma. Theresas husband Mario there was never any sexual relation between her and
or, in a proper case,[25] his heirs, who can contest the Mario, an admission that was binding on her. Gerardos
legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo born to his argument is without merit.
wife.[26] Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly
personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his First, the import of Ma. Theresas statement is that Jose
heirs.[27] Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa Gerardo is not her legitimate son with Mario but her
was void from the very beginning, he never became her illegitimate son with Gerardo. This declaration ― an
husband and thus never acquired any right to impugn the avowal by the mother that her child is illegitimate ― is
legitimacy of her child. the very declaration that is proscribed by Article 167 of
the Family Code.
The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual
union in marriage, particularly during the period of The language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion by
conception.[28] To overthrow this presumption on the the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot
basis of Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code, it must affect the legitimacy of a child born or conceived within
be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was a valid marriage.
no access that could have enabled the husband to
father the child.[29] Sexual intercourse is to be presumed Second, even assuming the truth of her statement, it does
where personal access is not disproved, unless such not mean that there was never an instance where Ma.
presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary.[30] Theresa could have been together with Mario or that
The presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted there occurred absolutely no intercourse between them.
only by the evidence of physical impossibility of coitus All she said was that she never lived with Mario. She
between husband and wife within the first 120 days of never claimed that nothing ever happened between
the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of them.
the child.[31]
Telling is the fact that both of them were living in Quezon
To rebut the presumption, the separation between the City during the time material to Jose Gerardos
spouses must be such as to make marital intimacy conception and birth. Far from foreclosing the possibility
impossible.[32] This may take place, for instance, when of marital intimacy, their proximity to each other only
they reside in different countries or provinces and they serves to reinforce such possibility. Thus, the
were never together during the period of impossibility of physical access was never established
conception.[33] Or, the husband was in prison during the beyond reasonable doubt.
period of conception, unless it appears that sexual union
took place through the violation of prison regulations.[34]
Third, to give credence to Ma. Theresas statement is to therein by the interested parties.[47] Between the
allow her to arrogate unto herself a right exclusively certificate of birth which is prima facie evidence of
lodged in the husband, or in a proper case, his heirs.[37] A Jose Gerardos illegitimacy and the quasi-conclusive
mother has no right to disavow a child because maternity presumption of law (rebuttable only by proof
is never uncertain.[38] Hence, Ma. Theresa is not beyond reasonable doubt) of his legitimacy, the
permitted by law to question Jose Gerardos legitimacy. latter shall prevail. Not only does it bear more
weight, it is also more conducive to the best interests
Finally, for reasons of public decency and morality, a of the child and in consonance with the purpose of
married woman cannot say that she had no intercourse the law.
with her husband and that her offspring is
illegitimate.[39] The proscription is in consonance with The law, reason and common sense dictate that a
the presumption in favor of family solidarity. It also legitimate status is more favorable to the child. In the
promotes the intention of the law to lean toward the eyes of the law, the legitimate child enjoys a preferred
legitimacy of children.[40] and superior status. He is entitled to bear the surnames
of both his father and mother, full support and full
Gerardos insistence that the filiation of Jose Gerardo was inheritance.[48]
never an issue both in the trial court and in the appellate
court does not hold water. The fact that both Ma. On the other hand, an illegitimate child is bound to use
Theresa and Gerardo admitted and agreed that Jose the surname and be under the parental authority only of
Gerardo was born to them was immaterial. That was, his mother. He can claim support only from a more
in effect, an agreement that the child was limited group and his legitime is only half of that of his
illegitimate. If the Court were to validate that legitimate counterpart.[49] Moreover (without
stipulation, then it would be tantamount to allowing unwittingly exacerbating the discrimination against
the mother to make a declaration against the him), in the eyes of society, a bastard is usually regarded
legitimacy of her child and consenting to the denial as bearing a stigma or mark of dishonor. Needless to
of filiation of the child by persons other than her state, the legitimacy presumptively vested by law upon
husband. These are the very acts from which the law Jose Gerardo favors his interest.
seeks to shield the child.
As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall have the
Public policy demands that there be no compromise on right to bear the surnames of his father Mario and
the status and filiation of a child.[41] Otherwise, the child mother Ma. Theresa, in conformity with the
will be at the mercy of those who may be so minded to provisions of the Civil Code on surnames.[50] A
exploit his defenselessness. persons surname or family name identifies the family to
which he belongs and is passed on from parent to
Moreover, the law itself establishes the status of a child.[51] Hence, Gerardo cannot impose his surname on
child from the moment of his birth.[43] Although a Jose Gerardo who is, in the eyes of the law, not related to
record of birth or birth certificate may be used as him in any way.
primary evidence of the filiation of a child,[44] as the
status of a child is determined by the law itself, proof There being no such parent-child relationship
of filiation is necessary only when the legitimacy of between them, Gerardo has no legally demandable
the child is being questioned, or when the status of a right to visit Jose Gerardo.
child born after 300 days following the termination
of marriage is sought to be established.[45]

Here, the status of Jose Gerardo as a legitimate child was

not under attack as it could not be contested collaterally
and, even then, only by the husband or, in extraordinary
cases, his heirs. Hence, the presentation of proof of
legitimacy in this case was improper and uncalled for.

In addition, a record of birth is merely prima

facie evidence of the facts contained
therein.[46] As prima facie evidence, the statements in
the record of birth may be rebutted by more
preponderant evidence. It is not conclusive evidence
with respect to the truthfulness of the statements made
 A child born to a husband and wife during a valid
ONG VS DIAZ marriage is presumed legitimate.21

RTC: The legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on Article 167. The children shall be considered legitimate
the following grounds provided for in Article 166 of the although the mother may have declared against its
same Code. Paragraph 1 of the said Article provides that legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
there must be physical impossibility for the husband to The law requires that every reasonable presumption be
have sexual intercourse with the wife within the first 120 made in favor of legitimacy.
days of the 300 days following the birth of the child
because of – The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is
a) physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual not conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown by
intercourse with his wife; evidence to the contrary. Hence, Article 255 of the New
b) husband and wife were living separately in such a way Civil Code23 provides:
that sexual intercourse was not possible;
c) serious illness of the husband which prevented sexual Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty
intercourse. days following the celebration of the marriage, and
before three hundred days following its dissolution or
It was established by evidence that the husband is a the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be
Japanese national and that he was living outside of the legitimate.
country (TSN, Aug. 27, 1999, page 5) and he comes home
only once a year. Both evidence of the parties proved that Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted
the husband was outside the country and no evidence other than that of the physical impossibility of the
was shown that he ever arrived in the country in the year husband’s having access to his wife within the first one
1997 preceding the birth of plaintiff Joanne Rodjin Diaz. hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which
preceded the birth of the child.This physical
While it may also be argued that plaintiff Jinky had a impossibility may be caused:
relationship with another man before she met the 1) By the impotence of the husband;
defendant, there is no evidence that she also had sexual 2) By the fact that husband and wife were living
relations with other men on or about the conception of separately in such a way that access was not possible;
Joanne Rodjin. Joanne Rodjin was her second child (see 3) By the serious illness of the husband.24
Exh. "A"), so her first child, a certain Nicole (according to
defendant) must have a different father or may be the The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as
son of Hasegawa K[u]tsuo. follows:

The defendant admitted having been the one who ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is
shouldered the hospital bills representing the expenses established by any of the following:
in connection with the birth of plaintiff. It is an evidence (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
of admission that he is the real father of plaintiff. final judgment; or
Defendant also admitted that even when he stopped (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public
going out with Jinky, he and Jinky used to go to motels document or a private handwritten instrument and
even after 1996. Defendant also admitted that on some signed by the parent concerned.
instances, he still used to see Jinky after the birth of In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate
Joanne Rodjin. Defendant was even the one who fetched filiation shall be proved by:
Jinky after she gave birth to Joanne. (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of
a legitimate child; or
On the strength of this evidence, the Court finds that (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
Joanne Rodjin is the child of Jinky and defendant Rogelio special laws.
Ong and it is but just that the latter should support
plaintiff. ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
CA: The case is hereby REMANDED to the court a quo for evidence as legitimate children.
the issuance of an order directing the parties to make
arrangements for DNA analysis for the purpose of
determining the paternity of plaintiff minor Joanne
Rodjin Diaz, upon consultation and in coordination with
laboratories and experts on the field of DNA analysis.
FERNANDEZ VS CA voluntary recognition of parentage. . . . The reason for
this rule that canonical records do not constitute the
Petitioners presented the following documentary authentic document prescribed by Arts. 115 and 117 to
evidence: prove the legitimate filiation of a child is that such
their certificates of live birth, identifying respondent canonical record is simply proof of the only act to which
Carlito as their father; the priest may certify by reason of his personal
the baptismal certificate of petitioner Claro which also knowledge, an act done by himself or in his presence, like
states that his father is respondent Carlito; the administration of the sacrament upon a day stated; it
photographs of Carlito taken during the baptism of is no proof of the declarations in the record with respect
petitioner Claro; and to the parentage of the child baptized, or of prior and
pictures of respondent Carlito and Claro taken at the distinct facts which require separate and concrete
home of Violeta Esguerra. evidence.

Petitioners likewise presented as witnesses, Rosario In Macandang vs. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 73 (1980),
Cantoria,3 Dr. Milagros Villanueva,4 Ruby Chua Cu,5 and we also ruled that while baptismal certificates may be
Fr. Liberato Fernandez.6 The first three witnesses told considered public documents, they can only serve as
the trial court that Violeta Esguerra had, at different evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the
times,7introduced the private respondent to them as her dates so specified. They are not necessarily competent
"husband". Fr. Fernandez, on the other hand, testified evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to
that Carlito was the one who presented himself as the the child's paternity.
father of petitioner Claro during the latter's baptism.
Fourth, the certificates of live birth (Exh. "A"; Exh. "B") of
Firstly, we hold that petitioners cannot rely on the the petitioners identifying private respondent as their
photographs showing the presence of the private father are not also competent evidence on the issue of
respondent in the baptism of petitioner Claro These their paternity. Again, the records do no show that
photographs are far from proofs that private respondent private respondent had a hand in the preparation of said
is the father of petitioner Claro. As explained by the certificates. In rejecting these certificates, the ruling of
private respondent, he was in the baptism as one of the the respondent court is in accord with our
sponsors of petitioner Claro. His testimony was pronouncement in Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar, 102
corroborated by Rodante Pagtakhan. Phil. 1050 (1958), viz:

Secondly, the pictures taken in the house of Violeta . . . Section 5 of Act No. 3793 and Article 280 of the Civil
showing private respondent showering affection to Claro Code of the Philippines explicity prohibited, not only the
fall short of the evidence required to prove paternity. As naming of the father or the child born outside wedlock,
we held in Tan vs. Trocio, 192 SCRA 764, viz: when the birth certificates, or the recognition, is not filed
or made by him, but, also, the statement of any
. . . The testimonies of complainant and witness Marilou information or circumstances by which he could be
Pangandaman, another maid, to show unusual closeness identified. Accordingly, the Local Civil Registrar had no
between Respondent and Jewel, like playing with him authority to make or record the paternity of an
and giving him paternity. The same must be said of . . . illegitimate child upon the information of a third person
(the) pictures of Jewels and Respondent showing and the certificate of birth of an illegitimate child, when
allegedly their physical likeness to each other. Said signed only by the mother of the latter, is incompetent
evidence is inconclusive to prove paternity and much evidence of fathership of said child.
less would prove violation of complaint's person and
honor. (Emphasis supplied) In the absence of this proof, we are not prepared to
concede that Father Fernandez who officiates numerous
Thirdly, the baptismal certificates (Exh. "D") of petitioner baptismal ceremonies day in and day out can remember
Claro naming private respondent as his father has scant the parents of the children he has baptized.
evidentiary value. There is no showing that private
respondent participated in its preparation. On this score,
we held in Berciles vs. Systems, et al. 128 SCRA 53 (1984):

As to the baptismal certificates, Exh. "7-A", the rule is that

although the baptismal record of a natural child
describes her as a child of the record the decedent had no
intervening, the baptismal record cannot be held to be a
FERNANDEZ VS FERNANDEZ judicial partition. In fact, the issue of whether or not
Rodolfo Fernandez was the son of the deceased spouses
Jose Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia was squarely
1. Petitioners allege that the respondent court raised by petitioners in their pre-trial brief[9] filed before
found the extra-judicial partition executed by the trial court, hence they are now estopped from
petitioner Rodolfo Fernandez and Generosa assailing the trial courts ruling on Rodolfos status.
Fernandez, widow of Dr. Jose Fernandez, null
and void because the former allegedly failed to We agree with the respondent court when it found that
prove legitimate filiation to his putative father, petitioner Rodolfo failed to prove his filiation with the
the late Dr. Jose Fernandez. Petitioners, deceased spouses Fernandez. Such is a factual issue
contend, however, that the burden of proof lies which has been thoroughly passed upon and settled both
with the respondents because they were the by the trial court and the appellate court. Factual findings
ones contesting the filiation of Rodolfo of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and
Fernandez. They insist that both lower courts not reviewable by this Court and they carry even more
had no power to pass upon the matter of weight[10] when the Court of Appeals affirms the factual
filiation because it could not be collaterally findings of the trial court.[11] We accordingly find no
attacked in the present action but in a separate cogent reason to disagree with the respondent courts
and independent action directly impugning evaluation of the evidence presented, thus:[12]
such filiation.
The Records Management and Archives Office is bereft of
We are not persuaded. any records of the birth of appellant Rodolfo Fernandez.
It must be noted that the respondents principal action
was for the declaration of absolute nullity of two 2. Appellant nonetheless, contends that the
documents, namely: deed of extra-judicial partition and Application for Recognition of Back Pay
deed of absolute sale, and not an action to impugn ones Rights Under Act No. 897 is a public
legitimacy. The respondent court ruled on the filiation of document and a conclusive proof of the
petitioner Rodolfo Fernandez in order to determine legitimate filiation between him and the
Rodolfos right to the deed of extra-judicial partition as deceased spouses (Rollo, p. 41, Appellants
the alleged legitimate heir of the spouses Fernandez. Brief). We do not agree.

While we are aware that one’s legitimacy can be It may be conceded that the Application for Recognition
questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by of Back Pay Rights Under Act No. 897 is a public
the proper party, this doctrine has no application in document nevertheless, it was not executed to admit the
the instant case considering that respondents claim filiation of Jose K. Fernandez with Rodolfo V. Fernandez,
was that petitioner Rodolfo was not born to the the herein appellant. The public document
deceased spouses Jose and Generosa Fernandez; we contemplated in Article 172 of the Family Code refer
do not have a situation wherein they (respondents) deny to the written admission of filiation embodied in a
that Rodolfo was a child of their uncles wife. public document purposely executed as an
admission of filiation and not as obtaining in this
Petitioners recourse to Art. 263 of the New Civil Code case wherein the public document was executed as
(now Art. 170 of the Family Code) is not well taken. This an application for the recognition of rights to back
legal provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. pay under Republic Act No. 897. Section 23, Rule 132 of
It is inapplicable to this case because this is not an action the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the
private respondents to claim their inheritance as legal Sec. 32. Public documents as evidence Documents
heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do not claim consisting of entries in public records made in the
that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie
child of the deceased, but that she is not the evidence of the facts therein stated. All other public
decedents child at all. Being neither legally adopted documents are evidence, even against a third person, of
child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a child the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date
by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not of the latter.
a legal heir of the deceased.
Thus, it is necessary to pass upon the relationship of The rule is not absolute in the sense that the contents
petitioner Rodolfo Fernandez to the deceased spouses of a public document are conclusive evidence against
Fernandez for the purpose of determining what legal the contracting parties as to the truthfulness of the
right Rodolfo has in the property subject of the extra- statements made therein. They constitute only prima
facie evidence of the facts which give rise to their Cathedral of Dagupan City on August 10, 1989 stating
execution and of the date of the latter. Thus, a therein that appellant is a child of the late spouses having
baptismal certificate issued by a Spanish priest under the been born on November 15, 1934 and baptized on
Spanish regime constitutes prima facie evidence of the November 24, 1934 (Exh. "1 Exhibits for the
facts certified to by the parish priest from his own Defendants). As stated, while baptismal certificates
knowledge such as the administration of the sacrament may be considered public documents, they are
on the day and in the place and manner set forth in the evidence only to prove the administration of the
certificate; but it does not constitute proof of the sacraments on the dates therein specified, but not
statements made therein concerning the parentage of the the veracity of the statements or declarations made
person baptized (Francisco, Evidence, 1994 ed., p. 516, therein with respect to his kinsfolk (Reyes vs. Court of
citing Garcia vs. Gajul, 53 Phil. 642; Adriano vs. de Jesus, Appeals, 135 SCRA 439). It may be argued that a
23 Phil. 350; Buan vs. Arquiza, 5 Phil. 193; baptismal certificate is one of the other means allowed
Siguion vs. Siguion, 8 Phil. 7). Public documents are by the Rules of Court and special laws of proving filiation
perfect evidence of the fact which give rise to their but in this case, the authenticity of the baptismal
execution and of the date of the latter if the act which the certificate was doubtful when Fr. Raymundo Q. de
officer witnessed and certified to or the date written by Guzman of St. John the Evangelist Parish of Lingayen-
him are not shown to be false; but they are not conclusive Dagupan, Dagupan City issued a certification on October
evidence with respect to the truthfulness of the 16, 1995 attesting that the records of baptism on June 7,
statements made therein by the interested parties 1930 to August 8, 1936 were all damaged (Records, p.
(Martin, Rules of Court in the Philippines with Note and 148, Exh. G). Neither the family portrait offered in
Comments, vol. 4, p. 577). evidence establishes a sufficient proof of filiation
Pictures do not constitute proof of filiation
Corollarily, the Application for Recognition of Back (Reyes vs. Court of Appeals) (supra). In fine, the evidence
Pay Rights Under Act No. 897 is only a proof that Jose presented by appellant did not acquire evidentiary
K. Fernandez filed said application on June 5, 1954 in weight to prove his filiation. Consequently the Extra-
Dagupan City but it does not prove the veracity of the Judicial Partition dated August 31, 1989 executed by
declaration and statement contained in the said appellant Rodolfo Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia is
application that concern the relationship of the null and void.
applicant with herein appellant. In like manner, it is
not a conclusive proof of the filiation of appellant Considering the foregoing findings, petitioner Rodolfo is
with his alleged father, Jose K. Fernandez the not a child by nature of the spouses Fernandez and not a
contents being, only prima facie evidence of the facts legal heir of Dr. Jose Fernandez , thus the subject deed of
stated therein. extra-judicial settlement of the estate of Dr. Jose
Fernandez between Generosa vda. de Fernandez and
Additionally, appellant claims that he enjoyed and Rodolfo is null and void insofar as Rodolfo is
possessed the status of being a legitimate child of the concerned[13] pursuant to Art.1105 of the New Civil Code.
spouses openly and continuously until they died (Rollo,
p. 42; Appellants Brief). Open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child is meant
the enjoyment by the child of the position and
privileges usually attached to the status of a
legitimate child such as bearing the paternal
surname, treatment by the parents and family of the
child as legitimate, constant attendance to the childs
support and education, and giving the child the
reputation of being a child of his parents (Sempio-Diy,
The Family Code of the Philippines, pp. 245-
246). However, it must be noted that, as was held in
Quismundo vs. WCC, 132 SCRA 590, possession
of status of a child does not in itself constitute an
acknowledgment; it is only a ground for a child to
compel recognition by his assumed parent.

Lastly, to substantiate his claim of being a legitimate

child appellant presented a baptismal certificate issued
by Fr. Rene Mendoza of the St. John Metropolitan
LABAGALA VS SANTIAGO

Article 263 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of

a child, to assert and prove that a person is not a mans
child by his wife. However, the present case is not one
impugning petitioners legitimacy. Respondents are
asserting not merely that petitioner is not a legitimate
child of Jose, but that she is not a child of Jose at
all.[17] Moreover, the present action is one for recovery of
title and possession, and thus outside the scope of Article
263 on prescriptive periods.

A baptismal certificate, a private document, is not

conclusive proof of filiation.[24] More so are the
entries made in an income tax return, which only
shows that income tax has been paid and the amount
thereof.[25]

We find petitioners silence concerning the absence of her

birth certificate telling. It raises doubt as to the existence
of a birth certificate that would show petitioner to be the
daughter of Jose Santiago and Esperanza Cabrigas. Her
failure to show her birth certificate would raise the
presumption that if such evidence were presented, it
would be adverse to her claim. Petitioners counsel
argued that petitioner had been using Santiago all her
life. However, use of a family name certainly does not
establish pedigree.

Further, we note that petitioner, who claims to be Ida

Santiago, has the same birthdate as Ida Labagala.[26] The
similarity is too uncanny to be a mere coincidence.

Thus, we are constrained to agree with the factual finding

of the Court of Appeals that petitioner is in reality the
child of Leon Labagala and Cornelia Cabrigas, and
contrary to her averment, not of Jose Santiago and
Esperanza Cabrigas. Not being a child of Jose, it follows
that petitioner can not inherit from him through
intestate succession. It now remains to be seen whether
the property in dispute was validly transferred to
petitioner through sale or donation.
LOCSIN. VS LOCSIN, JR. circumstance should have aroused the suspicion of both
the trial court and the Court of Appeals and should have
impelled them to declare Exhibit "D" a spurious
Pursuant to Section 12 of Act 3753 (An Act to Establish a document.
Civil Register), the records of births from all cities and
municipalities in the Philippines are officially and Exhibit "8" shows that respondent's record of birth was
regularly forwarded to the Civil Registrar General in made by his mother. In the same Exhibit "8", the
Metro Manila by the Local Civil Registrars. Since the signature and name of Juan C. Locsin listed as
records of births cover several decades and come from respondent's father and the entry that he and Amparo
all parts of the country, to merely access them in the Civil Escamilla were married in Oton, Iloilo on November 28,
Registry General requires expertise. To locate one single 1954 do not appear.
birth record from the mass, a regular employee, if not
more, has to be engaged. It is highly unlikely that any of In this connection, we echo this Court's pronouncement
these employees in Metro Manila would have reason to in Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar[16] that:
falsify a particular 1957 birth record originating from the Section 5 of Act No. 3753 and Article 280 of the Civil Code
Local Civil Registry of Iloilo City. of the Philippines x x x explicitly prohibit, not only the
naming of the father of the child born out of
With respect to Local Civil Registries, access thereto by wedlock, when the birth certificate, or the
interested parties is obviously easier. Thus, in proving recognition, is not filed or made by him, but also, the
the authenticity of Exhibit "D," more convincing evidence statement of any information or circumstances by which
than those considered by the trial court should have been he could be identified. Accordingly, the Local Civil
presented by respondent. Registrar had no authority to make or record the
paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information of
When entries in the Certificate of Live Birth recorded in a third person and the certificate of birth of an
the Local Civil Registry vary from those appearing in the illegitimate child, when signed only by the mother of
copy transmitted to the Civil Registry General, pursuant the latter, is incompetent evidence of fathership of
to the Civil Registry Law, the variance has to be clarified said child. (Emphasis ours)
in more persuasive and rational manner.
The Roces ruling regarding illegitimate filiation is further
The Civil Registry Law requires, inter alia, the Local Civil elucidated in Fernandez vs. Court of Appeals [17] where
Registrar to send copies of registrable certificates and this Court said that "a birth certificate not signed by
documents presented to them for entry to the Civil the alleged father (who had no hand in its
Registrar General, thus: preparation) is not competent evidence of
Duties of Local Civil Registrar. Local civil registrars paternity."
shall (a) file registrable certificates and documents
presented to them for entry; (b) compile the same At this point, it bears stressing the provision of Section
monthly and prepare and send any information required 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court that
of them by the Civil-Registrar; (c) issue certified "(d)ocuments consisting of entries in public records
transcripts or copies of any document registered upon made in the performance of a duty by a public officer
payment of proper fees; (d) order the binding, properly are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated." In
classified, of all certificates or documents registered this case, the glaring discrepancies between the two
during the year; (e) send to the Civil Registrar- Certificates of Live Birth (Exhibits "D" and "8") have
General, during the first ten days of each month, a overturned the genuineness of Exhibit "D" entered in
copy of the entries made during the preceding the Local Civil Registry. What is authentic is Exhibit
month, for filing; (f) index the same to facilitate search "8" recorded in the Civil Registry General.
and identification in case any information is required;
and (g) administer oaths, free of charge, for civil register Incidentally, respondent's photograph with his mother
purposes"[15] (Emphasis ours) near the coffin of the late Juan C. Locsin cannot and will
not constitute proof of filiation,[19] lest we recklessly set
In light of the above provisions, a copy of the document a very dangerous precedent that would encourage and
sent by the Local Civil Registrar to the Civil Registrar sanction fraudulent claims.
General should be identical in form and in substance with
the copy being kept by the latter.In the instant case,
Exhibit "8", as transmitted to the Civil Registrar General
is not identical with Exhibit "D" as appearing in the
records of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. Such
BERNABE VS ALEJO adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method
of enforcing rights or obtains redress for their
The right to seek recognition granted by the Civil Code to invasion.[14](Citations omitted)
illegitimate children who were still minors at the time
the Family Code took effect cannot be impaired or taken Recently, in Fabian v. Desierto,[15] the Court laid down the
away. The minors have up to four years from attaining test for determining whether a rule is procedural or
majority age within which to file an action for substantive:
recognition. [I]n determining whether a rule prescribed by the
Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the
Under the new law, an action for the recognition of an lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any
illegitimate child must be brought within the lifetime of substantive right, the test is whether the rule really
the alleged parent. The Family Code makes no distinction regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for
on whether the former was still a minor when the latter enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive
died. Thus, the putative parent is given by the new Code law and for justly administering remedy and redress for
a chance to dispute the claim, considering that a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a
illegitimate children are usually begotten and raised in vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right
secrecy and without the legitimate family being aware of such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a
their existence. x x x The putative parent should thus be substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of
given the opportunity to affirm or deny the implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely
childs filiation, and this, he or she cannot do if he or she with procedure.[16]
is already dead.[10]
Applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we hold that
Nonetheless, the Family Code provides the caveat that Article 285 of the Civil Code is a substantive law, as it
rights that have already vested prior to its enactment gives Adrian the right to file his petition for
should not be prejudiced or impaired as follows: recognition within four years from attaining
majority age. Therefore, the Family Code cannot
ART. 255. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar impair or take Adrians right to file an action for
as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired recognition, because that right had already vested
rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. prior to its enactment.

The crucial issue to be resolved therefore is Uyguangco v. Court of Appeals[17] is not applicable to the
whether Adrians right to an action for recognition, which case at bar, because the plaintiff therein sought
was granted by Article 285 of the Civil Code, had already recognition as an illegitimate child when he was no
vested prior to the enactment of the Family Code. Our longer a minor. On the other hand, in Aruego Jr. v. Court
answer is affirmative. of Appeals[18] the Court ruled that an action for
recognition filed while the Civil Code was in effect should
A vested right is defined as one which is absolute, not be affected by the subsequent enactment of the
complete and unconditional, to the exercise of which no Family Code, because the right had already vested.
obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in
itself and not dependent upon a contingency
x x x.[11] Respondent however contends that the filing of
an action for recognition is procedural in nature and that
as a general rule, no vested right may attach to [or] arise
from procedural laws.[12]

Bustos v. Lucero[13] distinguished substantive from

procedural law in these words:
x x x. Substantive law creates substantive rights and the
two terms in this respect may be said to be synonymous.
Substantive rights is a term which includes those rights
which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the
disturbance of normal relations. Substantive law is that
part of the law which creates, defines and regulates
rights, or which regulates the rights and duties which
give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which
courts are established to administer; as opposed to
VERCELES VS POSADAS (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and
(1) whether or not paternity and filiation can be resolved signed by the parent concerned.
in an action for damages with support pendente lite;
(2) whether or not the filiation of Verna Aiza Posada as In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate
the illegitimate child of petitioner was proven; and filiation shall be proved by:
(3) whether or not respondents are entitled to damages. (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of
a legitimate child; or
It is not the caption but the facts alleged which give (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
meaning to a pleading. Courts are called upon to pierce special laws.
the form and go into the substance thereof.19 In
determining the nature of an action, it is not the caption, Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their
but the averments in the petition and the character of the illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
relief sought, that are controlling.20 evidence as legitimate children.

A perusal of the Complaint before the RTC shows that The action must be brought within the same period
although its caption states "Damages coupled with specified in Article 173, except when the action is based
Support Pendente Lite," Clarissa’s averments therein, her on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the
meeting with petitioner, his offer of a job, his amorous action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged
advances, her seduction, their trysts, her pregnancy, parent.
birth of her child, his letters, her demand for support for
her child, all clearly establish a case for recognition of The letters, one of which is quoted above, are private
paternity. We have held that the due recognition of an handwritten instruments of petitioner which
illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a establish Verna Aiza’s filiation under Article 172 (2)
statement before a court of record, or in any of the Family Code. In addition, the array of evidence
authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of presented by respondents, the dates, letters,
acknowledgement of the child, and no further court pictures and testimonies, to us, are convincing, and
action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is irrefutable evidence that Verna Aiza is, indeed,
treated not just a ground for compulsory petitioner’s illegitimate child.
recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that
does not require a separate action for judicial Petitioner not only failed to rebut the evidence
approval.21 presented, he himself presented no evidence of his own.
His bare denials are telling. Well-settled is the rule that
The letters of petitioner marked as Exhibits "A" to "D" are denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing
declarations that lead nowhere but to the conclusion that evidence, are negative and self-serving which merit no
he sired Verna Aiza. Although petitioner used an alias in weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary
these letters, the similarity of the penmanship in these value over the testimony of credible witnesses who
letters vis the annotation at the back of petitioner’s testify on affirmative matters.23
fading photograph as a youth is unmistakable. Even an
inexperienced eye will come to the conclusion that they We, however, cannot rule that respondents are entitled
were all written by one and the same person, petitioner, to damages. Article 221924of the Civil Code which
as found by the courts a quo. states moral damages may be recovered in cases of
seduction is inapplicable in this case because
We also note that in his Memorandum, petitioner Clarissa was already an adult at the time she had an
admitted his affair with Clarissa, the exchange of love affair with petitioner.
letters between them, and his giving her money during
her pregnancy. 22 Neither can her parents be entitled to damages. Besides,
there is nothing in law or jurisprudence that entitles the
Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code are the rules for parents of a consenting adult who begets a love child to
establishing filiation. They are as follows: damages. Respondents Constantino and Francisca
Posada have not cited any law or jurisprudence to justify
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is awarding damages to them.
established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgment; or
DELA CRUZ VS GRACIA

In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the earlier In the eyes of society, a child with an unknown father
quoted statements in Dominiques Autobiography have bears the stigma of dishonor. It is to petitioner minor
been made and written by him. Taken together with the childs best interests to allow him to bear the surname of
other relevant facts extant herein that Dominique, during the now deceased Dominique and enter it in his birth
his lifetime, and Jenie were living together as common- certificate.
law spouses for several months in 2005 at his parents
house in Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal; she
was pregnant when Dominique died on September 4,
2005; and about two months after his death, Jenie gave
birth to the child they sufficiently establish that the child
of Jenie is Dominiques.

In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court

sees it fit to adopt the following rules respecting the
requirement of affixing the signature of the
acknowledging parent in any private handwritten
instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a
legitimate or illegitimate child is made:

1) Where the private handwritten instrument is

the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation,
there should be strict compliance with the requirement
that the same must be signed by the acknowledging
parent; and

2) Where the private handwritten instrument

is accompanied by other relevant and competent
evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be
shown to have been made and handwritten by the
acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of
such other evidence.

Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the
paramount consideration in resolving questions
affecting him.[22] Article 3(1) of the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of a Child of which
the Philippines is a signatory is similarly emphatic:

Article 3

1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken

by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of
law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the
best interests of the child shall be a primary
consideration.[23] (Underscoring supplied)

It is thus (t)he policy of the Family Code to liberalize the

rule on the investigation of the paternity and filiation of
children, especially of illegitimate children x x x.[24]Too,
(t)he State as parens patriae affords special protection to
children from abuse, exploitation and other conditions
prejudicial to their development.[25]
NEPOMUCENO VS LOPEZ GOTARDO VS BULING

In the present case, Arhbencel relies, in the main, on the One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate,
handwritten note executed by petitioner. through the record of birth appearing in the civil register
or a final judgment, an admission of filiation in a public
The note does not contain any statement whatsoever document or a private handwritten instrument and
about Arhbencel’s filiation to petitioner. It is, therefore, signed by the parent concerned, or the open and
not within the ambit of Article 172(2) vis-à-vis Article continuous possession of the status of a legitimate or
175 of the Family Code which admits as competent illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the
evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation Rules of Court and special laws.32 We have held that such
in a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent other proof of one's filiation may be a "baptismal
concerned. certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which
his name has been entered, common reputation
The note cannot also be accorded the same weight as the respecting [his] pedigree, admission by silence, the
notarial agreement to support the child referred to in [testimonies] of witnesses, and other kinds of proof
Herrera. For it is not even notarized. And Herrera admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court."33
instructs that the notarial agreement must be
accompanied by the putative father’s admission of In Herrera v. Alba,34 we stressed that there are four
filiation to be an acceptable evidence of filiation. Here, significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity
however, not only has petitioner not admitted filiation action that parties have to face: a prima facie case,
through contemporaneous actions. He has consistently affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and
denied it. physical resemblance between the putative father and
the child.35 We explained that a prima facie case exists if
The only other documentary evidence submitted by a woman declares — supported by corroborative proof
Arhbencel, a copy of her Certificate of Birth,11 has no — that she had sexual relations with the putative father;
probative value to establish filiation to petitioner, the at this point, the burden of evidence shifts to the putative
latter not having signed the same. father.36 We explained further that the two affirmative
defenses available to the putative father are: (1)
At bottom, all that Arhbencel really has is petitioner’s incapability of sexual relations with the mother due to
handwritten undertaking to provide financial support to either physical absence or impotency, or (2) that the
her which, without more, fails to establish her claim of mother had sexual relations with other men at the time
filiation. The Court is mindful that the best interests of of conception.37
the child in cases involving paternity and filiation should
be advanced. It is, however, just as mindful of the In this case, the respondent established a prima facie case
disturbance that unfounded paternity suits cause to the that the petitioner is the putative father of Gliffze through
privacy and peace of the putative father’s legitimate testimony that she had been sexually involved only with
family. one man, the petitioner, at the time of her
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of conception.38Rodulfo corroborated her testimony that
Appeals Decision of July 20, 2007 is SET ASIDE. The the petitioner and the respondent had intimate
Order dated June 7, 2006 of Branch 130 of the Caloocan relationship.39
City RTC dismissing the complaint for insufficiency of
evidence is REINSTATED. On the other hand, the petitioner did not deny that he had
sexual encounters with the respondent, only that it
occurred on a much later date than the respondent
asserted, such that it was physically impossible for the
respondent to have been three (3) months pregnant
already in September 1994 when he was informed of the
pregnancy.40 However, the petitioner failed to
substantiate his allegations of infidelity and insinuations
of promiscuity. His allegations, therefore, cannot be
given credence for lack of evidentiary support. The
petitioner’s denial cannot overcome the respondent’s
clear and categorical assertions.
SALAS VS MATUSALEM opposing party, within a specified time to procure the
appointment of an executor or administrator for the
The testimonies of respondent and Murillo, by estate of the deceased and the latter shall immediately
themselves are not competent proof of paternity and the appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court
totality of respondent’s evidence failed to establish charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by
Christian Paulo’s filiation to petitioner. the opposing party, may be recovered as costs.

Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard
of proof is required to establish paternity and filiation.
An order for recognition and support may create an
unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the
family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued
only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and
convincing evidence.

Finally, we note the Manifestation and Motion41 filed by

petitioner’s counsel informing this Court that petitioner
had died on May 6, 2010.

The action for support having been filed in the trial court
when petitioner was still alive, it is not barred under
Article 175 (2)42 of the Family Code. We have also held
that the death of the putative father is not a bar to the
action commenced during his lifetime by one claiming to
be his illegitimate child.43 The rule on substitution of
parties provided in Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, thus applies.

SEC. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. – Whenever a

party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not
thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel
to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such
death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and
address of his legal representative or representatives.
Failure of counsel to comply with his duty shall be a
ground for disciplinary action.

The action must be brought within the same period

specified in Article 173, except when the action is based
on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the
action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged
parent.

The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be

substituted for the deceased, without requiring the
appointment of an executor or administrator and the
court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor
heirs.

The court shall forthwith order said legal representative

or representatives to appear and be substituted within a
period of thirty (30) days from notice.

If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the

deceased party, or if the one so named shall fail to appear
within the specified period, the court may order the
AGUILAR VS SIASAT under the first paragraph thereof, the same being an
express recognition in a public instrument.
Petitioner argues that Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1
(Exhibit “G”) satisfies the requirement for proof of To repeat what was stated in De Jesus, filiation may be
filiation and relationship to the Aguilar spouses under proved by an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
Article 172 of the Family Code. document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned, and such due
A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners recognition in any authentic writing is, in itself, a
were born during the marriage of their parents. The consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no
certificates of live birth would also identify Danilo de further court action is required. And, relative to said form
Jesus as being their father. of acknowledgment, the Court has further held that:

There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court
established and founded on sounder morality and more sees it fit to adopt the following rules respecting the
convincing reason than the presumption that children requirement of affixing the signature of the
born in wedlock are legitimate. This presumption indeed acknowledging parent in any private handwritten
becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a
physical impossibility of access between the spouses legitimate or illegitimate child is made:
during the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the 1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone
physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation, there
intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband should be strict compliance with the requirement that
and wife are living separately in such a way that sexual the same must be signed by the acknowledging parent;
intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the and
husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse.
Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set 2) Where the private handwritten instrument is
forth in Article 170, and in proper cases Article 171, of accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence,
the Family Code (which took effect on 03 August 1988), it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to
the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child would no have been made and handwritten by the acknowledging
longer be legally feasible and the status conferred by the parent as it is merely corroborative of such other
presumption becomes fixed and unassailable.27 evidence.

Thus, applying the foregoing pronouncement to the Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the
instant case, it must be concluded that petitioner – who “paramount consideration” in resolving questions
was born on March 5, 1945, or during the marriage of affecting him. Article 3(1) of the United Nations
Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar28 and Convention on the Rights of a Child of which the
before their respective deaths29 – has sufficiently Philippines is a signatory is similarly emphatic:
proved that he is the legitimate issue of the Aguilar Article 3
spouses. As petitioner correctly argues, Alfredo Aguilar’s
SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit “G”) satisfies the requirement for 1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken
proof of filiation and relationship to the Aguilar spouses by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of
under Article 172 of the Family Code; by itself, said law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the
document constitutes an “admission of legitimate best interests of the child shall be a primary
filiation in a public document or a private handwritten consideration.
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.”
It is thus “(t)he policy of the Family Code to liberalize the
Petitioner has shown that he cannot produce his rule on the investigation of the paternity and filiation of
Certificate of Live Birth since all the records covering the children, especially of illegitimate children x x x.” Too,
period 1945-1946 of the Local Civil Registry of Bacolod “(t)he State as parens patriae affords special protection
City were destroyed, which necessitated the introduction to children from abuse, exploitation and other conditions
of other documentary evidence – particularly Alfredo prejudicial to their development.”30 (Emphasis
Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit “G”) – to prove filiation. supplied)
It was erroneous for the CA to treat said document as
mere proof of open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child under the second paragraph
of Article 172 of the Family Code; it is evidence of filiation
ARADO VS ALCORAN effect, "it has to be probated, legalized or allowed in the
proper testamentary proceeding. The probate of the will
Rightly enough, the RTC and the CA unanimously is mandatory." It appears that such will remained
concluded that Nicolas had duly acknowledged Anacleto ineffective considering that the records are silent as to
as his illegitimate son. The birth certificate of Anacleto whether it had ever been presented for probate, and had
appearing in the Register of Births of the Municipality of been allowed by a court of competent jurisdiction. The
Bacong, Negros Oriental (Exhibits 3, 3-A) showed that petitioners alleged this fact in their complaint, and the
Nicolas had himself caused the registration of the birth of respondents did not controvert the allegation. In the
Anacleto. The showing was by means of the name of absence of proof showing that the supposed will of
Nicolas appearing in the column "Remarks" in Page 53, Joaquina had been duly approved by the competent
Book 4, Register No. 214 of the Register of Births. Based court, we hold that it had not been so approved. Hence,
on the certification (Exhibit 3-B) issued by the Local Civil we cannot sustain the CA's ruling to the effect that
Registrar of the Municipality of Bacong, Negros Oriental, Joaquina had bequeathed her properties to Anacleto by
the column in the Register of Births entitled "Remarks" will, and that the properties had been transmitted to him
(Observaciones) was the space provided for the name of upon her death.
the informant of the live birth to be registered.
Considering that Nicolas, the putative father, had a direct
hand in the preparation of the birth certificate, reliance
on the birth certificate of Anacleto as evidence of his
paternity was fully warranted.

Anacleto had an established right to inherit from Nicolas,

whose estate included the first eight of the subject
properties that had previously belonged to Raymundo.
Anacleto became a co-owner of said properties, pro
indiviso, when Nicolas died in 1954.44 Likewise,
Joaquina succeeded to, and became a pro indiviso co-
owner of, the properties that formed part of the estate of
Nicolas. When Joaquina died in 1981, her hereditary
estate included the two remaining properties, as well as
her share in the estate of Nicolas. In as much as Joaquina
died without any surviving legitimate descendant,
ascendant, illegitimate child or spouse, Article 100345 of
the Civil Code mandated that her collateral relatives
should inherit her entire estate.

Contrary to the rulings of the lower courts, Anacleto was

barred by law from inheriting from the estate of
Joaquina. To start with, Anacleto could not inherit from
Joaquina by right of representation of Nicolas, the
legitimate son of Joaquina.46 Under Article 992 of the
Civil Code, an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his
father or mother; in the same manner, such children or
relatives shall not inherit from the illegitimate child. As
certified in Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court,47 the
right of representation is not available to illegitimate
descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance of a
legitimate grandparent. And, secondly, Anacleto could
not inherit from the estate of Joaquina by virtue of the
latter's last will and testament, i.e., the Katapusan Tugon
(Testamento) (Exhibit K). Article 838 of the Civil Code
dictates that no will shall pass either real or personal
property unless the same is proved and allowed in
accordance with the Rules of Court. We have clarified in
Gallanosa v. Arcangel48 that in order that a will may take
TAMARGO VS CA supervision and control. Article 58 of the Child and Youth
Welfare Code, re-enacted this rule:

In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto Article 58 Torts — Parents and guardians are
with an air rifle occured when parental authority was responsible for the damage caused by the child under
still lodged in respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural their parental authority in accordance with the civil
parents of the minor Adelberto. It would thus follow that Code. (Emphasis supplied)
the natural parents who had then actual custody of the
minor Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the suit Article 221 of the Family Code of the Philippines 9 has
for damages. similarly insisted upon the requisite that the child, doer
of the tortious act, shall have beer in the actual custody
The natural parents of Adelberto, however, stoutly of the parents sought to be held liable for the ensuing
maintain that because a decree of adoption was issued by damage:
the adoption court in favor of the Rapisura spouses,
parental authority was vested in the latter as adopting Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental
parents as of the time of the filing of the petition for authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and
adoption that is, before Adelberto had shot Jennifer damages caused by the acts or omissions of their
which an air rifle. The Bundoc spouses contend that they unemancipated children living in their company and
were therefore free of any parental responsibility for under their parental authority subject to the appropriate
Adelberto's allegedly tortious conduct. defenses provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent Bundoc spouses rely on Article 36 of the We do not believe that parental authority is properly
Child and Youth Welfare Code 8 which reads as follows: regarded as having been retroactively transferred to and
vested in the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, at
Art. 36. Decree of Adoption. — If, after considering the the time the air rifle shooting happened. We do not
report of the Department of Social Welfare or duly consider that retroactive effect may be given to the
licensed child placement agency and the evidence decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon
submitted before it, the court is satisfied that the the adopting parents accruing at a time when
petitioner is qualified to maintain, care for, and educate adopting parents had no actual or physically custody
the child, that the trial custody period has been over the adopted child. Retroactive affect may
completed, and that the best interests of the child will be perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for
promoted by the adoption, a decree of adoption shall be adoption where such is essential to permit the
entered, which shall be effective he date the original accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the
petition was filed. The decree shall state the name by adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold that
which the child is thenceforth to be known. (Emphasis parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the
supplied) Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for
a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and
The Bundoc spouses further argue that the above Article which they could not have prevented (since they were at
36 should be read in relation to Article 39 of the same the time in the United States and had no physical custody
Code: over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and
unconscionable. Such a result, moreover, would be
Art. 39. Effect of Adoption. — The adoption shall: inconsistent with the philosophical and policy basis
underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a little
(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the natural differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the
parents, except where the adopter is the spouse of the part of the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could
surviving natural parent; have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to
their control at the time the tort was committed.
and urge that their Parental authority must be deemed to
have been dissolved as of the time the Petition for Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code fortifies
adoption was filed. the conclusion reached above. Article 35 provides as
follows:
The Court is not persuaded. As earlier noted, under the
Civil Code, the basis of parental liability for the torts of a Art. 35. Trial Custody. — No petition for adoption shall
minor child is the relationship existing between the be finally granted unless and until the adopting parents
parents and the minor child living with them and over are given by the courts a supervised trial custody period
whom, the law presumes, the parents exercise of at least six months to assess their adjustment and
emotional readiness for the legal union. During the LAHOM VS SIBULO
period of trial custody, parental authority shall be vested
in the adopting parents. (Emphasis supplied) It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that
herein petitioner filed an action to revoke the decree of
Under the above Article 35, parental authority is adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new law,[22] had
provisionally vested in the adopting parents during already abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter
the period of trial custody, i.e., before the issuance of under the Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a
a decree of adoption, precisely because the adopting decree of adoption. Consistently with its earlier
parents are given actual custody of the child during pronouncements, the Court should now hold that the
such trial period. In the instant case, the trial custody action for rescission of the adoption decree, having been
period either had not yet begun or bad already been initiated by petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come into
completed at the time of the air rifle shooting; in any force, no longer could be pursued.
case, actual custody of Adelberto was then with his
natural parents, not the adopting parents. Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an
action to set aside the adoption is subject to the fiveyear
Accordingly, we conclude that respondent Bundoc bar rule under Rule 100[23] of the Rules of Court and
spouses, Adelberto's natural parents, were that the adopter would lose the right to revoke the
indispensable parties to the suit for damages brought by adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The
petitioners, and that the dismissal by the trial court of exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a
petitioners' complaint, the indispensable parties being condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a
already before the court, constituted grave abuse of vested right entitled to protection. It must also be
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. acknowledged that a person has no vested right in
statutory privileges.[24] While adoption has often been
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for referred to in the context of a right, the privilege to adopt
Review is hereby GRANTED DUE COURSE and the is itself not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 6 September right merely created by statute.[25] It is a privilege that
1988, in C.A.-G.R. No. SP-15016 is hereby REVERSED and is governed by the states determination on what it may
SET ASIDE. Petitioners' complaint filed before the trial deem to be for the best interest and welfare of the
court is hereby REINSTATED and this case is REMANDED child.[26] Matters relating to adoption, including the
to that court for further proceedings consistent with this withdrawal of the right of an adopter to nullify the
Decision. Costs against respondent Bundoc spouses. This adoption decree, are subject to regulation by the
Decision is immediately executory. State.[27] Concomitantly, a right of action given by
statute may be taken away at anytime before it has been
SO ORDERED. exercised.[28]

While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from

an adopter a consequential right to rescind the adoption
decree even in cases where the adoption might clearly
turn out to be undesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the
bounden duty of the Court to apply the law. Dura lex sed
lex would be the hackneyed truism that those caught in
the law have to live with. It is still noteworthy, however,
that an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties
of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the
forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an
undeserving child. For instance, upon the grounds
recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an adopted
child his legitime and, by a will and testament, may freely
exclude him from having a share in the disposable
portion of his estate.
LANDINGIN VS REPUBLIC and never came back. The children were then left to the
guidance and care of their paternal grandmother. It is the
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as paternal relatives, including petitioner, who provided for
the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, provides: the children’s financial needs. Hence, Amelia, the
biological mother, had effectively abandoned the
Sec. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. - children. Petitioner further contends that it was by twist
After being properly counseled and informed of his/her of fate that after 12 years, when the petition for adoption
right to give or withhold his/her approval of the was pending with the RTC that Amelia and her child by
adoption, the written consent of the following to the her second marriage were on vacation in the Philippines.
adoption is hereby required: Pagbilao, the DSWD social worker, was able to meet her,
and during the meeting, Amelia intimated to the social
(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over; worker that she conformed to the adoption of her three
children by the petitioner.
(b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the
legal guardian, or the proper government Petitioner’s contention must be rejected. When she filed
instrumentality which has legal custody of the child; her petition with the trial court, Rep. Act No. 8552 was
already in effect. Section 9 thereof provides that if the
(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) written consent of the biological parents cannot be
years of age or over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any; obtained, the written consent of the legal guardian of the
minors will suffice. If, as claimed by petitioner, that the
(d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age biological mother of the minors had indeed abandoned
or over, of the adopter, if living with said adopter and the them, she should, thus have adduced the written consent
latter’s souse, if any; of their legal guardian.

(e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be Ordinarily, abandonment by a parent to justify the
adopted. adoption of his child without his consent, is a conduct
which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental
The general requirement of consent and notice to the duties.33 The term means neglect and refusal to perform
natural parents is intended to protect the natural the filial and legal obligations of love and support. If a
parental relationship from unwarranted interference by parent withholds presence, love, care, the opportunity to
interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard display filial affection, and neglects to lend support and
the best interests of the child in the manner of the maintenance, the parent, in effect, abandons the child.34
proposed adoption.32
Merely permitting the child to remain for a time
Clearly, the written consent of the biological parents is undisturbed in the care of others is not such an
indispensable for the validity of a decree of adoption. abandonment.35 To dispense with the requirement of
Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires consent, the abandonment must be shown to have
that his consent must be obtained before his parental existed at the time of adoption.36
rights and duties may be terminated and re-established
in adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to In this case, petitioner relied solely on her testimony and
submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to the that of Elaine Ramos to prove her claim that Amelia
adoption. Ramos had abandoned her children.

We note that in her Report, Pagbilao declared that she Petitioner failed to offer in evidence Pagbilao’s Report
was able to interview Amelia Ramos who arrived in the and of the Joint Affidavit of Consent purportedly
Philippines with her son, John Mario in May 2002. If said executed by her children; the authenticity of which she,
Amelia Ramos was in the Philippines and Pagbilao was likewise, failed to prove. The joint written consent of
able to interview her, it is incredible that the latter would petitioner’s children was notarized on January 16,
not require Amelia Ramos to execute a Written Consent 2002 in Guam, USA; for it to be treated by the Rules
to the adoption of her minor children. Neither did the of Court in the same way as a document notarized in
petitioner bother to present Amelia Ramos as witness in this country it needs to comply with Section 2 of Act
support of the petition. No. 2103:

Petitioner, nonetheless, argues that the written consent Section 2. An instrument or document acknowledged and
of the biological mother is no longer necessary because authenticated in a foreign country shall be considered
when Amelia’s husband died in 1990, she left for Italy
authentic if the acknowledgment and authentication are years, has savings, a house, and currently earns $5.15 an
made in accordance with the following requirements: hour with tips of not less than $1,000.00 a month. Her
children and siblings have likewise committed
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before (1) an themselves to provide financial backing should the need
ambassador, minister, secretary of legation, chargé d arise. The OSG, again in its comment, banks on the
affaires, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the statement in the Home Study Report that "petitioner has
Republic of the Philippines, acting within the country or limited income." Accordingly, it appears that she will rely
place to which he is accredited, or (2) a notary public or on the financial backing of her children and siblings in
officer duly authorized by law of the country to take order to support the minor adoptees. The law, however,
acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the states that it is the adopter who should be in a position
place where the act is done. to provide support in keeping with the means of the
family.
(b) The person taking the acknowledgment shall certify
that the person acknowledging the instrument or Since the primary consideration in adoption is the best
document is known to him, and that he is the same interest of the child, it follows that the financial capacity
person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same of prospective parents should also
is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be under his be carefully evaluated and considered. Certainly, the
official seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if adopter should be in a position to support the would-be
not, his certificate shall so state. In case the adopted child or children, in keeping with the means of
acknowledgment is made before a notary public or an the family.
officer mentioned in subdivision (2) of the preceding
paragraph, the certificate of the notary public or the According to the Adoption Home Study Report49
officer taking the acknowledgment shall be forwarded by the Department of Public Health & Social
authenticated by an ambassador, minister, secretary of Services of the Government of Guam to the DSWD,
legation, chargé de affaires, consul, vice-consul, or petitioner is no longer supporting her legitimate
consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines, acting children, as the latter are already adults, have individual
within the country or place to which he is accredited. The lives and families. At the time of the filing of the petition,
officer making the authentication shall certify under his petitioner was 57 years old, employed on a part-time
official seal that the person who took the basis as a waitress, earning $5.15 an hour and tips of
acknowledgment was at the time duly authorized to act around $1,000 a month. Petitioner’s main intention in
as notary public or that he was duly exercising the adopting the children is to bring the latter to Guam, USA.
functions of the office by virtue of which he assumed to She has a house at Quitugua Subdivision in Yigo, Guam,
act, and that as such he had authority under the law to but the same is still being amortized. Petitioner likewise
take acknowledgment of instruments or documents in knows that the limited income might be a hindrance to
the place where the acknowledgment was taken, and that the adoption proceedings.
his signature and seal, if any, are genuine.
Given these limited facts, it is indeed doubtful whether
As the alleged written consent of petitioner’s legitimate petitioner will be able to sufficiently handle the financial
children did not comply with the afore-cited law, the aspect of rearing the three children in the US. She only
same can at best be treated by the Rules as a private has a part-time job, and she is rather of age. While
document whose authenticity must be proved either by petitioner claims that she has the financial support and
anyone who saw the document executed or written; or backing of her children and siblings, the OSG is correct in
by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or stating that the ability to support the adoptees is
handwriting of the makers.47 personal to the adopter, as adoption only creates a legal
relation between the former and the latter. Moreover, the
Since, in the instant case, no further proof was records do not prove nor support petitioner’s allegation
introduced by petitioner to authenticate the written that her siblings and her children are financially able and
consent of her legitimate children, the same is that they are willing to support the minors herein. The
inadmissible in evidence. Court, therefore, again sustains the ruling of the CA on
this issue.
In reversing the ruling of the RTC, the CA ruled that
petitioner was not stable enough to support the children While the Court recognizes that petitioner has only the
and is only relying on the financial backing, support and best of intentions for her nieces and nephew, there are
commitment of her children and her siblings.48 legal infirmities that militate against reversing the ruling
Petitioner contradicts this by claiming that she is of the CA. In any case, petitioner is not prevented from
financially capable as she has worked in Guam for 14 filing a new petition for adoption of the herein minors.
IN RE: ADOPTION OF MICHELLE AND MICHAEL LIM
(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the
It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for termination of the guardianship and clearance of his/her
adoption were filed, petitioner had already remarried. financial accountabilities.
She filed the petitions by herself, without being joined by
her husband Olario. We have no other recourse but to Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the
affirm the trial courts decision denying the petitions for following cases:
adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit. Section 7,
Article III of RA 8552 reads: (i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate
son/daughter of the other; or
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate
(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other spouse
of full civil capacity and legal rights, of good has signified his/her consent thereto; or
moral character, has not been convicted of any
crime involving moral turpitude, emotionally (iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
and psychologically capable of caring for
children, at least sixteen (16) years older than In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse
the adoptee, and who is in a position to support adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the other, joint
and care for his/her children in keeping with parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.
the means of the family. The requirement of (Emphasis supplied)
sixteen (16) year difference between the age of
the adopter and adoptee may be waived when The use of the word shall in the above-quoted provision
the adopter is the biological parent of the means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is
adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptees mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of
parent; joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal
situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the
(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the
above stated for Filipino nationals: Provided, That spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony
his/her country has diplomatic relations with the between the spouses.[12]
Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has been
living in the Philippines for at least three (3) The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity.
continuous years prior to the filing of the application Petitioner, having remarried at the time the
for adoption and maintains such residence until the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt.
adoption decree is entered, that he/she has been Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by
certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or petitioner herself, without joining her husband,
any appropriate government agency that he/she has Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the
the legal capacity to adopt in his/her country, and petitions for adoption on this ground.
that his/her government allows the adoptee to enter
his/her country as his/her adopted son/daughter: Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three
Provided, further, That the requirements on exceptions enumerated in Section 7. First, the
residency and certification of the aliens qualification children to be adopted are not the legitimate
to adopt in his/her country may be waived for the children of petitioner or of her husband Olario.
following: Second, the children are not the illegitimate children
of petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario are not
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative legally separated from each other.
within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or
affinity; or The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption
as shown in his Affidavit of Consent does not suffice.
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter There are certain requirements that Olario must
of his/her Filipino spouse; or comply being an American citizen. He must meet the
qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as:
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic
adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relative within the relations with the Republic of the Philippines;
fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the
Filipino spouses; or
(2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at least any kind. To this end, the adoptee is entitled to love,
three continuous years prior to the filing of the guidance, and support in keeping with the means of the
application for adoption; family.
(3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption
decree is entered; SEC. 18. Succession. - In legal and intestate succession,
(4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and the adopter(s) and the adoptee shall have reciprocal
(5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopters country rights of succession without distinction from legitimate
as the latters adopted child. None of these qualifications filiation. However, if the adoptee and his/her biological
were shown and proved during the trial. parent(s) had left a will, the law on testamentary
succession shall govern.
These requirements on residency and certification of the
aliens qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived Adoption has, thus, the following effects:
pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees are not (1) sever all legal ties between the biological parent(s)
relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the
affinity of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the spouse of the adopter;
adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner. (2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the adopter;
(3) give adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and
Petitioner contends that joint parental authority is not obligations arising from the relationship of parent and
anymore necessary since the children have been child, including but not limited to: (i) the right of the
emancipated having reached the age of majority. This is adopter to choose the name the child is to be known; and
untenable. (ii) the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and
compulsory heirs of each other.[18]
Parental authority includes caring for and rearing the
children for civic consciousness and efficiency and the Therefore, even if emancipation terminates parental
development of their moral, mental and physical authority, the adoptee is still considered a legitimate
character and well-being.[13] The father and the mother child of the adopter with all the rights of a legitimate
shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons child such as: (1) to bear the surname of the father and
of their common children.[14] Even the remarriage of the the mother; (2) to receive support from their parents;
surviving parent shall not affect the parental authority and (3) to be entitled to the legitime and other
over the children, unless the court appoints another successional rights. Conversely, the adoptive parents
person to be the guardian of the person or property of shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the
the children.[15] benefits to which biological parents are entitled such as
support and successional rights
It is true that when the child reaches the age of
emancipation that is, when he attains the age of majority
or 18 years of age[16] emancipation terminates parental
authority over the person and property of the child, who
shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil
life.[17] However, parental authority is merely just
one of the effects of legal adoption. Article V of RA
8552 enumerates the effects of adoption, thus:

ARTICLE V
EFFECTS OF ADOPTION

SEC. 16. Parental Authority. - Except in cases where the

biological parent is the spouse of the adopter, all legal
ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee
shall be severed and the same shall then be vested on the
adopter(s).

SEC. 17. Legitimacy. - The adoptee shall be considered

the legitimate son/daughter of the adopter(s) for all
intents and purposes and as such is entitled to all the
rights and obligations provided by law to legitimate
sons/daughters born to them without discrimination of
CASTRO VS GREGORIO In this instance, joint adoption is not necessary.
However, the spouse seeking to adopt must first
obtain the consent of his or her spouse.
Petitioners argue that they should have been given notice
by the trial court of the adoption, as adoption laws In the absence of any decree of legal separation or
require their consent as a requisite in the proceedings. annulment, Jose and Rosario remained legally married
despite their de facto separation. For Jose to be eligible
Petitioners are correct. to adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario must first signify her
consent to the adoption. Jose, however, did not validly
It is settled that "the jurisdiction of the court is obtain Rosario's consent. His submission of a fraudulent
determined by the statute in force at the time of the affidavit of consent in her name cannot be considered
commencement of the action."55 As Jose filed the compliance of the requisites of the law. Had Rosario been
petition for adoption on August 1, 2000, it is Republic Act given notice by the trial court of the proceedings, she
No. 855256 which applies over the proceedings. The law would have had a reasonable opportunity to contest the
on adoption requires that the adoption by the father of a validity of the affidavit. Since her consent was not
child born out of wedlock obtain not only the consent of obtained, Jose was ineligible to adopt.
his wife but also the consent of his legitimate children.
The law also requires the written consent of the
Under Article III, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8552, the adopter's children if they are 10 years old or older.
husband must first obtain the consent of his wife if he In Article III, Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552:
seeks to adopt his own children born out of wedlock:
SEC. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. —
ARTICLE III After being properly counseled and informed of his/her
ELIGIBILITY right to give or withhold his/her approval of the
adoption, the written consent of the following to the
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. — The following may adopt: adoption is hereby required:

Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the (c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10)
following cases: years of age or over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any;
(Emphasis supplied)
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate
son/daughter of the other; or The consent of the adopter's other children is necessary
as it ensures harmony among the prospective siblings. It
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate also sufficiently puts the other children on notice that
son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other spouse they will have to share their parent's love and care, as
has signified, his/her consent thereto; or well as their future legitimes, with another person.

(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other. It is undisputed that Joanne was Jose and Rosario's
legitimate child and that she was over 10 years old at the
The provision is mandatory. As a general rule, the time of the adoption proceedings. Her written consent,
husband and wife must file a joint petition for therefore, was necessary for the adoption to be valid.
adoption. The rationale for this is stated in In Re:
Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim: To circumvent this requirement, however, Jose
manifested to the trial court that he and Rosario were
The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted childless, thereby preventing Joanne from being notified
provision means that joint adoption by the husband and of the proceedings. As her written consent was never
the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the obtained, the adoption was not valid.
concept of joint parental authority over the child which
is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is For the adoption to be valid, petitioners' consent was
elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural required by Republic Act No. 8552. Personal service
to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also of summons should have been effected on the spouse
insures harmony between the spouses.58 and all legitimate children to ensure that their
substantive rights are protected. It is not enough to
The law provides for several exceptions to the rely on constructive notice as in this case.
general rule, as in a situation where a spouse seeks Surreptitious use of procedural technicalities cannot
to adopt his or her own children born out of wedlock. be privileged over substantive statutory rights.
Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice (P50,000.00), but not more than Two hundred
on Rosario and Joanne of the proceedings, it never thousand pesos (P200,000.00) at the discretion
validly acquired jurisdiction. of the court shall be imposed on any person
who shall commit any of the following acts:
There was extrinsic fraud
(i) obtaining consent for an adoption through
The badges of fraud are present in this case. coercion, undue influence, fraud, improper
material inducement, or other similar acts;
First, the petition for adoption was filed in a place (ii) non-compliance with the procedures and
that had no relation to any of the parties. safeguards provided by the law for
adoption; or
Second, using the process of delayed registration,69 (iii) subjecting or exposing the child to be
Jose was able to secure birth certificates for Jed and adopted to danger, abuse, or exploitation.
Regina showing him to be the father and Larry as
merely the informant. (b) Any person who shall cause the fictitious
registration of the birth of a child under the
Third, Jose blatantly lied to the trial court when he name(s) of a person(s) who is not his/her
declared that his motivation for adoption was biological parent(s) shall be guilty of
because he and his wife, Rosario, were childless, to simulation of birth, and shall be punished by
the prejudice of their daughter, Joanne. The consent of prision mayor in its medium period and a fine
Rosario to the adoption was also disputed by Rosario and not exceeding Fifty thousand pesos
alleged to be fraudulent. (P50.000.00). (Emphasis supplied)

All these tactics were employed by Jose, not only to Unfortunately, Jose's death carried with it the
induce the trial court in approving his petition, but also extinguishment of any of his criminal liabilities.78
to prevent Rosario and Joanne from participating in the Republic Act No. 8552 also fails to provide any
proceedings or opposing the petition. provision on the status of adoption decrees if the
adoption is found to have been obtained
When fraud is employed by a party precisely to fraudulently. Petitioners also cannot invoke Article VI,
prevent the participation of any other interested Section 19 of Republic Act No. 855279 since rescission of
party, as in this case, then the fraud is extrinsic, adoption can only be availed of by the adoptee.
regardless of whether the fraud was committed Petitioners, therefore, are left with no other remedy in
through the use of forged documents or perjured law other than the annulment of the judgment.
testimony during the trial.
The fraud employed in this case has been to Joanne's
Jose's actions prevented Rosario and Joanne from having prejudice. There is reason to believe that Joanne has
a reasonable opportunity to contest the adoption. Had grown up having never experienced the love and care of
Rosario and Joanne been allowed to participate, the trial a father, her parents having separated a year after her
court would have hesitated to grant Jose's petition since birth. She has never even benefited from any monetary
he failed to fulfill the necessary requirements under the support from her father. Despite all these adversities,
law. There can be no other conclusion than that because Joanne was able to obtain a medical degree from the
of Jose's acts, the trial court granted the decree of University of the Philippines College of Medicine80 and
adoption under fraudulent circumstances. is now working as a doctor in Canada.81 These
accomplishments, however, are poor substitutes if the
The law itself provides for penal sanctions for those who injustice done upon her is allowed to continue.
violate its provisions. Under Article VII, Section 21 of
Republic Act No. 8552:

ARTICLE VII
VIOLATIONS AND PENALTIES

SEC. 21. Violations and Penalties. —

(a) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six

(6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years
and/or a fine not less than Fifty thousand pesos
BARTOLOME VS SSS The provision adverted to is applicable herein by analogy
insofar as the restoration of custody is
concerned.1âwphi1 The manner herein of terminating
In attempting to cure the glaring constitutional violation the adopter’s parental authority, unlike the grounds for
of the adverted rule, the ECC extended illegitimate rescission,23 justifies the retention of vested rights and
parents an opportunity to file claims for and receive obligations between the adopter and the adoptee, while
death benefitsby equating dependency and legitimacy to the consequent restoration of parental authority in favor
the exercise of parental authority. Thus, as insinuated by of the biological parents, simultaneously, ensures that
the ECC in its assailed Decision, had petitioner not given the adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left to fend for
up John for adoption, she could have still claimed death himself at such a tender age.
benefits under the law.
To emphasize, We can only apply the rule by analogy,
To begin with, nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it especially since RA 8552 was enacted after
say that "legitimate parents" pertain to those who Cornelio’s death. Truth be told, there is a lacuna in the
exercise parental authority over the employee enrolled law as to which provision shall govern contingencies in
under the ECP. Itwas only in the assailed Decision all fours with the factual milieu of the instant petition.
wherein such qualification was made. In addition, Nevertheless, We are guided by the catena of cases and
assuming arguendothat the ECC did not overstep its the state policies behind RA 855224 wherein the
boundaries in limiting the adverted Labor Code paramount consideration is the best interest of the child,
provision to the deceased’s legitimate parents, and that which We invoke to justify this disposition. It is, after all,
the commission properly equated legitimacy to parental for the best interest of the child that someone will remain
authority, petitioner can still qualify as John’s secondary charged for his welfare and upbringing should his or her
beneficiary. adopter fail or is rendered incapacitated to perform his
duties as a parent at a time the adoptee is still in his
True, when Cornelio, in 1985, adoptedJohn, then about formative years, and, to Our mind, in the absence or, as in
two (2) years old, petitioner’s parental authority over this case, death of the adopter, no one else could
John was severed. However, lest it be overlooked, one reasonably be expected to perform the role of a parent
key detail the ECC missed, aside from Cornelio’s death, other than the adoptee’s biological one.
was that when the adoptive parent died less than three
(3) years after the adoption decree, John was still a Moreover, this ruling finds support on the fact that even
minor, at about four (4) years of age. though parental authority is severed by virtue of
adoption, the ties between the adoptee and the
John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a biological parents are not entirely eliminated. To
significant factor in the case at bar. Under such demonstrate, the biological parents, in some
circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to instances, are able to inherit from the adopted, as
have reverted in favor of the biological parents. can be gleaned from Art. 190 of the Family Code:
Otherwise, taking into account Our consistent ruling that
adoption is a personal relationship and that there are no Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the
collateral relatives by virtue of adoption,21 who was adopted shall be governed by the following rules:
then left to care for the minor adopted child if the adopter
passed away?
(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the
To be sure, reversion of parental authority and legal legitimate ascendants of the adopted concur with the
custody in favor of the biological parents is not a novel adopter, they shall divide the entire estate, one-half to be
concept. Section 20 of Republic Act No. 855222 (RA inherited by the parents or ascendants and the other half,
8552), otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act, by the adopters;
provides:
(6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted
Section 20. Effects of Rescission.– If the petition [for survive, then the ordinary rules of legal or intestate
rescission of adoption] is granted, the parental authority succession shall apply.
of the adoptee's biological parent(s), if known, or the
legal custody of the Department shall be restored if the Similarly, at the time of Cornelio Colcol’s death,
adoptee is still a minoror incapacitated. The reciprocal which was prior to the effectivity of the Family Code,
rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee the governing provision is Art. 984 of the New Civil
to each other shall be extinguished. (emphasis added) Code, which provides:
Art. 984. In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving Moreover, John, in his SSS application,28 named
no children or descendants, his parents and relatives by petitioner as one of his beneficiaries for his benefits
consanguinity and not by adoption, shall be his legal under RA 8282, otherwise known as the "Social Security
heirs. Law." While RA 8282 does not cover compensation for
work-related deaths or injury and expressly allows the
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological designation of beneficiaries who are not related by blood
parents retain their rights of succession to the estate to the member unlike in PD 626, John’s deliberate act of
of their child who was the subject of adoption. While indicating petitioner as his beneficiary at least evinces
the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered that he, in a way, considered petitioner as his dependent.
employee do not form part of the estate of the Consequently, the confluence of circumstances – from
adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or Cornelio’s death during John’s minority, the restoration
intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the of petitioner’s parental authority, the documents
rights of the biological parents and those by adoption showing singularity of address, and John’s clear intention
vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the to designate petitioner as a beneficiary - effectively made
adopted. In the same way that certain rights still attach petitioner, to Our mind, entitled to death benefit claims
by virtue of the blood relation, so too should certain as a secondary beneficiary under PD 626 as a dependent
obligations, which, We rule, include the exercise of parent.
parental authority, in the event of the untimely passing
of their minor offspring’s adoptive parent. We cannot All told, the Decision of the ECC dated March 17, 2010 is
leave undetermined the fate of a minor child whose bereft of legal basis. Cornelio’s adoption of John,
second chance ata better life under the care of the without more, does not deprive petitioner of the
adoptive parents was snatched from him by death’s cruel right to receive the benefits stemming from John’s
grasp. Otherwise, the adopted child’s quality of life might death as a dependent parent given Cornelio’s
have been better off not being adopted at all if he would untimely demise during John’s minority. Since the
only find himself orphaned in the end. Thus, We hold parent by adoption already died, then the death
that Cornelio’s death at the time of John’s minority benefits under the Employees' Compensation
resulted in the restoration of petitioner’s parental Program shall accrue solely to herein petitioner,
authority over the adopted child. John's sole remaining beneficiary.

On top of this restoration of parental authority, the fact WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
of petitioner’s dependence on John can be established March 17, 2010 Decision of the Employees'
from the documentary evidence submitted to the ECC. As Compensation Commission, in ECC Case No. SL-18483-
it appears in the records, petitioner, prior to John’s 0218-10, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The ECC is hereby
adoption, was a housekeeper. Her late husband died in directed to release the benefits due to a secondary
1984, leaving her to care for their seven (7) children. But beneficiary of the deceased covered employee John
since she was unable to "give a bright future to her Colcol to petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome.
growing children" as a housekeeper, she consented to
Cornelio’s adoption of John and Elizabeth in 1985.

Following Cornelio’s death in 1987, so records reveal,

both petitioner and John repeatedly reported "Brgy.
Capurictan, Solsona, Ilocos Norte" as their residence. In
fact, this very address was used in John’s Death
Certificate25 executed in Brazil, and in the Report of
Personal Injury or Loss of Life accomplished by the
master of the vessel boarded by John.26 Likewise, this is
John’s known address as per the ECC’s assailed
Decision.27 Similarly, this same address was used by
petitioner in filing her claim before the SSS La Union
branch and, thereafter, in her appeal with the ECC.
Hence, it can be assumed that aside from having been
restored parental authority over John, petitioner
indeed actually execised the same, and that they
lived together under one roof.
DE ASIS VS CA In the case at bar, respondent minors mother, who was
the plaintiff in the first case, manifested that she was
Petitioner contends that the aforecited manifestation, in withdrawing the case as it seemed futile to claim support
effect, admitted the lack of filiation between him and the from petitioner who denied his paternity over the child.
minor child, which admission binds the complainant, and Since the right to claim for support is predicated on the
since the obligation to give support is based on the existence of filiation between the minor child and the
existence of paternity and filiation between the child and putative parent, petitioner would like us to believe that
the putative parent, the lack thereof negates the right to such manifestation admitting the futility of claiming
claim for support. Thus, petitioner maintains that the support from him puts the issue to rest and bars any and
dismissal of the Complaint by the lower court on the all future complaint for support.
basis of the said manifestation bars the present action for
support, especially so because the order of the trial court The manifestation sent in by respondents mother in the
explicitly stated that the dismissal of the case was with first case, which acknowledged that it would be useless
prejudice. to pursue its complaint for support, amounted to
renunciation as it severed the vinculum that gives the
The petition is not impressed with merit. minor, Glen Camil, the right to claim support from his
putative parent, the petitioner. Furthermore, the
The right to receive support can neither be renounced agreement entered into between the petitioner and
nor transmitted to a third person. Article 301 of the Civil respondents mother for the dismissal of the complaint
Code, the law in point, reads: for maintenance and support conditioned upon the
dismissal of the counterclaim is in the nature of a
Art. 301. The right to receive support cannot be compromise which cannot be countenanced. It violates
renounced, nor can it be transmitted to a third person. the prohibition against any compromise of the right to
Neither can it be compensated with what the recipient support.
owes the obligor. xxx
Thus, the admission made by counsel for the wife of the
Furthermore, future support cannot be the subject of a facts alleged in a motion of the husband, in which the
compromise. latter prayed that his obligation to support be
extinguished cannot be considered as an assent to the
Article 2035. No compromise upon the following prayer, and much less, as a waiver of the right to claim
questions shall be valid: for support.[5]

(1) The civil status of persons; It is true that in order to claim support, filiation and/or
(2) The validity of a marriage or legal separation; paternity must first be shown between the claimant and
(3) Any ground for legal separation the parent. However, paternity and filiation or the lack of
(4) Future support; the same is a relationship that must be judicially
(5) The jurisdiction of courts; established and it is for the court to declare its existence
(6) Future legitime. or absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of
the parties.
The raison d etre behind the proscription against
renunciation, transmission and/or compromise of the The civil status of a son having been denied, and this civil
right to support is stated, thus: status, from which the right to support is derived being
in issue, it is apparent that no effect can be given to such
The right to support being founded upon the need of the a claim until an authoritative declaration has been made
recipient to maintain his existence, he is not entitled to as to the existence of the cause.[6]
renounce or transfer the right for this would mean
sanctioning the voluntary giving up of life itself. The right Although in the case under scrutiny, the admission may
to life cannot be renounced; hence, support, which is the be binding upon the respondent, such an admission is at
means to attain the former, cannot be renounced. most evidentiary and does not conclusively establish the
lack of filiation.
To allow renunciation or transmission or compensation
of the family right of a person to support is virtually to Neither are we persuaded by petitioners theory that the
allow either suicide or the conversion of the recipient to dismissal with prejudice of Civil Case Q-88-935 has the
a public burden. This is contrary to public policy.[4] effect of res judicata on the subsequent case for support.
GAN VS REYES LIM VS. LIM

Anent respondent Francisco and Federicos claim that Here, there is no question that Cheryl is unable to
they have the option under the law as to how they could discharge her obligation to provide sufficient legal
perform their obligation to support Rica and Rina, support to her children, then all school-bound. It is also
respondent Francisco insists that Rica and Rina should undisputed that the amount of support Edward is able to
move here to the Philippines to study in any of the local give to respondents, P6,000 a month, is insufficient to
universities. After all, the quality of education here, meet respondents basic needs. This inability of Edward
according to him, is at par with that offered in the USA. and Cheryl to sufficiently provide for their children shifts
The applicable provision of the Family Code on this a portion of their obligation to the ascendants in the
subject provides: nearest degree, both in the paternal (petitioners) and
maternal[19] lines, following the ordering in Article 199.
Art. 204. The person obliged to give support shall have To hold otherwise, and thus subscribe to petitioners
the option to fulfill the obligation either by paying the theory, is to sanction the anomalous scenario of
allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in the tolerating extreme material deprivation of children
family dwelling the person who has a right to receive because of parental inability to give adequate support
support. The latter alternative cannot be availed of in even if ascendants one degree removed are more than
case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto. able to fill the void.

Under the abovecited provision, the obligor is given the However, petitioners partial concurrent obligation
choice as to how he could dispense his obligation to give extends only to their descendants as this word is
support. Thus, he may give the determined amount of commonly understood to refer to relatives, by blood of
support to the claimant or he may allow the latter to stay lower degree. As petitioners grandchildren by blood,
in the family dwelling. The second option cannot be only respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and
availed of in case there are circumstances, legal or moral, Mariano III belong to this category. Indeed, Cheryls right
which should be considered. to receive support from the Lim family extends only to
her husband Edward, arising from their marital
In this case, this Court believes that respondent bond.[20] Unfortunately, Cheryls share from the amount
Francisco could not avail himself of the second option. of monthly support the trial court awarded cannot be
From the records, we gleaned that prior to the determined from the records. Thus, we are constrained
commencement of this action, the relationship between to remand the case to the trial court for this limited
respondent Francisco, on one hand, and petitioner and purpose.
her twin daughters, on the other, was indeed quite
pleasant. The correspondences exchanged among them As an alternative proposition, petitioners wish to avail of
expressed profound feelings of thoughtfulness and the option in Article 204 of the Civil Code, as amended,
concern for one anothers well-being. The photographs and pray that they be allowed to fulfill their obligation by
presented by petitioner as part of her exhibits presented maintaining respondents at petitioners Makati
a seemingly typical family celebrating kinship. All of residence. The option is unavailable to petitioners.
these, however, are now things of the past. With the
filing of this case, and the allegations hurled at one The application of Article 204 is subject to its exception
another by the parties, the relationships among the clause. Here, the persons entitled to receive support are
parties had certainly been affected. Particularly petitioners grandchildren and daughter-in-law. Granting
difficult for Rica and Rina must be the fact that those who petitioners the option in Article 204 will secure to the
they had considered and claimed as family denied having grandchildren a well-provided future; however, it will
any familial relationship with them. Given all these, we also force Cheryl to return to the house which, for her, is
could not see Rica and Rina moving back here in the the scene of her husbands infidelity. While not rising to
Philippines in the company of those who have disowned the level of a legal obstacle, as indeed, Cheryls charge
them. against Edward for concubinage did not prosper for
insufficient evidence, her steadfast insistence on its
occurrence amounts to a moral impediment bringing
the case within the ambit of the exception clause of
Article 204, precluding its application.
DOLINA VS VALLECERA aware of the disturbance that unfounded paternity suits
cause to the privacy and peace of the putative father’s
Dolina evidently filed the wrong action to obtain support legitimate family.12 Vallecera disowns Dolina’s child and
for her child. The object of R.A. 9262 under which she denies having a hand in the preparation and signing of its
filed the case is the protection and safety of women certificate of birth. This issue has to be resolved in an
and children who are victims of abuse or violence.6 appropriate case.
Although the issuance of a protection order against
the respondent in the case can include the grant of
legal support for the wife and the child, this assumes
that both are entitled to a protection order and to
legal support.

Dolina of course alleged that Vallecera had been abusing

her and her child.1avvphil But it became apparent to the
RTC upon hearing that this was not the case since,
contrary to her claim, neither she nor her child ever lived
with Vallecera. As it turned out, the true object of her
action was to get financial support from Vallecera for her
child, her claim being that he is the father. He of course
vigorously denied this.

To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in

proper action, first establish the filiation of the child,
if the same is not admitted or acknowledged. Since
Dolina’s demand for support for her son is based on her
claim that he is Vallecera’s illegitimate child, the latter is
not entitled to such support if he had not acknowledged
him, until Dolina shall have proved his relation to him.7
The child’s remedy is to file through her mother a
judicial action against Vallecera for compulsory
recognition.8 If filiation is beyond question, support
follows as matter of obligation.9 In short, illegitimate
children are entitled to support and successional
rights but their filiation must be duly proved.10

Dolina’s remedy is to file for the benefit of her child an

action against Vallecera for compulsory recognition
in order to establish filiation and then demand
support. Alternatively, she may directly file an action
for support, where the issue of compulsory
recognition may be integrated and resolved.11

It must be observed, however, that the RTC should not

have dismissed the entire case based solely on the lack of
any judicial declaration of filiation between Vallecera
and Dolina’s child since the main issue remains to be the
alleged violence committed by Vallecera against Dolina
and her child and whether they are entitled to protection.
But of course, this matter is already water under the
bridge since Dolina failed to raise this error on review.
This omission lends credence to the conclusion of the
RTC that the real purpose of the petition is to obtain
support from Vallecera.

While the Court is mindful of the best interests of the

child in cases involving paternity and filiation, it is just as
LIM-LUA VS. LUA
In the case at bar, records clearly show and in fact has
Here, the CA should not have allowed all the expenses been admitted by petitioner that aside from paying the
incurred by respondent to be credited against the expenses of their two (2) children’s schooling, he gave
accrued support pendente lite. As earlier mentioned, the his two (2) children two (2) cars and credit cards of
monthly support pendente lite granted by the trial which the expenses for various items namely: clothes,
court was intended primarily for food, household grocery items and repairs of their cars were chargeable
expenses such as salaries of drivers and house to him which totaled an amount of more than One
helpers, and also petitioner’s scoliosis therapy Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00) for each of them and
sessions. Hence, the value of two expensive cars considering that as testified by the private respondent
bought by respondent for his children plus their that she needs the total amount of ₱113,000.00 for the
maintenance cost, travel expenses of petitioner and maintenance of the household and other miscellaneous
Angelli, purchases through credit card of items other expenses and considering further that petitioner can
than groceries and dry goods (clothing) should have afford to buy cars for his two (2) children, and to pay the
been disallowed, as these bear no relation to the expenses incurred by them which are chargeable to him
judgment awarding support pendente lite. While it is through the credit cards he provided them in the amount
true that the dispositive portion of the executory of ₱100,000.00 each, it is but fair and just that the
decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740 ordered herein monthly support pendente lite for his wife, herein
respondent to pay the support in arrears "less than the private respondent, be fixed as of the present in the
amount supposedly given by petitioner to the private amount of ₱115,000.00 which would be sufficient
respondent as her and their two (2) children monthly enough to take care of the household and other needs.
support," the deductions should be limited to those This monthly support pendente lite to private
basic needs and expenses considered by the trial and respondent in the amount of ₱115,000.00 excludes the
appellate courts. The assailed ruling of the CA allowing amount of One Hundred ThirtyFive (₱135,000.00)
huge deductions from the accrued monthly support of Thousand Pesos for medical attendance expenses
petitioner and her children, while correct insofar as it needed by private respondent for the operation of both
commends the generosity of the respondent to his her eyes which is demandable upon the conduct of such
children, is clearly inconsistent with the executory operation. Likewise, this monthly support of
decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740. More important, it ₱115,000.00 is without prejudice to any increase or
completely ignores the unfair consequences to petitioner decrease thereof that the trial court may grant private
whose sustenance and well-being, was given due regard respondent as the circumstances may warrant i.e.
by the trial and appellate courts. This is evident from the depending on the proof submitted by the parties during
March 31, 2004 Order granting support pendente lite to the proceedings for the main action for support.
petitioner and her children, when the trial court
observed: The amounts already extended to the two (2) children,
being a commendable act of petitioner, should be
While there is evidence to the effect that defendant is continued by him considering the vast financial
giving some forms of financial assistance to his two (2) resources at his disposal.
children via their credit cards and paying for their school
expenses, the same is, however, devoid of any form of
spousal support to the plaintiff, for, at this point in time,
while the action for nullity of marriage is still to be
heard, it is incumbent upon the defendant,
considering the physical and financial condition of
the plaintiff and the overwhelming capacity of
defendant, to extend support unto the latter. x x x29

On appeal, while the Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740

reduced the amount of monthly support fixed by the trial
court, it nevertheless held that considering respondent’s
financial resources, it is but fair and just that he give a
monthly support for the sustenance and basic necessities
of petitioner and his children. This would imply that any
amount respondent seeks to be credited as monthly
support should only cover those incurred for sustenance
and household expenses.1avvphi1
BBB VS AAA status [of a child] cannot be attacked collaterally.” The
child’s legitimacy “cannot be contested by way of defense
The deletion from the PPO of the directive of the RTC and or as a collateral issue in another action for a different
the CA relative to the award of support is not warranted. purpose.”34 The instant petition sprang out of AAA’s
While CCC is not BBB’s biological son, he was legitimated application for a PPO before the RTC. Hence, BBB’s
under the latter’s name. Like DDD and EEE, CCC is claim that CCC is not his biological son is a collateral
entitled to receive support from BBB. issue, which this Court has no authority to resolve
now.
BBB claims that DDD and EEE are now under his sole
care and custody, which allegedly renders moot the All told, the Court finds no merit in BBB’s petition, but
provision in the PPO relative to support. BBB points out there exists a necessity to remand the case for the RTC to
that CCC is not his biological son. Impliedly then, BBB resolve matters relative to who shall be granted custody
justifies why CCC is not entitled to receive support from over the three children, how the spouses shall exercise
him. visitation rights, and the amount and manner of
providing financial support.
This Court is not persuaded.
The RTC and the CA found substantial evidence and did
Article 177 of the Family Code provides that “[o]nly not commit reversible errors when they issued the PPO
children conceived and born outside of wedlock of against BBB. Events, which took place after the issuance
parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, of the PPO, do not erase the fact that psychological,
were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each emotional and economic abuses were committed by BBB
other may be legitimated.” Article 178 states that against AAA. Hence, BBB’s claim that he now has actual
“[l]egitimation shall take place by a subsequent valid sole care of DDD and EEE does not necessarily call for
marriage between parents.” this Court’s revocation of the PPO and the award to him
of custody over the children.
In the case at bar, the parties do not dispute the fact
that BBB is not CCC’s biological father. Such being the This Court, thus, affirms the CA’s order to remand the
case, it was improper to have CCC legitimated after case for the RTC to resolve the question of custody. Since
the celebration of BBB and AAA’s marriage. Clearly the children are now all older than seven years of age,
then, the legal process of legitimation was trifled they can choose for themselves whom they want to stay
with. BBB voluntarily but falsely acknowledged CCC with. If all the three children would manifest to the RTC
as his son. Article 1431 of the New Civil Code pertinently their choice to stay with AAA, then the PPO issued by RTC
provides: shall continue to be executed in its entirety. However, if
any of the three children would choose to be under BBB’s
Art. 1431. Through estoppel an admission or care, necessarily, the PPO issued against BBB relative to
representation is rendered conclusive upon the person them is to be modified. The PPO, in its entirety, would
making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against remain effective only as to AAA and any of the children
the person relying thereon. who opt to stay with her. Consequently, the RTC may
accordingly alter the manner and amount of financial
At least for the purpose of resolving the instant petition, support BBB should give depending on who shall finally
the principle of estoppel finds application and it now be awarded custody over the children. Pursuant to
bars BBB from making an assertion contrary to his Articles 201 and 202 of the Family Code, BBB’s resources
previous representations. He should not be allowed to and means and the necessities of AAA and the children
evade a responsibility arising from his own are the essential factors in determining the amount of
misrepresentations. He is bound by the effects of the support, and the same can be reduced or increased
legitimation process. CCC remains to be BBB’s son, and proportionately. The RTC is reminded to be circumspect
pursuant to Article 179 of the Family Code, the in resolving the matter of support, which is a mutual
former is entitled to the same rights as those of a responsibility of the spouses. The parties do not dispute
legitimate child, including the receipt of his father’s that AAA is now employed as well, thus, the RTC should
support. consider the same with the end in mind of promoting the
best interests of the children.
Notwithstanding the above, there is no absolute
preclusion for BBB from raising before the proper court
the issue of CCC’s status and filiation. However, BBB
cannot do the same in the instant petition before this
Court now. In Tison v. CA,33 the Court held that “the civil
LAXAMANA VS LAXAMANA dependent.[18] There is no showing that the court
ascertained the categorical choice of the children. These
In controversies involving the care, custody and control inadequacies could have been remedied by an exhaustive
of their minor children, the contending parents stand trial probing into the accuracy of Dr. Ocampos report and
on equal footing before the court who shall make the the capacity of both parties to raise their children. The
selection according to the best interest of the child. trial court was remiss in the fulfillment of its duties when
The child if over seven years of age may be permitted to it approved the agreement of the parties to submit the
choose which parent he/she prefers to live with, but the case for decision on the basis of sketchy findings of facts.
court is not bound by such choice if the parent so chosen
is unfit. In all cases, the sole and foremost consideration In Lacson v. Lacson,[19] the case was remanded to the
is the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of trial court with respect to the issue of custody. In the said
the child concerned, taking into account the respective case, the court a quo resolved the question of the
resources as well as social and moral situations of the childrens custody based on the amicable settlement of
opposing parents.[15] the spouses. Stressing the need for presentation of
evidence and a thorough proceedings, we explained
In Medina v. Makabali,[16] we stressed that this is as it
should be, for in the continual evolution of legal It is clear that every child [has] rights which are not and
institutions, the patria potestas has been transformed should not be dependent solely on the wishes, much less
from the jus vitae ac necis (right of life and death) of the the whims and caprices, of his parents. His welfare
Roman law, under which the offspring was virtually a should not be subject to the parents' say-so or mutual
chattel of his parents, into a radically different agreement alone. Where, as in this case, the parents are
institution, due to the influence of Christian faith and already separated in fact, the courts must step in to
doctrines. The obligational aspect is now supreme. There determine in whose custody the child can better be
is no power, but a task; no complex rights of parents but assured the rights granted to him by law. The need,
a sum of duties; no sovereignty, but a sacred trust for the therefore, to present evidence regarding this matter,
welfare of the minor. becomes imperative. A careful scrutiny of the records
reveals that no such evidence was introduced in the CFI.
Mindful of the nature of the case at bar, the court a quo This latter court relied merely on the mutual agreement
should have conducted a trial notwithstanding the of the spouses-parents. To be sure, this was not sufficient
agreement of the parties to submit the case for resolution basis to determine the fitness of each parent to be the
on the basis, inter alia, of the psychiatric report of Dr. custodian of the children.
Teresito. Thus, petitioner is not estopped from
questioning the absence of a trial considering that Besides, at least one of the children Enrique, the eldest is
said psychiatric report, which was the courts now eleven years of age and should be given the choice
primary basis in awarding custody to respondent, is of the parent he wishes to live with. x x x.
insufficient to justify the decision. The fundamental
policy of the State to promote and protect the welfare of In the instant case, the proceedings before the trial court
children shall not be disregarded by mere technicality in leave much to be desired. While a remand of this case
resolving disputes which involve the family and the would mean further delay, the childrens paramount
youth.[17] While petitioner may have a history of interest demand that further proceedings be conducted
drug dependence, the records are inadequate as to to determine the fitness of both petitioner and
his moral, financial and social well-being. The results respondent to assume custody of their minor children.
of the psychiatric evaluation showing that he is not
yet completely cured may render him unfit to take
custody of the children, but there is no evidence to
show that respondent is unfit to provide the children
with adequate support, education, as well as moral
and intellectual training and development. Moreover,
the children in this case were 14 and 15 years old at the
time of the promulgation of the decision, yet the court did
not ascertain their choice as to which parent they want
to live with. In its September 8, 1999 order, the trial court
merely stated that: The children were asked as to
whether they would like to be with petitioner but there
are indications that they entertain fears in their hearts
and want to be sure that their father is no longer a drug
GUALBERTO VS GUALBERTO Art. 17. Joint Parental Authority. The father and the
mother shall exercise jointly just and reasonable
Article 213 of the Family Code[31] provides: parental authority and responsibility over their
legitimate or adopted children. In case of disagreement,
ART. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental the fathers decision shall prevail unless there is a judicial
authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by order to the contrary.
the court. The court shall take into account all relevant
considerations, especially the choice of the child over In case of the absence or death of either parent, the
seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit. present or surviving parent shall continue to exercise
parental authority over such children, unless in case of
No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the surviving parents remarriage, the court for justifiable
the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to reasons, appoints another person as guardian.
order otherwise.
In case of separation of his parents, no child under five
This Court has held that when the parents are separated, years of age shall be separated from his mother, unless
legally or otherwise, the foregoing provision governs the the court finds compelling reasons to do so. (Italics
custody of their child.[32] Article 213 takes its bearing supplied)
from Article 363 of the Civil Code, which reads:
The above mandates reverberate in Articles 211, 212 and
Art. 363. In all questions on the care, custody, education 213 of the Family Code. It is unmistakable from the
and property of children, the latters welfare shall be language of these provisions that Article 211[35] was
paramount. No mother shall be separated from her child derived from the first sentence of the aforequoted Article
under seven years of age, unless the court finds 17; Article 212,[36] from the second sentence; and
compelling reasons for such measure.(Italics supplied) Article 213,[37] save for a few additions, from the third
sentence. It should be noted that the Family Code has
The general rule that children under seven years of age reverted to the Civil Code provision mandating that a
shall not be separated from their mother finds its raison child below seven years should not be separated from
detre in the basic need of minor children for their the mother.[38]
mothers loving care.[33] In explaining the rationale for
Article 363 of the Civil Code, the Code Commission Mandatory Character
stressed thus: of Article 213 of the Family Code

The general rule is recommended in order to avoid a In Lacson v. San Jose-Lacson,[39] the Court held that the
tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn away use of shall in Article 363 of the Civil Code and the
from her. No man can sound the deep sorrows of a observations made by the Code Commission underscore
mother who is deprived of her child of tender age. The the mandatory character of the word.[40] Holding in that
exception allowed by the rule has to be for compelling case that it was a mistake to deprive the mother of
reasons for the good of the child: those cases must indeed custody of her two children, both then below the age of
be rare, if the mothers heart is not to be unduly hurt. If seven, the Court stressed:
she has erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty of
imprisonment and the (relative) divorce decree will [Article 363] prohibits in no uncertain terms the
ordinarily be sufficient punishment for her. Moreover, separation of a mother and her child below seven years,
her moral dereliction will not have any effect upon the unless such a separation is grounded upon compelling
baby who is as yet unable to understand the situation. reasons as determined by a court.[41]
(Report of the Code Commission, p. 12)
In like manner, the word shall in Article 213 of the Family
A similar provision is embodied in Article 8 of the Child Code and Section 6[42] of Rule 99 of the Rules of Court
and Youth Welfare Code (Presidential Decree No. has been held to connote a mandatory character.[43]
603).[34] Article 17 of the same Code is even more Article 213 and Rule 99 similarly contemplate a situation
explicit in providing for the childs custody under various in which the parents of the minor are married to each
circumstances, specifically in case the parents are other, but are separated by virtue of either a decree of
separated. It clearly mandates that no child under five legal separation or a de facto separation.[44] In the
years of age shall be separated from his mother, unless present case, the parents are living separately as a matter
the court finds compelling reasons to do so. The of fact.
provision is reproduced in its entirety as follows:
The Best Interest of the Child
a Primary Consideration fact that a mother is a prostitute or has been unfaithful to
her husband would render her unfit to have custody of
The Convention on the Rights of the Child provides that her minor child.[51] To deprive the wife of custody, the
[i]n all actions concerning children, whether undertaken husband must clearly establish that her moral lapses
by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of have had an adverse effect on the welfare of the child or
law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the have distracted the offending spouse from exercising
best interests of the child shall be a primary proper parental care.[52]
consideration.[45]
To this effect did the Court rule in Unson III v.
The principle of best interest of the child pervades Navarro,[53] wherein the mother was openly living with
Philippine cases involving adoption, guardianship, her brother-in-law, the childs uncle. Under that
support, personal status, minors in conflict with the law, circumstance, the Court deemed it in the nine-year-old
and child custody. In these cases, it has long been childs best interest to free her from the obviously
recognized that in choosing the parent to whom custody unwholesome, not to say immoral influence, that the
is given, the welfare of the minors should always be the situation in which the mother ha[d] placed herself might
paramount consideration.[46] Courts are mandated to create in [the childs] moral and social outlook.[54]
take into account all relevant circumstances that would
have a bearing on the childrens well-being and In Espiritu v. CA,[55] the Court took into account
development. Aside from the material resources and the psychological and case study reports on the child, whose
moral and social situations of each parent, other factors feelings of insecurity and anxiety had been traced to
may also be considered to ascertain which one has the strong conflicts with the mother. To the psychologist the
capability to attend to the physical, educational, social child revealed, among other things, that the latter was
and moral welfare of the children.[47] Among these disturbed upon seeing her mother hugging and kissing a
factors are the previous care and devotion shown by each bad man who lived in their house and worked for her
of the parents; their religious background, moral father. The Court held that the illicit or immoral activities
uprightness, home environment and time availability; as of the mother had already caused the child emotional
well as the childrens emotional and educational needs disturbances, personality conflicts, and exposure to
conflicting moral values x x x.
Tender-Age
Presumption Based on the above jurisprudence, it is therefore not
enough for Crisanto to show merely that Joycelyn was a
As pointed out earlier, there is express statutory lesbian. He must also demonstrate that she carried on
recognition that, as a general rule, a mother is to be her purported relationship with a person of the same sex
preferred in awarding custody of children under the age in the presence of their son or under circumstances not
of seven. The caveat in Article 213 of the Family Code conducive to the childs proper moral development. Such
cannot be ignored, except when the court finds cause to a fact has not been shown here. There is no evidence that
order otherwise.[48] the son was exposed to the mothers alleged sexual
proclivities or that his proper moral and psychological
The so-called tender-age presumption under Article 213 development suffered as a result.
of the Family Code may be overcome only by compelling
evidence of the mothers unfitness. The mother has been Moreover, it is worthy to note that the trial court judge,
declared unsuitable to have custody of her children in Helen Bautista-Ricafort, ruled in her May 17, 2002 Order
one or more of the following instances: neglect, that she had found the reason stated by [Crisanto] not to
abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual be compelling[56] as to suffice as a ground for separating
drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, the child from his mother. The judge made this
insanity or affliction with a communicable disease.[49] conclusion after personally observing the two of them,
both in the courtroom and in her chambers on April 16,
Here, Crisanto cites immorality due to alleged lesbian 2002, and after a chance to talk to the boy and to observe
relations as the compelling reason to deprive Joycelyn of him firsthand. This assessment, based on her unique
custody. It has indeed been held that under certain opportunity to witness the childs behavior in the
circumstances, the mothers immoral conduct may presence of each parent, should carry more weight than
constitute a compelling reason to deprive her of a mere reliance on the records. All told, no compelling
custody.[50] reason has been adduced to wrench the child from the
mothers custody.
But sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not
prove parental neglect or incompetence. Not even the No Grant of Habeas Corpus
and Preliminary Injunction

As we have ruled that Joycelyn has the right to keep her

minor son in her custody, the writ of habeas corpus and
the preliminary mandatory injunction prayed for by
Crisanto have no leg to stand on. A writ of habeas corpus
may be issued only when the rightful custody of any
person is withheld from the person entitled thereto,[57]
a situation that does not apply here.

On the other hand, the ancillary remedy of preliminary

mandatory injunction cannot be granted, because
Crisantos right to custody has not been proven to be clear
and unmistakable.[58] Unlike an ordinary preliminary
injunction, the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
is more cautiously regarded, since the latter requires the
performance of a particular act that tends to go beyond
the maintenance of the status quo.[59] Besides, such an
injunction would serve no purpose, now that the case has
been decided on its merits.[60]

WHEREFORE, the Petition in GR No. 154994 is

GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
is hereby REVERSED and the May 17, 2002 Regional Trial
Court Order REINSTATED. The Petition in GR No. 156254
is DISMISSED. Costs against Petitioner Crisanto Rafaelito
Gualberto V.

SO ORDERED.
SALIENTES VS ABANILLA In the present case, it is incumbent upon petitioners to
show that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in
Petitioners contend that the order is contrary to Article issuing the order.
213[7] of the Family Code, which provides that no child
under seven years of age shall be separated from the Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where
mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to rightful custody is withheld from a person entitled
order otherwise. They maintain that herein respondent thereto.[9] Under Article 211[10] of the Family Code,
Loran had the burden of showing any compelling reason respondent Loran and petitioner Marie Antonette
but failed to present even a prima facie proof thereof. have joint parental authority over their son and
consequently joint custody. Further, although the
Petitioners posit that even assuming that there were couple is separated de facto, the issue of custody has
compelling reasons, the proper remedy for private yet to be adjudicated by the court. In the absence of a
respondent was simply an action for custody, but not judicial grant of custody to one parent, both parents
habeas corpus. Petitioners assert that habeas corpus is are still entitled to the custody of their child. In the
unavailable against the mother who, under the law, has present case, private respondents cause of action is
the right of custody of the minor. They insist there was the deprivation of his right to see his child as alleged
no illegal or involuntary restraint of the minor by his own in his petition.[11] Hence, the remedy of habeas
mother. There was no need for the mother to show cause corpus is available to him.
and explain the custody of her very own child.
In a petition for habeas corpus, the childs welfare is the
Private respondent counters that petitioners argument supreme consideration. The Child and Youth Welfare
based on Article 213 of the Family Code applies only to Code[12] unequivocally provides that in all questions
the second part of his petition regarding the custody of regarding the care and custody, among others, of the
his son. It does not address the first part, which pertains child, his welfare shall be the paramount
to his right as the father to see his son. He asserts that the consideration.[13]
writ of habeas corpus is available against any person who
restrains the minors right to see his father and vice versa. Again, it bears stressing that the order did not grant
He avers that the instant petition is merely filed for delay, custody of the minor to any of the parties but merely
for had petitioners really intended to bring the child directed petitioners to produce the minor in court
before the court in accordance with the new rules on and explain why private respondent is prevented
custody of minors, they would have done so on the dates from seeing his child. This is in line with the directive
specified in the January 23, 2003 and the February 24, in Section 9[14] of A.M. 03-04-04-SC[15] that within
2003 orders of the trial court. fifteen days after the filing of the answer or the
expiration of the period to file answer, the court shall
Private respondent maintains that, under the law, he and issue an order requiring the respondent (herein
petitioner Marie Antonette have shared custody and petitioners) to present the minor before the court.
parental authority over their son. He alleges that at times This was exactly what the court did.
when petitioner Marie Antonette is out of the country as
required of her job as an international flight stewardess, Moreover, Article 213 of the Family Code deals with the
he, the father, should have custody of their son and not judicial adjudication of custody and serves as a guideline
the maternal grandparents. for the proper award of custody by the court. Petitioners
can raise it as a counter argument for private
As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the respondents petition for custody. But it is not a basis for
assailed January 23, 2003 Order of the trial court did not preventing the father to see his own child. Nothing in the
grant custody of the minor to any of the parties but said provision disallows a father from seeing or visiting
merely directed petitioners to produce the minor in his child under seven years of age.
court and explain why they are restraining his liberty.
The assailed order was an interlocutory order precedent In sum, the trial court did not err in issuing the orders
to the trial courts full inquiry into the issue of custody, dated January 23, 2003 and February 24, 2003. Hence,
which was still pending before it. the Court of Appeals properly dismissed the petition for
certiorari against the said orders of the trial court.
Under Rule 41, Section 1[8] of the Rules of Court, an
interlocutory order is not appealable but the aggrieved
party may file an appropriate special action under Rule
65. The aggrieved party must show that the court gravely
abused its discretion in issuing the interlocutory order.
GAMBOA-HIRSCH VS HIRSCH

The Convention on the Rights of the Child provides that

in all actions concerning children, whether undertaken
by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of
law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the
best interests of the child shall be a primary
consideration (emphasis supplied).[5] The Child and
Youth Welfare Code, in the same way, unequivocally
provides that in all questions regarding the care and
custody, among others, of the child, his/her welfare shall
be the paramount consideration.[6]

The so-called tender-age presumption under Article

213 of the Family Code may be overcome only by
compelling evidence of the mothers unfitness. The
mother is declared unsuitable to have custody of her
children in one or more of the following instances:
neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality,
habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment
of the child, insanity, or affliction with a
communicable disease.[7] Here, the mother was not
shown to be unsuitable or grossly incapable of caring for
her minor child. All told, no compelling reason has been
adduced to wrench the child from the mothers custody.
DACASIN VS DACASIN exclusive maternal custody regime under the second
paragraph of Article 213.[22]
In this jurisdiction, parties to a contract are free to
stipulate the terms of agreement subject to the minimum It will not do to argue that the second paragraph of
ban on stipulations contrary to law, morals, good Article 213 of the Family Code applies only to judicial
customs, public order, or public policy.[12]Otherwise, custodial agreements based on its text that No child
the contract is denied legal existence, deemed inexistent under seven years of age shall be separated from the
and void from the beginning.[13]For lack of relevant mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to
stipulation in the Agreement, these and other ancillary order otherwise. To limit this provisions enforceability
Philippine substantive law serve as default parameters to court sanctioned agreements while placing private
to test the validity of the Agreements joint child custody agreements beyond its reach is to sanction a double
stipulations.[14] standard in custody regulation of children under seven
years old of separated parents. This effectively
At the time the parties executed the Agreement on 28 empowers separated parents, by the simple expedient of
January 2002, two facts are undisputed: (1) Stephanie avoiding the courts, to subvert a legislative policy vesting
was under seven years old (having been born on 21 to the separated mother sole custody of her children
September 1995); and (2) petitioner and respondent under seven years of age to avoid a tragedy where a
were no longer married under the laws of the United mother has seen her baby torn away from her.[23]This
States because of the divorce decree. The relevant ignores the legislative basis that [n]o man can sound the
Philippine law on child custody for spouses separated in deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of
fact or in law[15] (under the second paragraph of Article tender age.[24]
213 of the Family Code) is also undisputed: no child
under seven years of age shall be separated from the It could very well be that Article 213s bias favoring one
mother x x x.[16] (This statutory awarding of sole separated parent (mother) over the other (father)
parental custody[17]to the mother is encourages paternal neglect, presumes incapacity for
mandatory,[18]grounded on sound policy joint parental custody, robs the parents of custodial
consideration,[19]subject only to a narrow exception not options, or hijacks decision-making between the
alleged to obtain here.[20]) Clearly then, the Agreements separated parents.[25]However, these are objections
object to establish a post-divorce joint custody regime which question the laws wisdom not its validity or
between respondent and petitioner over their child uniform enforceability. The forum to air and remedy
under seven years old contravenes Philippine law. these grievances is the legislature, not this Court. At any
rate, the rules seeming harshness or undesirability is
The Agreement is not only void ab initio for being tempered by ancillary agreements the separated parents
contrary to law, it has also been repudiated by the may wish to enter such as granting the father visitation
mother when she refused to allow joint custody by the and other privileges. These arrangements are not
father. The Agreement would be valid if the spouses have inconsistent with the regime of sole maternal custody
not divorced or separated because the law provides for under the second paragraph of Article 213 which merely
joint parental authority when spouses live grants to the mother final authority on the care and
together.[21]However, upon separation of the spouses, custody of the minor under seven years of age, in case of
the mother takes sole custody under the law if the child disagreements.
is below seven years old and any agreement to the
contrary is void. Thus, the law suspends the joint custody Further, the imposed custodial regime under the second
regime for (1) children under seven of (2) separated or paragraph of Article 213 is limited in duration, lasting
divorced spouses. Simply put, for a child within this age only until the childs seventh year. From the eighth year
bracket (and for commonsensical reasons), the law until the childs emancipation, the law gives the separated
decides for the separated or divorced parents how best parents freedom, subject to the usual contractual
to take care of the child and that is to give custody to the limitations, to agree on custody regimes they see fit to
separated mother. Indeed, the separated parents cannot adopt. Lastly, even supposing that petitioner and
contract away the provision in the Family Code on the respondent are not barred from entering into the
maternal custody of children below seven years anymore Agreement for the joint custody of Stephanie, respondent
than they can privately agree that a mother who is repudiated the Agreement by asserting sole custody over
unemployed, immoral, habitually drunk, drug addict, Stephanie. Respondents act effectively brought the
insane or afflicted with a communicable disease will have parties back to ambit of the default custodial regime in
sole custody of a child under seven as these are reasons the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code
deemed compelling to preclude the application of the vesting on respondent sole custody of Stephanie.
Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decrees alleged carries as much validity against the alien divorcee in this
invalidity - not because the Illinois court lacked jurisdiction as it does in the jurisdiction of the aliens
jurisdiction or that the divorce decree violated Illinois nationality, irrespective of who obtained the divorce.
law, but because the divorce was obtained by his Filipino
spouse[26]- to support the Agreements enforceability.
The argument that foreigners in this jurisdiction are not
bound by foreign divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van
Dorn v. Romillo[27]settled the matter by holding that an
alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce decree
obtained abroad.[28]There, we dismissed the alien
divorcees Philippine suit for accounting of alleged post-
divorce conjugal property and rejected his submission
that the foreign divorce (obtained by the Filipino spouse)
is not valid in this jurisdiction in this wise:

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada

divorce in any of the States of the United States. The
decree is binding on private respondent as an American
citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue
petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union.
What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is
not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being
contrary to local law and public policy.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied

in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals
are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the
same being considered contrary to our concept of public
policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law.
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from the standards of
American law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage.

xxxx

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is

no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioners husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is
bound by the Decision of his own countrys Court, which
validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right
over the alleged conjugal property. (Emphasis supplied)

We reiterated Van Dorn in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera[29]to

dismiss criminal complaints for adultery filed by the
alien divorcee (who obtained the foreign divorce decree)
against his former Filipino spouse because he no longer
qualified as offended spouse entitled to file the
complaints under Philippine procedural rules. Thus, it
should be clear by now that a foreign divorce decree