Hurt and Grievous Hurt

Contents
 Hurt
 Grievous hurt
o Rational behind the Section
o Scope
 Difference between hurt and grievous hurt
o Difference between punishments for hurt and
grievous hurt
o Difference between grievous hurt and culpable
homicide
 Grievous hurt and compelling wife to prostitution
 Acid Attack
 Latest Development
 Case Analysis
 Conclusion
 Bibliography

Submitted by: Shikhar Agarwal

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 Hurt
In normal sense, hurt means to cause bodily injury and/or pain to
another person. IPC defines Hurt as follows -

Section 319 - Whoever causes bodily pain, disease, or infirmity to any

person is said to cause hurt.

Based on this, the essential ingredients of Hurt are -

Bodily pain, disease or infirmity must be caused - Bodily pain, except

such slight harm for which nobody would complain, is hurt. For
example, pricking a person with pointed object like a needle or
punching somebody in the face, or pulling a woman's hair. The duration
of the pain is immaterial. Infirmity means when any organ is not able to
function normally. It can be temporary or permanent. It also includes
state of mind such as hysteria or terror.

It should be caused due to a voluntary act of the accused.

When there is no intention of causing death or bodily injury as is likely

to cause death, and there is no knowledge that inflicting such injury
would cause death, the accused would be guilty of hurt if the injury is
not serious. In a case in 1883, the accused struck a man one blow on
the head with a bamboo yoke and the injured man died, primarily due
to excessive opium administered by his friends to alleviate pain. He was
held guilty under this section.

The authors of the code have observed that in many cases offences that
fall under hurt will also fall under assault. However, there can be
certain situations, where they may not. For example, if A leaves food

Submitted by: Shikhar Agarwal

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mixed with poison on B's desk and later on B eats the food causing hurt,
it cannot be a case of assault.

If the accused did not know about any special condition of the
deceased and causes death because of hurt, he will be held guilty of
only hurt. Thus, in Marana Goundan's case AIR 1941, when the accused
kicked a person and the person died because of a diseased spleen, he
was held guilty of only hurt.

A physical contact is not necessary. Thus, a when an accused gave food

mixed with dhatura and caused poisoning, he was held guilty of Hurt.

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 Grievous Hurt
Cases of severe hurt are classified under grievous hurt. The authors of
the code observed that it would be very difficult to draw a line between
hurt and grievous hurt but it was important to draw a line even if it is
not perfect so as to punish the cases which are clearly more than hurt.

Rational, Scope and Components of Grievous hurt

The following kinds of hurt are designated as “grievous”

First- Emasculation.

‘Emasculation’- the term ‘emasculation’ means the depriving a person

of masculine vigor, castration. Injury to the scrotum would render a
man impotent. A person emasculating himself cannot be convicted
under this section. A person causing hurt to himself does not come
within the purview of this section.

Secondly- Permanent privation of the sight of either eye.

Losing eye sight-where as many as twenty four persons lost their eye-
sight permanently in consequence of arrack distributed by the accused
after mixing methyl alcohol in it, the hurt has to be regarded as
grievous hurt because of what has been stated in the clause2.

Thirdly- Permanent privation of the hearing of either ear.

It deprives a man of his sense of hearing. Injury to the tympanum or

auditory nerve or by thrusting something into the ear which causes
deafness.

Fourthly- Privation of any member or joint.

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The term ‘member’ means an organ or a limb being part of man
capable of performing a distinct function. It includes, nose, mouth,
hands, feet, phalanges etc.

Fifthly- Destruction or permanent impairing of the powers of any

member or joint.

The use of limbs and joints of body are essential to the discharge of the
normal functions of the body. Their deprivation causes lifelong crippling
and makes the person defenseless and miserable.

Sixthly- Permanent disfiguration of the head or face.

The word ‘disfigure’ means to cause some external injuries which

detracts from his personal appearance but does not weaken him. In
Gangaram v. State of Rajasthan1 the bridge of the nose was cut, as the
injury was inflicted by a sharp – edged weapon, it was held that the act
amounted to permanent disfiguration within the meaning of this clause
and hence the injury was grievous.

Seventhly- Fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth.

It is not necessary that a bone should be cut through and, the cut
should be up to the medulla. If there is a break by cutting or splintering
of the bone or there is a rupture or fissure in it, it would amount to a
fracture but the doctor must document the dimensions of fracture and
duration/age correlation with age of injury. Dislocation means
displacement. Mere looseness of teeth will not amount to dislocation.
It has to be proved that the tooth was originally not loose and that
there was fracture or dislocation by the injury.

1
1984 Cr LJ 180 NOC (Raj)

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Eighthly- Any hurt which endangers life or which causes the victim to be
in severe bodily pain or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits for a
period of 20 days.

A wound may cause intense pain, prolonged disease or long lasting

body injury but does not fall under any of the seven clauses. A body
injury/beating may not mutilate the sufferer or fracture his bones but
may be so harsh and painful may cause even death. The eighth clause
provides for such hurts. Under this, three different clauses of hurt are
included. These are:

 Any hurt which endangers life.

 Any hurt which causes the victim to be in severe bodily pain for a
period of 20 days.
 Any hurt which prevents the victim from following his ordinary
pursuits for a period of 20 days.

In Muhammad Rafi’s2 case, the accused, a mocha (cobbler ) aged about

20 years who inflicted an injury on the neck of the deceased with a
penknife from behind, was convicted by the Session’s Court under
section 304(2) IPC for culpable homicide to murder. The tragedy took
place as a result of a quarrel between the two boys over a loan of sum
of fifteen paisa. The deceased was taken to the hospital and died
fifteen days later as a result of septic poisoning from the wound.

Allowing the appeal partially, the Lahore High Court held the accused
liable under section 322, IPC for causing death by grievous hurt as
against culpable homicide not amounting to murder as the

2
AIR 1930 Lah. 305.

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circumstances did not justify a time a wound on the neck is dangerous
to life within the meaning of clause 8 of section 320, IPC.

In Mohindar Singh v. Emperor3, the accused on 22nd August, 1922

inflicted a wound on Sarwan singh’s leg with a gandasa (a sharp –
edged weapon) and gave him blows with the back of the gandasa.
Tetanus set in on 31st August, 1922 which caused his death. Held, a
wound in the leg was not in itself sufficiently dangerous to bring the
case within the meaning of grievous hurt when death due to tetanus
which supervened and resulted in the death of deceased.

Rational behind the section- The authors of the code observe: “we
have found it very difficult to draw a line between those bodily hurts
which are serious and those which are slight. To draw such a line
between with perfect accuracy is absolutely impossible; but it is far
better that such a line should be drawn, though rudely, than that
offences some of which approach in enormity to murder, while others
are little more than frolics which a good natures man would hardly
recent, should be classed together.

Some hurts which are not, like those kinds of hurt which are
mentioned in condition 1 to 7, distinguished by a broad and obvious
line from slight hurts, may nevertheless be most serious. A wound, for
example, which neither emasculates the sufferer, nor blinds him, nor
destroys his hearing, nor deprives him of a member or a joint, nor
breaks his bones, nor dislocate them, may yet cause intense pain,
prolonged disease, lasting injury to constitution. It is evidently desirable
that law should make a distinction between such a wound, mad scratch
which he headed by just sticking plaster. A beating, again, which does

3
AIR 1925 Lah. 297.

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not maim the sufferer or break his bones may be so cruel as to bring
him to point of death. Such a beating, it is clear, ought not to be
confounded with a bruise, which requires only to be bathed with
vinegar, and of which the traces disappear in a day.”

Scope- Like in Section 319, this section is also in the nature of definite
clause. Section 319 defines hurt, whereas section 320 defines ‘grievous
hurt’.

To make out the offence of voluntarily causing grievous hurt, there

must be some specific hurt, voluntarily inflicted, and coming within the
eight kinds enumerated in this section. When a person forcibly thrust
lathi into the rectum of another person and causes serious injuries, he
was held guilty of causing grievous hurt. Injuries inflicted with the help
of burning firewood cannot be considered as grievous hurt as they do
not come within the specific items of the injuries mentioned in the
definition of grievous hurt; nor do they endanger life.

Difference between hurt and grievous hurt

Section 321- Voluntarily causing hurt –

Whoever does any act with the intention of thereby causing hurt to any
person, or with the knowledge that he is likely thereby to cause hurt to
any person, and does thereby cause hurt to any person, is said
"voluntarily to cause hurt".

Section 322- Voluntarily causing grievous hurt –

Whoever voluntarily causes hurt, if the hurt which he intends to cause

or knows himself to be likely to cause is grievous hurt, and if the hurt

Submitted by: Shikhar Agarwal

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which he causes is grievous hurt, is said "voluntarily to cause grievous
hurt".

Explanation.-A person is not said voluntarily to cause grievous

hurt except when he both causes grievous hurt and intends or
knows himself to be likely to cause grievous hurt. But he is said
voluntarily to cause grievous hurt, if intending or knowing himself
to be likely to cause grievous hurt of one kind, he actually causes
grievous hurt of another kind.

The provisions of this section are very precise and incapable of

misconstruction. A magistrate dealing with charges of voluntarily
causing grievous hurt must consider and decide not only whether
grievous hurt has been caused but if it has been caused voluntarily or
himself knew to be likely to cause grievous hurt. If he intended or knew
himself to be likely to cause only simple hurt, he cannot be convicted
under section 325. Section 321 and the explanation to section 322
make it clear that either the ingredient of intention or that of
knowledge, must be essentially present in order to constitute the
offence of hurt. Such a knowledge cab be inferred from the part of
body chosen for inflicting violence and the severity of that violence as
shown by the injuries on the body of the victim. The means by which
the injury was cause is not the true criterion. The answer really
depends on the nature of the injury caused and the manner in which
the blows were administered, whether by fists and slaps or by a
weapon.

Submitted by: Shikhar Agarwal

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 Difference between punishments for “hurt” and “grievous hurt”

Section 323- Punishment for voluntarily causing hurt –

Whoever, except in the case provided for by section 334, voluntarily

causes hurt, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description
for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may
extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.

When the injury is not serious and there was no intention to

cause death or grievous hurt, nor did the accused have knowledge that
it was likely to cause grievous hurt or death, he is guilty of causing hurt
and not death, even though death is caused. Where the accused was
one of the persons who assaulted the deceased with a stick but there
was no proof that the fatal blow or grievous injury was caused by him,
it was held, that the accused could only be convicted under section
323.4

Where evidence gave no clue as to on which part of the body of

deceased the accused has struck and prosecution also could not
establish that the death of deceased was caused by striking on some
vital body, the accused could only be convicted under section 323.

Section 325- Punishment for voluntarily causing grievous hurt –

Whoever, except in the case provided for by section 335, voluntarily

causes grievous hurt, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also
be liable to fine.

The prosecution may prove:

4
Babu Bika Jadhav 1996 Cri LJ 3952 (Bom)

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 i. That the accused caused of any kind described in section 320.
ii. That the accused intended, or knew that he was likely, to cause
grievous hurt of any kind described;
iii. That the accused did so voluntarily.

Where there is no evidence to indicate as to which of the accused

persons actually caused grievous hurt none of them could be
convicted under section 325. It may be presumed that each of them
intended to cause grievous hurt but such a presumption alone is not
sufficient to establish the offence of causing grievous hurt unless it is
further shown that the accused actually caused grievous hurt.5

The prosecution does not have to prove hurt under s.319 in order
to prove grievous hurt under s.320 as they have to prove homicide
under s.299 and then move on to s.300 in order to prove murder.
Section 320 has very clearly laid down hurt which are to be classified
as grievous hurt and the eighthly clause is the only one in which
some interpretation and misuse is possible. The only catch in this
section is the intention part. Although intention can be inferred from
the way in which the injury was caused, but it takes a little more for
the prosecution to prove grievous hurt because the defense would
always like to bring the injury from s.320 to s.319 because the
punishment and fine imposed is much less. An illustration in this
respect can be that if a person slaps another person and he falls
down, hitting his head on the ground which results in his death. This
is only a case of simple hurt as the person had only slapped and in
ordinary course of things it would not lead to death. Now let us
consider another case, a boxer ‘punches’ a person in his stomach

5
Dipa AIR 1947 All 408.

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 twice. The person falls down, head hits the ground and he dies. In
this case it is very clearly evident from the circumstances that the
intention was to cause to grievous hurt as he was a ‘boxer’ and he
‘punched’ twice. It can safely inferred that the boxer ‘knew’ if not
‘intended’ that if he ‘punches’ a person twice in his stomach, it will
cause grievous hurt if not death.

Although there is a huge fundamental difference between the

offence of hurt and grievous hurt, but in practice, they are not that
minutely followed in practical application. Going by the language of
the section 319, there is no clear cut definition of hurt whereas on
the contrary section 320 has defined which categories of hurt fall
under grievous hurt.

Difference between Grievous Hurt and Culpable Homicide

The line separating Grievous Hurt and Culpable Homicide is very thin. In
Grievous Hurt, the life is endangered due to injury while in culpable
homicide, death is likely to be caused. Thus, acts neither intended nor
likely to cause death may amount to grievous hurt even though death is
caused.

In case of Formina Sbastio Azardeo v. State of Goa Daman and Diu6, the
deceased was making publicity about the illicit intimacy between N and
W. On the fateful day, N, W, and her husband A caught hold of D and
tied him up to a pole and beat him as a result of which he died. They
were not armed with any dangerous weapon and had no intention to
kill him. N and W were held guilty of only causing grievous hurt.

6
1992 CLJ SC.

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 Grievous hurt and compelling wife to prostitution
The Parsi Act in Section 32(e) of the Parsi Act has clubbed the three
different grounds of divorce, viz., (i) Grievous Hurt, (ii) V.D. - Venereal
Diseases and (iii) Compelling the wife to submit herself to Prostitution.
No doubt all these three grounds operate in three different lines and
bear no relation with one another.

The Act could have and should have spelt out these three grounds and
should have added them separately in the list of grounds of divorce
nevertheless, the Act has chosen to put them together, for no obvious
reason or for no reasons explained in the Act. Be it as it is. The grounds
of divorce are, in any case boon to the married women and therefore,
welcome in any combination.

The grounds, VD, Compelling Wife to Prostitution and Grievous Hurt,

are not based on void or voidable marriage but proceed from the valid
marriage or the marriage which does not suffer from any legal infirmity
under the Law of Contract.

Compelling Wife to Prostitution

Compelling wife to prostitution is a ground of divorce under Section

32(e) of the Act. Indeed, this ground is more akin to immoral behaviour
of the husband, such as sodomy, bestiality, etc. It is not unusual in this
strange world that, in some rare of rarest cases, men do behave in this
inexplicable manner. The women are, therefore, given a 'right' to seek
divorce on the strange behaviour of man of forcing his wife to
prostitution.

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Venereal Disease

The other ground; Venereal Disease (VD) is also a ground for divorce.
This ground is discussed in the commentary on Divorce Act in this Book
and hence, not repeated here.

Grievous Hurt

The 'Grievous Hurt' is also the ground for divorce under the Act,
however, nowhere, it states what it means. Whereas, the term cruelty,
as understood, as of now, means physical injury, however, the Parsi
Act, separately and independently enumerates this ground in the list of
ground of divorce. The term 'Grievous Hurt' is peculiar to Criminal Law.
The Indian Penal Code in Section 320 lies down thus:

For matrimonial purpose, the eighth clause would be more in use than
the other clauses. It only means that life is in immediate danger and
doctors describe it danger to life. Although the medical evidence may
be more reliable but is not legally necessary. The apex Court has held
that cutting or splintering of the bone or a rupture or Fissure in it,
would amount to "fracture" within the meaning of Clause 7 of Section
320 of IPC.

The Parsi Act prescribes the period of limitation of two years. The
period of limitation begins under the Act:

(i) After infliction of the grievous hurt.

(ii) After the knowledge of suffering of the venereal disease of the
other spouse.

Submitted by: Shikhar Agarwal

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 Acid Attack7
It is most shocking and distressing to see that in-spite of incidents of
acid attacks mounting very high in our country, adequate punishment is
not meted out to the offenders and in most cases they escape
unpunished or with very minor punishment. This is just not done.
Section 326 of IPC which covers grievous hurt caused by throwing of
corrosive substance etc. is just not adequate to deal with cases of acid
throwing. It contains glaring infirmities and time is ripe now to remove
such infirmities and make it more stringent.

226th report of Law Commission titled “The Inclusion of Acid Attacks as

Specific Offences in the IPC and a law for Compensation for Victims of
Crime” very categorically points out that Section 326 of IPC is just
insufficient/inadequate to deal with it.

Firstly, the definition of grievous hurt is not broad enough to cover the
various kinds of injuries which are inflicted during acid attacks.
Secondly, the section does not cover the act of administering acid.
Thirdly, the section gives a wide discretion to the courts as far as
punishment is concerned. The cases on acid attacks in India show that
normally inadequate punishment is awarded in these cases.

Fourthly, the section in the IPC does not punish the intentional act of
throwing of acid if no injuries occur. Lastly, the section also does not
specify who the fine should be awarded to. All these glaring anomalies
and infirmities must be addressed properly so that no offender is able
to escape unpunished by taking undue advantage of them.

7
Acid Attack: Talibanic Act Must be Punished in Same Way
GoIndoCal, Sanjeev Sirohi , Jan. 2, 2012, 6:40pm IST.

Submitted by: Shikhar Agarwal

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I also very strongly feel that 226th report of Law Commission very
rightly recommends that a new section 326A be added to the IPC. The
proposed Section 326A will read as follows: “Whoever burns or maims
or disfigures or disables any part or parts of the body of a person or
causes grievous hurt by throwing acid on or administering acid to that
person, with the intention of causing or with the knowledge that he is
likely to cause such injury or hurt shall be punishable with
imprisonment of either description which shall not be less than 10
years but which may extend to life and with fine which may extend to
Rs 10 Lakhs.

Provided that any fine levied under this section shall be given to the
person on whom acid has been thrown or administered. Also, it is a
cognizable , non–bailable and non–compoundable and triable by court
of session.

Further, Section 326 A (ii) provides that, “Whoever throws acid on or

administers acid to, any person with the intention of causing burns or
maiming or disfiguring or disabling or causing grievous hurt to that
person shall be liable to imprisonment of either description for a term
not less than 5 years but which may extend to 10 years and with fine
which may extend to Rs 5 Lakh.

The classification of offence is same as mentioned in Section 326 (i).

Apart from all this, it was also proposed that in cases of acid attacks a
presumption be incorporated in the Indian Evidence Act as Section
114B. Section 114B dealing with presumption as to acid attack reads: “If
a person has thrown acid on, or administered acid to, another person
the court shall presume that such an act has been done with the

Submitted by: Shikhar Agarwal

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intention of causing, or with the knowledge that such an act is likely to
cause such hurt or injury as is mentioned in Section 326A of the IPC.”

Acid when thrown on face can severely damage the eyes, ears, mouth
and nose apart from lips and eyelids. Also, when the acid splashes or
drips over any organ of the body, it burns everything which comes in its
ambit. Breathing problems or failure in extreme cases is another
potential hazards which the victims of acid attacks have to grapple
with.

It can cause permanent or temporary disfigurements with either chin

becoming welded to the chest or mouth no longer opening or eyelids
no longer closing which itself speaks volumes of the serious gravity of
the crime and must never go unpunished or even lightly punished
because it spoils the entire life of the person on whom it is thrown and
who prior to the attack was leading a normal life. No provocation, no
matter how strong it may be, can ever even remotely be allowed to be
justified under any circumstances, come what may!

The victims die daily and suffer from not only psychological symptoms
like weakness, insomnia, depression, fear of another similar attack but
also face discrimination as no one wants to employ them nor their own
relatives are happy to be at their constant services. Of course,
exceptions are there but they are few and far between.

There goes a well known old adage: “Prevention is better than cure.’’
This resoundingly applies to acid attacks also which even the Law
Commission realized and therefore in its 226th report recommended
that the distribution and sale of acid be strictly regulated and the sale
of acid across shop counters be banned which most unfortunately has
not been the case till now.

Submitted by: Shikhar Agarwal

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Infact, it is a child’s play to obtain acid from across the counter in
medical and other stores and therefore it has become a relatively cheap
and effective way of committing acts of violence against women.

This is exactly what is most concerning and it would not be proper to

downplay it because acid attack incidents on especially innocent,
hapless women or girls have witnessed an astronomical increase in the
last few years.

Latest Development
Insertion of new section 326A- throwing or using of acid in any
form on the body of another person- notwithstanding contained in
s.324 or 326 of the code, whoever does any act of throwing acid or
using acid in any form on the other person with the intention of or with
the knowledge that he is likely to cause such person permanent or
partial damage or deformity disfiguration or disability to any part of the
body of such person shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which shall not be less than 10 years but which
may extend to life and shall also be liable to fine which shall be
minimum of Rs. 2 lakhs and may extend to Rs. 5 lakhs.

The offence shall be cognizable, non-bailable and non-

compoundable.

Justification: Although the offences relating to acid throwing is covered

under s.320 and 326 of the IPC but keeping in view the extreme
heinous nature of the act and the fact that under s. 326 the offence can
be punished with imprisonment for life or with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to 10 years, it is proposed in

Submitted by: Shikhar Agarwal

18
the bill that atleast the minimum punishment be not less than 10 years
and extend to life imprisonment.

Submitted by: Shikhar Agarwal

19
 Case Analysis with latest judgements

Sushil Raikwar v. The State Of M.P. on 18 October, 20128

Facts
The complainant Nathuram was working on his handcart shop of
snacks. His son Raju @ Kamlesh was selling Samosas. At about 9:00 PM
in the night the appellant went to the shop of the complainant and took
some Samosas. Thereafter Raju @ Kamlesh asked for money, then the
quarrel started. The appellant gave a slap to Raju @ Kamlesh. The
complainant tried to stop their quarrel and when he intervened in that
quarrel, the appellant took hot oil from the utensil kept on the
handcart and poured upon the complainant due to which the
complainant sustained burn injuries on his right chest, right abdomen,
right hand and right leg. The customers of the complainant saw the
incident.

Arguments on behalf of Respondent

The learned counsel for the State has submitted that the appellant was
to be convicted for the offence under Section 308 of IPC, because the
victim sustained 25-30% burns and he could die. Similarly, the sentence
directed by the trial Court appears to be correct.

8
Criminal Appeal No. 2259 OF 1996.

Submitted by: Shikhar Agarwal

20
Arguments on behalf of Appellant
The appellant-accused abjured his guilt. He did not take any specific
plea, but he has stated that due to his quarrel with Raju, a push was
given to the handcart of the complainant and it was disbalanced, and
therefore the utensil having hot oil turned on the complainant. He did
not assault the complainant in such a manner.

The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that there was no
willful act of the appellant, but a push was caused suddenly to the
handcart, and therefore the complainant sustained some superficial
burns. The injuries caused to the victim were not fatal in nature,
therefore no offence under Section 308 of IPC was made out. In the
alternate, it is submitted that the appellant remained in the custody for
22 days. He was a youth of 22 years at the time of the incident, who has
faced the trial and appeal for the last 16 years and now he has settled
in the life, and therefore he may not be sent to the jail again.

The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that there was no
willful act of the appellant, but a push was caused suddenly to the
handcart, and therefore the complainant sustained some superficial
burns. The injuries caused to the victim were not fatal in nature,
therefore no offence under Section 308 of IPC was made out. In the
alternate, it is submitted that the appellant remained in the custody for
22 days. He was a youth of 22 years at the time of the incident, who has
faced the trial and appeal for the last 16 years and now he has settled
in the life, and therefore he may not be sent to the jail again.

Prayers
Submitted by: Shikhar Agarwal
21
 1. Whether the appeal of the appellant can be accepted?
2. And whether the sentence directed by the trial Court against the
appellant can be reduced?

Judgement
The presence of the appellant is proved. There is no doubt in his
identification. If the handcart was pushed and hot oil fell upon the
victim due to disbalance, then the oil should have fell on the lower part
of the body of the victim Nathuram, but some drops of the oil might
have reached to the upper part of his body, but the entire oil could not
reach to the upper part of the body. Therefore the defence taken by
the appellant cannot be accepted.

The trial Court has convicted the appellant for commission of offence
under Section 308 of IPC. If the evidence of Nathuram and Raju is
considered along with the medical evidence, then it would be clear that
the quarrel took place in a spur of moment. It was not pre- planned
incident caused by the appellant. He could not hold the hot utensil in
his hands for a longer period, and therefore he could pour the hot oil
upon the complainant in a very small period of time, and therefore it
cannot be said that he was intended to kill the victim. Similarly, the
victim Nathuram did not sustain any fatal injury. He sustained only
simple injuries. The injuries sustained by the complainant do not fall
within the ingredients of Section 320 of IPC, and therefore it was not
grievous. Hence the case of the appellant does not fall in any
ingredients of Section 300 of IPC. It is a case of causing simple hurt by
hot oil, and therefore the crime committed by the appellant falls within
the purview of Section 324 of IPC only.

Submitted by: Shikhar Agarwal

22
The quarrel took place for payment of Rs.2/-, and therefore it cannot
be said that either the complainant or his son gave any sudden or grave
provocation to the appellant when he was throwing hot oil. He ought to
have been known that by such an act, the complainant may sustain
such burn injuries, and therefore the act done by the appellant appears
to be so voluntary, hence he has caused some injuries to the victim by
throwing hot oil upon him, and therefore he is guilty of offence under
Section 324 of IPC.

The instant appeal filed by the appellant is partly allowed. The

conviction as well as the sentence directed by the trial Court for the
offence under Section 308 of IPC is hereby set aside. He is acquitted
from the charge of offence under Section 308 of IPC, but convicted for
commission of offence under Section 324 of IPC and sentenced to the
period which he has already undergone in the custody by enhancing
the fine amount from Rs.1,000/- to Rs.7,000/.

Bade Lal Parshad & Ors vs $ State & Ors on 17 October,

2012
Facts
A complaint was lodged by the complainant Bade Lal Parshad, on 22nd
March, 2006 against the accused persons herein, alleging that on 21nd
March, 2006, wife of the accused Parbhu Nath had thrown garbage in
front of the house of the complainant and when it was objected to by
his wife son of the accused Parbhu Nath abused her. In order to put an
end to the fight, the complainant went to the house of one of his

Submitted by: Shikhar Agarwal

23
neighbours and in the meantime his daughter came and said that some
persons were beating his son. It was further alleged that on reaching his
house Pintu and Chottu caught hold of the complainant and exhorted
their co-accused to beat him and then other accused, having iron rods
started beating him as a result of which he sustained many injuries on
his head, right elbow and his upper lips and accused Prema Devi, wife
of the accused Parbhu Nath, injured the son of the complainant by
hitting him on his head with a brick.

Judgement
According to Session Court, accused persons cannot be charged for an
offence punishable under Section 308/34 IPC. The only offence under
Section 324/34 IPC is made out against the accused persons.

However, the apex court allowed the petition. The impugned order is
set aside and framing of charge under Section 308/34 IPC in place of
324/34 IPC against all the accused persons is ordered.

Jagdamba Prasad & Ors. vs The State Of M.P.9 on 5

September, 2012
Facts
On 18.8.1994 at about 7-7.30 p.m in the evening, the victim Khadiya
was going from his field to his house at Village Thigri. In front of the
house of Jagadamba Khare, the appellants abused the victim Khadiya
with obscene words and words based upon his caste. They have told to

9
Criminal Appeal No.280 of 1997.

Submitted by: Shikhar Agarwal

24
the victim Khadiya that why he was not living like a Chamar. Thereafter,
victim Khadiya was taken in the house of Jagadamba Khare and the
appellants had assaulted him. Hakka, brother of the victim Khadiya,
went to the Outpost Mohendra of P.S. Simaria, and gave a written
report with the statement that Khadiya is still in the house of
Jagadamba. At Outpost Mohendra a case was registered and
thereafter, it was transferred to the Police Station Simaria. The victim
Khadiya was sent to the hospital for his medico legal examination. Dr.
P.K. Jain examined Khadiya and gave a report. He found six injuries to
the victim Khadiya situated on left scapula, left forearm, left ear, right
hand, right feet and right hip. He was referred for the X-Ray
examination. Dr. Singh took the X- Ray of the victim Khadiya and gave a
report. He found a fracture of the right tibia bone to the victim Khadiya.

The appellants abjured their guilt. They have stated that they were
falsely implicated due to the enmity. They never assaulted the victim on
the basis of the caste or otherwise.

After considering the evidence adduced by both the parties the learned
Special Judge acquitted the appellants from the charges of offence
punishable under Section 3(1)(xiv) of the Special Act and convicted
them for offence punishable under Section 3(1)(x) of the Special Act.

The appellants have preferred this appeal against the judgment dated
6.1.1997 passed by the Special Judge under the SC/ST (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act in ST whereby the appellants were convicted for offence
punishable under Section 3(1)(x) of SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act,
1989 and sentenced for six months rigorous imprisonment with fine of
Rs.500/-. In default of payment of fine one month's rigorous
imprisonment was also directed.

Submitted by: Shikhar Agarwal

25
Arguments on behalf of Appellants
The learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that according to
the prosecution's story no offence was committed at the public place. It
was not told by the witness Khadiya that the appellants told him to live
like a Chamar. On the contrary he has accepted that there was enmity
with the appellants since last five years and therefore, the victim
Khadiya was not ready to do the work of the appellants and therefore,
no offence punishable under Section 3(1)(x) of the Special Act is made
out against the appellants.

Arguments on behalf of Petitioners

The learned Panel Lawyer has submitted that the conviction and
sentence directed by the trial Court appears to be correct whereas the
trial Court has not framed the charges under Section 325 read with
Section 34 of the I.P.C. Khadiya sustained a grievous hurt due to the
assault caused by the appellants and therefore, the appellants are
culprits for the offence punishable under Section 325 read with Section
34 of I.P.C.

Payers
1. Whether the appellants could be convicted for offence punishable
under Section 3(1)(x) of the Special Act ?
2. Whether the case may be remanded for trial of the appellants for
the charge of offence under Section 325 read with Section 34 of
the I.P.C ?
3. Whether the sentence directed against the appellant can be
reduced ?

Submitted by: Shikhar Agarwal

26
Judgement
It is apparent that the appellants cannot be convicted for offence
punishable under Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities)
act and therefore, the trial Court has erred in convicting them for such
an offence. Consequently, the appeal filed by the appellants is hereby
allowed. Conviction as well as the sentence directed against the
appellants for offence punishable under Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act is hereby set aside. The appellants are
acquitted from the charges of offence punishable under Section
3(1)(x) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. They would be
entitled to get the fine amount back, if they have deposited the same.

Tufani Bhuiyan And Ors. vs State Of Jharkhand10 on 3

January, 2006
Facts
PW 2 Mewalal Bhuiyan is the son of Kishun Bhuiyan who is the
deceased. PW 3, Sitwa Devi is the mother of PW 2 and wife of Kishun
Bhuiyan. The appellants are related with the deceased and were
residing in the same premises. The case of the prosecution is that the
deceased was a witch and he is responsible for the death of the wife of
Charan Bhuiyan. It is said that; witchcraft was the motive for which the
unfortunate incident took place at about 7 p.m. on 30.7.1986. PW 2,
Mewalal was grazing his cattle and at that time the appellants and two
others who died before trial, went to the place of occurrence. They
10
2006 CriLJ 1878, 2006 (1) JCR 279 Jhr.

Submitted by: Shikhar Agarwal

27
asked PW 2 about the where about of Kishun Bhuiyan, the deceased in
the case, PW 2 refused to reply and so he was beaten. PW 2, thereafter,
proceeded towards the village Gidhoor and on the way, saw his uncle
Rameshwar Bhuiyan and his mother Sitwa Devi. PW 2 requested his
father not to go to the place where he was earlier grazing the cattle as
the appellants were searching for him. The deceased ignoring the
request of PW 2 went towards the place where PW 2 was grazing cattle
and seeing him the appellants 1 to 3 assaulted him with lathi and spear.
PW 3 intervened but he was also beaten by Pokhan, the other accused
who is since dead. Thereafter the appellants went away from that
place. Kishun Bhuiyan died due to the injury sustained by him.

Arguments on behalf of Appellants

Learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the appellants, submits that
the prosecution having miserably failed to establish the cause of death
of the deceased Kishun Bhuiyan, the trial Court was not justified in
convicting the appellants under Section 302, IPC. Learned counsel
further, submits that the prosecution did not examine any of the
doctors to hold that PWs 2 and 3 suffered injuries and therefore, the
accused are entitled for acquittal.

Judgement
The prosecution did not even produce the document i.e. post-mortem
examination report, nor did it examine the doctor. Therefore, there is
no evidence on record to show that Kishun Bhuiyan died on account of
homicidal violence. In the absence of any medical evidence, we are
unable to hold that the prosecution has proved its case under Sections
323 and 324, IPC, There is nothing on record to prove that Kishun

Submitted by: Shikhar Agarwal

28
Bhuiyan died on account of homicidal violence and that PWs 2 and 3
suffered injury. Judges, therefore, hold that, the prosecution has
miserably failed to establish the charge of murder as well as the
charges under Sections 323 and 324, IPC. Judges have no option but to
acquit the appellants and accordingly, the appellants were acquitted of
the charges levelled against them. This appeal was accordingly
allowed.

Submitted by: Shikhar Agarwal

29
 Conclusion
Section 321 and explanation of section 322 make it clear that
either the ingredients of intention or that of knowledge must be
essentially present in order to constitute the offence of hurt. In
Dalapati Mahji’s11 case, during the quarrel the accused dragged the
victim by holding his hand, whereby the victim fell down and sustained
leg injuries. It appeared as if the victim was drunk and the accused
dragged him with no intention to aasault. It could be inferred that the
accused did not intend to cause grievous hurt, but grievous hurt ensued
unexpectedly. Therefore, conviction under section 325 was liable to be
set aside.

So punishments of HURT is just like Newton’s third law of

motion which states that “every action have an equal and
opposite reaction” mean if today you are injuring somebody
with guilty mind tomorrow he can file case against you and
get relief of what you had given to him.

11
1982 Cri LJ 134.

Submitted by: Shikhar Agarwal

30
 Bibliography

 Basu’s INDIAN PENAL CODE, 10th ed., Ashok Law House, New
Delhi.
 Dr. Hari Singh Gour, PENAL LAW OF INDIA, 11th ed., Vol. 3, Law
Publishers India Pvt. Ltd.
 K.D. Gaur, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, 6th ed., Lexis
Nexis Butterworths.
 K.I. Vibhute, P.S.A. Pillai’s CRIMINAL LAW, 10th ed., Lexis Nexis
Butterworths.
 Faculty of Law, University of Delhi, CRIMINAL LAW-I, July 2011.

Submitted by: Shikhar Agarwal

31