DELHI NSTITUTE OF LAW

MURDER AND CULPABLE HOMICIDE

(1) The first is, what may be called, 'culpable homicide of the first degree'. This is the gravest form of
culpable homicide, which is defined in Section 300 as 'murder'

. (2) The second may be termed as 'culpable homicide of the second degree'. This is punishable under the
first part of Section 304.

(3) Then, there is 'culpable homicide of the third degree'. This is the lowest type of culpable homicide and
the punishment provided for it is also the lowest among the punishments provided for the three grades.
Culpable homicide of this degree is punishable under the second part of Section 304

Section 300 IPC reads as hereunder: Except in the case hereinafter expected, Culpable Homicide is
Murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing the death of the person,
or

Secondly- If it is done with the intention of causing such type of bodily injury as the offender knows to be
likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm of such injury is caused, or

Thirdly- If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended
to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or

Fourthly- If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all
probability, cause the death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without
any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.

As per penal provision under S.300 IPC except the exceptions culpable homicide is murder.

Exception 1- When culpable homicide is not murder- Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender,
whilst deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the person
who gave the provocation or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident. The above
exception is subject to the following provisos:-

First- That the provocation is not sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender as an excuse for killing. or
doing harm to any person.

Secondly- That the provocation is not given by anything done in obedience to the law, or by a public servant
in the lawful exercise of the powers of such public servant.

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Thirdly- That the provocation is not given by anything done in the lawful exercise of the right of private
defense

Exception 2- Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, in the exercise in good faith of the right of
private defense of person or property, exceeds the power given to him by law and causes the death of the
person against whom he is exercising such right of defense without premeditation, and without any intention
of doing more harm than is necessary for the purpose of such defense.

Exception 3- Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, being a public servant or aiding. a public
servant acting for the advancement of public justice, exceeds the powers given to him by law, and causes
death by doing an act which he, in good faith, believes to be lawful and necessary for the due discharge of
his duty as such public servant and without ill-will towards the person whose death is caused

. Exception 4.- Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight
in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender having taken undue advantage or acted
in a cruel or unusual manner

Exception 5- Culpable homicide is not murder when the person whose death is caused, being above the age
of eighteen years, suffers death or takes the risk of death with his own consent

Exception 1: Grave and Sudden Provocation:

The first and foremost landmark decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court on the Exception is K.M.Nanavati v.
State of Maharashtra AIR 1962 SC 605, wherein the following principles have been laid down: “

1. The test of ‘grave and sudden’ provocation is whether a reasonable man, belonging to the same class of
society as the accused, placed in the situation in which the accused was placed would be so provoked as to
lose his selfcontrol;

2. In India, words and gestures may also, under certain circumstances, cause grave and sudden provocation
to an accused so as to bring his act with the first exception of Sec.300, I.P.C.

3. The mental background created by the previous act of the victim may be taken into consideration in
ascertaining whether the subsequent act caused grave and sudden provocation for committing the offence.

4. The fatal blow should be clearly traced to the influence of passion arising from that provocation and not
after the passion had cooled down by lapse of time, or otherwise giving room and scope for premeditation
and calculation

“It is common knowledge that the term “self control” in the said provision is a subjective phenomenon and it
can be inferred from the surrounding circumstances of a given case. Therefore in order to find out whether
the last act of provocation upon which the offender caused the death was sufficiently grave as to deprive him
of the power of self-control, we have to take into consideration the previous act of provocation caused by the
deceased person.

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In RajKumar v. State of Punjab (2015) 16 SCC 337, the trial court convicted appellant under S.304 Pt.1
finding it as a case of grave and sudden provocation, High Court converted S.304 Part.1 to 302 IPC, The
Apex court held that, “the eye witnesses namely, P.W 2, Anil Chhabra and P.W 3, Gurbachan Singh are
quite cogent and consistent that there was an altercation and that soon thereafter the appellant took out his
licensed weapon fired upon the deceased.

Even if we were to accept that any abuses were hurled by the deceased, questions such as who was
responsible for such verbal altercation, who had initiated such verbal altercation, what was the extent of such
abuse, whether such abuses would, in normal circumstances, have provoked a reasonable minded person still
remain unanswered. These are issues which ought to have been proved by way of positive evidence or
inferences clearly discernible from the record. We do not find any material even suggesting such inferences.
In our view, the High Court was completely right and justified in negating the plea of “sudden and grave
provocation”.

In Saroj v. State of W.B (2014) 4 SCC 802, the deceased was found in house of accused at night to meet
thier daughter/sister.-Grave and sudden provacation established-Nature of injuries- Absence of
Premeditation – Apprecation of evidenceConviction of Appelants A-1 to A3 u/s 302 r/w s.34 altered to one
u/s 304 Pt.1 r/w s.34 and they were sentenced to undergo seven years’ rigorous imprisonment each.

In Chaitu v. State of UP (2014) 11 SCC 218, dispute was over sharing of water from canal leading to
quarrel and upon grave and sudden provocation, deceased was injured in ensuing fight by the accused and
sccumbing to injuries only on the next day.Agricultural lands were situated nearby the Appellants and
deceased – accused opened Muhar of Nali and diverted the water of the canal to flow into his field - there
was altercation between the parties and also scuffle between them - accused assaulted and gave blows with
lathi, legs and fists - deceased succumbed to his injuries – Trail court convicted the Appellant – High court
dismissed the Appeal - appellants contended that the occurrence took place 34 years ago on account of
sudden provocation and the act was committed by the accused without premeditation – Held that assault was
in the heat of passion on a sudden quarrel in which the accused cannot be said to have acted in an unduly
cruel manner - Evidence shows 14 that the accused/appellants gave blows with lathi, legs and fists mainly on
the limbs of deceased - circumstances it was a case of grave and sudden provocation and would fall under
the First Exception section 300 of IPC - Appeal is partly allowed.

In Hansa Singh v. State of Punjab [AIR 1977 SC 1801], the accused on seeing one Gurbachan Singh (the
deceased) committing sodomy on his son, assaulted him resulting in death. The court held that the accused
(appellant) had done so under sudden and grave provocation which led him to commit murderous assault.
The appeal of the accused was allowed. Conviction of the accused was reduced from life imprisonment
under Section 302 to imprisonment for seven years under Section 304, part-II of IPC vide Exception 1 to
Section 300, IPC.

In Muthu v. State of Tamil Nadu [(2007) 7 Supreme 547], it has been stated that in the heat of the
moment people sometimes do act which aren’t premeditated. Hence, the law provides that while those who
commit acts in a fit or anger should also be punished, their punishment should be lesser than that of

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premeditated offences. We are satisfied that Muthu was deprived of the power of self-control by grave and
sudden provocation which led him to commit the offence. If rubbish is thrown into one’s house or shop, one
would naturally get very upset.

It is evident that the accused had no motive or intention to cause death since he was not carrying the knife
from before, and only picked it up during the scuffle with Shiva (deceased). The Court further said that this
was not a murder but culpable homicide not amounting to murder punished under Section 304. In this case,
life term reduced to 5 years giving the accused benefit of Exception 1 to 300, IPC considering constant
harassment may lead to deprivation of the power of self-control amounting to grave and sudden provocation.

In Dattu Genu Gaikwad v. State of Maharashtra [AIR 1974 SC 387], the accused killed the deceased as
the deceased attempted reign to outrage the modesty of accused’s wife a month back. In view of the long
time interval, it was held that the plea of ‘sudden and grave’ provocation was not available.

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Exception 2: Self defense Under this exception, the accused is entitled to right of self-defense either to
protect the body or to protect his property. It is pertinent to note that on the facts and circumstance of the
case, if it is established that the deceased is the aggressor and the accused attacked him only while
exercising his right of private defense, then it is not murder and therefore the accused is entitled for
acquittal. On the other hand, if the accused exceeds his right to private defense, then he is liable to be
punished u/s 304 part 1 or part 2 IPC.

The principles with respect to Self-defense or private defense was summarized by the Hon’ble Apex Court
in the case of Arun v. State of Maharashtra (2012) 5 SCC 530 as follows, “. Law clearly spells out that
the right of private defence is available only when there is a reasonable apprehension of receiving injury.

A plea of right of private defence cannot be based on surmises and speculation. While considering whether
the right of private defence is available to an accused, it is not relevant whether he may have a chance to
inflict severe and mortal injury on the aggressor. In order to find whether the right of private defence is
available to an accused, the entire incident must be examined with care and viewed in its proper setting.

Udhayakumar Pardarinath jadav v. State of Maharashtra AIR 2008 SC 2827

Scuffle between the deceased and the accused. The deceased at that time was armed with knife and he was
karate expert. Accused apprehended injury on him and inflicted three injuries on the deceased. Fatal injury
on the chest penetrated deep into body. Held, accused exceeded his right of private defense. Convicted under
304 Part 1 IPC.

In Darshan singh v. state of Punjab 2010 2 SCC 333this court laid down the following principles, which
emerged upon the careful consideration and scrutiny of a number of judgments as follows:

“The following principles emerge on scrutiny of the following judgments:

1. Self-preservation is the basic human instinct and is duly recognized by the criminal jurisprudence of all
civilized countries. All free, democratic and civilized countries recognize the right of private defense within
certain reasonable limits.

2. The right of private defense is available only to one who is suddenly confronted with the necessity of
averting an impending danger and not of self creation.

3. A mere reasonable apprehension is enough to put the right of self defense into operation. In other words,
it is not necessary that there should be an actual commission of the offence in order to give rise to the right
of private defense. It is enough if the accused apprehended that such an offence is contemplated and it is
likely to be committed if the right of private defense is not exercised.

4. The right of private defense commences as soon as a reasonable apprehension arises and it is coterminous
with the duration of such apprehension

. 5. It is unrealistic to expect a person under assault to modulate his defense step by step with any
arithmetical exactitude

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. 6. In private defense the force used by the accused ought not to be wholly disproportionate or much greater
than necessary for protection of the person or property.

7. It is well settled that even if the accused does not plead self-defense, it is open to consider such a plea if
the same arises from the material on record.

8. The accused need not prove the existence of the right of private defense beyond reasonable doubt.

9. The Indian Penal Code confers the right of private defense only when that unlawful or wrongful act is an
offence

10. A person who is in imminent and reasonable danger of losing his life or limb may in exercise of self
defense inflict any harm even extending to death on his assailant either when the assault is attempted or
directly threatened.”

In the recent case of Prasad Swanker v. Ranjit Kumar (2015) 16 SCC 411, it was a case of Murder wherein
the plea of right to private defense was raised. A cross version of dacoity by deceased persons was held to be
credible. Recoveries from the place of occurrence, non-explanation of the injuries to the accused, made the
cross versions to be found probable. Reversal of the conviction was confirmed.

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Exception 3: Act of Public Servant According to Exception 3 to Section 300,

culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, being a public servant or aiding a public servant acting for
the advancement of public justice, exceeds the powers given to him by law, and causes the death by doing
an act which he, in good faith, believes to be lawful and necessary for the due discharge of his duty as such
public servant and without ill-will towards the person whose death is caused. The essential ingredients of the
Exception 3 of Section 300 are as follows:

(i) The offence must be committed by a public servant or by a person aiding a public servant;

(ii) The act alleged must have been committed by the public servant in the discharge of his official duties; (

iii) He should have exceeded the powers given to him by law;

(iv) The act should be done in good faith;

(v) The public servant should have believed that his act was lawful and necessary for the due discharge of
his duties;

(vi) He should not have borne any ill-will towards the person whose death was caused.

In Dakhi Singh v. State [AIR 1955 All 379], a constable of Railway Protection Police shot a thief
suspected to be tampering with sugar bags from the goods wagon on order by the havaldar. He did so in
discharge of his duty and that it was just an accident that he hit the fireman instead. He was convicted under
Section 302 by the lower Court. On appeal, it was held that the case would be covered by Exception 3 to
Section 300 of IPC

. In the present case, there was no ill-will between the appellant and the 21 deceased. The appellant was a
public servant and his object was the advancement of public justice. He caused the death of the fireman by
doing an act which he, in good faith, believed to be lawful and necessary for the due discharge of his duty.

In such circumstances, it was held that the offence committed was culpable homicide not amounting to
murder punishable under Section 304, Part-11 of I PC and not murder. The conviction under Section 302 for
murder was set aside. Exception 3 of Section 300 gives protection so long as the public servant acts in good
faith, but if his act is illegal and unauthorized by law, or if he glaringly exceeds the powers entrusted to him
by law, the Exception 3 will not protect him.

In Subha Naik v. R [(1898) 21 Mad. 249], a constable caused death under orders of a superior, it being
found that neither he nor his superior believed that it was necessary for public security to disperse certain
crowd by firing on them, it was held that he was guilty of murder since he was ‘not protected in that he
obeyed the orders of his superior officer’.

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Exception 4: Without Premeditation The Apex court in Surendar Kumar v. Union Territory, Chandigarh
(1989) 2 SCC 217 summarized the principles as follows, “To invoke this exception four requirements must
be satisfied, namely,

(i) it was a sudden fight;

(ii) there was no premeditation;

(iii) the act was done in a heat of passion; and

(iv) the assailant had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner.

The cause of the quarrel is not relevant nor is it relevant who offered the provocation or started the assault.
The number of wounds caused during the occurrence is not a decisive factor but what is important is that the
occurrence must have been sudden and unpremeditated and the offender must have acted in a fit of anger. Of
course, the offender must not have taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. Where, on a
sudden quarrel, a person in the heat of the moment picks up a weapon which is handy and causes injuries,
one of which proves fatal, he would be entitled to the benefit of this exception provided he has not acted
cruelly”

In Amirthalinga Nadar v. State of Tamil Nadu (1976) 2 SCC 195, Justice P.N.Bagwati, held that In a
case of Sudden fight, where the fatal blow was given as 23 part of the sudden fight that arouse out of sudden
quarrel betweeen the appelants part and deceased’s party, there is no scope for premeditation. The appelant
neither took undue advantage nor acted in cruel and unusual manner. Conviction altered from section 302 to
304 Part 1

. In the case of Dattu Shamrao valake and ors v. State of Maharashtra (2005) 11 SCC 261, In spite of
having an axe with him, had suffered quite a severe injury viz., contusion of 8"x1" over chest which could
have been caused, according to the Doctor, by an object like cycle chain. It is not possible to say at what
stage A3 had received such injury. At any rate, there was no clarification bearing on this aspect from the
prosecution side - Though three injuries were noted, they are all on the left parietal region causing the
fracture of skull bone. Looking at the nature of injuries, it is quite possible to say that all the injuries would
have been caused by one or two axe blows, but not necessarily three. In fact, PW6 states in cross
examination that she had seen one axe blow being given by accused No.3 on the neck of B - Cannot say
beyond doubt that the 2nd appellant acted in a cruel or atrocious manner by attacking the deceased with the
axe once or twice - Not inclined to deprive the 2nd appellant of the benefit of Exception No.4 –

It would be appropriate to convict him under Part I of Section 304 IPC because having regard to the gravity
of the injuries caused with a dangerous weapon, each one of which was fatal, the 2nd appellant must be
imputed with the intention to cause such bodily injury as was likely to cause death, if not the intention of
causing death.

The prosecution couldn’t prove that the accused anticipated the arrival of the prosecution party and they
were lying in wait to cause harm to the deceased . It was not possible to say with reasonable certainty as to
which party provoked the other and how the fight was initiated. Initially only one accused was armed with
axe and was later on joined by the others in fight , which is indicative of the fact that there was no
preconcert among the accused to attack the prosecution party. The incident was for a short duration and the

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accused fled from the scence immediately after the fight. There is nothing to show that the accused had
taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or usual manner. Therefore the court held that the Exeception-4 of
Section 300 is applicable.

In the case of Bhimanna v. State of Karnataka (2012) 9 SCC 650, Due to a dispute over pathway, there
was a sudden quarrel between the accused and the deceased. The accused stopped attacking as soon as the
deceased fell down. This is indicative of the fact that there was no intention to kill and there was no
premeditation. The Apex court finally held that the accused should be convicted under s.304, 447,504 r/w 34
while setting aside the conviction u/s 302 r/w 34 IPC.

In Prabhakar Vithal Gholve v. State of Maharashtra (2016) 12 SCC 490,It was a case of sudden fight
without Pre meditation. There was no proof of motive and injuries were present in the body of the accused.
when injury on the appellant has also been proved there is sufficient material to infer the reasonable
possibility of a grave and sudden provocation. it can be safely inferred that there was no intention on the part
of the accused persons to cause death. However, the injuries on head did prove fatal and knowledge of such
effect of the injuries can be fastened against the appellant. Therefore the conviction of appellant under
section 302 IPC, substituted with conviction u/s 304 Part II IPC.

The juvenile offender Balu went to the house of the prosecution party and allegedly committed assault for
which he was overpowered. On his cries, the appellant and four others rushed with sticks. the appellant
assaulted the deceased by stick on head followed by Balu who also assaulted the deceased by stick on head.
The deceased fell down and died immediately.

The High court confirmed the appellant’s conviction u/s 302 IPC.the appellant contended that the conviction
could at best be valid under Section 304 Part I and not under Section 302 of the IPC

. The Apex court held that, there is no reason for the assault except an assertion that the appellant was
unhappy with a female inmate of the house of prosecution party on a minor issue that she had received some
message on telephone but did not convey the same to the appellant.. It would be natural for the family
members of juvenile offender Balu on hearing his cries, to rush for his help and when injury on the appellant
has also been proved there is sufficient material to infer the reasonable possibility of a grave and sudden
provocation.

In .Nanak Ram v. State of Rajasthan (2014) 12 SCC 297, due to dispute over possession of land accused
persons duly armed, entered into bara and started dismantaling the fence. On being questioned, the accused
persons in heat of passion simultaneously inflicted barchi-blow on head of deceased which proved fatal.
High court convicted the accused u/s 304 Part II IPC. The Apex court held that the exception 4 is applicable
and the conviction and sentence is altered from Part II to Part I of S.304 IPC.

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Exception 5: Consensual Homicide/ Suicide pacts According to Exception 5 of Section 300, culpable
homicide is not murder when the person whose death is caused being above the age of 18 years, suffers
death or takes the risk of death with his own consent. The points to be proved are:

1) The death was caused with the consent of the deceased;

2) The deceased was then above 18 years of age;

3) That such consent was free and voluntary and not given through fear or misconception of facts.

The Apex court in Vijay alias Gyan chand jain v. State of MP (1994) 6 SCC 308, held as follows, “it may
be noted that exception 5 to Section 300 I.P.C. must receive a very strict and not a liberal interpretation and
in applying the said exception the act alleged to be consented to or authorised by the victim must be
considered with a very close scrutiny.

In this connection, reference may be made to an old Full Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in
Queen Empress v. Nayamuddin and Ors. Indian Law Reports Calcutta Vol. XVIII 484. In our views, the
learned Counsel for the State is justified in his contention that consent by necessary implication should not
be permitted to be raised by way of defence. The appellant at no point of time had spoken about such
consent and simply on account of the son not hearing any shriek or sound of agony, it cannot be held that the
deceased wife had consented to or authorised the appellant to cause the murderous assault. “

In Ujagar Singh v. R [AIR 1918 Lah 145], the accused killed his stepfather who was an infirm, old and
invalid man, with the latter’s consent, his motive being to get three innocent men (his enemies) implicated. It
was held that the offence was covered by the Fifth Exception to Section 300, and punishable under the first
part of Section 304, IPC.

In Re : Ambalathil Assainar AIR 1956 Mad 97, out of poverty, husband directed his wife to go back to
the house of her mother. She refused and stated that it is better to kill her than going to the house of the
mother. Husband then inflicted an injury by knife. Since consent was not unequivocal, but, conditional
otherwise, she will have to deprive the company of the husband. The husband more or less was responsible
for making her conditional consent. On these facts, Madras High Court held that Exception 5 cannot be
denied

In Dasrath Paswan v. State of Bihar [AIR 1958 Pat 190], the accused was a tenth class student and failed
thrice. He decided to end his life and informed his wife. She asked him to first kill her and then kill himself.
In accordance with their pact, the accused killed his wife aged 19 years. He was arrested before he could kill
himself. He was convicted under Section 302, IPC for the murder of his wife and sentenced to transportation
for life. On appeal, the Patna High Court, having regard to the extraordinary nature of this case, held that a
moderate sentence is proper.

The appellant is immature young man and was suffering from an inferior complex. The loss of a devoted
wife has already been a great punishment to him. Appellant was sentenced to five years of rigorous
imprisonment under Section 304 Part-I of the IPC, relying upon Exception 5 to Section 300

. In Ganesh Dooley v. R [(1879) 12 R5 Cal. 351], A and B, snake charmers induced С and D to allow
themselves to be bitten by a snake believing that they extracted the fangs. С and D died with snake bite. A
and В were held guilty of culpable homicide under Exception 5 to Section 300, on the ground that the
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deceased gave their consent ‘with full knowledge of the fact, in the belief of the existence of powers which
the accused asserted and believed themselves to possess.

IMPORTANT JUDGMENTS

In Virsa Singh v. The State of Punjab, 1958 SCR 1495 Vivian Bose j. speaking for this Court, explained
the meaning and scope of S.300(3), "The prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a
case under s. 300, 3rdly'. • First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present;.

secondly the nature of the injury must be proved. These are purely objective investigations

. It must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular injury, that is to say,. that it was not
accidental or unintentional or that some other kind of injury was intended. •

Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further, and,

fourthly it must be ,proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out
above was suffi- cient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.

This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the
offender."

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Single blow and Single stab cases:

1. In Pappu v. State of MP AIR 2006 SC 2659, the Apex court held that,it cannot be laid down as a rule of
universal application that whenever one blow is given, Section 302 IPC is ruled out. It would depend upon
the weapon used, the size of it in some cases, force with which the blow was given, part of the body it was
given and several such relevant factors.

2. In Bunni lal Chaudhary v. State of Bihar AIR 2006 SC 2531, the death was caused by a Gunshot
injury. There was no dispute that the injury inflicted on left side of the chest of deceased was single one. No
attempt was made by the accused to cause serious injury on vital part of the body of deceased. Act, which
was done by the accused, was done with knowledge that he was likely by such act to cause death of
deceased. The court held that the case falls under the third part of S.299 and punishable u/s 304 Part II

3. In Lakshman v. State of MP AIR 2006 SC 3204, the Apex Court held as follows, “the fact situation
shows that arrows were being shot from a distance, not with any accuracy. One of such arrows hit the
deceased. As established by the evidence of eye- witnesses the appellant had shot that arrow. There was no
sudden quarrel as stated by the appellant. The evidence shows otherwise. Considering the background facts
as noted above, appellant has to be convicted in terms of Section 304 Part I IPC and not in Section 302 IPC.
The conviction accordingly altered. Custodial sentence of 10 years would meet the ends of justice.”

4. In Hardeve Bhanji v. State of Gujarat 1993 CRLJ 64, According to P.W. 2, A-2 dealt only one blow.
The nature of the injury shows that the sharp edge of the axe was not used. The whole thing happened in a
sudden manner. The 45 court held that, under these circumstances clause I of S. 300, IPC is not attracted. If
A-2 had the intention to cause death, one would expect him to use the sharp edge of the axe. The very fact
that he used the blunt side of the axe shows that he had no intention to cause the death. Further it is not a
premeditated act. Now coming to clause III of S. 300, IPC, admittedly he caused only one injury with the
blunt side of the axe, which unfortunately resulted in the fracture of skull bone. Further this happened during
the quarrel. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to hold that he intended to cause that particular injury
which the Doctor found to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Under similar
circumstances the courts have held that the offence punishable would be one of culpable homicide as
knowledge that he was likely to cause death by such an act can be attributed to the accused. Accordingly, the
court set aside the conviction of the appellant under S. 302, I.P.C. and the sentence of imprisonment for life
thereunder. Instead convicted him under S. 304, Part II

5. In Augustine Saldanha v. State of Karnataka AIR 2003 SC 3843, only one blow was given in the
darknight. Though it cannot be said as a rule of universal application thatwhenever one blow is given
application of Section 302 IPC will be ruled out and that even a single blow delivered with a heavy or
dangerous weapon on a vital part of the body would make the offence a murder. On the peculiar facts found
in the present case, we feel that clause ‘Thirdly’ of Section 300 cannot be applied. The blow was said to
have been delivered with a stick and in a pitch dark night of time in the forest surroundings of the area
where it occurred. It could not reasonably be stated with any certainty that the accused chose that vital part
of the body to inflict the injury and that the blow wasaimed without any of such specific intention could
have landed on the head due to so many other circumstances, than due to any positive intention also. The
Apex Court, therefore, alter the conviction of appellant Augustine Saldanha from Section 302 IPC to Section
304 Part II.

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Distinction between ‘murder’ and ‘culpable homicide not amounting to murder’: Homicide means
killing of a human being by another human being. A homicide can be lawful or unlawful. Lawful homicide
includes situations where a person who has caused the death of another cannot be blamed for his death.

For example, in exercising the right of private defense or in other situations explained in Chapter IV of IPC
covering General Exceptions. Unlawful homicide means where the killing of another human is not approved
or justified by law. Culpable Homicide is in this category. Culpable means blame worthy.

Thus, Culpable Homicide means killing of a human being by another human being in a blameworthy or
criminal manner

The Hon’ble Apex Court in a landmark case State ofAP.v. Rayavarappu Punnaya AIR 1977 SC 45 made
a comparative table in order to appreciate the points of distinction between S.299 and S.300 as hereunder.

The following comparative table will be helpful in appreciating the points of distinction between the two
offences. "Section 299 Section 300 A person commits culpable homicide if the act by which the death is
caused is done - Subject to certain exceptions culpable homicide is murder if the act by which the death is
caused is done - INTENTION (a) with the intention of causing death; or (b) with the intention of causing
such bodily injury as is likely to cause death; or (1) with the intention of causing death; or

(2) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death
of the person to whom the harm is caused; or (3) with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person
and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death; or

KNOWLEDGE (c) with the knowledge that the act is likely to cause death. (4) with the knowledge that the
act is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to
cause death, and without any excuse or incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as is mentioned
above."

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 DELHI NSTITUTE OF LAW

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