500 Case 3
500 Case 3
As the CA correctly held, the petitioner’s reference to Bayog is misplaced as the factual situation in
that case does not obtain in the present case.
In Bayog, the Court faulted the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) for not receiving the defendant’s
belated Answer. As ruled by the Court, had the MCTC not refrained from receiving the defendant’s
Answer, the MCTC would have found that the defendant raised tenancy as an issue. While tenancy
as a defense in ejectment cases does not automatically divest the MCTC of its jurisdiction over
ejectment cases, the MCTC should have heard and received evidence to determine whether the
MCTC had jurisdiction over the case. If tenancy had indeed been an issue, the MCTC had no option
but to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.10
In the present case, the MTC correctly observed the proper procedure in ejectment cases. As
expressly provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, ejectment cases merely require
the submission by the parties of affidavits and position papers. The rule directs courts to conduct
hearings only when necessary to clarify factual matters. "This procedure is in keeping with the
objective of the Rule of promoting the expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases."11
Therefore, the petitioner’s assertion that the MTC did not receive testimonial or documentary
evidence in resolving the case is not correct. In fact, it is from the evidence furnished by the parties
that the MTC concluded that the petitioner never shared his produce with Lilia. Expectedly, the MTC
ruled that the petitioner was not Lilia’s tenant and in this light, it had jurisdiction over the case.
The issue of sharing of harvests between the petitioner and Lilia is a factual issue the Court should
not bother in a Rule 45 petition. Nevertheless, if only to lay this issue to rest, the Court confirms that
there was never any harvest sharing between the parties to make the petitioner the tenant of Lilia;
this has been the consistent factual finding in the courts below and this finding binds this Court in the
absence of any compelling reason showing that it is tainted with infirmity. The Court has repeatedly
emphasized that sharing of produce must exist between the tenant and the landowner for tenancy
relationship to exist.12 In the absence of this factual basis, the lower tribunals were correct in
upholding the jurisdiction of the MTC over the ejectment case.
The Court may not entertain the petitioner’s new theory that there existed tenancy relationship
between him and the previous owners of the land, and that Lilia must respect and continue that
tenancy relationship. The petitioner never raised this issue before the lower tribunals, save in his
motion for reconsideration before the CA. For the Court to accept the petitioner’s new theory runs
counter to the rule we have held in the past: "points of law, theories, issues and arguments not
brought to the attention of the trial court will not be and ought not to be considered by a reviewing
court, as these cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Basic consideration of due process
impels this rule."13
WHEREFORE, in light of these considerations, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari
The decision dated October 25, 2006 and the resolution dated May 29, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01662 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson s Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
Footnotes
2
Id. at 19-26; penned by Associate Justice Agustin S. Dizon, and concurred in by Associate
Justices Pampio A. Abarintos and Priscilla Baltazar-Padilla.
3
Id. at 34-35.
4
Penned by Judge Glenda C. Go, MTC of San Fernando, Cebu; id. at 151-157.
5
Id. at 22.
6
Supra note 2.
7
327 Phil. 1019 (1996).
8
Section 10. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Expiration of Period, etc. -
The agricultural leasehold relation under this Code shall not be extinguished by mere
expiration of the term or period in a leasehold contract nor by the sale, alienation or transfer
of the legal possession of the landholding. In case the agricultural lessor sells, alienates or
transfers the legal possession of the landholding, the purchaser or transferee thereof shall be
subrogated to the rights and substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor.
9
Rollo, pp. 178-181.
10
Supra note 7, at 1037.
11
Odsigue v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111179, July 4, 1994, 233 SCRA 626, 630.
12
See Gelos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86186, May 8, 1992, 208 SCRA 608, 614; and De
la Cruz v. Bautista, G.R. No. 39695, June 14, 1990, 186 SCRA 517, 527.
Mark Anthony Esteban, etc. v. Spouses Rodrigo C. Marcelo and Carmen T. Marcelo, G.R.
13
No. 197725, July 31, 2013, citing Nunez v. SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions, Inc., G.R. No.
180542, April 12, 2010, 618 SCRA 134, 145; italics ours.
Two. The CA upheld respondent District Engineer’s view that the MCTC should have considered the
inhabitants of Barangay Poblacion indispensable parties to the ejectment case since the land
belonged to them and since it was for their benefit that the gym was to be built.
But, ownership of the land is not the issue in forcible entry actions. The issue in such actions is who
among the parties has prior possession de facto.11 While the trial court may have to determine the
issue of ownership, such determination is only provisional, to ascertain who among the parties has a
better right of possession.12
Here, the MCTC resolved the issue of ownership, ruling that the lot on which the gym was being built
belonged to petitioner EDNP. The latter’s evidence clearly shows how it came to possess the lot in
question. It acquired the land through a deed of donation that Pedro Compalas Aglipay executed in
favor of EDNP’s predecessor-in-interest, the Domestic and Foreign Missionary Society of the
Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America.
Petition