CENTRAL BANK EMPLOYEES ASSOC v.

BSP either by virtue of the popular mandate given to him under the corresponding provisions of the Constitution and the laws
G.R. No. 148208, December 15, 2004 or any other duly recognized grant of power and authority, the opposition cannot be placed at par with him, since logically
the opposition can only fiscalize the administration and punctualize its errors and shortcomings to the end that when the
FACTS: duly scheduled time for the people to exercise their inalienable power to make a better choice, the opposition may have
July 3, 1993, RA No 7653 (The New Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the old Central Bank of the Philippines and the chance to make them accept the alternative they can offer. Therefore, when the head of state is afforded the opportunity
created a new BSP. Article II, Section 15 (c) RA 7653 conforms to the RA No 6758 (Salary Standardization Act). However, or when he feels it incumbent upon him to communicate and dialogue with the people on any matter affecting the plan of
Enactment of R.A. Nos. 7907 + 8282 + 8289 + 8291 + 8523 + 8763 + 9302 or other Governmental Financial Institutions the government or any other matter of public interest, no office or entity of the government is obliged to give the opposition
charters of the GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS were also amended, but the personnel of the latter GFIs were all exempted from the the same facilities by which its contrary views may be ventilated.
coverage of the SSL. Thus, within the class of rank-and-file personnel of GFIs, the BSP rank-and-file are also discriminated
upon. PJA v. PRADO
GR 105371, 11 November 1993
HELD:
Sec 15 (c), Art II of RA No 7653, constitutes invidious discrimination on the 2,994 rank-and-file employees of Banko Sentral FACTS:
ng Pilipinas. The issue is not the declared policy of the law per se, but the oppressive results of Congress inconsistent and The Philippine Judges Association filed the petition assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act 7354 (An Act Creating
unequal policy towards the rank-and-file of the BSP and the 7 other GFIs. The challenge to the constitutionality of Sec 15 the Philippine Postal Corporation), it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary; contending
(c), Art II of RA No 7653 is premised precisely on the irrational discriminatory policy adopted by Congress in its treatment that their official functions as judges will be prejudiced by the withdrawal of franking privilege.
of persons similarly situated.
The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality but it requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under ISSUE:
like circumstances and conditions both as to priveleges conferred and liabilities enforced. Favoritism and undue preference Whether the withdrawal of the franking privilege of the Judiciary violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
cannot be allowed. For the principles is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under
circumstance which, if not identical are analogous. HELD:
YES.
PNB v. PALMA The withdrawal of franking privilege from the Judiciary would further deepen the problem in the delay in the
G.R. 157279, August 9, 2005 administration of justice. The Court are dependent on the postal service for communicating with lawyers and litigants as
part of the judicial process. It should not be hard to imagine the increased difficulties of our courts if they have to affix a
FACTS: purchased stamp to every process they send in the discharge of their judicial functions, considering that the Judiciary has
Salary Standardization Law took effect on 01 July 1989. The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued the lowest appropriation in the national budget compared to the Legislative and Executive Departments (.84% of P309
Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10 (DBM-CCC No. 10) to implement R.A. 6758. It enumerated the other billion budgeted for 1993). The repealing clause is a discriminatory provision that denied the Judiciary the equal protection
allowances/fringe benefits which are not integrated into the basic salary rates prescribed under R.A. 6758, but were of the laws guaranteed for all persons or things similarly situated. The distinction made by the law is superficial. It is not
allowed to be continued only for incumbents as of 30 June 1989. The same was ruled ineffective due to non-publication. based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking privilege
Respondents filed petition for mandamus alleging that they were deprived of the said allowances enjoyed by other (The President of the Philippines; the Vice President of the Philippines; Senators and Members of the House of
employees. They contend that the withholding of their entitlement to the same benefits is an unfair discrimination and a Representatives; the Commission on Elections; former Presidents of the Philippines; widows of former Presidents of the
violation of their equal protection clause of the Constitution. Philippines; the National Census and Statistics Office; and the general public in the filing of complaints against public offices
or officers).
HELD:
A valid classification was made by the law in segregating other employees from the incumbents who were already receiving OLIVAREZ v. SANDIGANBAYAN
the benefits on July 1, 1989. The Court stressed that in reserving the benefits to incumbents alone, the legislatures intention G.R. No. 118533 October 4, 1995
was not only to adhere to the policy of non-diminution of pay, but also to be consistent with the prospective application of
laws and the spirit of fairness and justice FACTS:
Baclaran Credit Cooperative, Inc. (BCCI), through its board member charged petitioner Parañaque Mayor Olivarez with
UNIDO v. COMELEC Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for unreasonably refusing to issue a mayor’s permit despite request
GR 56515, 3 April 1981 and follow-ups to implement Parañaque Sangguniang Bayan Resolution which petitioner himself approved. the resolution
authorized BCCI to set up a night manufacturer’s fair during the Christmas fiesta celebration of and at Baclaran for 60 days
FACTS: for which they will use a portion of the service road of Roxas Boulevard from the corner of Opena to Rivera Streets. BCCI
UNIDO is a political organization or aggrupation campaigning for "NO" votes to the amendments to the Constitution of the requesting assistance for the issuance of a mayor’s permit, BCCI counsel Atty. Renato Dilag to petitioner formally
Philippines of 1973 proposed by the Batasang Pambansa. UNIDO addressed a letter to Comelec on 10 March 1981 to grant demanding implementation of Resolution. petitioner replied letter to Atty. Dilag stating among others that the non-
it the same opportunity as given President Marcos, who was campaigning for “YES”. COMELEC denied UNIDO’s request. implementation of Resolution was due to BCCI’s failure to apply for appropriate permit and license to operate the Night
Manufacturer’s Fair which was one of the conditions in the authorization.
ISSUE:
Whether the opposition should be given the same opportunity and facilities given to the President to communicate and HELD:
dialogue with the people on matters affecting the plan of government or of public interest. YES.
In apparent disregard of BCCI’s right to equal protection, that BCCI and the unidentified Baclaran-based vendors’
HELD: associations were not similarly situated as to give at least a semblance of legality to the apparent haste with which said
NO. executive order was issued. It would seem that if there was any interest served by such executive order, it was that of
It is undeniable and but natural that the head of state of every country in the world must, from the very nature of his herein petitioner. As the mayor of the municipality, the officials referred to were definitely under his authority and he was
position, be accorded certain privileges not equally available to those who are opposed to him in the sense that, since the not without recourse to take appropriate action on the letter-application of BCCI although the same was not strictly in
head of state has the grave and tremendous responsibility of planning and implementing the plan of government itself, accordance with normal procedure. There was nothing to prevent him from referring said letter-application to the licensing
department, but which paradoxically he refused to do. Whether petitioner was impelled by any material interest or ulterior violation of the right to equal protection of the laws. First, contrary to petitioners’ claim, substantial distinctions lie between
motive may be beyond us for the moment since this is a matter of evidence, but the environmental facts and circumstances the establishments inside and outside the zone, justifying the difference in their treatment. The Court found substantial
are sufficient to create a belief in the mind of a reasonable man that this would not be completely improbable, absent differences between the retailers inside and outside the secured area, thereby justifying a valid and reasonable
countervailing clarification. Lastly, it may not be amiss to add that petitioner, as a municipal mayor, is expressly authorized classification. Certainly, there are substantial differences between the big investors who are being lured to establish and
and has the power to issue permits and licenses for the holding of activities for any charitable or welfare purpose, pursuant operate their industries in the so-called “secured area” and the present business operators outside the area. On the one
to the Local Government Code of. Hence, he cannot really feign total lack of authority to act on the letter-application of hand, we are talking of billion-peso investments and thousands of new jobs. On the other hand, definitely none of such
BCCI. magnitude. In the first, the economic impact will be national; in the second, only local. Even more important, at this time
the business activities outside the “secured area” are not likely to have any impact in achieving the purpose of the law,
TIU v. CA which is to turn the former military base to productive use for the benefit of the Philippine economy. There is, then, hardly
GR No. 127410, January 20, 1999 any reasonable basis to extend to them the benefits and incentives accorded in R.A. 7227. It is well-settled that the equal-
protection guarantee does not require territorial uniformity of laws. As long as there are actual and material differences
FACTS: between territories, there is no violation of the constitutional clause. And of course, anyone, including the petitioners,
The petitioners challenged before this Court the constitutionality of EO 97-A for allegedly being violative of their right to possessing the requisite investment capital can always avail of the same benefits by channeling his or her resources or
equal protection of the laws. Section 12 thereof created the Subic Special Economic Zone and granted thereto special business operations into the fenced-off free port zone.
privileges, such as tax exemptions and duty-free importation of raw materials, capital and equipment to business
enterprises and residents located and residing in the said zones. According to which the grant and enjoyment of the tax ISAE v. QUISUMBING
and duty incentives authorized under Republic Act No. 7227 (RA 7227) were limited to the business enterprises and G.R. No. 128845, June 1, 2000
residents within the fenced-in area of the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ).
FACTS:
HELD: The School, hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires
NO. and (2) local-hires. The School employs four tests to determine whether a faculty member should be classified as a foreign-
The Order is not violative of the equal protection clause; neither is it discriminatory. Rather, than we find real and hire or a local hire. Should the answer to any of four tests queries point to the Philippines, the faculty member is classified
substantive distinctions between the circumstances obtaining inside and those outside the Subic Naval Base, thereby as a local hire; otherwise, he or she is deemed a foreign-hire. The School grants foreign-hires salary rate twenty-five percent
justifying a valid and reasonable classification. (25%) more than local-hires.
It is well-settled that the equal-protection guarantee does not require territorial uniformity of laws. As long as there are
actual and material differences between territories, there is no violation of the constitutional clause. And of course, anyone, HELD:
including the petitioners, possessing the requisite investment capital can always avail of the same benefits by channeling Yes, Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. The foregoing provisions
his or her resources or business operations into the fenced-off free port zone. That the classification set forth by the impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of “equal pay for equal work.” Persons who
executive issuance does not apply merely to existing conditions. As laid down in RA 7227, the objective is to establish a work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar
“self-sustaining, industrial, commercial, financial and investment center” in the area. There will, therefore, be a long-term salaries. This rule applies to the School, its “international character” notwithstanding. The School contends that petitioner
difference between such investment center and the areas outside it. has not adduced evidence that local-hires perform work equal to that of foreign-hires. The employer in this case has failed
Lastly, the classification applies equally to all the resident individuals and businesses within the “secured area.” The to show evidence that foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both groups have
residents, being in like circumstances or contributing directly to the achievement of the end purpose of the law, are not similar functions and responsibilities, which they perform under similar working conditions. In this case, the court find the
categorized further. Instead, they are all similarly treated, both in privileges granted and in obligations required. The Court point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and
holds that no undue favor or privilege was extended. The classification occasioned by EO 97-A was not unreasonable, local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires
capricious or unfounded. To repeat, it was based, rather, on fair and substantive considerations that were germane to the and local-hires. The practice of the School of according higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public policy and,
legislative purpose. certainly, does not deserve the sympathy of the Court.

COCONUT OIL REFINERS v. TORRES PHILRECA v. DILG

FACTS: FACTS:
This is a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction seeking to enjoin and prohibit the Executive Branch, through the public A class suit was filed by petitioners in their own behalf and in behalf of other electric cooperatives organized and existing
respondents, and to declare the following issuances as unconstitutional, illegal, and void: under P.D. No. 269, as amended, and registered with the National Electrification Administration (NEA). Accordingly,
Section 5 of Executive Order No. 80,1 dated April 3, 1993, regarding the CSEZ. petitioners enjoys Assistance; Exemption from Taxes, Imposts, Duties, Fees; Assistance from the National Power
Executive Order No. 97-A, dated June 19, 1993, pertaining to the SSEZ. Corporation. Petitioners contend that they are exempt from payment of local taxes, including payment of real property tax.
Section 4 of BCDA Board Resolution No. 93-05-034,2 dated May 18, 1993, pertaining to the CSEZ. With the passage of the Local Government Code, however, they allege that their tax exemptions have been invalidly
Petitioners contend that the aforecited issuances are unconstitutional and void as they constitute executive lawmaking, withdrawn. In particular, petitioners assail Sections 193 and 234 of the Local Government Code on the ground that the said
and that they are contrary to Republic Act No. 72273 and in violation of the Constitution, particularly Section 1, Article III provisions discriminate against them, in violation of the equal protection clause. Further, they submit that the said
(equal protection clause) provisions are unconstitutional because they impair the obligation of contracts between the Philippine Government and
the United States Government.
HELD:
NO. HELD:
Petitioners’ contention cannot be sustained. It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the There is No Violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The equal protection clause under the Constitution means that “no
equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on a reasonable classification. Classification, to be valid, person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other
must (1) rest on substantial distinction, (2) be germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions classes in the same place and in like circumstances.” Thus, the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated
only, and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class. Applying the foregoing test to the present case, the finds no by a law based on reasonable classification. The court hold that there is reasonable classification under the Local
Government Code to justify the different tax treatment between electric cooperatives covered by P.D. No. 269, as amended, Filipino guerrillas, in the petitioner’s house; that petitioner immediately objected to the presentation of said documents,
and electric cooperatives under R.A. No. 6938. and called the attention of the respondent judges to the fact that he had filed a petition, in which he protested against the
procedure of the government in the seizure of said documents, and asked for their return to the petitioner.
First, substantial distinctions exist between cooperatives under P.D. No. 269, as amended, and cooperatives under R.A. No.
6938. These distinctions are manifest in at least two material respects which go into the nature of cooperatives envisioned Issue: Whether the arresting officer committed unlawful searches and seizures when they obtained the document being
by R.A. No. 6938 and which characteristics are not present in the type of cooperative associations created under P.D. No. reclaimed by the petitioner
269, as amended.
Capital Contributions by Members Held: No, The right of officers and men of the United States Army to arrest herein petitioner, as a collaborationist suspect,
Extent of Government Control over Cooperatives and to seize his personal papers, without any search warrant, in the zone of military operations, is unquestionable, under
Second, the classification of tax-exempt entities in the Local Government Code is germane to the purpose of the law. The the provisions of the Regulations relative to the Laws and Customs of War on Land of the Hague Conventions of 1907,
Constitutional mandate that every local government unit shall enjoy local autonomy, does not mean that the exercise of authorizing the seizure of military papers in the possession of prisoners of war and also under the proclamation, issued by
power by local governments is beyond regulation by Congress. Thus, while each government unit is granted the power to Gen. Douglas MacArthur, as Commander in Chief of the United States of Army, declaring his purpose to remove certain
create its own sources of revenue, Congress, in light of its broad power to tax, has the discretion to determine the extent of citizens of the Philippines, who had voluntarily given aid and comfort to the enemy, in violation of the allegiance due the
the taxing powers of local government units consistent with the policy of local autonomy. Governments of the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines, when apprehended, from any position of
political and economic influence in the Philippines and to hold them in restraint for the duration of the war.
BELTRAN v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH
G.R. No. 133640, November 25, 2005 The most important exception to the necessity for a search warrant is the right of search and seizure as an incident to a
lawful arrest. A lawful arrest may be made either while a crime is being committed or after its commission. The right to
FACTS: search includes in both instances that of searching the person of him who is arrested, in order to find and seize things
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 was enacted into law on April 2, 1994. The Act seeks to connected with the crime as its fruits or as the means by which it was committed. When one is legally arrested for an
provide an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and by regulating blood banks in the offense, whatever is found in his possession or in his control may be seized and used in evidence against him; and an officer
country. Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, constituting the Implementing Rules and Regulations of said law was has the right to make an arrest without a warrant of a person believed by the officer upon reasonable grounds to have
promulgated by respondent Secretary of the Department of Health (DOH). Section 7 of R.A. 7719 provides Phase-out of committed a felony.
Commercial Blood Banks – All commercial blood banks shall be phased-out over a period of two (2) years after the
effectivity of this Act, extendable to a maximum period of two (2) years by the Secretary.” Section 23 of Administrative The purpose of the constitutional provisions against unlawful searches and seizures is to prevent violations of private
Order No. 9 provides Process of Phasing Out. — The Department shall effect the phasing-out of all commercial blood banks security in person and property, and unlawful invasions of the sanctity of the home, by officers of the law acting under
over a period of two (2) years, extendible for a maximum period of two (2) years after the effectivity of R.A. 7719. The legislative or judicial sanction, and to give remedy against such usurpations when attempted. But it does not prohibit the
decision to extend shall be based on the result of a careful study and review of the blood supply and demand and public Federal Government from taking advantage of unlawful searches made by a private person or under authority of state law.
safety.” On August 23, 1994, the National Blood Services Act providing for the phase out of commercial blood banks took
effect. On April 28, 1995, Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, constituting the Implementing Rules and Regulations People vs. Andre Marti G.R. No. 81561, January 18, 1991 193 SCRA 57 (1991)
of said law was promulgated by DOH. The phase-out period was extended for two years by the DOH. Hence, petitioners
were granted by the Secretary of Health their licenses to open and operate a blood bank only until May 27, 1998. On May Fact: In 1987, the appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland.
20, 1998, prior to the expiration of the licenses granted to petitioners, they filed a petition for certiorari with application Appellant filled up the contract necessary for the transaction, writing therein his name, passport number, the date of
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court shipment and the name and address of the consignee, namely, “WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland”
assailing the constitutionality and validity of the aforementioned Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect the packages. Appellant, however, refused, assuring
her that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of appellant’s
HELD: representation, Anita Reyes no longer insisted on inspecting the packages. Before delivery of appellant’s box to the Bureau
No, the court deem the classification to be valid and reasonable for the following reasons: of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following standard operating
One, it was based on substantial distinctions. The former operates for purely humanitarian reasons and as a medical service procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. When he opened appellant’s box, a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. His
while the latter is motivated by profit. Also, while the former wholly encourages voluntary blood donation, the latter treats curiousity aroused, He made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the contents thereof.
blood as a sale of commodity. Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory examination of the
Two, the classification, and the consequent phase out of commercial blood banks is germane to the purpose of the law, that samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper. He brought the letter and a sample of appellant’s shipment to the
is, to provide the nation with an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and treating blood Narcotics Section of the NBI and informed the them that the rest of the shipment was still in his office. Therefore, Job Reyes
transfusion as a humanitarian or medical service rather than a commodity. This necessarily involves the phase out of and three NBI agents, and a photographer, went to the Reyes’ office at Ermita. The package which allegedly contained books
commercial blood banks based on the fact that they operate as a business enterprise, and they source their blood supply was likewise opened by Job Reyes. He discovered that the package contained bricks or cake-like dried marijuana leaves.
from paid blood donors who are considered unsafe compared to voluntary blood donors as shown by the USAID-sponsored The package which allegedly contained tabacalera cigars was also opened. It turned out that dried marijuana leaves were
study on the Philippine blood banking system. neatly stocked underneath the cigars. The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the contents
Three, the Legislature intended for the general application of the law. Its enactment was not solely to address the peculiar thereof, after signing a “Receipt” acknowledging custody of the said effects . Thereafter, an Information was filed against
circumstances of the situation nor was it intended to apply only to the existing conditions. appellant for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Lastly, the law applies equally to all commercial blood banks without exception.
Issue: Whether the search and seizure committed by the private individual inviolate the constitutional right of the accused
ARRESTS, SEARCHES, AND SEIZURES against unlawful searches and seizures?

Alvero v. Dizon G.R. No. L-342 May 4, 1946 76 Phil. 637 (1946) Held: No, The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed
only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against
Fact: Petitioner has been accused of treason; that at the hearing on his petition for bail, the prosecution presented, as part the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. Corolarilly, alleged
of its evidence, certain documents which had been allegedly seized by soldiers of the United States Army, accompanied by violations against unreasonable search and seizure may only be invoked against the State by an individual unjustly
traduced by the exercise of sovereign authority. To agree with appellant that an act of a private individual in violation of Petitioners that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution and the Rules of
the Bill of Rights should also be construed as an act of the State would result in serious legal complications and an absurd Court — because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2)
interpretation of the constitution. That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the
acts of private individuals finds support in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. True, the liberties aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal
guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land must always be subject to protection. manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants,
to be disposed of in accordance with law — said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari,
Bache and Co., vs. Ruiz GR No. L-32409 February 27, 1971 37 SCRA 323 (1971) prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending final disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued restraining Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from using the effects
seized as aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due course,
Fact: Respondent Commissioner, wrote a letter to respondent Judge Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same null and void, and
against petitioners for violation of the National Internal Revenue Code, in relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof, commanding the respondents, their agents or representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section
and authorizing a Revenue Examiner to make and file the application for search warrant which was attached to the letter. 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under the search
In the afternoon of the following day, respondent De Leon and his witness, respondent Logronio, went to the Court of First warrants in question.
Instance of Rizal. They brought with them the following papers: respondent Vera’s aforesaid letter-request; an application
for search warrant already filled up but still unsigned by respondent De Leon; an affidavit of respondent Logronio Issue: Whether the documents, papers, and things seized in the residences of petitioners may be used in evidence against
subscribed before respondent De Leon; a deposition in printed form of respondent Logronio already accomplished and the petitioners, corporation.
signed by him but not yet subscribed; and a search warrant already accomplished but still unsigned by respondent Judge.
At that time respondent Judge was hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court to Held: No, documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners is not covered with the search warrant and
take the depositions of respondents De Leon and Logronio. After the session had adjourned, respondent Judge was are inadmissible evidence against petitioners herein. Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional
informed that the depositions had already been taken. The stenographer, upon request of respondent Judge, read to him mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner
her stenographic notes; and thereafter, respondent Judge asked respondent Logronio to take the oath and warned him that set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. The court were not
if his deposition was found to be false and without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury. Respondent Judge signed satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said motion for reconsideration, and the contents of the aforementioned
respondent de Leon’s application for search warrant and respondent Logronio’s deposition, Search Warrant was then sign affidavits and other papers submitted in support of said motion, have sufficiently established the facts or conditions
by respondent Judge and accordingly issued. Three days later, the BIR agents served the search warrant petitioners at the contemplated in the cases relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant application of the views therein expressed, should we
offices of petitioner corporation. Petitioners’ lawyers protested the search on the ground that no formal complaint or agree thereto.
transcript of testimony was attached to the warrant. The agents nevertheless proceeded with their search which yielded
six boxes of documents. Petitioners filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal praying that the search warrant Zurcher vs. Stanford Daily 436 U.S. 54 (1978)
be quashed, dissolved or recalled, that preliminary prohibitory and mandatory writs of injunction be issued, that the search
warrant be declared null and void, and that the respondents be ordered to pay petitioners, jointly and severally, damages Fact: Respondents, a student newspaper that had published articles and photographs of a clash between demonstrators
and attorney’s fees. On March 18, 1970, the respondents, thru the Solicitor General, filed an answer to the petition. After and police at a hospital, and staff members, brought a civil action against the petitioners claiming that a search pursuant to
hearing, the court, presided over by respondent Judge, issued on July 29, 1970, an order dismissing the petition for a warrant issued on a judge’s finding of probable cause that the newspaper (which was not involved in the unlawful acts)
dissolution of the search warrant. Hence, Petitioners came to this Court. possessed photographs and negatives revealing the identities of demonstrators who had assaulted police officers at the
hospital had deprived respondents of their constitutional rights. The District Court granted declaratory relief, holding that
Issue: Whether a corporation is entitled to protection against unreasonable search and seizure? the Fourth Amendment as made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth forbade the issuance of a warrant to search for
materials in possession of one not suspected of crime unless there is probable cause, based on facts presented in a sworn
Held: Yes, A corporation is, after all, but an association of individuals under an assumed name and with a distinct legal affidavit, to believe that a subpoena duces tecum would be impracticable. Failure to honor the subpoena would not, alone,
entity. In organizing itself as a collective body it waives no constitutional immunities appropriate to such body. Its property justify issuance of a warrant; it would also have to appear that the possessor of the objects sought would disregard a court
cannot be taken without compensation. It can only be proceeded against by due process of law, and is protected against order not to remove or destroy them. The court also held that, where the innocent object of the search is a newspaper, First
unlawful discrimination. we are of the opinion that an officer of a corporation which is charged with a violation of a statute Amendment interests make the search constitutionally permissible only in the rare circumstance where there is a clear
of the state of its creation, or of an act of Congress passed in the exercise of its constitutional powers, cannot refuse to showing that (1) important materials will be destroyed or removed from the jurisdiction; and (2) a restraining order would
produce the books and papers of such corporation, we do not wish to be understood as holding that a corporation is not be futile.
entitled to immunity, against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Issue: Whether the Respondent, a third party not involved in unlawful act cannot be a subject of search warrant and
Stonehill v. Diokno G.R. No. L-19550, June 19, 1967 20 SCRA 383 (1967) seizure.

Fact: Upon application of the officers Respondents-Prosecutors, Respondents-Judges issued, a total of 42 search warrants Held: No, A State is not prevented by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments from issuing a warrant to search for evidence
against petitioners herein and/or the corporations of which they were officers, directed to the any peace officer, to search simply because the owner or possessor of the place to be searched is not reasonably suspected of criminal involvement.
the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take The critical element in a reasonable search is not that the property owner is suspected of crime, but that there is reasonable
possession of the following personal property to wit: cause to believe that the “things” to be searched for and seized are located on the property to which entry is sought.

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, Wilson v. Layne 98-0083, May 24, 1999
typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts,
balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers). as “the subject of the offense; stolen or Fact: While executing a warrant to arrest petitioners’ son in their home, respondents, deputy federal marshals and local
embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense,” or “used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense,” sheriff’s deputies, invited a newspaper reporter and a photographer to accompany them. The warrant made no mention of
which is described in the applications adverted to above as “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, such a media “ride-along.” The officers’ early morning entry into the home prompted a confrontation with petitioners, and
Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code.” a protective sweep revealed that the son was not in the house. The reporters observed and photographed the incident but
were not involved in the execution of the warrant. Their newspaper never published the photographs they took of the
incident. Petitioners sued the officers in their personal capacities for money damages, contending that the officers’ actions are in the place sought to be searched. And when the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher
in bringing the media to observe and record the attempted execution of the arrest warrant violated their Fourth or editor in connection with the publication of subversive materials, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must
Amendment rights. The District Court denied respondents’ motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is intending to publish.
immunity. In reversing, the Court of Appeals declined to decide whether the officers’ actions violated the Fourth Mere generalization will not suffice. Thus, the broad statement in of the respondent’s application that petitioner “is in
Amendment, but concluded that because no court had held at the time of the search that media presence during a police possession or has in his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and other documents
entry into a residence constituted such a violation, the right allegedly violated was not “clearly established” and thus which were used and are all continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under
respondents were entitled to qualified immunity. Presidential Decree 885, as amended …” is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable
cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve
Issue: Whether the search warrant and seizure violated the right of the petitioner went the respondent invited members as basis for the issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave error for respondent judge to have done so. Equally
of media to “ride-along” during the serving of the said warrant. insufficient as basis for the determination of probable cause is the statement contained in the joint affidavit of Alejandro
M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, “that the evidence gathered and collated by our unit clearly shows that the premises
Held: Yes, media “ride-along” in a home violates the Fourth Amendment, but because the state of the law was not clearly above- mentioned and the articles and things above-described were used and are continuously being used for subversive
established at the time the entry in this case took place, respondent officers are entitled to qualified immunity. Respondent activities in conspiracy with, and to promote the objective of, illegal organizations such as the Light-a-Fire Movement,
violates the Fourth Amendment rights of homeowners for police to bring members of the media or other third parties into Movement for Free Philippines, and April 6 Movement.”
their home during the execution of a warrant when the presence of the third parties in the home was not in aid of the
warrant’s execution. The Amendment embodies centuries-old principles of respect for the privacy of the home, which apply In mandating that “no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, … after examination
where, as here, police enter a home under the authority of an arrest warrant in order to take into custody the suspect under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; the Constitution requires no less than
named in the warrant. It does not necessarily follow from the fact that the officers were entitled to enter petitioners’ home personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be
that they were entitled to bring a reporter and a photographer with them. The Fourth Amendment requires that police justified. this Court ruled that “the oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the
actions in execution of a warrant be related to the objectives of the authorized intrusion. Certainly the presence of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual
reporters, who did not engage in the execution of the warrant or assist the police in their task, was not related to the making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause.” As couched, the quoted
objective of the authorized intrusion, the apprehension of petitioners’ son. Taken in their entirety, the reasons advanced averment in said joint affidavit filed before respondent judge hardly meets the test of sufficiency established by this Court.
by respondents to support the reporters’ presence–publicizing the government’s efforts to combat crime, facilitating
accurate reporting on law enforcement activities, minimizing police abuses, and protecting suspects and the officers–fall People v. Chua Ho San 308 SCRA 432 (1999) G.R. No. 128222, June 17, 1999
short of justifying media ride-alongs. Although the presence of third parties during the execution of a warrant may in some
circumstances be constitutionally permissible, the presence of these third parties was not. Fact: In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other contraband, CID began patrolling the Bacnotan
coastline with his officers. While monitoring the coastal area he intercepted a radio call from ALMOITE requesting police
Burgos vs. Chief of Staff G.R. No. L-64261, December 26, 1984 133 SCRA 800 (1984) assistance regarding an unfamiliar speedboat. CID and six of his men. When the speedboat landed, the male passenger
alighted, and using both hands, carried what appeared a multicolored strawbag. He then walked towards the road. By this
Fact: Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory time, ALMOITE, CID and BADUA, the latter two conspicuous in their uniform and issued side-arms, became suspicious of
injunction is the validity of two [2] search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano, the man as he suddenly changed direction and broke into a run upon seeing the approaching officers. BADUA, however,
Executive Judge of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal [Quezon City], under which the premises known as No. 19, Road prevented the man from fleeing by holding on to his right arm. Although CID introduced themselves as police officers, the
3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the man appeared impassive. Speaking in English, CID then requested the man to open his bag, but he seem not to understand.
“Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines, CID thus tried speaking Tagalog, then Ilocano, but still to no avail. CID then resorted to what he termed “sign language;” he
equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said motioned with his hands for the man to open the bag. This time, the man apparently understood and acceded to the request.
newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession A search of the bag yielded several transparent plastic packets containing yellowish crystalline substances. which was later
and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the “We Forum” newspaper, were seized. Petitioners fault found out that it was Shabu. CID then gestured to the man to close the bag, which he did. As CID wished to proceed to the
respondent judge for his alleged failure to conduct an examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and his police station, he signaled the man to follow, but the latter did not to comprehend. Hence, CID placed his arm around the
witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted constitutional provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court .6 shoulders of the man and escorted the latter to the police headquarters. CHUA was initially charged with illegal possession
This objection, however, may properly be considered moot and academic, as petitioners themselves conceded during the of methaphetamine hydrochloride before the RTC. The RTC convicted Chua Ho San guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Chua
hearing on August 9, 1983, that an examination had indeed been conducted by respondent judge of Col. Abadilla and his Ho San prays for his acquitttal and the reversal of the judgment of the RTC.
witnesses. In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be searched with sufficient
particularity, it has been held “that the executing officer’s prior knowledge as to the place intended in the warrant is Issue: Whether the accused who was acting suspiciously constitute Probable Cause impelling the police officers from
relevant. This would seem to be especially true where the executing officer is the affiant on whose affidavit the warrant effecting an in flagrante delicto arrest.
had issued, and when he knows that the judge who issued the warrant intended the building described in the affidavit, And
it has also been said that the executing officer may look to the affidavit in the official court file to resolve an ambiguity in Held: No, the Court, finds that these do not constitute “probable cause.” None of the telltale clues, e.g., bag or package
the warrant as to the place to be searched.” emanating the pungent odor of marijuana or other prohibited drug, confidential report and/or positive identification by
informers of courier(s) of prohibited drug and/or the time and place where they will transport/deliver the same,
It is contended by petitioners, however, that the abovementioned documents could not have provided sufficient basis for suspicious demeanor or behavior and suspicious bulge in the waist — accepted by this Court as sufficient to justify a
the finding of a probable cause upon which a warrant may validly issue in accordance with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 warrantless arrest exists in this case. The term probable cause had been understood to mean a reasonable ground of
Constitution. suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man’s belief that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. Specifically with respect to arrests, it is such facts and
Issue: Whether general description of the things to be seized is enough to constitute probable cause to validate the issuance circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by
of a search warrant and seizure the person sought to be arrested. In cases of in fragrante delicto, arrests, a peace officer or a private person may without a
warrant, arrest a person, when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
Held: No, Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet attempting to commit an offense. The arresting officer, therefore, must have personal knowledge of such facts or as recent
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense case law adverts to, personal knowledge of facts or circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable cause.
The search cannot therefore be denominated as incidental to an arrest. While a contemporaneous search of a person
arrested may be effected to deliver dangerous weapons or proofs or implements used in the commission of the crime and
which search may extend to the area within his immediate control where he might gain possession of a weapon or evidence
he can destroy, a valid arrest must precede the search. The process cannot be reversed. In a search incidental to a lawful
arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a
large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance,
the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made — the process cannot be reversed.