17-8-2018

Foreign affairs
On August 18, Pakistan’s newest prime minister, Imran Khan, will wake up to the
reality of a live western border with Afghanistan. One hopes that his first day at
work doesn’t begin with a skirmish or an attack on a Pakistani post or an IED or a
bomb going off either side of the border soon to be followed with allegations
against the other country.
Welcome to the helm, prime minister. Hope the above doesn’t happen but it soon
will – and the reality of a strategic bind will bite. Pakistan is at war, sort of. Call it
hybrid or any other name; it is a war where unsuspecting people will lose lives.
One assurance though: the last four prime ministers and a few presidents have
survived its test and Imran Khan will too. How these men in power impacted the
war remains moot; in fact, the answer is: very little. There are two ways of looking
at it. One, that neither had any control over the direction the war took as Pakistan
reacted to what was being imposed from the outside. Two, could they have brought
an end to it even if they so wished? Or, could Pakistan alone close the war, having
suffered disastrously in blood and treasure?
Perhaps their inability to intervene meaningfully exhibited in their frustration with
the mechanics of the war ultimately abdicating the responsibility to the army as it
pervaded over time. That gave reason to the growing noise of Rawalpindi
arrogating to itself the power to shape the country’s foreign policy entrenching
dissonance as a permanent feature of the popular discourse. Either way, the
country bled at its core, sapping the nation’s vitals in dealing with a complex
strategic environment even as it had little control.
This is where the popular view, even if misplaced, found root in the genesis of the
civil-military disequilibrium and lack of civilian supremacy. It placed the army in the
dock with allegations of expansionism in Afghanistan by keeping the war alive
through proxies and sponsored elements – exactly what Ashraf Ghani et al
proclaim. Surely, Imran Khan is no stranger to this school of thought and may even
have subscribed to it at one point in his political journey. It remains an own-goal
which is music to the ears of those in Afghanistan.
This motley collection includes the Americans who brought the war to Afghanistan
and have only added fuel to the fire with their presence. It also includes the Indians
as they ostensibly rebuild Afghanistan after it was demolished by their American
cousins and in its guise ensure fruitful returns for their effort by imposing on

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Pakistan its second front through skilful manipulation of inimical forces in situ. Then
there are intelligence outfits from various nations who either pursue what is dear
to them in Afghanistan or assist the bigger players, or both; the Iranians who have
their own interests to secure; the Chinese who avidly follow their strategic
economic ends; and the many groups which have changed nomenclature from Al-
Qaeda to the Taliban (Afghan and Pakistani), and now Daesh in concurrence which
has moved there in large numbers as space closes on it in Syria and Iraq. Add to this
the manifest interests of the extended neighbourhood from the Sunni-Arab and
Shia-Iran principalities, and decide who was Ghani representing as he spoke to
Imran on the eve of the latter’s electoral victory? If one can crack this code, the war
in Afghanistan can be better understood.
Yet peace must be sought in Afghanistan both for its derived benefits to Pakistan
and for forging a stable and economically prosperous neighbourhood. CPEC will
only bear true fruit if its extensions, east and west, can be operationalised. Despite
the foundational imperative of such a need, executive authority remains
constrained in wringing strategic corrections due to the complexity related to the
nature of war. This translates into frustrations which then find voice in domestic
framing of the military whose handling of the war may have imposed such a
strategic bind. The Talibs and their cohorts were pushed into Pakistan by the US’
2001 riposte in Afghanistan. By 2015, Pakistan had pushed them back after having
had to bear with them for 15 years and after their demonic mutation against the
host itself. What once was the Quetta Shura or the Haqqani Network now exists as
a unified force within Afghanistan fighting its battles for the control of Ghazni and
ungoverned spaces.
To continue to lash Pakistan with allegations of coveting proxies is insidious,
whether from within or without. Within, it is used as a convenient tool to flag the
perceived civ-mil imbalance, while without it just is such a convenient scapegoat to
which our internal debate adds credence. IK will be tested from the word go on his
ability to bring this baby – the Afghan policy – back into the civilian domain from
the (wretched) hands of the military. And this will then be whipped into a perpetual
tussle which will be forced upon him as a litmus test of his effectiveness above and
beyond all else, distracting him from the doable within our national capacity. This
game has gone on for too long and needs to stop.
Given the perplexing nature of the war that Afghanistan has become, it will need a
dual approach towards some resolution. Understanding that bringing peace
entirely around Pakistan’s own efforts is a non-starter; it will help to first keep the
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maleficent out. Four steps will help sanitise our spaces: cleansing our own stables
(Raddul Fasaad and a rejuvenated National Action Plan); putting a fence up to keep
the bad men out; working with Afghanistan to repatriate the over 2.5 million
Afghans back to their country, obviating hideouts; and offensive action to eliminate
imminent threat when one is detected along the badlands of the borders. This will
also lighten the load for government forces in Afghanistan fighting these elements.
Engaging with the Afghan government and the US, as indeed with the Taliban
where influence still exists, while using the good offices of regional countries in the
Quadrilateral Dialogue and the SCO can urge a more cooperative approach towards
peace. Keeping the Afghan government assured of our resolve to manifestly disable
the use of our soil by armed groups fighting in Afghanistan through joint patrolling
and monitoring of the troubled areas along the border and via fencing it should
bring them the required peace of mind. They could then focus entirely on fighting
their battles within, both overt and covert. Beyond this, the war will need to find
its own closure when the major players in Afghanistan can let the country find its
own normal, and build on it without undue intervention. This is the only way
forward to returning peace to a devastated land and to the region.
Scapegoating the Pakistani military doesn’t help and the dynamics of foreign
relations aren’t predicated only on initiatives taken within; the eviction of groups
from North Waziristan stand witness. It is important instead to recognise the
limitations which restrict influence in complex scenarios. While our geography
mandates our attention, it is history that will shape region’s future. Progress in
Afghanistan will thus only drag because of the prevailing conflicts in the situation
there.
By: Shahzad Chaudhry