TORTS AND DAMAGES

Atty. Giancarlo Alicaya | SY 2018-19

I. Concept P500.00 per year of service was agreed upon as separation pay.
However, respondent taxi drivers did not agree, thus the case was
a. History filed. Respondents claiming that they are regular employees having
earned $15.00 for working 16 days a month.
b. Definition

LARGO
Labor Arbiter found the complainants to be regular workers of
In common law, torts cover all wrongful acts, CFTI and ordered them to paid P1,200 per year of service for
although sometimes viewed to be limited only to a “humanitarian consideration” setting aside the agreement between
wrong independent of a contract. CFTI and the drivers’ union. LA rejected the allegations of CFTI
(financial loss due to the erruption of Mt. Pinatubo which made the
Intentional torts include assault, battery, intentional
roads impassable but the records are devoid of such evidence)
infliction of emotional distress (flED), invasion of privacy,
because their closure was due to the untimely closure of Clark Air
false imprisonment, fraud, malicious prosecution,
Base.
defamation, abuse of processes, trespass to land and
trespass to chattels.

On the other hand, unintentional torts are usually NLRC modified decision of LA granting separation pay to the
founded on negligent acts and may include malpractice private respondents stating - “In discharging the above obligations,
(professional negligence), and product liability. Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, which is headed by Sergio F. Naguiat
and Antolin Naguiat, father and son at the same time the President
AQUINO
and Vice-President and General Manager, respectively, should be
joined as indispensable party whose liability is joint and several.”
Tort is an unlawful violation of private right, not
created by contract, and which gives rise to an action for
damages. It is an act or omission producing an injury to
another, without any previous existing lawful relation of Issue:
which the said act or omission may be said to be a natural
outgrowth or incident. (Robles v. Castillo)
Whether or not the resolution issued by NLRC is contrary to
It is also defined as a “private or civil wrong or injury, law.
other than breach of contract,’’ for which the court will
provide a remedy in the form of an action for damages. It
is a violation of a duty imposed by general law or
(Petitioners incessantly insist that Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises,
otherwise upon all persons occupying the relation to each
Inc. is a separate and distinct juridical entity which cannot be held
other which is involved in a given transaction. There must
jointly and severally liable for the obligations of CFTI. And similarly,
always be violation of some duty that must arise by
Sergio F. Naguiat and Antolin Naguiat were merely officers and
operation of law and not by mere agreement of the
stockholders of CFTI and, thus, could not be held personally
parties. It is a legal wrong committed upon person or
accountable for corporate debts.)
property independent of contract. (Black’s Law Dictionary)

As thus defined, tort in common law includes

intentional torts, negligence, and strict liability in tort. Ruling:
Intentional torts include conduct where the actor desires
to cause the consequences of his act or believes the
consequences are substantially certain to result from it. YES, CFTI was the actual and direct employer of individual
Intentional torts include assault, battery, false respondents, and that Naguiat Enterprises was neither their indirect
imprisonment, defamation, invasion of privacy and employer nor labor-only contractor. It was not involved at all in the
interference of property. taxi business.
Negligence, on the other hand, involves voluntary
acts or omissions which result in injury to others, without
intending to cause the same. The actor fails to exercise CFTI president is solidarily liable. In the broader interest of
due care in performing such acts or omissions. There is justice, we, however, hold that Sergio F. Naguiat, in his capacity as
strict liability in tort where the person is made liable president of CFTI, cannot be exonerated from joint and several
independent of fault or negligence upon submission of liability in the payment of separation pay to individual respondents.
proof of certain facts.

Sergio F. Naguiat, admittedly, was the president of CFTI who

Naguiat v. NLRC, GR No. 116123, March 13, 1997 actively managed the business. Thus, applying the ruling in A. C.
Ransom, he falls within the meaning of an "employer" as
Facts: contemplated by the Labor Code, who may be held jointly and
severally liable for the obligations of the corporation to its dismissed
employees.
Taxi Drivers (respondents) praying for separation pay from the
CFTI (Naguiat Enterprise, petitioners) which was dissolved due to the
phase-out of the US Military bases in the Philippines. There was a Moreover, petitioners also conceded that both CFTI and
negotiation with the CFTI Labor Union of which an amount of Naguiat Enterprises were "close family corporations"[34] owned by
 TORTS AND DAMAGES
Atty. Giancarlo Alicaya | SY 2018-19

the Naguiat family. Section 100, paragraph 5, (under Title XII on Close  Intentional and  Acts committed by
Acts
Corporations) of the Corporation Code, states: included
malicious acts negligence without
intent

Governing  Penal Code  Art. 2176 of the Civil

"(5) To the extent that the stockholders are actively law Code
engage(d) in the management or operation of the business and
affairs of a close corporation, the stockholders shall be held to  Broader - includes not  Homologous - limited to
strict fiduciary duties to each other and among themselves. Said only negligence, but negligent acts or
stockholders shall be personally liable for corporate torts unless intentional criminal omissions and excludes
the corporation has obtained reasonably adequate liability Scope acts as well such as intentional ones
insurance." (underscoring supplied) assault and battery,
false imprisonment
and deceit
Nothing in the records show whether CFTI obtained "reasonably
adequate liability insurance;" thus, what remains is to determine
whether there was corporate tort. II. Quasi-Delict

a. Statutory Basis - Art. 2176

Our jurisprudence is wanting as to the definite scope of
LARGO
"corporate tort." Essentially, "tort" consists in the violation of a right
given or the omission of a duty imposed by law. Simply stated, tort Our concept of torts leans towards its civil law
is a breach of a legal duty. Article 283 of the Labor Code mandates equivalent of culpa aquiliana. Thus, in Article 2176 of our
the employer to grant separation pay to employees in case of closure Civil Code, the following definition appears: "Whoever by
or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due act or omission causes damage to another, there being
to serious business losses or financial reverses, which is the condition fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
obtaining at bar. CFTI failed to comply with this law-imposed duty or done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
obligation. Consequently, its stockholder who was actively engaged contractual relation between the parties, is called a
in the management or operation of the business should be held quasi-delict."
personally liable.
AQUINO

Antolin T. Naguiat was the vice president of the CFTI. Although Article 1157 of the New Civil Code includes
he carried the title of "general manager" as well, it had not been quasi-delict as a source of obligation. This source of
shown that he had acted in such capacity. Furthermore, no evidence obligation is classified as “extra-contractual obligation”
on the extent of his participation in the management or operation of and is governed by Chapter XVII, Chapter 2 of the Code
the business was proffered. In this light, he cannot be held solidarily consisting of Articles 2176 to 2194.
liable for the obligations of CFTI and Sergio Naguiat to the private
Under this view, quasi-delict is homologous but not
respondents.
identical to tort of common law. (Manila Railroad Co. vs.
Cia Transatlantica, 38 Phil. 875). In Cangco vs. Manila
Railroad Company (38 Phil. 768 [1918]), the Supreme
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is Court cited Manresa (Vol. 8, p. 68) who declared that the
PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed February 28, 1994 Resolution of the liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is always
NLRC is hereby MODIFIED as follows: based upon a voluntary act or omission which, without
willful intent, but by mere negligence or inattention, has
caused damage to another.
(1) Petitioner Clark Field Taxi, Incorporated, and Sergio F.
The proposition is that the entire notion of
Naguiat, president and co-owner thereof, are ORDERED to pay,
quasi-delict is founded on fault or negligence which
jointly and severally, the individual respondents their separation pay
excludes all notions of intent, deliberateness, bad faith
computed at US$120.00 for every year of service, or its peso
or malice.
equivalent at the time of payment or satisfaction of the judgment;

b. Definition
(2) Petitioner Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, Incorporated, and
Antolin T. Naguiat are ABSOLVED from liability in the payment of
separation pay to individual respondents.
Picart v. Smith, GR No. L-12219, March 15, 1918

Facts:
c. Torts vs. Quasi-Delict

In this action the plaintiff, Amado Picart, seeks to recover of the

TORTS QUASI-DELICT defendant, Frank Smith, jr., the sum of P31,000, as damages alleged
to have been caused by an automobile driven by the defendant.
 TORTS AND DAMAGES
Atty. Giancarlo Alicaya | SY 2018-19

opinion, negligent in the eye of the law.

The plaintiff was riding on his horse over Carlatan Bridge when
the defendant approached from the opposite direction riding his
automobile going at the rate of about 10/12 miles per hour. When The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in
the defendant neared the bridge, he saw the plaintiff and honked to a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in
give warning. The plaintiff thinking that he has not sufficient time to doing the alleged negligent act use that person would have used in
get over to the other side, pulled up his horse closely up against the the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law
railing on the right instead of going to the left. As the defendant here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the
approached (thinking that the plaintiff had moved), he guided the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law.
automobile to the left as it was the proper side of the road. In so The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by
doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would move to the reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation
other side. The pony had not as yet exhibited fright, and the rider had before him. The law considers what would be reckless,
made no sign for the automobile to stop. Seeing that the pony was blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and
apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the right while prudence and determines liability by that.
yet some distance away or slowing down, continued to approach
directly toward the horse without diminution of speed. When he had
gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a
across to the other side, the defendant quickly turned his car prudent man in a given situation must of course be always
sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse alongside of the determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts
railing where it as then standing; but in so doing the automobile involved in the particular case. Abstract speculations cannot here be
passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became of much value but this much can be profitably said: Reasonable men
frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its head toward govern their conduct by the circumstances which are before them or
the railing. In so doing, it as struck on the hock of the left hind leg by known to them. They are not, and are not supposed to be,
the flange of the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its omniscient of the future. Hence they can be expected to take care
rider was thrown off with some violence. From the evidence adduced only when there is something before them to suggest or warn of
in the case we believe that when the accident occurred the free danger. Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration,
space where the pony stood between the automobile and the railing foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If so, it was
of the bridge was probably less than one and one half meters. As a the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm.
result of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received contusions Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by ignoring of the suggestion
which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be
attention for several days. held to exist. Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for
determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this:
Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position
Issue: of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to
another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct
or guarding against its consequences.

Whether or not the defendant for maneuvering his car was

guilty of negligence giving rise to a civil obligation to repair the
damage done. It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free
from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting
himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already
stated, the defendant was also negligent; and in such case the
Ruling: problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and
directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the
two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the
YES. As the defendant started across the bridge, he had the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an
right to assume that the horse and the rider would pass over to the appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the
proper side; but as he moved toward the center of the bridge it was person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm
demonstrated to his eyes that this would not be done; and he must and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without
in a moment have perceived that it was too late for the horse to reference to the prior negligence of the other party.
cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle. In the nature of
things this change of situation occurred while the automobile was yet
some distance away; and from this moment it was not longer within The decision in the case of Rkes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co.
the power of the plaintiff to escape being run down by going to a (7 Phil. Rep., 359) should perhaps be mentioned in this connection.
place of greater safety. The control of the situation had then passed This Court there held that while contributory negligence on the part
entirely to the defendant; and it was his duty either to bring his car to of the person injured did not constitute a bar to recovery, it could
an immediate stop or, seeing that there were no other persons on be received in evidence to reduce the damages which would
the bridge, to take the other side and pass sufficiently far away from otherwise have been assessed wholly against the other party.
the horse to avoid the danger of collision. Instead of doing this, the
defendant ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse. He
was, we think, deceived into doing this by the fact that the horse
had not yet exhibited fright. But in view of the known nature of From what has been said it results that the judgment of the
horses, there was an appreciable risk that, if the animal in question lower court must be reversed, and judgment is her rendered that the
was unacquainted with automobiles, he might get exited and jump plaintiff recover of the defendant the sum of two hundred pesos
under the conditions which here confronted him. When the (P200), with costs of other instances. The sum here awarded is
defendant exposed the horse and rider to this danger he was, in our estimated to include the value of the horse, medical expenses of the
plaintiff, the loss or damage occasioned to articles of his apparel, and
 TORTS AND DAMAGES
Atty. Giancarlo Alicaya | SY 2018-19

lawful interest on the whole to the date of this recovery. The other For a long period, he also felt pain all over his body.
damages claimed by the plaintiff are remote or otherwise of such
character as not to be recoverable. So ordered.
Victorino Cusi claimed that prior to the accident he was a
successful businessman — the Special Assistant to the Dolor Lopez
Separate Opinions Enterprises, the managing partner of Cusi and Rivera Partnership, the
manager of his ricemill, and with substantial investments in other
business enterprises. As a result of his injuries, he was unable to
After mature deliberation, I have finally decided to concur with properly attend to his various business undertakings. On the other
the judgment in this case. I do so because of my understanding of the hand, his wife, Pilar, was a skilled music and piano teacher. After the
"last clear chance" rule of the law of negligence as particularly accident, she lost the dexterity of her fingers forcing her to quit her
applied to automobile accidents. This rule cannot be invoked where profession. She also bore ugly scars on several parts of her body, and
the negligence of the plaintiff is concurrent with that of the she suffered anxiety of a possible miscarriage being then five (5)
defendant. Again, if a traveler when he reaches the point of collision months pregnant at the time of the accident.
is in a situation to extricate himself and avoid injury, his negligence at
that point will prevent a recovery. But Justice Street finds as a fact
that the negligent act of the interval of time, and that at the moment The defense is centered on the proposition that the gross
the plaintiff had no opportunity to avoid the accident. Consequently, negligence of Victorino Cusi was the proximate cause of the
the "last clear chance" rule is applicable. In other words, when a collision; that had he made a full stop before traversing the crossing
traveler has reached a point where he cannot extricate himself and as required by section 56(a) of Act 3992 (Motor Vehicle Law), he
vigilance on his part will not avert the injury, his negligence in could have seen and heard the approach of the train, and thus,
reaching that position becomes the condition and not the proximate there would have been no collision.
cause of the injury and will not preclude a recovery. (Note especially
Aiken vs. Metcalf [1917], 102 Atl., 330.)
Lower court ruled in favor of complainants.

Issue:

1 - Whether or not PRR are liable.

Cusi, et. al. v. PNR, GR No. L-29889, May 31, 1979
2 - Whether or not the negligence of Victorino Cusi was the
Facts:
proximate cause of the collision.

Direct appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of

Ruling:
Rizal ordering defendant-appellant to indemnify the plaintiffs-
appellees in the total amount of Two Hundred Thirty-Nine Thousand
and Six Hundred Forty-Eight Pesos, and Seventy-Two Centavos
(P239,648.72) for injuries received in a collision caused by the gross 1 - YES. Supreme court ruled affirming the decisiong however
negligence of defendant-appellant, plus Ten Thousand Pesos award are reduced to a reasonable amount.
(P10,000.00) as attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.

As the action is predicated on negligence, the New Civil Code

Plaintiffs were on their way home in their Vauxhall car from a making clear that "whoever by act or omission causes damage to
party that ended at 11 o’clock. Upon reaching the railroad tracks, another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
finding that the level crossing bar was raised and seeing that there damage done the crucial question posed in the petition at bar is the
was no flashing red light, and hearing no whistle from any coming existence of negligence on the part of defendant-appellant as found
train, Cusi slackened his speed and proceeded to cross the tracks. At by the lower court.
the same time, a train bound for Lucena traversed the crossing,
resulting in a collision. The impact threw the plaintiffs out of their
car. Both were rushed to the hospital and series of operations were The judicial pronouncement below that the gross negligence
done. of defendant-appellant was the proximate cause of the collision has
been thoroughly reviewed by this Court and we fully affirm the
same.
For these injuries (fractures, concussion, abrasions, lacerations
and contusions with hematoma in various part of her bodies), she
underwent a total of four surgical opera. petitions in a period of two Negligence has been defined by Judge Cooley in his work on
years. As a result of the fracture on her right arm, there was a Torts 3d ed sec. 13243 as "the failure to observe for the protection
shortening of about 1 cm. of that arm. She lost the flexibility of her of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution,
wrist, elbow and shoulder. Up to the time she took the witness stand and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such
in August, 1966, she still had an intermedullary nail in the bone of her other person suffers injury." By such a test, it can readily be seen
right arm. Likewise, Victorino Cusi suffered brain injuries which that there is no hard and fast rule whereby such degree of care and
affected his speech, memory, sense of hearing and neck movement. vigilance is measured, it is dependent upon the circumstances in
 TORTS AND DAMAGES
Atty. Giancarlo Alicaya | SY 2018-19

which a person finds himself so situated. All that the law requires is Victorino Cusi, instead of stopping or slackening his speed, proceeded
that it is always incumbent upon a person to use that care and with reckless speed and regardless of possible or threatened danger,
diligence expected of reasonable men under similar circumstances. then We would have been put in doubt as to the degree of prudence
exercised by him and would have, in all probability, declared him
These are the circumstances attendant to the collision. negligent. 6 But as the contrary was established, we remain
Undisputably, the warning devices installed at the railroad crossing convinced that Victorino Cusi had not, through his own negligence,
were manually operated; there were only 2 shifts of guards provided contributed to the accident so as to deny him damages from the
for the operation thereof — one, the 7:00 A.M. to 3:00 P. M. shift, defendant-appellant.
and the other, the 3:00 P.M. to 11:00 P.M. shift. On the night of the
accident, the train for Lucena was on an unscheduled trip after 11:00
P.M. During that precise hour, the warning devices were not
operating for no one attended to them. Also, as observed by the WHEREFORE, the judgment of the lower court is hereby
lower court, the locomotive driver did not blow his whistle, thus: "... AFFIRMED with the modification that the total amount of damages
he simply sped on without taking an extra precaution of blowing his shall bear legal interest at six per cent (6%) from the rendition of the
whistle from a distance of 50 to 10 meters from the crossing. That decision dated March 26, 1968.
the train was running at full speed is attested to by the fact that
notwithstanding the application of the emergency brakes, the train
did not stop until it reached a distance of around 100 meters." Jarco Mktg. V. CA, 321 SCRA 377

Facts:
These facts assessed together show the inadequacy, nay, the
absence, of precautions taken by the defendant-appellant to warn
the travelling public of the impending danger. It is clear to Us that as Petitioner Jarco Marketing Corporation is the owner of Syvels
the signal devices were wholly manually-operated, there was an Department Store, Makati City. Petitioners Leonardo Kong, Jose
urgent need for a flagman or guard to man the crossing at all times. Tiope and Elisa Panelo are the stores branch manager, operations
As it was, the crossing was left unattended to after eleven o'clock manager, and supervisor, respectively. Private respondents are
every night and on the night of the accident. We cannot in all reason spouses and the parents of Zhieneth Aguilar (ZHIENETH).
justify or condone the act of the defendant-appellant allowing the
subject locomotive to travel through the unattended crossing with
inoperative signal devices, but without sending any of its employees In the afternoon of 9 May 1983, CRISELDA and ZHIENETH were
to operate said signal devices so as to warn oncoming motorists of at the 2nd floor of Syvels Department Store, Makati City. CRISELDA
the approach of one of its locomotives. It is not surprising therefore was signing her credit card slip at the payment and verification
that the in operation of the warning devices created a situation counter when she felt a sudden gust of wind and heard a loud thud.
which was misunderstood by the riding public to mean safe passage. She looked behind her. She then beheld her daughter ZHIENETH on
Jurisprudence recognizes that if warning devices are installed in the floor, her young body pinned by the bulk of the stores
railroad crossings, the travelling public has the right to rely on such gift-wrapping counter/structure. ZHIENETH was crying and screaming
warning devices to put them on their guard and take the necessary for help. Although shocked, CRISELDA was quick to ask the assistance
precautions before crossing the tracks. A need, therefore, exists for of the people around in lifting the counter and retrieving ZHIENETH
the railroad company to use reasonable care to keep such devices in from the floor.[3]
good condition and in working order, or to give notice that they are
not operating, since if such a signal is misunderstood it is a menace.
Thus, it has been held that if a railroad company maintains a
ZHIENETH was quickly rushed to the Makati Medical Center
signalling device at a crossing to give warning of the approach of a
where she was operated on. The next day ZHIENETH lost her speech
train, the failure of the device to operate is generally held to be
and thereafter communicated with CRISELDA by writing on a magic
evidence of negligence, which maybe considered with all the
slate. The injuries she sustained took their toil on her young body.
circumstances of the case in determining whether the railroad
She died fourteen (14) days after the accident or on 22 May 1983, on
company was negligent as a matter of fact.
the hospital bed. She was six years old.

After the burial of their daughter, private respondents

2 - After a thorough perusal of the facts attendant to the case, demanded upon petitioners the reimbursement of the
this Court is in fun accord with the lower court. Plaintiff-appellee hospitalization, medical bills and wake and funeral expenses[6] which
Victorino Cusi had exercised all the necessary precautions required of they had incurred. Petitioners refused to pay. Consequently, private
him as to avoid injury to -himself and to others. We find no need for respondents filed a complaint for damages, docketed as Civil Case
him to have made a full stop; relying on his faculties of sight and No. 7119 wherein they sought the payment of P157,522.86 for actual
hearing, Victorino Cusi had no reason to anticipate the impending damages, P300,000 for moral damages, P20,000 for attorneys fees
danger. and an unspecified amount for loss of income and exemplary
damages.

Hence, on the same impression that the crossing was safe for
passage as before, plaintiff-appellee Victorino Cusi merely slackened In their answer with counterclaim, petitioners denied any
his speed and proceeded to cross the tracks, driving at the proper liability for the injuries and consequent death of ZHIENETH. They
rate of speed for going over railroad crossings. Had claimed that CRISELDA was negligent in exercising care and diligence
defendant-appellant been successful in establishing that its over her daughter by allowing her to freely roam around in a store
locomotive driver blew his whistle to warn motorists of his approach filled with glassware and appliances. ZHIENETH too, was guilty of
to compensate for the absence of the warning signals, and that contributory negligence since she climbed the counter, triggering its
 TORTS AND DAMAGES
Atty. Giancarlo Alicaya | SY 2018-19

eventual collapse on her. Petitioners also emphasized that the accident for which neither CRISELDA nor even ZHIENETH could
counter was made of sturdy wood with a strong support; it never fell entirely be held faultless and blameless. Further, petitioners adverted
nor collapsed for the past fifteen years since its construction. to the trial courts rejection of Gonzales testimony as unworthy of
credence.

Additionally, petitioner Jarco Marketing Corporation

maintained that it observed the diligence of a good father of a family As to private respondents claim that the counter should have
in the selection, supervision and control of its employees. The other been nailed to the ground, petitioners justified that it was not
petitioners likewise raised due care and diligence in the performance necessary. The counter had been in existence for several years
of their duties and countered that the complaint was malicious for without any prior accident and was deliberately placed at a corner to
which they suffered besmirched reputation and mental anguish. They avoid such accidents. Truth to tell, they acted without fault or
sought the dismissal of the complaint and an award of moral and negligence for they had exercised due diligence on the matter. In
exemplary damages and attorneys fees in their favor. fact, the criminal case[10] for homicide through simple negligence
filed by private respondents against the individual petitioners was
dismissed; a verdict of acquittal was rendered in their favor.
Trial court dismissed complaint and counterclaim after finding
that the preponderance of the evidence favored petitioners. It ruled
that the proximate cause of the fall of the counter on ZHIENETH was The Court of Appeals, however, decided in favor of private
her act of clinging to it. It believed petitioners witnesses who testified respondents and reversed the appealed judgment.
that ZHIENETH clung to the counter, afterwhich the structure and the
girl fell with the structure falling on top of her, pinning her stomach.
In contrast, none of private respondents witnesses testified on how It found that petitioners were negligent in maintaining a
the counter fell. The trial court also held that CRISELDA’s negligence structurally dangerous counter. The counter was shaped like an
contributed to ZHIENETH’s accident. inverted L[11] with a top wider than the base. It was top heavy and
the weight of the upper portion was neither evenly distributed nor
supported by its narrow base. Thus, the counter was defective,
Private respondents appealed the decision, attributing as errors unstable and dangerous; a downward pressure on the overhanging
of the trial court its findings that: (1) the proximate cause of the fall portion or a push from the front could cause the counter to fall. Two
of the counter was ZHIENETHs misbehavior; (2) CRISELDA was former employees of petitioners had already previously brought to
negligent in her care of ZHIENETH; (3) petitioners were not negligent the attention of the management the danger the counter could
in the maintenance of the counter; and (4) petitioners were not liable cause. But the latter ignored their concern. The Court of Appeals
for the death of ZHIENETH. faulted the petitioners for this omission, and concluded that the
incident that befell ZHIENETH could have been avoided had
petitioners repaired the defective counter. It was inconsequential
Further, private respondents asserted that ZHIENETH should be that the counter had been in use for some time without a prior
entitled to the conclusive presumption that a child below nine (9) incident.
years is incapable of contributory negligence. And even if ZHIENETH,
at six (6) years old, was already capable of contributory negligence,
still it was physically impossible for her to have propped herself on The Court of Appeals declared that ZHIENETH, who was below
the counter. She had a small frame (four feet high and seventy seven (7) years old at the time of the incident, was absolutely
pounds) and the counter was much higher and heavier than she was. incapable of negligence or other tort. It reasoned that since a child
Also, the testimony of one of the stores former employees, Gerardo under nine (9) years could not be held liable even for an intentional
Gonzales, who accompanied ZHIENETH when she was brought to the wrong, then the six-year old ZHIENETH could not be made to account
emergency room of the Makati Medical Center belied petitioners for a mere mischief or reckless act. It also absolved CRISELDA of any
theory that ZHIENETH climbed the counter. Gonzales claimed that negligence, finding nothing wrong or out of the ordinary in
when ZHIENETH was asked by the doctor what she did, ZHIENETH momentarily allowing ZHIENETH to walk while she signed the
replied, [N]othing, I did not come near the counter and the counter document at the nearby counter.
just fell on me.[9] Accordingly, Gonzales testimony on ZHIENETHs
spontaneous declaration should not only be considered as part of res
gestae but also accorded credit. The Court of Appeals also rejected the testimonies of the
witnesses of petitioners. It found them biased and prejudiced. It
instead gave credit to the testimony of disinterested witness
Moreover, negligence could not be imputed to CRISELDA for it Gonzales. The Court of Appeals then awarded P99,420.86 as actual
was reasonable for her to have let go of ZHIENETH at the precise damages, the amount representing the hospitalization expenses
moment that she was signing the credit card slip. incurred by private respondents as evidenced by the hospital's
statement of account.[12] It denied an award for funeral expenses
for lack of proof to substantiate the same. Instead, a compensatory
Finally, private respondents vigorously maintained that the damage of P50,000 was awarded for the death of ZHIENETH.
proximate cause of ZHIENETHs death, was petitioners negligence in
failing to institute measures to have the counter permanently nailed.
Issue:

On the other hand, petitioners argued that private respondents

raised purely factual issues which could no longer be disturbed. They 1 - Whether or not the death of Zhieneth was accidental or
explained that ZHIENETHs death while unfortunate and tragic, was an
 TORTS AND DAMAGES
Atty. Giancarlo Alicaya | SY 2018-19

attributable to negligence. their admissibility as part of the res gestae is that they be made or
uttered under the influence of a startling event before the declarant
2 - In case of a finding of negligence, whether or not the same had the time to think and concoct a falsehood as witnessed by the
was attributable to private respondents for maintaining defective person who testified in court. Under the circumstances thus
counter or to Criselda and Zhieneth for failing to exercise due and described, it is unthinkable for ZHIENETH, a child of such tender age
reasonable care while inside the store premises. and in extreme pain, to have lied to a doctor whom she trusted with
her life. We therefore accord credence to Gonzales testimony on
the matter, i.e., ZHIENETH performed no act that facilitated her
Ruling: tragic death. Sadly, petitioners did, through their negligence or
omission to secure or make stable the counters base.

An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault

or negligence attaches to the defendant. It is a fortuitous Without doubt, petitioner Panelo and another store supervisor
circumstance, event or happening; an event happening without any were personally informed of the danger posed by the unstable
human agency, or if happening wholly or partly through human counter. Yet, neither initiated any concrete action to remedy the
agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual or situation nor ensure the safety of the stores employees and patrons
unexpected by the person to whom it happens. as a reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have done. Thus, as
confronted by the situation petitioners miserably failed to discharge
the due diligence required of a good father of a family.
On the other hand, negligence is the omission to do something
which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the Anent the negligence imputed to ZHIENETH, we apply the
doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not conclusive presumption that favors children below nine (9) years old
do. Negligence is the failure to observe, for the protection of the in that they are incapable of contributory negligence. In his
interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution and book,[28] former Judge Cezar S. Sangco stated:
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such
other person suffers injury.
In our jurisdiction, a person under nine years of age is
conclusively presumed to have acted without discernment, and is,
Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory; one on that account, exempt from criminal liability. The same
cannot exist with the other. Accident occurs when the person presumption and a like exemption from criminal liability obtains in
concerned is exercising ordinary care, which is not caused by fault a case of a person over nine and under fifteen years of age, unless it
of any person and which could not have been prevented by any is shown that he has acted with discernment. Since negligence may
means suggested by common prudence. be a felony and a quasi-delict and required discernment as a
condition of liability, either criminal or civil, a child under nine years
of age is, by analogy, conclusively presumed to be incapable of
The test in determining the existence of negligence is negligence; and that the presumption of lack of discernment or
enunciated in the landmark case of Picart v. Smith, thus: Did the incapacity for negligence in the case of a child over nine but under
defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable fifteen years of age is a rebuttable one, under our law. The rule,
care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have therefore, is that a child under nine years of age must be
used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. conclusively presumed incapable of contributory negligence as a
matter of law. [Emphasis supplied]

We rule that the tragedy which befell ZHIENETH was no

accident and that ZHIENETHs death could only be attributed to Even if we attribute contributory negligence to ZHIENETH and
negligence. assume that she climbed over the counter, no injury should have
occurred if we accept petitioners theory that the counter was stable
and sturdy. For if that was the truth, a frail six-year old could not
have caused the counter to collapse. The physical analysis of the
This testimony of Gonzales pertaining to ZHIENETHs statement counter by both the trial court and Court of Appeals and a scrutiny of
formed (and should be admitted as) part of the res gestae under the evidence on record reveal otherwise, i.e., it was not durable after
Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, thus: all. Shaped like an inverted L, the counter was heavy, huge, and its
top laden with formica. It protruded towards the customer waiting
area and its base was not secured.
Part of res gestae. Statements made by a person while a
startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or
subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may CRISELDA too, should be absolved from any contributory
be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements negligence. Initially, ZHIENETH held on to CRISELDAs waist, later to
accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a the latters hand.[31] CRISELDA momentarily released the childs hand
legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae. from her clutch when she signed her credit card slip. At this precise
moment, it was reasonable and usual for CRISELDA to let go of her
child. Further, at the time ZHIENETH was pinned down by the
It is axiomatic that matters relating to declarations of pain or counter, she was just a foot away from her mother; and the
suffering and statements made to a physician are generally gift-wrapping counter was just four meters away from CRISELDA.[32]
considered declarations and admissions.[23] All that is required for The time and distance were both significant. ZHIENETH was near her
mother and did not loiter as petitioners would want to impress upon
 TORTS AND DAMAGES
Atty. Giancarlo Alicaya | SY 2018-19

us. She even admitted to the doctor who treated her at the hospital
that she did not do anything; the counter just fell on her.
Fault, in general, signifies a voluntary act or omission which
causes damage to the right of another giving rise to an obligation on
the part of the actor to repair such damage. Negligence is the
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another
DENIED and the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals of 17 person that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the
June 1996 in C.A. G.R. No. CV 37937 is hereby AFFIRMED. circumstances justly demand. Fault requires the execution of a
positive act which causes damage to another while negligence
consists of the omission to do acts which result in damage to
Child Learning v. Tagorio, 426 SCRA 236 another.

Facts:
In this tort case, respondents contend that CLC failed to provide
precautionary measures to avoid harm and injury to its students in
The complaint alleged that during the school year 1990-1991, two instances: (1) failure to fix a defective door knob despite having
Timothy was a Grade IV student at Marymount School, an academic been notified of the problem; and (2) failure to install safety grills on
institution operated and maintained by Child Learning Center, Inc. the window where Timothy fell from.
(CLC). In the afternoon of March 5, 1991, between 1 and 2 p.m.,
Timothy entered the boys comfort room at the third floor of the
Marymount building to answer the call of nature. He, however, found
The trial court found that the lock was defective on March 5,
himself locked inside and unable to get out. Timothy started to panic
1991. The Court of Appeals held that there was no reason to disturb
and so he banged and kicked the door and yelled several times for
the factual assessment.
help. When no help arrived he decided to open the window to call for
help. In the process of opening the window, Timothy went right
through and fell down three stories. Timothy was hospitalized and
given medical treatment for serious multiple physical injuries. The fact, however, that Timothy fell out through the window
shows that the door could not be opened from the inside. That
sufficiently points to the fact that something was wrong with the
door, if not the door knob, under the principle of res ipsa loquitor.
An action under Article 2176 of the Civil Code was filed by
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies where (1) the accident was
respondents against the CLC, the members of its Board of Directors,
of such character as to warrant an inference that it would not have
namely Spouses Edgardo and Sylvia Limon, Alfonso Cruz, Carmelo
happened except for the defendants negligence; (2) the accident
Narciso and Luningning Salvador, and the Administrative Officer of
must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the
Marymount School, Ricardo Pilao. In its defense, CLC maintained that
exclusive management or control of the person charged with the
there was nothing defective about the locking mechanism of the
negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been
door and that the fall of Timothy was not due to its fault or
due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the
negligence. CLC further maintained that it had exercised the due care
person injured. Petitioners are clearly answerable for failure to see
and diligence of a good father of a family to ensure the safety,
to it that the doors of their school toilets are at all times in working
well-being and convenience of its students.
condition. The fact that a student had to go through the window,
instead of the door, shows that something was wrong with the door.

Trial court ruled in favor of respondents and ordered

petitioners CLC and Spouses Limon to pay respondents, jointly and
Petitioners argument that CLC exercised the due diligence of a
severally.
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its
employees is not decisive. Due diligence in the selection and
supervision of employees is applicable where the employer is being
CA affirmed. held responsible for the acts or omissions of others under Article
2180 of the Civil Code. In this case, CLCs liability is under Article
2176 of the Civil Code, premised on the fact of its own negligence in
Issue: not ensuring that all its doors are properly maintained.

Whether or not CLC is liable. - YES Our pronouncement that Timothy climbed out of the window
because he could not get out using the door, negates petitioners
other contention that the proximate cause of the accident was
Timothys own negligence. The injuries he sustained from the fall
Ruling:
were the product of a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any intervening cause, that originated from CLCs own
negligence.
In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
plaintiff has to prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the
damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the
We, however, agree with petitioners that there was no basis
defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond;
to pierce CLCs separate corporate personality. To disregard the
and (3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or
corporate existence, the plaintiff must prove: (1) Control by the
negligence and the damages incurred.
individual owners, not mere majority or complete stock ownership,
resulting in complete domination not only of finances but of policy
 TORTS AND DAMAGES
Atty. Giancarlo Alicaya | SY 2018-19

and business practice in respect to a transaction so that the Civil Case No. A-1646. Petitioner and Oller filed an Answer with
corporate entity as to this transaction had at the time no separate Third-Party Complaint[6] impleading Yoro as third-party defendant.
mind, will or existence of its own; (2) such control must have been
used by the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to perpetuate the
violation of a statutory or other positive legal duty, or a dishonest After four years of hearing the case, the trial court promulgated
and unjust act in contravention of the plaintiffs legal right; and (3) its Decision[11] holding that the diggings were not intended for the
the control and breach of duty must proximately cause the injury or construction of sewerage and septic tanks but were made to
unjust loss complained of. The absence of these elements prevents construct tunnels to find hidden treasure.
piercing the corporate veil.[13] The evidence on record fails to show
that these elements are present, especially given the fact that
plaintiffs complaint had pleaded that CLC is a corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court but with modifications.

On 9th and 10th points raised concerning the award of Issue:

damages, the resolution would rest on factual determinations by the
trial court, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and no legal issue
warrants our intervention. WHETHER OR NOT THE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT
ENTERED INTO BY THE PETITIONER AND YORO HAS THE EFFECT OF
MAKING THE LATTER SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR DAMAGES TO THE
WHEREFORE, the petition is partly granted and the Decision and RESPONDENT.
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 50961 dated
September 28, 2001 and November 23, 2001, respectively, are
MODIFIED in that petitioners Spouses Edgardo and Sylvia Limon are Ruling:
absolved from personal liability. The Decision and Resolution are
AFFIRMED in all other respects. No pronouncement as to costs.
The findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals on this
point are in complete unison. Petitioner and Yoro were in quest for
hidden treasure[26] and, undoubtedly, they were partners in this
endeavor.
c. Elements

(a) DAMAGES suffered by the plaintiff;

We find no compelling reason to disturb this particular
(b) FAULT or NEGLIGENCE of the defendant, or some conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals. The issue, therefore,
other person for whose acts he must respond; must be ruled in the negative.
(c) CONNECTION OF CAUSE AND EFFECT between the
fault or negligence of the defendant and the
damages incurred by the plaintiff Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides:

Chan, Jr. V. Iglesia ni Cristo, Inc., GR No. 160283, October 14, 2005 ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
The Aringay Shell Gasoline Station is owned by the petitioner. It damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
is located in Sta. Rita East, Aringay, La Union, and bounded on the contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and
south by a chapel of the respondent. is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

The gasoline station supposedly needed additional sewerage Based on this provision of law, the requisites of quasi-delict
and septic tanks for its washrooms. In view of this, the services of are the following:
Dioscoro Ely Yoro (Yoro), a retired general of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, was procured by petitioner, as the former was allegedly a
construction contractor in the locality.
(a) there must be an act or omission;

(b) such act or omission causes damage to another;

Diggings thereafter commenced. After some time, petitioner
(c) such act or commission is caused by fault or negligence; &
was informed by the members of the respondent that the digging
traversed and penetrated a portion of the land belonging to the (d) there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
latter. The foundation of the chapel was affected as a tunnel was dug parties.
directly under it to the damage and prejudice of the respondent.

All the requisites are attendant in the instant case. The

On 18 April 1995, a Complaint[5] against petitioner and a tortious act was the excavation which caused damage to the
certain Teofilo Oller, petitioners engineer, was filed by the respondent because it was done surreptitiously within its premises
respondent before the RTC, La Union, Branch 31, docketed therein as and it may have affected the foundation of the chapel. The
 TORTS AND DAMAGES
Atty. Giancarlo Alicaya | SY 2018-19

excavation on respondents premises was caused by fault. Finally,

there was no pre-existing contractual relation between the petitioner
and Yoro on the one hand, and the respondent on the other. WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 25
September 2003 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the award of
exemplary damages, which is hereby increased to P100,000.00. Costs
against petitioner.
For the damage caused to respondent, petitioner and Yoro are
jointly liable as they are joint tortfeasors. Verily, the responsibility of
two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.
Dra. Dela LLana v. Rebecca Biong, GR No. 182356, Dec. 4, 2013

On March 30, 2000, at around 11:00 p.m., Juan dela Llana was
The heavy reliance of petitioner in paragraph 4 of the MOA driving a 1997 Toyota Corolla car along North Avenue, Quezon City.4
cited earlier cannot steer him clear of any liability.

His sister, Dra. dela Llana, was seated at the front passenger
As a general rule, joint tortfeasors are all the persons who seat while a certain Calimlim was at the backseat.5
command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance,
cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve
of it after it is done, if done for their benefit.[29]
Juan stopped the car across the Veterans Memorial Hospital
when the signal light turned red. A few seconds after the car halted, a
dump truck containing gravel and sand suddenly rammed the car’s
Indubitably, petitioner and Yoro cooperated in committing the rear end, violently pushing the car forward. Due to the impact, the
tort. They even had provisions in their MOA as to how they would car’s rear end collapsed and its rear windshield was shattered. Glass
divide the treasure if any is found within or outside petitioners splinters flew, puncturing Dra. dela Llana. Apart from these minor
property line. Thus, the MOA, instead of exculpating petitioner from wounds, Dra. dela Llana did not appear to have suffered from any
liability, is the very noose that insures that he be so declared as other visible physical injuries.6
liable.

The traffic investigation report dated March 30, 2000 identified

Besides, petitioner cannot claim that he did not know that the the truck driver as Joel Primero. It stated that Joel was recklessly
excavation traversed the respondents property. In fact, he had two imprudent in driving the truck.7
(2) of his employees actually observe the diggings, his security guard
and his engineer Teofilo Oller.[30]

Joel later revealed that his employer was respondent Rebecca

Biong, doing business under the name and style of "Pongkay Trading"
Coming now to the matter on damages, the respondent and was engaged in a gravel and sand business.8
questions the drastic reduction of the exemplary damages awarded
to it. It may be recalled that the trial court awarded exemplary
damages in the amount of P10,000,000.00 but same was reduced by
In the first week of May 2000, Dra. dela Llana began to feel mild
the Court of Appeals to P50,000.00.
to moderate pain on the left side of her neck and shoulder. The pain
became more intense as days passed by. Her injury became more
severe. Her health deteriorated to the extent that she could no
Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of longer move her left arm. On June 9, 2000, she consulted with Dr.
example or correction for the public good.[31] In quasi-delicts, Rosalinda Milla, a rehabilitation medicine specialist, to examine her
exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with condition. Dr. Milla told her that she suffered from a whiplash injury,
gross negligence.[32] By gross negligence is meant such entire want an injury caused by the compression of the nerve running to her left
of care as to raise a presumption that the person in fault is arm and hand. Dr. Milla required her to undergo physical therapy to
conscious of the probable consequences of carelessness, and is alleviate her condition. Dra. dela Llana’s condition did not improve
indifferent, or worse, to the danger of injury to person or property despite three months of extensive physical therapy.
of others.

She then consulted other doctors, namely, Drs. Willie Lopez,

Surreptitiously digging under the respondents chapel which Leonor Cabral-Lim and Eric Flores, in search for a cure. Dr. Flores, a
may weaken the foundation thereof, thereby endangering the lives neuro-surgeon, finally suggested that she undergo a cervical spine
and limbs of the people in worship, unquestionably amounts to surgery to release the compression of her nerve. On October 19,
gross negligence. Not to mention the damage that may be caused to 2000, Dr. Flores operated on her spine and neck, between the C5 and
the structure itself. The respondent may indeed be awarded the C6 vertebrae.10
exemplary damages.

The operation released the impingement of the nerve, but

For such tortious act done with gross negligence, the Court feels incapacitated Dra. dela Llana from the practice of her profession
that the amount awarded by the Court of Appeals is inadequate. The since June 2000 despite the surgery.
exemplary damages must correspondingly be increased to
P100,000.00.

Dra. dela Llana, on October 16, 2000, demanded from Rebecca

 TORTS AND DAMAGES
Atty. Giancarlo Alicaya | SY 2018-19

compensation for her injuries, but Rebecca refused to pay.12 was vicariously liable because she was the employer and she
personally chose him to drive the truck. On the day of the collision,
she ordered him to deliver gravel and sand to Muñoz Market, Quezon
Thus, on May 8, 2001, Dra. dela Llana sued Rebecca for City. The Court concluded that the three elements necessary to
damages before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (RTC). She establish Rebecca’s liability were present: (1) that the employee
alleged that she lost the mobility of her arm as a result of the was chosen by the employer, personally or through another; (2)
vehicular accident and claimed ₱150,000.00 for her medical expenses that the services were to be rendered in accordance with orders
(as of the filing of the complaint) and an average monthly income of which the employer had the authority to give at all times; and (3)
₱30,000.00 since June 2000. She further prayed for actual, moral, that the illicit act of the employee was on the occasion or by reason
and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees.13 of the functions entrusted to him. The RTC thus awarded Dra. dela
Llana the amounts of ₱570,000.00 as actual damages, ₱250,000.00 as
moral damages, and the cost of the suit.

At the trial, Dra. dela Llana presented herself as an ordinary

witness15 and Joel as a hostile witness.16
The CA reversed the RTC ruling. It held that Dra. dela Llana
failed to establish a reasonable connection between the vehicular
accident and her whiplash injury by preponderance of evidence. It
Dra. dela Llana reiterated that she lost the mobility of her arm noted that the interval between the date of the collision and the date
because of the vehicular accident. To prove her claim, she identified when Dra. dela Llana began to suffer the symptoms of her illness was
and authenticated a medical certificate dated November 20, 2000 lengthy. It concluded that this interval raised doubts on whether
issued by Dr. Milla. The medical certificate stated that Dra. dela Llana Joel’s reckless driving and the resulting collision in fact caused Dra.
suffered from a whiplash injury. It also chronicled her clinical history dela Llana’s injury. It also declared that courts cannot take judicial
and physical examinations.17 notice that vehicular accidents cause whiplash injuries. It observed
that Dra. dela Llana did not immediately visit a hospital to check if
she sustained internal injuries after the accident. Moreover, her
Meanwhile, Joel testified that his truck hit the car because the failure to present expert witnesses was fatal to her claim. It also gave
truck’s brakes got stuck.18 no weight to the medical certificate. The medical certificate did not
explain how and why the vehicular accident caused the injury.

In defense, Rebecca testified that Dra. dela Llana was physically

fit and strong when they met several days after the vehicular Issue:
accident. She also asserted that she observed the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of Joel. She pointed
out that she required Joel to submit a certification of good moral Whether Joel’s reckless driving is the proximate cause of Dra.
character as well as barangay, police, and NBI clearances prior to his dela Llana’s whiplash injury.
employment. She also stressed that she only hired Primero after he
successfully passed the driving skills test conducted by Alberto
Marcelo, a licensed driver-mechanic.19
Ruling:

Alberto also took the witness stand. He testified that he

checked the truck in the morning of March 30, 2000. He affirmed that Dra. dela Llana failed to establish her case by preponderance of
the truck was in good condition prior to the vehicular accident. He evidence.
opined that the cause of the vehicular accident was a damaged
compressor. According to him, the absence of air inside the tank
damaged the compressor. Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that "[w]hoever by act
or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
RTC ruled in favor of Dra. Dela Llana and held that the negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
proximate cause of Dra. Dela Llana’s whiplash injury to be Joel’s the parties, is a quasi-delict." Under this provision, the elements
reckless driving. necessary to establish a quasi-delict case are:

It found that a whiplash injury is an injury caused by the sudden (1) damages to the plaintiff;
jerking of the spine in the neck area. It pointed out that the massive
damage the car suffered only meant that the truck was
over-speeding. It maintained that Joel should have driven at a slower (2) negligence, by act or omission, of the defendant or by
pace because road visibility diminishes at night. He should have some person for whose acts the defendant must respond, was
blown his horn and warned the car that his brake was stuck and guilty; and
could have prevented the collision by swerving the truck off the road.
It also concluded that Joel was probably sleeping when the collision
occurred as Joel had been driving for fifteen hours on that fateful (3) the connection of cause and effect between such
day. The RTC further declared that Joel’s negligence gave rise to the negligence and the damages.
presumption that Rebecca did not exercise the diligence of a good
father of a family in Joel's selection and supervision of Joel. Rebecca
 TORTS AND DAMAGES
Atty. Giancarlo Alicaya | SY 2018-19

These elements show that the source of obligation in a of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED and the petition is hereby DENIED
quasi-delict case is the breach or omission of mutual duties that for lack of merit.
civilized society imposes upon its members, or which arise from
non-contractual relations of certain members of society to others. SO ORDERED.

Based on these requisites, Dra. dela Llana must first establish Taylor v. Manila Railroad, 16 Phil 8
by preponderance of evidence the three elements of quasi-delict
On the 30th of September, 1905, plaintiff, with a boy named
before we determine Rebecca’s liability as Joel’s employer.
Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of age, crossed the footbridge to
the Isla del Provisor, for the purpose of visiting one Murphy, an
employee of the defendant, who and promised to make them a
She should show the chain of causation between Joel’s reckless cylinder for a miniature engine. Finding on inquiry that Mr. Murphy
driving and her whiplash injury. was not in his quarters, the boys, impelled apparently by youthful
curiosity and perhaps by the unusual interest which both seem to
have taken in machinery, spent some time in wandering about the
Only after she has laid this foundation can the presumption - company's premises. The visit was made on a Sunday afternoon, and
that Rebecca did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a it does not appear that they saw or spoke to anyone after leaving the
family in the selection and supervision of Joel - arise.30 power house where they had asked for Mr. Murphy.

Once negligence, the damages and the proximate causation After watching the operation of the travelling crane used in
are established, this Court can then proceed with the application handling the defendant's coal, they walked across the open space in
and the interpretation of the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the the neighborhood of the place where the company dumped in the
Civil Code. cinders and ashes from its furnaces. Here they found some twenty or
thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground. These caps are
approximately of the size and appearance of small pistol cartridges
and each has attached to it two long thin wires by means of which it
Under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, in relation with the fifth
may be discharged by the use of electricity. They are intended for use
paragraph of Article 2180, "an action predicated on an employee’s
in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite, and have in
act or omission may be instituted against the employer who is held
themselves a considerable explosive power. After some discussion as
liable for the negligent act or omission committed by his
to the ownership of the caps, and their right to take them, the boys
employee."
picked up all they could find, hung them on stick, of which each took
end, and carried them home. After crossing the footbridge, they met
a little girl named Jessie Adrian, less than 9 years old, and all three
The rationale for these graduated levels of analyses is that it is went to the home of the boy Manuel. The boys then made a series of
essentially the wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which experiments with the caps. They trust the ends of the wires into an
creates the vinculum juris in extra-contractual obligations. electric light socket and obtained no result. They next tried to break
the cap with a stone and failed. Manuel looked for a hammer, but
could not find one. Then they opened one of the caps with a knife,
In civil cases, a party who alleges a fact has the burden of and finding that it was filled with a yellowish substance they got
proving it. matches, and David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted
match to the contents. An explosion followed, causing more or less
serious injuries to all three. Jessie, who when the boys proposed
putting a match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and
He who alleges has the burden of proving his allegation by
started to run away, received a slight cut in the neck. Manuel had his
preponderance of evidence or greater weight of credible evidence.
hand burned and wounded, and David was struck in the face by
several particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured his right
eye to such an extent as to the necessitate its removal by the
The reason for this rule is that bare allegations, surgeons who were called in to care for his wounds.
unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof.

The evidence does definitely and conclusively disclose how the

In short, mere allegations are not evidence. caps came to be on the defendant's premises, nor how long they had
been there when the boys found them. It appears, however, that
some months before the accident, during the construction of the
In sum, Dra. dela Llana miserably failed to establish her cause defendant's plant, detonating caps of the same size and kind as those
by preponderance of evidence. While we commiserate with her, our found by the boys were used in sinking a well at the power plant near
solemn duty to independently and impartially assess the merits of the place where the caps were found; and it also appears that at or
the case binds us to rule against Dra. dela Llana’s favor. Her claim, about the time when these caps were found, similarly caps were in
unsupported by prepondernace of evidence, is merely a bare use in the construction of an extension of defendant's street car line
assertion and has no leg to stand on. to Fort William McKinley. The caps when found appeared to the boys
who picked them up to have been lying for a considerable time, and
from the place where they were found would seem to have been
discarded as detective or worthless and fit only to be thrown upon
WHEREFORE, presmises considered, the assailed Decision dated
the rubbish heap.
February 11, 2008 and Resolution dated March 31, 2008 of the Court
 TORTS AND DAMAGES
Atty. Giancarlo Alicaya | SY 2018-19

strangers who are unlawfully upon its premises that it owes to

passengers conveyed by it, it is not exempt from responsibility to such
No measures seems to have been adopted by the defendant strangers for injuries arising from its negligence or from its tortious
company to prohibit or prevent visitors from entering and walking acts;" and that "the conduct of an infant of tender years is not to be
about its premises unattended, when they felt disposed so to do. judged by the same rule which governs that of adult. While it is the
general rule in regard to an adult that to entitle him to recover
damages for an injury resulting from the fault or negligence of
Trial court ruled in favor of plaintiff. another he must himself have been free from fault, such is not the
rule in regard to an infant of tender years. The care and caution
required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only, and
It is clear that the accident could not have happened and not this is to be determined in each case by the circumstances of the
the fulminating caps been left exposed at the point where they were case." --- TURNRABLE or TORPEDO case
found, or if their owner had exercised due care in keeping them in an
appropriate place; but it is equally clear that plaintiff would not have
been injured had he not, for his own pleasure and convenience, The doctrine of the case of Railroad Company vs. Stout was
entered upon the defendant's premises, and strolled around thereon vigorously controverted and sharply criticized in several state courts,
without the express permission of the defendant, and had he not and the supreme court of Michigan in the case of Ryan vs. Towar
picked up and carried away the property of the defendant which he (128 Mich., 463) formally repudiated and disapproved the doctrine of
found on its premises, and had he not thereafter deliberately cut the Turntable cases, especially that laid down in Railroad Company
open one of the caps and applied a match to its contents. vs. Stout, in a very able decision wherein it held, in the language of
the syllabus: (1) That the owner of the land is not liable to trespassers
thereon for injuries sustained by them, not due to his wanton or
But counsel for plaintiff contends that because of plaintiff's willful acts; (2) that no exception to this rule exists in favor of children
youth and inexperience, his entry upon defendant company's who are injured by dangerous machinery naturally calculated to
premises, and the intervention of his action between the negligent attract them to the premises; (3) that an invitation or license to cross
act of defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises and the the premises of another can not be predicated on the mere fact that
accident which resulted in his injury should not be held to have no steps have been taken to interfere with such practice; (4) that
contributed in any wise to the accident, which should be deemed to there is no difference between children and adults as to the
be the direct result of defendant's negligence in leaving the caps circumstances that will warrant the inference of an invitation or a
exposed at the place where they were found by the plaintiff, and this license to enter upon another's premises.
latter the proximate cause of the accident which occasioned the
injuries sustained by him.
As we think we have shown, under the reasoning on which rests
the doctrine of the Turntable and Torpedo cases, no fault which
Issue: would relieve defendant of responsibility for injuries resulting from
its negligence can be attributed to the plaintiff, a well-grown boy of
15 years of age, because of his entry upon defendant's uninclosed
premises without express permission or invitation' but it is wholly
Whether a railroad company is liable for an injury received by different question whether such youth can be said to have been free
an infant of tender years, who from mere idle curiosity, or for the from fault when he willfully and deliberately cut open the detonating
purposes of amusement, enters upon the railroad company's cap, and placed a match to the contents, knowing, as he undoubtedly
premises, at a place where the railroad company knew, or had good did, that his action would result in an explosion. On this point, which
reason to suppose, children would be likely to come, and there found must be determined by "the particular circumstances of this case,"
explosive signal torpedoes left unexposed by the railroad company's the doctrine laid down in the Turntable and Torpedo cases lends us
employees, one of which when carried away by the visitor, exploded no direct aid, although it is worthy of observation that in all of the
and injured him; or where such infant found upon the premises a "Torpedo" and analogous cases which our attention has been
dangerous machine, such as a turntable, left in such condition as to directed, the record discloses that the plaintiffs, in whose favor
make it probable that children in playing with it would be exposed to judgments have been affirmed, were of such tender years that they
accident or injury therefrom and where the infant did in fact suffer were held not to have the capacity to understand the nature or
injury in playing with such machine. character of the explosive instruments which fell into their hands.

Ruling: In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was a
well-grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally and physically
than the average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy;
The great weight of authority holds the owner of the premises was able to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days
liable. after the injury was incurred; and the record discloses throughout
that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care of himself. The
evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that, despite his denials
on the witness stand, he well knew the explosive character of the cap
As laid down in Railroad Co. vs. Stout (17 Wall. (84 U. S.), 657),
with which he was amusing himself. The series of experiments made
wherein the principal question was whether a railroad company was
by him in his attempt to produce an explosion, as described by the
liable for in injury received by an infant while upon its premises, from
little girl who was present, admit of no other explanation. His
idle curiosity, or for purposes of amusement, if such injury was,
attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity, followed by his
under circumstances, attributable to the negligence of the company),
efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final success
the principles on which these cases turn are that "while a railroad
of his endeavors brought about by the application of a match to the
company is not bound to the same degree of care in regard to mere
 TORTS AND DAMAGES
Atty. Giancarlo Alicaya | SY 2018-19

contents of the caps, show clearly that he knew what he was about. for the negligence act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed
Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the proximate
anticipate that the explosion might be dangerous, in view of the fact and principal cause of the accident which inflicted the injury.
that the little girl, 9 years of age, who was within him at the time
when he put the match to the contents of the cap, became
frightened and ran away. The rule of the Roman law was: Quod quis ex culpa sua
damnum sentit, non intelligitur sentire. (Digest, book 50, tit. 17 rule
203.)
True, he may not have known and probably did not know the
precise nature of the explosion which might be expected from the
ignition of the contents of the cap, and of course he did not The Patidas contain the following provisions:
anticipate the resultant injuries which he incurred; but he well knew
that a more or less dangerous explosion might be expected from his
act, and yet he willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced the
explosion. It would be going far to say that "according to his The just thing is that a man should suffer the damage which
maturity and capacity" he exercised such and "care and caution" as comes to him through his own fault, and that he can not demand
might reasonably be required of him, or that defendant or anyone reparation therefor from another. (Law 25, tit. 5, Partida 3.)
else should be held civilly responsible for injuries incurred by him
under such circumstances.
And they even said that when a man received an injury through
his own acts the grievance should be against himself and not against
The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to another. (Law 2, tit. 7, Partida 2.)
have the necessary capacity to understand and appreciate the
nature and consequences of his own acts, so as to make it
negligence on his part to fail to exercise due care and precaution in According to ancient sages, when a man received an injury
the commission of such acts; and indeed it would be impracticable through his own acts the grievance should be against himself and not
and perhaps impossible so to do, for in the very nature of things the against another. (Law 2, tit. 7 Partida 2.)
question of negligence necessarily depends on the ability of the
minor to understand the character of his own acts and their
consequences; and the age at which a minor can be said to have
And while there does not appear to be anything in the Civil
such ability will necessarily depends of his own acts and their
Code which expressly lays down the law touching contributory
consequences; and at the age at which a minor can be said to have
negligence in this jurisdiction, nevertheless, the interpretation placed
such ability will necessarily vary in accordance with the varying
upon its provisions by the supreme court of Spain, and by this court
nature of the infinite variety of acts which may be done by him. But
in the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. Rep.,
some idea of the presumed capacity of infants under the laws in
359), clearly deny to the plaintiff in the case at bar the right to
force in these Islands may be gathered from an examination of the
recover damages from the defendant, in whole or in part, for the
varying ages fixed by our laws at which minors are conclusively
injuries sustained by him.
presumed to be capable of exercising certain rights and incurring
certain responsibilities, though it can not be said that these
provisions of law are of much practical assistance in cases such as
that at bar, except so far as they illustrate the rule that the capacity We think it is quite clear that under the doctrine thus stated,
of a minor to become responsible for his own acts varies with the the immediate cause of the explosion, the accident which resulted
varying circumstances of each case. Under the provisions of the in plaintiff's injury, was in his own act in putting a match to the
Penal Code a minor over fifteen years of age is presumed to be contents of the cap, and that having "contributed to the principal
capable of committing a crime and is to held criminally responsible occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not recover."
therefore, although the fact that he is less than eighteen years of
age will be taken into consideration as an extenuating circumstance
(Penal Code, arts. 8 and 9). At 10 years of age a child may, under d. Culpa Aquiliana v. Culpa Criminal v. Culpa Contractual
certain circumstances, choose which parent it prefers to live with
(Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 771). At 14 may petition for the
appointment of a guardian (Id., sec. 551), and may consent or
AQUILIANA CRIMINAL CONTRACTUAL
refuse to be adopted (Id., sec. 765). And males of 14 and females of
12 are capable of contracting a legal marriage (Civil Code, art. 83; G. (Quasi-delict)
O., No. 68, sec. 1).
Source  Independent  Contract (breach
of a contract of contract by reason
of defendant’s failure
(extra-contract)
We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient to exercise due care
in its performance)
capacity and understanding to be sensible of the danger to which he
exposed himself when he put the match to the contents of the cap; Act/om  Only of private  Crimes that
that he was sui juris in the sense that his age and his experience ission
concern affect public
qualified him to understand and appreciate the necessity for the interest
exercise of that degree of caution which would have avoided the
injury which resulted from his own deliberate act; and that the Law  Civil Code, by  Penal Code
injury incurred by him must be held to have been the direct and means of punishes or
immediate result of his own willful and reckless act, so that while it indemnificatio corrects the
may be true that these injuries would not have been incurred but n, merely criminal act
 TORTS AND DAMAGES
Atty. Giancarlo Alicaya | SY 2018-19

repairs the do a resurvey of the same and the laying out of the concrete
damage monuments. The spouses Frank and Erlinda also refuted the spouses
Luzs and Kenichiros allegation of negligence and averred that the
 Include all acts  Covers only subject complaint was instituted to harass them.
in which “any acts where
kind of fault or there is a
negligence penal law
intervenes” covering them RTC ruled in favor of Spouses San Pedro. The RTC found that
indeed the perimeter fence constructed by the respondents
Liability
 ER - subsidiary  encroached on the right-of-way in question; that the preponderance
of evidence supports the finding that the encroachment was caused
by the negligence of the petitioners; that, in particular, respondents
constructed the fence based on the concrete cyclone monuments
Sps. Batal v. Sps. Luz San Pedro, et.al., GR No. 164601, Sep. 27, 2006
that were installed by petitioner Frank Batal and after he gave his
This case originated from an action for damages filed with the assurance that they can proceed accordingly; that the negligence in
RTC by Spouses Luz San Pedro and Kenichiro Tominaga (respondents) the installation of the monuments was due to the fact that petitioner
against Spouses Erlinda Batal and Frank Batal (petitioners) for failure Erlinda Batal, the one truly qualified, did not provide the needed
to exercise due care and diligence by the latter in the preparation of supervision over the work; and, lastly, that the testimonies of the
a survey which formed the basis for the construction of a perimeter petitioners on the whole were not credible.
fence that was later discovered to have encroached on a right of way.

CA affirmed the decision of RTC. In concurring with the findings

The spouses Luz San Pedro (Luz) and Kenichiro Tominaga of the RTC, the CA in addition held that the petitioners cannot claim
(Kenichiro) are the owners of a parcel of land, on which their house that the error of the construction ofthe fence was due to the
was erected, described as Lot 1509-C-3 with an area of 700 square unilateral act of respondents in building the same without their
meters situated in Barangay Malis, Guiguinto, Bulacan. Said property consent, since the former gave their word that the arrangement of
was acquired by them from one Guillermo Narciso as evidenced by a the monuments of title accurately reflected the boundaries of the
Bilihan ng Bahagi ng Lupa dated March 18, 1992. lot; and that, as a result, the northern portion of the fence had to be
demolished and rebuilt in order to correct the error.

The spouses Luz and Kenichiro then contracted the services of

Frank Batal (Frank) who represented himself as a surveyor to conduct Issue:
a survey of their lot for the sum of P6,500.00. As Luz and Kenichiro
wanted to enclose their property, they again procured the services of
Frank for an additional fee of P1,500.00 in order to determine the Whether a party having performed affirmative acts upon which
exact boundaries of the same by which they will base the another person based his subsequent actions, cannot thereafter
construction of their perimeter fence. refute his acts or renege on the effects of the same, to the prejudice
of the latter.

Consequently, Frank placed concrete monuments marked P.S.

on all corners of the lot which were used as guides by Luz and Ruling:
Kenichiro in erecting a concrete fence measuring about eight (8) feet
in height and cost them P250,000.00 to build.
NO. The petitioners insist that there had been no error in their
resurvey, but rather, the error occurred in respondents fencing; that
Sometime in 1996, a complaint was lodged against Luz and the proximate cause of the damage had been respondents own
Kenichiro before the barangay on the ground that the northern negligence such that the fencing was done unilaterally and solely by
portion of their fence allegedly encroached upon a designated them without the prior approval and supervision of the petitioners.
right-of-way known as Lot 1509-D. Upon verification with another And to justify their case, the petitioners argue that the courts a quo
surveyor, Luz and Kenichiro found that their wall indeed overlapped misapprehended the facts. Accordingly, they ask this Court to review
the adjoining lot. They also discovered that it was not Frank but his findings of fact. Well-established is the rule that factual findings of
wife Erlinda Batal (Erlinda), who is a licensed geodetic engineer. the trial court and the CA are entitled to great weight and respect[9]
and will not be disturbed on appeal save in exceptional
circumstances,[10] none of which obtains in the present case.
During their confrontations before the barangay, Frank
admitted that he made a mistake and offered to share in the
expenses for the demolition and reconstruction of the questioned Culpa, or negligence, may be understood in two different
portion of Luz and Kenichiros fence. He however failed to deliver on senses: either as culpa aquiliana, which is the wrongful or negligent
his word, thus the filing of the instant suit. act or omission which creates a vinculum juris and gives rise to an
obligation between two persons not formally bound by any other
obligation, or as culpa contractual, which is the fault or negligence
In their defense, the defendants-spouses Frank and Erlinda incident in the performance of an obligation which already existed,
Batal submitted that Frank never represented himself to be a and which increases the liability from such already existing
licensed geodetic engineer. It was Erlinda who supervised her obligation.[13] Culpa aquiliana is governed by Article 2176 of the
husbands work [and t]hat the house and lot of plaintiffs, Luz and Civil Code and the immediately following Articles; while culpa
Kenichiro, were already fenced even before they were contracted to
 TORTS AND DAMAGES
Atty. Giancarlo Alicaya | SY 2018-19

contractual is governed by Articles 1170 to 1174 of the same Code.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed

Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
Articles 1170 and 1173 provide:

Culpa Aquiliana Culpa Contractual

ART. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations
are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any Wrongful or negligent act Fault or negligence incident
manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages. or commission which creates a in the performance of an
vinculum juris and gives rise to obligation which already existed,
an obligation between two and which increases the liability
ART. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in persons not formally bound by from such already existing
the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the any other obligation obligation
obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons,
Article 2176 and the immediately Article 1170 to 1174
of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the
following articles
provisions of articles 1171 and 2202, paragraph 2, shall apply.

If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to Rakes v. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co., GR No. 1719, Jan. 23, 1907
be observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good
This is an action for damages. The plaintiff, one of a gang of
father of a family shall be required. eight negro laborers in the employment of the defendant, was at
work transporting iron rails from a barge in the harbor to the
company's yard near the malecon in Manila. Plaintiff claims that but
In the present case, it is clear that the petitioners, in carrying one hand car was used in this work. The defendant has proved that
out their contractual obligations, failed to exercise the requisite there were two immediately following one another, upon which were
diligence in the placement of the markings for the concrete piled lengthwise seven rails, each weighing 560 pounds, so that the
perimeter fence that was later constructed. The placement of the ends of the rails lay upon two crosspieces or sills secured to the cars,
markings had been done solely by petitioner Frank Batal who is not a but without side pieces or guards to prevent them from slipping off.
geodetic engineer. It was later discovered that it was not he but his According to the testimony of the plaintiff, the men were either in
wife, petitioner Erlinda Batal, who is the licensed geodetic engineer the rear of the car or at its sides. According to that defendant, some
and who is, therefore, the one qualified to do the work. Petitioner of them were also in front, hauling by a rope. At a certain spot at or
Frank Batals installation of the concrete cyclone monuments had near the water's edge the track sagged, the tie broke, the car either
been done without the adequate supervision of his wife, Erlinda. As a canted or upset, the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff, breaking his
result, the placement of the monuments did not accurately reflect leg, which was afterwards amputated at about the knee.
the dimensions of the lot. The respondents, upon assurance given by
petitioner Frank Batal that they could proceed with the construction
of the perimeter fence by relying on the purported accuracy of the
According to plaintiffs witnesses, a depression of the track,
placement of the monuments, erected their fence which turned out
varying from one half inch to one inch and a half, was therafter
to encroach on an adjacent easement. Because of the encroachment, apparent to the eye, and a fellow workman of the plaintiff swears
the respondents had to demolish and reconstruct the fence and, that the day before the accident he called the attention of McKenna,
thus, suffered damages.
the foreman, to it and asked by simply straightening out the
crosspiece, resetting the block under the stringer and renewing the
tie, but otherwise leaving the very same timbers as before. It has not
Being guilty of a breach of their contract, petitioners are liable proven that the company inspected the track after the typhoon or
for damages suffered by the respondents in accordance with had any proper system of inspection.
Articles 1170 and 2201 of the Civil Code,[16] which state:

In order to charge the defendant with negligence, it was

Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations necessary to show a breach of duty on its part in failing either to
are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay and those who in any properly secure the load on iron to vehicles transporting it, or to
manner contravene the tenor thereof are liable for damages skillfully build the tramway or to maintain it in proper condition, or to
vigilantly inspect and repair the roadway as soon as the depression in
it became visible. It is upon the failure of the defendant to repair the
Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for weakened track, after notice of its condition, that the judge below
which the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those based his judgment.
that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of
the obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have
reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted. This case presents many important matters for our decision,
and first among them is the standard of duty which we shall establish
in our jurisprudence on the part of employees toward employees.
In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the
obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be
reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation. The lack or the harshness of legal rules on this subject has led
many countries to enact designed to put these relations on a fair
 TORTS AND DAMAGES
Atty. Giancarlo Alicaya | SY 2018-19

basis in the form of compensation or liability laws or the institution individual is civilly liable for a negligent act or omission, it is not
of insurance. In the absence of special legislation we find no required that the inured party should seek out a third person
difficulty in so applying the general principles of our law as to work criminally liable whose prosecution must be a condition precedent
out a just result. to the enforcement of the civil right.

Article 1092 of the Civil Code provides: Under article 20 of the Penal Code the responsibility of an
employer may be regarded as subsidiary in respect of criminal
actions against his employees only while they are process of
Civil obligations, arising from crimes or misdemeanors, shall prosecution, or in so far as they determinate the existence of the
be governed by the provisions of the Penal Code. criminal act from which liability arises, and his obligation under the
civil law and its enforcement in the civil courts is not barred thereby
unless by election of the injured person. Inasmuch as no criminal in
question, the provisions of the Penal Code can not affect this
And article 568 of the latter code provides: action. This construction renders it unnecessary to finally determine
here whether this subsidiary civil liability in penal actions survived
the laws that fully regulated it or has been abrogated by the
He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that if American civil and criminal procedure now in force in the Philippines.
done with malice would constitute a grave crime, shall be punished.

The difficulty in construing the articles of the code above cited

And article 590 provides that the following shall be punished: in this case appears from the briefs before us to have arisen from the
interpretation of the words of article 1093, "fault or negligence not
punished by law," as applied to the comprehensive definition of
offenses in articles 568 and 590 of the Penal Code. It has been shown
4. Those who by simple imprudence or negligence, without
that the liability of an employer arising out of his relation to his
committing any infraction of regulations, shall cause an injury
employee who is the offender is not to be regarded as derived from
which, had malice intervened, would have constituted a crime or
negligence punished by the law, within the meaning of articles 1092
misdemeanor.
and 1093. More than this, however, it can not be said to fall within
the class of acts unpunished by the law, the consequences of which
are regulated by articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code. The acts to
And finally by articles 19 and 20, the liability of owners and which these articles are applicable are understood to be those and
employers for the faults of their servants and representatives is growing out of preexisting duties of the parties to one another. But
declared to be civil and subsidiary in its character. were relations already formed give rise to duties, whether springing
from contract or quasi contract, then breaches of those duties are
subject to articles 1101, 1103, and 1104, of the same code. A typical
It is contented by the defendant, as its first defense to the application of the distinction may be found in the consequences of a
action, that the necessary conclusion from these collated laws is that railway accident due to defective machinery supplied by the
the remedy for injuries through negligence lies only in a criminal employer. His liability to his employee would arise out of the contract
action in which the official criminally responsible must be made of employment, that to the passengers out of the contract for
primarily liable and his employer held only subsidiarily to him. passage. while that to that injured bystander would originate in the
According to this theory the plaintiff should have procured the arrest negligent act itself. This distinction is thus clearly set forth by
of the representative of the company accountable for not repairing Manresa in his commentary on article 1093.
the tract, and on his prosecution a suitable fine should have been
imposed, payable primarily by him and secondarily by his employer.
We are with reference to such obligations, that culpa, or
negligence, may be understood in two difference senses; either as
As an answer to the argument urged in this particular action it culpa, substantive and independent, which on account of its origin
may be sufficient to point out that nowhere in our general statutes is arises in an obligation between two persons not formerly bound by
the employer penalized for failure to provide or maintain safe any other obligation; or as an incident in the performance of an
appliances for his workmen. His obligation therefore is one "not obligation; or as already existed, which can not be presumed to
punished by the law " and falls under civil rather than criminal exist without the other, and which increases the liability arising
jurisprudence. But the answer may be a broader one. We should be from the already exiting obligation.
reluctant, under any conditions, to adopt a forced construction of
these scientific codes, such as is proposed by the defendant, that
would rob some of these articles of effect, would shut out litigants Of these two species of culpa the first one mentioned, existing
their will from the civil courts, would make the assertion of their by itself, may be also considered as a real source of an independent
rights dependent upon the selection for prosecution of the proper obligation, and, as chapter 2, title 16 of this book of the code is
criminal offender, and render recovery doubtful by reason of the devoted to it, it is logical to presume that the reference contained
strict rules of proof prevailing in criminal actions. in article 1093 is limited thereto and that it does not extend to
those provisions relating to the other species of culpa (negligence),
the nature of which we will discuss later. (Vol. 8, p. 29.)
An examination of this topic might be carried much further, but
the citations of these articles suffices to show that the civil liability
was not intended to be merged in the criminal nor even to be And in his commentary on articles 1102 and 1104 he says that
suspended thereby, except as expressly provided by law. Where an these two species of negligence may be somewhat inexactly
 TORTS AND DAMAGES
Atty. Giancarlo Alicaya | SY 2018-19

described as contractual and extra-contractual, the letter being the in this case that the plaintiff knew before the accident occurred that
culpa aquiliana of the Roman law and not entailing so strict an the stringers and rails joined in the same place."
obligation as the former. This terminology is unreservedly accepted
by Sanchez-Roman (Derecho Civil, fourth section, Chapter XI, Article
II, No. 12), and the principle stated is supported be decisions of the Were we not disposed to agree with these findings they would,
supreme court of Spain, among them those of November 20, 1896 nevertheless, be binding upon us, because not "plainly and
(80 Jurisprudencia Civil, No. 151), and June 27, 1894 (75 manifestly against the weight of evidence," as those words of section
Jurisprudencia Civil, No. 182). The contract is one for hire and not 497, paragraph 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure were interpreted by
one of mandate. (March 10, 1897, 81 Jurisprudencia Civil, No. 107.) the Supreme Court of the United States in the De la Rama case (201
U. S., 303).

This contractual obligation, implied from the relation and

perhaps so inherent in its nature to be invariable by the parties, In respect of the second charge of negligence against the
binds the employer to provide safe appliances for the use of the plaintiff, the judgment below is not so specific. While the judge
employee, thus closely corresponding to English and American Law. remarks that the evidence does not justify the finding that the car
On these principles it was the duty of the defendant to build and to was pulled by means of a rope attached to the front end or to the
maintain its track in reasonably sound condition, so as to protect its rails upon it, and further that the circumstances in evidence make it
workingmen from unnecessary danger. It is plain that in one respect clear that the persons necessary to operate the car could not walk
or the other it failed in its duty, otherwise the accident could not upon the plank between the rails and that, therefore, it was
have occurred; consequently the negligence of the defendant is necessary for the employees moving it to get hold upon it as best
established. they could, there is no specific finding upon the instruction given by
the defendant to its employees to walk only upon the planks, nor
upon the necessity of the plaintiff putting himself upon the ties at the
Issue: side in order to get hold upon the car. Therefore the findings of the
judge below leave the conduct of the plaintiff in walking along the
side of the loaded car, upon the open ties, over the depressed track,
Of the negligence of the plaintiff, contributing to the accident, free to our inquiry.
to what extent it existed in fact and what legal effect is to be given it.
In two particulars is he charged with carelessness:
While the plaintiff and his witnesses swear that not only were
they not forbidden to proceed in this way, but were expressly
First. That having noticed the depression in the track he directed by the foreman to do so, both the officers of the company
continued his work; and and three of the workmen testify that there was a general
prohibition frequently made known to all the gang against walking by
the side of the car, and the foreman swears that he repeated the
prohibition before the starting of this particular load. On this
Second. That he walked on the ends of the ties at the side of contradiction of proof we think that the preponderance is in favor of
the car instead of along the boards, either before or behind it. the defendant's contention to the extent of the general order being
made known to the workmen. If so, the disobedience of the plaintiff
in placing himself in danger contributed in some degree to the
Ruling: injury as a proximate, although not as its primary cause. This
conclusion presents sharply the question, What effect is to be given
such an act of contributory negligence? Does it defeat a recovery,
according to the American rule, or is it to be taken only in reduction
As to the first point, the depression in the track night indicate
of damages?
either a serious or a rival difficulty. There is nothing in the evidence
to show that the plaintiff did or could see the displaced timber
underneath the sleeper. The claim that he must have done so is a
conclusion drawn from what is assumed to have been a probable While a few of the American States have adopted to a greater
condition of things not before us, rather than a fair inference from or less extent the doctrine of comparative negligence, allowing a
the testimony. While the method of construction may have been recovery by a plaintiff whose own act contributed to his injury,
known to the men who had helped build the road, it was otherwise provided his negligence was slight as compared with that of the
with the plaintiff who had worked at this job less than two days. A defendant, and some others have accepted the theory of
man may easily walk along a railway without perceiving a proportional damages, reducing the award to a plaintiff in
displacement of the underlying timbers. The foreman testified that proportion to his responsibility for the accident, yet the
he knew the state of the track on the day of the accident and that it overwhelming weight of adjudication establishes the principle in
was then in good condition, and one Danridge, a witness for the American jurisprudence that any negligence, however slight, on the
defendant, working on the same job, swore that he never noticed the part of the person injured which is one of the causes proximately
depression in the track and never saw any bad place in it. The sagging contributing to his injury, bars his recovery. (English and American
of the track this plaintiff did perceive, but that was reported in his Encyclopedia of law, Titles "Comparative Negligence" and
hearing to the foreman who neither promised nor refused to repair Contributory Negligence.")
it. His lack of caution in continuing at his work after noticing the
slight depression of the rail was not of so gross a nature as to
constitute negligence, barring his recovery under the severe In Grant Trunk Railway Company vs. Ives (144 U. S., 408, at page
American rule. On this point we accept the conclusion of the trial 429) the Supreme Court of the United States thus authoritatively
judge who found as facts that "the plaintiff did not know the cause states the present rule of law:
of the one rail being lower than then other" and "it does not appear
 TORTS AND DAMAGES
Atty. Giancarlo Alicaya | SY 2018-19

responsible in the case. The Court of Appeals holds that the

petitioner is being sued for his failure to exercise all the diligence of a
Although the defendant's' negligence may have been the good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Pedro
primary cause of the injury complained of, yet an action for such Fontanilla to prevent damages suffered by the respondents.
injury can not be maintained if the proximate and immediate cause
of the injury can be traced to the want of ordinary care and caution
in the person injured; subject to this qualification, which has grown
up in recent years (having been first enunciated in Davies vs. Mann, Issue:
10 M. & W., 546) that the contributory negligence of the party
injured will not defeat the action if it be shown that the defendant
might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have Whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action
avoided the consequences of the injured party's negligence. against Fausto Barredo, thus making him primarily and directly,
responsible under article 1903 of the Civil Code as an employer of
Pedro Fontanilla. (The defendant maintains that Fontanilla's
******************************************************** negligence being punishable by the Penal Code, his (defendant's)
liability as an employer is only subsidiary, according to said Penal
code, but Fontanilla has not been sued in a civil action and his
property has not been exhausted.)
Barredo and Garcia v. Almario, GR No. L-48006, July 8, 1942

This case comes up from the Court of Appeals which held the
petitioner herein, Fausto Barredo, liable in damages for the death of Ruling:
Faustino Garcia caused by the negligence of Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi
driver employed by said Fausto Barredo.
Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or
"culpa aquiliana " is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code
At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely
road between Malabon and Navotas, Province of Rizal, there was a apart and independent from delict or crime. Upon this principle and
head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven by on the wording and spirit article 1903 of the Civil Code, the primary
Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis. The and direct responsibility of employers may be safely anchored.
carretela was overturned, and one of its passengers, 16-year-old boy
Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from which he died two days later.
A criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in the Court of First The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and Revised Penal
Instance of Rizal, and he was convicted and sentenced to an Code are as follows:
indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to two years of
prision correccional. The court in the criminal case granted the
petition that the right to bring a separate civil action be reserved. The
CIVIL CODE
Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence of the lower court in the
criminal case. Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario, parents of the
deceased on March 7, 1939, brought an action in the Court of First
Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo as the sole proprietor of ART. 1089 Obligations arise from law, from contracts
the Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8, and quasi-contracts, and from acts and omissions which are
1939, the Court of First Instance of Manila awarded damages in favor unlawful or in which any kind of fault or negligence
of the plaintiffs for P2,000 plus legal interest from the date of the intervenes.
complaint. This decision was modified by the Court of Appeals by
reducing the damages to P1,000 with legal interest from the time the
action was instituted. It is undisputed that Fontanilla 's negligence xxx xxx xxx
was the cause of the mishap, as he was driving on the wrong side of
the road, and at high speed. As to Barredo's responsibility, the Court
of Appeals found:
ART. 1092. Civil obligations arising from felonies or
misdemeanors shall be governed by the provisions of the
Penal Code.
... It is admitted that defendant is Fontanilla's employer. There
is proof that he exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage. (See p. 22, appellant's brief.) In fact it is shown he
ART. 1093. Those which are derived from acts or
was careless in employing Fontanilla who had been caught several
omissions in which fault or negligence, not punishable by law,
times for violation of the Automobile Law and speeding (Exhibit A) —
intervenes shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter II, Title
violation which appeared in the records of the Bureau of Public
XVI of this book.
Works available to be public and to himself. Therefore, he must
indemnify plaintiffs under the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil
Code.
xxx xxx xxx

The main theory of the defense is that the liability of Fausto

Barredo is governed by the Revised Penal Code; hence, his liability is ART 1902. Any person who by an act or omission causes
only subsidiary, and as there has been no civil action against Pedro damage to another by his fault or negligence shall be liable for
Fontanilla, the person criminally liable, Barredo cannot be held
 TORTS AND DAMAGES
Atty. Giancarlo Alicaya | SY 2018-19

the damage so done. person, and by a person under nine years of age, or by one
over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted
without discernment shall devolve upon those having such
ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding person under their legal authority or control, unless it appears
article is enforcible, not only for personal acts and omissions, that there was no fault or negligence on their part.
but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible.

Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile

The father and in, case of his death or incapacity, the or minor under his authority, legal guardianship, or control, or
mother, are liable for any damages caused by the minor if such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor
children who live with them. shall respond with their own property, excepting property
exempt from execution, in accordance with the civil law.

Guardians are liable for damages done by minors or

incapacitated persons subject to their authority and living with Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of article 11,
them. the person for whose benefit the harm has been prevented
shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they
may have received.

Owners or directors of an establishment or business are

equally liable for any damages caused by their employees
while engaged in the branch of the service in which employed, The courts shall determine, in their sound discretion, the
or on occasion of the performance of their duties. proportionate amount for which each one shall be liable.

The State is subject to the same liability when it acts When the respective shares can not be equitably determined,
through a special agent, but not if the damage shall have been even approximately, or when the liability also attaches to the
caused by the official upon whom properly devolved the duty Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and,
of doing the act performed, in which case the provisions of the in all events, whenever the damage has been caused with the
next preceding article shall be applicable. consent of the authorities or their agents, indemnification shall be
made in the manner prescribed by special laws or regulations.

Finally, teachers or directors of arts trades are liable for

any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of
are under their custody. article 12, the persons using violence or causing the fear shall
be primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be no such
persons, those doing the act shall be liable, saving always to
the latter that part of their property exempt from execution.
The liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the
persons mentioned therein prove that they are exercised all
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the
damage. ART. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavern
keepers and proprietors of establishment. — In default of
persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavern keepers, and any
other persons or corporation shall be civilly liable for crimes
ART. 1904. Any person who pays for damage caused by committed in their establishments, in all cases where a
his employees may recover from the latter what he may have violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special
paid. police regulation shall have been committed by them or their
employees.

REVISED PENAL CODE

Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution
of goods taken by robbery or theft within their houses lodging
ART. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. — therein, or the person, or for the payment of the value
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in
advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing
him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall
furthermore have followed the directions which such
ART. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. —
innkeeper or his representative may have given them with
The exemption from criminal liability established in
respect to the care of and vigilance over such goods. No
subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of article 12 and in subdivision 4
liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or
of article 11 of this Code does not include exemption from civil
intimidation against or intimidation of persons unless
liability, which shall be enforced to the following rules:
committed by the innkeeper's employees.

First. In cases of subdivision, 1, 2 and 3 of article 12 the

ART. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. —
civil liability for acts committed by any imbecile or insane
 TORTS AND DAMAGES
Atty. Giancarlo Alicaya | SY 2018-19

The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding

article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and
corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code
committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or and the culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito under the Civil Code are:
employees in the discharge of their duties.

1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are

xxx xxx xxx only of private concern.

ART. 365. Imprudence and negligence. — Any person 2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the
who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had criminal act, while the Civil Code, by means of indemnification,
it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall merely repairs the damage.
suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prision correccional in its minimum period; if it would have
constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in 3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the
its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed. former are punished only if there is a penal law clearly covering
them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which "any
king of fault or negligence intervenes." However, it should be noted
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, that not all violations of the penal law produce civil responsibility,
shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave such as begging in contravention of ordinances, violation of the game
felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium laws, infraction of the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt. (See Colin
and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less and Capitant, "Curso Elemental de Derecho Civil," Vol. 3, p. 728.)
serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum
period shall be imposed."

PSBA, et. al. v. CA, et. al., GR No. 84698, Jan. 4, 1992
It will thus be seen that while the terms of articles 1902 of the
Civil Code seem to be broad enough to cover the driver's negligence
in the instant case, nevertheless article 1093 limits cuasi-delitos to
acts or omissions "not punishable by law." But inasmuch as article
365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes not only reckless but even
simple imprudence or negligence, the fault or negligence under Cerezo v. Tuazon, GR No. 141538, March 23, 2004
article 1902 of the Civil Code has apparently been crowded out. It is
this overlapping that makes the "confusion worse confounded."
However, a closer study shows that such a concurrence of scope in
regard to negligent acts does not destroy the distinction between the
civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for Const. Dev’t. Corp. of the Phil. v. Estrella, et.al., GR No. 147791
cuasi-delitos or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligent act
causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime
under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or create an action for
cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual under articles 1902-1910 of
the Civil Code. III. Negligence

a. Definition
The individuality of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual
LARGO
looms clear and unmistakable. This legal institution is of ancient
lineage, one of its early ancestors being the Lex Aquilia in the Roman Negligence is statutorily defined to be the omission
Law. In fact, in Spanish legal terminology, this responsibility is often of that degree of diligence which is required by the
referred to as culpa aquiliana. The Partidas also contributed to the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the
genealogy of the present fault or negligence under the Civil Code; for circumstances of persons, time and place (Art. 1173, NCC).
instance, Law 6, Title 15, of Partida 7, says: "Tenudo es de fazer It is the omission to do something which a reasonable man,
emienda, porque, como quier que el non fizo a sabiendas en daño al guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate
otro, pero acaescio por su culpa." the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of
something which a prudent and reasonable man would do
(Philippine Bank of Commerce v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
The distinctive nature of cuasi-delitos survives in the Civil Code. 97626, 14 March 1997).
According to article 1089, one of the five sources of obligations is this
It also refers to the conduct which creates undue risk
legal institution of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual: "los
of harm to another, the failure to observe that degree of
actos . . . en que intervenga cualquier genero de culpa o negligencia."
care, precaution and vigilance that the circumstance justly
Then article 1093 provides that this kind of obligation shall be
demand, whereby that other person suffers injury (Smith
governed by Chapter II of Title XVI of Book IV, meaning articles
Bell Dodwell Shipping Agency Corporation v. Borja, G.R.
1902-0910. This portion of the Civil Code is exclusively devoted to the
No. 143008,10 June 2002).
legal institution of culpa aquiliana.
 TORTS AND DAMAGES
Atty. Giancarlo Alicaya | SY 2018-19

AQUINO with “full bright lights.” Temporarily blinded, he instinctively swerved

to the right to avoid colliding with the oncoming vehicle, and bumped
Actionable negligence may either be culpa plaintiff’s car, which he did not see because it was midnight blue in
contractual, culpa aquiliana and criminal negligence. color, with no parking lights or early warning device, and the area
Thus, an action for damages for the negligent acts of the was poorly lighted. He alleged in his defense that the left rear portion
defendant may be based on contract, quasi-delict or of plaintiff’s car was protruding as it was then “at a standstill
delict. The bases of liability are separate and distinct from diagonally” on the outer portion of the right lane towards Araneta
each other even if only one act or omission is involved. Avenue (par. 18, Answer). He confirmed the testimony of plaintiff’s
witness that after being bumped the car of the plaintiff swerved to
the right and hit another car parked on the sidewalk. Defendants
counterclaimed for damages, alleging that plaintiff was reckless or
Valuenzela v. CA, GR No. 115024, Feb. 7, 1996
negligent, as she was not a licensed driver.
These two petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Revised Rules of Court stem from an action to recover damages
by petitioner Lourdes Valenzuela in the Regional Trial Court of The police investigator, Pfc. Felic Ramos, who prepared the
Quezon City for injuries sustained by her in a vehicular accident in the vehicular accident report and the sketch of the three cars involved in
early morning of June 24, 1990. The facts found by the trial court are the accident, testified that the plaintiff’s car was “near the sidewalk”;
succinctly summarized by the Court of Appeals below: this witness did not remember whether the hazard lights of plaintiff’s
car were on, and did not notice if there was an early warning device;
there was a street light at the corner of Aurora Blvd. and F. Roman,
This is an action to recover damages based on quasi-delict, for about 100 meters away. It was not mostly dark, i.e., “things can be
serious physical injuries sustained in a vehicular accident. seen.” (p. 16, tsn, Oct. 28, 1991).

Plaintiff’s version of the accident is as follows: At around 2:00 A witness for the plaintiff, Rogelio Rodriguez, testified that after
o’clock in the morning of June 24, 1990, plaintiff Ma. Lourdes plaintiff alighted from her car and opened the trunk compartment,
Valenzuela was driving a blue Mitsubishi Lancer with Plate No. FFU defendant’s car came approaching very fast ten meters from the
542 from her restaurant at Marcos highway to her home at Palanza scene; the car was “zigzagging.” The rear left side of plaintiff’s car was
Street, Araneta Avenue. She was travelling along Aurora Blvd. with a bumped by the front right portion of defendant’s car; as a
companion, Cecilia Ramon, heading towards the direction of Manila. consequence, the plaintiff’s car swerved to the right and hit the
Before reaching A. Lake Street, she noticed something wrong with parked car on the sidewalk. Plaintiff was thrown to the windshield of
her tires; she stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to defendant’s car, which was destroyed, and landed under the car. He
verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed. Having stated that defendant was under the influence of liquor as he could
been told by the people present that her rear right tire was flat and “smell it very well.” (pp. 43, 79, tsn, June 17, 1991).
that she cannot reach her home in that car’s condition, she parked
along the sidewalk, about 1-1/2 feet away, put on her emergency
lights, alighted from the car, and went to the rear to open the trunk. After trial, the lower court sustained the plaintiff’s submissions
She was standing at the left side of the rear of her car pointing to the and found defendant Richard Li guilty of gross negligence and liable
tools to a man who will help her fix the tire when she was suddenly for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
bumped by a 1987 Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant Richard Li
and registered in the name of defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc.
Because of the impact, plaintiff was thrown against the windshield of
xxx
the car of the defendant, which was destroyed, and then fell to the
ground. She was pulled out from under defendant’s car. Plaintiff’s left
leg was severed up to the middle of her thigh, with only some skin
and sucle connected to the rest of the body. She was brought to the It is plainly evident that the petition for review in G.R. No.
UERM Medical Memorial Center where she was found to have a 117944 raises no substantial questions of law. What it, in effect,
“traumatic amputation leg, left up to distal thigh (above knee).” She attempts to have this Court review are factual findings of the trial
was confined in the hospital for twenty (20) days and was eventually court, as sustained by the Court of Appeals finding Richard Li grossly
fitted with an artificial leg. The expenses for the hospital confinement negligent in driving the Mitsubishi Lancer provided by his company in
(P120,000.00) and the cost of the artificial leg (P27,000.00) were paid the early morning hours of June 24, 1990. This we will not do. As a
by defendants from the car insurance. general rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding and
conclusive upon us, and this Court will not normally disturb such
In her complaint, plaintiff prayed for moral damages in the factual findings unless the findings of fact of the said court are
amount of P1 million, exemplary damages in the amount of palpably unsupported by the evidence on record or unless the
P100,000.00 and other medical and related expenses amounting to a judgment itself is based on a misapprehension of facts.
total of P180,000.00, including loss of expected earnings.

In the first place, Valenzuela’s version of the incident was fully

Defendant Richard Li denied that he was negligent. He was on corroborated by an uninterested witness, Rogelio Rodriguez, the
his way home, travelling at 55 kph; considering that it was raining, owner-operator of an establishment located just across the scene of
visibility was affected and the road was wet. Traffic was light. He the accident. On trial, he testified that he observed a car being driven
testified that he was driving along the inner portion of the right lane at a “very fast” speed, racing towards the general direction of
of Aurora Blvd. towards the direction of Araneta Avenue, when he Araneta Avenue. Rodriguez further added that he was standing in
was suddenly confronted, in the vicinity of A. Lake Street, San Juan, front of his establishment, just ten to twenty feet away from the
with a car coming from the opposite direction, travelling at 80 kph, scene of the accident, when he saw the car hit Valenzuela, hurtling
 TORTS AND DAMAGES
Atty. Giancarlo Alicaya | SY 2018-19

her against the windshield of the defendant’s Mitsubishi Lancer, from him, which was (the) plaintiff’s car.” He alleged that upon seeing this
where she eventually fell under the defendant’s car. Spontaneously sudden “apparition” he put on his brakes to no avail as the road was
reacting to the incident, he crossed the street, noting that a man slippery.
reeking with the smell of liquor had alighted from the offending
vehicle in order to survey the incident. Equally important, Rodriguez
declared that he observed Valenzuela’s car parked parallel and very One will have to suspend disbelief in order to give credence to
near the sidewalk, contrary to Li’s allegation that Valenzuela’s car Li’s disingenuous and patently self-serving asseverations. The average
was close to the center of the right lane. We agree that as between motorist alert to road conditions will have no difficulty applying the
Li’s “self-serving” asseverations and the observations of a witness brakes to a car traveling at the speed claimed by Li. Given a light
who did not even know the accident victim personally and who rainfall, the visibility of the street, and the road conditions on a
immediately gave a statement of the incident similar to his testimony principal metropolitan thoroughfare like Aurora Boulevard, Li would
to the investigator immediately after the incident, the latter’s have had ample time to react to the changing conditions of the road
testimony deserves greater weight. As the court emphasized: if he were alert — as every driver should be — to those conditions.
Driving exacts a more than usual toll on the senses. Physiological
“fight or flight” mechanisms are at work, provided such mechanisms
The issue is one of credibility and from Our own examination of were not dulled by drugs, alcohol, exhaustion, drowsiness, etc. Li’s
the transcript, We are not prepared to set aside the trial court’s failure to react in a manner which would have avoided the accident
reliance on the testimony of Rodriguez negating defendant’s could therefore have been only due to either or both of the two
assertion that he was driving at a safe speed. While Rodriguez drives factors: 1) that he was driving at a “very fast” speed as testified by
only a motorcycle, his perception of speed is not necessarily Rodriguez; and 2) that he was under the influence of alcohol. Either
impaired. He was subjected to cross-examination and no attempt factor working independently would have diminished his
was made to question his competence or the accuracy of his responsiveness to road conditions, since normally he would have
statement that defendant was driving “very fast.” This was the same slowed down prior to reaching Valenzuela’s car rather than be in a
statement he gave to the police investigator after the incident, as situation forcing him to suddenly apply his brakes. As the trial court
told to a newspaper report. (Exh. “P”). We see no compelling basis for noted (quoted with approval by respondent court);
disregarding his testimony.

Secondly, as narrated by defendant Richard Li to the San Juan

The alleged inconsistencies in Rodriguez’ testimony are not Police immediately after the incident, he said that while driving along
borne out by an examination of the testimony. Rodriguez testified Aurora Blvd., out of nowhere he saw a dark maroon lancer right in
that the scene of the accident was across the street where his front of him, which was plaintiff’s car, indicating, again, thereby that,
beerhouse is located about ten to twenty feet away. (pp. 35-36, tsn, indeed, he was driving very fast, oblivious of his surroundings and the
June 17, 1991). He did not state that the accident transpired road ahead of him, because if he was not, then he could not have
immediately in front of his establishment. The ownership of the missed noticing at a still far distance the parked car of the plaintiff at
Lambingan sa Kambingan is not material; the business is registered in the right side near the sidewalk which had its emergency lights on,
the name of his mother, but he explained that he owns the thereby avoiding forcefully bumping at the plaintiff who was then
establishment. (p. 5, tsn, June 20, 1991). Moreover, the testimony standing at the left rear edge of her car.
that the streetlights on his side of Aurora Boulevard were on the
night the accident transpired (p. 8) is not necessarily contradictory to Since, according to him, in his narration to the San Juan Police,
the testimony of Pfc. Ramos that there was a streetlight at the corner he put on his brakes when he saw the plaintiff’s car in front of him,
of Aurora Boulevard and F. Roman Street. (p. 45, tsn, Oct. 20, 1991). but that it failed as the road was wet and slippery, this goes to show
again, that, contrary to his claim, he was, indeed, running very fast.
With respect to the weather condition, Rodriguez testified that For, were it otherwise, he could have easily completely stopped his
there was only a drizzle, not a heavy rain and the rain has stopped car, thereby avoiding the bumping of the plaintiff, notwithstanding
and he was outside his establishment at the time the accident that the road was wet and slippery. Verily, since, if, indeed, he was
transpired. (pp. 64-65, ts, June 17, 1991). This was consistent with running slow, as he claimed, at only about 55 kilometers per hour,
plaintiff’s testimony that it was no longer raining when she left Bistro then, inspite of the wet and slippery road, he could have avoided
La Conga. (pp. 10-11, tsn, April 29, 1991). It was defendant Li who hitting the plaintiff by the mere expedient or applying his brakes at
stated that it was raining all the way in an attempt to explain why he the proper time and distance.
was travelling at only 50-55 kph. (p. 11, tsn, Oct. 14, 1991). As to the
testimony of Pfc. Ramos that it was raining, he arrived at the scene It could not be true, therefore, as he now claims during his
only in response to a telephone call after the accident had transpired. testimony, which is contrary to what he told the police immediately
(pp. 9-10, tsn, Oct. 28, 1991). We find no substantial inconsistencies after the accident and is, therefore, more believable, that he did not
in Rodriguez’s testimony that would impair the essential integrity of actually step on his brakes, but simply swerved a little to the right
his testimony or reflect on his honesty. We are compelled to affirm when he saw the on-coming car with glaring headlights, from the
the trial court’s acceptance of the testimony of said eyewitness. opposite direction, in order to avoid it.

For, had this been what he did, he would not have bumped the
car of the plaintiff which was properly parked at the right beside the
Against the unassailable testimony of witness Rodriguez we sidewalk. And, it was not even necessary for him to swerve a little to
note that Li’s testimony was peppered with so many inconsistencies the right in order to safely avoid a collision with the on-coming car,
leading us to conclude that his version of the accident was merely considering that Aurora Blvd. is a double lane avenue separated at
adroitly crafted to provide a version, obviously self-serving, which the center by a dotted white paint, and there is plenty of space for
would exculpate him from any and all liability in the incident. Against both cars, since her car was running at the right lane going towards
Valenzuela’s corroborated claims, his allegations were neither backed Manila and the on-coming car was also on its right lane going to
up by other witnesses nor by the circumstances proven in the course Cubao.”
of trial. He claimed that he was driving merely at a speed of 55 kph.
when “out of nowhere he saw a dark maroon lancer right in front of Having come to the conclusion that Li was negligent in driving
 TORTS AND DAMAGES
Atty. Giancarlo Alicaya | SY 2018-19

his company-issued Mitsubishi Lancer, the next question for us to prepared after the incident showed Valenzuela’s car partly straddling
determine is whether or not Valenzuela was likewise guilty of the sidewalk, clear and at a convenient distance from motorists
contributory negligence in parking her car alongside Aurora passing the right lane of Aurora Boulevard. This fact was itself
Boulevard, which entire area Li points out, is a no parking zone. corroborated by the testimony of witness Rodriguez.

We agree with the respondent court that Valenzuela was not Under the circumstances described, Valenzuela did exercise the
guilty of contributory negligence. standard reasonably dictated by the emergency and could not be
considered to have contributed to the unfortunate circumstances
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured which eventually led to the amputation of one of her lower
party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, extremities. The emergency which led her to park her car on a
which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for sidewalk in Aurora Boulevard was not of her own making, and it was
his own protection. Based on the foregoing definition, the standard evident that she had taken all reasonable precautions.
or act to which, according to petitioner Li, Valenzuela ought to have
conformed for her own protection was not to park at all at any point Obviously in the case at bench, the only negligence ascribable
of Aurora Boulevard, a no parking zone. We cannot agree. was the negligence of Li on the night of the accident. “Negligence, as
it is commonly understood is conduct which creates an undue risk of
harm to others.” It is the failure to observe that degree of care,
Courts have traditionally been compelled to recognize that an precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,
actor who is confronted with an emergency is not to be held up to whereby such other person suffers injury. We stressed, in Corliss vs.
the standard of conduct normally applied to an individual who is in Manila Railroad Company, that negligence is the want of care
no such situation. The law takes stock of impulses of humanity when required by the circumstances.
placed in threatening or dangerous situations and does not require The circumstances established by the evidence adduced in the
the same standard of thoughtful and reflective care from persons court below plainly demonstrate that Li was grossly negligent in
confronted by unusual and oftentimes threatening conditions. Under driving his Mitsubishi Lancer. It bears emphasis that he was driving at
the “emergency rule” adopted by this court in Gan vs. Court of a fast speed at about 2:00 A.M. after a heavy downpour had settled
Appeals, an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of into a drizzle rendering the street slippery. There is ample testimonial
danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best evidence on record to show that he was under the influence of
means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not liquor. Under these conditions, his chances of effectively dealing with
guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and changing conditions on the road were significantly lessened. As
upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the Prosser and Keaton emphasized:
emergency was brought by his own negligence.
[U]nder present day traffic conditions, any driver of an
Applying this principle to a case in which the victims in a automobile must be prepared for the sudden appearance of
vehicular accident swerved to the wrong lane to avoid hitting two obstacles and persons on the highway, and of other vehicles at
children suddenly darting into the street, we held, in McKee vs. intersections, such as one who sees a child on the curb may be
Intermediate Appellate Court, that the driver therein, Jose Koh, required to anticipate its sudden dash into the street, and his failure
“adopted the best means possible in the given situation” to avoid to act properly when they appear may be found to amount to
hitting the children. Using the “emergency rule” the court concluded negligence.
that Koh, in spite of the fact that he was in the wrong lane when the
collision with an oncoming truck occurred, was not guilty of Li’s obvious unpreparedness to cope with the situation
negligence. confronting him on the night of the accident was clearly of his own
making.
While the emergency rule applies to those cases in which
reflective thought, or the opportunity to adequately weigh a
threatening situation is absent, the conduct which is required of an
individual in such cases is dictated not exclusively by the suddenness b. Test of Negligence
of the event which absolutely negates thoughtful care, but by the
over-all nature of the circumstances. A woman driving a vehicle LARGO

suddenly crippled by a flat tire on a rainy night will not be faulted for
The test by which to determine the existence of
stopping at a point which is both convenient for her to do so and
negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows:
which is not a hazard to other motorists. She is not expected to run
Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act, use
the entire boulevard in search for a parking zone or turn on a dark
that reasonable care and caution which on ordinarily
street or alley where she would likely find no one to help her. It
prudent person would have used in the same situation?
would be hazardous for her not to stop and assess the emergency
If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
(simply because the entire length of Aurora Boulevard is a no-parking
zone) because the hobbling vehicle would be both a threat to her The existence of negligence in a given case is not
safety and to other motorists. In the instant case, Valenzuela, upon determined by reference to the personal judgment of the
reaching that portion of Aurora Boulevard close to A. Lake St., actor in the situation before him. The law considers what
noticed that she had a flat tire. To avoid putting herself and other would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man
motorists in danger, she did what was best under the situation. As of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines
narrated by respondent court: “She stopped at a lighted place where liability by that. (Picart vs. Smith, 37 Phil. 809 (1918).
there are people, to verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit
help if needed. Having been told by the people present that her rear Reasonable men govern their conduct by the
right tire was flat and that she cannot reach her home she parked circumstances which are before them or known to them.
along the sidewalk, about 1 1/2 feet away, behind a Toyota Corona They are not, and are not supposed to be omniscient of
Car.” In fact, respondent court noted, Pfc. Felix Ramos, the the future. Hence they can be expected to take care only
investigator on the scene of the accident confirmed that Valenzuela’s when there is something before them to suggest or warn
car was parked very close to the sidewalk. The sketch which he of danger.
 TORTS AND DAMAGES
Atty. Giancarlo Alicaya | SY 2018-19

Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the instance, where a particular act is followed
ignoring of the suggestion borne of this provision, is from past acts or omissions, one is charged with
always necessary before negligence can be held to exist notice that a similar act or omission, may
(Picart vs. Smith, supra; also, People v. De los Santos, G.R. produce a similar result. (67 C.J.S 527). If the
No. 131588, 27 March 2001). actor is familiar with the place of the accident
because he always passes by such area, he is
also charged with the knowledge of the
make-up of the same area.
c. Foreseeability
In PLDT Company, Inc. vs. Court of
Foreseeability of the harm is therefore an
Appeals (No. 57079, September 29, 1989), the
indispensable requirement.
plaintiff was not able to recover from the
defendant telephone company even if he was
injured because of the excavation of the
d. Degrees of Negligence company in the street. He sustained such
injuries when his jeep ran over a mound of
In the civil law and at common law, three degrees of
earth and fell into an open trench dug by the
negligence were recognized, namely, slight negligence,
telephone company for its underground
ordinary negligence and gross negligence.
conduit system. Although there were no
Slight negligence is the failure to exercise great or warning signs in the area, the plaintiff was not
extraordinary care. Ordinary negligence is the want of allowed to recover because he had knowledge
ordinary care and diligence, that is, such care and of the presence and location of the excavations,
diligence as an ordinarily prudent person would exercise having passed on the same street almost
under the same or similar circumstances. Gross everyday. He was found negligent in exercising
negligence is materially greater than ordinary negligence, due care for his own safety. In Corliss vs. Manila
and consists of an entire absence of care or an absence Railroad Company (supra, p. 685), knowledge of
of even slight care or diligence; it implies a thoughtless the victim was also considered material in
disregard for consequences or an indifference to the determining his negligence in crossing the
rights or welfare of others (cf, 65 CJS at pp.536-539). railroad resulting in his death. The Supreme
Court affirmed the trial court’s reliance on
several circumstances, including the victim’s
knowledge and familiarity with the set-up of
e. Standard of Conduct (Aquino)
the check point and the existence of the tracks.
i. General Rule

The Supreme Court explained in Picart vs.

A reasonable man is also deemed to
Smith (supra, at p. 37) that the standard of conduct
have knowledge of facts that a man should be
used in the Philippines is that of paterfamilias in
expected to know based on ordinary human
Roman law or that who is referred to in Article 1173
experience. For instance, a reasonable man can
of the Civil Code (in rel. Art. 2178) as a good father
be expected to know the effect of heavy rains
of a family. What should be determined in
on the road or a railroad track. (Philippine
negligence cases is what is foreseeable to a good
National Railway vs. Intermediate Appellate
father of a family. A good father of a family is
Court, 217 SCRA 409, 414 [1993]). Experience
likewise referred to as the reasonable man, man of
teaches that a driver should anticipate sudden
ordinary intelligence and prudence, or ordinary
appearance of other vehicles at an intersection
reasonable prudent man. In English law, he is
or if a driver sees a child on a curb, he may
sometimes referred to as the man on top of a
anticipate the child’s sudden dash into the
Clapham omnibus. (Bolam vs. Friern Hospital
street. (Valenzuela vs. Court of Appeals, supra
Management Committee, 2 All E.R. 119 Queens
at p. 671). One should also expect children to
Bench Div. [1957]).
roam around vacant lots (Taylor vs. Manila
Electric and Light Co., 16 Phil. 8 [1910]) and
should be expected to know the natural
Attributes of a Good Father of a Family reaction of animals to frightening objects.
(Picart vs. Smith, supra).
A. Knowledge and Experience of the Actor

The prudent man is expected to act

according to the circumstances that appear to A prudent man should also be expected
him at the time of the incident and he is not to know basic laws of nature and physics like
judged based on his knowledge or experience gravity. For example, a driver is expected to
after the event. (67 C.J.S 528). The law does not know that his vehicle will accelerate if the
require the standard of one who is fortified street is going downhill. Any person is also
with a gift of prophesy or one who is expected to know that a boulder might fall from
omniscient of the future (Picart vs. Smith, supra; a high place if it was placed there in a
Adams vs. Bullock, 227 N.Y. 208, 125 N.E. 93 precarious state.
[1919]). However, there are matters which a
prudent man is conclusively presumed to know
based on actual knowledge and experience. For
ii. Special Circumstances
 TORTS AND DAMAGES
Atty. Giancarlo Alicaya | SY 2018-19

Physical Disability considered to prove negligence in driving a motor

vehicle. As explained by the Supreme Court, driving
The Constitution recognizes the rights of exacts a more than usual toll on the senses. While
disabled persons. In fact, it mandates the creation of driving, the body releases catecholamines in
a “special agency for disabled persons for their response to ‘alerting’ or threatening conditions
rehabilitation, self-development and self-reliance, (called ‘fight’ or ‘flight’ conditions by physiologists)
and their integration in the mainstream of the rendering the individual, through his reflexes, senses
society.” (Section 13, Article XIII, 1987 Constitution). and other alerting mechanisms responsive to these
The same principle for the integration of the disabled conditions. Alcohol dulls these normal bodily
in the mainstream of society is being upheld under responses. (Valenzuela vs. Court of Appeals, supra, p.
existing laws, particularly Republic Act No. 7277 77, citing Best and Taylor, Physiological Basis of
otherwise known as the Magna Carta for Disabled Medical Practice, 81 [1993]). However, different
Persons. persons have different reactions to liquor. A person
Nevertheless, integration of a disabled person may take as much as several bottles of beer or
in the mainstream of society does not mean that he several glasses of hard liquor and still remain sober
will be treated exactly the same way as one who is and unaffected by the alcoholic drink. (Nitura vs.
not. A person who is physically disabled cannot be Employees’ Compensation Commission, 201 SCRA
expected to act as if he is not disabled. Thus, the 278, 282-283 [1991]).
standard of conduct to which he must conform to Moreover, proof of intoxication may in proper
avoid being negligent is that of a reasonable person cases establish a presumption of negligence. Driving
under like disability. For example, in the case of a under the influence of alcohol is a violation of traffic
blind man, he must take the precautions, be they regulations. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, it is
more or less, which the ordinary reasonable man presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has
would take if he were blind. (Roberts vs. State of been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was
Lousiana, 396 So. 2d 566 [1981], citing W. Prosser, violating any traffic regulation.
The Law of Torts, Section 32, at Pages 151-152, 4th
ed., 1971).

A person who is suffering from physical Insanity

disability must, however, refrain from activities
which a reasonable person suffering from such Under the Revised Penal Code, an insane
disability would not undertake. Obviously, a blind person is exempt from criminal liability. However,
person should refrain from driving altogether. by express provision of law, there may be civil
liability even when the perpetrator is held to be
exempt from criminal liability. “Such is the case of a
lunatic or demented person who, in spite of his
Intoxication deranged mind, is still reasonably and justly liable
Mere intoxication is not negligence, nor does with his property for the consequences of his acts,
the mere fact of intoxication establish want of even though they be performed unwittingly. Law and
ordinary care. It is but a circumstance to be society are under obligation to protect him and,
considered with the other evidence tending to prove when so declared liable with his property for
negligence. It is a general rule that it is immaterial reparation and indemnification, he is still entitled to
whether a man is drunk or sober if no want of reservation of what is necessary for his decent
ordinary care or prudence can be imputed to him, maintenance, but this protection does not exclude
and no greater degree of care is required to be liability for damages caused to those who may have
exercised by an intoxicated man for his own the misfortune to suffer the consequences of his
protection than a sober one. If one’s conduct is act.” (U.S. vs. Bagay, 20 Phil. 142, 146).
characterized by a proper degree of care and The same rule is applicable under the Civil Code.
prudence, it is immaterial whether he is drunk or The insanity of a person does not excuse him or his
sober. (Wright vs. Manila Electric Co., 28 Phil. 122 guardian from liability based on quasi-delict. (Articles
[1914]). In other words, intoxication is of little 2180 and 2182, Civil Code). This means that the act
consequence in negligence cases if it was not shown or omission of the person suffering from mental
that such drunkenness contributed to the accident or defect will be judged using the standard test of a
that the accident would have been avoided had he reasonable man.
been sober. (U.S. vs. Crame, 30 Phil. 2 [1915]). For
example, the plaintiff cannot be considered The bases for holding a permanently insane
negligent based on the sole fact that he was person liable for his tort are as follows: (a) Where
intoxicated when he fell into an uncovered hole in one of two innocent persons must suffer a loss it
the sidewalk of a public street. “A drunken man is as should be borne by the one who occasioned it; (b) to
much entitled to a safe street, as a sober one, and induce those interested in the estate of the insane
much more in need of it.” (Robinson vs. Pioche, person (if he has one) to restrain and control him;
Bayerque & Co., 5 Cal. 460 [1855], cited in Richard A. and (c) the fear that an insanity defense would lead
Epstein, Cases and Materials on Torts, 1995 Ed., p. to false claims of insanity to avoid liability. (Breunig
187). vs. American Family Insurance Co., 173 N.W. 2d 619
[1970]).
However, as pointed out earlier, intoxication
may be one of the circumstances to be considered to It should be noted, however, that there are
prove negligence. For instance, intoxication may be rare cases in the United States when a person may
 TORTS AND DAMAGES
Atty. Giancarlo Alicaya | SY 2018-19

escape liability by invoking his mental disorder. Thus, consequences; and the age at which a minor can be
a driver of a motor vehicle is not liable if he was said to have such ability will necessarily vary in
suddenly overcome without forewarning by a mental accordance with the varying nature of the infinite
disorder or disability which incapacitated him from variety of acts which may be done by him.”
conforming his conduct to the standards of a
reasonable man under like circumstances. It was It should be noted in this connection that under
explained that it is unjust to hold a man responsible the Revised Penal Code, a child who is age nine (9)
for his conduct which he is incapable of avoiding and or below is exempt from criminal liability. (Art. 8). A
which incapability was unknown to him prior to the child over nine (9) but below fifteen (15) is likewise
accident. (Breunig vs. American Family Insurance Co., exempt from criminal liability if he acted without
ibid.). discernment. Under the Family Code and the Child
and Youth Welfare Code, the choice of the child
who is at least 12 where his custody is in question is
to be respected unless there is no valid reason to
Women accord the same with respect. The consent of
There is no question that when it comes to children who are at least ten (10) of the person who
physical features, there is a distinction between man will adopt and the natural parents of the person to
and woman. A man is generally physically stronger be adopted are likewise required in adoption cases.
than a woman and the same should be taken into Applying the provisions of the Revised Penal
consideration in determining if the defendant, who Code, Judge Sanco takes the view that a child who is
is a woman, was negligent. nine (9) or below is conclusively presumed to be
The problem, however, arises if the question incapable of negligence. (1 Sanco, Phil. Law on Torts
involves attitude. The question may be posed: Can and Damages, 70-71). On the other hand, if the child
we apply the same objective standard to women is above nine (9) but below fifteen (15), there is a
that we are applying to a man or are we to assume disputable presumption of absence of negligence.
that there is a fundamental difference between the The doctrine in Jarco Marketing Corporation et
reaction or attitude of women compared to men al. v. Court of Appeals (ibid.) therefore modifies the
given the same set of facts? Although there is no rule laid down in Taylor v. Manila Electric Railroad
unequivocal statement of the rule, Valenzuela vs. and Light Co. (supra.). If the child is under nine years,
Court of Appeals cited earlier, appears to require a it is no longer necessary to determine his maturity
different standard of care for women under the and capacity because he is conclusively presumed
circumstances indicated therein. The Supreme Court to be incapable of negligence. If the child is above
seemed to say that the conduct to be expected of nine to fifteen, he is disputably presumed to be
women is different from that of a man. incapable of negligence but the opposing party can
iii. Children prove that the child is at such stage of maturity and
capacity that he can already determine what a
The rule that there is one standard of conduct reasonable man would do under the same
— that of a reasonable man — is subject to certain circumstances.
exceptions or qualifications. Thus, the action of the
child will not necessarily be judged according to the
standard of an ordinary adult. Neither will an Liability of children
expert be judged based on what a non-expert can
foresee. It should be noted, however, that the absence
of negligence does not necessarily mean absence of
The rule in this jurisdiction is that “the care and liability. Thus, under the Revised Penal Code, a child
caution required of a child is according to his who is nine years old can still be subsidiarily liable
maturity and capacity only and this is to be with his properties. (Art. 101, Revised Penal Code).
determined in each case by the circumstances of This liability is considered liability without fault. (1
the case.” (Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad and Aquino, Revised Penal Code 883). Similarly, the
Light Co., 16 Phil. 8 [1910]). If a minor is mature absence of negligence or intent on the part of the
enough to understand and appreciate the nature child may not excuse the parents from their
and consequences of his actions, he will be vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil
considered negligent if he fails to exercise due care Code or Art. 221 of the Family Code because they
and precaution in the commission of such acts. are liable for their own negligence in the
The Court explained in Taylor vs. Manila Electric supervision of their child. The minor child, on the
Railroad and Light Co. (ibid.), however that “the law other hand, shall be answerable with his own
fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said property in an action against him if he has no
to have the necessary capacity to understand and parents or guardian. The Supreme Court in
appreciate the nature and consequences of his acts, interpreting the provisions of the Old Civil Code on
so as to make it negligence on his part to exercise tort explained that if the theory of the action is culpa
due care and precaution in the commission of such aquiliana, the minority of the actor does not free him
acts; and indeed it would be impracticable and from responsibility for damages. The Court further
perhaps impossible so to do, for in the very nature explained that the liability of an infant in a civil
of things the question of negligence necessarily action for his torts is imposed as a mode, not of
depends on the ability of the minor to understand punishment, but for compensation. If property had
the character of his own acts and their been destroyed or other loss was occasioned by a
 TORTS AND DAMAGES
Atty. Giancarlo Alicaya | SY 2018-19

wrongful act, it is just that the loss should fall upon pilotage and to enact safety laws requiring vessels
the estate of the wrongdoer rather than that of the approaching their ports to take on board pilots duly
guiltless person, and that liability is imposed without licensed under local law. (supra, p. 60). Thus, upon
reference to the question of moral guilt. assuming the office of a compulsory pilot, the latter
Consequently, for every tortious act of violence or is held to the universally accepted high standards of
other pure tort, the infant tortfeasor is liable in a civil care and diligence required of a pilot, whereby he
action to the injured person in the same extent as an assumes to have skill and knowledge in respect to
adult. (Magtibay vs. Tionco, 74 Phil. 576, 578-579 navigation in the particular waters over which his
[1944]). license extends superior to and more to be trusted
than that of the master. A pilot should have a
In other words, the effect of the circumstance thorough knowledge of general and local regulations
that the actor is a child would vary if the child is the and physical conditions affecting the vessel in his
defendant-actor or the plaintiff. The circumstance charge and the waters for which he is licensed, such
becomes material if the child is the person exposed as a particular harbor or river. He is not held to the
to the risk. If the child is the actor, even if he is highest possible degree of skill and care demanded
legally incapable of discernment because he is, for by the circumstances, but must have and exercise
example, only six (6) years old, the parents or any the ordinary skill and care demanded by the
person exercising parental authority over him may circumstances, and usually shown by an expert in his
still be liable if they did not exercise proper diligence profession. Under extraordinary circumstances, a
in supervising the child. The actor himself is liable up pilot must exercise extraordinary care. (p. 61).
to the extent of his properties.
The rule regarding experts is demonstrated in
United States vs. Pineda (37 Phil. 456, 462-464),
iv. Experts involving pharmacists. The Supreme Court explained
that the profession of pharmacy is one demanding
An expert should exhibit the care and skill of care and skill. It requires the highest degree of
one ordinarily skilled in the particular field that he prudence, thoughtfulness, and vigilance and the
is in. In fact, when a person holds himself out as most exact and reliable safeguards consistent with
being competent to do things requiring professional the reasonable conduct of business, in order that
skills, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails human life may not constantly be exposed to the
to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled danger flowing from the substitution of deadly
in the particular work which he attempted to do. poison for harmless medicine. “In other words, the
(Culion Ice, Fish & Electric Co., Inc. vs. Philippine care required must be commensurate with the
Motors Corporation, No. 32611, November 3, 1930, danger involved and skill employed must correspond
55 Phil. 129). with the superior knowledge of the business which
the law demands.”
The Supreme Court explained in Far Eastern
Shipping Company vs. Court of Appeals (297 SCRA 30, The rule regarding experts is applicable not
64 [1998]) that an act may be negligent if it is done only to professionals, like doctors, pilots and others,
without the competence that a reasonable person who have undergone formal education. In Sofia
in the position of the actor would recognize as Fernando, et al. vs. Court of Appeals (208 SCRA 714
necessary to prevent it from creating an [1992]), an invitation to bid was issued to different
unreasonable risk of harm to another. Those who persons for the re-emptying of the septic tank in a
undertake any work calling for special skills are public market in Davao City. Later, a non-winning
required not only to exercise reasonable care in bidder named Mr. Bertulano, with four other
what they do but also possess a standard minimum companions were found dead inside the septic tank.
of special knowledge and ability. Every man who It appeared that the five victims entered the septic
offers his services to another, and is employed, tank and proceeded to re-empty the same without
assumes to exercise in the employment such skills the consent of proper authorities. When the heirs of
he possesses, with a reasonable degree of diligence. the victims sued for damages, they were denied
In all these employment where peculiar skill is recovery by the Supreme Court explaining, among
requisite, if one offers his services he is understood others that the accident in the case occurred
as holding himself out to the public as possessing because the victims on their own and without
the degree of skill commonly possessed by others in authority from proper authorities of the city opened
the same employment, and if his pretentions are the septic tank.
unfounded, he commits a species of fraud on every
man who employs him in reliance on his public Care required must also be commensurate with
profession. the danger that the activity entails. Thus, where the
performance of work involves danger to the public
The above-cited Far Eastern Shipping Company unless performed with skill, the ordinary prudent
case involved a compulsory pilot of a seagoing vessel. man is deemed to have such required skill. (57 Am.
A pilot in maritime law is a person duly qualified to Jur. 2d 420). For instance, a person hoisting a heavy
conduct a vessel into or out of ports, or in certain safe in a public place where people are constantly
waters. It is more generally understood as a person passing is bound to use such care as the nature of
who was taken on board at a particular place for the the employment and the situation and
purpose of conducting a ship through a river, road or circumstances require of a prudent person
channel, or from a port. In some states and localities, experienced and skilled in such work. (ibid.). Similarly,
it is quite common to provide for compulsory a person engaged in the business of selling
 TORTS AND DAMAGES
Atty. Giancarlo Alicaya | SY 2018-19

explosives or even mere firecrackers should exercise the responsible persons although under the
due care commensurate with the demands of such circumstances of the case, it may appear that
dangerous activity. one of them was more culpable, and that the
duty owed by them to the injured person was
NEGLIGENCE not the same. No actor's negligence ceases to
be a proximate cause merely because it does
f. Negligence as Proximate Cause
not exceed the negligence of other actors. Each
i. Definition wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result
and is liable as though his acts were the sole
LARGO cause of the injury (Far Eastern Shipping Co. vs.
Court of Appeals, et al, G.R. No. 130068 &
Proximate cause has been defined as: " . . . 130150, October 1,1998).
'that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening AQUINO
cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred.'

"Proximate cause is determined by the facts of ● Remote

each case upon mixed considerations of logic,
● Intervening
common sense, policy and precedent" (The
Consolidated Bank & Trust Co. v. Court of Appeals, g. Evidentiary Considerations
G.R. No. 138569, September 11,2003, 410 SCRA
562). i. Proof of Negligence

The term has also been defined as the ii. Presumption of Negligence
dominant or immediate cause; the cause that sets
the others in motion; the efficient cause; the one ● Res Ipsa Loquitur
that necessarily sets the other causes in operation.
LARGO
An act or omission is not the proximate cause of an
injury unless, had it not happened, the injury would
Res ipsa loquitor (The thing speaks for itself)
not have occurred. The proximate cause need not be
the sole cause, or necessarily the direct cause, or the Res ipsa loquitur is rule of evidence
one which is nearest in time or place to the result (86 whereby negligence of alleged wrongdoer may
C.J.S. 943). be inferred from mere fact that accident
happened provided character of accident and
circumstances attending it lead reasonably to
ii. The “Cause” belief that in absence of negligence it would
not have occurred and that thing which caused
● Proximate injury is shown to have been under
management and control of alleged
● Concurrent
wrongdoer.
LARGO Under doctrine of "res ipsa loquitur" the
happening of an injury permits an inference of
In order to render a person liable, negligence where plaintiff produces
negligence need not be the sole cause of an substantial evidence that injury was caused by
injury. It is sufficient that this negligence, an agency or instrumentality under exclusive
concurring with one or more efficient causes control and management of defendant, and
other than plaintiff's, is the proximate cause of that the occurrence was such that in the
the injury. ordinary course of things would not happen if
Accordingly, where several causes reasonable care had been used." (Layugan vs.
combine to produce injuries, a person is not Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73998,
relieved from liability because he is responsible November 14,1988).
for only one of them, it being sufficient that the The doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur as a rule
negligence of the person charged with injury is of evidence is peculiar to the law of negligence
an efficient cause without which the injury which recognizes that prima facie negligence
would not have resulted to as great an extent, may be established without direct proof and
and that such cause is not attributable to the furnishes a substitute for specific proof of
person injured. It is no defense to one of the negligence. The doctrine is not a rule of
concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would substantive law but merely a mode of proof or
not have resulted from his negligence alone, a mere procedural convenience. The rule,
without the negligence or wrongful acts of the when applicable to the facts and
other concurrent tortfeasor. Where several circumstances of a particular case, is not
causes producing an injury are concurrent and intended to and does not dispense with the
each is an efficient cause without which the requirement of proof of culpable negligence
injury would not have happened, the injury on the part of the party charged. It merely
may be attributed to all or any of the causes determines and regulates what shall be prima
and recovery may be had against any or all of facie evidence thereof and facilitates the
 TORTS AND DAMAGES
Atty. Giancarlo Alicaya | SY 2018-19

burden of plaintiff of proving a breach of the

duty of due care (Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol.
65A). It is not a rule of substantive law and, as ● Possession of Dangerous Weapons and
such, it does not create an independent ground Substances (Art. 2188)
of liability. Instead, it is regarded as a mode of
LARGO
proof, or a mere procedural convenience since
it furnishes a substitute for, and relieves the
There is prima facie presumption of
plaintiff of, the burden of producing specific
negligence on the part of the defendant if the
proof of negligence. The maxim simply places
death or injury results from his possession of
on the defendant the burden of going forward
dangerous weapons or substances, such as
with the proof. Resort to the doctrine may be
firearms and poison, except when the
allowed only when (a) the event is of a kind
possession or use thereof is indispensable in
which does not ordinarily occur in the absence
his occupation or business (Article 2188, NCC).
of negligence; (b) other responsible causes,
including the conduct of the plaintiff and third
persons, are sufficiently eliminated by the
evidence; and (c) the indicated negligence is
within the scope of the defendant's duty to
iii. Burden of Proof
the plaintiff. Thus, it is not applicable when an
unexplained accident may be attributable to LARGO
one of several causes, for some of which the
defendant could not be responsible (FGU The burden of proving negligence that is the
Insurance Corp. vs. G. P. Sarmiento Trucking proximate cause of the quasi-delict is on the one
Corp. et al, G.R. No. 141910, August 6, 2002). alleging the same. The person who alleged
negligence must prove it (Cea vs. Villanueva, G.R. No.
The doctrine can be invoked when and
L-5446, March 10,1911). A person claiming damages
only when, under the circumstances involved,
for the negligence of another has the burden of
direct evidence is absent and not readily
proving the existence of such fault or negligence
available.
causative thereof. The facts constitutive of
Res ipsa loquitur is an evidentiary negligence must be affirmatively established by
presumption, therefore, it is not to be invoked competent evidence. Whosoever relies on
to overcome evidence but to be applied only in negligence for his cause of action has the burden in
its absence. the first instance of proving the existence of the
same if contested, otherwise his action must fail
Res ipsa loquitur has application only to (PLDT vs. Court of Appeals, supra).
the law of negligence (63 Amjur 2d at 721). It
is confined only to cases of pure
(non-contractual) tort since obviously the
iv. Quantum Evidence
presumption of negligence in culpa
contractual immediately attaches by a failure h. Other Factors
of the covenant or its tenor (FGU Insurance
Corp. vs. G. P. Sarmiento Trucking Corp. et al,
supra).

Where the doctrine is applicable, all that

the plaintiff must prove is the accident itself;
no other proof of negligence is required
beyond the accident itself.

● Respondeat Superior

● Violation of Traffic Rules (Art. 2184-85)

LARGO

It is disputably presumed that a driver

was negligent, if he had been found guilty of
reckless driving or violating traffic regulations
at least twice within the next preceding two
months (Article 2184, NCC). UNLESS there is
proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a
person driving a motor vehicle has been
negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was
violating any traffic regulation (Article 2185,
NCC).