Jackson v.

Macalino, 2003

Raymond Michael Jackson, an American national, filed a petition for habeas corpus against the
Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID), John Doe and Jane Doe. The
trial court, however, dismissed the said petition on the ground that based on the return of the
respondents, the petitioner was arrested and detained at the CID on the basis of the summary
deportation order issued by the Board of Commissioners(BOC) on December 11, 1997 and of the hold
departure order of the Makati Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 98-1155, and that the said
petition for habeas corpus was premature as there was a pending petition to lift the summary
deportation order before the BOC filed by petitioner. Dissatisfied, petitioner filed the instant petition for
certiorari.

In dismissing the petition, the Court ruled that Section 13 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as
amended; provides that if it appears that the detained person is in custody under a warrant of
commitment in pursuance of law, the return shall be considered prima facie evidence of the cause of
restraint. In this case, based on the return of the writ by the respondents, the petitioner was arrested
and detained at the CID detention center at Bicutan, Paranaque City, under Mission Order No. RBR-99-
164 dated May 21, 1999 based on the Order of the BOC dated December 11, 1997 which had become
final and executory. Thus, the petitioner's arrest and detention are in accord with Section 45(d) in
relation to Section 37 (a)(9) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940.

Moreover, the petitioner, in his motion for reconsideration filed with the CID, offered to post a bail bond
for his provisional release to enable him to secure the necessary documents to establish the appropriate
grounds for his permanent stay in the Philippines. By offering to post a bail bond, the petitioner thereby
admitted that he was under the custody of the CID and voluntarily accepted the jurisdiction of the CID.

FACTS: An information was filed against an American citizen, Raymond Jackson for violation of Article
176 of the Revised Penal Code. Summary deportation proceedings were initiated at the Commission of
Immigration and Deportation (CID) against the petitioner. However, he could not be deported because
he filed a petition to lift the summary order of deportation with the CID which had not yet been
resolved. The CID then issued an order for his arrest for being an undesirable alien, based on the hold
departure order in one of the criminal cases. Jackson filed a petition for habeas corpus against the
Commissioner of the CID. The court directed its issuance as well as a return of the writ by the
respondents. In their return, the respondents alleged inter alia that the detention was on the basis of
the summary deportation order issued and the hold departure order of the Makati RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Commissioner of the CID can issue warrants of arrest and if so, whether or
not such warrants can only be issued to enforce a final order of deportation.

HELD:

The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful restraint.
It is essentially a writ of inquiry and is granted to test the right under which he is detained. The term
“court” includes quasi-judicial bodies like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration. As a
general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondent rests on the petitioner who
attaches such restraints. Whether the return sets forth process where on its face shows good ground for
the detention of the petitioner, it is incumbent on him to allege and prove new matter that tends to
invalidate the apparent effects of such process. If it appears that the detained person is in custody under
a warrant of commitment in pursuance of law, the return shall be considered prima facie evidence of
the cause of restraint. In this case, based on the return of the writ by the respondents, Jackson was
arrested and detained based on the order of the BOC which had become final and executory. His
passports were tampered with. Based on previous jurisprudence, such constitute sufficient grounds for
the arrest and deportation of aliens from the Philippines. Hence, the petition was dismissed.

Facts:

Salvador Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton filed an administrative case against Arsenio Pascual
Jr. for alleged immorality. At the initial hearing thereof, Gatbonton’s counsel announced that he would
present Pascual as his first witness. Pascual objected, relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from
being a witness against himself. The Board of Examiners took note of such a plea but scheduled Pascual to
testify in the next hearing unless in the meantime he could secure a restraining order from a competent
authority. Pascual filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila an action for prohibition with prayer for
preliminary injunction against the Board of Medical Examiners. The lower court ordered that a writ of
preliminary injunction issue against the Board commanding it to refrain from hearing or further proceeding
with such an administrative case and to await the judicial disposition of the matter. Subsequently, a decision
was rendered by the lower court finding the claim of Pascual to be well-founded and prohibiting the Board
"from compelling the petitioner to act and testify as a witness for the complainant in said investigation
without his consent and against himself." Hence, the Board appealed.

Issue:
Whether a medical practitioner charged with malpractice in administrative case can avail of the
constitutional guarantee not to be a witness against himself.

Held:
Yes. The case for malpractice and cancellation of the license to practice medicine while
administrative in character possesses a criminal or penal aspect. An unfavorable decision would
result in the revocation of the license of the respondent to practice medicine. Consequently, he can
refuse to take the witness stand.
The right against self-incrimination extends not only to right to refuse to answer questions put to
the accused while on witness stand, but also to forgo testimony, to remain silent and refuse to take the
witness stand when called by as a witness by the prosecution. The reason is that the right against self-
incrimination, along with the other rights granted to the accused, stands for a belief that while a crime
should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objective should not be
accomplished according to means and methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded to the human
personality.