THE REAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN ESSENCE (ESSENTIA) AND ACT OF

BEING (ESSE)

Paul Gerard Horrigan, Ph.D., 2006.

The real distinction between essence (essentia) and act of being (esse) in creatures (finite
beings)1 is one of the most fundamental metaphysical doctrines taught by St. Thomas Aquinas.2

1
Studies on the real distinction between essence (essentia) and act of being (esse): H. RENARD, Essence and
Existence, “Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association,” 21 (1946), pp. 53-65 ; H. RENARD,
Being and Essence, “The New Scholasticism,” 23 (1949), pp. 62-70 ; C. FABRO, La nozione metafisica di
partecipazione, 2nd ed., S.E.I., Turin, 1950, pp. 218-219; U. DEGL’INNOCENTI, La distinzione reale nel ‘De ente
et essentia’ di S. Tommaso, “Doctor Communis,” 10 (1957), pp. 165-173 ; W. L. REESE, Concerning the “Real
Distinction” of Essence and Existence, “The Modern Schoolman,” 38 (1961), pp. 142-148; M. W. KEATING, The
Relation Between the Proofs for the Existence of God and the Real Distinction of Essence and Existence in St.
Thomas Aquinas, Fordham University, New York, 1962 ; L. SWEENEY, Existence/Essence in Thomas Aquinas’s
Early Writings, “Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association,” 37 (1963), pp. 105-109 ; J.
BOBIK, Aquinas on Being and Essence, Notre Dame, IN, 1965, pp. 162-170 ; J. OWENS, Quiddity and Real
Distinction in St. Thomas Aquinas, “Mediaeval Studies,” 27 (1965), pp. 1-22 ; H. P. KAINZ, The Suarezian Position
on Being and the Real Distinction: An Analytic and Comparative Study, “The Thomist,” 34 (1970), pp. 289-305 ; B.
NEGRONI, Essenza ed esistenza nell’omonimo opuscolo di S.Tommaso d’Aquino, in Atti del Congresso
Internazionale Tommaso d’Aquino nel suo VII Centenario (6), Rome-Naples, 1974, pp. 238-289; A. MAURER, St.
Thomas Aquinas, On Being and Essence, Toronto, 1968, pp. 21 ff ; T. E. Dillon, The Real Distinction Between
Essence and Existence in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN, 1977 ; M.
KOSUGI, Esse and Essentia in St. Thomas Aquinas, “Studies in Medieval Thought,” 21 (1979), pp. 155-163; J.
WIPPEL, Aquinas’s Route to the Real Distinction. A Note on the “De ente et essentia”, c. 4, “The Thomist,” 43
(1979), pp. 279-295 ; J. OWENS, Stages and Distinction in “De ente”: A Rejoinder, “The Thomist,” 45 (1981), pp.
99-123 ; J. WIPPEL, Essence and Existence in the “De ente”, ch. 4, and Essence and Existence in Other Writings,
in Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas, Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C., 1984, pp.
107-161; S. MacDONALD, The Esse/Essentia Argument in Aquinas’s “De ente et essentia”, “Journal of the History
of Philosophy,” 22 (1984), p. 158 ff ; L. DEWAN, Saint Thomas, Joseph Owens, and the Real Distinction Between
Being and Essence, “The Modern Schoolman,” 61 (1984), pp. 145-156 ; W. PATT, Aquinas’s Real Distinction and
Some Interpretations, “The New Scholasticism,” 62 (1988), pp. 1-29 ; M. BROWN, Aquinas and the Real
Distinction: A Re-evaluation, “New Blackfriars,” 67 (1988), pp. 170-177 ; F. A. CUNNINGHAM, Essence and
Existence in Thomism: A Mental vs. the “Real Distinction?”, University Press of America, Lanham, MD, 1988; M.
BEUCHOT, La esencia y la existencia en Tomás de Aquino, “Revista de Filosofia,” (Mexico), 22 (1989), pp. 149-
165; L. DEWAN, St. Thomas and the Distinction between Form and Esse in Caused Things, “Gregorianum,” 80
(1999), pp. 353-369 ; J. F. WIPPEL, Essence-Esse Composition and the One and the Many, in J. F. Wippel, The
Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C., 2000, pp. 132-
176.
2
Alvira, Clavell and Melendo explain how the real distinction of essence (essentia) and act of being (esse) in finite
beings is the basis of the total dependence of creatures on the Creator, writing: “The real distinction enables us to
have a correct understanding of how a creature depends on the Creator, of the nature of this dependence, and of the
intimate presence of God in the created being.
“God alone is Pure Act or unlimited Perfection which subsists in itself. Creatures, in contrast, are limited, having
their act of being received from God. Hence, they are necessarily composed of act and potency. This is only possible
if the essence and the act of being (the sole constituent principles which extend to all creatures) are really distinct.
Otherwise, the finiteness of a creature would be as metaphysically inexplicable as the self-limitation of act.
“If the distinction between essence and the act of being were not real, the creative act of God would leave no
trace in the being of the creature. The creature reveals its origin from nothingness, its indigence and its finitude,
precisely through its real composition of essence and the act of being, whereby the latter is not contained in the
essence in a necessary way.

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As act of the essence (actus essentiae understood as actus essendi, principle of the actuation of
the essence [essentia]), the act of being (esse) is necessarily really distinct from essence
(essentia) since act is really distinct from its corresponding potency. Potency is really distinct
from act. “The constituent principles of a reality which are called potency and act must be really
distinct. For that which perfects cannot be really the same as that which is perfectible; otherwise
the perfectible would give itself an act which it does not have, so that being would come from
non-being. Moreover, if potency and act were not really distinct, that which limits and that which
is limited would be really the same, so that act would limit itself.

“From the real distinction of potency and act it follows that nothing can be potency and
act in the same respect because this would imply that that which perfects is really the same as
that which is perfected or perfectible. This assertion, however, does not mean that a higher
degree of the same act cannot be received by a subject whose potency is already partially
actualized. An intellect, for instance, which has already been actualized with respect to the
knowledge of one thing can continue to acquire more knowledge and thus becomes more
actualized. But that part of a potency which has become actualized is no longer potency. On the
other hand, in different respects a thing may be in potency and act at the same time. For instance,
the power of speech may be considered as an act insofar as it perfects man’s nature, but insofar
as it can be perfected by the act of speech it is a potency. Thus it is quite possible that what is an
act in one order is a potency in a different order. It is even possible for an act to be unlimited in
one order and limited in a different order.”3

“Besides, this explains the nature of the dependence which unites creatures to their Cause. The whole of creation
depends on God as its fullest and radical Principle. The meeting point for creature and Creator is the act of being
(esse), whose special characteristics justify the full subordination of finite reality to the Subsistent Act of Being. As
we have just mentioned, this subordination of the creature to the Creator is:
“– Radical: every effect depends upon its cause inasmuch as it has been produced by this cause. The immediate
proper effect of the divine action of creation and conservation is the esse of each creature which is a likeness of the
Divine esse. Since esse is the act of all other acts of the creature, the latter’s dependence on God is radical; without
the act of being, there would be nothing.
“– Total and all-comprehensive: this dependence extends to each and all of the perfections of the composite
(substance, qualities, powers and operations), all of which are in potency with respect to the act of being.
“ – Closest or most intrinsic: since ‘the act of being is what is innermost in each thing.’(Summa Theologiae, I, q.
8, a. 1, c.). God’s presence in creatures through the act of being is more intimate than the creature’s own presence in
itself.
“Lastly, as the act of the essence, ‘esse’ provides a basis for the different degrees of necessity in being found in
created things, namely, the fact that some creatures are corruptible and others are incorruptible. If esse were not a
real principle of creatures, but merely something extrinsic (coming from God), all things would be equally
contingent. Angels, the human soul, and animals would thus all have the same degree of necessity in their being,
since they all equally come from God and do not differ at all as regards the fact of being created. Since, however,
esse is an act, it is determined by the essence which sustains it, and it is, therefore, limited by the conditions of this
essence. There are essences (the angels and the human soul) which are spiritual and immortal; by virtue of the very
nature they have received from God, they have permanence in being once they have been created. Other beings,
however, are not endowed with such stability; for that reason they are called ‘corruptible’ beings”(T. ALVIRA, L.
CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, Metaphysics, Sinag-Tala, Manila, 1991, pp. 111-113).
3
H. J. KOREN, Introduction to the Science of Metaphysics, B. Herder, St. Louis, 1965, pp. 116-117. Kreyche
explains the difference between a logical distinction (including the virtual distinction) and a real distinction (major
and minor) and shows that act and potency are really distinct by a minor real distinction between metaphysical, not
physical, principles of being: “In general, there are two types of distinction – logical and real. Formally considered,
a logical distinction is a lack of identity, not in the order of things, but in the order of our concepts of things. Thus, if
we conceive one and the same thing from two different points of view (for example, six and a half dozen eggs), the

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 Arguments in Support of the Real Distinction Between Essence (Essentia) and Act of
Being (Esse) in Finite Beings

1. The Argument Based on the Limitation Found in Creatures. Every created being
possesses the act of being (esse) in a partial manner both in extension, as it is not the only one,
and in intensity of being, as its actuality is possessed in a limited manner. As regards extension,
aside from any given finite being that we observe, we also observe that there are many other
finite beings as well. Therefore, no created being exhausts the perfection of esse. As regards
intensity of being no creature (finite being) possesses its perfections to the greatest possible
degree. Therefore, no created being is identical with its esse but rather participates in the act of
being (esse) in a limited way, its essence (essentia) being the receptive potency that limits the act
of being.

2. The Argument Based on the Multiplicity of Creatures. We observe the obvious fact that
there are a multitude of beings (entia) around us (many individual plants, trees, oranges, apples,
dogs, cats, ants, etc.). This shows that created beings (finite beings) are composed of act of being
(esse) and essence (essentia). Why? Because if something’s essence (essentia) were its own act
of being (esse) it would necessarily be one and simple. Act cannot be multiplied except by being
united to something distinct from itself. Now, esse is really multiplied in these many individuals
that we observe around us, but this would be impossible unless the act of being (esse) be united
to a potency – the essence (essentia) – really distinct from it.

3. The Argument Based on the Similarity Found Among Beings. If a cat, a dog, a horse,
and an oak tree, for example, are similar there must be something in them that accounts for their

distinction in question is not a real, but a logical one. (Some logical distinctions are purely logical, as is the example
given in the text; others are said to be virtual. A virtual distinction is a logical one that has some basis in the thing
itself). By contrast, a real distinction is one that exists in the order of things themselves – that is, independently of
our knowledge of them. Thus the distinction, let us say, between two parakeets exists apart from any consideration of
the mind.
“The example of the parakeets is an illustration of a real distinction between one thing and another. This type of
distinction is known in philosophy as a ‘major’ real distinction, and the nature of such a distinction is obvious. Less
obvious, however, is the distinction that exists, not between two things, but between two or more parts of a single
thing, called a ‘minor’ real distinction. We may exemplify this latter by the difference that exists between an arm
and a leg. Though really distinct, an arm and a leg are not, properly speaking, ‘things.’ Yet they are distinct, really
distinct, because an arm is not a leg, nor is a leg an arm. The example in question is a minor real distinction between
physical parts. Most important of all for our own purposes is the distinction that exists, not between physical parts,
but between metaphysical principles of being. This too is a minor real distinction, and it is the distinction that exists
between potency and act.
“From what we have just said it should be evident that potency and act are not merely distinct in our thinking
about them – that is, not distinct by a type of logical distinction. They are really distinct in things themselves by a
minor real distinction. It should hardly be necessary at this point to ‘prove’ that potency and act are distinct,
meaning really distinct. This is an immediate deduction from the nature of potency and act: in the measure in which
it is in act it is perfect. To deny that potency and act are really distinct is to admit in effect that something could be
perfect and imperfect from one and the same point of view, and this is a plain contradiction.
“Finally, it must be noted that any attempt to discount the real distinction between potency and act would render
impossible any genuine solution to the very problems that give rise to this distinction. Thus, if potency and act are
not really distinct, then the problem of change or becoming becomes insoluble. Further, if potency and act are not
really distinct, there is no genuine solution to the problem of limitation. In conclusion, if these principles are in any
sense real, it must be allowed that they are really distinct”(R. J. KREYCHE, First Philosophy, Holt, New York,
1959, pp. 100-103).

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conformity and something that accounts for their difference. The source of their similarity must
naturally be distinct from the source of diversity. Now, all these creatures (finite beings) are
similar because they all possess, have, the act of being (esse as actus essendi4), by participation,
efficiently caused by Esse Divinum, Ipsum Esse Subsistens (God), and because of this all these
finite beings are, they all exist. But they differ from one another on account of their essences
(essence here is the principle of specification or determination) which limit esse in diverse
manners. Therefore, esse and essentia are really distinct from one another.

4. The Argument from the Fact of Caused Being. “The real distinction can be argued from
the fact of caused being. Whatever is caused by another, the spiritual creature (angel), man, the
material being of the cosmos precisely as caused by another, it receives esse by the action of an
agent and so it cannot have esse by its own nature. A being whose essence is to be must be of its
very nature and so it essentially or necessarily exists. It is impossible that it not exist. It cannot
receive esse from another. It is simply uncaused. Whatever is caused being, therefore, is being
whose essence is really distinct from its esse. St. Thomas says: ‘It is against the nature of a made
thing for its essence to be its act of being (esse)…’5”6

A General Argument Showing the Real Distinction. “These arguments,” explains Kenneth
Dougherty, “may be summed up in a general argument. If a being exists so that its essence is its
esse, such a being would be pure actuality. It would possess no potency since the act of being
completes a thing as its ultimate perfection. A being whose essence is its esse would be
essentially actual or absolutely perfect. A finite or created being by identity cannot be absolutely
perfect. Therefore, its essence cannot be really identical with its esse. Essence and act of being in
finite beings must be really distinct. As we have seen, every finite being must have potency as its
coprinciple with act in being, precisely because it is limited, composite, mutable and caused.”7
4
“The notion of the actus essendi is of such importance that committing it to obscurity (an unfortunate fact of
history) has led to many metaphysical errors. The rejection of esse as the act of the essence began in the formalism
of certain Scholastics after St. Thomas Aquinas. Essence was no longer seen as the potentia essendi, but as
something with a certain autonomy of its own. As a result of the failure to consider esse as an intrinsic act of ens, of
seeing it rather as something extrinsic (a mere ‘state,’ resulting from divine action, without any consequence within
the very structure of created reality itself), essence took on an exaggerated value. Instead of seeing the essence as
something which is for the sake of esse, formalistic philosophers subordinated esse to essence, and essence thus
became the fundamental constitutive element of the creature.
“Torn loose from the act of being, the essence was then defined solely in terms of its abstract content or
intelligibility, and this provided a fertile field for any metaphysics which would give primacy to thought over being.
It is not hard to see why this ‘philosophy of essence’ was followed by an ‘immanentist metaphysics.’ Since esse had
been maintained in a world of essences only as an external appendage, it was finally replaced by the act of reason,
which would confer intelligibility to essences and grant them the sole reality acknowledged by immanentists,
namely, a ‘thought reality’(T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 115-116).
5
Summa Theologiae, I, q. 7, a. 2, ad 1.
6
K. DOUGHERTY, Metaphysics, Greymoor Press, Peekskill, New York, 1965, p. 131.
7
K. DOUGHERTY, op. cit., p. 131. In his critique of Francisco Suarez’s essentialist denial of the real distinction of
essence (essentia) and act of being (esse) in finite beings (Suarez asserting, instead, a virtual logical distinction),
Étienne Gilson writes: “…What matters here is the notion of being. What does Suarez call being? If it is really
actual being, then it is that being which belongs to an essence when, once a mere possible, it has become actual
owing to the efficacy of its causes. It then enjoys the being of actual essence (esse actualis essentiae). Having said
this, Suarez asks himself whether, in order to be actually, such a being as that of actual essence still requires the
supplement which Thomists call existence. And, of course, his answer is, no. Let us posit any essence whatever, for
instance, ‘man.’ Since it is not contradictory nor fancied by imagination, it is a ‘real essence.’ Again, it is a real
essence because it is, if not actual, at least possible. If it is only possible, it still lacks actuality, and consequently it

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does not exist; but, if it is an actual possible, that is, if that essence has the being of an ‘actual essence,’ what could it
still lack in order to exist? Nothing. Essence can be but actual or possible, and the only difference between these two
conditions is that what is actual is, whereas what is only possible is not. To say that an essence is a true actual being
(verum actuale ens) is therefore to say that such an essence actually is, or exists.
“What is going on in the mind of Suarez seems pretty clear. He begins by identifying being with essence.
Accordingly, he conceives all actual beings as simply many fully actualized essences. He then wonders what actual
existence could well add to an already existing being. The question is the more absurd as, from the very definition of
its terms, existence itself is here conceived as a thing, as that, in order to exist, an already existing thing should
include, over and above what it is, another thing. All this does not make sense, it is no wonder that Suarez parted
company with Thomas Aquinas on this most fundamental of all philosophical problems.
“But let us look more closely at his own position. Like all philosophers, and, I suppose, like practically all men
who understand the meaning of those terms, Suarez realizes that what makes an actual essence to be different from a
merely possible one is existence. Like all Christian philosophers, Suarez moreover admits, and indeed expressly
teaches, that no finite essence exists out of itself but owes its existence to the divine act of creation. Existence then is
to him, as he readily acknowledges that it is to all men, the supreme mark of reality. He accordingly declares that
existence is a formal and intrinsic constituent of reality properly so called. ‘Existence,’ Suarez says, ‘is that
whereby, formally and intrinsically, a thing is actually existing’; whereupon he adds that ‘although existence be not
a formal cause strictly and properly said, it nevertheless is an intrinsic and formal constituent of what it
constitutes.’(F. SUAREZ, Metaphysicae disputationes, XXXI, 5, 1). Obviously, Suarez is not existence-blind. He
knows that real things do exist; what he does not know is where existence can fit in such a philosophical
interpretation of reality as his own is.
“The very example offered by Suarez in support of his statement is enough to arouse suspicion. Existence, he
says, is a formal constituent of actual essence, as personality is a formal and intrinsic constituent of the person. If
this is really what he means, it is no wonder that he refuses to consider existence as a truly formal cause; for, indeed,
personality is not a cause of the person in any sense of the word. There is not a person where there is personality;
there is personality where there is a person. So, too, existence is not the formal cause whereby an existent actually
exists, rather, existence is the property of actually given existents. What puzzles Suarez at this juncture is, that
existence seems to add so much to essence, and yet is itself nothing. Here is a possible essence, then God creates it;
what has God created? Obviously, God has created that essence. And, as we already know, for that essence to be
actualized by God and to exist are one and the same thing. What Suarez fails to see, unless, perhaps, his adversary is
himself suffering from double vision, is that, when God creates an essence, He does not give it its actuality of
essence, which any possible essence enjoys in its own right; what God gives it is another actuality, which is that of
existence. Taken in itself, the essence of man is fully actual qua essence. For a theologian like Suarez, the ‘real
essence’ of the humblest possible being must needs be eternally and eternally completely determined in the mind of
God, so that it can lack no actuality qua essence. What it is still lacking is existence. Creation thus does not actualize
the essentiality of the essence, but it actualizes that essence in another order than that of essence, by granting it
existence. Now, this is precisely what the philosophical essentialism of Suarez forbids him to see. ‘Ens actu,’ Suarez
says, ‘idem est quod existens: A being in act is an existing being’(F. SUAREZ, Metaphysicae disputationes, XXXI,
1, 13). True, but the whole question is to know if a being in act is but its own essence, which is an entirely different
proposition. In a mind, an essence is in act through the existence of that mind; in a thing, an essence is in act through
the existence of that thing. In no case is it true to say that an essence is in act through its actualization qua essence.
Yet, this is what Suarez forcefully asserts, and this is why he finally decides that between an actualized essence and
its existence there is no real distinction, but a mere distinction of reason (Ibid.).
“It is noteworthy that Suarez is here going even beyond Duns Scotus in his reduction of being to essentiality. We
have seen how thin the distinction between essence and its existential modality was in the doctrine of Duns Scotus.
Yet, Suarez considers the Scotists to be so many supporters of some sort of real distinction, because, like Avicenna,
they make existence an appendix of the essence. To him, this is still too much. According to Suarez, it is the same
for an essence to be in actu exercito, that is, actually to exercise its act of essence, and to exist. Of course, we can
think of the essence as not yet exercising its act; then it is a pure abstraction of the mind; and it is true that we can
thus abstractly distinguish an existing essence from its existence, but this mental distinction does not affect the thing
itself. Between actual existence and an actual, existing essence, there really is no distinction.
“…What Suarez would like to know is quid existentia sit: what is existence, as if existence could be a what.
Having himself identified being with its essence, he could not possibly find in it an is which, if it is, is neither an
essence nor a thing. This is why Suarez does not know existence when he sees it. Hence his strange metaphysical
notion of being. If we take an essence, Suarez says, ‘abstractly conceived and precisely in itself, that is, as being in

5
potency, it is distinguished from actual existence as non-being is distinguished from being.’(F. SUAREZ,
Metaphysicae disputationes, XXXI, 4, 5). In his doctrine, the actualization of non-being as such is the very origin
and philosophical explanation of being.
“The influence of Suarez on the development of modern metaphysics has been much deeper and wider than is
commonly known. It has naturally reached in the first place those seventeenth-century scholastic philosophers who
find very few readers today, yet have themselves exerted a perceptible influence on the development of
metaphysical thought. Through them, Suarez has become responsible for the spreading of a metaphysics of essences
which makes profession of disregarding existences as irrelevant to its own object. This is the more remarkable as,
after all, Suarez himself had never discarded existences as irrelevant to metaphysical speculation; but he had
identified existences with actual essences, so that his disciples were quite excusable in ruling existence out of
metaphysics.”(E. GILSON, Being and Some Philosophers, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, 1952,
pp. 100-103, 105).
Suarez and the Suarezian school “hold for a mental distinction between essence and existence. For it is by
existence that a thing becomes real from a state of possibility. All its reality is due to its existence. There is no
distinct reality such as essence. Essence cannot be without existence.
“The Thomist concedes that essence cannot be isolated from esse as if essence could really be apart from esse as
oxygen can be physically separated from hydrogen as components of water. The difficulty is in understanding the
meaning of a real distinction which cannot be locally distinct.
“Essence and esse are not parts of a being in the same way as integral parts that can be locally separated. They
are entitative components of the finite. The reality which esse confers on essence is to make an essence really
existing. But it does not follow from this that all the reality in the finite being is esse. There must be a real subject of
which esse is the act. This real subject is a real potency that receives esse. Reality is not purely the actual in finite
being. There is also the reality of potency. So too matter is a real potency distinct in a thing from the substantial act,
the form. Essence is not real in the existential order without the act of being and yet it is not identical with the act of
being. Essence and act of being are coprinciples of the being of finite things. Finite reality is not purely esse but a
compound of potency and act, an imperfect mode of existence.
“What results from the union of essence and esse is the existent, the individual existing thing, the supposit.
Essence and esse complement one another as potency and act, as what is existing and the act of being in the
constitution of finite being ultimately outside its causes. Esse is not related to essence as another substance nor as an
accident but rather as the ultimate actuality of the essence.
“The doctrine of the real distinction between essence and act of being is a basically integral part of the Thomistic
synthesis. It is not a more or less accidental corollary attached to the metaphysics of St. Thomas. It is a fundamental
application of the doctrine of potency and act to the understanding of finite being. For essence stands to esse as
potency to act. The real distinction between potency and act is resolved in the relation of the entitative parts of finite
being. ‘It must be considered that as esse and what is differ in simple things according to intention so in composite
things they differ really’(In Boethium de Hebdomadibus, lecture 2)”(K. DOUGHERTY, op. cit., pp. 131-132).
Certain Jesuits, who do not follow the lead of Suarez and defend the real distinction between esse and essentia in
finite beings, include Schiffini, Billot, Mattiussi, Remer, Maurice de la Taille, Boyer, and Henri Renard. Most of the
early Thomists defended the real distinction including Capreolus and Francis de Sylvestris.