India’s Nuclear Policy

Introduction

India has had an uncomfortable relationship with nuclear weapons.

From the early days of independence, Indian leaders, especially
Jawaharlal Nehru, took a very public and very vocal stand against
nuclear weapons. But Nehru, a modernist, was also convinced that
nuclear technology had a role to play in national development. To a
lesser degree, he also thought that nuclear weapons technology might
have a role to play in national defence if efforts at nuclear disarmament
should fail. These somewhat contradictory strands are still visible
today, as they have been through much of the last six decades of Indian
nuclear policy. But it would be foolish to suggest that Nehru’s
perspective on nuclear weapons was the only determinant in Indian
nuclear policy. India’s nuclear policy was also influenced by India’s
international security condition as well as by domestic variables such as
the vagaries of political change and the influence of bureaucratic elites.
Indeed, India’s decision to build a nuclear force was taken only in the
late 1980s, much after it had become clear that Pakistan —with
Chinese technological assistance— had made rapid advances in the
nuclear weapons programme. As for bureaucratic influence, some
defence scientists played a key role in keeping the weapons programme
alive even when there was no political support or indeed, active
opposition, while other bureaucrats were responsible for creating
political awareness of India’s declining nuclear options. Nevertheless,
these variables suggest a moderate Indian approach to nuclear
weapons and thus reinforce the dominant tendency towards a political
rather a military approach to looking at nuclear weapons. They do not
suggest any dramatic changes nor rapid advances in India’s nuclear
weapons programme.

The Purpose of India’s Nuclear Weapons

Indian leaders have generally considered nuclear weapons at best a

necessary evil. Prime Ministers Lal Bahadur Shastri and Rajiv Gandhi
sought international solutions to avoid committing to nuclear weapons;
Prime Minister Morarji Desai shut down the weapons program for a
time. Even Prime Minister Atal Vajpayee, who ordered the nuclear tests
in 1998, was more ambivalent two decades earlier, siding with Desai in
voting against restarting the nuclear weapons program in 1979. As a
number of analysts have concluded, growing nuclear threats and a
progressively unaccommodating global nuclear order forced New Delhi
to move towards a declared nuclear arsenal in the 1990s. This
discomfort with nuclear weapons has defined the manner in which
India has viewed nuclear weapons. Much of the Indian debate about
nuclear weapons between the 1960s and the 1990s did not consider
how nuclear weapons might be used within the framework of Indian
strategy. The arguments and propositions largely revolved around
whether India should go nuclear, not what India should do with nuclear
weapons. It was only in the 1980s that some Indian strategists such as
K. Subrahmanyam and General K. Sundarji started writing about what
nuclear weapons might be useful for.5 This also coincided with greater
attention among decision-makers to such questions. Both Sundarji and
Subrahmanyam argued that the kind of bloated nuclear arsenals that
the US and the Soviet Union developed during the Cold War were
unnecessary and wasteful. Nuclear deterrence could be had at far
cheaper cost, with a relatively small arsenal. In essence, as Tellis has
argued, what Sundarji and Subrahmanyam were suggesting was a view
of nuclear weapons that emphasized its political rather than military
utility, its deterrence rather than war-fighting capability. This view of
the political utility of nuclear weapons is also reflected in arguments
about nuclear weapons providing political space and strategic
autonomy, arguments that former Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant
Singh has made. Not surprisingly, the eventual Indian nuclear deterrent
emphasized small numbers and a capability to retaliate, rather than
building a deterrent force that would have parity with other nuclear
powers.

But the notion that nuclear weapons are political tools is primarily
about how India views the usability of nuclear weapons. It does not
extend to India’s views about how other states, particularly Pakistan,
might see nuclear weapons. In fact Indian views about what nuclear
weapons in others’ hands might do are highly pessimistic, assuming
implicitly that other states might not be as responsible as New Delhi is
or has been. India’s view on nuclear proliferation is one indicator of this
deeply pessimistic view that India has of the possibility of nuclear
weapons use by other states. Though India objected to the Nuclear
Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), it has seen proliferation itself as a
threat to international stability and has repeatedly touted its
“exemplary non-proliferation record of four decades and more.” Thus
the Indian view of the spread of nuclear weapons is fundamentally
different from the ‘more may be better’ arguments of proliferation
optimists such as Kenneth Waltz, or even the radical rejection of the
concept of non-proliferation by China prior to 1991. Indian officials do
not think that nuclear weapons have stabilized the region; rather they
believe that nuclear weapons in Pakistani hands increase the nuclear
risk in the region because Pakistan is seen as irresponsible. This fits a
larger pattern of contradiction which assumes that other powers,
Pakistan in particular, will not be as responsible as India has been.

Indian views about missile defenses are a further indication of the

contradiction in Indian views about nuclear weapons. If nuclear
weapons are essentially political weapons, not usable in fighting wars,
the logic of missile defenses seems difficult to understand: clearly
missile defenses are needed only if one assumes that nuclear weapons
are going to be used. Nevertheless, New Delhi has pursued a ballistic
missile defence (BMD) system since at least the mid-1990s. India’s
search for an appropriate BMD system appears linked to the growth of
Pakistan’s missile delivery capability, including the transfer of Chinese
missiles such as the M-. As with nuclear weapons, the search for a BMD
system has continued despite changes of political leadership and
ideology in New Delhi. At various times, India has sought the Russian-
built S-300, the Israeli-American Arrow, and the US-built Patriot ballistic
missile defence systems. India is also thought to have a domestic BMD
system in development, built around the still under-development Akash
Surface-to-Air missile (SAM). New Delhi’s decade-long search has been
unsuccessful possibly because Indian decision-makers have not given
sufficient thought to what kind of system India needs. Indeed, it is not
clear how missile defenses will fit into the existing Indian nuclear
doctrine. India’s official nuclear doctrine has made no mention of a
missile defence system, and it is unlikely that the war-fighting
orientation of missile defenses will sit well with the political/deterrence
driven sentiment that dominates the nuclear doctrine. None of the
Indian governments that have been in power since 1995 have given any
reason why they want missile defences, though the issue had created
dissension among some of allies of the United Progressive Alliance
(UPA) government when it included communist parties because New
Delhi has been seeking to buy a US-built system based on the Patriot
PAC-3. Thus India’s view of nuclear weapons suggests an element of
inconsistency: nuclear weapons are essentially political weapons and
unusable militarily by India, but other states might not be as restrained.
As a consequence, India both opposes the spread of nuclear weapons
and pursues BMDs.

India’s Changing Nuclear Doctrine

India’s nuclear doctrine, in its declaratory form if not in its operational

variation, has undergone some changes since it was first announced in
August 1999. The 1999 doctrine was produced by the National Security
Advisory Board (NSAB), a group of non-governmental experts, and its
status was thus somewhat suspect. Indeed, the government formally
claimed that the doctrine was not the official doctrine. However, much
of what was stated by the NSAB in the “unofficial” nuclear doctrine was
what had already been stated by various government officials, including
the prime minister, at different times in and out of parliament. The only
major difference between the various official statements and what was
stated in the NSAB’s nuclear doctrine was that the NSAB document
discussed the need for a nuclear triad for India, which the government
had not acknowledged until then but which was both logical and
unsurprising. Thus, the government’s coyness about the doctrine was
probably unnecessary.
In any case, when some details of the Indian nuclear doctrine were
officially released in January 2003 it in many ways stuck to some of the
main elements of the 1999 doctrine though there were some important
differences. The 2003 nuclear doctrine was released as a brief press
statement, but it did state the key elements of the doctrine. The actual
nuclear doctrine is reported to be a much more comprehensive
document. Below I briefly outline the main elements of the 1999
doctrine and the changes made in the 2003 version.

The 1999 doctrine suggested a nuclear doctrine that was based on an

unspecified minimum force but one which would also be credible and
survivable. In addition, India would not use nuclear weapons first (no-
first use of nuclear weapons or NFU) and will not use of nuclear
weapons against non-nuclear countries (Negative Security Assurance or
NSA). The doctrine emphasized the need for credible nuclear forces
that would be able to survive a first strike against it as well as the need
for strict political control over nuclear forces. The NSAB document also
emphasized India’s nuclear disarmament objectives. None of these
were new: what was new, however, was that the doctrine also talked
about a nuclear triad of aircraft, long-range ballistic missiles and
submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

In January 2003, the government released a brief press statement (of

just 349 words) that revealed some aspects of the ‘official’ nuclear
doctrine. From the press statement, it is unclear when this doctrine was
formulated and its relationship to the 1999 doctrine, though it could be
read as having been the official doctrine for a while. The press
statement revealed that many of the elements of the Indian nuclear
doctrine was the same as in the 1999 doctrine, but a number of caveats
had been added, and some pledges especially that of the NFU and non-
use against non-nuclear powers had been diluted. There were also
details about command and control aspects that were new.

There were at least three variations of note in the new doctrine. First
was the introduction of the notion of ‘massive’ retaliation to a nuclear
attack on India. The 1999 doctrine had only talked of a ‘punitive’
retaliation that would cause ‘unacceptable’ damage. It is still unclear
why this change was introduced, and indeed whether this was a change
at all because some key individuals who presumably had a role in
drafting the doctrine appeared unaware of the consequence of the
change in such key concepts. A cynical but plausible interpretation is
that this was simply public braggadocio, especially since the press
release came in the wake of India’s failed attempt at coercive
diplomacy in the aftermath of the terrorist attack on the Indian
parliament in December 2001. Whatever the interpretation of these
words, there was little explication either in the press statement or
subsequently about the meaning or logic of this change.

The second significant variation was the dilution of both India’s NFU
pledge as well as the pledge not to attack non-nuclear countries (NSA).
The original NFU pledge and the NSA pledge not only in the 1999
doctrine but also in various official statements in and out of parliament
was without any qualifiers. But in the 2003 version, there is an
important qualifier: India will consider the use of nuclear weapons in
response to a ‘major attack’ on India or on Indian forces anywhere with
chemical or biological weapons (CBW). This dilutes both the NFU pledge
as well as the pledge not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear
states. It dilutes the NFU pledge because India could use nuclear
weapons first against nuclear powers which decide to use chemical or
biological weapons against India. For example, if Pakistan uses chemical
weapons against India, India might use nuclear weapons in retaliation,
though in such cases, New Delhi would also be violating its NFU pledge.
Similarly, it dilutes the NSA because New Delhi could potentially use
nuclear weapons against a state that does not have nuclear weapons.
Hypothetically, if a country such as Bangladesh were to use chemical
weapons against India, Indian leaders might be forced to consider the
use of nuclear weapons in retaliation for such an attack, even if it is
clear that Bangladesh does not possess nuclear weapons, thus violating
India’s non-attack against non-nuclear countries pledge. These
contradictions have either not been thought through by those who
framed the doctrine or else they have not taken these modifications
seriously.

Interviews with Indian officials have suggested two reasons for such
changes. First, since India no longer has CBW, it has only nuclear
weapons to deter potential CBW use against India. The argument
appears to be that there is a potential that Indian territory or forces
might come under chemical or biological weapon attack from a non-
nuclear country or even a terrorist entity but would be unable to
respond because of the earlier blanket pledge on NFU. The second
reason is that these changes reflect the government’s response to
domestic criticism about the NFU pledge being too weak to deal with
potential threats. I suspect that the second reason is closer to the truth.
Once again, the timing of these changes is significant. By late 2002,
New Delhi was feeling particularly frustrated with Pakistan’s support for
terror and India’s inability to do much about it, as well as the failure of
Operation Parakram (the military mobilization in 2001– 2002). A
muscular nuclear doctrine may have been seen as one way of
responding to this frustration. On the other hand, it is unclear if the
government considered the problems of what Scott Sagan had called
the ‘commitment trap’. Sagan had argued that making such a
commitment might force decision-makers into either using nuclear
weapons unnecessarily or create credibility problems that will end up
diluting deterrence. This will happen because unless you carry out your
threats, threats on which your deterrence depends might not be very
credible in the future. Thus leaders and decision-makers have to be
careful and prudent about the deterrence threats they make in order to
make sure that these are actually threats that can be carried out if the
contingency arose. There is little indication that the implications of
these contradictions have been considered seriously by the
government. In any case, the 2003 press statement remains the only
official statement of India’s nuclear doctrine to date.

India’s Assured Retaliation Strategy

Though Indian officials continue to characterize the nuclear doctrine as

one of minimum deterrence, I have characterized it elsewhere as
‘assured retaliation’. Minimum deterrence is politically attractive
because it suggests limited goals and a responsible attitude towards
nuclear weapons. Though this largely reflects India’s approach towards
nuclear weapons, the changes that have taken place in the doctrine,
especially the dilution of the NFU and NSA pledges and the reference to
massive retaliation all suggest that assured retaliation is a better
characterization of India’s nuclear strategy than ‘credible minimum
deterrence’.

Assured retaliation includes the NFU pledge, with the problematic

caveats noted earlier. It also includes the certainty of retaliation, but
there is little indication that such retaliation will take place prior to an
enemy attack striking India. Indian leaders appear content to wait until
an attack has already landed on Indian soil before considering
retaliation. In other words, there are no declaratory or operational
indicators that suggest that India might adopt either a launch-on-
warning (LOW) or a launch-under-attack (LUA) posture for its nuclear
force. Indeed, Indian nuclear forces are still reportedly kept de-alerted
and de-mated, which would obviate LOW or LUA strategies. Such a
posture assumes that there will be considerable time between an
attack and an order to retaliate because it will be many hours before
the various components of India’s nuclear forces can be brought
together and mated for delivery. This might change once India’s nuclear
submarines assume a strategic deterrent role because India will then
have to keep its submarine-based nuclear weapons mated, but it is
unlikely that the nuclear submarine component of India’s strategic
forces would be ready for many more years.

Assured retaliation as strategy also includes massive retaliation, though

this has certain other well-recognized problems. First, it is not very
credible to threaten massive retaliation under all circumstances. For
example, it will be difficult for Indian decision-makers to justify a
massive retaliatory attack against Pakistan if Pakistan had only used
one nuclear warhead to attack an advancing Indian military column
inside Pakistani territory. Though this is an extreme scenario, it is
possible to think of other scenarios of a limited Pakistani nuclear use in
the context of a military confrontation between India and Pakistan. The
massive retaliation doctrine will then force Indian leaders on to the
horns of a dilemma: either stick to the doctrine and launch an
unjustifiably large retaliation, or suffer the loss of credibility of not
sticking to the doctrine.

Second, massive retaliation might force any potential adversary to also

plan a massive attack and potentially a plan a counter-force first-strike
as part of a damage limitation strategy. In other words, if Pakistan is
convinced that India will launch a massive retaliation irrespective of the
size of the original Pakistan attack, then Pakistan would have little
reason to keep their nuclear first strike limited. After all why keep your
first blow limited —and risk losing your own nuclear forces in an Indian
retaliation— if New Delhi will in any case retaliate massively ? New
Delhi does not appear to recognize that its own choices can affect the
choices of potential adversaries, sometimes with negative
consequences for India.

Of course, one potential positive consequence also needs to be kept in

mind. If an adversary thinks that India might actually carry out a
massive retaliation and that no nuclear war was likely to remain limited
to isolated or discrete nuclear exchanges, it could force them to
reconsider any offensive plans. The choice for an attacker then would
be all or nothing: such drastic choices might be unpalatable.

India’s Nuclear Capabilities

India’s nuclear capabilities are not known with any certainty. India is
thought to have anywhere between 70 and 100 nuclear warheads.
These are reportedly kept de-mated, with components in the hands of
different agencies. Such a posture ensures greater safety for the
nuclear assets and reduces the likelihood of accidents and inadvertent
use of nuclear weapons. But there have been murmurs within the
armed services about the feasibility of keeping weapons and delivery
vehicles separated and about the smoothness and speed of integrating
them. Given the sensitivity of the topic, obviously little is known about
either the procedures or any problems.

India has significant stores of fissile materials, as much as ten tons. This
would be sufficient for as many as 1000 warheads if it were all to be
used for nuclear warheads. However, most of this stockpile appears
intended for feeding India’s indigenously built fast breeder reactors.
Though that should eventually yield an even larger stockpile, India is
not thought to have enough reprocessing capability to convert this to
weapons-grade plutonium.

India’s nuclear delivery capability has grown very slowly. Though the
Indian guided missile development programme is almost a quarter
century old, it has yet to develop a long-range missile capable of
targeting all of China. Even the current underdevelopment long-range
missile, the Agni-3, has a range of only 3500 kilometers which is too
short to target much of China. The Agni-3 has now been tested four
times, the fourth test being conducted by the Army as a user trial.
Nevertheless, it will be some time before the missile is deployed with
the Indian strategic forces. The rumors that an even longer range
missile, the Agni-5, is under development have now been officially
confirmed by senior defence research officials. The Agni-5 will have a
range of more than 5000 kilometers, allowing it to target much of
China. The Agni-5 development is expected to begin shortly, and the
first test should happen within two years.
India’ current ballistic missile and combat aircraft are sufficient,
however, for targeting Pakistan. India has a number of missiles
including the Prithvi, the Agni-1 and Agni-2, as well as the Agni-3 for
targeting Pakistan. India has a number of combat aircraft too which can
be used as delivery vehicle vis-à-vis Pakistan, including the Jaguar, the
Mirage-2000 and the Su-30.

India is also developing a sea-based deterrent in the form of a nuclear-

powered ballistic missile submarine. The first of these missile
submarines, the Arihant, has been launched, though it will be some
time before the submarine will be ready for sea-trial and even longer
before it joins the deterrent force. Two more submarines of the same
type are planned. What missile they will carry is unclear, with
contradictory reports in the India media. It is also unclear how New
Delhi will deal with the command and control issues that are raised by
these platforms, including the thorny issue of how to keep these
weapons de-mated in a submarine. Indian civilian leaders has
consistently emphasized political control over these weapons, but
maintaining political control over nuclear weapons in submarines has
been a problem for all countries that have opted to put nuclear missiles
in submarines.

The most notable aspect of the nuclear weapons capabilities has been
their rather slow development. It has taken India a quarter century to
develop even intermediate range missiles such as the Agni-3, and it has
yet to develop one with intercontinental ranges. Similarly, the number
of India’s warhead stockpile has grown only very slowly. On the other
hand, it is unclear what final state of capabilities India is aiming at,
either in terms of the warheads or in terms of delivery vehicles. These
decisions have probably not been finalized, and are likely to remain
flexible to respond to changing strategic requirements.

Nuclear Dilemmas

Nuclearization has had unforeseen consequences for India security.

Though nuclear weapons, the perfect status quo weapon, has benefits
for a status quo power such as India, there are also some concerns
about what it does to the military balance in South Asia. By neutralizing
India’s conventional superiority, nuclear weapons may have been partly
responsible for hobbling India’s capacity to react to Pakistan’s constant
provocations.

Both the Kargil crisis (1999) and the Parakram crisis (2001–2002)
demonstrated this. In Kargil, despite unambiguous evidence of
Pakistani forces crossing the Line of Control (LoC), the Indian military
response was limited to dealing with the forces that had already
crossed the LoC rather than with attacking their support bases across
the LoC or punishing Pakistan for that misadventure. New Delhi was
extremely careful not to allow its forces to cross the LoC, giving strict
instructions to its military, including the air force, that it must stay
within Indian territory. Such orders constrained Indian military
operations, but were nevertheless seen as necessary to prevent any
escalation to a full-scale war, with potential consequences for further
escalation to the nuclear level. But Pakistan also miscalculated the
Indian response: Pakistani military leadership had apparently assumed
that India cannot react at all to the military incursions in Kargil because
of New Delhi’s fear of nuclear escalation. They were wrong in that
calculation but fear of nuclear escalation did limit the Indian response
to India’s side of the LoC.

The Parakram crisis showed similar results. In the aftermath of the

terrorist attack on the Indian parliament in December 2001, India
ordered full military mobilization. Despite some initial fear at the Indian
response Pakistan stood its ground, calculating that India would not risk
nuclear escalation by launching a military attack. They were right: India
ultimately backed down with little achieved. India’s restraint in dealing
with the attack on the Indian parliament once again demonstrated the
limitations that nuclear weapons imposed on India’s capacity to
respond to Pakistan’s use of terrorism as a strategy. India used the
military mobilization essentially as a way of putting pressure on
Pakistan, as well as putting pressure on the U.S. to lean on Pakistan,
rather than as a prelude to the use of force.

In 2008, Pakistan-based terrorists attacked both the Indian embassy in

Afghanistan as well as the city of Mumbai and there is evidence that
both attacks had Pakistan’s official sanction. This time, unlike in the
aftermath of the attack on the Indian parliament, the Indian
government did not even appear to have considered retaliatory
strategies. India’s inability to respond is another excellent
demonstration of how debilitating the fear of nuclear escalation has
been in terms of Indian policy. As a RAND report on the Mumbai attack
pointed out, “(A)fter becoming an overt nuclear power, Pakistan has
become emboldened to prosecute conflict at the lower end of the
spectrum, confident that nuclear weapons minimize the likelihood of
an Indian military reaction.”
 It would be difficult to lay on the blame for India’s pusillanimity on
nuclear weapons alone. India’s divided government (every government
in the last two decades has been a coalition) as well as Indian political
culture make India very risk averse. And after overt nuclearization, and
especially after 9/11, any potential war between India and Pakistan
raises even greater international concern than before. Nevertheless,
fear of nuclear escalation probably plays a greater role than other
factors in determining the Indian response.

India has tried to deal with such problems in at least two ways. In the
immediate aftermath of Kargil, Indian military and political leaders
suggested that despite nuclearization India has the space to fight a
limited conventional war. This suggested that India could wage a full-
scale conventional war against Pakistan without the worry that it might
escalate to the nuclear level. This ‘limited war doctrine’ appears to have
been purely declaratory and talk of such limited war options died down
almost immediately. It is unclear if these pronouncements were the
result of any politically approved strategy; the fact that such ideas were
quickly forgotten suggests that these were more personal ruminations
than any state policy.

Again, after the Parakram crisis, the Indian Army came up with what
they called the ‘Cold Start’ doctrine. Cold start was the idea that India
would station sufficient troops at the border to start offensive
operation immediately, without waiting for a full-scale mobilization.
Such offensives would be in the form of multiple but shallow attacks
across the entire India–Pakistan border. Again, it is unclear if such plans
have any political backing. In any case, the problem was not the speed
of launching an offensive but the question of whether there can be any
military response at all under nuclear conditions. Though the army and
other services have conducted several military exercises to test out
elements of the Cold Start doctrine, its political status remains
uncertain. No political leaders have so far used the concept publicly or
spoken about it. The key problem facing the Indian decision-makers is
not so much the speed with which Indian forces can be mobilized —
which is what Cold Start is designed to address— but the question of
whether there are any military solutions to the problem of Pakistan’s
sponsorship of terrorism itself. This remains a continuing and key
problem for New Delhi. Until this issue is resolved, there is little that a
‘cold start’ doctrine can actually accomplish.

Nuclear Arms Control

Over the last several decades, India has emphasized nuclear

disarmament rather than nuclear non-proliferation. New Delhi’s
position on the spread of nuclear weapons was a complex one. On the
one hand, India always saw such spread of nuclear weapons as a
danger. Its decision not to sign the NPT despite taking part in the
negotiations was a difficult one, reached after New Delhi concluded
that signing the treaty would adversely affect Indian security especially
because neither Washington nor Moscow appeared willing to provide
any form of extended deterrence cover for India’s security. In other
words, India never accepted the idea that nuclear proliferation was
legitimate, unlike, for example, China in the 1950s and 1960s.
Therefore, though New Delhi refused to sign the NPT, it also refused to
help other states such as Libya with nuclear technology.

New Delhi was also quite meticulous about ensuring that its nuclear
weapons technology did not reach other non-nuclear weapon states.
Though there have been some concerns raised that India might have
illegally acquired some technologies and materials, and that it may
have been careless in ensuring the security of some of its nuclear
technology, the Indian record in protecting its technology from leaking
is far better than that of most other nuclear powers. In the process,
New Delhi built up a reputation as a ‘responsible nuclear power’ that
became an unexpected bonus in dealing with the international
community, especially as India sought a waiver from NSG guidelines.
India squared this circle of both opposing the NPT and opposing nuclear
proliferation by taking the position that though each country should be
free to decide on how to meet its security needs, states that did sign
the NPT had an obligation to live up to their commitments. Thus, on
both North Korea and Iran, India’s position has been to argue that
because these countries voluntarily accepted the NPT, they have an
obligation to live up to their treaty commitments. India’s response to
the threat of nuclear proliferation was to take an active part in nuclear
disarmament diplomacy, seeing the elimination of nuclear weapons as
both a way of dealing with the threat of proliferation as also a way of
avoiding the unpleasant decision about building its own nuclear
weapons. India also was at the forefront in pressing that all
commitments in the NPT be honored, including the Article 6 obligation
towards nuclear disarmament, rather than focusing only on the spread
of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states. Thus, a favorite Indian
argument about nuclear proliferation was to point out that what
mattered was not just horizontal proliferation (or the expansion of the
nuclear weapons club) but also vertical proliferation (the expansion of
the arsenals of the existing members of the nuclear club).
Nevertheless, as the global nuclear non-proliferation regime comes
under increasing threat due to non-compliance or even outright
violations by countries such as Iran and North Korea, India will have to
increasingly face up to the needs of fashioning a more appropriate
approach to the non-proliferation regime. In addition to focusing on
nuclear disarmament and non-compliance by NWS (Nuclear Weapon
States), India will also have to come up with meaningful and effective
ways of dealing with non-compliance by NNWS (Non-Nuclear Weapon
States), something that India had previously ignored. One of the
disadvantages that India faces in making this policy transition is that
India is not a member of the NPT and it is unlikely to become one
unless India’s de facto NWS status is accepted as de jure status by the
NPT members. This is unlikely. But the alternative —India giving up its
nuclear weapons and joining the treaty as a NNWS— is equally unlikely.
In essence, then, India’s relationship with the treaty is unlikely to
undergo any formal changes though India can be expected to play a
more active diplomatic role in trying to keep the NPT system together.

As stated earlier, India is likely to continue stressing nuclear

disarmament as a way of resolving the problems of nuclear
proliferation. Though India’s disarmament drive is sometimes seen a
cynical ploy to divert attention from its unwillingness to accede to the
NPT, a good number among India’s political and administrative elite
appear sincerely committed to the goal of a nuclear-weapon free
world. This may very well be because no serious cost-benefit analysis
has been undertaken within the government of the implications of
nuclear disarmament on India’s security interest. If so, it would not be
the first time: India originally supported both the NPT and the CTBT
without realizing the full import of these treaties on India’s security.
India eventually refused to accede to either treaty. Nevertheless, India
does strongly support a Nuclear Weapons Convention with the
objective of eventual comprehensive nuclear disarmament. Even after
openly declaring itself as a nuclear weapon state, India has reiterated
its commitment to comprehensive nuclear disarmament. ‘

Obviously, nuclear disarmament is unlikely in the immediate future. In

the meantime, India faces some key nuclear arms control challenges in
the next couple of years. The most immediate of these issues are those
related to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile
Material Control Treaty (FMCT).

For New Delhi, the CTBT is a domestic rather more than an

international problem. There is a continuing dispute within the Indian
defence science community about the success of the H-bomb test in
1998. A section of India’s scientific community, mostly retired
scientists, has argued that the H-bomb test was not successful and that
India should test again. The Indian government as well as serving
nuclear scientists have repeatedly stated that they are satisfied with
the results of the 1998 tests and no further tests are necessary. In
addition, there is some disquiet among some members of the Indian
strategic community about India signing the CTBT after just six tests.
Both of these concerns make for serious and rather vocal opposition to
any moves by New Delhi to sign the CTBT. Though the government can
overcome such opposition, it would require the kind of political
commitment that the current government has so far not suggested it is
willing to expend. Thus, they are hoping that either opposition in the US
Senate or some other problem will slow the CTBT. The loss of
momentum in the U.S. Senate on the CTBT thus comes as good news to
New Delhi. In any case, it is highly unlikely that New Delhi will sign the
CTBT in the near future given such domestic issues, unless all the main
nuclear powers sign and ratify the treaty.

The FMCT presents a different and more serious problem. It is unclear if

India’s fissile material stockpiles are sufficient to meet India’s current
and future strategic needs. India agreed to join the FMCT negotiations,
one suspects, with the same short-sightedness that it joined the NPT
and CTBT negotiations. From New Delhi’s perspective, the FMCT is
thankfully tied up in a number of controversies, especially the one
about the scope of the treaty. But should these problems be resolved
India might suddenly find itself once again staring at a treaty that it
helped negotiate but which does not serve its strategic needs. But
unlike the CTBT, the FMCT is not so much a domestic political issue as a
practical issue that has to do with decisions about the size of the
nuclear arsenal that India wants. Until now, Indian decision makers
have been reluctant to make these decisions, and they can be expected
to put off such decisions for as long as possible.

The Implications of the US–India Nuclear Deal

The US–India nuclear deal was essential to India because India’s

traditional approach towards nuclear cooperation had reached a dead-
end. Traditionally, India sought international nuclear cooperation, even
while maintaining a nuclear weapons program, by agreeing to partial
safeguards on nuclear imports. This strategy allowed India to
supplement its domestic nuclear power capability with international
cooperation, as long as there were willing international partners.
However, when the rules of international nuclear commerce changed
from partial safeguards (safeguards only on the specific imported item)
to full-scope safeguards (safeguards on the entire nuclear program as a
condition for any nuclear commerce), India was faced with the choice
of either giving up its nuclear weapons program, or giving up on
international nuclear commerce. Not surprisingly, India chose the
latter. What the US–India nuclear deal does is give India the option yet
again to both keep its nuclear weapons program while also preserving
its access to international nuclear commerce. The issue had become
even more vital for India because India’s explosive economic growth
has put much greater strains on its electricity generation capacity,
leading to peak power shortages of as such as 11 percent. Now that the
nuclear deal is complete, and India has the necessary waiver from the
NSG that permits other nuclear powers such as France and Russia to
supply India with civilian nuclear technology, India is expected to
significantly enhance its civilian nuclear power sector with international
cooperation. Indeed, several agreements have already been signed to
bring to fruition additional nuclear power generating capacity and more
nuclear power agreements are expected to be signed over the next two
years.

The nuclear deal is unlikely to have major impact on India’s nuclear

weapons program. In the last two decades, ever since India went
nuclear in the late 1980s, India has only built a few dozen nuclear
warheads. Most estimates suggest that India has enough fissile material
for about 65 –110 warheads, with some estimates suggesting even
lower numbers. If we assume a median of 85 warheads, it would
suggest that India has only built, on average, about four warheads a
year. This suggests that India feels no great pressure to rapidly increase
its arsenal. The suggestion, by some arms control experts, that access
to foreign nuclear fuel will free India’s domestic fuel resources for
weapons does not hold much water because India has much larger
stockpiles of fuel (about one ton) that it could have converted for
weapons if it had wanted to do so. In other words, the small size of the
Indian nuclear force is the consequence of deliberate choice rather
than because of any fissile material shortage.

Conclusion

India’s nuclear policy has evolved gradually rather than dramatically.

This is unlikely to change. Indian leaders and the political and
administrative system are cautious and risk-averse. And India faces no
existential insecurities and is indeed a fairly confident and secure state
that dominates its region. Thus, there is little domestic political or
international reasons to expect rapid changes in India’s nuclear policy.
But just as it is cautious in advancing its nuclear weapons arsenal, it will
also be cautious in advancing on the nuclear arms control and
disarmament agenda. India is unlikely to sign either the CTBT or the
FMCT, should they be presented to New Delhi in the next couple of
years. On the other hand, India is also unlikely to stage more nuclear
tests or hugely increase its nuclear arsenal. Over the next decade, India
should be expected to gradually increase the size of its arsenal and
make it more robust and reliable, with some 6000 kilometer plus range
ballistic missiles and possibly one or two submarines capable of firing
long-range ballistic missiles. India has sought BMDs for over a decade.
Though it is possible that India might buy a BMD system or develop one
indigenously, it is unlikely that such systems will be deployed in the
next few years. India can also be expected to campaign vigorously for
nuclear disarmament. New Delhi can also be expected to continue to
worry about the negation of its conventional military deterrent, but it is
unlikely that it will find a solution to this puzzle either in the immediate
future.