Model CCAPM
Model CCAPM
Pricing Model
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Readings
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The Representative Agent Hypothesis and its Notion of
Equilibrium
An infinitely-lived Representative Agent
–Helps avoid terminal period problem
–Equivalence with finite lives if operative bequest
motive
–In complete markets, representative agent is the one
whose utility function is a weighted average of the
utilities of all the economy’s participants
No Trade Equilibrium
–Positive net supply: the representative agent willingly
holds total supply
–Zero net supply: at the prevailing price, supply =
demand =0
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An Exchange (Endowment) Economy. Lucas 1978
4 / 30
Transition probability matrix (TPM)
5 / 30
The problem
∞
!
X
max E δ t U (c˜t )
{zt+1 }
t=0
s.t. ct + pt zt+1 ≤ zt Yt + pt zt
zt ≤ 1, all t
F.O.C:
U 0 (ct )pt = δEt U 0 (c̃t+1 )(p̃t+1 + Ỹt+1 ) or
X
U 0 (ct (Y i ))pt (Y i ) = δ πij U 0 (ct+1 (Y j )) pt+1 (Y j ) + Yt+1 (Y j )
| {z }
j
utility loss | {z }
from expected utility gain at
purchasing 1 t + 1 from liquidating the
unit of sec. proceeeds and consuming
at t
6 / 30
Definition of an equilibrium. U 0 (ct )pt = δEt U 0 (c̃t+1 )(p̃t+1 + Ỹt+1 )
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Example
Assume utility is U (c) = log c, δ = 0.96, the 3-state economy,
(Y 1 , Y 2 , Y 3 ) = (3/2, 1, 1/2). The TPM is
1/2 1/4 1/4
T = 1/4 1/2 1/4
1/4 1/4 1/2
Denote p(Y i ) = p(i), then
2 1 1 1 1 1 1
p(1) = 0.96( + + ) + 0.96 p(1) + p(2) + p(3)
3
|{z} 2
| 4 4}
{z |3 4 {z 2 }
=U 0 [c(Y 1 )] π1j U 0 [c(j)]Y (j) = j π1j U 0 [c(j)]p(j)
P P
= j
1 1 1
1p(2) = 0.96 + 0.96 p(1) + p(2) + p(3)
6 2 2
1 1
2p(3) = 0.96 + 0.96 p(1) + p(2) + 1p(3)
6 4
Solving the system yields p(1) = 36, p(2) = 24, p(3) = 12. 8 / 30
Equilibrium pricing
U 0 (Yt )pt = δEt U 0 (Ỹt+1 )(p̃t+1 + Ỹt+1 )
∞ 0
jU(Ỹt+j )
X
pt = Et δ Ỹt+j
j=1
U 0 (Yt )
10 / 30
Interpreting the Exchange Equilibrium
Define the period t to t + 1 return for security j as
pjt+1 + Yjt+1
1 + rjt+1 =
pjt
Using equation (*),
0
U (c̃t+1 )
1 = δEt (1 + r̃jt+1 )
U 0 (ct )
Let qtb denote the t-period price of a one-period riskless discount
bond paying 1 unit of consumption at t + 1 in every state.
0
U (c̃t+1 )
qtb = δEt · 1
U 0 (ct )
Since the riskfree rate is defined from qtb (1 + rf t+1 ) = 1,
0
1 U (c̃t+1 )
= δEt
1 + rf t+1 U 0 (ct )
Under risk-neutrality, U (ct ) is linear, rf t+1 is constant. Link
between discount factor and risk-free rate in a risk neutral
world. 11 / 30
Interpreting the Exchange Equilibrium
U 0 (c̃t+1 )
1 = δEt (1 + r̃jt+1 )
U 0 (ct )
U 0 (c̃t+1 )
0
U (c̃t+1 )
1 = δEt Et [1 + r̃jt+1 ] + δcovt , r̃jt+1
U 0 (ct ) U 0 (ct )
| {z }
=1/(1+rf t+1 )
U 0 (c̃t+1 )
1 + rjt+1
= 1 − δcovt , r̃jt+1
1 + rf t+1 U 0 (ct )
U 0 (c̃t+1 )
rjt+1 − rf t+1 = −δ(1 + rf t+1 )covt , r̃jt+1 .
U 0 (ct )
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CAPM and CCAPM
U 0 (c̃t+1 )
CCAPM: rjt+1 − rf t+1 = −covt , r̃jt+1 δ(1 + rf t+1 )
U 0 (ct )
cov(r̃m , r˜j )
CAPM: rjt+1 − rf t+1 = (rmt+1 − rf t+1 ),
var(r̃m )
| {z }
=βj
a − bc̃t+1
rjt+1 − rf t+1 = −δ(1 + rf t+1 )covt , r̃jt+1
a − bct
−b
rjt+1 − rf t+1 = −δ(1 + rf t+1 ) covt (c̃t+1 , r̃jt+1 )
a − bct
δb(1 + rf t+1 )
rjt+1 − rf t+1 = covt (c̃t+1 , r̃jt+1 )
a − bct
| {z }
>0
δb(1 + rf t+1 )
rct+1 − rf t+1 = covt (c̃t+1 , r̃ct+1 )
a − bct
mean, % s.d., %
r 6.98 16.54
rf 0.80 5.67
r − rf 6.18 16.67
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Equity premium, annual time series
Ch 14: The Equity Premium in Retrospect 8
CD
a'
nU
.
Cr
Year-end
Fig 1 Realized equity risk premium per year, 1926-2000 Source: Ibbotson (2001).
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Year-end
Fig 1 Realized equity risk premium per year, 1926-2000 Source: Ibbotson (2001).
Equity premium, 20-year average
18
0
a
P
E
w
.2
a
Ec
Fig 2 Equity risk premium over 20-year periods, 1926-2000 Source: Ibbotson (2001).
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Ch 14: The Equity Premium in Retrospect 895
Table 2
Equity premium in different countriesa
UK 1947-1999 57 11 46
Japan 1970-1999 47 14 33
Germany 1978-1997 98 32 66
France 1973-1998 90 27 63
a Source: UK from Siegel (1998), the rest are from Campbell (2001).
Table 3
Terminal value of $1 invested in stocks and bondsa
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urce: UK from Siegel (1998), the rest are from Campbell (2001).
Table 3
Terminal value of $1 invested in stocks and bondsa
he annual return on the British stock market was 5 7 % over the post-w 20 / 30
The equity premium puzzle
c1−γ
U (c) =
1−γ
Assume xt+1 ≡ ct+1ct
∼ iid lognormal(1.0183, 0.03572 ), and
so log xt+1 ∼ iidN (µx , σx2 ). Then,
1
1.0183 = exp(µx + σx2 )
2
0.03572 = exp(2µx + σx2 )[exp(σx2 − 1)]
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The equity premium puzzle
Assume
pt = vYt
The stock price at t is proportional to the dividend paid at
t.
Verify that it qualifies for a solution:
U 0 (c̃t+1 )
vYt = δEt (v Ỹt+1 + Ỹt+1 ) 0
U (ct )
Ỹt+1
x̃−γ
v = δEt
(v + 1)
t+1
Yt
|{z}
=x̃t+1 : Lucas tree
1−γ
δE[x̃ ]
v= indeed a constant
1 − E[x̃1−γ ]
22 / 30
The equity premium puzzle
−1
U 0 (c̃t+1 )
1 1 1
Rf t+1 = b = δEt 0 =
qt U (ct ) δ E[x̃−γ ]
r − rf = γσx2
r − rf 0.0698 − 0.008
γ= 2
= ≈ 50
σx 0.03572
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Is γ = 50 realistic?
1−γ
Assume current wealth 50, 000, utility function u(W ) = W1−γ
and a chance to play the gamble (0,1/2; 50000,1/2). What is
the certainty equivalent (CE) of the gamble? (Π is the
maximum willing to pay to avoid playing the gamble
(–25000,1/2; 25000,1/2) with the current wealth of 75,000.)
γ CE Π
0 25,000 0
1 20,711 4,289
3 13,246 11,754
5 8,566 16,434
10 3,991 21,009
20 1,858 23,142
30 1,209 23,791
50 712 24,288
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The risk-free rate puzzle
Similarly, if γ = 2,
1 1
δ= = ≈ 1.02
Rf t+1 E[x̃−γ ] 1.008 exp(−γµx + 0.5γ 2 σx2 )
E m̃(R̃i − R̃j ) = 0
| {z }
≡R̃i−j
σm |E(r̃m − rf )| 0.062
≥ = ≈ 0.37
E[m̃] σrm −rf 0.167
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Solutions?
Habit formation—makes IMRS, the pricing kernel in
the CCAPM, more volatile
Heterogeneity—if markets are incomplete, income risk
is persistent, and the variance of consumption growth
is countercyclical (higher in recessions than in normal
times), the model-implied equity premium will be
higher
—“. . . the risk premium is highest in a recession since equities
are a poor hedge against the potential loss of employment. . . even
though per capita consumption growth is poorly correlated with
stocks returns, investors require a hefty premium to hold stocks
over short-term bonds because stocks perform poorly in
recessions, when an investor is more likely to be laid off.” Mehra
& Prescott (2003).
Limited stock-market participation—the relevant
stochastic discount factor is IMRS of stockholders
whose consumption growth is more volatile 30 / 30