Vulnerability assessment of lifelines and essential

facilities (WP06): methodological handbook

Appendix 7:
Gas utility system

February 2003
Report n°GTR-RSK 0101-152av7
Vulnerability assessment of lifelines and essential
facilities (WP06): methodological handbook

Appendix 7:
Gas utility system
M. ALEXOUDI, K. PITILAKIS
with the collaboration of
O. MONGE

February 2003
Report n°GTR-RSK 0101-152av7
 An advanced approach to earthquake risk scenarios,
with applications to different European towns
RISK-UE – EVK4-CT-2000-00014

Contents
1 GS1 : Production facilities ..................................................................................... 6
1.1 Description ............................................................................................................... 6
1.2 Classification ............................................................................................................ 7
1.3 Typology................................................................................................................... 7
1.4 Damage, consequences or losses.............................................................................. 7
1.5 Vulnerability............................................................................................................. 8
1.6 Restoration.............................................................................................................. 10
2 GS2: Tank farms .................................................................................................. 11
2.1 Description ............................................................................................................. 11
2.1.1 Underground Storage Facilities.............................................................. 11
2.1.2 Above ground Storage Tank................................................................... 11
2.1.3 Gas Holder.............................................................................................. 12
2.2 Classification .......................................................................................................... 14
2.3 Typology................................................................................................................. 14
2.4 Damage, consequences or losses............................................................................ 14
2.5 Vulnerability........................................................................................................... 15
2.6 Restoration.............................................................................................................. 17
3 GS3: Gas pipelines................................................................................................ 18
3.1 Description ............................................................................................................. 18
3.2 Classification .......................................................................................................... 18
3.3 Typology................................................................................................................. 18
3.4 Damage, consequences or losses............................................................................ 20
3.5 Vulnerability........................................................................................................... 20
3.6 Restoration.............................................................................................................. 23
4 GS4: Stations......................................................................................................... 24
4.1 Description ............................................................................................................. 24
4.1.1 Compressor stations................................................................................ 24
4.1.2 Metering Station ..................................................................................... 24
4.1.3 Metering/ Pressure Reduction Stations (M/R Stations) ......................... 24
4.1.4 Metering/ Compressor Station (M/C Stations)....................................... 24
4.1.5 LNG Terminal Stations .......................................................................... 24
4.2 Classification .......................................................................................................... 28
4.3 Typology................................................................................................................. 29
4.4 Damage, consequences or losses............................................................................ 29
4.5 Vulnerability........................................................................................................... 31
4.6 Restoration.............................................................................................................. 33
5 References ............................................................................................................. 34

RISK-UE – Appendix 7: Gas utility system 3

 An advanced approach to earthquake risk scenarios,
with applications to different European towns
RISK-UE – EVK4-CT-2000-00014

List of illustrations
FIGURES

Figure 1: Fragility curves of production facilities (GS1) with anchored components

subject to ground shaking......................................................................................... 9
Figure 2: Fragility curves of production facilities (GS1) with unanchored components
subject to ground shaking......................................................................................... 9
Figure 3: Restoration curves of production facilities (GS1) .......................................... 10
Figure 4: Fragility curves of tank farm (GS2) with anchored components subject to
ground shaking. ...................................................................................................... 15
Figure 5: Fragility curves of tank farm (GS2) with unanchored components subject to
ground shaking. ...................................................................................................... 16
Figure 6: Restoration curves of tank farm (GS2). .......................................................... 17
Figure 7: Restoration curves of gas pipelines (GS3)...................................................... 23
Figure 8: Fragility curves of compression station (GS4) with anchored components
subject to ground shaking....................................................................................... 32
Figure 9: Fragility curves of compression station (GS4) with unanchored components
subject to ground shaking....................................................................................... 32
Figure 10: Restoration curves of gas stations (GS4). ..................................................... 33

TABLES

Table 1: Some elements of classification of production facilities.................................... 7

Table 2: Possible consequences of earthquake on production facilities. ......................... 7
Table 3: Some elements of classification of tank farms................................................. 14
Table 4: Possible consequences of earthquake on tank farms........................................ 14
Table 5: Some elements of classification of gas pipeline............................................... 18
Table 6: Possible modes of failures for pipe subject to earthquake. .............................. 20
Table 7: Coefficient of ground shaking vulnerability model, according to various pipe
material. .................................................................................................................. 22
Table 8: Coefficient of ground shaking vulnerability model, according to various pipe
diameter. ................................................................................................................. 22
Table 9: Coefficient of ground failure vulnerability model, according to various pipe
material and joint type. ........................................................................................... 22
Table 10: Some elements of classification of gas station............................................... 28
Table 11: Possible consequences of earthquake on tank farms...................................... 30

4 RISK-UE – Appendix 7: Gas utility system

 An advanced approach to earthquake risk scenarios,
with applications to different European towns
RISK-UE – EVK4-CT-2000-00014

PHOTO.

Photo. 1: Onshore Facility (Well in Germany). ............................................................... 6

Photo. 2: Offshore platforms (Well)................................................................................. 6
Photo. 3: Underground storage facility. ......................................................................... 13
Photo. 4: LNG Storage tanks.......................................................................................... 13
Photo. 5: Dry gasholder.................................................................................................. 13
Photo. 6: Construction of transmission pipelines. .......................................................... 19
Photo. 7: Distribution network/ storage of distribution pipeline.................................... 19
Photo. 8: Compressor station (Siberia)........................................................................... 25
Photo. 9: Compressor station (Mexico).......................................................................... 25
Photo. 10: Metering station (Australia). ......................................................................... 26
Photo. 11: Kiosk solution/ equipment inside the building/ buried (M/R stations)......... 26
Photo. 12: Kiosk solution/ buried equipment (M/C stations)......................................... 26
Photo. 13: Pumping and compressor station. ................................................................. 26
Photo. 14: Piping system in terminal station. ................................................................. 27
Photo. 15: Revithousa terminal station in Greece. ......................................................... 27

VULNERABILITY MODELS

Vulnerability model 1: GS1, production facilities subject to ground shaking. ................ 8

Vulnerability model 2: GS2, tank farm subject to ground shaking................................ 15
Vulnerability model 3: GS3, gas pipeline subject to wave propagation, ground failure or
fault crossing. ......................................................................................................... 21
Vulnerability model 4: GS4, compression station subject to ground shaking. .............. 31

RESTORATION MODELS

Restoration model 1: GS1, production facilities. ........................................................... 10

Restoration model 2: GS2, tank farm. ............................................................................ 17
Restoration model 3: GS3, gas pipelines........................................................................ 23
Restoration model 4: GS4, gas stations.......................................................................... 33

RISK-UE – Appendix 7: Gas utility system 5

 An advanced approach to earthquake risk scenarios,
with applications to different European towns
RISK-UE – EVK4-CT-2000-00014

1 GS1 : Production facilities

1.1 DESCRIPTION
Production Facilities serve as the source of the gas supply and consist either of
onshore facilities (Production field, Photo. 1) or offshore platforms (Photo. 2).
A production field is an area encompassing a group of producing oil and gas pools. An
oil field may include one or more pools and have wells producing from several different
formations at different depths.
Offshore is a term used to describe natural gas production in marine-water.
Natural gas supplies to Western Europe came from offshore platforms that are primary
located in the British, Norwegian, Dutch and Danish sectors of the North Sea.

Photo. 1: Onshore Facility (Well in Germany).

Photo. 2: Offshore platforms (Well).

6 RISK-UE – Appendix 7: Gas utility system

 An advanced approach to earthquake risk scenarios,
with applications to different European towns
RISK-UE – EVK4-CT-2000-00014

1.2 CLASSIFICATION
Beyond classification achieved within “Urban system analysis” (WP03), it is also
possible to classify production facilities importance, according to one or several of the
following points (Table 1).

Table 1: Some elements of classification of production facilities.

GS1: Production facilities 1 (High) 2 (Medium) 3 (Low)
Redundancy capability 1 2 >2
Quality of the product Excellent Very Good Good
Contribution to local production >80% 40 to 80% <40%

1.3 TYPOLOGY
Production facilities may be described with respect to whether:
- Production facilities are Onshore or Offshore;
- Subcomponents are anchored or unanchored.

1.4 DAMAGE, CONSEQUENCES OR LOSSES

Beyond common damage states, alternate expressions of losses seem relevant for
production facilities (Table 2):
- Serviceability
o Nominal use, Reduced used or Not usable;
o Usable without repairs, After repairs or Not repairable.
- Damage factor or replacement cost (usually between 0 and 1 or 100%).

Table 2: Possible consequences of earthquake on production facilities.

Replacement
Serviceability Damage State description (Hazus ’99)
value (%)
Complete failure of all elevated
75 – 100 Complete
pipes or collapse of the building
Well pump is being badly
Not
distorted and non-functional or
repairable
50 – 75 Extensive extensive damage to elevated
pipes or extensive damage to
No ability
building
of produce
Malfunction of well pump and
gas
motor for about a week due to
loss of electric power and backup
Operational
30 – 50 Moderate power if any, considerable
after repairs
damage to mechanical and
electrical equipment or moderate
damage to building
Reduced Malfunction of well pump and
ability of motor for a short time (less than
Operational 10 – 30 Slight /
produce three days) due to loss of electric
without Minor
gas power and backup power if any,
repair
Normal 1 - 10 or slight damage to building
function / None /

RISK-UE – Appendix 7: Gas utility system 7

 An advanced approach to earthquake risk scenarios,
with applications to different European towns
RISK-UE – EVK4-CT-2000-00014

1.5 VULNERABILITY
Fragility curves (medians and dispersions (β) of lognormal distribution) for production
facilities (GS1) are provided (Vulnerability model 1) according to:
- Typology;
- Possible damage, consequences or losses;
- Peak Ground Acceleration.

Dispersions,
Typology Damage state Median PGA (g)
β
Complete 0.49 0.56
Extensive 0.40 0.50
Anchored components (Figure 1)
Moderate 0.27 0.50
Minor 0.13 0.55
Complete 0.49 0.56
Unanchored components Extensive 0.40 0.50
(Figure 2) Moderate 0.31 0.59
Minor 0.15 0.80
Vulnerability model 1: GS1, production facilities subject to ground shaking.

8 RISK-UE – Appendix 7: Gas utility system

 An advanced approach to earthquake risk scenarios,
with applications to different European towns
RISK-UE – EVK4-CT-2000-00014

Cumulative fragility curves

1
Probability to exceed loss level

0.75

0.5

0.25

0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3
PGA (g)

Minor Moderate Extensive Complete

Figure 1: Fragility curves of production facilities (GS1) with anchored components

subject to ground shaking.

Cumulative fragility curves

1
Probability to exceed loss level

0.75

0.5

0.25

0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3
PGA (g)

Minor Moderate Extensive Complete

Figure 2: Fragility curves of production facilities (GS1) with unanchored

components subject to ground shaking.

RISK-UE – Appendix 7: Gas utility system 9

 An advanced approach to earthquake risk scenarios,
with applications to different European towns
RISK-UE – EVK4-CT-2000-00014

1.6 RESTORATION
According to damage states, restoration curves (Figure 3) are continuous (means and
standard deviations of normal distribution) and approximate discrete functions of time
(Restoration model 1, according to ATC-13 in Hazus ’99). However, it is mainly
recommended to interview system manager / owner to adapt or improve the proposed
model according to each country and organization abilities

GS1, production Normal Discrete function

facilities distribution
Damage state Mean (days) σ 1 day 3 days 7 days 30 days 90 days
Complete 190.0 80.0 0 1 2 3 11
Extensive 14.0 12.0 14 18 28 91 100
Moderate 3.0 2.2 19 50 97 100 100
Minor 0.4 0.1 100 100 100 100 100
Restoration model 1: GS1, production facilities.

Restoration Curves
1

0.9

0.8

0.7
percent functional

0.6

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

0
1 10 100 1 000
time (days)

Minor Moderate Extensive Complete

Figure 3: Restoration curves of production facilities (GS1)

10 RISK-UE – Appendix 7: Gas utility system

 An advanced approach to earthquake risk scenarios,
with applications to different European towns
RISK-UE – EVK4-CT-2000-00014

2 GS2: Tank farms

2.1 DESCRIPTION
Tank farms are facilities that store fuel products (it is suitable for oil system). They
include tanks, pipes and electric components.
There are two types of storage facilities: Underground storage facilities and Storage
Tanks.

2.1.1 Underground Storage Facilities

The use of sub-surface facilities for storing gas usually is used to balance seasonal
variations in demand.
Storage facilities may be classified as:
- seasonal supply reservoirs, designed to be filled during the 214 day non-heating
season (mostly gas/oil fields and aquifers);
- high-deliverability sites for 151-day heating season (mostly salt cavern reservoirs).
These facilities are located hundred meters below the surface. They are usually natural
geological reservoirs, such as depleted oil or gas fields or water-bearing sands on the
top and impermeable cap rock.

Underground Storage Facilities (Photo. 3):

- Porous rock storage and Cavity Storage;
- Seasonal/ high-deliverability sites.

2.1.2 Above ground Storage Tank

LNG tanks are used to store Liquefied Natural Gas. They differ from Water/
Wastewater tanks as they are designed to minimise any heat ingress. The insulation of
the tanks, as efficient as it is, will not keep the temperature of LNG cold by itself. LNG
will stay at near constant temperature if kept at constant pressure. This phenomenon is
called “autorefrigeration”. As long as the steam (LNG vapour boil off) is allowed to
leave the tank, in a safe and controlled manner, the temperature will remain constant.
This vaporisation loss is collected from the tank and either reabsorbed as a liquid, sent
to the gas output line connecting to the national gas grid, or used as fuel on the site. The
LNG tanks would be of a full containment design. In a full containment system two
tanks are employed, an inner tank which contains the stored liquid, and an outer tank
which provides security in the event of any loss of containment or leak from the inner
tank. Sophisticated automatic protection systems are employed to monitor the tank
levels, pressures, temperatures and any potential leakage from the inner tank. An
electrical heating system would be installed in the concrete base slab of the LNG
storage tanks to avoid frost heave.
Pressure within the tanks is maintained fractionally above atmospheric pressure to
exclude any air, which might otherwise infiltrate into the tank. A set of submersible
pumps would be installed within the inner storage tanks. These pumps, referred to as
“send-out” pumps, are used to transfer LNG from the storage tanks to the downstream
stages of the plant. The space between the inner and outer tanks would be filled with
high efficiency insulation, designed to maintain the gas in its liquid state (at -1622
Celsius, -260 degrees Fahrenheit).

RISK-UE – Appendix 7: Gas utility system 11

 An advanced approach to earthquake risk scenarios,
with applications to different European towns
RISK-UE – EVK4-CT-2000-00014

Above ground Storage Tank - Liquefied Storage Tanks (LNG, Photo. 4)

- Shape,
o Vertical cylinders (usually),
o Horizontal cylinders,
o Spherical,
o Rectangular;
- Capacity,
o Large (>60 000 m3),
o Medium (30 000 to 60 000 m3),
o Low (<30 000 m3)
- Dimension,
o Height,
o Diameter -for cylindrical-,
o Dimension in the longitude/ transversal direction -for rectangular
- Code level,
o Medium,
o High
- Material
o Steel,
o Pre-stress concrete
- Construction type
o Elevated by columns,
o Built “at- grade” to rest directly on the ground,
o Built “at grade” to rest on a foundation,
o Concrete pile foundation
- Style of roof system (Steel)
- Anchored or unanchored
- Operation function
o Full,
o Near Full (70% of full),
o Half full (50%),
o Less than half (<50%)
- Back up power
o Anchored,
o Unanchored,
o No

2.1.3 Gas Holder

Gas Holders are class of structures that are unique to gas distribution facilities.
Although they are not currently being constructed, there are a large number of older
gasholders that remain in use. Current structural codes and standards don’t adequately
address gasholders.
Gas Holders is a gas-tight receptacle or container in which gas is stored for future use. It
is made of steel and the particularity is that its roof is floating according to the pressure.

Gas Holder (Photo. 5):

- Dry Gas Holder
- Piston Deck Type

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 An advanced approach to earthquake risk scenarios,
with applications to different European towns
RISK-UE – EVK4-CT-2000-00014

- Stabilizer Type

Photo. 3: Underground storage facility.

© SOFREGAZ (www.sofregaz.fr)

Photo. 4: LNG Storage tanks.

Photo. 5: Dry gasholder.

RISK-UE – Appendix 7: Gas utility system 13

 An advanced approach to earthquake risk scenarios,
with applications to different European towns
RISK-UE – EVK4-CT-2000-00014

2.2 CLASSIFICATION
Beyond classification achieved within “Urban system analysis” (WP03), it is also
possible to classify production facilities importance, according to one or several of the
following points (Table 3).

Table 3: Some elements of classification of tank farms.

GS2: Tank farm 1 (High) 2 (Medium) 3 (Low)
Redundancy capability 1 2 >2
Part of the population served >75% 50-75% <50%
Capacity Seasonal High –
(Underground storage) supply deliverability site
Capacity 30,000 to
>60 000 m3 <30 000 m3
(Liquefied Storage Tanks) 60 000 m3
Capacity
Large Medium Small
(Gas Holder)
Historical value, according to each
<1940 In between >1970
country (Gas Holder)

2.3 TYPOLOGY
Tank farm may be described with respect to whether subcomponents are anchored or
unanchored.

2.4 DAMAGE, CONSEQUENCES OR LOSSES

Beyond common damage states (level I, for LNG), alternate expressions of losses
(level II) seem relevant for tank farms (Table 4):
- Serviceability (Usable without repairs, After repairs; Not repairable).
- Replacement value (%);

Table 4: Possible consequences of earthquake on tank farms.

Replacement
Serviceability Damage State description (Hazus ’99)
value (%)
Complete failure of all elevated pipes, or
75 – 100 Complete
collapse of tanks.
Not repairable
Tanks being extensively damaged, or
50 – 75 Extensive
extensive damage to elevated pipes.
Malfunction of tank farm for a week or
Operational so due to loss of backup power,
30 – 50 Moderate
after repairs extensive damage to various equipments,
or considerable damage to tanks.
10 – 30 Malfunction of tank farm for a short time
Operational Slight /
(less than three days) due to loss of
without repair 1 - 10 Minor
backup power or light damage to tanks.

14 RISK-UE – Appendix 7: Gas utility system

 An advanced approach to earthquake risk scenarios,
with applications to different European towns
RISK-UE – EVK4-CT-2000-00014

2.5 VULNERABILITY
There is not any vulnerability model for underground storage.
Fragility curves (medians and dispersions (β) of lognormal distribution) for tank farms
(GS2) are provided (Vulnerability model 2, from Hazus ’99) according to:
- Typology;
- Possible damage, consequences or losses;
- Peak Ground Acceleration.

This model can be only used for tank farms with above ground gas storage facilities
(LNG) with hypothesis that LNG has similar design practice with LPG (oil storage
tank)

Typology
Damage state Median PGA (g) β
Complete 0.87 0.50
Extensive
Anchored components (Figure 4) 0.50 0.55
Moderate
Minor 0.29 0.55
Complete 0.68 0.55
Unanchored components Extensive 0.41 0.55
(Figure 5) Moderate 0.23 0.55
Minor 0.12 0.55
Vulnerability model 2: GS2, tank farm subject to ground shaking.

Cumulative fragility curves

1
Probability to exceed loss level

0.75

0.5

0.25

0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3
PGA (g)

Minor Moderate / Extensive Complete

Figure 4: Fragility curves of tank farm (GS2) with anchored components subject to
ground shaking.

RISK-UE – Appendix 7: Gas utility system 15

 An advanced approach to earthquake risk scenarios,
with applications to different European towns
RISK-UE – EVK4-CT-2000-00014

Cumulative fragility curves

1
Probability to exceed loss level

0.75

0.5

0.25

0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3
PGA (g)

Minor Moderate Extensive Complete

Figure 5: Fragility curves of tank farm (GS2) with unanchored components subject
to ground shaking.

16 RISK-UE – Appendix 7: Gas utility system

 An advanced approach to earthquake risk scenarios,
with applications to different European towns
RISK-UE – EVK4-CT-2000-00014

2.6 RESTORATION
According to damage states, restoration curves (Figure 6) are continuous (means and
standard deviations of normal distribution) and approximate discrete functions of time
(Restoration model 2, according to ATC-13 in Hazus ’99). However, it is mainly
recommended to interview system manager / owner to adapt or improve the proposed
model according to each country and organization abilities

GS2, Tank farm Normal Discrete function

distribution
Damage state Mean (days) σ 1 day 3 days 7 days 30 days 90 days
Complete 70.0 55.0 11 12 13 24 65
Extensive 28.0 26.0 15 17 21 54 100
Moderate 7.0 7.0 20 29 50 100 100
Minor 0.9 0.5 58 100 100 100 100
Restoration model 2: GS2, tank farm.

Restoration Curves
1

0.9

0.8

0.7
percent functional

0.6

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

0
1 10 100 1 000
time (days)

Minor Moderate Extensive Complete

Figure 6: Restoration curves of tank farm (GS2).

RISK-UE – Appendix 7: Gas utility system 17

 An advanced approach to earthquake risk scenarios,
with applications to different European towns
RISK-UE – EVK4-CT-2000-00014

3 GS3: Gas pipelines

3.1 DESCRIPTION
Natural gas networks are operating at different pressures: supra-regional transmission
pipelines operate at very high pressures. These pipelines have a maximum diameter of
1.40 m and are operating at pressure higher than 100 bars. Such gas pipelines can cover
distances of up to 6 000 km (e.g. from west Siberia to western Europe).
Supra-regional transmission pipelines are then separated to several branches of high-
pressure pipelines (<70 bars). The high-pressure pipelines distribute natural gas to
several regions. Distribution pipelines then are used to serve the needs of communities.
The pressure for these regional networks range between from 1 to 70 bars, while local
distribution systems are usually operates in the medium (0.1 - 4 bars) or low-pressure
(<0.1 bas) range.
Offshore pipelines have smaller diameters (maximum 1.05 m) although they are
designed for much higher pressures (up to 200 bar).

Hereafter (Photo. 6, Photo. 7) some illustrations of transmission and distribution gas

pipelines.

3.2 CLASSIFICATION
Beyond classification achieved within “Urban system analysis” (WP03), it is also
possible to classify gas pipelines importance, according to one or several of the
following points (Table 5).

Table 5: Some elements of classification of gas pipeline.

GS3: Gas pipeline 1 (High) 2 (Medium) 3 (Low)
Regional and
Radiance In between Local
above
Redundancy capability Mainly single In between Mainly redundant
1
Level of risk Particular section Common section2
Transmission versus Mainly Mainly
In between
distribution transmission distribution
4 to
Pressure >60 bar 10 to 60 bar <4 bar
10 bar
Valves >5 km 2.5 to 5 km <2.5 km
100 to
Diameter (Transmission) >200 mm3 <100 mm
200 mm
Diameter (Distribution) >90 mm 32 to 90 mm <32 mm

3.3 TYPOLOGY
Pipe typology depends on the following parameters:

1
Particular section: section of pipe whose environment present critical elements at risk (e.g. high human
density zone)
2
Common section: section of pipe whose environment present restricted elements at risk (e.g. agricultural
zone)
3
Transmission from the city gate station to the first M/R station

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RISK-UE – EVK4-CT-2000-00014

- Location (buried or elevated);

- Material type (PVC, PEAD, Cast Iron, Ductile Iron, Steel),
- Material strength;
- Diameter (usually Φ75, Φ100- Φ150, Φ200- Φ400, Φ500)
- Wall thickness;
- Smoothness of coating;
- Type of connection (Rubber gasket, Lap-Arc Welded, heat fusion, arc or
oxyacetylene-gas welds, screwed, mechanical restrained);
- Pressure classification;
- Design Flow;
One Way Or Bi- Directional Feed.

© SOFREGAZ
(www.sofregaz.fr)
Photo. 6: Construction of transmission pipelines.

© DEPA
Photo. 7: Distribution network/ storage of distribution pipeline.

RISK-UE – Appendix 7: Gas utility system 19

 An advanced approach to earthquake risk scenarios,
with applications to different European towns
RISK-UE – EVK4-CT-2000-00014

3.4 DAMAGE, CONSEQUENCES OR LOSSES

Transmission pipelines are typically large- diameter welded steel pipes that are
expected to perform in earthquakes in a manner superior to that of typical underground
pipelines (ATC-25).
Generally, no serious damage was noticed by travelling ground waves to steel pipes
constructed with modern welding techniques and quality control measures. There is a
remarkable and consistent difference in the earthquake performance of pipelines of
different ages. Well- made oxy- acetylene and electric arc welds are about equal in
strength although the heat- affected zone adjacent to an oxy- acetylene weld is
somewhat larger and the joint ductility somewhat less than those associated with an
electric arc weld. The reason for the higher incidence of weld damage is associated with
poor weld quality.
Approximately 90% of all pipeline damage caused by travelling ground waves in 1994,
Northridge earthquake occur in areas with MMI≥VIII (O’ROURKE and PALMER,
1994).
Different modes of failures are possible (Table 6), namely well described by
O’ROURKE and LIU, (1999).

Table 6: Possible modes of failures for pipe subject to earthquake.

Continuous pipes Segmented pipes
ATC-25 (O’ROURKE and (O’ROURKE and ALA, 2001a
LIU, 1999) LIU, 1999)
Axial pull-out
Tensile failure Crushing of bell and Pullout at a joint
Pipe crushing
Local buckling spigot joints Excessive rotation at a joint
and cracking
(wrinkling) Joint rotation Excessive tensile and
Joint breaking
Beam buckling failure/leakage bending deformations of the
Joints pulling
Welded slip joint Round flexural pipe barrel
cracks

The possible consequences for the pipes are described by a repair rate combining breaks
and leaks. A pipe repair can be due either to a complete fracture of the pipe, a leak in
the pipe or damage to an appurtenance of the pipe. In any case, these repairs require the
water agency to perform a repair in the field. It is often assumed that:
- Damage due to seismic waves will consist of 80 % leaks and 20 % breaks,
- While damage due to ground failure will consist of 20 % leaks and 80 % breaks.

Consequences of gas leakage are very serious. Thus even few leaks or 1 break should
mean pipe closure until reparation.

3.5 VULNERABILITY
The damage algorithm for buried pipe (Vulnerability model 3) is expressed as a repair
rate per unit length of pipe, as a function of ground shaking (Peak Ground Velocity,
Equation 1, according to ISOYAMA, 1998) or ground failure (Permanent Ground
Displacement, Equation 2, according to ALA, 2001a and ALA, 2001b).

20 RISK-UE – Appendix 7: Gas utility system

 An advanced approach to earthquake risk scenarios,
with applications to different European towns
RISK-UE – EVK4-CT-2000-00014

The development of damage algorithms for buried pipe is primarily based on empirical
evidence, tempered with engineering judgment and sometimes by analytical
formulations. ISOYAMA (1998) relationship is based on great amount of information
gathered concerning the effects of wave propagation on gas pipelines since San
Fernando Earthquake. Calibration of the corrected factors (Cp, Cd) has been carried out
according to existing detailed information on two municipalities located in Kobe
surroundings. Other relationships are similar to those proposed for water pipes
(appendix 11).

The simple fault crossing pipe vulnerability model (Equation 3 and Equation 4) should
be used only for vulnerability analyses of a large inventory of pipelines that cross faults.
For pipe-fault-specific conditions, analytical techniques can be used to evaluate pipe-
specific performance.
With:
- Repair rate, (repairs per kilometre);
- Cp (Table 7), Cd (Table 8) and K2 (Table 9), coefficients according to various pipe
material, diameter size and joint type;
- PGV, Peak Ground Velocity (m/s);
- PGD, Permanent Ground Displacement (m).

As a more advanced (level II) alternative, or for specific sections of pipes, a mechanical
evaluation may be performed in order to compare strain demand and capacity
(O’ROURKE and LIU, 1999). Thus, one may consider:
- Permanent Ground Displacement and wave propagation hazard;
- Soil-pipe interaction;
- Failure modes and failure criterion;
- Response of pipelines to seismic hazard.

Induced hazard Vulnerability model

Equation 1 :
Wave propagation
Repair Rate (repair/km) = Cp⋅Cd⋅0.00311⋅ PGV −15
100
( )
1.3

Equation 2 :
Ground failure Repair Rate (repair/km) = 1.06 ⋅K2⋅ PGD
0.3048 0.0254
(0.319
)
Lognormal standard deviation (β=0.74)
Equation 3 :
Fault crossing  PGD 
(continuous pipe) Proba. No failure = 1−0.70⋅ 0.0254 ≥0.05
 60 
 
Equation 4 :
Proba. No failure = 1.00; PGD ≤ 0.025
Fault crossing
Proba. No failure = 0.50; PGD = 0.025 to 0.3 m
(segmented pipe)
Proba. No failure = 0.20; PGD = 0.3 to 0.6 m
Proba. No failure = 0.05; PGD > 0.6 m
Vulnerability model 3: GS3, gas pipeline subject to wave propagation, ground failure
or fault crossing.

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Table 7: Coefficient of ground shaking vulnerability model, according to various pipe

material.
Corrective factors,
Material
Cp
Cast iron (CIP)/ Steel concrete 1.0
Ductile Cast Iron (DIP) 0.3
PVC (VP) 0.5
Steel (SP) 0.3
Glass fibre reinforced polyester 1.0
High density polyethylene
1.0
(PEAD)
Fibrocement (ACP) 1.2

Table 8: Coefficient of ground shaking vulnerability model, according to various pipe

diameter.
Diameter Φ75 Φ100- Φ150 Φ200- Φ450 Φ500-
Corrective factors,
1.6 1.0 0.8 0.5
Cd

Table 9: Coefficient of ground failure vulnerability model, according to various pipe

material and joint type.
Pipe material Joint type K2
Unknown / 1
Cement 1.0
Cast Iron Rubber gasket 0.8
Mechanical restrained 0.7
Arc welded, lap welds
(large diameter, non 0.15
Welded steel
corrosive)
Rubber gasket 0.7
Rubber gasket 0.8
Asbestos Cement
Cement 1.0
Welded 0.6
Concrete w/Stl
Cement 1.0
Cyl.
Rubber gasket 0.7
PVC Rubber gasket 0.8
Ductile Iron Rubber gasket 0.5

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3.6 RESTORATION
According to damage states, restoration curves (Figure 7) are continuous (means and
standard deviations of normal distribution) and approximate discrete functions of time
(Restoration model 3, according to ATC-13 in Hazus ’99). However, it is mainly
recommended to interview system manager / owner to adapt or improve the proposed
model according to each country and organization abilities

GS3, Normal Discrete function

Pipelines distribution
Damage state Mean (days) σ 1 day 3 days 7 days 30 days 90 days
Break 7.0 4.0 7 16 50 100 100
Leak 3.0 2.0 16 50 98 100 100
Restoration model 3: GS3, gas pipelines.

Restoration Curves
1

0.9

0.8

0.7
percent functional

0.6

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

0
1 10 100 1 000
time (days)

Leak Break

Figure 7: Restoration curves of gas pipelines (GS3).

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 An advanced approach to earthquake risk scenarios,
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4 GS4: Stations
4.1 DESCRIPTION
Five different types of stations exist in Gas System:
- Compressor Station;
- Metering station;
- Metering and Regulation Station (M/R Station);
- Metering and Compression Station (M/C Station);
- Terminal station.
City gate station is the site where a local distribution company receives and measures
gas from a pipeline to the company. City Gate station includes Metering and Regulation
equipments. Regulation equipments are used for stabilizing the pressure.

4.1.1 Compressor stations

Compressor station is a facility, which supplies gas with energy to move in transmission
lines (Photo. 8 and Photo. 9.). Otherwise compressor stations are operated at
underground storage facilities to raise the pressure of the gas injected into storage or to
compress the natural gas as it leaves storage to be fed into the pipeline.
The distance between compressor stations along a transmission trunk line is usually
between 100 and 250 km. Each station contains one or more centrifugal or reciprocating
compressor units, and auxiliary equipment for purposes such as generating electricity,
cooling discharge gas and SCADA system that controls the station with all the
equipments. Two or more compressors at station can be used either in parallel or in
series (FEMA 233). However, no differentiation is made between these two types of
compressors in the analysis of natural gas systems.

4.1.2 Metering Station

Metering stations (Photo. 10) are stations along the pipeline system that serve to
maintain the flow of gas and control the quality using gas meters. General, there are
some Central Meting stations that control the quality of the transferred gas derived of
high-pressure pipes and smaller Meting Stations combined with Regulator stations that
maybe exist inside communities.

4.1.3 Metering/ Pressure Reduction Stations (M/R Stations)

Pressure reduction stations (Photo. 11) are equipments inside buildings, kiosks or
buried. The main purpose of M/R station is the reduction of the gas pressure for
industrial or commercial use. In each station, there is SCADA system that controls the
system. All the data and information essential for the operation of the stations then are
leaded to Control Building.

4.1.4 Metering/ Compressor Station (M/C Stations)

M/R stations contain metering and compression equipments (Photo. 13).

4.1.5 LNG Terminal Stations

The terminal stations include moorings for tankers, used for the transportation of
liquefied natural gas, storage tanks for the liquefied gas and re-liquefaction installations.

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(1m3 of Liquefied natural gas (LNG) corresponds to as much as 600 m3 natural gas
following degasification). After the regasification complex pipeline system were
constructed for the supply of the transportation system. Piping system (Photo. 14) in the
station or in terminal stations should be designed in order to prevent rupture during the
worse case earthquake. No specific guide exists.
The terminal stations either can be in coastline or in small islands that are near by the
consumption. They are special structures with special specification. There is not a
common typology. In Greece a terminal station is located in the island of Revithousa
(Photo. 15).
A general summary of analysis procedure is available in ASME (1983, Appendix N of
ASME Section III, Division 1, Nuclear Power Plant Components).

Photo. 8: Compressor station (Siberia).

Photo. 9: Compressor station (Mexico).

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Photo. 10: Metering station (Australia).

Photo. 11: Kiosk solution/ equipment inside the building/ buried (M/R stations).

© SOFREGAZ (www.sofregaz.fr)

Photo. 12: Kiosk solution/ buried Photo. 13: Pumping and compressor
equipment (M/C stations). station.

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(© DEPA)
Photo. 14: Piping system in terminal Photo. 15: Revithousa terminal station in
station. Greece.

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RISK-UE – EVK4-CT-2000-00014

4.2 CLASSIFICATION
Beyond classification achieved within “Urban system analysis” (WP03), it is also
possible to classify gas station importance, according to one or several of the following
points (Table 10).

Table 10: Some elements of classification of gas station.

GS4: Gas station 1 (High) 2 (Medium) 3 (Low)
Radiance National / Regional In between Local
Redundancy
Mainly single In between Mainly redundant
capability
SCADA System Yes / No
Compression station
Raise the pressure at
Move gas in
Function underground storage /
transmission lines
facilities
Distance between
>250 km 100 to 250 km <100 km
stations
City Gate Station
Function M/R or M/C
Size Central/Large Medium Small
Metering Station
Size Central Medium Small
M/ R Stations
3
Size >4 000 m 1 000 to 4 000 m3 <1 000 m3
Flow
(N, normal >6000 m3/h 6 000 to 4 000 m3/h <4 000 m3/h
conditions)
Number /
1 2 >3
operation sector
Essential Structures
Customers type Industrial Important Customers Usual Customers
Commercial use
Terminal station
Function Storage
Contribution to Whole country for Large part of country for Small part of
national needs 1 day 1 day country for 1 day

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4.3 TYPOLOGY
Stations mean the building / or the structure itself, and the equipments inside.

At least, gas station may be described with respect to whether subcomponents are
anchored4 or unanchored.

Beyond this one should add:

- Existence of SCADA system;
- Proportion of electrical and mechanical component;
- Existence of back up power;
Especially for Metering/Pressure Reduction Stations and Metering & Compressor
Station, the following indication may also be relevant:
- Kiosk Solution,
- Buried equipment,
- Equipment inside or near by the buildings.

Concerning buildings, Building Typology Matrix (BTM), defined in WP04:

“Vulnerability assessment of current buildings”, should be used as a minimum.
M/R Stations are usually one story buildings constructed by reinforced concrete with a
roof of steel or elenit. The lightness of the roof is supposed to relief the pressure in the
case of explosion by leaving the building.

The final fragility curve can derived either taking into account all component (every
component have equal importance) or by estimating the percentage of the equipment
essentials for the operation of the Station. With the second approach we can assume a
weighting importance of some components compared with some others.

4.4 DAMAGE, CONSEQUENCES OR LOSSES

The building compared to equipments is more critical for stations as the equipments
such pumps and compressors don’t seem to be particularly vulnerable to earthquake
shaking (FEMA 233).
Other types of stations may be vulnerable to Permanent Ground Displacements (e.g.
M/R Station with buried equipments)

Beyond common damage states, alternate expressions of losses seem relevant

(Table 11):
- Serviceability
o Nominal use, Reduced used or Not usable;
o Usable without repairs, After repairs or Not repairable.
- Damage factor or replacement cost (usually between 0 and 1 or 100%).

4
Anchored means equipment designed with special seismic tie downs and tiebacks while unanchored
means equipment with manufactures normal requirements.

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Table 11: Possible consequences of earthquake on tank farms.

Replacement
Serviceability Damage State description (Hazus ’99)
value (%)
Complete failure of all
75 – 100 Complete elevated pipes, or collapse
Can’t move the Not of tanks.
gas in repairable Tanks being extensively
transmission 50 – 75 Extensive damaged, or extensive
lines damage to elevated pipes.
OR Malfunction of tank farm
Raise the for a week or so due to
pressure at loss of backup power,
Operational
underground 30 – 50 Moderate extensive damage to
after repairs
storage facilities various equipments, or
considerable damage to
tanks.
Several stops in
the movement of
gas in
transmission Malfunction of tank farm
lines for a short time (less than
Operational 10 – 30 Slight /
OR three days) due to loss of
without Minor
in the raise of backup power or light
repair
pressure at damage to tanks.
underground
storage facilities
1 - 10
Normal function
/ None /

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4.5 VULNERABILITY
Concerning the buildings holding the equipments in a gas station, the damage
assessment should be determined on a site-specific basis, using seismic input
parameters adapted to the site, and following a detailed examination of the structure.
However two types of seismic evaluations are proposed:
- Level I, one should use the BTM and then results of WP04 (level II);
- Level II, one should use WP04 (level II) methods, which means analytical
vulnerability studies.

Fragility curves (medians and dispersions (β) of lognormal distribution) for gas stations
(GS4) are provided (Vulnerability model 4, from Hazus ’99) according to:
- Typology;
- Possible damage, consequences or losses;
- Peak Ground Acceleration.

Typology Damage state Median PGA (g) β

Complete 1.50 0.80
Extensive 0.77 0.65
Anchored components (Figure 8)
Moderate 0.34 0.65
Minor 0.15 0.75
Complete 1.50 0.80
Unanchored components Extensive 0.77 0.65
(Figure 9) Moderate 0.24 0.60
Minor 0.12 0.60
Vulnerability model 4: GS4, compression station subject to ground shaking.

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Cumulative fragility curves

1
Probability to exceed loss level

0.75

0.5

0.25

0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3
PGA (g)

Minor Moderate Extensive Complete

Figure 8: Fragility curves of compression station (GS4) with anchored components

subject to ground shaking.

Cumulative fragility curves

1
Probability to exceed loss level

0.75

0.5

0.25

0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3
PGA (g)

Minor Moderate Extensive Complete

Figure 9: Fragility curves of compression station (GS4) with unanchored components

subject to ground shaking.

32 RISK-UE – Appendix 7: Gas utility system

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4.6 RESTORATION
According to damage states, restoration curves (Figure 10) are continuous (means and
standard deviations of normal distribution) and approximate discrete functions of time
(Restoration model 4, according to ATC-13 in Hazus ’99). However, it is mainly
recommended to interview system manager / owner to adapt or improve the proposed
model according to each country and organization abilities

GS4, stations Normal Discrete function

distribution
Damage state Mean (days) σ 1 day 3 days 7 days 30 days 90 days
Complete 35.0 18.0 3 4 6 40 100
Extensive 13.5 10.0 10 15 25 95 100
Moderate 3.1 2.7 22 50 93 100 100
Minor 0.9 0.3 65 100 100 100 100
Restoration model 4: GS4, gas stations.

Restoration Curves
1

0.9

0.8

0.7
percent functional

0.6

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

0
1 10 100 1 000
time (days)

Minor Moderate Extensive Complete

Figure 10: Restoration curves of gas stations (GS4).

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 An advanced approach to earthquake risk scenarios,
with applications to different European towns
RISK-UE – EVK4-CT-2000-00014

5 References
AMERICAN LIFELINES ALLIANCE (2001a). Seismic fragility formulations for
water systems. Part 1 – Guideline. ASCE-FEMA 104 p..

AMERICAN LIFELINES ALLIANCE (2001b). Seismic fragility formulations for

water systems. Part 2 – Appendices. ASCE-FEMA 239 p..

APPLIED TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL (1985). Earthquake Damage Evaluation Data

for California. ATC-13, Redwood City, CA.

APPLIED TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL (1991). Seismic Vulnerability and Impact of

Disruption of Lifelines in the Conterminous United States. ATC-25, Redwood
City, CA.

DIKKERS R.D, CHUNG R.M, MOHRAZ B, LEW H.S, WRIGHT R.N. (1996).
Proceedings of a workshop on developing and adopting seismic design and
construction standards for lifelines. NISTIR 5907.

EERI (1992). Costa Rica Earthquake of April 22, 1991. Reconnaissance Report.
Earthquake Spectra, supplement B to Vol. 7, Edited by G.H. SHEA.

EERI (1995) Hokkaido- Nansei-Oki Earthquake and Tsunami of July 12, 1993.
Reconnaissance Report. Earthquake Spectra, supplement A to Vol. 11, Edited by
R.M. CHUNG.

FEMA 226 (1992). Collocation Impacts on the Vulnerability of Lifelines During

Earthquakes with Applications to the Cajon Pass, California. Earthquake Hazard
Reduction Series 61. 93 p..

FEMA 233 (1992). Earthquake resistant construction of gas and liquid fuel pipeline
systems serving or regulated by the federal government. Earthquake Hazard
Reduction Series 67. Edited by F.Y. Yokel, R.G. Mathey. 68p.

FERRITTO J., DICKENSON St, Priestley N, WERNER St, TAYLOR Cr. (1999).
Seismic Criteria For California Marine Oil Terminals. Naval Facilities
Engineering Center.

ISOYAMA (1998).

LIU XUEJIE, HOU ZHONGLING (1990). Seismic damage estimation and optimum
recovery principle of water supply network. Seismic Behavior and Risk Analysis
of Buried Pipelines. Edited by Z.Hou, S.Takada. pp. 215- 222

McDONOUGH P. W. (1995). Seismic Design Guide for Natural Gas Distributors.

Technical Council on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering. Monograph n°9. ASCE.

34 RISK-UE – Appendix 7: Gas utility system

 An advanced approach to earthquake risk scenarios,
with applications to different European towns
RISK-UE – EVK4-CT-2000-00014

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF BUILDING SCIENCES (1997, 1999). Direct physical

damage to lifelines – transportation systems. Earthquake loss estimation
methodology. HAZUS. Technical manual, vol. 2. Chapter 7. 102 p., 4 app..
Chapter 8. 91 p., 5 app.. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Washington,
D.C.

O’ROURKE M.J., LIU X. (1999). Response of buried pipelines subject to earthquake

effects. MCEER. Monograph series n°3. 249 p..

O’ROURKE, PALMER M.C, (1994) The Northridge, California Earthquake of

January 17, 1994: Performance of gas transmission pipelines. NCEER-94-0011.
80 p..

SCHIFF A.J., BUCKLE I.G. (1995). Critical issues and state-of-the-art in Lifeline
earthquake engineering. Technical Council on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering.
Monograph n°7. ASCE. 92 p..

SHINOZUKA M., EGUCHI R. (1997) Seismic Risk Analysis of Liquid fuel Systems:
A conceptual and procedural framework for guidelines development. NIST GCR-
97-719. 71p..

TECHNIKA XRONIKA (1998). Natural gas and Greece consumption. Technical

Chamber of Greece. Part I. 89 p..

TECHNIKA XRONIKA (1998) Natural gas and Greece consumption. Technical

Chamber of Greece. Part II. 89 p..

http://www.gazdefrance.com/

http://transport.gazdefrance.com/

http://www.depa.gr/

http://www.ruhrgas.de/

http://www.desc.dla.mil/

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