EN BANC provocation from anyone suddenly,

G.R. Nos. 141943-45 November 13, 2002 unexpectedly and in totally senseless and
surprising act or rampage attacked, assaulted
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. and shot five (5) customers, namely: Benjamin
DIOSDADO RECEPCION Y PALASO (deceased), FELIPE E. Valdez, Rodolfo D. Ortega, Augusto A.
DELA CRUZ Y REYES, AUDIE DONA Y BINAN, Billodo, Ruperto S. San Juan and Renato T.
ALFREDO BARACAS Y CONCEPCION, EDUARDO Cleofas, Sr., thereby hitting and mortally
PALACPAC Y ROSALES, BERNARDO RANARA Y wounding the said five (5) persons causing their
MORATALLA (at large), JOEMARI DELOS REYES Y instantaneous death." 3
CONCEPCION, DOMINADOR RECEPCION Y PALASO
and ROBERT ALFONSO Y MARTIZANO, appellants. In Criminal Case No. 57209 —

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. "That on or about 1:00 to 3:00 A.M. or
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant. thereabout, on July 28, 1999 in Caloocan City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
SYNOPSIS Honorable court, the above-named accused
Eight persons were charged with multiple had in their possession, custody and control the
murder, violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866 and robbery in following firearms/handguns loaded with
band in three separate accusatory informations. Appellants herein ammunitions to wit:
allegedly entered a pub house and started shooting at the customers
therein. When the shooting stopped, the lifeless bodies of five men a. One (1) Cal. 38 Armscor SN-
were found sprawled on the floor. The occurrence was witnessed by 760006;
several people who took the witness stand during the trial and
identified some of the accused as the perpetrators of the crime. The b. One (1) Cal. 38 Armscor SN-
group's devious actions did not stop there; they boarded a passenger 51900;
jeep and used it as an escape vehicle. They stopped for a while to
c. One (1) Cal. 38 Armscor SN-
refuel at Petron station while some of them entered a convenience
51952;
store from where more gunshots were fired. Their notorious adventure
ended in Paniqui, Tarlac where the group debated on the fate of their
d. One (1) Cal. 38 Squires Bingham
driver. Finally, they decided to spare his life but, not without
SN-1095906;
threatening to kill him if he would report the incident to the police.
However, it was also through the testimony of the jeepney driver that e. One (1) Pistol 9mm Noringco SN-
led to the identification of the malefactors. Thus, the cases were filed 861406966;
against herein appellants. During trial, one of the malefactors died in
an escape attempt, while another one escaped and remained at large. f. Fifty-two (52) pcs. Cal. 38 live
After trial, the seven remaining accused, including the escapee, were ammunitions;
found guilty of multiple murder and were sentenced to several death
penalties. The capital punishment having been imposed, the case was g. Twenty-eight (28) pcs. 9MM live
elevated to the Supreme Court for automatic review. ammunitions;
The Supreme Court found the seven appellants guilty of h. Eight (8) pcs. Cal. 38 empty shells,
homicide, thus lowered the penalty. According to the Court, the
eyewitnesses categorically identified the malefactors. The alleged "without the necessary license or
discrepancies in the testimony of the witnesses could easily be authority as required by law and which firearms
explained by the fact that they saw the incident from different angles. were used in the commission of multiple murder
The defense of alibi proffered by appellants proved to be too weak (killing of five persons, namely: Benjamin E.
against the positive identification made by the eyewitnesses. The Court Valdez, Roldolfo D. Ortega, Augusto A. Billodo,
ruled that a scrutiny of the facts in evidence would indicate a scanty Ruperto S. San Juan and Renato T. Cleofas,
showing of the requirements to qualify the senseless killing of the five Sr. at Sabungan Fastfood & Videoke, which is
victims, either by treachery or by evident premeditation, to murder. within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Thus, the Court downgraded the crime committed to homicide. Court)." 4

DECISION In Criminal Case No. 57210 —

VITUG, J p: "That on or about 1:15 A.M. on July

28, 1999 in Caloocan City, Philippines, and
Five innocent men met their sudden death at a not-so-forlorn within the jurisdiction of this Honorable court,
corner of Caloocan City when a group of malefactors, without apparent the above-named accused, acting in concert,
provocation or reason, had cast their terror on the early morning of 28 conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
July 1999. one another, with intent of gain, by means of
force, threats, violence or intimidation, and
Eight 1 persons were charged with multiple murder, violation immediately after accused totally unprovoked
of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866, 2 and robbery in band in three and unexpected shooting rampage, which
separate accusatory Informations that read: resulted in the death of several customers, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and
In Criminal Case No. 57208 — feloniously, with the use of their unlicensed
firearm, forcibly and violently take, divest, and
"That on or about 1:15 o'clock a.m. of carry away from LENY GATICA, FREDEBERT
July 28, 1999 in Caloocan City, Philippines, and DADON, DENNIS SERRANO and RODEL
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, FESARIT, the following cash and personal
the above-named accused, conspiring, belongings, namely: a lady bracelet worth
confederating and mutually helping each other, P3,500.00, three (3) men wristwatches worth
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and P7,500.00 and the establishment earnings of
feloniously, with intent to kill, evident P5,000.00, to the loss, damage and prejudice of
premeditation and treachery after posing as the above-named owner/s." 5
customers and armed with unlicensed
handguns entered Sabungan Fastfood & The indictees, when arraigned, pled "not guilty" to all the
Videoke and once inside, without any charges. The cases were tried jointly.
 The Version of the Prosecution — Tarlac, he pointed to the exact place where the armed men got off from
his vehicle. Conrado Marquez, likewise invited by the police for
Marie Flamiano was a waitress at "Sabungan Fastfood and
interrogation, readily informed the police of the place where he brought
Videoke Pub," located along Samson Road, in Caloocan City. At about
the men who hired his tricycle. The police promptly cordoned the area
one-thirty on the morning of 28 July 1999, she was attending to
and the group, along with FO1 Felipe dela Cruz, surrendered after
customers when seven men, she identified to be Diosdado Recepcion,
several calls by the police. Taken into custody were Felipe dela Cruz,
Alfredo Baracas, Joemari delos Reyes, Bernardo Ranara, Dominador
Joemari delos Reyes, Audie Dona, Alfredo Baracas, Eduardo
Recepcion, Robert Alfonso and Audie Dona, entered the pub while one
Palacpac, Bernardo Ranara, Robert Alfonso, and Dominador
was tailing behind at the entrance. The men occupied table 12 and
Recepcion. Diosdado Recepcion, then a special agent of the Narcotics
ordered beer from waitress Eliza Bautista. A few minutes later, three
Command, was intercepted at the national highway of Cuyapo, Nueva
men from the group transferred to table 10. Just as Marie was
Ecija, on board a tricycle. At the Tarlac Police Station, Labjata
approaching table 13 to get the microphone from a customer, one of
identified his passengers, namely, Audie Dona, Alfredo Baracas,
the men stood up and fired his gun at another customer. Marie
Diosdado Recepcion, Bernardo Ranara, Eduardo Palacpac,
identified this gunman to be Alfredo Baracas.
Dominador Recepcion, Joemari delos Reyes and Robert Alfonso.
Eliza Bautista, the waitress who served the group, among
Diosdado Recepcion, Felipe dela Cruz, Audie Dona, Alfredo
them Diosdado Recepcion, Robert Alfonso, Audie Dona, Alfredo
Baracas, Eduardo Palacpac, Bernardo Ranara, Joemari delos Reyes,
Baracas, Eduardo Palacpac, Joemari delos Reyes and Dominador
Dominador Recepcion, and Roberto Alfonso were charged with
Recepcion, saw another man pull out a gun and shot a customer,
multiple murder, violation of P.D. No. 1866, and robbery in band before
Rodolfo Ortega, while on his knees. The women later identified the
the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region, Branch 129,
gunman to be Diosdado Recepcion. Rosalia Juanica, a co-waitress
Caloocan City. The incident that occurred at the 7-11 convenience
who had meanwhile dashed out and hid at the nearby "St. Joseph
store also spawned several separate criminal informations (not
Store," saw Rodolfo Ortega, kneeling with both hands raised in plea,
involved in the instant cases under review).
but one of the men, she likewise identified to be Diosdado Recepcion,
fired his gun at pointblank range. During the trial, Diosdado Recepcion died in an escape
attempt, while accused Bernardo Ranara escaped and remained at
Jojo Paraiso was with his co-security guards having a
large.
drinking spree when a group of armed men, started shooting. Some of
the men shouted, "dapa," but Jojo's companion, Benjamin Valdez, The Version of the Defense
unfortunately took a bullet shot before he could get the chance to heed
the warning. Jojo identified the person who fired at Valdez to be Robert The defense interposed alibi.
Alfonso. He hid under the table and could only watch the men gone
berserk. The last of the gunmen who left the pub, still firing his gun, According to Dominador Recepcion, he was, at the time of
was Joemari delos Reyes. the reported shooting incident, fast asleep at Greenwoods Subdivision
in Cainta, Rizal, where he was a construction worker. His co-workers
Jhosa Reyes, a waitress at the A & E Kitchenette just across were Eduardo Palacpac and Robert Alfonso. On the evening of 27 July
the Sabungan, saw the gunmen and their cohorts scamper away after 1999, the trio went to Pansi, Paniqui, Tarlac, to help Dominador
the shooting incident. She recognized three of the gunmen, Robert Recepcion's nephew, Joemari delos Reyes, find a job. it was after one
Alfonso, Joemari delos Reyes and Eduardo Palacpac, as being o'clock in the afternoon when Joemari brought them to the house of his
"regular" customers at the A & E Kitchenette. Shortly before the cousin FO1Felipe dela Cruz.
shooting, Alfonso, delos Reyes, Palacpac and another companion
were drinking at the kitchenette but soon headed towards the alley Joemari delos Reyes testified that, on the afternoon of 28
near the pub. July 1999, he was at home when his uncle Dominador Recepcion
arrived with Robert Alfonso and Eduardo Palacpac. He brought his
Found sprawled on the floor, when the shooting finally guests to the house of Felipe dela Cruz where they partook of beer.
stopped, were the lifeless bodies of five men — Benjamin Valdez,
Augusto Billodo, Renato Cleofas, Rodolfo Ortega and Ruperto San Felipe dela Cruz stated that on 28 July 1999, about one
Juan. o'clock in the afternoon, his father fetched him from a cousin's house.
When he arrived home, he was met by Joemari delos Reyes along
Ruben Labjata, a jeepney driver, was waiting for passengers with the latter's companions, namely, Eduardo Palacpac, Robert
at Dagohoy Street, Caloocan City, when he heard gunshots. He was Alfonso, and Dominador Recepcion. In the evening of the same day,
about to leave with only a few passengers when, unexpectedly, three about eight o'clock, he invited his visitors to join him in attending a
men arrived and ordered all the passengers to get off the vehicle. The wake just a few meters away, and they stayed there until dawn. The
men menacingly pointed their guns at Labjata and ordered him to following morning of 29 July 1999, policemen arrived and cordoned his
drive. Moments later, five more men boarded his jeepney. Three of the house. He was arrested together with Joemari delos Reyes, Audie
men stayed with the driver at the front seat while the other five sat at Dona and Alfredo Baracas. During a series of questioning at the
the rear. The group directed Labjata to drive towards Monumento and Caloocan Police Station, dela Cruz insisted that he was attending a
then to EDSA. After stopping briefly at Petron Station to refuel, the wake at the time the shooting incident occurred in Caloocan City.
group proceeded to Quezon City. At a "7-11" convenience store, in
Tandang Sora, some of the men alighted from the vehicle. More Audie Dona said that on 28 July 1999, he and his friend
gunshots were fired. Boarding once again the jeepney, the men told Alfredo Baracas, went to Pansi, Ramos, Tarlac, to visit his cousin
Labjata to go north until they finally reached, hours later, Paniqui, Joemari delos Reyes and to get some fresh fish and vegetables. When
Tarlac. At Paniqui, the men debated on the driver's fate. After hearing he did not find Joemari at his house, he and Baracas proceeded to the
one suggest that he should be killed ("tumba"), Labjata panicked and place of dela Cruz where they were invited to join the group of Felipe
begged the group to spare him — "maawa po kayo, may pamilya po dela Cruz, Joemari delos Reyes, Eduardo Palacpac, and Dominador
ako." One of the men allowed him to go home with a warning that he Recepcion in a drinking spree. Dona and Baracas stayed until nine
should not report the incident to the police. In open court, he identified o'clock in the evening when they repaired to the house of Joemari to
the malefactors to be Audie Dona, Alfredo Baracas, Diosdado spend the night. On 29 July 1999, he and Baracas went back to see
Recepcion, Bernardo Ranara, Eduardo Palacpac, Dominador dela Cruz but found Joemari still sleeping. The two dozed off while
Recepcion, Joemari delos Reyes and Robert Alfonso. waiting for Joemari to wake up until they all found themselves
surrounded by the police.
Conrado Marquez, a tricycle driver, was waiting for
passengers along the highway of Paniqui, Tarlac, when he saw a When the trial was over and weighing the evidence before it,
group of men alight from a dirty jeepney. Four of the men rode in his the court a quo found the several accused guilty in Criminal Case No.
tricycle, while the other four took two more tricycles. Marquez brought C-57208 for multiple murder but acquitted them in Criminal Case No.
the group to Brgy. Coral, Ramos, Tarlac. C-57209 for the charge of illegal possession of firearm and Criminal
Case No. 57210 for robbery in band because of insufficiency of
Around lunchtime on 29 July 1999, the Bulacan Police evidence. The trial court adjudged thusly:
invited Ruben Labjata for questioning. Taken by police authorities to
 "WHEREFORE, premises b) Moral Damages – 100,000.00
considered, this Court finds the following
accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of c) Funeral expense – 17,500.00
Multiple Murder in Criminal Case No. C-57208, —————
as defined and penalized under Art. 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 6 TOTAL – 167,500.00
of Rep. Act No. 7659:

1. Audie Dona 5. Heirs of Augusto Billodo —

2. Alfredo Baracas

3. Bernardo Ranara (escaped) a) Death Indemnity – P50,000.00

b) Moral Damages – 100,000.00
4. Eduardo Palacpac
—————
5. Dominador Recepcion
TOTAL – 150,000.00
6. Joemari delos Reyes
"or the aggregate amount of P843,500.00.
7. Robert Alfonso
"Considering that the accused
"Accordingly, the 7 above-named Diosdado Recepcion is now deceased, he is
accused shall each serve the penalty of DEATH hereby dropped from these cases, pursuant
FIVE (5) TIMES OVER corresponding to to Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code.
the 5 victims they murdered.
"Considering also that the accused
"By way of civil liabilities, the 7 above- Bernardo Ranara is now at large after having
named accused shall jointly and severally pay escaped on November 22, 1999, let an Order of
the following amounts of money to the following Arrest be issued against him for the service of
complaining witnesses, without subsidiary his sentence in Criminal Case No. C-57208 for
imprisonment in case of insolvency: Multiple Murder.

"As an Accessory to Multiple Murder

under Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code, the
1. Divina Ortega — accused FO1 Felipe dela Cruz shall serve the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from 10
years and 1 day of Prision Mayor, as minimum,
a) Death Indemnity – P50,000.00 to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of Reclusion
Temporal, as maximum, with all the accessory
b) Moral Damages – 100,000.00 penalties under the law and shall pay the costs.
c) Funeral expense – 20,000.00 "Criminal Case No. C-57209 for
————— Illegal Possession of Firearms is ordered
dismissed, the filing thereof being unnecessary,
TOTAL – 170,000.00 pursuant to Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 8294.

"Criminal Case No. C-57210 for

2. Virginia Cleofas — Robbery in Band is likewise ordered dismissed
for insufficiency of evidence.

"The Branch Clerk of this Court shall

a) Death Indemnity – P50,000.00 now issue the corresponding Commitment
b) Moral Damages – 100,000.00 Order to the Director, Bureau of Corrections,
thru the City Jail Warden of Quezon City.
c) Funeral expense – 20,000.00
"Pursuant to Section 22 of Rep. Act
————— 7659, the Branch Clerk shall elevate the
TOTAL – 170,000.00 complete records of this case to the Honorable
Supreme Court within 20 days but not earlier
than 15 days after this promulgation, for
automatic review." 6
3. Jocelyn Valdez —
The capital punishment having been imposed on herein
appellants for the crime of multiple murder, the case was elevated to
a) Death Indemnity – P50,000.00 this Court for automatic review. In their brief, appellants ascribed to the
trial court a number of alleged errors but, by and large, they focused on
b) Moral Damages – 100,000.00
the issue of credibility of the witnesses and the imposition of the death
c) Funeral expense – 36,000.00 penalty.

————— Appellants argue that the witnesses presented by the

prosecution have committed several inconsistencies, mainly on the
TOTAL – 186,000.00
identities of the gunmen, said to be well enough to discredit their
testimony. The poor lighting condition of the pub, they claim, could
have easily blurred the vision of the witnesses frustrating any clear
4. Estella Ablong San Juan — identification of the assailants. The defense also belabors the finding of
conspiracy and, in general, of their conviction by the trial court.

a) Death Indemnity – P50,000.00 In criminal cases, particularly where the capital punishment
is imposed, this Court takes a most painstaking effort to ascertain the
guilt or innocence of the convicted accused. Nevertheless, it has long "A Because I was the one serving them and I
been a standing rule that the findings on the credibility of witnesses by was able to talk to them, sir.
the trial court are hardly disturbed on appeal. The appellate court
adheres to such deference in view of the vantage that a trial court "Q Can you recall who among the 7 whom you
enjoys in its reception of testimonial evidence. It is only when there talked with first?
evidently are matters of substance that have been overlooked that an
appellate court would feel justified to ignore the evaluation and "A That one, sir.
assessment made by the trial court on such evidence. Looking closely
at the records, nothing significant is disclosed to warrant a reversal of "Interpreter
the rule. Observe thusly —
As witness pointing to the person who identified
Testimony of Eliza Bautista himself as Robert Alfonso when
asked.
"Q Miss Bautista, you said you are a waitress of
Sabungan Fastfood and Videoke? "Fiscal Dañosos

"A Yes, sir. "Q Was he also the one who ordered beer from
you?
"Q And as such, one of your duties is to serve
food, drinks or whatever to your "A That one, sir. He was the one who ordered
customers? the 7 beers.

"A Yes, sir. "Interpreter

"Fiscal Dañosos As witness pointing to the person who ordered

7 beers and identified himself as
"Q Did you recall if you reported for work Audie Dona.
sometime at around 12 to 1:00 o'clock
midnight at Sabungan Fastfood on "xxx xxx xxx
July 28, 1999? "Fiscal Dañosos
"A Yes, sir. I was there, sir. "Q Is there anything unusual that happened?
"xxx xxx xxx "Court
"Fiscal Dañosos
Answer.
"Q Alright. You said you have 2 customers in
the name of San Juan and Ortega. "A I did not notice anything unusual when I
And then, you said also you pointed served beer, sir. Because after I gave
to the group of the accused and you them a bottle of beer, after that they
said that they were [y]our last have put their beers on a glass, sir.
customers. Alright, more or less, what
"xxx xxx xxx
time did [these] new customers or last
customers of yours arrived? "Q After pouring beer to their glass, what else
happened?
"A 1:15 a.m., sir.
"A Nothing happened, sir. They just sat [there].
"xxx xxx xxx
"Q Alright. You said that Ortega and San Juan
"Q Now, when you saw them entering the
[were] shot dead. Now, would you
Sabungan Restaurant, what if any did
know or recall who shot Ortega and
you do being a waitress?
San Juan?
"A After they entered together, they ordered 7
"A I know who shot Ortega. But I don't know
beers. So, I served 7 beers and then
who shot San Juan, sir.
occupied a table and after occupying
the table, the 3 transferred to another
"Q Alright, who shot Ortega?
table, sir.
"A That man, sir.
"xxx xxx xxx
"Q Let's go back Miss Bautista to your last "Interpreter
customers. You said that you served
beer to 7 customers and you said Witness pointing to a person who identified
they were your last and in fact, you himself as Diosdado Recepcion when
just pointed them because they are asked.
here, is that correct?
"xxx xxx xxx
"A Yes, sir. "Fiscal Dañosos
"Interpreter "Q Alright. We go back Miss Witness to the 7
customers that you served beer. Now,
Witness pointing to the accused. [these] 7 customers that you [said]
became your last customer[s] that
"Fiscal Dañosos
evening, would you be able to identify
or recognize their faces if you see
"Q Alright. How are you so sure that they were
them again?
the last customers on that early
morning of July 28, 1999 at around
"A Yes, sir.
1:20 in the morning?
 "xxx xxx xxx You said that there were persons who shot
individuals in Sabungan, how many
"Court
were they?
Teka, isa-isahin mo. Sige.
"A Seven (7), sir.
"Interpreter
"Q Now, if they are here in Court, will you be
able to recognize them?
"As witness pointing to Diosdado Recepcion,
Alfredo Baracas, Audie Dona, Robert
"A Yes, sir.
Alfonso, Eduardo Palacpac, Joemari
delos Reyes, Dominador Recepcion. "Q Will you point to them if they are here in
Court?
"Fiscal Dañosos
"Interpreter
"Q Thank you Miss Witness. Alright, Miss
Bautista, do you recall if all or anyone Witness is pointing to 7 male persons inside
of these 7 customers that you have this Courtroom, who when asked their
just identified were old or former names, answered . . . Diosdado
customers of Sabungan Restaurant? Recepcion, Alfredo Baracas, Joemari
delos Reyes, Bernardo Ranara,
"A Not our former customers, sir." 7
Dominador Recepcion, Robert
Alfonso and Audie Dona.
Testimony of Marie Flamiano
"Asst. Chief Pros. Mariano
"Asst. Chief Pros. Mariano
These 7 persons whom you identified, do you
Ms. Witness, you said you are a waitress at
know what particular acts they did at
Sabungan Restaurant, how long have
the Sabungan incident?
you been a waitress thereat?
"A They were shooting.
"A For 7 months, now, sir.
"xxx xxx xxx
"Q Do you remember having reported for work
on the evening of July 27, 1999? "Q Aside from the fact that you saw them with
guns, what else did you see?
"A Yes, sir.
"A I saw the dead person outside, that person
"Q And what is your working hours at the was already kneeling and begging for
Sabungan Restaurant? life but they still killed that person.
"A From 6:00 p.m., sir. "Q And do you know who shot that person who
was already kneeling?
"Q In the evening of July 27, 1999?
"A The first person I pointed out in Court.
"A 6:00 p.m., sir.
"Q And you are referring to?
"Q Up to what time?
"A Diosdado Recepcion, sir." 8
"A Up to 2:00 a.m., sir.
On cross-examination, this witness elaborated:
"Q In the early morning of July 28, 1999 at
about 1:20, do you recall of any "Q And what could be your basis in pointing to
unusual incident that occurred in Diosdado Recepcion as well as to
Sabungan Restaurant? accused Alfredo Baracas and the
rest, when you did not see who shot
"A Yes, sir. whom?
"Q What was that incident? "A Because I saw them, sir.
"A They shot somebody, sir. "Q How far were you from these two accused
that I mentioned during the shooting
"Q Who shot somebody? incident?
"A They are here in Court, sir. "A About 7 to 8 meters, sir.
"Q Whom did you see shooting somebody at "Q At that time the shooting incident occurred,
that time? what was your duty, if ever?
"A Para silang walang awang namaril . . . "A Because it was almost our closing time, I
was just sitting, I have nobody to
"Atty. Ongteco
serve.
Your Honor, the answer is irresponsive.
"Q When these 7 persons entered, were there
other customers in the
"Court
establishment?
Let it remain, just answer what is being asked
"A Yes, sir.
of you.
"xxx xxx xxx
"Asst. Chief Pros. Mariano
 "Q In other words, when you scampered "Q Now, on the said date, July 28, 1999 at
outside, you did not see with around 1:30 in the morning, do you
particularity the accused shooting the still remember your whereabouts?
victim, is that correct?
"A Yes, sir.
"A While I was running, I saw them, they were
shooting the victims, sir. "Q Where were you?

"Q You mean to tell me that during the time you "A I was at Sabungan Restaurant, sir.
were running outside, your head was
turning back to where the accused "Q Accordingly, you were on duty on said date,
were situated shooting? July 28, 1999. Why were you at
Sabungan Fastfood?
"A Yes, sir. (Witness is pointing as to the
direction of the door of the restaurant) "A I was already off-duty at that time, sir.

"Q With that distance you are pointing to, to the "Q Now, who were with you at Sabungan
corner of this room, you could have Restaurant, if any?
not ascertain[ed] Mr. Diosdado
Recepcion holding a gun and "A We were 5, sir.
shooting at somebody, is that
correct? "Q Please tell us their names or some of them?

"A I saw him, sir. "A Our Asst. OIC, Benjamin Valdez, Fisaret,
Daniel Aycardo, Jimmy Serrano and
"Q In fact in your testimony, you cannot identify myself, sir.
whether it was a short gun or a long
gun? "Q Would I get from you that all these
companions of yours were also
"A Yes, sir, I could not identify the kind of guns security guards?
they were using.
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Because you became very scared,
frightened and nervous that is why "Fiscal Bajar
you scampered outside?
While you and your 4 other companions were
"A Yes, sir. inside the Sabungan Restaurant on
July 28, 1999 at around 1:30 in the
"Q And also because of that nervousness and early morning, do you remember any
fright that you experienced, you are in unusual incident that happened inside
doubt whether it was really Diosdado or outside thereat?
Recepcion whom you saw?
"A Yes, sir.
"A I saw him sir. (Siya po).
"Q But before that, what were you and your
"Q That incident on July 28, 1999 was the first other 4 companions doing at the
time that you saw this person whom Sabungan Restaurant on the wee-
you pointed as Diosdado Recepcion, hours of July 28, 1999?
is that right?
"A We were having a drinking spree, sir.
"A Yes, sir.
"Q What was that unusual incident that
"Q So, how can you be very sure that it was him happened inside the Sabungan
who was holding a gun and shooting Restaurant?
at somebody when you said that was
the first time that you saw him and "A A shooting incident suddenly took place and
your distance was quite far and then we dropped ourselves on the
likewise you cannot determine or ground because of that shooting
ascertain whether he was holding a incident, sir.
long gun or short gun?
"Q But before that shooting incident, do you
"A Because I saw them standing, sir. recall what particular place inside the
Sabungan Restaurant were you
"Q You mean to tell me that aside from seated?
Diosdado Recepcion, all the 7
accused were all standing? "A Yes, sir.

"A Yes, sir, they were all standing. "Q Where were you particularly seated?

"Q And you also would like to impress before "A Near the side of the Sabungan Fastfood and
this Court that all the 7 accused were we were in front of the videoke
holding a gun and were all standing machine, sir.
and were all shooting at somebody?
"Q When you said in front you were just very
"A I am not sure but all of them stood up and near?
shot somebody." 9
"A Yes, sir.
Testimony of Jojo Paraiso
"Q Now, [was] there any other persons inside "A I saw a light or spark that came out from the
the Sabungan Fastfood aside from nozzle of the gun after I heard the
you and your companions? shot, sir.

"A Yes, sir. "Q And to what direction does the firing directed
or pointed to?
"Q How many, if you remember?
"A To the persons they shot, sir.
"A We were 9, sir.
"Q Where were [these] persons firing located?
"Court
"A They were seated because they were also
And aside from the 5 of them? drinking, sir.

"A There were 9 customers in all in that "Q In relation to where you were seated and
restaurant, sir. drinking, where were these persons
located?
"Court
"A They were at the side of the restaurant and
"Q Including you or excluding you? near the table who fired the shots, sir.
"A Including me, sir. We were 9 customers. "Q And how many table[s] were [occupied by
these] persons and to where the firing
"Fiscal Bajar was directed?
"Q How about the non-customers? "A Only one (1), sir.
"A 7, sir. "xxx xxx xxx
"Q And what were [these] non-customers doing "Fiscal Bajar
inside the Sabungan Restaurant?
"Q Now, how many shots did you hear?
"A They also ordered beer and they also posed
as customers, sir. "A Many, sir. And I could not count it, sir.

But they were not able to drink beer and when "Q And how about you, what did you do when
they ordered they already fired their you heard this successive shots from
guns, sir. the table of this 3 persons?

"Fiscal Bajar "A One of them shouted 'dapa,' that is why I hid
myself under the table, sir.
"Q Now, where were [these] other non-
customers who were ordering beers "Q Now, how about your other 4 companions,
situated inside the Sabungan what did they do after you dropped
Restaurant in relation to where you yourself [on] the ground?
were seated?
"A The other one who was shot remained
"A They positioned themselves at the center of seated in front of his table. But my
the videoke machine but at first they other 3 companions docked on the
were together and then they ordered, table, sir.
the 3 separated from the group, sir.
"Q And what happened to that person who was
"Q And how far was your table from this table of shot? That [lone] person that
the non-customers? according to you who was shot?

"A About 3 meters away from our table, sir. "A He died, sir.

"xxx xxx xxx "Q And after you have 'yuko,' did you notice
what happened next?
"Fiscal Bajar
"A I looked outside, sir. And then I found out
"Q Okay. Now, after the group parted ways and that my [companion was] shot and
the 3 occupied another table, what then the one beside him was shot
happened? next, sir.
"A 3 minutes after, the 3 separated from the "Q Now, where did this person who shot your
group and the shooting started, sir. companions come from because,
according to you, you were looking
"Q And where did the shooting come from? outside?
"A From the 3 persons who separated from the "A That person who shot my companion was
group, sir. near the table of my other companion
that was shot and the distance of my
"Q Why did you say that it came from the 3
companion from the one who shot
persons?
him was only about a meter away, sir.
"A Because after hearing the first shot, I looked
"Q When you said companion who was shot,
at that direction, sir.
are you referring to the one who
transferred to another table?
"Q And were you able to see the firearms used
in firing the shots?
"A Yes, sir. Our companion, sir. As witness stepped down from the witness
stand and tapped the shoulder of the
"xxx xxx xxx accused Joemari Delos Reyes.
"Q So, after you saw your companions shot,
"xxx xxx xxx
what did you do, if any?
"Q Now, please demonstrate to us how your
"A I remained there under the table but companion was shot by Robert
sometimes I would look and Alfonso?
sometimes I would bow my head.
"A Like this, sir. The accused was in the
"Q And to whom were you looking at? standing position when he fired [at]
my companion at a distance of one
"A To our companions, sir. (1) meter. And after shooting my
companion, that gun man fired again
"Q And do you remember how many times [you at a man beside my companion, sir.
performed] that 'yuko, tingin, yuko,
tingin?' "Q And what was the position of your
companion when he was fired upon?
"A Whenever I noticed that they were looking at
me, I [would] look down or bow my "A He was seated, sir.
head, sir.
"Q And what was then your position when you
"Court saw your companion being shot?
What do you mean 'they?' "A I was under the table but I was looking at
their direction, sir." 10
"A The one who [shot] my companions, your
Honor. On cross-examination, Paraiso continued:
"Fiscal Bajar "Q Mr. Witness, you said that the shooting
incident happened at 1:30 in the early
"Q And how far was this person who [shot] your morning of July 28, 1999. What time
companions from you who was did you start drinking at the Sabungan
looking at him and to the one who Restaurant?
looked at you?
"A About 12:45 a.m., sir.
"A About 4 meters, sir.
"Q How many bottles of what were you
"Q Now, if that person is in Court, would you be drinking?
able to identify him?
"A Beer, sir.
"A Yes, sir.
"Q How many bottles of beer have you already
"Q Please point to him if he is around? You [tap] consumed?
his shoulder, if you want?
"A During the shooting incident 2 bottles, sir.
"A Yes, sir. This one, sir.
"Q Now, according also to you it was the 3 men
"Interpreter who separated from the larger group
[who] transferred to another table?
Witness tapped the shoulder of Robert Alfonso.
"A Yes, sir.
"xxx xxx xxx
"Q And it was after about 15 minutes that one of
them started shooting?
"Q Could you recognize anyone of them?
"A Yes, sir.
"A The one who shot our companions and he
was with the 4 persons in that table, "xxx xxx xxx
sir.
"Q How did you position yourself when you hid
"Q So, the question is if you have recognized yourself under the table? How did you
anyone of the persons who remained position yourself? Did the table
in the table? completely cover you?

"A Yes, sir. The one who came out last after the "A The table completely covered me, sir.
shooting, sir. But when he came out
he fired a gun. "Q Could you say that you were not shot
because you were not seen by the
"Q If that last person you saw was on their way gunman?
out from the Sabungan Restaurant is
in Court, can you point to him? "A Yes, sir. I know that they did not notice me
Please step down and tap the there under the table, sir. Maybe if
shoulder if he is around? they noticed me that I was there
under the table looking at them,
"A Yes, sir. This one, sir. maybe they would shoot me, sir.

"Interpreter "Q So, we can presume that you were not shot
because you were not seen by the
gunman?
 "A Yes, sir. but the other one was not drinking,
sir, just [went] back and forth.
"Q You were not seen because the table was
about 3 x 3 ft. Do you mean to tell us "Q These customers whom you said were the
Mr. Witness that 3 ft. x 3 ft. table was ones who started shooting
able to accommodate all 5 of you? at Sabungan, who were these
persons, if you know?
"A Yes, sir.
"A I was able to recognize Ricky, Edwin.
"Q Now, you were also not seen by the gunman
because the table was covered by the "Q Who else? I thought you said there were 4 of
table cloth? them.

"A No cover, sir. "Court

"Q You felt that at that time that you present The question [was], who fired the gun?
yourself under the table was not
detected by the gunman because "FISCAL MARIANO
none of them noticed you under the
table? "Q Who were these persons who fired the gun?

"A I know that I was [not] noticed by them, sir. "Court

Because [if] they have noticed me
under the table and they know that I Ricky, Edwin, sino pa?
was looking at them, they will shoot
me, sir." 11 "Witness

Testimony of Jhosa Reyes Those are the only two but almost all of them,
Your Honor.
"Q In the early morning of July 28, 1999, do you
remember of any unusual incident "Fiscal Mariano
that happened at your place of work?
If they are in Courtroom, will you be able to
"A Yes, sir. identify them?

"Q What was that incident, if you can still recall? "A Yes, sir.

"A There was a shooting incident, sir. "Q Please point them out.

"Q Where was that shooting incident? "Atty. Ongteco

"A In Sabungan, sir, in front of the place where I May we request that the witness tell the Court
work. who is Ricky, Edwin?

"Q How far is that Sabungan from your place of "Court

work?
Unahin si Ricky. Tumayo ang itinuro.
"A Across the highway, sir.
"Mr. dela Cruz
"Q Do you know who were the persons who
Witness pointed to a person who when asked
fired their guns at Sabungan?
of his name, answered to the name of
"A Yes, sir. Robert Alfonso.

"Q Why do you know these persons? "Court

"A Because the persons who fired their guns Sino pa? Iyong bumaril, ha?
were our customers first before they
"Mr. dela Cruz
transferred to Sabungan, sir.
Witness pointed to a person who when asked
"Q How often do you see these persons at your
of his name answered to the name of
dining place?
Joemari delos Reyes.
"A Twice, sir.
"Court
"Q When was the first time that you saw them?
Sino pa?
"A Every week, sir.
"Mr. dela Cruz
"Q What were they doing when they [went] to
Witness pointed to a person who when asked
your place?
of his name answered to the name of
"A They [drank], sir. Eduardo Palacpac." 12

"Q How many are these persons, if you can Testimony of Ruben Labjata
remember?
"Q Mr. Labjata, will you tell this Honorable Court
"A Because the 3 persons used to go to our where were you in the early morning
place but recently they were 4 already of July 28, 1999?
"A I was in Dagohoy with my jeepney waiting for When they told me to start the jeep, there were
passengers, sir. some persons who boarded the jeep,
sir.
"Q More or less, what time was that when you
were with your jeep and waiting for "Fiscal Dañosos
passengers?
"Q Can you also tell the Honorable Court briefly
"A Between twelve and one a.m., sir. what was the condition of this other
group who also boarded?
"Q Do you recall, Mr. Labjata, of any unusual
incident that occurred while waiting "A They were also holding guns, sir.
for passengers inside your jeepney?
"Q More or less, how many of them, the one[s]
"A While my jeep was parked there, I heard that boarded again?
gunshots, sir.
"A When I start[ed] the engine or already driving
"Q What else, if any, happened? the jeep I saw 8, sir.

"A I was about to leave then and I have already "xxx xxx xxx
passengers when some people
"Fiscal Dañosos
suddenly arrived, sir.
"Q When you were ordered to go, what did you
"xxx xxx xxx
do, if any?
"Q Did you, if you did notice if the 3 men who
ordered immediately to let your "A I drove the jeep and then we made a turn
passengers get off the jeep, if they near the Monumento Circle and
were armed? proceeded to Edsa, sir.

"Atty. Ongteco "Q While you were proceeding to Edsa, did you
notice anything unusual again?
The same objection.
"A Yes, sir, I noticed something unusual
"Court because while they were conversing
to each other, I heard somebody said
Same ruling, you are practically telling the that 'hindi ako ang bumaril.'
witness that they were armed.
"xxx xxx xxx
"Fiscal Dañosos
"Q From Petron Gas Station after you have
"Q Alright, while the 3 ordered you, did you gassed up, where did you go, if you
notice anything, if you did any? went somewhere else?

"A They were armed with guns, sir. "A We proceeded to the highway and then when
we were already far from Petron, we
"Q What kind of guns, are they long arms or made a left turn, sir.
short arms?
"Q In what direction was this left [turn] going
"A Short arms, sir. towards?

"xxx xxx xxx "A I am not familiar with that route, sir.
"Q Other than the 3 were there other persons "Q By the way, who among the group ordered
who boarded your jeep? you to what direction you [were] going
to?
"Atty. Ongteco
"A The one on my left side, sir.
Same objection.
"Q At that point of time, did the group tell you
"Court where you [were] going?
I will allow that. "A I do not know where to go but they ordered
me and I followed them.
"Atty. Ongteco
"Q Now, as a jeepney driver from Bulacan, can
But that is the same banana because you tell the Honorable Court to what
according to the witness, the 3 direction or route you were going?
persons ordered the other
passengers of the jeep to alight. "A After making a left turn, we passed by a 711
store, sir.
"Court
"xxx xxx xxx
That was ordering the passengers to alight.
The question now is, were there other "Q While you were driving your jeep from
persons who boarded your jeep. I will Caloocan City to Tarlac, was there a
allow that. Answer that. time whether one of the group told
you what to do?
"Witness
"A Yes, sir. They poked a gun at me and told
me to follow them whatever they
wanted me to do, sir.
 "xxx xxx xxx "A I left at a place where they alighted and then
I went back to Bulacan, sir.
"Q While you were so scared because you were
ordered and you realized that you "xxx xxx xxx
reached Paniqui, was there at any
moment while driving your jeep that "Q When did you see them again?
you [felt] that you might be killed by
this armed men? "A After they were arrested from their hideout,
sir.
"Atty. Ongteco
"Q Where exactly did you meet them at Paniqui,
Leading. Tarlac?

"Fiscal Dañosos "A At the Municipal Hall of Paniqui, Tarlac, sir.

I am asking for his feelings. "Q More or less, what time was that already?

"Court "A About past eight in the morning, sir.

Did you ever feel that you might be killed? I will "Q You said that at around past eight, you saw
allow it. the group again who commandeered
your jeep. How did you know that
"Witness they were the same persons who
commandeered your jeep that early
Because when we arrived [at] Tarlac, I heard morning of July 28, 1999?
one of them said 'tumba.'
"A Because I was able to recognize the faces of
"xxx xxx xxx the others, sir.
"Court
"Q Mr. Witness, if you can see the faces of this
group of persons who commandeered
What did you do after hearing 'tumba?' Witness
your jeep and who threatened to kill
may answer.
you and who ordered you to stop at
"Witness Paniqui, Tarlac, and which you saw
again the following day in the morning
I told them, 'Sir, maawa naman po kayo.' at Paniqui, Tarlac, would you be able
to recognize their faces again if you
"Fiscal Dañosos will see these people?

"Q To whom did you address your words? "A Yes, sir.

"A I just said, 'Maawa naman po kayo, huwag "Q Now, will you please stand, Mr. Witness, and
ninyo po akong itumba because I look around this courtroom and then
have a family.' point to the faces of those people
whom you said commandeered your
"Q After you told the group of the accused jeep in that early morning?
that, 'Sir, huwag naman ninyo akong
itumba,' what else transpired? "Mr. Nestor dela Cruz

"A One of them said, 'in behalf of your The witness pointed to a man, who when asked
family, bubuhayin ka namin for the of his name, answered to the name of
sake of your family. (Alang-alang sa Audie Dona.
pamilya mo).
"Fiscal Dañosos
"Q What else, if any, after one of them told you
that for the sake of your family, we Who else?
will not kill you.
"Mr. dela Cruz
"A They told me that after reaching Tarlac, I will
return back and without turning my The witness pointed to a man, who when asked
head and do not report to the police of his name, answered to the name of
or else they will shoot me. Alfredo Baracas.

"Q So, after you received those orders, what did "Fiscal Dañosos
you do, if any?
Who else?
"A When they alighted from the jeep, I did not
"Mr. dela Cruz
look at them. Once they alighted, I
proceeded or went back to Bulacan,
The witness pointed to a man, who when asked
sir.
of his name, answered to the name of
Diosdado Recepcion.
"Q You said that after hearing their orders and
reaching Paniqui, Tarlac, they went
"Fiscal Dañosos
down. They alighted. Did all of them
alight at the same time? Who else?
"A They alighted one after the other, sir. "Mr. dela Cruz
"Q After they have alighted, what else if any
transpired?
 The witness pointed to a man, who when asked intent to commit the crime is engendered in the mind of the accused,
of his name, answered to the name of the motive which gives rise to it, and the means which are beforehand
Bernardo Ranara. selected to carry out that intent. All such facts and antecedents which
make notorious the pre-existing design to accomplish the criminal
"Fiscal Dañosos purpose must be proven to the satisfaction of the court. 19

Who else? A scrutiny of the facts in evidence would indicate a scanty

showing of the requirements to qualify the senseless killing of the five
"Mr. dela Cruz victims, either by treachery or by evident premeditation, to murder.
While the attack upon the victims could be described as being
The witness pointed to a man, who when asked unexpected, somehow voiding any risk to the perpetrators thereof,
of his name, answered to the name of there is, however, insufficient evidence to indicate that the means
Eduardo Palacpac. adopted by the appellants have consciously been adopted. Mere
suddenness of the attack is not enough to show treachery; it should
"Fiscal Dañosos also be shown that the mode of attack has knowingly been intended to
accomplish the wicked intent. 20 Neither would evident premeditation
Who else?
qualify the offense to murder in the absence of clear substantiation that
the appellants have definitely resolved to commit the offense and have
"Mr. dela Cruz
reflected on the means to bring about the execution following an
The witness pointed to a man, who when asked appreciable length of time.
of his name, answered to the name of
The trial court, however, correctly appreciated conspiracy.
Dominador Recepcion.
The presence of conspiracy could be revealed by the acts done before,
"Fiscal Dañosos during and after the commission of the crime that made evident a joint
purpose, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments. 21 The
Who else? several acts of appellants during and after the shooting rampage
disclosed a unison of objectives. Not one tried to stop the other in the
"Mr. dela Cruz perpetration of the crime. All were clearly in it together, performing
specific acts with such closeness and coordination as would
The witness pointed to a man, who when asked unmistakably show a common scheme. The attendance of treachery
of his name, answered to the name of would thus render it unnecessary for the prosecution to show who
Joemari delos Reyes. among the conspirators actually hit and killed their victims, each of
them being equally liable with the other in the perpetration of the crime.
"Fiscal Dañosos
Without proof of any circumstance that would qualify it, the
Who else? killing could not amount to murder. Appellants should thus be held
liable only for homicide for the death of each of the victims. It was
"Mr. dela Cruz alleged in the accusatory information and shown in evidence that the
crimes were indeed perpetrated with the use of unlicensed firearms.
The witness pointed to a man, who when asked Pursuant to Republic Act 8294 22 (amending Presidential Decree No.
of his name, answered to the name of 1866), which was already in effect when the killing spree occurred, if
Robert Alfonso." 13 "homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed
firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an
The eyewitnesses categorically identified the malefactors. aggravating circumstance."
The alleged discrepancies in the testimony of the witnesses could
easily be explained by the fact that they saw the incident from different The trial court has convicted FO1 Felipe dela Cruz as an
angles of the shooting. The impact of events, as well as the accessory. This Court, however, finds no evidence to convict him as
unconscious working of the mind, it is said, could readily warp the such accessory. Under Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code, the
human perception in varying ways and degrees. Empiric data is yet to actual knowledge of the commission of the crime is an important
be found in order to accurately measure the value of testimony of a element to being an encubridor, and the records are bereft of sound
witness other than its conformity to human behavior and the common proof that dela Cruz has had knowledge of any or all of the nefarious
experience of mankind. 14 deeds earlier committed by his guests.
The defense of alibi proffered by appellants is much too The arrest of appellants has been made in "hot pursuit," an
weak against the positive identification made by the eyewitnesses. It is exception from the rule that warrantless arrests are illegal. In any
not enough for an alibi to prosper to prove that the person raising it has event, appellants can no longer assail the illegality of their arrest since
been somewhere else when the crime is committed; it must likewise be such a claim has not been brought up before or during the
demonstrated that it would have been physically impossible for him to arraignment. The failure to timely move for the quashal of the
be at the scene of the crime. 15 Where there is the least chance to be Information on this basis operates as a waiver of the right to question
present at the locus criminis, alibi will not hold much water. 16 The the supposed irregularity of the arrest. 23
bare evidence given by appellants to vouch their individual claims and
establish alibi is far from being iron-clad against the possibility of their The crime of homicide is punishable under Article 249 of the
having been at the crime scene. Revised Penal Code by reclusion temporal with a duration of 12 years
and 1 day to 20 years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
Article 248 17 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by appellants may be held to suffer imprisonment, as minimum, of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, makes a person guilty of murder if the anywhere within the full range of prision mayor of from 6 years and 1
killing is attended by, among other circumstances (but not here day to 12 years and, as maximum, to anywhere within the range
appurtenant), treachery or evident premeditation. An essence of of reclusion temporal in its maximum period, considering the
treachery is not only the swiftness and the surprise in the attack upon attendance of the aggravating circumstance of "use of an unlicensed
an unsuspecting victim but also the attendance of two concurring firearm," of from 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 20 years.
conditions, i.e., that the malefactor must have employed means,
method or manner of execution that would insure his safety from the The damages awarded by the trial court accord with
retaliatory act of the victim, and such means, method or form of prevailing jurisprudence except for the grant of P100,000.00 moral
execution are consciously and deliberately adopted by the malefactor. damages to the heirs of each of the victims which amount should be
The qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation, on the other reduced to P50,000.00.
hand, requires that the execution of the criminal act be preceded by
cool thought and reflection upon a resolution to carry out the criminal WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the court a
intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm quo convicting appellants is AFFIRMED subject to the following
judgment. 18 Evident premeditation needs proof of the time when the MODIFICATIONS, to wit:
 Appellants Dominador Recepcion, Audie Dona, Alfredo
Baracas, Eduardo Palacpac, Bernardo Ranara, Joemari delos Reyes
and Robert Alfonso are all hereby found guilty of homicide, on five
counts, and each of them shall suffer five imprisonment terms, each for
the death of their five victims, of the indeterminate penalty of 9 years
and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 16 years and 1 day
of reclusion temporal in its maximum period, as maximum, and shall
pay, jointly and severally, the sums adjudged by the trial court except
that the P100,000.00 moral damages to each victim is reduced,
correspondingly, to P50,000.00. ASDCaI

Appellant Felipe dela Cruz is ACQUITTED for insufficiency

of evidence.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Mendoza, Panganiban, Qu

isumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Carpio, Corona, Morales, Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna,JJ.,
concur.

Austria-Martinez, J., on leave.

 THIRD DIVISION On July 29, 1991, the National Bureau of Investigation wrote a
G.R. No. 10608 April 7, 1993 letter 7 to the trial court requesting that custody of petitioner be
transferred to the Bureau in view of an investigation for illegal
ROLITO GO Y TAMBUNTING, petitioner, vs. possession of firearms involving petitioner.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO,
PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 168, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
NCJR, PASIG, METRO MANILA and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents. On the same date, July 29, 1991, the trial court issued an
Law Firm of Raymundo A. Armovit for petitioner. Order 8 granting the NBI temporary custody of petitioner subject to the
The Solicitor General for public respondents. following conditions: (a) the petitioner is to be accorded his
constitutional rights during the investigation; (b) the NBI investigation is
RESOLUTION to be conducted only during office hours and petitioner is to be
returned to the custody of the CAPCOM at the end of each day; and
ROMERO, J p: (c) the NBI should report to the trial court the status of the
investigation.
This is a Motion for Reconsideration of this Court's Resolution dated
September 23, 1992 denying petitioner's Petition and affirming the On July 30, 1991, petitioner filed a motion 9 before the
Decision and Resolution promulgated on March 9, 1992 and June 26, trial court praying that the Order dated July 29, 1991 be nullified and
1992, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. recalled.
26305. 1 The CA Decision and Resolution upheld the following: (1)
The following day, July 31, 1991, the NBI filed a motion 10 praying that
respondent Judge Benjamin V. Pelayo's Order dated September 4,
it be granted full custody of petitioner pending the investigation of the
1991 which denied petitioner's Motion for Recusation; and (2)
case involving illegal possession of firearms.
respondent judge's Order dated September 17, 1991 denying
petitioner's Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to Transfer Venue An Order 11 was issued by the trial Court dated August 1, 1991 setting
Outside Metro Manila. for hearing the issue concerning the proper venue of petitioner's
detention. cdrep
A review of the antecedent facts of this case, particularly those wherein
respondent Judge participated, is in order to arrive at a just and correct After the hearing on petitioner's custody, the trial court issued an
assessment of his acts vis-a-vis the petitioner. cdll Order 12 dated August 2, 1991 ordering the CAPCOM to bring the
person of petitioner to the court not later than August 5, 1991 so that a
On July 2, 1991, Eldon Maguan was shot inside his car along Wilson
commitment order for his detention at the Rizal Provincial Jail could be
Street, San Juan, Metro Manila. After conducting an
issued. The Commitment Order 13 ordering the Provincial
investigation of the shooting incident, the police identified
Warden of the Provincial Jail of Pasig to take custody ofpetitioner was
petitioner Rolito Goas the prime suspect in the commission of the
issued on August 5, 1991.
crime. On July 8, 1991, petitioner, accompanied by two lawyers,
presented himself before the San Juan Police Station. He was arrested On August 8, 1991, petitioner filed a Motion for Recusation 14 praying
and booked for the shooting of Maguan. The police filed a complaint that respondent judge inhibit himself from hearing the case. The
for frustrated homicide with the Office of the Provincial motion was denied by respondent judge in his Order dated September
Prosecutor of Rizal. 4, 1991. 15
On July 11, 1991, an information for murder was filed against petitioner On August 22, 1991, petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings
before the Regional Trial Court, Pasig, Metro Manila, the victim Eldon and Transfer Venue Outside Metro Manila which was denied by
Maguan having died on July 9, 1991. respondent judge on September 17, 1991. 16
On the same day, July 11, 1991, counsel for petitioner filed with the Petitioner was arraigned on August 23, 1991. In view of his refusal to
Prosecutor an omnibus motion praying for petitioner's immediate enter a plea, a plea of "Not Guilty" was entered for him by the
release and for a preliminary investigation. Provincial Prosecutor trial court. 17
Mauro Castro interposed no objection to petitioner's being granted
provisional liberty on a cash bond of P100,000.00. In the meantime, this Court, by Resolution dated July 24, 1991,
remanded to the Court of Appeals the petition filed by petitioner
The case was raffled to the sala of respondent judge, the Hon. assailing the July 17, 1991 Order of the trial court.
Benjamin V. Pelayo, who, on July 12, 1991, approved the cash bond
posted by petitioner and ordered his release. On August 27, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus before
the Court of Appeals.
On July 16, 1991, respondent judge issued an Order granting leave for
the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal to conduct a preliminary On September 23, 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a consolidated
investigation. decision dismissing the two petitions. However, upon petition by
petitioner, this Court by an 8-6 vote in G.R. No. 101837 issued a
However, on July 17, 1991, respondent judge motu proprio issued an decision reversing the, CA decision and ordering (a) the Provincial
Order 2 which: (a) recalled the July 12, 1991 Order granting bail; (b) Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation; and (b) the
directed petitioner to surrender within 48 hours from notice; (c) release of petitioner without prejudice to any order that the
cancelled the July 16, 1991 Order granting leave for the Provincial trial court may issue, should the Provincial Prosecutor move for
Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation; (d) treated cancellation of bail at the conclusion of the preliminary investigation.
petitioner's omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary
investigation dated July 11, 1991 as a petition for bail. After conducting a preliminary investigation pursuant to this Court's
decision in G.R. No. 101837, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
On July 19, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition issued a Resolution dated February 27, 1992 finding probable cause to
and mandamus questioning the July 17, 1991 Order of respondent charge petitioner with the crime of murder. The Resolution was
judge. On the same day, petitioner filed before the trial courta motion approved by the Provincial Prosecutor who filed with the trial court a
to suspend all the proceedings pending the resolution of the petition motion to cancel the bail of petitioner and a motion to set the criminal
filed before the Supreme Court. 3 This motion was denied by case for resumption of the trial on the merits.
respondent judge. 4
Petitioner attempted to have the Resolution of the Prosecutor reversed
On July 23, 1991, petitioner voluntarily surrendered to the CAPCOM. by appealing to the Department of Justice, and filing petitions with
Upon motion 5 by petitioner, the respondent judge issued an the Court of Appeals (CA, G.R. SP No. 27738) and finally to
Order 6 directing "the accused's continued detention at the CAPCOM this Court (G.R. No. 105424), but his efforts did not meet with success.
until such time as the Court shall have properly determined the place
where accused should be detained."
On October 1, 1991, petitioner filed another petition for certiorari, respondent Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in its
prohibition and mandamus before this Court seeking to annul: (1) the assailed decision.
Order of the trial court dated September 4, 1991 denying petitioner's
Motion for Recusation; and (2) the Order dated September 17, 1991 On October 12, 1992, the present Motion for Reconsideration 21 was
denying petitioner's Motion to Suspend Proceedings and Transfer filed in which petitioner reiterates his position that respondent judge
Venue Outside Metro Manila. The petition, docketed as G.R. No. should inhibit himself from the case.
101772, was remanded to the Court of Appeals.
On December 16, 1992, petitioner filed a pleading captioned "Urgent
On March 9, 1992, the Court of Appeals (13th Division) rendered a Motion (for preliminary mandatory injunction)." In said Motion,
decision dismissing the petition. As to the denial of petitioner's Motion petitioner questioned the Order of the trial court dated December 9,
for Recusation, the Court of Appeals held in part: 1992 denying petitioner's Motion to Reopen Hearing (of the
cancellation of bail proceedings) and to Present Last Witness. It
"On the basis of the allegation of the petition, the Court is not inclined appears that after the presentation of eleven (11) witnesses by the
to strike down the denial of petitioner's motion for recusation as a prosecution and six (6) by the defense, the trial court considered the
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge absent question concerning the cancellation of petitioner's bail ripe for
any clear showing of such grave abuse of his discretion. The resolution. Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion to Reopen and Present
allegation of petitioner in support of his motion for recusation are Last Witness. 22 But the trial court issued an Order 23 dated
conclusions based on his own fears and are therefore speculations December 9, 1992 which, among other things, denied the Motion. In
than anything else. the Urgent Motion filed with this Court on December 16, 1992,
petitioner prayed "for the issuance forthwith and ex parte of a
In order to warrant a finding of 'prejudicial' publicity as urged by the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction directing respondent judge to
petitioner, there must be allegation and proof that the judge has been allow petitioner to complete his defense evidence by presenting his last
unduly influenced, not simply that he might be, by the witness on the bail issue . . ." 24
"barrage" of publicity (Martelino vs. Alejandro, 32 SCRA 106; emphasis
supplied). While there is such allegation in the petition, the Court has On December 29, 1992, the Court passed a Resolution 25 issuing a
however found no proof so far adduced sufficient to accept the temporary restraining order (TRO) restraining respondent judge from
petitioner's claim that the respondent judge has been unduly influenced resolving the bail issue and directing him to allow petitioner to present
by the alleged publicity. his last witness. This Resolution was clarified and the TRO confirmed
in another Resolution issued by the Court on January 11, 1993. 26
Additionally, We quote hereunder the pronouncement of the
Supreme Court in the case of Aparicio vs. Andal, 175 SCRA 569 On January 8, 1993, the OSG filed a Comment on petitioner's Motion
where, citing the case of Pimentel vs. Salanga, 21 SCRA 160, it said: for Reconsideration.

Efforts to attain fair, just and impartial trial and decision, have a natural At the outset, it is noteworthy to observe that petitioner in this Motion
and alluring appeal. But, we are not licensed to indulge in unjustified for Reconsideration no longer raises the question of change of venue.
assumptions, or make a speculative approval to this ideal. It ill Moreover, the Motion for Reconsideration is predicated on what
behooves this Court to tar and feather a judge as biased or prejudiced, petitioner alleges are "the supervening events demonstrating partiality
simply because counsel for a party litigant happens to complain to the prosecution, on one hand, and hostility against petitioner, on the
against him. As applied here, respondent judge has not as yet crossed other." 27 Perforce, this Resolution shall only consider the allegations
the line that divides partiality and impartiality. He has not thus far and issues raised in this Motion for Reconsideration and in the
stepped to one side of the fulcrum. No act or conduct of his would Comment thereon filed by the OSG.
show arbitrariness or prejudice. Therefore, we are not to assume what
respondent judge, not otherwise legally disqualified, will do in a case Petitioner's Motion for Recusation filed before the trial court is based
before him. We have had occasion to rule in a criminal case that a on Rule 137, sec. 1, par. 2 of the Rules of Court on
charge made before trial that a party 'will not be given a fair, impartial disqualification of judges.
and just hearing' is 'premature.' Prejudice is not to be presumed.
Especially if weighed against a judge's legal obligation under his oath The Constitution commands that in all criminal prosecutions, the
to administer justice without respect to person and to equal right to the accused shall enjoy the right to have "a speedy, impartial, and public
poor and the rich.' To disqualify or not to disqualify himself then, as far trial." 28 (Emphasis supplied) This right is a derivation and
as respondent judge is concerned, is a matter of conscience." 18 elaboration of the more fundamental right to due
process of law. 29 The rule on the disqualification of judges is a
The Court of Appeals also sustained the trial court's mechanism for enforcing the requirements of due process. "It is now
denial of petitioner's Motion to Suspend Proceedings and Transfer beyond dispute that due process cannot be satisfied in the
Venue Outside Metro Manila with the following pronouncement: LexLib absence of that degree of objectivity on the part of a judge sufficient to
reassure litigants of his being fair and being just. Thereby there is the
"On the question of the denial by the respondent court of petitioner's legitimate expectation that the decision arrived at would be the
motion to suspend proceedings and transfer venue outside of Metro application of the law to the facts as found by a judge who does not
Manila, suffice it to say that the respondent court was correct in play favorites." 30
denying petitioner's motion. For indeed, the authority to order a
change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice is The "cold neutrality of an impartial judge," 31 although required
vested in the Supreme Court by Article VIII, Section 5, paragraph primarily for the benefit of the litigants, is also designed to preserve the
4 of the Constitution. Neither the respondent court nor this Court has integrity of the judiciary and more fundamentally, to gain and maintain
the authority to grant petitioner's motion for transfer of venue. The the people's faith in the institutions they have erected when they
cases cited by petitioner in support of this issuewere all decided by the adopted our Constitution. The notion that "justice must satisfy the
Supreme Court before the advent of the 1973 Constitution where the appearance of justice" 32 is an imposition by the citizenry, as the final
provision on transfer of venue was first adopted, hence not applicable judge of the conduct of public business, including trials, upon the
to the instant case." 19 courts of a high and uncompromising standard in the proper
dispensation of justice.
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the CA decision having been
denied, 20 a petition under Rule 45 was filed before this Court on July While bias and prejudice, which are relied upon by petitioner, have
29, 1992 assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals. On September been recognized as valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition 33 of the
9, 1992, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing judge under Rule 137, sec. 1, par. 2, 34 the established rule is that
respondent People of the Philippines, filed a Comment on the Petition. mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. There should be
clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge. 35 Bare
On September 23, 1992, the Court, after considering the allegations allegations of partiality and prejudgment will not suffice. 36 Bias and
contained, issues raised and the arguments adduced in the Petition, as prejudice cannot be presumed especially if weighed against a judge's
well as the Comment filed by the OSG, issued a Resolution denying sacred obligation under his oath of office to administer justice without
the Petition on the ground that the respect to person and do equal right to the poor and the rich. 37
In the Motion for Reconsideration now before the Court, petitioner, to "Pursuing his unconstitutional bent first evinced when, without
prove his allegation of bias on the part of respondent judge, takes the benefit of preliminary investigation, petitioner's arraignment and trial,
latter to task for continuing with the trial during the pendency of this then arrest and detention for almost a year was peremptorily ordered
petition stating that: — which this Court reversed and rebuked (G.R. no. 101837,
promulgated 11 February 1992) — the unchastened trial judge let out
"Even as the instant petition for the trial judge's recusation yet with two palpably biased and hostile orders, infra, clearly and
pends, the latter did not see fit to suspend the hearings. unmistakably demonstrating an unconstitutional
Indeed the trial judge has been conducting marathon prejudgment of petitioner's culpability." 46
hearings which, in the context of his questioned fairness and
impartiality, roars out as a railroad rush to make official a The first of these allegedly "palpably biased and hostile orders" was
pre-determined verdict of guilt." 38 that issued by respondent judge on August 14, 1992 overruling
petitioner's objection to the admissibility of an affidavit ofGeronimo
The Court draws the attention of petitioner and his counsels 39 to the Gonzaga offered by the prosecution. Petitioner contends that
procedure to be followed by the judge before whom a motion for respondent judge should not have admitted the extrajudicial
disqualification has been filed. Rule 137, sec. 2 provides: Cdpr statements of Gonzaga because the latter did not take the witness
stand to affirm the statements contained in the document presented by
"If it be claimed that an official is disqualified from sitting as above the prosecution. Petitioner suspected that respondent judge was trying
provided, the party objecting to his competency may, in writing, file with to bolster the evidence for the prosecution.
the official his objection, stating the grounds therefor, and the official
shall thereupon proceed with the trial, or withdraw therefrom, in This contention is without merit. The mere fact that the trial judge
accordance with his determination of the question of his overruled petitioner's objection to the admissibility of a particular
disqualification . . ." (Emphasis supplied) piece of evidence is not proof of bias. In Jandionco v. Peñaranda,47 it
was held that "[d]ivergence of opinions between a judge hearing a
In People v. Moreno, 40 we stated that if a judge denies the motion for case and a party's counsel, as to applicable laws and jurisprudence, is
disqualification and rules favorably on his competency to try the case, not a sufficient ground to disqualify the judge from hearing the case on
it becomes a matter of official duty for him to proceed with the trial and the ground of bias and manifest partiality." 48 If petitioner disagrees
decision of the case. He cannot shirk the responsibility without the with the judge's ruling, he may still question the admissibility of the
risk of being called upon to account for his dereliction. Although this evidence when he files an appeal, in case a judgment of conviction is
case was decided prior to the introductionof par. 2 of Rule 137, sec. 1, rendered. To conclude, however, that respondent judge, by overruling
there is no reason why the procedure laid down in Rule 137, sec. 2 the objection raised by petitioner's counsel, was trying to strengthen
and applied in People v. Moreno should not likewise apply to a motion the prosecution's evidence is not only baseless because there was no
for inhibition filed pursuant to Rule 137, sec. 1, par. 2. 41 In fact, evidence given to support this conclusion, but also premature because
in Genoblazo v. Court of Appeals, 42 the Court applied the procedure at that stage, the judge was not yet appreciating the merits and
prescribed in Rule 137, sec. 2 when the trial judge denied a party's weight of the particular piece of evidence in question but was merely
motion for inhibition under Rule 137, sec. 1, par. 2, thus: ruling on its admissibility. Petitioner's conclusion that "the offer and
admission of Gonzaga's hearsay 'eyewitness' statement suggest a
"Moreover, the trial judge acted correctly in proceeding with the case sinister concert to simulate evidential strength" 49 is, if not
by setting it for pre-trial since it is within her sound discretion, after her suggestive of paranoia, at the very least, an overreaction.
decision in favor of her own competency, to either proceed with the
trial or refrain from acting on the case until determination of the The other supervening event allegedly demonstrating the judge's
issue of her disqualification by the appellate court [Section 2 of Rule partiality occurred during one of the hearings concerning the
137 of the Revised Rules of Court; De la Paz v. Intermediate prosecution's motion for the cancellation of petitioner's bail. On
Appellate Court, supra, at 76]. 43 September 28, 1992, after eleven (11) witnesses had been presented
for the prosecution and two (2) for the defense, respondent judge
Hence, if the trial judge decides to deny a motion for inhibition based considered the cancellation of bail proceedings ripe for resolution and
on Rule 137, sec. 1, par. 2, he shall proceed with the trial, refused to allow petitioner's counsel to present anymore witnesses.
unless of course restrained by either the Court of Appeals or by The reasons given by respondent judge for his ruling were: (1) the
thisCourt. The mere filing of a motion for inhibition before the proceeding in the cancellation of bail is summary and different from the
trial court or a petition before either the Court of Appeals or the hearing on the merits; (2) the court need not receive exactly the same
Supreme Court challenging an order of the trial judge denying a motion number of witnesses from both the prosecution and the defense; and
for inhibition will not deprive the judge of authority to proceed with the (3) the counsel for petitioner previously limited himself to two (2)
case. Otherwise, by the expedient of filing such motion or petition, witnesses as borne out by the record of the case. 50
although the same be lacking in merit, a party can unduly delay the
trial. Respondent judge is correct in appreciating the nature of the bail
proceedings. "[T]he hearing of an application for bail should be
In the case at hand, respondent judge acted in accordance with the summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court. By 'summary
Rules and prevailing jurisprudence when he proceeded with the trial hearing' [is] meant such brief and speedy method of receiving and
after denying petitioner's Motion for Recusation. Petitioner cannot, considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with
therefore, cite the fact that respondent judge did not suspend hearing the purpose of the hearing which is merely to determine the
the case during the pendency of this petition as proof of his claim that weight of the evidence for the purpose of bail. In such a hearing,
the judge is partial. This Court has not, in connection with the petition, the court 'does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry
issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining respondent judge as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against
from further hearing the case. The TRO which this Court issued on accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what
December 29, 1992 after the petition was denied and pending this further evidence may be therein offered is admitted.' . . . The
Motion for Reconsideration ordered the judge to desist from resolving course of the inquiry may be left to the discretion of thecourt which
the question on the cancellation of bail until the last may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to
witness of petitioner was heard. The TRO did not restrain the judge substantial matters avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the
from hearing the case. On the contrary, the judge was ordered to hear examination and cross-examination of witnesses and reducing to a
petitioner's last witness in the cancellation of bail reasonable minimum the amount of corroboration particularly on
proceedings. 44 Because it was his duty to continue trying the case details that are not essential to the purpose of the hearing." 51
and there was no order from this Court not to do so, respondent judge
committed no impropriety evincing partiality when he continued hearing Although the proceedings conducted by respondent judge were not for
the case during the pendency of the petition before this Court. an application for bail but to cancel that which was issued to petitioner,
the principles and procedure governing hearings on an application for
Petitioner, in this Motion for Reconsideration, claims that since the bail were correctly applied by respondent judge in the
issuance of the Court Resolution dated September 23, 1992 denying cancellation of bail proceedings since the bail was issued by
his Petition, there have been "supervening events demonstrating this Court in G.R. No. 101837 without prejudice to any lawful order
partiality to the prosecution on one hand, and hostility against which the trial court may issue in case the Provincial Prosecutor moves
petitioner, on the other hand." 45 Petitioner alleges:
for the cancellation of the bail. 52 The grant of bail was made without 4. Motion to Suspend Proceedings
prejudice because where bail is not a matter ofright, as in this case, the and Transfer Venue Outside
prosecution must be given the opportunity to prove that there is a Metro Manila August 22, 1991
strong evidence of guilt. 53 In the cancellation of bail proceedings 5. Motion to Suspend Proceedings March 4,
before him, the judge was confronted with the same issue as in an 1991
application for bail, i.e., whether the evidence of guilt is so strong as to 6. Second Motion to Inhibit March 2, 1992
convince the court that the accused is not entitled to bail. Hence, the 7. Motion to Suspend Action on
similarity of the nature and procedure of the hearings for an application Formal Offer of Evidence and on
for bail and the cancellation of the same. cdrep Submission of Memorandum Dec. 21, 1992
8. Motion to Reopen Hearing and
Having determined that respondent judge made a proper Present Last Witness Dec. 1, 1992
appreciation of the nature of the bail proceedings before him, we
likewise hold that it was within his discretion to limit the Before this Court, petitioner has already filed three (3) petitions
number ofwitnesses for petitioner. The power of the court in the bail assailing various orders of respondent judge in connection with the
proceedings to make a determination as to whether or not the single murder case pending against him. Apart from the present
evidence of guilt is strong "implies a full exercise of judicial petition which is docketed as G.R. No. 106087, petitioner has
discretion." 54 If the trial judge believes that the evidence before him is previously filed two (2) other petitions docketed as G.R. Nos. 101837
sufficient for him to rule on the bail issue, after giving both parties their and 105424. In all three (3) petitions, petitioner applied for a temporary
opportunity to present evidence, it is within his authority to consider the restraining order to have the proceedings before the trial court held in
bail proceedings ripe for resolution. In any case, respondent judge abeyance.
acceded to petitioner's request and allowed him to present more
The murder case involving only one accused, the petitioner, has
witnesses in the bail proceedings.
become unnecessarily complicated and the proceedings before the
In fine, the Court holds that the respondent judge's ruling on trial court protracted, as can be gleaned from the fact that between the
September 28, 1992 considering the prosecution's motion for filing of the information on July 11, 1991 and the end of last year or
cancellation of bail ripe for resolution on the basis of the evidence December 31, 1992, the records of the case now consist of four (4)
already presented was not motivated by bias or prejudice. volumes and the transcript of stenographic notes have reached a
total of one thousand five hundred and twenty three (1523) pages.
Finally, petitioner, in this Motion for Reconsideration, restates his Hearings are still being conducted.
argument in the Petition that the respondent judge is biased, as
evidenced by his Order dated July 17, 1991 55 which in effect allowed When taken in the light of petitioner's repeated attempts to have the
petitioner's arraignment and trial without the benefit of a preliminary proceedings in the murder case suspended and his lawyers'
investigation. transparent maneuvers for the needless protraction of the case, the
Motion for Recusation can only be viewed as another dilatory move
It is true that in Go v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 101837, and the present Motion for Reconsideration a further ploy to stall
February 11, 1992, a divided Court nullified respondent judge's July hearings.
17, 1991 Order and ordered that a preliminary investigation be
conducted. But the erroneous Order of respondent judge is not In sum, after a careful examination of the records of the case, including
necessarily proof of partiality. In People v. Lacson, 56 we held that the transcript of stenographic notes, and considering the applicable
erroneous rulings do not always constitute law, the pertinent rules and prevailing jurisprudence, we reiterate our
evidence of bias. 57 InLuciano v. Mariano, 58 we made the holding in the Court Resolution dated September 23, 1992 that
pronouncement that "[t]he mere fact that the judge has erroneously the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in affirming the
ruled against the same litigant on two or more occasions does not respondent judge's Order which denied petitioner's Motion for
create in our minds a decisive pattern of malice on the part of the judge Recusation. This extended Resolution should put an end to petitioner's
against that particular litigant. This is not an unusual occurrence in our obvious attempts at deferring the trial of his principal case by dwelling
courts . . ." Moreover, the fact that the erroneous order issued by a on incidental matters. The motion for reconsideration must, perforce,
judge can be remedied and was actually corrected, as in this case, be denied with finality.
militates against the disqualification of the judge on the ground of bias
In the Comment on the petitioner's Motion for Recusation, the Solicitor
or partiality. 59
General prays that Attys. Raymundo A. Armovit, Miguel R. Armovit and
We have earlier underscored the importance of the Rafael R. Armovit, be disciplinarily dealt with by thisCourt for allegedly
rule of disqualification of judges, not only in safeguarding the using abusive and intemperate language against respondent judge
rights of litigants to due process of law but also in earning for the which betrays disrespect to the trial court. LLjur
judiciary the people's confidence, an element so essential in the
Indeed, in the Motion for Reconsideration, counsels for petitioner
effective administration of justice. The rule should, therefore, not be
describe as "unparalleled for sheer malevolence" 62 respondent
used cavalierly to suit a litigant's personal designs or to defeat the
judge's allegedly erroneous assumptions. Petitioner's lawyers further
ends ofjustice. "While We are exacting on the conduct of judges
stated: "Petitioner's counsel, citing the above proceedings, contested
confronted with motions for disqualification's, We cannot, however,
the trial judge's baseless, nay despotic attempt to muzzle his right to
tolerate acts of litigants who, for any conceivable reason, seek to
be heard in his defense . . ." 63 The trial judge's actions were also
disqualify a judge for their own purpose, under a plea of bias, hostility,
branded as an "obviously unholy rush to do petitioner in . . ." 64
prejudice or prejudgment . . . [T]his Court does not approve the
tactic of some litigants of filing of baseless motion for
In the Urgent Motion filed by petitioner on December 16, 1992,
disqualification of the judge as a means of delaying the case
respondent judge is alleged to have: (1) "generated belief of his being
and/or of forum-shopping for a more friendly judge." 60
under contract to do the prosecution's bidding;" (2) "evinced contempt
for Supreme Court case law;" and (3) "dishonored his judicial oath and
In the case at hand, the Motion for Recusation filed by petitioner must
duty to hear before he condemns, proceed upon inquiry, and render
be viewed in the light of his lawyers' many attempts to suspend the
judgment on a man's liberty only after a full trial of the facts." 65
proceedings before the respondent judge. Before the trialcourt,
petitioner tried at least eight (8) times, not merely to reset the
The Rules of Court commands members of the bar "[t]o observe and
scheduled hearings, 61 but to suspend the trial of the case itself. The
maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial
following pleadings filed by petitioner before respondent judge all officers." 66 Reinforcing this rule of conduct is the Code ofProfessional
prayed either to suspend the proceedings entirely or for the respondent
Responsibility which states in Canon 11 the following: "A lawyer shall
judge to delay the disposition of a particular issue:
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others." Rule
CAPTION OF PLEADING DATE OF FILING
11.03 of the Code further states: "A lawyer shall abstain from
1. Urgent Ex-Parte Motion July 19, 1991 scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behaviour before the
2. Motion to Hold in Abeyance August 2, 1991 courts." The next succeeding rule, Rule 11.03 adds: "A lawyer shall not
3. Motion for Recusation August 8, 1991
attribute to a judge motives not supported by the record or having
materiality to the case."

To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted

members of the bar, in pursuing their duty to advance the
interests of their clients, to use strong language. But this privilege is
not a license to malign our courts of justice. Irreverent behavior
towards the courts by members of the bar is proscribed, not so much
for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but more
importantly, for the maintenance of respect for our judicial system, so
necessary for the country's stability. "Time and again, this Court has
admonished and punished, in varying degrees, members of the bar for
statements, disrespectful or irreverent, acrimonious or
defamatory, of this Court or the lower courts . . . To be sure, lawyers
may come up with various methods, perhaps more effective, in calling
the Court's attention to the issues involved. The language vehicle does
not run short of expressions, emphatic but respectful, convincing but
not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive." 67

In light of the above doctrines and jurisprudence, as well as the

inherent power and authority of this Court to cite members of the Bar in
contempt and to discipline them, we are of the opinion that the
language used by petitioner's lawyers is highly derogatory, offensive
and contemptuous.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration

is DENIED with FINALITY. Attys. Raymundo A. Armovit, Miguel R.
Armovit and Rafael R. Armovit are hereby ordered to pay a
FINE of P500.00 each with a stern WARNING that a repetition of this
or similar act and language will be dealt with more severely. Let a
copy of this Resolution be attached to their records.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Melo, JJ ., concur.

||| (Go y Tambunting v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106087

(Resolution), [April 7, 1993])
 FIRST DIVISION confederating together and mutually helping
G.R. No. 95847-48 March 10, 1993 one another, armed with a piece of wood and
hallow (sic) block and with intent to kill one
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Clarito B. Blace, did then and there wilfully,
GABRIEL GERENTE y BULLO, accused-appellant. unlawfully and feloniously, with evident
premeditation and treachery, attack, assault and
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. hit with the said piece of wood and hollow block
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant. the said Clarito B. Blace, hitting the latter on the
different parts of his body, thereby inflicting
DECISION serious physical injuries which directly caused
the death of the said victim." (p. 3, Rollo.)
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J p:
Edna Edwina Reyes testified that at about 7:00 a.m. of
April 30, 1990, appellant Gabriel Gerente, together with Fredo
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Echigoren and Totoy Echigoren, started drinking liquor and
Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172, which found the smoking marijuana in the house of the appellant which is about
appellant guilty of Violation of Section 8 of Republic Act 6425 six (6) meters away from the house of the prosecution witness
(Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) and sentenced him to suffer the who was in her house on that day. She overheard the three men
penalty of imprisonment for a term of twelve (12) years and one talking about their intention to kill Clarito Blace. She testified that
(1) day, as minimum, to twenty (20) years, as maximum; and also she heard Fredo Echigoren saying, "Gabriel, papatayin natin si
found him guilty of Murder for which crime he was sentenced to Clarito Blace," and Totoy Echigoren allegedly seconded Fredo's
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The dispositive portion of suggestion saying: "Papatayin natin 'yan mamaya." Appellant
the appealed decision reads: allegedly agreed: "Sigue, papatayin natin mamaya." (pp. 3-4, tsn,
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing the August 24, 1990.)
Court finds the accused Gabriel Gerente in Fredo and Totoy Echigoren and Gerente carried out
Criminal Case No. 10255-V-90 guilty beyond their plan to kill Clarito Blace at about 2:00 p.m. of the same day.
reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 8 The prosecution witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, testified that she
of R.A. 6425 and hereby sentences him to witnessed the killing. Fredo Echigoren struck the first blow against
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve Clarito Blace, followed by Totoy Echigoren and
years and one day as minimum to twenty years Gabriel Gerente who hit him twice with a piece of wood in the
as maximum, and a fine of twelve thousand, head and when he fell, Totoy Echigoren dropped a hollow block
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of on the victim's head. Thereafter, the three men dragged Blace to
insolvency, and to pay the costs. a place behind the house of Gerente.
"In Criminal Case No. 10256-V-90, At about 4:00 p.m. of the same day, Patrolman Jaime
the Court finds the accused Urrutia of the Valenzuela Police Station received a report from the
Gabriel Gerente guilty beyond reasonable doubt Palo Police Detachment about a mauling incident. He went to the
of the crime of Murder, and there by (sic) no Valenzuela District Hospital where the victim was brought. He
aggravating circumstances nor mitigating was informed by the hospital officials that the victim died on
circumstances, is hereby sentenced to suffer arrival. The cause of death was massive fracture of the skull
the penalty of reclusion perpetua; to indemnify caused by a hard and heavy object. Right away, Patrolman
the heirs of the victim in the sum of P30,000.00, Urrutia, together with Police Corporal Romeo Lima and Patrolman
and in the amount of P17,609.00 as funeral Alex Umali, proceeded to Paseo de Blas where the mauling
expenses, without subsidiary imprisonment in incident took place. There they found a piece of wood with blood
case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The stains, a hollow block and two roaches of marijuana. They were
accused Gabriel Gerente shall be credited with informed by the prosecution witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, that
the full term of his preventive imprisonment." (p. she saw the killing and she pointed to Gabriel Gerente as one of
25, Rollo.) the three men who killed Clarito.
Appellant Gabriel Gerente y Bullo was charged with The policemen proceeded to the house of the appellant
Violation of Section 8, Art. II of R.A. 6425, which was docketed as who was then sleeping. They told him to come out of the house
Criminal Case No. 10255-V-90 of the Regional Trial Court of and they introduced themselves as policemen. Patrolman Urrutia
Valenzuela, Metro Manila. The Information reads: frisked appellant and found a coin purse in his pocket which
"That on or about the 30th day of contained dried leaves wrapped in cigarette foil. The dried leaves
April, 1990, in the municipality of Valenzuela, were sent to the National Bureau of Investigation for examination.
Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the The Forensic Chemist found them to be marijuana. LexLib
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- Only the appellant, Gabriel Gerente, was apprehended
named accused, without justification, did then by the police. The other suspects, Fredo and Totoy Echigoren,
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously are still at large.
have in his possession and control dried
flowering tops wrapped in foil with markings and
place in a transparent plastic bag which are
On May 2, 1990, two separate informations were filed
considered prohibited drugs." (p. 2, Rollo.)
by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Benjamin Caraig against him
The same accused, together with Totoy and Fredo for Violation of Section 8, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, and for Murder.
Echigoren who are both at large, was charged with Murder in
When arraigned on May 16, 1990, the appellant
Criminal Case No. 10256-V-90 in an information of the same date
pleaded not guilty to both charges. A joint trial of the two cases
and signed by the same Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, as
was held. On September 24, 1990, the trial court rendered a
follows: cdphil
decision convicting him of Violation of Section 8 of R.A. 6425 and
"That on or about the 30th day of of Murder.
April, 1990, in the municipality of Valenzuela,
In this appeal of the appellant, the following errors are
Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
ascribed to the trial court:
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused together with two (2) others 1. the court a quo gravely erred in admitting the
who are still at large and against whom the marijuana leaves adduced in evidence by the
preliminary investigation has not yet been prosecution; and
terminated by the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Bulacan, conspiring,
 2. the court a quo gravely erred in convicting the and all unlawful articles found in his person, or within his
accused-appellant of the crimes charged immediate control may be seized."
despite the absence of evidence required to
There is no merit in appellant's allegation that the trial
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
court erred in convicting him of having conspired and cooperated
The appellant contends that the trial court erred in with Fredo and Totoy Echigoren to kill Blace despite the testimony
admitting the marijuana leaves as evidence in violation of his of Dr. Valentin Bernales that the fracture on the back of the
constitutional right not to be subjected to illegal search and victim's skull could have been inflicted by one person only.
seizure, for the dried marijuana leaves were seized from him in What Dr. Bernales stated was a mere possibility that
the course of a warrantless arrest by the police officers. We do only one person dropped the concrete hollow block on the head of
not agree. the victim, smashing it. That circumstance, even if true, does not
The search of appellant's person and the seizure of the absolve the other two co-conspirators in the murder of Blace for
marijuana leaves in his possession were valid because they were when there is a conspiracy to commit a crime, the act of one
incident to a lawful warrantless arrest. conspirator is the act of all. The conspiracy was proven by the
eyewitness-testimony of Edna Edwina Reyes, that she overheard
Paragraphs (a) and (b), Section 5, Rule 113 of the the appellant and his companions conspire to kill Blace, that
Revised Rules of Court provide: acting in concert, they attacked their victim with a piece of wood
and a hollow block and caused his death. "When there is no
'SECTION 5. Arrest without warrant;
evidence indicating that the principal witness for the prosecution
when lawful. — A peace officer or a private
was moved by improper motive, the presumption is that he was
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
not so moved and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit"
"(a) When, in his presence, the (People vs. Belibet, 199 SCRA 587, 588). Hence, the trial court
person to be arrested has committed, is actually did not err in giving full credit to Edna Reyes' testimony. prcd
committing, or is attempting to commit an
Appellant's failure to escape (because he was very
offense;"
drunk) is no indicium of his innocence.
"(b) When an offense has in fact just
The Solicitor General correctly pointed out in the
been committed, and he has personal
appellee's brief that the award of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity for
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
the death of Clarito Blace should be increased to P50,000.00 in
be arrested has committed it; . . .'
accordance with our ruling in People vs. Sison, 189 SCRA 643.
The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3)
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby
hours after Gerente and his companions had killed Blace. They
AFFIRMED, with modification of the civil indemnity awarded to the
saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the
heirs of the victim, Clarito Blace, which is hereby increased to
scene of the crime, they found the instruments of death: a piece
P50,000.00.
of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used to
bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, SO ORDERED.
reported the happening to the policemen and pinpointed her
neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those Cruz, Bellosillo and Quiason, JJ ., concur.
circumstances, since the policemen had personal knowledge of
the violent death of Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente and
two others had killed him, they could lawfully ||| (People v. Gerente y Bullo, G.R. No. 95847-48, [March 10,
arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they had postponed his arrest 1993])
until they could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as
his two companions did. prLL
In Umil vs. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311, the arrest of the
accused without a warrant was effected one (1) day after he had
shot to death two Capcom soldiers. The arrest was held lawful by
this Court upon the rationale stated by us in People vs.
Malasugui, 63 Phil. 221, 228, thus:
"To hold that no criminal can, in any
case, be arrested and searched for the
evidence and tokens of his crime without a
warrant, would be to leave society, to a large
extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most
expert, and the most depraved of criminals,
facilitating their escape in many instances."
The search conducted on Gerente's person was
likewise lawful because it was made as an incident to a valid
arrest. This is in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the
Revised Rules of Court which provides:
"SECTION 12. Search incident to
lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may
be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search
warrant."
The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his
arrest was a permissible precautionary measure of arresting
officers to protect themselves, for the person who is about to be
arrested may be armed and might attack them unless he is first
disarmed. In Adams vs. Williams, 47 U.S. 143, cited in Justice
Isagani A. Cruz's Constitutional Law, 1991 Edition, p. 150, it was
ruled that "the individual being arrested may be frisked for
concealed weapons that may be used against the arresting officer
 FIRST DIVISION For its part, the defense presented SPO2 Jerome Cause as
G.R. No. 148825 December 27, 2002 its witness and had prosecution witness Mylene Cabunoc recalled to
be presented as hostile witness. It opted not to let SUSAN take the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,vs. witness stand.
SUSAN CANTON, appellant.
The evidence for the prosecution established that on 12
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. February 1998, at about 1:30 p.m., SUSAN was at the Ninoy Aquino
Perlas, De Guzman, Antonio, Venturanza, Quizon-Venturanza & International Airport (NAIA), being a departing passenger bound for
Herbosa Law Firm, Sandoval & Ozamiz for accused-appellant. Saigon, Vietnam. 2 When she passed through the metal detector
booth, a beeping sound was emitted. Consequently, Mylene Cabunoc,
SYNOPSIS a civilian employee of the National Action Committee on Hijacking and
Appellant was charge with violation of Section 16 of Article III Terrorism (NACHT) and the frisker on duty at that time, called her
of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425). At the attention, saying "Excuse me ma'am, can I search you?" 3 Upon
trial, the prosecution established that at the time of the commission of frisking SUSAN, Mylene felt something bulging at her abdominal area.
the crime, appellant was at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Mylene inserted her hand under the skirt of SUSAN, pinched the
(NAIA), being a departing passenger bound for Saigon, Vietnam. package several times and noticed that the package contained what
When she passed through metal detector booth, a beeping sound was felt like rice granules. 4 When Mylene passed her hand, she felt similar
emitted. Consequently, the frisker on duty frisked and searched packages in front of SUSAN's genital area and thighs. She
appellant. The frisker felt something bulging at appellant's abdominal asked SUSAN to bring out the packages, but the latter refused and
area so she was brought to a comfort room for a thorough physical said: "Money, money only." Mylene forthwith reported the matter to
examination. It was discovered that appellant was carrying packages SPO4 Victorio de los Reyes, her supervisor on duty. 5
containing shabu. After due proceedings, the trial court found her guilty
as charged. Hence, this appeal. aCITEH SPO4 De los Reyes instructed Mylene to call Customs
Examiner Lorna Jalac and bring SUSAN to a comfort room for a
In affirming the conviction of appellant, the Supreme Court thorough physical examination. Upon further frisking in the ladies'
ruled that the search was made pursuant to routine airport security room, Mylene touched something in front of SUSAN's sex organ. She
procedure, which is allowed under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6235. directed SUSAN to remove her skirt, girdles and
This constitutes another exception to the proscription against panty. SUSAN obliged. Mylene and Lorna discovered three packages
warrantless searches and seizures. In the said provision, passengers individually wrapped and sealed in gray colored packing tape,
are subject to search for prohibited materials or substances. To limit which SUSAN voluntarily handed to them. 6 The first was taken
the action of the airport security personnel to simply refusing her entry from SUSAN's abdominal area; the second, from in front of her genital
into the aircraft and sending her home, and thereby depriving them of area; and the third, from her right thigh. 7 Mylene turned over the
the ability and facility to act accordingly, including to further search packages to SPO4 De los Reyes. 8 The latter forthwith informed his
without warrant, in light of such circumstances, would be to sanction superior officer Police Superintendent Daniel Santos about the
impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of incident. Together with SUSAN, they brought the gray plastic packs to
society. Thus, the strip search in the ladies' room was justified under the customs examination table, opened the same and found that they
the circumstances. contained white crystalline substances 9 which, when submitted for
laboratory examination, yielded positive results for methamphetamine
The search conducted on appellant resulted in the discovery hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug. 10
and recovery of three packages containing shabu. Such warrantless
search and seizure was legal. Armed with the knowledge that appellant For the defense, SPO2 Jerome Cause, an investigator of the
was committing a crime, the airport security personnel and police First Regional Aviation Office, testified that no investigation was ever
authorities were duty-bound to arrest her. Her subsequent arrest conducted on SUSAN. 11 However, SUSAN signed a receipt of the
without a warrant was justified, since it was effected upon the following articles seized from her: (1) three bags of methamphetamine
discovery and recovery of shabu in her person flagrante delicto. hydrochloride or shabu approximately 1,100 grams; (2) one American
passport bearing Number 700389994; (3) one Continental Micronesia
DECISION plane ticket with stock control number 0414381077; and (4) two panty
girdles. 12 He said that he informed SUSAN of her constitutional rights
DAVIDE, JR.,C.J p: but admitted that she did not have a counsel when she signed the
receipt. 13 Yet he told her that she had the option to sign or not to sign
Appellant Susan Canton (hereafter SUSAN) was charged the receipt. 14
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City with the violation of
Section 16 of Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic When recalled as witness for the defense, Mylene merely
Act No. 6425), as amended, under an Information 1 whose accusatory reiterated the circumstances surrounding the arrest and search
portion reads as follows: of SUSAN and the seizure of the prohibited items found on her
person. 15
That on February 12, 1998 at the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport, and within After consideration of the evidence presented, the trial court
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the rendered a decision 16 finding SUSAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt
above named accused did then and there of the offense of violation of Section 16 of Article III ofRepublic Act No.
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously has in her 6425, as amended, and sentencing her to suffer the penalty
possession NINE HUNDRED NINETY EIGHT of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P1 million.
POINT TWO EIGHT HUNDRED ZERO NINE
(998.2809) GRAMS of methamphetamine SUSAN filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or New
hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without the Trial, 17 alleging therein that the trial judge erred in (1) giving weight to
corresponding prescription or license. the medical certificate executed by a certain Dr. Ma. Bernadette
Arcena because it was not presented in court nor marked or admitted,
CONTRARY TO LAW. and is therefore hearsay evidence; (2) upholding the presumption of
regularity in the performance of duty of police officers, since lady
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-0189 and frisker Mylene Cabunoc is not even a police officer; (3) making
raffled to Branch 110 of said court. statements which gave the impression that the burden of proof was
shifted to the accused; and (4) deliberately ignoring the decisive issue
SUSAN entered a plea of not guilty upon her arraignment. of how the evidence was secured. SUSAN also assailed the propriety
of the search and seizure without warrant on the ground that the
At the trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses Forensic seized items were not in plain view. Furthermore, alleging bias and
Chemist Julieta Flores, lady frisker Mylene Cabunoc, and SPO4 prejudice on the part of the trial judge, SUSAN filed a motion to inhibit
Victorio de los Reyes. Judge Porfirio G. Macaraeg from resolving the Motion for
Reconsideration and/or New Trial. 18
 After conducting a hearing on 24 November 2000 to resolve Anent the admission of the medical certificate issued by Dr.
appellant's Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial, as well as the Ma. Bernadette Arcena, the OSG argues that SUSAN's conviction was
Motion to Inhibit the Judge, the trial court issued an order19 on 26 not solely based on the questioned document but also on the fact that
November 2001 denying the motions. According to the trial judge (1) she was caught flagrante delicto in possession of a regulated drug
he explained to SUSAN's counsel the effects of the filing of a motion without being authorized by law. Consequently, it supports SUSAN's
for reconsideration, but the latter chose to magnify the judge's conviction but recommends the reduction of the fine from P1 million to
statement which was uttered in jest; (2) SUSAN's conviction was not P100,000.
based on the medical report which was not presented in court; (3)
there was no violation of SUSAN's constitutional rights because she We affirm SUSAN's conviction.
was never interrogated during her detention without counsel; and (4)
the specimens seized from her were found after a routine frisk at the We do not agree that the warrantless search and
airport and were therefore acquired legitimately pursuant to airport subsequent seizure of the regulated drugs, as well as the arrest
security procedures. of SUSAN, were violative of her constitutional rights.

Unsatisfied with the decision of the trial Sections 2 and 3(2) of Article III of the 1987
court, SUSAN seasonably appealed to us, imputing to the trial court Constitution provides:
the following errors: (1) in justifying the warrantless search against her
based on the alleged existence of probable cause; (2) in holding that Sec. 2. The right of the people to be
she was caught flagrante delicto and that the warrantless search was secure in their persons, houses, papers and
incidental to a lawful arrest; (3) in not ruling that the frisker went effects against unreasonable searches and
beyond the limits of the "Terry search" doctrine; (4) in not ruling seizures of whatever nature and for any
that SUSAN was under custodial investigation without counsel; (5) in purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
admitting to the records of the case the report of Dr. Ma. Bernadette warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
Arcena, which was not testified on or offered in evidence, and using upon probable cause to be determined
the same in determining her guilt; (6) in justifying under the rule on personally by the judge after examination under
judicial notice its cognizance of the medical report that has not been oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
offered in evidence; and (7) in applying the ruling in People v. witnesses he may produce, and particularly
Johnson. 20 describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
For assigned errors nos. 1 and 2, SUSAN asserts that the
strip search conducted on her in the ladies' room was constitutionally xxx xxx xxx
infirmed because it was not "incidental to an arrest." The arrest could
not be said to have been made before the search because at the time Sec. 3 ...
of the strip search, the arresting officers could not have known what
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation
was inside the plastic containers hidden on her body, which were
of this or the preceding section shall be
wrapped and sealed with gray tape. At that point then, they could not
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
have determined whether SUSAN was actually committing a crime.
The strip search was therefore nothing but a fishing expedition. Verily,
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search in
it is erroneous to say that she was caught flagrante delicto and that the
any particular case is a judicial question, determinable from a
warrantless search was incidental to a lawful arrest.
consideration of the circumstances involved. The rule is that
theConstitution bars State intrusions to a person's body, personal
For assigned error no. 3, SUSAN maintains that, following
effects or residence except if conducted by virtue of a valid search
the doctrine enunciated in Terry v. Ohio, 21 such stop and frisk search
warrant issued in compliance with the procedure outlined in
should have been limited to the patting of her outer garments in order
theConstitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court. 24
to determine whether she was armed or dangerous and therefore a
threat to the security of the aircraft.
The interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures
is not absolute. The recognized exceptions established by
For assigned error no. 4, SUSAN alleges that from the
jurisprudence are (1) search of moving vehicles; (2) seizure in plain
moment frisker Mylene felt a package at her abdominal area, started
view; (3) customs searches; (4) waiver or consented searches; (5) stop
inquiring about the contents thereof, detained her, and decided to
and frisk situations (Terry search); and (6) search incidental to a lawful
submit her to a strip search in the ladies' room, she was under
arrest. 25
custodial investigation without counsel, which was violative of Section
12, Article III of the Constitution.
I. The search conducted on SUSAN was not incidental
to a lawful arrest.
For assigned errors nos. 5 and 6, SUSAN assails the
propriety of the admission of the medical report executed by Dr. Ma. We do not agree with the trial court and the OSG that the
Bernadette Arcena on the ground that it was neither testified on nor search and seizure conducted in this case were incidental to a lawful
offered in evidence. arrest. SUSAN's arrest did not precede the search. When the metal
detector alarmed while SUSAN was passing through it, the lady frisker
Lastly, SUSAN questions the application of People v. on duty forthwith made a pat down search on the former. In the
Johnson 22 because of its sweeping statement allowing searches and process, the latter felt a bulge on SUSAN's abdomen. The strip search
seizures of departing passengers in airports in view of the gravity of that followed was for the purpose of ascertaining what were the
the safety interests involved. She stresses that the pertinent case packages concealed on SUSAN's body. If ever at the time SUSAN was
should have been Katz v. United States, 23 which upholds the Fourth deprived of her will and liberty, such restraint did not amount to an
Amendment of the United States of America that "protectspeople and arrest. Under Section 1 of Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
not places." Procedure, as amended, arrest is the "taking of a person into custody
in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an
In its Appellant's Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General offense."
(OSG) declares that SUSAN was found flagrante delicto in possession
of a regulated drug without being authorized by law. Thus, the case As pointed out by the appellant, prior to the strip search in
falls squarely within the exception, being a warrantless search the ladies' room, the airport security personnel had no knowledge yet
incidental to a lawful arrest. Moreover, SUSAN voluntarily submitted of what were hidden on SUSAN's body; hence, they did not know yet
herself to the search and seizure when she allowed herself to be whether a crime was being committed. It was only after the strip search
frisked and brought to the comfort room for further inspection by airport upon the discovery by the police officers of the white crystalline
security personnel. It likewise maintains that the methamphetamine substances inside the packages, which they believed to
hydrochloride seized from SUSAN during the routine frisk at the airport be shabu,that SUSAN was arrested. The search cannot, therefore, be
was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures. said to have been done incidental to a lawful arrest. In a search
incidental to a lawful arrest, the law requires that there be first a lawful
arrest before a search can be made; the process cannot be procedures and are therefore admissible in evidence against Leila.
reversed. 26 Corollarily, her subsequent arrest, although likewise without warrant,
was justified, since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery
II. The scope of a search pursuant to airport security of shabu in her person flagrante delicto.The Court held in this wise:
procedure is not confined only to search for
weapons under the "Terry search" doctrine. Persons may lose the protection of
the search and seizure clause by exposure of
The Terry search or the "stop and frisk" situation refers to a
their persons or property to the public in a
case where a police officer approaches a person who is acting
manner reflecting a lack of subjective
suspiciously, for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior in
expectation of privacy, which expectation
line with the general interest of effective crime prevention and
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.
detection. To assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing is
Such recognition is implicit in airport security
not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used
procedures. With increased concern over
against him, he could validly conduct a carefully limited search of the
airplane hijacking and terrorism has come
outer clothing of such person to discover weapons which might be
increased security at the nation's airports.
used to assault him. 27
Passengers attempting to board an aircraft
routinely pass through metal detectors; their
In the present case, the search was made pursuant to
carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage
routine airport security procedure, which is allowed under Section 9
are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should
of Republic Act No. 6235 reading as follows:
these procedures suggest the presence of
SEC. 9. Every ticket issued to a suspicious objects, physical searches are
passenger by the airline or air carrier concerned conducted to determine what the objects are.
shall contain among others the following There is little question that such searches are
condition printed thereon: "Holder hereof and reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness,
his hand-carried luggage(s) are subject to the gravity of the safety interests involved, and
search for, and seizure of, prohibited materials the reduced privacy expectations associated
or substances. Holder refusing to be searched with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often
shall not be allowed to board the aircraft," which notified through airport public address systems,
shall constitute a part of the contract between signs, and notices in their airline tickets that
the passenger and the air carrier. they are subject to search and, if any prohibited
materials or substances are found, such would
This constitutes another exception to the proscription against be subject to seizure. These announcements
warrantless searches and seizures. As admitted by SUSAN and shown place passengers on notice that ordinary
in Annex "D" of her Brief, the afore-quoted provision is stated in the constitutional protections against warrantless
"Notice to All Passengers" located at the final security checkpoint at searches and seizures do not apply to routine
the departure lounge. From the said provision, it is clear that the airport procedures.
search, unlike in the Terry search, is not limited to weapons.
Passengers are also subject to search for prohibited materials or SUSAN's reliance on Katz v. U.S. 29 is misplaced. The facts
substances. and circumstances of that case are entirely different from the case at
bar. In that case, the accused was convicted in the United States
In this case, after the metal detector District Court for the Southern District of California of transmitting
alarmed SUSAN consented to be frisked, which resulted in the wagering information by telephone. During the trial, the government
discovery of packages on her body. It was too late in the day for her to was permitted, over the accused's objection, to introduce evidence of
refuse to be further searched because the discovery of the packages accused's end of telephone conversations, which was overheard by
whose contents felt like rice granules, coupled by her FBI agents who had attached an electronic listening and recording
apprehensiveness and her obviously false statement that the packages device to the outside of the public telephone booth from which he
contained only money, aroused the suspicion of the frisker placed his calls. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
that SUSAN was hiding something illegal. It must be repeated that R.A. conviction. On certiorari,however, the Supreme Court of the United
No. 6235 authorizes search for prohibited materials or substances. To States of America reversed the decision, ruling that antecedent judicial
limit the action of the airport security personnel to simply refusing her authorization, which was not given in the instant case, was a
entry into the aircraft and sending her home (as suggested by constitutional precondition of the kind of electronic surveillance
appellant), and thereby depriving them of "the ability and facility to act involved. It ruled that what a person knowingly exposes to the public,
accordingly, including to further search without warrant, in light of such even in his own house or office, is not a subject the Fourth Amendment
circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectivity in law protection, but what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
enforcement, to the detriment of society." 28 Thus, the strip search in accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.
the ladies' room was justified under the circumstances.
The maxim — stare decisis et non quieta movere — invokes
III. The ruling in People v. Johnson is applicable to the adherence to precedents and mandates not to unsettle things which
instant case. are established. When the court has once laid down a principle of law
as applicable to a certain state of facts, it must adhere to that principle
The case of People v. Johnson,which involves similar facts and apply it to all future cases where the facts are substantially the
and issues, finds application to the present case. That case involves same. 30 There being a disparity in the factual milieu of Katz v.
accused-appellant Lelia Johnson, who was also a departing passenger U.S. and the instant case, we cannot apply to this case the ruling
bound for the United States via Continental Airlines CS-912. Olivia in Katz.
Ramirez was then the frisker on duty, whose task was to frisk
departing passengers, employees and crew to check for weapons, IV. The appellant, having been caught flagrante delicto,
bombs, prohibited drugs, contraband goods and explosives. When was lawfully arrested without a warrant.
Olivia frisked Leila, the former felt something hard on the latter's
abdominal area. Upon inquiry, Leila explained that she needed to wear Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended,
two panty girdles, as she had just undergone an operation as a result provides:
of an ectopic pregnancy. Not satisfied with the explanation, Olivia
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when
reported the matter to her superior, who then directed her to take Leila
lawful. — A peace officer or a private person
to the nearest women's room for inspection. In the comfort room, Leila
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
was asked "to bring out the thing under her girdle." She acceded and
brought out three plastic packs which contained a total of 580.2 grams
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.This Court ruled that the
arrested has committed, is actually
packs of "methamphetamine hydrochloride" seized during the routine
committing, or is attempting to commit
frisk at the airport was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security
an offense;
 (b) When an offense has just been committed having any morbid thoughts and perceptual
and he has probable cause to believe disturbances. (Italics supplied).
based on personal knowledge of facts
or circumstances that the person to This argument is meritorious. The admission of the questioned
be arrested has committed it; and document was erroneous because it was not properly identified.
Nevertheless, even without the medical report, appellant's
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner conviction will stand, as the court's finding of guilt was not based
who has escaped from a penal on that document.
establishment or place where he is
VII. SUSAN's conviction and the penalty imposed on
serving final judgment or is
her are correct.
temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being Having found the warrantless search and seizure conducted
transferred from one confinement to in this case to be valid, we do not hesitate to rule that that the three
another. packages of shabu recovered from SUSAN are admissible in evidence
against her. Supported by this evidence and the testimonies of the
In cases failing under paragraphs (a) prosecution witnesses, her conviction must inevitably be sustained.
and (b) above, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the Sections 16 and 20 of Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act
nearest police station or jail and shall be of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), as amended, provides:
proceeded against in accordance with Section 7
of Rule 112. SEC. 16. Possession or Use of
Regulated Drugs.— The penalty of reclusion
The present case falls under paragraph (a) of the afore- perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five
quoted Section. The search conducted on SUSAN resulted in the hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos
discovery and recovery of three packages containing white crystalline shall be imposed upon any person who shall
substances, which upon examination yielded positive results for possess or use any regulated drug without the
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.As discussed earlier, such corresponding license or prescription, subject to
warrantless search and seizure were legal. Armed with the knowledge the provisions of Section 20 hereof.
that SUSAN was committing a crime, the airport security personnel
and police authorities were duty-bound to arrest her. As held xxx xxx xxx
in People v. Johnson,her subsequent arrest without a warrant was
justified, since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery SEC. 20. Application of Penalties,
of shabu in her person flagrante delicto. confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or
Instruments of the Crime.— The penalties for
V. The constitutional right to counsel afforded an offenses under Section 3, 4, 7, 8, and 9 of
accused under custodial investigation was Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of
not violated. Article III of this Act shall be applied if the
dangerous drugs involved [are] in any of the
Entrenched is the rule that the rights provided in Section 12,
following quantities:
Article III of the Constitution may be invoked only when a person is
under "custodial investigation" or is "in custody xxx xxx xxx
interrogation."31 Custodial investigation refers to the "questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into 3. 200 grams or more of shabu or
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any methylamphetamine
significant way." 32 This presupposes that he is suspected of having hydrochloride ...
committed a crime and that the investigator is trying to elicit information
or a confession from him. 33 And the right to counsel attaches upon There being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the
the start of such investigation. 34 The objective is to prohibit proper penalty is reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 63(2) of the
"incommunicado" interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated Revised Penal Code.
atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statements without full
warnings of constitutional rights. 35 As regards the fine, courts may fix any amount within the
limits established by law. For possession of regulated drugs, the law
In this case, as testified to by the lone witness for the fixes the range of the fine from P500,000 to P10 million. In view of the
defense, SPO2 Jerome Cause, no custodial investigation was net weight of methamphetamine hydrochloride found in the possession
conducted after SUSAN's arrest. She affixed her signature to the of SUSAN, the trial court's imposition of fine in the amount of P1 million
receipt of the articles seized from her, but before she did so, she was is well within the range prescribed by law.
told that she had the option to sign or not to sign it. In any event, her
signature to the packages was not relied upon by the prosecution to VIII. The other items seized from the appellant should
prove its case. Moreover, no statement was taken from her during her be returned to her.
detention and used in evidence against her. 36 Hence, her claim of
violation of her right to counsel has no leg to stand on. AIDSTE Section 3 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure authorizes the confiscation of the following:
VI. The admission of the medical report was erroneous.
SEC. 3. Personal property to be
SUSAN assails, on the ground of violation of the hearsay seized. — A search warrant may be issued for
rule, the admission of the medical report on the physical and medical the search and seizure of personal property:
examination conducted upon appellant's request, which contained the
following: (a) Subject of the offense;

On subsequent examinations, she (b) Stolen or embezzled and other

was seen behaved and cooperative. She proceeds, or fruits of the
related that she was an illegitimate daughter, offense; or
married, but divorced in 1995. She verbalized, "I
gamble like an addict. I gambled since I was (c) Used or intended to be used as
young and I lost control of myself when I played the means of committing an
cards. When I lost control, I want my money offense.
back. I owe other people lots of money. I lost all
the cash of my husband. This is the first time I Clearly, the seizure of SUSAN's passport, plane tickets, and
carried shabu.I need the money." She denied girdles exceeded the limits of the afore-quoted provision. They,
therefore, have to be returned to her. 37
 IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 110, in Criminal Case No.
98-0189 finding appellant SUSAN CANTON guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the violation of Section 16, Article III of the Dangerous Act of
1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), as amended, and sentencing her to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of One Million
Pesos (P1,000,000) and the costs is hereby AFFIRMED. The
appellant's passport, plane tickets, and girdles are hereby ordered to
be returned to her. DaESIC

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Vitug, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

||| (People v. Canton, G.R. No. 148825, [December 27, 2002], 442
PHIL 743-764)
 THIRD DIVISION Hence, this appeal.
G.R. No. 99050 September 2, 1992
In the Appellant's Brief, accused imputes upon the trial court the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. commission of the following errors.
CONWAY B. OMAWENG, accused-appellant.
"I
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. . . . IN CONVICTING THE
Joel C. Obar for accused-appellant. ACCUSED DESPITE INSUFFICIENCY
OF EVIDENCE TO PROVE HIS GUILT
DECISION BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
DAVIDE, JR., J p:
II
Accused Conway B. Omaweng was originally indicted for the violation . . . IN NOT CONSIDERING
of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as THE JOINT CLARIFICATORY
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, in a criminal complaint STATEMENT OF THE ARRESTING
filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Bontoc, Mountain Province on 12 OFFICERS TO THE EFFECT THAT
September 1988. 1 Upon his failure to submit counter-affidavits despite THE ACCUSED IS NOT THE OWNER
the granting of an extension of time to do so, the court declared that he OF THE PROHIBITED DRUG
had waived his right to a preliminary investigation and, finding probable SUBJECT OF THIS CASE.
cause against the accused, ordered the elevation of the case to the
proper court. 2 III
. . . IN NOT RULING THAT
On 14 November 1988, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Mountain THE CONTRABAND SUBJECT OF
Province filed an Information charging the accused with the violation THE INSTANT CASE IS
of Section 47 Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE FOR
amended. The accusatory portion thereof reads: Cdpr HAVING BEEN OBTAINED IN
VIOLATION OF THE
"That on or about September 12, 1988, at CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE
Dantay, Bontoc, Mountain Province, and within ACCUSED AGAINST
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the UNREASONABLE SEARCH (sic) AND
above-named accused, without being SEIZURE." 7
authorized by law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously dispatch in transit or The appeal is without merit. The decision appealed from must be
transport in a Ford Fiera, owned and driven by upheld.
him, 10 1/4 kilos of processed marijuana in
powder form contained in al plastic bags of After a careful review and evaluation of the evidence, We find to have
different sizes which were placed in a travelling been fully proven the following facts as summarized by the Solicitor
bag destained (sic) and intended for delivery, General in the Brief for the Appellee. 8
disposition and sale in Sagada, Mountain
Province, with full knowledge that said "In the morning of September 12, 1988, Joseph
processed marijuana is (sic) prohibited drug or Layong, a PC constable with the Mt. Province
from which (sic) prohibited drug may be PC Command at Bontoc, Mt. Province
manufactured. proceeded with other PC soldiers to Barrio
Dantay, Bontoc and, per instruction of their
CONTRARY TO LAW." 3 officer, Capt. Eugene Martin, put up a
checkpoint at the junction of the roads, one
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 713. going to Sagada and the other to Bontoc (TSN,
November 9, 1989, pp. 3-4). They stopped and
After his motion for reinvestigation was denied by the Provincial checked all vehicles that went through the
Fiscal, 4 the accused entered a plea of not guilty during his checkpoint (TSN, April 5, 1990, p. 12).
arraignment on 20 June 1989.
At about 9:15 A.M., Layong and his teammate,
During the trial on the merits, the prosecution presented four (4) Constable David Osborne Famocod (sic), saw
witnesses. The accused did not present any evidence other than and flagged down a cream-colored Ford Fiera
portions of the Joint Clarificatory Sworn Statement, dated 23 bearing Plate No. ABT-634 coming from the
December 1988, of prosecution witnesses Joseph Layong and David Bontoc Poblacion and headed towards Baguio
Fomocod. (TSN, November 9, 1989, pp. 4-5, 8). The
vehicle was driven by appellant and had no
On 21 March 1991, the trial court promulgated its
passengers (TSN, November 9, 1989, pp. 4-5).
Judgment 5 convicting the accused of the crime of transporting
prohibited drugs penalized under Section 4, Article II of R.A. No. 6425, Layong and his companions asked permission
as amended. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: to inspect the vehicle and appellant acceded to
the request. (TSN, November 9, 1989, pp. 4-5).
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
When they peered into the rear of the vehicle,
imposing upon the accused herein the penalty
they saw a travelling bag which was partially
of life imprisonment and a fine of Twenty Five
covered by the rim of a spare tire under the
Thousand Pesos.
passenger seat on the right side of the vehicle
Pursuant to Sec. 20, Art. IV of the aforecited (TSN, November 9, 1989, pp. 6, 10, 11). LibLex
special law, the drugs subject of the crime are
Layong and his companions asked permission
ordered confiscated and forfeited in favor of the
to see the contents of the bag (TSN, November
Government. Accordingly, it is further directed
9, 1989, p. 6). Appellant consented to the
that such drugs so confiscated and forfeited be
request but told them that it only contained
destroyed without delay per existing rules and
some clothes (TSN, November 9, 1989, p. 6).
regulations on the matter.
When Layong opened the bag, he found that it
Costs against the accused. contained forty-one (41) plastic packets of
different sizes containing pulverized substances
SO ORDERED." 6 (TSN, November 9, 1989, pp. 7, 9).
 Layong gave a packet to his team leader, placed by an unknown person in the bag of the accused, is not
constable David Osborne Fomocod, who, after supported by evidence. Said sworn statement cannot be used as a
sniffing the stuff concluded that it was marijuana basis for exoneration because the very same officers who signed the
(TSN, November 9, 1989, p. 16). same reiterated on the witness stand their statements in their original
affidavit implicating the accused, both the criminal complaint before the
The PC constables, together with appellant, Municipal Trial Court of Lontoc and the information in this case were
boarded the latter's Ford Fiera and proceeded based on this original affidavit. No probative value could be assigned
to the Bontoc poblacion to report the incident to to it not only because it was procured by the defense under
the PC Headquarters (TSN, November 9, 1989, questionable circumstances, but also because the affiants therein
pp. 7-8) The prohibited drugs were surrendered merely expressed their personal opinion. The trial court's correct
to the evidence custodian, Sgt. Angel Pokling exposition on this point, to which nothing more may be added,
(TSN, November 9, 1989, pp. 7-8). deserves to be quoted, thus:

"From the portions of the 'Joint Clarificatory

Sworn Statement- of prosecution witnesses
Major Carlos Figueroa, a PC Forensic Chemist Layong and Fomocod cited (Exhs. "I" to "I-C"; p
at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet, who 155, Record), the defense would want this
has conducted more than 2500 professional Court to draw the inference that the accused
examinations of marijuana, shabu and cocaine Conway Omaweng is innocent as confirmed by
samples, conducted two chemistry no less than the persons who apprehended the
examinations of the substance contained in the suspect in flagranti (sic). In other words, that the
plastic packets taken from appellant and found said accused is not the owner of the contraband
them to be positive for hashish or marijuana confiscated but someone else; that to (sic)
(TSN, October 24, 1990, pp. 3, 5-81)." 9 mysterious individual placed the prohibited
articles inside the travelling bag of the accused
Anent the first assigned error, the accused contends that the without the knowledge and consent of the latter;
prosecution failed to prove that he is the owner of the marijuana found and that the identity of this shadowy third
inside the travelling bag which he had in his vehicle, a Ford Fiera. person is known by the PC/INP investigators.
Proof of ownership is immaterial. Accused was prosecuted for the The isolated declarations, albeit under oath are
dispatching in transit or transporting of prohibited drugs pursuant to much too asinine to be true and do not affect
Section 4, Article II of R.A. No. 6425, as amended. This section does the credibilities of the witnesses — affiants and
not require that for one to be liable for participating in any of the the truth of their affirmations on the stand. As
proscribed transactions enumerated therein, he must be the owner of gleaned from parts of the record of the
the prohibited drug. It simply reads: reinvestigation of this case conducted by the
Provincial Fiscal (Exhs "G" and "D"; pp. 158 and
"SEC. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, 161, Record), it appears that Layong and
Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Fomocod were prevailed upon to affix their
Drugs. — The penalty of life imprisonment to signatures to (sic) the document styled as 'Joint
death and a fine ranging from twenty thousand Clarificatory Sworn Statement' by interested
to thirty thousand pesos shall be imposed upon persons in a vain ploy to extricate the accused
any person who, unless authorized by law, shall from the morass he got himself into. Testifying
sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, in open court, the same witnesses maintained
distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any the tenor of their original affidavit supporting the
prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any filing of the criminal complaint in the lower court
of such transactions. If the victim of the offense (Exh. "C"; p. 2, Record) No additional
is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved information was elicited from said witnesses
in any offense under this Section be the during their examination from which it can
proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, reasonably be deduced that a third person
the maximum penalty herein provided shall be instead of the accused is the culprit and that the
imposed." suspect is being framed-up for a crime he did
not commit. Nonetheless,
This section penalizes the pusher, who need not be the owner of the
granting arguendo that the declarations of
prohibited drug. The law defines pusher as "any person who sells,
Layong and Fomocod now the bone of
administers, delivers, or gives away to another, on any terms
contention, are on the level, the same are but
whatsoever, or distributes, dispatches in transit or transports any
mere opinions and conclusions without bases.
dangerous drug or who acts as a broker in any of such transactions, in
Any which way, to believe that any person in his
violation of this Act. 10
right mind owning several kilos of hot hashish
In People vs. Alfonso, 11 where the accused was charged with the worth tens of thousands of pesos would simply
stash it away in the travelling bag of someone
unlawful transportation of marijuana under the aforesaid Section 4, this
he has no previous agreement with is a
Court ruled that ownership is not a basic issue. LexLib
mockery of common sense. And to think further
The facts, as proven by the prosecution, establish beyond cavil that the that the PC/INP agents know of such fact yet
accused was caught in the act of transporting the prohibited drug or, in they kept the vital information under 'confidential
other words, in flagrante delicto. That he knew fully well what he was Status' (whatever that means in police parlance)
doing is shown beyond moral certainty by the following circumstances: while an innocent person is being prosecuted
(a) the prohibited drug was found in a travelling bag, (b) he is the and practically in the shadow of the gallows for
owner of the said bag, (c) he concealed the bag behind a spare tire, (d) the offense would be stretching human credulity
he was travelling alone, and (e) the Ford Fiera in which he loaded the to the snapping point. By and large, the fact
bag was under his absolute control, pursuant to Section 4, Rule 133 of remains as the circumstances logically indicate
the Rules of Court (on circumstantial evidence), the combination of all that the accused Conway Omaweng has
these circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond knowledge of the existence of the contraband
reasonable doubt. Such circumstances, unrebutted by strong and inside his vehicle and he was caught red-
convincing evidence by the accused, even gave rise to the handed transporting the hot stuff." 13
presumption that he is the owner of the prohibited drug. 12
The third assignment of error hardly deserves any consideration.
The second assigned error is devoid of merit. The declaration in the Accused was not subjected to any search which may be stigmatized as
joint clarificatory sworn statement executed by the apprehending a violation of his Constitutional right against unreasonable searches
officers, that the marijuana subject of the case was surreptitiously and seizures. 14 If one had been made, this Court would be the first to
condemn it "as the protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his irrelevant evidence not admissible in court;
constitutional rights is one of the highest duties and privileges of the
Court." 15 He willingly gave prior consent to the search and voluntarily "A-1" to "A-40" Objected to also as irrelevant as
agreed to have it conducted on his vehicle and travelling bag. the 40
Prosecution witness Joseph Layong testified thus: llcd
bags now being offered are not the same
"PROSECUTOR AYOCHOK:
bags alleged in the information which is 41
Q When you and David Fomocod saw the
travelling bag, what did you do? bags. The prosecution failed to proved (sic)

A When we saw that travelling bag, we asked beyond reasonable doubt that Exhibit "A-1"
the driver if we could see the
contents. to "A-40" are the same bags allegedly taken

Q And what did or what was the reply of the

driver, if there was any?
from inside Exhibit "A" because what is
A He said 'you can see the contents but those
are only clothings (sic).' supposed to be inside the bag are 41 bags

Q When he said that, what did you do? and not 40 bags."

A We asked him if we could open and see it. xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, the decision of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of
Q When you said that, what did he tell you? Bontoc, Mountain Province of 21 March 1991 in Criminal Case No. 713
finding the accused CONWAY B. OMAWENG guilty beyond
A He said you can see it. reasonable doubt of the crime charged, is hereby AFFIRMED.
Q And when he said 'you can see and open it,' Costs against the accused.
what did you do?
SO ORDERED.
A When I went inside and opened the bag, I
saw that it was not clothings (sic) that Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Romero, JJ ., concur.
was contained in the bag.
Feliciano, J ., is on leave.
Q And when you saw that it was not clothings
(sic), what did you do?

A When I saw that the contents were not

clothes, I took some of the contents
and showed it to my companion
Fomocod and when Fomocod
smelled it, he said it was
marijuana." 16

This testimony was not dented on cross-examination or rebutted by the

accused for he chose not to testify on his own behalf.

Thus, the accused waived his right against unreasonable searches and
seizures As this Court stated in People vs. Malasugui: 17

". . . When one voluntarily submits to a search

or consents to have it made of (sic) his person
or premises, he is precluded from later
complaining thereof (Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, 8th ed., vol. I, page 631.) The right
to be secure from unreasonable search may,
like every right, be waived and such waiver may
be made either expressly or impliedly."

Since in the course of the valid search forty-one (41) packages of

drugs were found, it behooved the officers to seize the same; no
warrant was necessary for such seizure. Besides, when said packages
were identified by the prosecution witnesses and later on formally
offered in evidence, the accused did not raise any objection
whatsoever. Thus, in the accused's Comments And/Or Objections To
Offer of Evidence, 18 We merely find the following: LLphil

"EXHIBIT COMMENTS AND/OR OBJECTIONS

"A" The bag was not positively identified to

be the same bag allegedly found inside

the vehicle driven by the accused. The

arresting officers failed to show any

identifying marks; thug, said bag is an

 FIRST DIVISION On September 21, 1996, at around 10:00 in the evening,
G.R. Nos. 136066-67 February 4, 2003 SPO2 Mario Nulud and PO2 Emmeraldo Nunag received a report from
their confidential informant that accused-appellant was about to deliver
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. drugs that night at the Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago, Angeles City.
BINAD SY CHUA, accused-appellant. The informer further reported that accused-appellant distributes illegal
drugs in different karaoke bars in Angeles City. On the basis of this
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. lead, the PNP Chief of Angeles City, Col. Neopito Gutierrez,
Ola & Asso. Law Offices for accused-appellant. immediately formed a team of operatives composed of Major
Bernardino, Insp. Tullao, Insp. Emmanuel Nunag, PO2 Emmeraldo
SYNOPSIS Nunag, SPO1 Fernando Go, and some civilian assets, with SPO2
Accused was charged with Violation of the Dangerous Drugs Mario Nulud, as team investigator. The group of SPO2 Nulud, PO2
Law and with Illegal Possession of Ammunition. After trial, he was Nunag and the civilian informer positioned themselves across
acquitted of Illegal Possession of Firearms for insufficiency of McArthur Highway near Bali Hai Restaurant, fronting Thunder Inn
evidence, but was convicted of Illegal possession of shabu. Hotel. The other group acted as their back up.
On appeal, he questioned the validity of the warrantless
arrest and consequent search and seizure made upon him. At around 11:45 in the evening, their informer pointed to a
car driven by accused-appellant which just arrived and parked near the
The Court acquitted the accused on the ground of entrance of the Thunder Inn Hotel. After accused-appellant alighted
reasonable doubt. The Court ruled that neither the in flagrante from the car carrying a sealed Zest-O juice box, SPO2 Nulud and PO2
delicto nor the "stop and frisk" principles are applicable to justify the Nunag hurriedly accosted him and introduced themselves as police
warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure made by the officers. As accused-appellant pulled out his wallet, a small transparent
police operatives on the accused. In acquitting the accused, the Court plastic bag with a crystalline substance protruded from his right back
noted the following circumstances: the appellant was first arrested pocket. Forthwith, SPO2 Nulud subjected him to a body search which
before the search and seizure of the alleged illegal items found in his yielded twenty (20) pieces of live .22 caliber firearm bullets from his left
possession; at the time of the arrest, accused did not exhibit manifest back pocket. When SPO2 Nunag peeked into the contents of the Zest-
unusual or suspicious conduct; the arrest of the accused was not a O box, he saw that it contained a crystalline substance. SPO2 Nulud
product of an "on the spot" tip which may excuse them from obtaining instantly confiscated the small transparent plastic bag, the Zest-O juice
a warrant of arrest; the prohibited substances were not in plain view of box, the twenty (20) pieces of .22 caliber firearm bullets and the car
the arresting officers, hence, inadmissible for being the fruits of the used by accused-appellant. Afterwards, SPO2 Nulud and the other
poisonous tree; there was also no clear showing that the items police operatives who arrived at the scene brought the confiscated
allegedly seized from accused were the same prohibited items items to the office of Col. Gutierrez at the PNP Headquarters in Camp
presented in court, since they were not marked at the place where they Pepito, Angeles City. 3
were seized.
When Col. Gutierrez opened the sealed Zest-O juice box, he
DECISION found 2 big plastic bags containing crystalline substances. The initial
field test conducted by SPO2 Danilo Cruz at the PNP Headquarters
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p: revealed that the seized items contained shabu. 4 Thereafter, SPO2
Nulud together with accused-appellant brought these items for further
Accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua was charged with laboratory examination to the Crime Laboratory at Camp Olivas, San
violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A. Fernando, Pampanga. After due testing, forensic chemist S/Insp. Daisy
7659, and for Illegal Possession of ammunitions in two separate Babor concluded that the crystalline substances yielded positive
Informations which read as follows: results for shabu. The small plastic bag weighed 13.815 grams while
the two big plastic bags weighed 1.942 kilograms of shabu. 5
Criminal Case No. 96-507 1
Accused-appellant vehemently denied the accusation
That on or about the 21st day of against him and narrated a different version of the incident.
September 1996, in the City of Angeles,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Accused-appellant alleged that on the night in question, he
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, was driving the car of his wife to follow her and his son to Manila. He
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and felt sleepy, so he decided to take the old route along McArthur
feloniously have in his possession and under Highway. He stopped in front of a small store near Thunder Inn Hotel
his control two (2) plastic bags containing in Balibago, Angeles City to buy cigarettes and candies. While at the
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (SHABU) store, he noticed a man approach and examine the inside of his car.
weighing more or less two (2) kilos and one (1) When he called the attention of the onlooker, the man immediately
small plastic bag containing Methamphetamine pulled out a .45 caliber gun and made him face his car with raised
Hydrochloride weighing more or less fifteen (15) hands. The man later on identified himself as a policeman. During the
grams, which is a regulated drug, without any course of the arrest, the policeman took out his wallet and instructed
authority whatsoever. him to open his car. He refused, so the policeman took his car keys
and proceeded to search his car. At this time, the police officer's
Criminal Case No. 96-513 2 companions arrived at the scene in two cars. PO2 Nulud, who just
arrived at the scene, pulled him away from his car in a nearby bank,
That on or about the 21st day of while the others searched his car.
September 1996, in the City of Angeles,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Thereafter, he was brought to the Salakot Police Station and
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, was held inside a bathroom for about fifteen minutes until Col.
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and Gutierrez arrived, who ordered his men to call the media. In the
feloniously have in his possession and under presence of reporters, Col. Gutierrez opened the box and accused-
his control twenty (20) pieces of live .22 cal. appellant was made to hold the box while pictures were being taken. 6
ammunitions, without first having obtained a
license or permit to possess or carry the same. Wilfredo Lagman corroborated the story of the accused-
appellant in its material points. He testified that he witnessed the
Accused-appellant pleaded "not guilty" on arraignment. The incident while he was conducting a routine security check around the
two cases were then jointly tried. premises of the Guess Building, near Thunder Inn Hotel. 7

The prosecution presented three (3) witnesses, all members On September 15, 1998 the Regional Trial Court of Angeles
of the police force of Angeles City. Their testimonies can be City, Branch 59, rendered a decisions, 8 the dispositive portion of
synthesized as follows: which reads:
 WHEREFORE, the foregoing review and this includes the review of the penalty and indemnity
considered, judgment is hereby rendered as imposed by the trial court. 12 We are clothed with ample authority to
follows: review matters, even those not raised on appeal, if we find that their
consideration is necessary in arriving at a just disposition of the case.
1. In Criminal Case No. 96-513 for Illegal Every circumstance in favor of the accused shall be
Possession of Ammunitions, the considered. 13 This is in keeping with the constitutional mandate that
accused is hereby acquitted of the every accused shall be presumed innocent unless his guilt is proven
crime charged for insufficiency of beyond reasonable doubt.
evidence.
First, with respect to the warrantless arrest and consequent
2. In Criminal Case No. 96-507 for Illegal search and seizure made upon accused-appellant, the court a
Possession of 1,955.815 grams quo made the following findings:
of shabu, accused Binad Sy Chua is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable Accused was searched and arrested
doubt of the crime charge and is while in possession of regulated drugs (shabu).
hereby sentenced to suffer the A crime was actually being committed by the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to accused and he was caughtin flagrante
pay a fine of One Million delicto. Thus, the search made upon his
(P1,000,000.00) Pesos. personal effects . . . allow a warrantless search
incident to a lawful arrest. . . .
SO ORDERED. 9
While it is true that the police officers
Hence, the instant appeal where accused-appellant raised were not armed with a search warrant when the
the following errors: search was made over the personal affects (sic)
of the accused, however, under the
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED circumstances of the case, there was sufficient
GRAVELY IN ITS FOLLOWING FINDINGS: probable cause for said officers to believe that
accused was then and there committing a
A. THE ARREST OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT crime.
BINAD SY CHUA WAS LAWFUL;
xxx xxx xxx
B. THE SEARCH OF HIS PERSON AND THE
SUBSEQUENT CONFISCATION In the present case, the police
OF SHABU ALLEGEDLY FOUND ON received information that the accused will
HIM WERE CONDUCTED IN A distribute illegal drugs that evening at the
LAWFUL AND VALID MANNER; Thunder Inn Hotel and its vicinities. The police
officer had to act quickly and there was no more
C. THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE time to secure a search warrant. The search is
SUPPORTING THE CRIME valid being akin to a "stop and frisk". 14
CHARGED IS SUFFICIENT TO
PROVE THE GUILT OF THE A thorough review of the evidence on record belies the
ACCUSED-APPELLANT BEYOND findings and conclusion of the trial court. It confused the two different
REASONABLE DOUBT. 10 concepts of a search incidental to a lawful arrest (in flagrante delicto)
and of a "stop-and-frisk."
Accused-appellant maintains that the warrantless arrest and
search made by the police operatives was unlawful; that in the light of In Malacat v. Court of Appeals, 15 we distinguished the
the testimony of SPO2 Nulud that prior to his arrest he has been under concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search incidental to a lawful
surveillance for two years, there was therefore no compelling reason arrest, to wit:
for the haste within which the arresting officers sought to arrest and
search him without a warrant; that the police officers had sufficient At the outset, we note that the trial
information about him and could have easily arrested him. Accused- court confused the concepts of a "stop-and-
appellant further argues that since his arrest was null and void, the frisk" and of a search incidental to a lawful
drugs that were seized should likewise be inadmissible in evidence arrest. These two types of warrantless searches
since they were obtained in violation of his constitutional rights against differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof
unreasonable search and seizures and arrest. before they may be validly effected and in their
allowable Scope.
Accused-appellant's argument is impressed with merit.
In a search incidental to a lawful
Although the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the
witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to great respect and will not validity of the incidental search, the legality of
be disturbed on appeal, however, this rule is not a hard and fast one. the arrest is questioned in a large majority of
these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely
It is a time-honored rule that the used as a pretext for conducting a search. In
assessment of the trial court with regard to the this instance, the law requires that there first be
credibility of witnesses deserves the utmost arrest before a search can be made—the
respect, if not finality, for the reason that the trial process cannot be reversed. At bottom,
judge has the prerogative, denied to appellate assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer
judges, of observing the demeanor of the may search the person of the arrestee and the
declarants in the course of their testimonies. area within which the latter may reach for a
The only exception is if there is a showing that weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize
the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or any money or property found which was used in
misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the
and substance that would have affected the crime, or that which may be used as evidence,
case. 11 or which might furnish the arrestee with the
means of escaping or committing violence.
In the case at bar, there appears on record some facts of
weight and substance that have been overlooked, misapprehended, or xxx xxx xxx
misapplied by the trial court which casts doubt on the guilt of accused-
appellant. An appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for
 We now proceed to the justification We find the two aforementioned elements lacking in the case
for and allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk" as at bar. The record reveals that when accused-appellant arrived at the
a "limited protective search of outer clothing for vicinity of Thunder Inn Hotel, he merely parked his car along the
weapons," as laid down in Terry, thus: McArthur Highway, alighted from it and casually proceeded towards
the entrance of the Hotel clutching a sealed Zest-O juice box.
We merely hold Accused-appellant did not act in a suspicious manner. For all intents
today that where a police and purposes, there was no overt manifestation that accused-appellant
officer observes unusual has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
conduct which leads him crime.
reasonably to conclude in
light of his experience that However, notwithstanding the absence of any overt act
criminal activity may be strongly manifesting a violation of the law, the group of SPO2 Nulud
afoot and that the persons "hurriedly accosted" 19 accused-appellant and later on "introduced
with whom he is dealing themselves as police officers." 20 Accused-appellant was arrested
may be armed and before the alleged drop-off of shabu was done. Probable cause in this
presently dangerous, where case was more imagined than real. Thus, there could have been no in
in the course of flagrante delicto arrest preceding the search, in light of the lack of an
investigating this behavior overt physical act on the part of accused-appellant that he had
he identifies himself as a committed a crime, was committing a crime or was going to commit a
policeman and makes crime. As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it has been held that
reasonable inquiries, and "reliable information" alone, absent any overt act indicative of a
where nothing in the initial felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the
stages of the encounter arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that
serves to dispel his would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. 21 Hence, in People
reasonable fear for his own v. Amminudin, 22 we ruled that "the accused-appellant was not, at the
or others' safety, he is moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was
entitled for the protection of about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was
himself and others in the descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no
area to conduct a carefully outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he
limited search of the outer was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the
clothing of such persons in vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of
an attempt to discover the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to
weapons which might be apprehension" (Emphasis supplied).
used to assault him. Such a
search is a reasonable The reliance of the prosecution in People v. Tangliben 23 to
search under the Fourth justify the police's actions is misplaced. In the said case, based on the
amendment. information supplied by informers, police officers conducted a
surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal compound in San Fernando,
Other notable points of Terry are that Pampanga against persons who may commit misdemeanors and also
while probable cause is not required to conduct on those who may be engaged in the traffic of dangerous drugs. At
a "stop-and-frisk," it nevertheless holds 9:30 in the evening, the policemen noticed a person carrying a red
that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate travelling bag who was acting suspiciously. They confronted him and
a "stop-and-frisk." A genuine reason must exist, requested him to open his bag but he refused. He acceded later on
in light of the police officer's experience and when the policemen identified themselves. Inside the bag
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that were marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic wrapper. The police
the person detained has weapons concealed officers only knew of the activities of Tangliben on the night of his
about him. Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a arrest.
two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of
effective crime prevention and detection, which In the instant case, the apprehending policemen already had
underlies the recognition that a police officer prior knowledge from the very same informant of accused-appellant's
may, under appropriate circumstances and in activities. No less than SPO2 Mario Nulud, the team leader of the
an appropriate manner, approach a person for arresting operatives, admitted that their informant has been telling
purposes of investigating possible criminal them about the activities of accused-appellant for two years prior to his
behavior even without probable cause; and (2) actual arrest on September 21, 1996. An excerpt of the testimony of
the more pressing interest of safety and self- SPO2 Mario Nulud reveals the illegality of the arrest of accused-
preservation which permit the police officer to appellant as follows:
take steps to assure himself that the person
with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly Q. Did the civilian informer of yours mentioned
weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be to you the name of this chinese drug
used against the police officer. 16 (Emphasis pusher?
ours)
A. He is mentioning the name of Binad or Jojo
In the case at bar, neither the in flagrante delicto nor the Chua.
"stop and frisk" principles is applicable to justify the warrantless arrest
and consequent search and seizure made by the police operatives on Q. And he had been mentioning these names to
accused-appellant. you even before September 21,
1996?
In in flagrante delicto arrests, the accused is apprehended at
the very moment he is committing or attempting to commit or has just A. Yes, sir.
committed an offense in the presence of the arresting officer.
Emphasis should be laid on the fact that the law requires that the Q. How long did this civilian informant have
search be incidental to a lawful arrest. Therefore it is beyond cavil that been telling you about the activities of
a lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his this chinese drug pusher reckoning in
belongings. 17 Accordingly, for this exception to apply two elements relation to September 21, 1996?
must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
A. That was about two years already.
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
Q. Notwithstanding his two years personal
presence or within the view of the arresting officer. 18
knowledge which you gained from the
 civilian informant that this chinese two years previous to the actual arrest, there was indeed no reason
drug pusher have been engaged why the police officers could not have obtained a judicial warrant
pushing drugs here in Angeles City, before arresting accused-appellant and searching his person.
you did not think of applying for a Whatever information their civilian asset relayed to them hours before
search warrant for this chinese drug accused-appellant's arrest was not a product of an "on the-spot" tip
pusher? which may excuse them from obtaining a warrant of arrest.
Accordingly, the arresting team's contention that their arrest of
A. No, sir. accused-appellant was a product of an "on-the-spot" tip is untenable.

xxx xxx xxx In the same vein, there could be no valid "stop-and-frisk" in
this case. A stop-and-frisk was defined as the act of a police officer to
Q. When you accosted this Binad Chua, he was
stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for
casually walking along the road near
weapon(s) 25 or contraband. The police officer should properly
the Thunder Inn Hotel, is that right?
introduce himself and make initial inquiries, approach and restrain a
A. He was pinpointed by the civilian informer person who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to
that he is the chinese drug pusher check the latter's outer clothing for possibly concealed
that will deliver to him also. weapons. 26 The apprehending police officer must have a genuine
reason, in accordance with the police officer's experience and the
Q. My question Mr. Witness, is this Jojo Chua or surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to be held
Binad Chua the accused in this case has weapons (or contraband) concealed about him. 27 It should
he alighted with a Corolla car with therefore be emphasized that a search and seizure should precede the
plate number 999, I think, he just arrest for this principle to apply. 28
alighted when you saw him?
This principle of "stop-and-frisk" search was invoked by the
A. Yes, sir. Court in Manalili v. Court of Appeals. 29 In said case, the policemen
chanced upon the accused who had reddish eyes, walking in a
Q. From the car when he alighted, he casually swaying manner, and who appeared to be high on drugs. Thus, we
walked towards near the entrance of upheld the validity of the search as akin to a "stop-and-frisk." InPeople
the Thunder Inn Hotel? v. Solayao, 30 we also found justifiable reason to "stop-and-frisk" the
accused after considering the following circumstances: the drunken
A. He was about to proceed towards Thunder actuations of the accused and his companions, the fact that his
Inn Hotel but he was pinpointed companions fled when they saw the policemen, and the fact that the
already by the civilian informer. peace officers were precisely on an intelligence mission to verify
reports that armed persons where roaming the vicinity.
Q. But he was just walking towards the entrance
of the Thunder Inn Hotel? The foregoing circumstances do not obtain in the case at
bar. There was no valid "stop-and-frisk" in the case of accused-
A. Yes, sir, he is about to enter Thunder Inn appellant. To reiterate, accused-appellant was first arrested before the
Hotel. search and seizure of the alleged illegal items found in his possession.
The apprehending police operative failed to make any initial inquiry into
xxx xxx xxx accused-appellant's business in the vicinity or the contents of the Zest-
O juice box he was carrying. The apprehending police officers only
Q. While he was walking, then you and PO2
introduced themselves when they already had custody of accused-
Nunag pounced on him as you used
appellant. Besides, at the time of his arrest, accused-appellant did not
pounced on him in your affidavit?
exhibit manifest unusual and suspicious conduct reasonable enough to
A. Yes, sir. dispense with the procedure outlined by jurisprudence and the law.
There was, therefore, no genuine reasonable ground for the
xxx xxx xxx immediacy of accused-appellant's arrest.

Q. And you pounced on Jojo Chua before you Obviously, the acts of the police operatives wholly depended
saw that alleged small plastic bag, is on the information given to them by their confidential informant.
that correct? Accordingly, before and during that time of the arrest, the arresting
officers had no personal knowledge that accused-appellant had just
A. Yes, sir. committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime.
Q. And after that you also confiscated this Zesto At any rate, even if the fact of delivery of the illegal drugs
juice box? actually occurred, accused-appellant's warrantless arrest and
consequent search would still not be deemed a valid "stop-and frisk".
A. Yes, sir. For a valid "stop-and frisk" the search and seizure must precede the
arrest, which is not so in this case. Besides, as we have earlier
xxx xxx xxx emphasized, the information about the illegal activities of accused-
Q. But would you agree with me that not all appellant was not unknown to the apprehending officers. Hence, the
crystalline substance is shabu? search and seizure of the prohibited drugs cannot be deemed as a
valid "stop-and-frisk".
A. No, that is shabu and it is been a long time
that we have been tailing the accused Neither can there be valid seizure in plain view on the basis
that he is really a drug pusher. of the seized items found in accused-appellant's possession. First,
there was no valid intrusion. Second, the evidence, i.e., the plastic
Q. So you have been tailing this accused for bags found in the Zest-O juice box which contained crystalline
quite a long time that you are very substances later on identified as methamphetamine hydrochloride
sure that what was brought by him (shabu) and the 20 rounds of .22 caliber ammunition, were not
was shabu? inadvertently discovered. The police officers first arrested accused-
appellant and intentionally searched his person and peeked into the
A. Yes, sir. 24 sealed Zest-O juice box before they were able to see and later on
ascertain that the crystalline substance was shabu. There was no clear
The police operatives cannot feign ignorance of the alleged showing that the sealed Zest-O juice box accused-appellant carried
illegal activities of accused-appellant. Considering that the identity, contained prohibited drugs. Neither were the small plastic bags which
address and activities of the suspected culprit was already ascertained allegedly contained crystalline substance and the 20 rounds of .22
caliber ammunition visible. These prohibited substances were not in
plain view of the arresting officers; hence, inadmissible for being the
fruits of the poisonous tree.

In like manner, the search cannot be categorized as a

search of a moving vehicle, a consented warrantless search, or a
customs search. It cannot even fall under exigent and emergency
circumstances, for the evidence at hand is bereft of any such showing.

All told, the absence of ill-motive on the part of the arresting

team cannot simply validate, much more cure, the illegality of the
arrest and consequent warrantless search of accused-appellant.
Neither can the presumption of regularity of performance of function be
invoked by an officer in aid of the process when he undertakes to
justify an encroachment of rights secured by the
Constitution. 31 In People v. Nubla, 32 we clearly stated that:

The presumption of regularity in the

performance of official duty cannot be used as
basis for affirming accused-appellant's
conviction because, first, the presumption is
precisely just that — a mere presumption. Once
challenged by evidence, as in this case, . . . [it]
cannot be regarded as binding truth. Second,
the presumption of regularity in the performance
of official functions cannot preponderate over
the presumption of innocence that prevails if not
overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Furthermore, we entertain doubts whether the items

allegedly seized from accused-appellant were the very same items
presented at the trial of this case. The record shows that the initial field
test where the items seized were identified as shabu, was only
conducted at the PNP headquarters of Angeles City. 33 The items
were therefore not marked at the place where they were taken.
In People v. Casimiro, 34 we struck down with disbelief the reliability of
the identity of the confiscated items since they were not marked at the
place where they were seized, thus:

The narcotics field test, which initially

identified the seized item as marijuana, was
likewise not conducted at the scene of the
crime, but only at the narcotics office. There is
thus reasonable doubt as to whether the item
allegedly seized from accused-appellant is the
same brick of marijuana marked by the
policemen in their headquarters and given by
them to the crime laboratory.

The government's drive against illegal drugs needs the

support of every citizen. But it should not undermine the fundamental
rights of every citizen as enshrined in the Constitution. The
constitutional guarantee against warrantless arrests and unreasonable
searches and seizures cannot be so carelessly disregarded as
overzealous police officers are sometimes wont to do. Fealty to the
constitution and the rights it guarantees should be paramount in their
minds, otherwise their good intentions will remain as such simply
because they have blundered. The criminal goes free, if he must, but it
is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more
quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard
of the charter of its own existence. 35

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the

Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 59, in Criminal Cases
Nos. 96-507 and 96-513, convicting accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua
of violation of Section 16, Article III, Republic Act No. 6425 and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetuaand to pay a
fine of P1,000,000.00, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-
appellant Binad Sy Chua is ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable
doubt. Consequently, he is ordered forthwith released from custody,
unless he is being lawfully held for another crime.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

 THIRD DIVISION Republic Act No. 6425, as amended (Illegal
G.R. No. 113447 October 9, 1997 Possession of Marijuana residue), and hereby
sentences (sic) said accused to suffer
ALAIN MANALILI y DIZON, petitioner, vs. imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1)
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE DAY; and to pay a fine of P6,000.00; and to pay
PHILIPPINES, respondents. the costs.

SYNOPSIS xxx xxx xxx"

Alain Manalili y Dizon was charged with violation of Section 8, Article II Appellant remained on provisional liberty. 7 Atty. Benjamin
of Republic Act No. 6425. After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Razon, counsel for the defense, filed a Notice of Appeal 8 dated May
Caloocan City rendered a decision convicting appellant of illegal 31, 1989. On April 19, 1993, Respondent Court 9 promulgated its
possession of marijuana residue. The accused was sentenced to suffer assailed Decision, denying the appeal and affirming the trial court: 10
imprisonment of six years and one day and to pay a fine of P6,000.00
and to pay the costs. The conviction of petitioner was based on the "ACCORDINGLY, the decision
strength of the arresting officers' testimony. On appeal, the Court of appealed from dated May 19, 1989 is hereby
Appeals found no proof that the decision of the trial court was based AFFIRMED in all respects. Costs against
on speculations, surmises or conjectures. Hence, this petition for appellant."
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the
reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals. cdasia Respondent Court 11 denied reconsideration via its assailed
The Supreme Court affirmed the assailed decision with Resolution dated January 20, 1994, disposing:
modification as to the imposable penalty. The Court held that the
"ACCORDINGLY, accused-
search made was valid, being akin to a stop-and-frisk. The general rule
appellant's motion for reconsideration is, as is
is that a search and seizure must be validated by a previously secured
hereby DENIED."
judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure is unconstitutional
and subject to challenge. This right, however is not absolute. Stop-and-
The Facts
frisk has already been adopted as another exception to the general
rule against a search without a warrant. Version of the Prosecution

DECISION The facts, as found by the trial court, are as follows: 12

PANGANIBAN, J p: "At about 2:10 o'clock in the afternoon

of April 11, 1988, policemen from the Anti-
Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City Police
When dealing with a rapidly unfolding and potentially Station were conducting a surveillance along A.
criminal situation in the city streets where unarguably there is no time Mabini street, Kalookan City, in front of the
to secure an arrest or a search warrant, policemen should employ Kalookan City Cemetery. The policemen were
limited, flexible responses — like "stop-and-frisk" — which are Pat. Romeo Espiritu and Pat. Anger Lumabas
graduated in relation to the amount of information they possess, the and a driver named Arnold Enriquez was driving
lawmen being ever vigilant to respect and not to violate or to treat a Tamaraw vehicle which was the official car of
cavalierly the citizen's constitutional rights against unreasonable arrest, the Police Station of Kalookan City. The
search and seizure. surveillance was being made because of
information that drug addicts were roaming the
The Case area in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery.
This rule is reiterated as we resolve this petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal Upon reaching the Kalookan City
of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 19, 1993 and its Cemetery, the policemen alighted from their
Resolution dated January 20, 1994 in CA G.R. CR No. 07266, entitled vehicle. They then chanced upon a male person
"People of the Philippines vs. Alain Manalili y Dizon." in front of the cemetery who appeared high on
drugs. The male person was observed to have
In an Information dated April 11, 1988, 1 Petitioner Alain reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying
Manalili y Dizon was charged by Assistant Caloocan City Fiscal E. manner. When this male person tried to avoid
Juan R. Bautista with violation ofSection 8, Article II of Republic Act the policemen, the latter approached him and
No. 6425, allegedly committed as follows: 2 introduced themselves as police officers. The
policemen then asked the male person what he
"That on or about the 11th day of April was holding in his hands. The male person tried
1988 in Caloocan City, MM, Philippines and to resist. Pat. Romeo Espiritu asked the male
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, person if he could see what said male person
the above-named accused without any authority had in his hands. The latter showed the wallet
of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and allowed Pat. Romeo Espiritu to examine the
and feloniously have in his custody, possession same. Pat. Espiritu took the wallet and
and control crushed marijuana residue, which is examined it. He found suspected crushed
a prohibited drug and knowing the same to be marijuana residue inside. He kept the wallet and
such. its marijuana contents. aisadc

Contrary to Law." The male person was then brought to

the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City
Upon his arraignment on April 21, 1988, appellant pleaded Police Headquarters and was turned over to
"not guilty" to the charge. 3 With the agreement of the public Cpl. Wilfredo Tamondong for investigation. Pat.
prosecutor, appellant was released after filing a P10,000.00 bail Espiritu also turned over to Cpl. Tamondong the
bond. 4 After trial in due course, the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan confiscated wallet and its suspected marijuana
City, Branch 124, acting as a Special Criminal Court, rendered on May contents. The man turned out to be the accused
19, 1989 a decision 5 convicting appellant of illegal possession of ALAIN MANALILI y DIZON.
marijuana residue. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: 6
Upon receipt of the confiscated
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the suspected marijuana residue from Pat. Espiritu,
foregoing, this Court finds the accused ALAIN Cpl. Tamondong wrapped the same with a
MANALILI Y DIZON guilty beyond reasonable white sheet of paper on which he wrote
doubt of violation of Section 8, Article II, of 'Evidence 'A' 4/11/88 Alain Manalili'. The white
 sheet of paper was marked as Exhibit 'E-3'. The the tricycle driver to go while they brought the
residue was originally wrapped in a smaller accused to the police headquarters at Kalookan
sheet of folded paper. (Exhibit 'E-4'). City where they said they would again search
the accused.
Cpl. Tamondong next prepared a
referral slip addressed to the NBI Forensic On the way to the police
Chemistry Section requesting a chemical headquarters, the accused saw a neighbor and
analysis of the subject marijuana residue signaled the latter to follow him. The neighbor
(Exhibit 'D'). Cpl. Tamondong thereafter thus followed the accused to the Kalookan City
prepared a Joint Affidavit of the apprehending Police Headquarters. Upon arrival thereat, the
policemen (Exhibit 'A'). Pat. Angel Lumabas accused was asked to remove his pants in the
handcarried the referral slip (Exhibit 'D') to the presence of said neighbor and another
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), including companion. The policemen turned over the
the subject marijuana residue for chemical pants of the accused over a piece of bond
analysis. The signature of Pat. Lumabas paper trying to look for marijuana. However,
appears on the left bottom corner of Exhibit 'D'. nothing was found, except for some dirt and
dust. This prompted the companion of the
The Forensic Chemistry Section of neighbor of the accused to tell the policemen to
the NBI received the aforesaid referral slip and release the accused. The accused was led to a
the subject marijuana residue at 7:40 o'clock in cell. The policemen later told the accused that
the evening of April 11, 1988 as shown on the they found marijuana inside the pockets of his
stamped portion of Exhibit 'D'. pants.

It was NBI Aida Pascual who At about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon
conducted the microscopic and chemical on the same day, the accused was brought
examinations of the specimen which she outside the cell and was led to the Ford Fiera.
identified. (Exhibit 'E') 13 Mrs. Pascual referred The accused was told by the policemen to call
to the subject specimen as 'crushed marijuana his parents in order to 'settle' the case. The
leaves' in her Certification dated April 11, 1988 policemen who led the accused to the Ford
(Exhibit 'F'). 14 These crushed marijuana leaves Fiera were Pat. Lumabas, Pat. Espiritu and Cpl.
gave positive results for marijuana, according to Tamondong. Pat. Lumabas was the policeman
the Certificate. who told the accused to call his parents. The
accused did not call his parents and he told the
Mrs. Pascual also conducted a policemen that his parents did not have any
chromatographic examination of the specimen. telephone.
In this examination, she also found that the
'crushed marijuana leaves' gave positive results At about 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon
for marijuana. She then prepared a Final Report of the same day, the accused was brought in
of her examinations (Exhibit 'G'). the office of an inquest Fiscal. There, the
accused told the Fiscal that no marijuana was
After conducting the examinations, found on his person but the Fiscal told the
Ms. Pascual placed the specimen in a white accused not to say anything. The accused was
letter-envelope and sealed it. (Exhibit 'E'). She then brought back to the Kalookan City Jail.
then wrote identification notes on this letter-
envelope. (Exhibit 'E-1'). Loreto Medenilla, the tricycle driver
who was allegedly with the accused when he
Pat. Lumabas carried the Certification and the accused were stopped by policemen
marked as Exhibit 'F' from the NBI Forensic and then bodily searched on April 11, 1988,
Chemistry Section to Cpl. Tamondong. Upon testified. He said that the policemen found
receipt thereof, Cpl. Tamondong prepared a nothing either on his person or on the person of
referral slip addressed to the City Fiscal of the accused when both were searched on April
Kalookan City. (Exhibit 'C')" 11, 1988.
On rebuttal, Pat. Espiritu testified that appellant was not Roberto Abes, a neighbor of the
riding a tricycle but was walking in front of the cemetery when he was accused, testified that he followed the accused
apprehended. 15 at the Kalookan City Police Headquarters on
April 11, 1988. He said that the police searched
Version of the Defense the accused who was made to take off his pants
The trial court summarized the testimonies of the defense at the police headquarters but no marijuana was
witnesses as follows: 16 found on the body of the accused".

"At about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon Appellant, who was recalled to the stand as sur-rebuttal
of April 11, 1988, the accused ALAIN MANALILI witness, presented several pictures showing that tricycles were
was aboard a tricycle at A. Mabini street near allowed to ply in front of the Caloocan Cemetery. 17
the Kalookan City Cemetery on the way to his
boarding house. Three policemen ordered the The Rulings of the Trial and the Appellate Courts
driver of the tricycle to stop because the tricycle The trial court convicted petitioner of illegal possession of
driver and his lone passenger were under the marijuana residue largely on the strength of the arresting officers
influence of marijuana. The policemen brought testimony. Patrolmen Espiritu and Lumabas were "neutral and
the accused and the tricycle driver inside the disinterested" witnesses, testifying only on what transpired during the
Ford Fiera which the policemen were riding in. performance of their duties. Substantially, they asserted that the
The policemen then bodily searched the appellant was found to be in possession of a substance which was
accused and the tricycle driver. At this point, the later identified as crushed marijuana residue.
accused asked the policemen why he was
being searched and the policemen replied that The trial court disbelieved appellant's defense that this
he (accused) was carrying marijuana. However, charge was merely "trumped up," because the appellant neither took
nothing was found on the persons of the any legal action against the allegedly erring policemen nor moved for a
accused and the driver. The policemen allowed reinvestigation before the city fiscal of Kalookan City.
 On appeal, Respondent Court found no proof that the of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate
decision of the trial court was based on speculations, surmises or him, and pat him for weapon(s):
conjectures. On the alleged "serious" discrepancies in the testimonies
of the arresting officers, the appellate court ruled that the said ". . . (W)here a police officer observes
inconsistencies were insubstantial to impair the essential veracity of an unusual conduct which leads him reasonably
the narration. It further found petitioner's contention — that he could to conclude in light of his experience that
not be convicted of illegal possession of marijuana residue — to be criminal activity may be afoot and that the
without merit, because the forensic chemist reported that what she persons with whom he is dealing may be armed
examined were marijuana leaves. cda and presently dangerous, where in the course
of investigating this behavior he identified
Issues himself as a policeman and makes reasonable
inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages
Petitioner assigns the following errors on the part of Respondent
of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable
Court.
fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled
"I for the protection of himself and others in the
area to conduct a carefully limited search of the
The Court of Appeals erred in outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to
upholding the findings of fact of the trial court. discover weapons which might be used to
assault him. Such a search is a reasonable
II search under the Fourth Amendment, and any
weapon seized may properly be introduced in
The Court of Appeals erred in evidence against the person from whom they
upholding the conviction of (the) accused (and) were taken." 19
in ruling that the guilt of the accused had been
proved (beyond) reasonable doubt. In allowing such a search, the United States Supreme Court
held that the interest of effective crime prevention and detection allows
III a police officer to approach a person, in appropriate circumstances and
manner, for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even
The Court of Appeals erred in not though there is insufficient probable cause to make an actual arrest.
ruling that the inconsistencies in the testimonies This was the legitimate investigative function which Officer McFadden
of the prosecution witnesses were material and discharged in that case, when he approached petitioner and his
substantial and not minor. companion whom he observed to have hovered alternately about a
street corner for an extended period of time, while not waiting for
IV anyone; paused to stare in the same store window roughly 24 times;
and conferred with a third person. It would have been sloppy police
The Court of Appeals erred in not
work for an officer of 30 years experience to have failed to investigate
appreciating the evidence that the accused was
this behavior further.
framed for the purpose of extorting money.
In admitting in evidence two guns seized during the stop-
V
and-frisk, the US Supreme Court held that what justified the limited
search was the more immediate interest of the police officer in taking
The Court of Appeals erred in not
steps to assure himself that the person with whom he was dealing was
acquitting the accused when the evidence
not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used
presented is consistent with both innocence and
against him.
guilt.
It did not, however, abandon the rule that the police must,
VI
whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches
The Court of Appeals erred in and seizures through the warrant procedure, excused only by exigent
admitting the evidence of the prosecution which circumstances.
are inadmissible in evidence."
In Philippine jurisprudence, the general rule is that a search
Restated more concisely, petitioner questions (1) the and seizure must be validated by a previously secured judicial warrant;
admissibility of the evidence against him, (2) the credibility of otherwise, such search and seizure is unconstitutional and subject to
prosecution witnesses and the rejection by the trial and the appellate challenge. 20 Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, gives this
courts of the defense of extortion, and (3) the sufficiency of the guarantee:
prosecution evidence to sustain his conviction.
"SEC. 2. The right of the people to be
The Court's Ruling secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and
The petition has no merit. seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
First Issue: Admissibility of the Evidence Seized warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
During a Stop-and-Frisk upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under
Petitioner protests the admission of the marijuana leaves oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
found in his possession, contending that they were products of an witnesses he may produce, and particularly
illegal search. The Solicitor General, in his Comment dated July 5, describing the place to be searched and the
1994, which was adopted as memorandum for respondent, counters persons or things to be seized."
that the inadmissibility of the marijuana leaves was waived because
petitioner never raised this issue in the proceedings below nor did he Any evidence obtained in violation of the mentioned
object to their admissibility in evidence. He adds that, even provision is legally inadmissible in evidence as a "fruit of the poisonous
assuming arguendo that there was no waiver, the search was legal tree," falling under the exclusionary rule:
because it was incidental to a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a),
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. "SEC. 3. . . .

We disagree with petitioner and hold that the search was (2) Any evidence obtained in violation
valid, being akin to a stop-and-frisk. In the landmark case of Terry of . . . the preceding section shall be
vs. Ohio, 18 a stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular designation inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding."
 This right, however, is not absolute. 21 The recent case Q Could you describe to us the appearance of
of People vs. Lacerna enumerated five recognized exceptions to the that person when you chanced upon
rule against warrantless search and seizure, viz.: "(1) search incidental him?
to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain
view, (4) customs search, and (5) waiver by the accused themselves of A That person seems like he is high on drug.
their right against unreasonable search and seizure." 22 In People
vs. Encinada, 23 the Court further explained that "[in] these cases, the
search and seizure may be made only with probable cause as the
essential requirement. Although the term eludes exact definition, Q How were you able to say Mr. Witness that
probable cause for a search is, at best, defined as a reasonable that person that you chanced upon
ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in was high on drug?
themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or the A Because his eyes were red and he was
existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a walking on a swaying manner.
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
Q What was he doing in particular when you
been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in
chanced upon him?
connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by
law is in the place to be searched."
A He was roaming around, sir.
Stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another
Q You said that he avoided you, what did you
exception to the general rule against a search without a warrant.
do when he avoided you?
In Posadas vs. Court of Appeals, 24 the Court held that there were
many instances where a search and seizure could be effected without A We approached him and introduced ourselves
necessarily being preceded by an arrest, one of which was stop-and- as police officers in a polite manner,
frisk. In said case, members of the Integrated National Police of Davao sir.
stopped petitioner, who was carrying a buri bag and acting
suspiciously. They found inside petitioner's bag one .38-cal. revolver Q How did you introduce yourselves?
with two rounds of live ammunition, two live ammunitions for a .22-cal.
gun and a tear gas grenade. In upholding the legality of the search, the A In a polite manner, sir.
Court said that to require the police officers to search the bag only after
they had obtained a search warrant might prove to be useless, futile Q What did you say when you introduced
and much too late under the circumstances. In such a situation, it was yourselves?
reasonable for a police officer to stop a suspicious individual briefly in
order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo while A We asked him what he was holding in his
obtaining more information, rather than to simply shrug his shoulders hands, sir.
and allow a crime to occur.
Q And what was the reaction of the person
In the case at hand, Patrolman Espiritu and his companions when you asked him what he was
observed during their surveillance that appellant had red eyes and was holding in his hands?
wobbling like a drunk along the Caloocan City Cemetery, which
according to police information was a popular hangout of drug addicts. A He tried to resist, sir.
From his experience as a member of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the
Caloocan City Police, such suspicious behavior was characteristic of Q When he tried to resist, what did you do?
drug addicts who were "high." The policemen therefore had sufficient
reason to stop petitioner to investigate if he was actually high on drugs. A I requested him if I can see what was he was
During such investigation, they found marijuana in petitioner's (sic) holding in his hands.
possession: 25
Q What was the answer of the person upon
"FISCAL RALAR: your request?

Q And why were you conducting surveillance in A He allowed me to examine that something in
front of the Caloocan Cemetery, his hands, sir.
Sangandaan, Caloocan City?
xxx xxx xxx
A Because there were some informations that
some drug dependents were roaming Q What was he holding?
around at A. Mabini Street in front of
A He was holding his wallet and when we
the Caloocan Cemetery, Caloocan
opened it, there was a marijuana (sic)
City.
crushed residue."
xxx xxx xxx
Furthermore, we concur with the Solicitor General's
Q While you were conducting your surveillance, contention that petitioner effectively waived the inadmissibility of any
together with Pat. Angel Lumabas evidence illegally obtained when he filed to raise this issue or to object
and one Arnold Enriquez, what thereto during the trial. A valid waiver of a right, more particularly of the
happened, if any? constitutional right against unreasonable search, requires the
concurrence of the following requirements: (1) the right to be waived
A We chanced upon one male person there in existed; (2) the person waiving it had knowledge, actual or
front of the Caloocan Cemetery then constructive, thereof; and (3) he or she had an actual intention to
when we called his attention he tried relinquish the right. 26 Otherwise, the Courts will indulge every
to avoid us, then prompting us to reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental safeguards and
approach him and introduce will not deduce acquiescence from the failure to exercise this
ourselves as police officers in a polite elementary right. In the present case, however, petitioner is deemed to
manner. cdtai have waived such right for his failure to raise its violation before the
trial court. In petitions under Rule 45, as distinguished from an ordinary
xxx xxx xxx appeal of criminal cases where the whole case is opened for review,
the appeal is generally limited to the errors assigned by petitioner.
Issues not raised below cannot be pleaded for the first time on
appeal. 27
 Second Issue: Assessment of Evidence indeterminate sentence the maximum term of
which shall be that which, in view of the
Petitioner also contends that the two arresting officers'
attending circumstances, could be properly
testimony contained "polluted, irreconcilable and unexplained"
imposed under the rules of the said Code, and
contradictions which did not support petitioner's conviction.
the minimum which shall be within the range of
the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the
We disagree. Time and again, this Court has ruled that the
Code for the offense; and if the offense is
trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses, particularly when
punished by any other law, the court shall
affirmed by the Court of Appeals as in this case, is accorded great
sentence the accused to an indeterminate
weight and respect, since it had the opportunity to observe their
sentence, the maximum term of which shall not
demeanor and deportment as they testified before it. Unless
exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the
substantial facts and circumstances have been overlooked or
minimum shall not be less than the minimum
misappreciated by the trial court which, if considered, would materially
term prescribed by the same. (As amended by
affect the result of the case, we will not countenance a departure from
this rule. 28 Act No. 4225.)

"SEC. 2. This Act shall not apply to

We concur with Respondent Court's ruling:
persons convicted of offenses punished with
"(e)ven assuming as contended by death penalty or life-imprisonment; to those
appellant that there had been some convicted of treason; to those convicted of
inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses' misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition or
testimonies, We do not find them substantial espionage; to those convicted of piracy; to
enough to impair the essential veracity of their those who are habitual delinquents; to those
narration. In People vs. Avila, it was held that — who shall have escaped from confinement or
"As long as the witnesses concur on the evaded sentence; to those who having been
material points, slight differences in their granted conditional pardon by the Chief
remembrance of the details, do not reflect on Executive shall have violated the terms thereof;
the essential veracity of their statements." to those whose maximum term of imprisonment
does not exceed one year, not to those already
However, we find that, aside from the presumption of sentenced by final judgment at the time of
regularity in the performance of duty, the bestowal of full credence on approval of this Act, except as provided in
Pat. Espiritu's testimony is justified by tangible evidence on record. Section 5 hereof." (Emphasis supplied)
Despite Pat. Lumabas' contradictory testimony, that of Espiritu is
supported by the Joint Affidavit 29 signed by both arresting policemen. The Dangerous Drugs Law, R.A. 6425, as amended by B.P.
The question of whether the marijuana was found inside petitioner's 179, imposes the following penalty for illegal possession of marijuana:
wallet or inside a plastic bag is immaterial, considering that petitioner
"Sec. 8. . . .
did not deny possession of said substance. Failure to present the
wallet in evidence did not negate that marijuana was found in
The penalty of imprisonment ranging
petitioner's possession. This shows that such contradiction is minor
from six years and one day to twelve years and
and does not destroy Espiritu's credibility. 30
a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve
thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any
Third Issue: Sufficiency of Evidence
person who, unless authorized by law, shall
The elements of illegal possession of marijuana are: (a) the possess or use Indian hemp."
accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a
prohibited drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by law; and (c) Prescinding from the foregoing, the Court holds that the
the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. 31 proper penalty is an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment ranging
from six years and one day to twelve years. 34
The substance found in petitioner's possession was
identified by NBI Forensic Chemist Aida Pascual to be crushed WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution are
marijuana leaves. Petitioner's lack of authority to possess these leaves hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is sentenced to
was established. His awareness thereof was undeniable, considering suffer IMPRISONMENT of SIX (6) YEARS, as minimum, to TWELVE
that petitioner was high on drugs when stopped by the policemen and (12) YEARS, as maximum, and to PAY a FINE of SIX THOUSAND
that he resisted when asked to show and identify the thing he was PESOS. Costs against petitioner.
holding. Such behavior clearly shows that petitioner knew that he was
holding marijuana and that it was prohibited by law. aisadc SO ORDERED.

Furthermore, like the trial and the appellate courts, we have Narvasa, C .J ., Romero, Melo and Francisco, JJ ., concur.
not been given sufficient grounds to believe the extortion angle in this
case. Petitioner did not file any administrative or criminal case against
the arresting officers or present any evidence other than his bare
claim. His argument that he feared for his life was lame and
unbelievable, considering that he was released on bail and continued
to be on bail as early as April 26, 1988. 32 Since then, he could have
made the charge in relative safety, as he was no longer in the custody
of the police. His defense of frame-up, like alibi, is viewed by this Court
with disfavor, because it is easy to concoct and fabricate. 33

The Proper Penalty

The trial and the appellate courts overlooked the
Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103, as amended) by
sentencing petitioner to a straight penalty of six years and one day of
imprisonment, aside from the imposed fine of six thousand pesos. This
Act requires the imposition of an indeterminate penalty:

"SEC. 1. Hereafter, in imposing a

prison sentence for an offense punished by the
Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the
court shall sentence the accused to an
 Republic of the Philippines objects. The wrapped objects turned out to contain hashish, a
SUPREME COURT derivative of marijuana.
Manila
EN BANC
Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But
G.R. No. 91107 June 19, 1991
before he alighted from the bus, accused stopped to get two (2)
travelling bags from the luggage carrier.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MIKAEL MALMSTEDT, *defendant-appellant. Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened
them. A teddy bear was found in each bag. Feeling the teddy bears,
the officer noticed that there were bulges inside the same which did not
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
feel like foam stuffing. It was only after the officers had opened the
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles for
bags that accused finally presented his passport.
defendant-appellant.

Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at

PADILLA, J.:
Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for further investigation. At the
investigation room, the officers opened the teddy bears and they were
In an information dated 15 June 1989, accused-appellant Mikael found to also contain hashish. Representative samples were taken
Malmstedt (hereinafter referred to as the accused) was charged before from the hashish found among the personal effects of accused and the
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 10, in same were brought to the PC Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis.
Criminal Case No. 89-CR-0663, for violation of Section 4, Art. II of
Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous
In the chemistry report, it was established that the objects examined
Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. The factual background of the case is
were hashish. a prohibited drug which is a derivative of marijuana.
as follows:
Thus, an information was filed against accused for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act.
Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the
Philippines for the third time in December 1988 as a tourist. He had
During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of "not guilty." For his
visited the country sometime in 1982 and 1985.
defense, he raised the issue of illegal search of his personal effects.
He also claimed that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers
In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio City. Upon his in his pouch bag and that the two (2) travelling bags were not owned
arrival thereat in the morning of the following day, he took a bus to by him, but were merely entrusted to him by an Australian couple
Sagada and stayed in that place for two (2) days. whom he met in Sagada. He further claimed that the Australian couple
intended to take the same bus with him but because there were no
more seats available in said bus, they decided to take the next ride and
At around 7:00 o'clock in the morning of 11 May 1989, accused went to
asked accused to take charge of the bags, and that they would meet
the Nangonogan bus stop in Sagada to catch the first available trip to
each other at the Dangwa Station.
Baguio City. From Baguio City, accused planned to take a late
afternoon trip to Angeles City, then proceed to Manila to catch his flight
out of the country, scheduled on 13 May 1989. From Sagada, accused Likewise, accused alleged that when the NARCOM officers demanded
took a Skyline bus with body number 8005 and Plate number AVC for his passport and other Identification papers, he handed to one of
902.1 the officers his pouch bag which was hanging on his neck containing,
among others, his passport, return ticket to Sweden and other papers.
The officer in turn handed it to his companion who brought the bag
At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that same day (11 May 1989),
outside the bus. When said officer came back, he charged the accused
Captain Alen Vasco, the Commanding Officer of the First Regional
that there was hashish in the bag. He was told to get off the bus and
Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa, ordered his men to
his picture was taken with the pouch bag placed around his neck. The
set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain
trial court did not give credence to accused's defense.
Province, for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the
Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint in the said area
was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada The claim of the accused that the hashish was planted by the
were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, NARCOM officers, was belied by his failure to raise such defense at
information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM, the earliest opportunity. When accused was investigated at the
that same morning, that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his Provincial Fiscal's Office, he did not inform the Fiscal or his lawyer that
possession prohibited drugs.2 the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers in his bag. It was
only two (2) months after said investigation when he told his lawyer
about said claim, denying ownership of the two (2) travelling bags as
The group composed of seven (7) NARCOM officers, in coordination
well as having hashish in his pouch bag.
with Tublay Police Station, set up a checkpoint at the designated area
at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning and inspected all vehicles coming
from the Cordillera Region. In a decision dated 12 October 1989, the trial court found accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act, specifically Section 4, Art. II of RA 6425, as amended. 3 The
At about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, the bus where accused was
dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
riding was stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan boarded the bus and
announced that they were members of the NARCOM and that they
would conduct an inspection. The two (2) NARCOM officers started WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of the accused Mikael
their inspection from the front going towards the rear of the bus. Malmstedt established beyond reasonable doubt, this Court
Accused who was the sole foreigner riding the bus was seated at the finds him GUILTY of violation of Section 4, Article 11 of
rear thereof. Republic Act 6425, as amended, and hereby sentences him
to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), with subsidiary
During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist.
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
Suspecting the bulge on accused's waist to be a gun, the officer asked
for accused's passport and other identification papers. When accused
failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was Let the hashish subject of this case be turned over to the
that was bulging on his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a First Narcotics Regional Unit at Camp Bado; Dangwa, La
pouch bag and when accused opened the same bag, as ordered, the Trinidad Benguet for proper disposition under Section 20,
officer noticed four (4) suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown Article IV of Republic Act 6425, as amended.
packing tape, prompting the officer to open one of the wrapped
 SO ORDERED.4 the Commanding Officer of NARCOM the very same morning that
accused came down by bus from Sagada on his way to Baguio City.
Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court finding him guilty
of the crime charged, accused argues that the search of his personal When NARCOM received the information, a few hours before the
effects was illegal because it was made without a search warrant and, apprehension of herein accused, that a Caucasian travelling from
therefore, the prohibited drugs which were discovered during the illegal Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him prohibited drugs, there
search are not admissible as evidence against him. was no time to obtain a search warrant. In the Tangliben case,13 the
police authorities conducted a surveillance at the Victory Liner
Terminal located at Bgy. San Nicolas, San Fernando Pampanga,
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in
against persons engaged in the traffic of dangerous drugs, based on
their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
information supplied by some informers. Accused Tangliben who was
searches and seizures.5 However, where the search is made pursuant
acting suspiciously and pointed out by an informer was apprehended
to a lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful
and searched by the police authorities. It was held that when faced
arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private
with on-the-spot information, the police officers had to act quickly and
person under the following circumstances.6
there was no time to secure a search warrant.

Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. –– A peace

It must be observed that, at first, the NARCOM officers merely
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
conducted a routine check of the bus (where accused was riding) and
person:
the passengers therein, and no extensive search was initially made. It
was only when one of the officers noticed a bulge on the waist of
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has accused, during the course of the inspection, that accused was
committed is actually committing, or is attempting to commit required to present his passport. The failure of accused to present his
an offense; identification papers, when ordered to do so, only managed to arouse
the suspicion of the officer that accused was trying to hide his identity.
For is it not a regular norm for an innocent man, who has nothing to
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he
hide from the authorities, to readily present his identification papers
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to when required to do so?
be arrested has committed it; and

The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession, plus the suspicious
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is failure of the accused to produce his passport, taken together as a
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case whole, led the NARCOM officers to reasonably believe that the
is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one accused was trying to hide something illegal from the authorities. From
confinement to another. these circumstances arose a probable cause which justified the
warrantless search that was made on the personal effects of the
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the accused. In other words, the acts of the NARCOM officers in requiring
person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith the accused to open his pouch bag and in opening one of the wrapped
delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be objects found inside said bag (which was discovered to contain
proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. hashish) as well as the two (2) travelling bags containing two (2) teddy
(6a 17a). bears with hashish stuffed inside them, were prompted by accused's
own attempt to hide his identity by refusing to present his passport,
and by the information received by the NARCOM that a Caucasian
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession. To
drugs (hashish). A crime was actually being committed by the accused deprive the NARCOM agents of the ability and facility to act
and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon accordingly, including, to search even without warrant, in the light of
his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing such circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and
provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of society.
arrest.7

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed judgment of

While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a conviction by the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the
search warrant when the search was made over the personal effects of accused-appellant.
accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was
sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was
then and there committing a crime. SO ORDERED.

Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea,
which could lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in Sarmiento, J., is on leave.
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched.8 The required probable cause that will justify a warrantless
search and seizure is not determined by any fixed formula but is
resolved according to the facts of each case.9

Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been

declared by this Court as valid, because of existence of probable
cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag
owned by the accused,10 or where the accused was acting
suspiciously,11 and attempted to flee.12

Aside from the persistent reports received by the NARCOM that

vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other
prohibited drugs, their Commanding Officer also received information
that a Caucasian coming from Sagada on that particular day had
prohibited drugs in his possession. Said information was received by
 EN BANC Later that same day, Police Chief Inspector and Forensic
G.R. No. 128222 June 17, 1999 Chemist Theresa Ann Bugayong Cid of the Philippine National Police,
Region I, received a letter request[3] from CID incidentally her husband
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. to conduct a laboratory examination of twenty-nine (29) plastic packets
CHUA HO SAN @ TSAY HO SAN, accused-appellant. placed inside a multicolored strawbag. In her Chemistry Report No. D-
025-95,[4] she stated that her qualitative examination established the
DECISION contents of the plastic packets, weighing 28.7 kilos, to be positive of
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.: methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.

Chua Ho San @ Tsay Ho San (hereafter CHUA) prays for his CHUA was initially charged with illegal possession of
acquittal and the reversal of the judgment of 10 February 1997 of the methamphetamine hydrochloride before the RTC which docketed the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, La Union, Branch 66, case as Criminal Case No. 4037. However, pursuant to the
finding him guilty of transporting, without appropriate legal authority, recommendation of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San
the regulated substance methamphetamine hydrochloride, in violation Fernando, La Union, that the facts of the case could support an
of Section 15,[1] Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known indictment for illegal transport of a regulated drug, the information was
as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as further amended by R.A. No. subsequently amended to allege that CHUA "willfully, unlawfully and
7659,[2] and sentencing him to "die by lethal injection." In view thereof, feloniously transpor(ted) 28.7 kilos of [m]ethamphetamine
the judgment was brought to this Court for automatic review pursuant [h]ydrochloride (shabu) without the necessary permit or authority to
to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of transport the same" in violation of Section 15, Article III of R.A. 6425 as
R.A. No. 7659. amended by R.A. 7659.

In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and At his arraignment on 31 July 1995, CHUA entered a plea of not
other contraband, Jim Lagasca Cid (hereafter CID), as Chief of Police guilty. The RTC was satisfied that CHUA understood the amended
of the Bacnotan Police Station, of La Union began patrolling the information read to him in Fukien by the Fukien-speaking interpreter,
Bacnotan coastline with his officers. While monitoring the coastal area Thelma Sales Go.
of Barangay Bulala on 29 March 1995, he intercepted a radio call at
around 12:45 p.m. from Barangay Captain Juan Almoite (hereafter Thereafter, the RTC exerted all efforts to obtain the services of a
ALMOITE) of Barangay Tammocalao requesting police assistance Taiwanese Interpreter through the auspices of the Department of
regarding an unfamiliar speedboat the latter had spotted. According to Foreign Affairs. However, it was only after directing the request to the
ALMOITE, the vessel looked different from the boats ordinarily used by Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in the Philippines that interpreters
fisherfolk of the area and was poised to dock at Tammocalao were assigned to CHUA.
shores. CID and six of his men led by his Chief Investigator, SPO1
Trial finally ensued. The State presented evidence tending to
Reynoso Badua (hereafter BADUA), proceeded forthwith to
Tammocalao beach and there conferred with ALMOITE. CID then establish the above narration of facts which were culled chiefly from
observed that the speedboat ferried a lone male passenger. As it was the testimony of CID, its first witness, and whose testimony, in turn,
was substantially corroborated by witnesses BADUA and ALMOITE.
routine for CID to deploy his men in strategic places when dealing with
similar situations, he ordered his men to take up positions thirty meters Expert witness Theresa Ann Cid, confirmed the entries of her
from the coastline. When the speedboat landed, the male passenger chemistry report in that the contents of the 29 plastic packets weighing
alighted, and using both hands, carried what appeared a multicolored 28.7 kilos sent to her for chemical analysis were pure, unadulterated
strawbag. He then walked towards the road. By this time, ALMOITE, methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. She also explained that
CID and BADUA, the latter two conspicuous in their uniform and they were unwashed, hence they appeared yellowish.
issued side-arms, became suspicious of the man as he suddenly
changed direction and broke into a run upon seeing the approaching For the defense, CHUA testified in his own behalf through
officers. BADUA, however, prevented the man from fleeing by holding interpreter Steven Yu. He disclosed that he hails from Taiwan and was
on to his right arm. Although CID introduced themselves as police employed in a shipbuilding and repairing company. On 21 March 1995,
officers, the man appeared impassive. Speaking in English, CID then he was instructed by his employer Cho Chu Rong (hereafter RONG) to
requested the man to open his bag, but he seemed not to board the latters 35-tonner ship which would embark for Nan Au Port,
understand. CID thus tried speaking Tagalog, then Ilocano, but still to Mainland China where they would buy fish. Upon arrival at their
no avail. CID then resorted to what he termed sign language; he destination, RONG left the ship, came back without the fish, but with
motioned with his hands for the man to open the bag. This time, the two bags, the contents of which he never divulged to CHUA. RONG
man apparently understood and acceded to the request. A search of then showed to CHUA a document purportedly granting them authority
the bag yielded several transparent plastic packets containing to fish on Philippine waters. So they sailed towards the Philippines and
yellowish crystalline substances. CID then gestured to the man to reached Dagupan, Pangasinan on 29 March 1995. At around 10:30
close the bag, which he did.As CID wished to proceed to the police a.m., they disembarked on a small speedboat with the two bags RONG
station, he signaled the man to follow, but the latter did not to brought with him from China. While sailing, RONG made several
comprehend. Hence, CID placed his arm around the shoulders of the phone calls using his mobile phone. CHUA heard RONG asked the
man and escorted the latter to the police headquarters. person on the other side of the line if he could see the speedboat they
were riding. Apparently, the person on shore could not see them so
At the police station, CID surmised, after having observed the they cruised over the waters for about five hours more when finally, low
facial features of the man, that he was probably Taiwanese. CID then on fuel and telephone battery, they decided to dock. CHUA anchored
"recited and informed the man of his constitutional rights" to remain the boat while RONG carried the bags to shore. The tasks completed,
silent, to have the assistance of a counsel, etc. Eliciting no response RONG left to look for a telephone while CHUA rested and sat one and
from the man, CID ordered his men to find a resident of the area who half (1 1/2) meters away from one bag. A child thereafter pointed out to
spoke Chinese to act as an interpreter. In the meantime, BADUA him that one bag was missing much to RONGs dismay when he
opened the bag and counted twenty-nine (29) plastic packets learned of it. When a crowd started to mill around them, the police
containing yellowish crystalline substances which he and CID arrived. CHUA then realized that RONG was nowhere to be found. The
suspected was shabu. The interpreter, Mr. Go Ping Guan, finally police immediately approached CHUA, and with nary any spoken
arrived, through whom the man was "apprised of his constitutional word, only gestures and hand movements, they escorted him to the
rights." The police authorities were satisfied that the man and the precinct where he was handcuffed and tied to a chair. Later, the police,
interpreter perfectly understood each other despite their uncertainty as led by an officer who CHUA guessed as the Chief of Police arrived with
to what language was spoken. But when the policemen asked the man the motor engine of the speedboat and a bag. They presented the bag
several questions, he retreated to his obstinate reticence and merely to him, opened it, inspected and weighed the contents, then
showed his I.D. with the name Chua Ho San printed thereon. CHUA's proclaimed them as methamphetamine hydrochloride.
bag and its contents were sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp
Diego Silang, Carlatan, San Fernando, La Union for laboratory CHUA denounced the prosecutions story as a distortion of the
examination. In the meantime, CHUA was detained at the Bacnotan truth. He denied he was ever favored with an interpreter or informed of
Police Station. his "constitutional rights," particularly of his right to
counsel. Consequently, his arrest was tainted with illegality and the
methamphetamine hydrochloride found in the bag should have been determine whether there was negligence or conspiracy in the escape
regarded inadmissible as evidence. He also maintained that CID never of Cho Chu Rong and the two (2) or three (3) persons who approached
graced the occasion of his setting foot for the first time at Tammocalao the accused in the seashore of Tammocalao, Bacnotan, La Union, and
beach. BADUA certainly never prevented him from running away, as attempted to take the remaining bag from accused, as well as the
such thought failed to make an impression in his mind. Most whereabouts of the other bag; and to furnish this Court a copy of the
significantly, he denied ownership and knowledge of the contents of report/result of the said investigation in order to show compliance
the bag, emphasizing that RONG alone exercised dominion over the herewith sixty (60) days from receipt hereof.
same.

Elmer Parong, (hereafter PARONG) a Sangguniang Bayan The confiscated 28.7 kilograms of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or
member, recalled that on the date in question, he arrived at the beach Shabu is ordered turned over immediately to the Dangerous Drugs
with the police. He saw CHUA standing with a bag beside him. He also Board for destruction in accordance with the law.
remembered hearing from the people congregating at the beach that
CHUA arrived with a companion and a certain policeman Anneb had The fiberglass boat with its motor engine is hereby ordered confiscated
chased the latters car. He additionally claimed that when the crowd in favor of the government and to be turned over to the Philippine
became unruly, the police decided to bring CHUA to police National Police, La Union Command, for use in their Bantay-Dagat
headquarters.There, the mayor took charge of the situation -- he operations against all illegal seaborne activities.
opened CHUA's bag with the assistance of the police, he called for a
forensic chemist surnamed CID to take a sample of the contents of the
bag, and he ordered his officials to find an interpreter.Throughout the SO ORDERED.[6]
proceedings, photographers were busy taking pictures to document the
event. Before this Court, CHUA posits that the RTC erred in (1)
admitting as competent evidence the 29 plastic packets of
Last to testify was Arsenio CRAIG, a farmer and resident of
methamphetamine hydrochloride since they were indubitably
Tammocalao who narrated that he was standing with CHUA on the
"forbidden fruits;" (2) granting weight and credence to the testimonies
beach when two men and a lady arrived. They were about to get a bag
of prosecution witnesses despite glaring inconsistencies on material
situated near CHUA when they detected the arrival of the local
points; and in (3) appreciating conspiracy between him and an
police. They quickly disappeared. CRAIG then noticed ALMOITE and
organized syndicate in the illicit commerce of prohibited drugs since
PARONG at the beach but not CID.
this was not alleged in the information.
In a decision promulgated on 10 February 1997, the RTC found
The Solicitor General traverses CHUA's contentions by asserting
that the prosecution successfully discharged its burden of proving that
that: (1) the search was licitly conducted despite the absence of search
CHUA transported 28.7 kilos of methamphetamine hydrochloride
and seizure warrants as circumstances immediately preceding to and
without legal authority to do so.Invoking People v. Tagliben[5] as
contemporaneous with the search necessitated and validated the
authority, the RTC characterized the search as incidental to a valid in
police action; and (2) that there was an effective and valid waiver of
flagrante delicto arrest, hence it allowed the admission of the
CHUA's right against unreasonable searches and seizures since he
methamphetamine hydrochloride as corpus delicti. The RTC also
consented to the search.
noted the futility of informing CHUA of his constitutional rights to
remain silent, and to have competent and independent counsel We reverse the RTC.
preferably of his own choice, considering the language barrier and the
observation that such irregularity was rectified when accused was duly Enshrined in the Constitution is the inviolable right to privacy of
arraigned and (afterwards) participated in the trial of this case. The home and person. It explicitly ordains that people have the right to be
RTC then disregarded the inconsistencies and contradictions in the secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as these referred to minor unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
details which did not impair the credibility of the witnesses or tarnish purpose.[7] Inseparable, and not merely corollary or incidental to said
the credence conferred on the testimonies thus delivered. right and equally hallowed in and by the Constitution, is the
exclusionary principle which decrees that any evidence obtained in
The RTC also believed that CHUA conspired not only with his violation of said right is inadmissible for any purpose in any
alleged employer RONG and the Captain of the 35-tonner vessel in the proceeding.[8]
illegal trade of prohibited drugs on Philippine shores, but with several
other members of an organized syndicate bent on perpetrating said The Constitutional proscription against unreasonable searches
illicit traffic. Such predilection was plainly evident in the dispositive and seizures does not, of course, forestall reasonable searches and
portion, to wit: seizure. What constitutes a reasonable or even an unreasonable
search in any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable
WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, as proven and from a consideration of the circumstances involved.[9] Verily, the rule is,
the Constitution bars State intrusions to a person's body, personal
established by convincing and satisfactory evidence that the accused
had conspired and acted in concert with one Cho Chu Rong, not to effects or residence except if conducted by virtue of a valid search
mention Chen Ho Fa, the Skipper of the 35-tonner ship they used in warrant issued in compliance with the procedure outlined in the
Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court; otherwise such
coming to the Country from China and Taiwan, this Court finds the
accused Chua Ho San @ Tsay Ho San guilty beyond reasonable search and seizure become unreasonable within the meaning of the
doubt of the offense of Violation of Sec. 15, Art. III of R.A. No. 6425, as aforementioned constitutional provision.[10] This interdiction against
warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not absolute and such
amended by R.A. No. 7659 as charged in the Information, and
considering the provisions of Sec. 20 of R.A. No. 7659 that the warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed
maximum penalty shall be imposed if the quantity permissible by jurisprudence[11] in instances of (1) search of moving
vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3) customs searches, (4) waiver or
sold/possessed/transported is 200 grams or more in the case of
Shabu, and considering, further that the quantity involved in this case consent searches, (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search),[12] and
is 28.7 kilograms which is far beyond the weight ceiling specified in (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid
warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid
said Act, coupled with the findings of conspiracy or that accused is a
member of an organized syndicated crime group, this Court, having no warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered
other recourse but to impose the maximum penalty to accused, this legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court
recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in
Court hereby sentences the said accused Chua Ho San @ Tsay Ho
San to die by lethal injection; to pay a fine of Ten Million Pesos flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrests of
(P10,000,000.00); and to pay the costs. escaped prisoners.[13]

This Court is therefore tasked to determine whether the

The Court hereby orders Director Ricareido [sic] Sarmiento of the warrantless arrest, search and seizure conducted under the facts of
Philippine National Police to immediately form an investigating the case at bar constitute a valid exemption from the warrant
Committee to be composed by [sic] men of unimpeachable integrity, requirement. Expectedly and quite understandably, the prosecution
who will conduct an exhaustive investigation regarding this case to and the defense painted extremely divergent versions of the
incident. But this Court is certain that CHUA was arrested and his bag approached him. This cast serious doubt on the truthfulness of the
searched without the benefit of a warrant. claim, thus:

In cases of in flagrante delicto arrests, a peace officer or a Q How far were you when the accused put the bag on his
private person may without a warrant, arrest a person, when, in his shoulder?
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.The arresting officer, A We were then very near him about three meters away from the
therefore, must have personal knowledge of such fact[14] or as recent male person carrying the bag.
case law[15] adverts to, personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable cause. The term Q To what direction was he facing when he put the bag on his
probable cause had been understood to mean a reasonable ground of shoulder?
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves A To the east direction.
to warrant a cautious mans belief that the person accused is guilty of
the offense with which he is charged. [16]Specifically with respect to Q In relation to you, where were you.
arrests, it is such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has A With the company of Sgt. Reynoso and Maj. Cid we approached
been committed by the person sought to be arrested. [17] In People v. the accused and when Maj. Cid went near him, he spoke in
Montilla,[18] the Court acknowledged that the evidentiary measure for Tagalog, English and Ilocano which accused did not
the propriety of filing criminal charges, and correlatively, for effecting understand because he did not respond.
warrantless arrest, has been reduced and liberalized. Noting that the
previous statutory and jurisprudential evidentiary standard was "prima Q When Maj. Cid was talking, what was the accused doing at that
facie evidence" and that it had been dubiously equated with probable time?
cause, the Court explained:
A He was walking.

[F]elicitously, those problems and confusing concepts (referring to Q To what direction he was walking?
prima facie evidence and probable cause) were clarified and set aright,
A He was walking to the east direction. (sic)
at least on the issue under discussion, by the 1985 amendment of the
Rules of Court which provides in Rule 112 thereof that the quantum of Q He was walking away from you or going near you?
evidence required in preliminary investigation is such evidence as
suffices to engender as well founded belief as to the fact of the A He was going away from us. That is why Sgt. Reynoso held the
commission of the crime and the respondents probable guilt thereof. It right arm of the accused.
has the same meaning as the related phraseology used in other parts
of the same Rule, that is, that the investigating fiscal finds cause to Q Was Sgt. Badua able to hold the right arm of the accused?
hold the respondent for trial, or where a probable cause exists. It
should, therefore, be in that sense, wherein the right to effect a A Yes sir and he stopped.[24]
warrantless arrest should be considered as legally
True, CHUA entered Philippine territory without a visa. This was
authorized. (emphasis supplied)[19] not obvious to the police. But gossamer to the officers sense
perception and view were CHUA disembarking from a speedboat,
Guided by these principles, this Court finds that there are no CHUA walking casually towards the road, and CHUA carrying a
facts on record reasonably suggestive or demonstrative of CHUAs multicolored strawbag. These acts did not convey any impression that
participation in an ongoing criminal enterprise that could have spurred he illegally entered Philippine shores. Neither were these overt
police officers from conducting the obtrusive search. The RTC never manifestations of an ongoing felonious activity nor of CHUAs criminal
took the pains of pointing to such facts, but predicated mainly its behavior as clearly established in CIDs testimony, thus:
decision on the finding that "accused was caught red-handed carrying
the bagful of [s]habu when apprehended. In short, there is no probable Q Was the accused committing a crime when you introduced
cause. At least in People v. Tangliben, the Court agreed with the lower yourselves:
court's finding that compelling reasons (e.g., accused was acting
A No, sir.
suspiciously, on the spot identification by an informant that accused
was transporting prohibitive drug, and the urgency of the situation) Q No, so there was no reason for you to approach the accused
constitutive of probable cause impelled police officers from effecting because he was not doing anything wrong?
an in flagrante delicto arrest. In the case at bar, the Solicitor General
proposes that the following details are suggestive of probable cause -- A No, sir, that is our objective, to approach the person and if ever
persistent reports of rampant smuggling of firearm and other or whatever assistance that we can give we will give. [25]
contraband articles, CHUA's watercraft differing in appearance from
the usual fishing boats that commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas, The search cannot therefore be denominated as incidental to an
CHUAs illegal entry into the Philippines (he lacked the necessary travel arrest. While a contemporaneous search of a person arrested may be
documents or visa), CHUAs suspicious behavior, i.e. he attempted to effected to deliver dangerous weapons or proofs or implements used in
flee when he saw the police authorities, and the apparent ease by the commission of the crime and which search may extend to the area
which CHUA can return to and navigate his speedboat with immediate within his immediate control where he might gain possession of a
dispatch towards the high seas, beyond the reach of Philippine laws. weapon or evidence he can destroy,[26] a valid arrest must precede the
search. The process cannot be reversed.
This Court, however, finds that these do not constitute probable
cause. None of the telltale clues, e.g., bag or package emanating the
pungent odor of marijuana or other prohibited drug,[20] confidential In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest
report and/or positive identification by informers of courier(s) of determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest
is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest
prohibited drug and/or the time and place where they will
transport/deliver the same,[21] suspicious demeanor or behavior[22] and was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance,
suspicious bulge in the waist[23]-- accepted by this Court as sufficient to the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can
be made - the process cannot be reversed.[27]
justify a warrantless arrest exists in this case. There was no classified
information that a foreigner would disembark at Tammocalao beach
bearing prohibited drug on the date in question. CHUA was not To reiterate, the search was not incidental to an arrest. There
identified as a drug courier by a police informer or agent. The fact that was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not fall under
the vessel that ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to the fishing the exemptions allowed by the Rules of Court[28] as already
boats of the area did not automatically mark him as in the process of shown. From all indications, the search was nothing but a fishing
perpetrating an offense. And despite claims by CID and BADUA that expedition. It is worth mentioning here that after introducing
CHUA attempted to flee, ALMOITE testified that the latter was merely themselves, the police officers immediately inquired about the contents
walking and oblivious to any attempt at conversation when the officers of the bag. What else could have impelled the officers from displaying
such inordinate interest in the bag but to ferret out evidence and Q Why, why was it - no, I reform my question your honor. Is it
discover if a felony had indeed been committed by CHUA -- in effect to normal procedure for you to examine anybody or to request
"retroactively establish probable cause and validate an illegal search anybody to open his bag?
and seizure."
A The fact that he was a foreigner, sir, it is also our duty to inspect
The State then attempted to persuade this Court that there was a the baggage, it is our routine duty of a police (sic), sir.
consented search, a legitimate waiver of the constitutional guarantee
against obtrusive searches. It is fundamental, however, that to Q Is that the normal duty of a police officer to request a person to
constitute a waiver, it must first appear that the right exists; secondly, open his bag?
that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the
existence of such a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual A yes, sir.
intention to relinquish the right.[29] CHUA never exhibited that he knew, Q Okey, (sic) you did not ask the accused, mr. (sic) witness, to
actually or constructively of his right against unreasonable searches or open his bag?
that he intentionally conceded the same. This can be inferred from the
manner by which the search was performed, thus: A No, sir.
Q Together with your Chief Investigator, what was the first thing Q But you simply requested him to open the nag?
that you did when you approached him (CHUA)?
A Yes, sir.[30]
A We introduced ourselves as police officers, sir.
CHUA obviously failed to understand the events that overran and
Q Okey, in the first place why did you introduce yourselves? overwhelmed him. The police officers already introduced themselves to
CHUA in three languages, but he remained completely deadpan. The
A That is normal practice in our part, sir. police hence concluded that CHUA failed to comprehend the three
languages. When CHUA failed to respond again to the polices request
***
to open the bag, they resorted to what they called sign language. They
Q If it is possible . Okey (sic) now, after introducing yourselves claimed that CHUA finally understood their hand motions and
what did you do? gestures. This Court disagrees. If CHUA could not understand what
was orally articulated to him, how could he understand the polices sign
A He did not answer me and he did not utter any word, language. More importantly, it cannot logically be inferred from his
alleged cognizance of the sign language that he deliberately,
Q When he did not utter any word. What else did he do? intelligently, and consciously waived his right against such an intrusive
search. This Court is not unmindful of cases upholding the validity of
A I asked again a question that if he can open his bag sir. consented warrantless searches and seizure. But in these cases, the
Q And did he understand your question when you requested him to police officers' request to search personnel effects was orally
open his bag? articulated to the accused and in such language that left no room for
doubt that the latter fully understood what was requested. In some
A No, sir, there is no answer. instances, the accused even verbally replied to the request
demonstrating that he also understood the nature and consequences
Q No answer? of such request.[31]
A Yes, sir, no answer. It was eventually discovered that the bag contained the regulated
substance. But this is a trifling matter. If evidence obtained during an
Q And when there was no answer what did you do next? illegal search even if tending to confirm or actually confirming initial
information or suspicion of felonious activity is absolutely considered
A I used sign language sir.
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding, the same being the
Q Will you demonstrate to this Honorable Court how you fruit of a poisonous tree[32] how much more of "forbidden fruits" which
demonstrated that sign language of opening the bag mr. did not confirm any initial suspicion of criminal enterprise as in this
(sic) witness? case - because the police admitted that they never harbored any initial
suspicion. Casting aside the regulated substance as evidence, the
A I pointed to the zipper of the bag and then made an action like remaining evidence on record are insufficient, feeble and ineffectual to
this sir. sustain CHUAs conviction.

*** Indeed, the likelihood of CHUA having actually transported

methamphetamine hydrochloride cannot be quickly dispelled. But the
SHERIFF: constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures
cannot be so carelessly disregarded as overzealous police officers are
The witness demonstrating (sic) by pointing to the straw bag and sometimes wont to do. Fealty to the Constitution and the rights it
then manifesting a sign to open the zipper of the straw bag guarantees should be paramount in their minds, otherwise their good
moving his right hand from left to right or from the opening to intentions will remain as such simply because they have
the end of the zipper. blundered. "There are those who say that 'the criminal is to go free
COURT: From the start of the zipper where you open it up to the because the constable has blundered.' In some cases this will
end of the zipper. undoubtedly be the result. But 'there is another consideration -- the
imperative of judicial integrity.' The criminal goes free, if he must, but it
Witness: Yes, sir, and then I made a motion like this. is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more
quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard
(The witness repeating the motion described on record.) of the charter of its own existence."[33]
COURT: Did you open that personally? As to the averred glaring inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, this Court considers them trivial as they refer to
WITNESS: insignificant details which will not affect the outcome of the case. On a
passing note, this Court calls the attention of the trial court regarding
A No, your honor.
its erroneous appreciation of conspiracy. This aggravating
Q Now, mr. (sic) witness, why did you request the accused to open circumstance is without question unsupported by the
the bag? records. Conspiracy was not included in the indictment nor raised in
the pleadings or proceedings of the trial court. It is also fundamental
A Because it is our duty also to inspect his belongings sir. that conspiracy must be proven just like any other criminal accusation,
that is, independently and beyond reasonable doubt.[34]
 WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 66, San Fernando, La Union in Criminal Case No.
4037 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and accused-appellant
CHUA HO SAN @ TSAY HO SAN is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime
charged, the evidence not being sufficient to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,

Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-
Santiago, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., no part. On official leave.
Panganiban, J., on leave.
 THIRD DIVISION about 12:30 a.m., he and other police officers, namely, Pat. Wilfredo
G.R. No. 120431 April 1, 1998 Aquilino, Simplicio Rivera, and Erlindo Lumboy of the Western Police
RODOLFO ESPANO, accused- District (WPD), Narcotics Division went to Zamora and Pandacan
petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE Streets, Manila to confirm reports of drug pushing in the area. They
PHILIPPINES, respondents. saw petitioner selling "something" to another person. After the alleged
buyer left, they approached petitioner, identified themselves as
Ceferino Padua Law Office for petitioner. policemen, and frisked him. The search yielded two plastic cellophane
The Solicitor General for respondents. tea bags of marijuana . When asked if he had more marijuana, he
replied that there was more in his house. The policemen went to his
SYNOPSIS residence where they found ten more cellophane tea
This is a petition for review of the bags of marijuana. Petitioner was brought to the police headquarters
decision of the court of Appeals in CA G.R. CR No. 13976 dated where he was charged with possession of prohibited drugs. On July
January 16, 1995 which affirmed in toto the judgment of the Regional 24, 1991, petitioner posted bail 3 and the trial court issued his
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 1, convicting petitioner order of release on July 29, 1991. 4
Rodolfo Espano for violation of Article II Section 8 of Republic Act No.
6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Annabelle Alip, forensic chemist of the WPD Criminal
Act of 1972. The records of the case reveal that herein petitioner was Investigation Laboratory Section, testified that the articles sent to her
caught in possession of and under his custody twelve plastic by Pat. Wilfredo Aquino regarding the apprehension of a certain
cellophane bags weighing 5.5 grams containing crushed flowering Rodolfo Espano for examination tested positive for marijuana, with
tops, marijuana which is a prohibited drug. In his appeal before the total weight of 5.5 grams.
Supreme Court, petitioner contends that the trial and appellate courts
erred in convicting him because (1) the pieces of evidence seized were By way of defense, petitioner that on said evening, he was
inadmissible; (2) the superiority of his constitutional right to be sleeping in house and was awakened only when the policemen
presumed innocent over the doctrine of presumption of regularity; (3) handcuffed him. He alleged that the policemen were looking for his
he was denied the constitutional right of confrontation and to brother-in-law Lauro, and when they could not find the latter, he was
compulsory process; and (4) his conviction was based on evidence brought to the police station for investigation and later indicted for
which was irrelevant and not properly identified. CIScaA possession of prohibited drugs. His wife Myrna corroborated his story.

The Supreme Court finds that there was no compelling The trial court rejected petitioner's defense as a "mere
reason to reverse the decisions of the trial and appellate courts. In this afterthought" and found the version of the prosecution "more credible
case, the findings of the trial court that the prosecution witnesses were and trustworthy."
more credible than those of the defense must stand. Petitioner failed to
show that Pat. Romeo Pagilagan, in testifying against him, was Thus, on August 14, 1992, the trial court rendered a
motivated by reasons other than his duty to curb drug abuse and had decision, convicting petitioner of the crime charged, the dispositive
any intent to falsely impute to him such a serious crime as portion of which reads:
possession of prohibited drugs. In the absence of such ill motive, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duty must "WHEREFORE there being proof
prevail. Furthermore, the defense of alibi set up by petitioner deserved beyond reasonable doubt, the court finds the
scant consideration. He simply contended that he was in his house accused Rodolfo Espano y Valeria guilty of the
sleeping at the timeof the incident. Lastly, the two cellophane crime of violation of Section 8, Article II, in
bags of marijuana seized were admissible in evidence because he was relation to Section 2 (e-L) (I) of Republic Act No.
caught in flagranti as a result of a buy-bust operation conducted by 6425 as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg.
police officers. However, as for the other ten cellophane 179, and pursuant to law hereby sentences him
bags of marijuana found at petitioner's residence, the same are to suffer imprisonment of six (6) years and one
inadmissible in evidence considering that the said bags were seized at (1) day to twelve (12) years and to pay a
petitioner's house after his arrest, hence, do not fall under the fine of P6,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment
exceptions provided under Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 in case of default plus costs.
Constitution. In view thereof, the instant petition is denied and the
The marijuana is declared fortified in
challenged decision is affirmed with modification as to the penalty.
favor of government and shall be turned over to
DECISION the Dangerous Drugs Board without delay.

ROMERO, J p: SO ORDERED." 5

Petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals.

This is a petition for review of the The appellate court, however, affirmed the decision of the trial court in
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 13976 dated toto.
January 16, 1995, 1 which affirmed in toto the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 1, convicting petitioner Hence, this petition.
Rodolfo Espano for violation of Article II, Section 8 of Republic Act No.
6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Petitioner contends that the trial and appellate courts erred
Act. aisadc in convicting him on the basis of the following: (a) the
pieces of evidence seized were inadmissible; (b) the superiority of his
Petitioner was charged under the following information: constitutional right to be presumed innocent over the
doctrine of presumption of regularity; (c) he was denied the
"That on or about July 14, 1991, in constitutional right of confrontation and to compulsory process; and (d)
the City of Manila, Philippines the said accused, his conviction was based on evidence which was irrelevant and not
not being authorized by law to possess or use properly identified.
any prohibited drug, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession After a careful examination of the records of the case,
and under his custody and control twelve (12) this Court finds no compelling reason sufficient to reverse the
plastic cellophane (bags) containing crushed decisions of the trial and appellate courts.
flowering tops, marijuana weighing 5.5 grams
which is prohibited drug. First, it is a well settled doctrine that findings of trial courts on
the credibility of witnesses deserve a high degree of respect. Having
Contrary to law." 2 observed the deportment of witnesses during the trial, the trial judge is
in a better position to determine the issue of credibility and, thus, his
The evidence for the prosecution, based on the findings will not be disturbed during appeal in the absence of any clear
testimony of Pat. Romeo Pagilagan, shows that on July 14, 1991, at showing that he had overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some
facts or circumstances of weight and substance which could have xxx xxx xxx."
altered the conviction of the appellants. 6
Petitioner's arrest falls squarely under the aforecited rule. He
In this case, the findings of the trial court that the prosecution was caught in flagranti as a result of a buy-bust operation conducted
witnesses were more credible than those of the defense must stand. by police officers on the basis of information received regarding the
Petitioner failed to show that Pat. Pagilagan, in testifying against him, illegal trade of drugs within the area of Zamora and Pandacan Streets,
was motivated by reasons other than his duty to curb drug abuse and Manila. The police officer saw petitioner handing over something to an
had any intent to falsely impute to him such a serious crime as alleged buyer. After the buyer left, they searched him and discovered
possession of prohibited drugs. In the absence ofsuch ill motive, the two cellophanes of marijuana. His arrest was, therefore, lawful and the
presumption of regularity of his official duty must prevail. two cellophane bags of marijuana seized were admissible in evidence,
being the fruits of the crime.
In People v. Velasco, 7 this Court reiterated the
doctrine of presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty As for the ten cellophane bags of marijuana found at
which provides: petitioner's residence, however, the same inadmissible in evidence.

"...Appellant failed to establish that The 1987 Constitution guarantees freedom against
Pat. Godoy and the other members of the buy- unreasonable searches and seizures under Article III, Section 2 which
bust team are policemen engaged in mulcting or provides:
other unscrupulous activities who where
motivated either by the desire to extort money "The right of the people to be secure
or exact personal vengeance, or by sheer whim in their persons, houses, papers and effects
and caprice, when they entrapped her. And in against unreasonable searches and
the absence of proof of any intent on the seizures of whatever nature and for any
part of the police authorities to falsely impute purposes shall be inviolable, and no search
such a serious crime against appellant, as in warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
this case, the presumption of regularity in the upon probable cause to be determined
performance of official duty, ...,must prevail over personally by the judge after examination under
the self-serving and uncorroborated oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
claim ofappellant that she had been framed." 8 witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the
Furthermore, the defense set up by petitioner does not persons or things to be seized."
deserve any consideration. He simply contended that he was in his
house sleeping at the time of the incident. This Court has consistently An exception to the said rule is a warrantless search
held that alibi is the weakest of all defenses; and for it to prosper, the incidental to a lawful arrest for dangerous weapons or anything which
accused has the burden of proving that he was not at the scene of the may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. 11 It may
crime of its commission and that it was physically impossible for him to extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises
be there. Moreover, the "claim of a 'frame-up', like alibi, is a defense or surroundings under his immediate control. In this case, the ten
that has been invariably viewed by the Court with disfavor for it can just cellophane bags of marijuana seized at petitioner's house after his
as easily be concocted but difficult to prove, and is a common and arrest at Pandacan and Zamora Streets do not fall under the said
standard line of defense in most prosecutions arising from exceptions.
violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act." 9 No clear and convincing
evidence was presented by petitioner to prove his defense of alibi. In the case of People v. Lua, 12 this Court held:

Second, petitioner contends that the prosecution's failure to "As regards the brick of marijuana
present the alleged informant in court cast a reasonable doubt which found inside the appellant's house, the
warrants his acquittal. This is again without merit, since failure of the trial court correctly ignored it apparently in
prosecution to produce the informant in court is of no moment view of its inadmissibility. While initially the
especially when he is not even the best witness to establish the fact arrest as well as the body search was lawful,
that a buy-bust operation had indeed been conducted. In this case, the warrantless search made inside the
Pat. Pagilagan, one of the policemen who apprehended petitioner, appellant's house became unlawful since the
testified on the actual incident of July 14, 1991, and identified him as police operatives were not armed with a search
the one they caught in possession ofprohibited drugs. Thus, warrant. Such search cannot fall under "search
made incidental to a lawful arrest," the same
"We find that the prosecution had being limited to body search and to that point
satisfactorily proved its case against appellants. within reach or control of the person arrested, or
There is no compelling reason for us to overturn that which may furnish him with the
the finding of the trial court that the means ofcommitting violence or of escaping. In
testimony of Sgt. Gamboa, the lone witness for the case at bar, appellant was admittedly
the prosecution, was straightforward, outside his house when he was arrested.
spontaneous and convincing. The Hence, it can hardly be said that the inner
testimony of a sole witness, if credible and portion of his house was within his reach or
positive and satisfies the court beyond control."
reasonable doubt, is sufficient to convict." 10
The articles seized from petitioner during his arrest were
Thus on the basis of Pat. Pagilagan's testimony, the valid under the doctrine of search made incidental to a lawful arrest.
prosecution was able to prove that petitioner indeed committed the The warrantless search made in his house, however, which yielded ten
crime charged; consequently, the finding of conviction was proper. cellophane bags of marijuana became unlawful since the police
officers were not armed with a search warrant at the time. Moreover, it
Lastly, the issue on the admissibility of the marijuana seized was beyond the reach and control of petitioner.
should likewise be ruled upon. Rule 113 Section 5(a) of the
Rules of Court provides: In sum, this Court finds petitioner Rodolfo Espano guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Article II, Section 8, in relation to
"A peace officer or a private person Section 2 (e-L) (I) of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. Under the
may, without a warrant, arrest a person: said provision, the penalty imposed is six years and one day to twelve
years and a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousands pesos.
a. when, in his presence, the person With the passage of Republic Act No. 7659, with took effect on
to be arrested has committed, is actually December 31, 1993, the imposable penalty shall now depend on the
committing, or is attempting to commit an quantity of drugs recovered. Under the provisions of Republic Act No.
offense; 7659, Section 20, and as interpreted
inPeople v. Simon 13 and People v. Lara, 14 if the
quantity of marijuana involved is less than 750 grams, the imposable
penalty ranges from prision correccional to reclusion temporal. Taking
into consideration that petitioner is not a habitual delinquent, the
amendatory provision is favorable to him and the quantity of marijuana
involved is less than 750 grams, the penalty imposed underRepublic
Act No. 7659 should be applied. There being no mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances, the imposable penalty shall be prision
correccional in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the maximum penalty shall be taken from the medium
period of prision correccional,which is two (2) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months, while the
minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is
one (1) month and one (1) day six (6) months of arresto mayor.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The

decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 13976 dated
January 16, 1995 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
petitioner Rodolfo Espano is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of TWO (2) months and ONE (1) day of arresto mayor,as
minimum of TWO (2) years, FOUR (4) months and ONE (1)
day of prision correccional,as minimum.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C .J .,Kapunan and Purisima, JJ ., concur.

||| (Espano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120431, [April 1, 1998], 351
PHIL 798-809)
 EN BANC The Court granted the temporary restraining
G.R. No. 80806 October 5, 1989 order on December 14, 1983. LLphil

LEO PITA, doing business under the name and style of PINOY In his Answer and Opposition filed on
PLAYBOY, petitioner, vs. December 27, 1983 defendant Mayor Bagatsing
THE COURT OF APPEALS, RAMON BAGATSING, and NARCISO admitted the confiscation and
CABRERA, respondents. burning of obscence reading materials on
December 1 and 3, 1983, but claimed that the
William C. Arceno for petitioner. said materials were voluntarily surrendered by
Casibang, Perello and De Dios for private respondent. the vendors to the police authorities, and that
the said confiscation and seizure was (sic)
DECISION undertaken pursuant to P.D. No. 960, as
SARMIENTO, J p: amended byP.D. No. 969, which amended
Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code. In
The petitioner, publisher of Pinoy Playboy, a "men's magazine", seeks opposing the plaintiff's application for a
the review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, 1 rejecting his writ of preliminary injunction, defendant pointed
appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, dismissing his out that in that anti-smut campaign conducted
complaint for injunctive relief. He invokes, in particular, the guaranty on December 1 and 3, 1983, the materials
against unreasonable searches and seizures of the Constitution, as confiscated belonged to the magazine stand
well as its prohibition against deprivation ofproperty without due owners and peddlers who voluntarily
process of law. Cdpr surrendered their reading materials, and that
the plaintiff's establishment was not raided.
There is no controversy as to the facts. We quote:
The other defendant, WPD Superintendent,
On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti- Narcisco Cabrera, filed no answer.
Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor of the
City of Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing, On January 5, 1984, plaintiff filed his
elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group, Memorandum in support of the issuance of the
Auxilliary Services Bureau, Western Police writ of preliminary injunction, raising the issue
District, INP of the Metropolitan Police as to "whether or not the defendants. and or
Force of Manila, seized and confiscated from their agents can without a court order confiscate
dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and or seize plaintiff's magazine before any judicial
peddlers along Manila sidewalks, magazines, finding is made on whether said magazine is
publications and other reading materials obscene or not"
believed to be obscene, pornographic and
The restraining order issued on December 14,
indecent and later burned the seized materials
1983 having lapsed on January 3, 1984, the
in public at the University belt along C.M. Recto
plaintiff filed an urgent motion for
Avenue, Manila, in the presence of Mayor
issuance of another restraining order, which
Bagatsing and several officers and
was opposed by defendant on the ground that
members of various student organizations.
issuance of a second restraining order would
violate the Resolution of the
Supreme Court dated January 11, 1983,
Among the publications seized, and later providing for the Interim Rules Relative to the
burned, was "Pinoy Playboy" magazines Implementation ofBatas Pambansa Blg. 129,
published and co-edited by plaintiff Leo Pita. which provides that a temporary restraining
order shall be effective only for twenty days
On December 7, 1983, plaintiff filed a case for from date of its issuance.
injunction with prayer for issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction against Mayor On January 9, 1984 defendant filed his
Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera, as Comment and or Rejoinder Memorandum in
superintendent of Western Police District of the support of his opposition to the issuance of a
City of Manila, seeking to enjoin and or restrain writ of preliminary injunction.
said defendants and their agents from
confiscating plaintiffs magazines or from On January 11, 1984, the trial court issued an
otherwise preventing the sale or circulation Order setting the case for hearing on January
thereof claiming that the magazine is a decent, 16, 1984 "for the parties to adduce evidence on
artistic and educational magazine which is not the question of whether the publication 'Pinoy
per se obscene, and that the publication is Playboy Magazine' alleged (sic) seized,
protected by the Constitutional confiscated and or burned by the defendants,
guarantees of freedom ofspeech and of the are obscence per se or not"
press.
On January 16, 1984, the Court issued an order
By order dated December 8, 1983 the Court set granting plaintiff's motion to be given three days
the hearing on the petition for preliminary "to file a reply to defendants' opposition dated
injunction on December 14, 1983 and ordered January 9, 1984, serving a copy thereof to the
the defendants to show cause not later than counsel for the defendants, who may file a
December 13, 1983 why the writ prayed for rejoinder within the same period from receipt,
should not be granted. after which the issue of Preliminary Injunction
shall be resolved"
On December 12, 1983, plaintiff filed an Urgent
Motion for issuance of a temporary restraining Plaintiff's supplemental Memorandum was filed
order against indiscriminate seizure, on January 18 1984. Defendant filed his
confiscation and burning of plaintiffs "Pinoy Comment on plaintiff's supplemental
Playboy" Magazines, pending hearing on the Memorandum on January 20, 1984, and plaintiff
petition for preliminary injunction in filed his "Reply-Memorandum" to defendants'
view of Mayor Bagatsing's pronouncement to Comment on January 25, 1984.
continue the Anti-Smut Campaign.
 On February 3, 1984, the Apparently, Kottinger was aware of its own uncertainty because in the
trial court promulgated the Order appealed from same breath, it would leave the final say to a hypothetical "community
denying the motion for a writ of preliminary standard" — whatever that is — and that the question must supposedly
injunction, and dismissing the case for be judged from case to case.
lack of merit. 2
About three decades later, this Court promulgated People v. Go
The Appellate Court dismissed the appeal upon the grounds, among Pin, 10 a prosecution under Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code. Go
other things, as follows: Pin was also even hazier:

We cannot quarrel with the basic postulate . . . We agree with counsel for appellant
suggested by appellant that seizure of allegedly in part. If such pictures, sculptures and
obscene publications or materials deserves paintings are shown in art exhibits and
close scrutiny because of the constitutional art galleries for the cause of art, to be
guarantee protecting the right to express viewed and appreciated by people
oneself in print (Sec. 9, Art. IV), and the interested in art, there would be no
protection afforded by the constitution against offense committed. However, the
unreasonable searches and seizure (Sec. 3, pictures here in question were used not
Art. IV). It must be equally conceded, however, exactly for art's sake but rather for
that freedom of the press is not without commercial purposes. In other words,
restraint, as the state has the right to protect the supposed artistic qualities of said
society from pornographic literature that is pictures were being commercialized so
offensive to public morals, as indeed we have that the cause of art was of secondary
laws punishing the author, publishers and or minor importance. Gain and profit
sellers of obscene publications (Sec. 1, Art. would appear to have been the main, if
201, Revised Penal Code, as amended by P.D. not the exclusive consideration in their
No. 960 and P.D. No. 969). Also well settled is exhibition; and it would not be surprising
the rule that the right against unreasonable if the persons who went to see those
searches and seizures recognizes certain pictures and paid entrance fees for the
exceptions, as when there is consent to the privilege of doing so, were not exactly
search or seizure, (People vs. Malesugui, 63 artists and persons interested in art and
Phil. 22) or search is an incident to an arrest, who generally go to art exhibitions and
(People vs. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169; Alvero vs. galleries to satisfy and improve their
Dizon, 76 Phil. 637) or is conducted in a vehicle artistic tastes, but rather people
or movable structure (See Papa vs. Magno, 22 desirous of satisfying their morbid
SCRA 857). 3 curiosity and taste, and lust, and for
love for excitement, including the youth
The petitioner now ascribes to the respondent court the following who because of their immaturity are not
errors: in a position to resist and shield
themselves from the ill and perverting
1. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the effects ofthese pictures. 11
decision of the trial court and, in effect, holding
that the police officers could without xxx xxx xxx
any court warrant or order seize and confiscate As the Court declared, the issue is a complicated one, in which the fine
petitioner's magazines on the basis lines have neither been drawn nor divided. It is easier said than done
simply of their determination that they are to say, indeed, that if "the pictures here in question were used not
obscene. exactly for art's sake but rather for commercial purposes," 12 the
pictures are not entitled to any constitutional protection.
2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
decision of the trial court and, in effect, holding It was People v. Padan y Alova, 13 however, that introduced to
that the trial court could dismiss the case on its Philippine jurisprudence the "redeeming" element that should
merits without any hearing thereon when what accompany the work, to save it from a valid prosecution. We quote:
was submitted to it for resolution was merely the
application of petitioner for the . . . We have had occasion to consider offenses
writ of preliminary injunction. 4 like the exhibition of still or moving
pictures of women in the nude, which we have
The Court states at the outset that it is not the first time that it is being condemned for obscenity and as offensive to
asked to pronounce what "obscene" means or what makes for an morals. In those cases, one might yet claim that
obscene or pornographic literature. Early on, in People vs. there was involved the element of art; that
Kottinger, 5 the Court laid down the test, in determining the connoisseurs of the same, and painters and
existence of obscenity, as follows: "whether the tendency of the matter sculptors might find inspiration in the
charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are showing of pictures in the nude, or the human
open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or body exhibited in sheer nakedness, as models
other article charged as being obscene may fall." 6 "Another test," in tableaux vivants. But an actual
so Kottinger further declares, "is that which shocks the ordinary and exhibition of the sexual act, preceded by
common sense of men as an indecency." 7 Kottinger hastened to say, acts of lasciviousness, can have no redeeming
however, that "[w]hether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend feature. In it, there is no room for art. One can
upon the circumstances of the case," 8and that ultimately, the question see nothing in it but clear and unmitigated
is to be decided by the "judgment of the aggregate sense of the obscenity, indecency, and an offense to public
community reached by it." 9 morals, inspiring and causing as it does, nothing
but lust and lewdness, and exerting a corrupting
Yet Kottinger, in its effort to arrive at a "conclusive" definition, influence specially on the youth of the land. . .
succeeded merely in generalizing a problem that has grown . 14
increasingly complex over the years. Precisely, the question is: When
does a publication have a corrupting tendency, or when can it be said
to be offensive to human sensibilities? And obviously, it is to beg the
question to say that a piece of literature has a corrupting Padan y Alova, like Go Pin, however, raised more questions than
influence because it is obscene, and vice-versa. answers. For one thing, if the exhibition was attended by "artists and
persons interested in art and who generally go to art exhibitions and
galleries to satisfy and improve their artistic tastes," 15 could the same What the Court is impressing, plainly and simply, is that the question is
legitimately lay claim to "art"? For another, suppose that the exhibition not, and has not been, an easy one to answer, as it is far from being a
was so presented that "connoisseurs of[art], and painters and sculptors settled matter. We share Tribe's disappointment over the discouraging
might find inspiration," 16 in it, would it cease to be a trend in American decisional law on obscenity as well as his pessimism
case of obscenity? on whether or not an "acceptable" solution is in sight.

Padan y Alova, like Go Pin also leaves too much latitude for judicial In the final analysis perhaps, the task that confronts us is less heroic
arbitrament, which has permitted an ad lib of ideas and "two-cents than rushing to a "perfect" definition of "obscenity", if that is possible,
worths" among judges as to what is obscene and what is art. as evolving standards for proper police conduct faced with the
problem, which, after all, is the plaint specifically raised in the petition.
In a much later decision, Gonzalez v. Kalaw Katigbak, 17 the Court,
following trends in the United States, adopted the test: "Whether to the However, this much we have to say.
average person, applying contemporary standards, the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient Undoubtedly, "immoral" lore or literature comes within the ambit of free
interest." 18 Kalaw-Katigbak represented a marked departure expression, although not its protection. In free expression cases,
from Kottinger in the sense that it measured obscenity in terms ofthe this Court has consistently been on the side of the exerciseof the right,
"dominant theme" of the work rather than isolated passages, which barring a "clear and present danger" that would warrant State
were central to Kottinger (although both cases are agreed that interference and action. 30 But, so we asserted in Reyes v.
"contemporary community standards" are the final arbiters ofwhat is Bagatsing, 31 "the burden to show the existence of grave and
"obscene"). Kalaw-Katigbak undertook moreover to make the imminent danger that would justify adverse action . . . lies on the . . .
determination of obscenity essentially a judicial question and as a authorit[ies]." 32
consequence, to temper the wide discretion Kottinger had given unto
law enforcers. cdphil "There must be objective and convincing, not subjective or conjectural,
proof of the existence of such clear and present danger." 33 "It is
It is significant that in the United States, constitutional law on obscenity essential for the validity of . . . previous restraint or censorship that the
continues to journey from development to development, which, states . . . authority does not rely solely on his own appraisal of what the
one authoritative commentator (with ample sarcasm), has been as public welfare, peace or safety may require." 34
"unstable as it is unintelligible." 19
"To justify such a limitation, there must be proof of such weight and
Memoirs v. Massachusettes, 20 a 1966 decision, which characterized sufficiency to satisfy the clear and present danger test." 35
obscenity as one "utterly without any redeeming social
value," 21 marked yet another development. The above disposition must not, however, be taken as a neat effort to
arrive at a solution — so only we may arrive at one but rather as a
The latest word, however, is Miller v. California, 22 which expressly serious attempt to put the question in its proper perspective, that is, as
abandoned Massachusettes, and established "basic guidelines," 23 to a genuine constitutional issue.
wit: "(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary
standards' would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the It is also significant that in his petition, the petitioner asserts
prurient interest . . .; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a constitutional issues, mainly, due process and illegal search and
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the seizure.
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." 24 As we so strongly stressed in Bagatsing, a case involving the
delivery of a political speech, the presumption is that the speech may
(A year later, the American Supreme Court decided Hamling v. United validly be said. The burden is on the State to demonstrate the
States, 25 which repeated Miller, and Jenkins v. Georgia, 26 yet existence of a danger, a danger that must not only be (1) clear but
another reiteration of Miller. Jenkins, curiously, acquitted the also, (2) present, to justify State action to stop the speech. Meanwhile,
producers of the motion picture, Carnal Knowledge, in the the Government must allow it (the speech). It has no choice. However,
absence of "genitals" portrayed on screen, although the film if it acts notwithstanding that (absence of evidence of a clear and
highlighted contemporary American sexuality.). present danger), it must come to terms with, and be held accountable
for, due process.
The lack of uniformity in American jurisprudence as to what constitutes
"obscenity" has been attributed to the reluctance of the courts to The Court is not convinced that the private respondents have shown
recognize the constitutional dimension of the problem. 27Apparently, the required proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the
the courts have assumed that "obscenity" is not included in the literature for which mandatory injunction had been sought below.
guaranty of free speech, an assumption that, as we averred, has First of all, they were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding
allowed a climate of opinions among magistrates predicated upon the said materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry
arbitrary, if vague theories of what is acceptable to society. And "[t]here out a search and seizure, by way of a search warrant.
is little likelihood," says Tribe, "that this development has reached a
state of rest, or that it will ever do so until the Court recognizes that The Court of Appeals has no "quarrel that . . . freedom of the press is
obscene speech is speech nonetheless, although it is subject — as in not without restraint, as the state has the right to protect society from
all speech — to regulation in the interests of [society as a whole] — but pornographic literature that is offensive to public morals." 36 Neither do
not in the interest of a uniform vision of how human sexuality should be we. But it brings us back to square one: were the "literature" so
regarded and portrayed." 28 confiscated "pornographic"? That "we have laws punishing the author,
publisher and sellers of obscence publications (Sec. 1, Art. 201,
In the case at bar, there is no challenge on the right of the State, in the Revised Penal Code, as amended by P.D. No. 960 and P.D. No.
legitimate exercise of police power, to suppress smut — provided it is 969)," 37 is also fine, but the question, again, is: Has the petitioner
smut. For obvious reasons, smut is not smut simply because one been found guilty under the statute?
insists it is smut. So is it equally evident that individual tastes develop,
adapt to wide-ranging influences, and keep in step with the rapid The fact that the former respondent Mayor's act was sanctioned by
advance of civilization. What shocked our forebears, say, five decades "police power" is no license to seize property in disregard of due
ago, is not necessarily repulsive to the present generation. James process. In Philippine Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, 38 We defined
Joyce and D.H. Lawrence were censored in the thirties yet their works police power as "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere
are considered important literature today. 29 Goya's La Maja with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general
desnuda was once banned from public exhibition but now adorns the welfare." 39 Presidential Decrees Nos. 960 and 969 are, arguably,
world's most prestigious museums. police power measures, but they are not, by themselves, authorities for
high-handed acts. They do not exempt our law enforcers, in carrying
But neither should we say that "obscenity" is a bare (no pun intended) out the decree of the twin presidential issuances (Mr. Marcos'), from
matter of opinion. As we said earlier, it is the divergent the commandments of the Constitution, the right to due process of law
perceptions of men and women that have probably compounded the and the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, specifically.
problem rather than resolved it.
Significantly, the Decrees themselves lay down procedures for makes it no different fromBurgos, a political case, because, and as we
implementation. We quote: have indicated, speech is speech, whether political or "obscene"

Sec. 2. Disposition of the Prohibited Articles. — The Court is not ruling out warrantless searches, as the
The disposition of the literature, films, prints, Rules of Court (1964 rev.) (the Rules then prevailing), provide:
engravings, sculptures, paintings, or other
materials involved in the violation referred to in SEC. 12. Search without warrant of person
Section 1 hereof (Art. 201), RPC as amended) arrested. — A person charged with an offense
shall be governed by the following rules: may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the
(a) Upon conviction of the commission ofthe offense. 44
offender, to be forfeited in favor of the
Government to be destroyed. but as the provision itself suggests, the search must have been
an incident to a lawful arrest, and the arrest must be on
(b) Where the criminal case account of a crime committed. Here, no party has been charged,
against any violator of this decree nor are such charges being readied against any party, under
results in an acquittal, the Article 201, as amended, of the Revised Penal Code.
obscene/immoral literature, films,
We reject outright the argument that "[t]here is no constitutional nor
prints, engravings, sculptures,
legal provision which would free the accused of all criminal
paintings or other materials and
responsibility because there had been no warrant," 45 and that
articles involved in the violation
"violation of penal law [must] be punished." 46 For starters, there is no
referred to in Section 1 (referring to
"accused" here to speak of, who ought to be "punished". Second, to
Art. 201) hereof shall nevertheless be
say that the respondent Mayor could have validly ordered the raid (as
forfeited in favor of the government to
a result of an anti-smut campaign) without a lawful search warrant
be destroyed, after forfeiture
because, in his opinion, "violation of penal laws" has been committed,
proceedings conducted by the
is to make the respondent Mayor judge, jury, and executioner rolled
Chief of Constabulary.
into one. And precisely, this is the very complaint of the petitioner.

We make this resume.

(c) The person aggrieved
1. The authorities must apply for the issuance of a search warrant from
by the forfeiture action of the
a judge, if in their opinion, an obscenity rap is in order;
Chief of Constabulary may, within
fifteen (15) days after his receipt of a
2. The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to
copy of the decision, appeal the
be seized are "obscene", and pose a clear and present danger of an
matter to the Secretaryof National
evil substantive enough to warrant State interference and action;
Defense for review. The
decision of the Secretary of National 3. The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed
Defense shall be final and "obscene:" the question is to be resolved on a case-to-case basis and
unappealable. (Sec. 2, PD No. 960 as on His Honor's sound discretion.
amended by PD No. 969.)
4. If, in the opinion of the court, probable cause exists, it may issue the
Sec. 4. Additional Penalties. — Additional search warrant prayed for;
penalties shall be imposed as follows:
5. The proper suit is then brought in the court under Article 201 of the
1. In case the offender is a Revised Penal Code;
government official or employee who
allows the violations of Section 1 6. Any conviction is subject to appeal. The appellate court may assess
hereof, the penalty as provided herein whether or not the properties seized are indeed "obscene"
shall be imposed in the maximum
period and, in addition, the accessory These do not foreclose, however, defenses under the Constitution or
penalties provided for in the Revised applicable statutes, or remedies against abuse of official power under
Penal Code, as amended, shall the Civil Code 47 or the Revised Penal code. 48
likewise be imposed. 40
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the
Under the Constitution, 41 on the other hand: respondent court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. It appearing,
however, that the magazines subject of the search and seizure have
SEC. 3. The right of the people to be secure in been destroyed, the Court declines to grant affirmative relief. To that
their persons, houses, papers, and effects extent, the case is moot and academic. cdll
against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any SO ORDERED.
purpose shall not be violated, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Cortes,
upon probable cause to be determined by the Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
judge, or such other responsible officer as may
be authorized by law, after examination under Fernan, C.J., Narvasa and Feliciano, JJ., In the result.
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly Gutierrez, Jr., J., On leave.
describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized. 42 ||| (Pita v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80806, [October 5, 1989], 258-A
PHIL 134-153)
It is basic that searches and seizures may be done only through a
judicial warrant, otherwise, they become unreasonable and subject to
challenge. In Burgos v. Chief of Staff AFP, 43 We countermanded the
orders of the Regional Trial Court authorizing the search of the
premises of We Forum and Metropolitan Mail, two Metro Manila
dailies, by reason of a defective warrant. We have greater reason here
to reprobate the questioned raid, in the complete absence of a warrant,
valid or invalid. The fact that the instant case involves an obscenity rap
 FIRST DIVISION Agnes, for alleged violations of some provisions of the Fisheries
G.R. No. L-25434 July 25, 1975 Act and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder.

HONORABLE ARSENIO N. ROLDAN, JR., in his capacity On August 5 or 6, 1965, the two fishing boats were
as Acting Commissioner, Philippine Fisheries actually seized for illegal fishing with dynamite. Fish caught with
Commission, and THE PHILIPPINE dynamite and sticks of dynamite were then found aboard the two
NAVY, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE FRANCISCO ARCA, vessels.
as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of On August 18, 1965, the Fisheries Commissioner
Manila (Branch I) and MORABE, DE GUZMAN & requested the Palawan Provincial Fiscal to file criminal charges
COMPANY, respondents. against the crew members of the fishing vessels.
Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz and Solicitor Augusto On September 30, 1965, there were filed in the Court of
M . Amores for petitioners. First Instance of Palawan a couple of informations, one against
J .C . Yuseco and A. R. Narvasa for private respondent. the crew members of Tony Lex III, and another against the crew
members of Tony Lex VI — both for violations of Act No. 4003, as
SYNOPSIS amended by Commonwealth Acts Nos. 462, 659 and 1088, i.e.,
for illegal fishing with the use of dynamite. On the same day, the
The Court of First Instance of Palawan ordered the seizure of two Fiscal filed an ex parte motion to hold the boats in custody as
vessels of respondent company in connection with illegal fishing with instruments and therefore evidence of the crime (p. 54, rec.), and
dynamite committed within the territorial waters of Palawan. cabled the Fisheries Commissioner to detain the vessels (p. 56,
Respondent company filed a complaint with application for a writ of rec.)
preliminary mandatory injunction with the Court of First Instance of
Manila. Respondent Judge issued the writ of preliminary mandatory On October 2 and 4, likewise, the Court of First
injunction after a bond was filed for the release of the vessels. Instance of Palawan ordered the Philippine Navy to take the boats
Petitioner's motion to reconsider the order was denied. Hence, this in custody.
petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to On October 2, 1965, respondent company filed a
restrain respondent judge from enforcing the questioned order. complaint with application for preliminary mandatory injunction,
docketed as Civil Case No. 62799 with the Court of First Instance
The Supreme Court granted the petition ruling that respondent judge of Manila against herein petitioners. Among others, it was alleged
committed a grave abuse of discretion in issuing the preliminary that at the time of the seizure of the fishing boats in issue, the
mandatory injunction and further in denying the motion to reconsider same were engaged in legitimate fishing operations off the coast
the same. It is basic that a court cannot interfere with the judgments, of Palawan; that by virtue of the offer of compromise dated
orders and decrees of another court of concurrent or coordinate September 13, 1965 by respondent company to the Secretary of
jurisdiction having equal power to grant the relief sought by injunction. Agriculture and Natural Resources, the numerous violations of the
Since the two vessels were already in custodia legis under the sole Fishery Laws, if any, by the crew members of the vessels were
control of the Palawan Court of First Instance, the Manila Court of First settled.
Instance cannot interfere with and change that possession.
On October 9, 1965, petitioners, represented by the
Writ of preliminary mandatory injunction set aside as null and void. Solicitor General, opposed the above-mentioned complaint,
alleging among others, that: (1) the issuance of the writ would
DECISION disrupt thestatus quo of the parties and would render nugatory
MAKASIAR, J p: any decision of the respondent court favorable to the defendant;
(2) that the vessels, being instruments of a crime in criminal cases
Nos. 3416 and 3417 filed with the Court of First Instance of
A petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary Palawan, the release of the vessels sans the corresponding order
injunction to restrain respondent Judge from enforcing his order from the above-mentioned court would deprive the same of its
dated October 18, 1965, and the writ of preliminary mandatory authority to dispose of the vessels in the criminal cases and the
injunction thereunder issued. Provincial Fiscal would not be able to utilize said vessels as
On April 3, 1964, respondent company filed with the evidence in the prosecution of said cases; (3) that as petitioners
Court of First Instance of Manila a civil case docketed as No. herein were in possession of one of the vessels in point, they
56701 against petitioner Fisheries Commissioner Arsenio cannot now be deprived of the legal custody thereof by reason of
N. Roldan, Jr., for the recovery of fishing vessel Tony Lex VI (one the dismissal of Civil Case No. 56701; (4) that petitioner Fisheries
of two fishing boats in question) which had been seized and Commissioner has the power to seize and detain the vessels
impounded by petitioner Fisheries Commissioner through the pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act No 3215 in relation to
Philippine Navy. Sections 903 and 2210 of the Revised Tariff and Customs Code:
(5) that respondents herein have not exhausted administrative
On April 10, 1964, respondent company prayed for a remedies before coming to court; (6) that the compromise
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction with respondent court, but agreement approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
said prayer was, however, denied. Resources and indorsed to the Fisheries Commissioner is never a
bar to the prosecution of the crime perpetrated by the crew
On April 28, 1964, the Court of First Instance of Manila members of the vessels belonging to respondent company.
set aside its order of April 10, 1964 and granted respondent
company's motion for reconsideration praying for preliminary And again, on October 15, 1965, herein petitioners filed
mandatory injunction. Thus, respondent company took their memorandum praying for the denial of the application for
possession of the vessel Tony Lex VI from herein petitioners by preliminary mandatory injunction.
virtue of the above said writ.
On the same day, October 15, 1965, herein petitioners
On December 10, 1964, the Court of First Instance of filed an urgent motion to submit additional documentary evidence.
Manila dismissed Civil Case No. 56701 for failure of therein
petitioner (respondent company herein) to prosecute as well as On October 18, 1965, herein petitioners, as defendants
for failure of therein defendants (petitioners herein) to appear on in said Civil Case No. 62799, filed their answer to the complaint
the scheduled date of hearing. The vessel, Tony Lex VI or Srta. with affirmative defenses, reiterating the grounds in their
Winnie however, remained in the possession of respondent opposition to the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
company. injunction and adding that herein private respondent admitted
committing the last violation when it offered in its letter dated
On July 20, 1965, petitioner Fisheries Commissioner September 21, 1965 to the Acting Commissioner of Fisheries, to
requested the Philippine Navy to apprehend vessels Tony Lex VI compromise said last violation (Exh. 12, pp. 60-61, rec.)
and Tony Lex III, also respectively called Srta. Winnie and Srta.
 On said day, October 18, 1965, the respondent Judge 182; Araneta & Uy vs. Commonwealth Insurance Company, 55
issued the challenged order granting the issuance of the writ of OG 431; Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. III, 1970
preliminary mandatory injunction and issued the preliminary writ ed., p. 64).
upon the filing by private respondent of a bond of P5,000.00 for
the release of the two vessels (pp. 95-102, rec.) As early as October 2 and 4, 1965, the two boats were
already in custodia legis under the sole control of the Palawan
On October 19, 1965, herein petitioners filed a motion Court of First Instance. The Manila Court of First Instance cannot
for reconsideration of the order issuing the preliminary writ on interfere with and change that possession (Hacbang vs. Leyte
October 18, 1965 on the ground, among others, that on October Bus Co., Inc., supra; NPC vs. Hon. Jesus de Vera, supra).
18, 1965 the Philippine Navy received from the Palawan Court of
First Instance two orders dated October 2 and 4, 1965 requiring It is immaterial that the vessels were then in the
the Philippine Navy to hold the fishing boats in custody and Philippine Navy basin in Manila; for the same in no way impugns
directing that the said vessels should not be released until further the jurisdiction already vested in the Palawan court, which has
orders from the Court, and that the bond of P5,000.00 is grossly custody thereof through the Philippine Navy. This is analogous to
insufficient to cover the Government's losses in case the two the situation in Colmenares versus Villar (L-27124, May 29, 1970,
vessels, which are worth P495,000.00, are placed beyond the 33 SCRA 186, 188-9), wherein We ruled "where the illegal
reach of the Government, thus frustrating their forfeiture as possession of firearms was committed in the town where the
instruments of the crime (pp. 103-109, rec.) Court sits, the fact that the firearms were confiscated from the
accused in another town does not affect the jurisdiction of the
On November 23, 1965, respondent Judge denied the Court" (pp. 186, 189).
said motion for reconsideration (p. 110, rec.)
It is likewise of no moment that the herein respondents
WE rule that the respondent Judge of the Manila Court were not notified by the herein petitioners of the seizure of the
of First Instance acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of questioned vessels by the Philippine Navy, because such
discretion when he issued on October 18, 1965 the order directing previous notice is not required by law.
the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and
when he refused to reconsider the same. II

I The dismissal on December 10, 1964 of the first Civil

Case No. 56701 by the Court of First Instance of Manila had the
When the respondent Judge issued the challenged necessary effect of automatically dissolving the writ of preliminary
order on October 18, 1965 and the writ of preliminary mandatory mandatory injunction issued therein on April 28, 1964, directing
injunction pursuant thereto, the fishing vessels were already the return of fishing vessel Tony Lex VI (pp. 156-157, rec.). Such
under the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Palawan by a preliminary writ, like any other interlocutory order, cannot
virtue of its orders of October 2 and 4, 1965, upon motion of the survive the main case of which it was but an incident; because
Provincial Fiscal (pp. 54, 55, rec.), directing the Philippine Navy to "an ancillary writ of preliminary injunction loses its force and effect
detain (pp. 108, 109, rec.) said vessels, which are subject to after the dismissal of the main petition" (National Sugar Workers'
forfeiture as instruments of the crime, to be utilized as evidence in Union, etc., vs. La Carlota Sugar Central, et al., L-23569, May 25,
Criminal Cases Nos. 3416 and 3417 for illegal fishing pending in 1972, 45 SCRA 104, 109; Lazaro vs. Mariano, 59 Phil. 627, 631;
said court (pp. 54-55, rec.). The said vessels were seized while Saavedra vs. Ibañez, 56 Phil. 33, 37; Hi Caiji vs. Phil. Sugar
engaging in prohibited fishing within the territorial waters of Estate and Development Company, 50 Phil. 592, 594).
Palawan (pp. 45, 48,-53, rec.) and hence within the jurisdiction of
the Court of First Instance of Palawan, in obedience to the rule Moreover, the writ of preliminary injunction issued on
that "the place where a criminal offense was committed not only April 28, 1964 in Civil Case No. 56701 was directed against the
determines the venue of the action but is an essential element of detention of the vessel Tony Lex VI for violations committed prior
jurisdiction" (Lopez vs. Paras, L-25795, Oct. 29, 1966, 18 SCRA to August 5, 1965, and therefore cannot and does not extend to
616, 619). The jurisdiction over the vessels acquired by the the seizure and detention of said vessel for violations on August 5
Palawan Court of First Instance cannot be interfered with by or 6, 1965, which violations were not and could not possibly be
another Court of First Instance. The orders of October 2 and 4, the subject-matter of said Civil Case No. 56701 which was filed
1965 by the Palawan Court of First Instance expressly direct the on April 3, 1964 (p. 12, rec.)
Philippine Navy "to hold in custody" the two vessels and that III
"same should not be released without prior order or authority from
this Court" (pp. 108, 109, rec.). Only the Palawan court can order Herein petitioners can validly direct and/or effect the
the release of the two vessels. Not even the Secretary of seizure of the vessels of private respondent for illegal fishing by
Agriculture and Natural Resources nor the Fisheries the use of dynamite and without the requisite licenses.
Commissioner can direct that the fishing boats be turned over to
private respondent without risking contempt of court. Section 4 of Republic Act No. 3512 approved on March
20, 1963 empowers the Fisheries Commissioner to carry out the
The grave abuse of discretion committed by the provisions of the Fisheries Act, as amended, and all rules and
respondent Judge was heightened by the fact that he did not regulations promulgated thereunder, to make searches and
reconsider his order of October 18, 1965 after he was informed by seizures personally or through his duly authorized representatives
petitioners in their motion for reconsideration filed on October 19, in accordance with the Rules of Court, of "explosives such as . .
1965 that the Palawan Court of First Instance had already issued .dynamites and the like . . .; including fishery products, fishing
the two orders dated October 2 and 4, 1965 directing the equipment, tackle and other things that are subject to seizure
Philippine Navy to hold in custody the fishing boats until further under existing fishery laws"; and "to effectively implement the
orders. enforcement of existing fishery laws on illegal fishing."
It is basic that one court cannot interfere with the Paragraph 5 of Section 4 of the same Republic Act
judgments, orders or decrees of another court of concurrent or 3512 likewise transferred to and vested in the Philippine Fisheries
coordinate jurisdiction having equal power to grant the relief Commission "all the powers, functions and duties heretofore
sought by injunction; because if coordinate courts were allowed to exercised by the Bureau of Customs, Philippine Navy and
interfere with each other's judgments, decrees or injunctions, the Philippine Constabulary over fishing vessels and fishery matters .
same would obviously lead to confusion and might seriously .."
hinder the administration of justice (Ongsinco, etc. vs. Tan, et al.,
97 Phil. 330; PNB vs. Javellana, 92 Phil. 525; Montesa vs. Manila Section 12 of the Fisheries Act, otherwise known
Cordage Company, 92 Phil. 25; Hubahib vs. Insular Drug as Republic Act No. 4003, as amended, prohibits fishing with
Company, 64 Phil. 119; Hacbang, et al. vs. The Leyte Auto Bus dynamites or other explosives which is penalized by Section 76
Company, et al., G.R. No. L-17907, May 30, 1963, 8 SCRA, 103, thereof "by a fine of not less than P1,500.00 nor more than
107-109; NPC vs. Hon. Jesus de Vera, G.R. No. L-15763, Dec. P5,000.00, and by imprisonment for not less than one (1) year
22, 1961, 3 SCRA, 646, 648; Cabigao vs. del Rosario, 44 Phil. and six (6) months nor more than five (5) years, aside from
the confiscation and forfeiture of all explosives, boats, tackles,
apparel, furniture, and other apparatus used in fishing in violation For illegal fishing again with explosives on April 25,
of said Section 12 of this Act." Section 78 of the same Fisheries 1963, the fishing boat Tony Lex VI together with its tackle,
Law provides that "in case of a second offense, apparel, furniture and all other apparatus used in fishing was
the vessel, together with its tackle, apparel, furniture and stores ordered confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government and
shall be forfeited to the Government." a fine in the amount of P5,000.00 was imposed on its owners-
operators, without prejudice to the filing of the necessary criminal
The second paragraph of Section 12 also provides that action, pursuant to the order of June 2, 1964 of the Commissioner
"the possession and/or finding, of dynamite, blasting caps and of Fisheries (pp. 37-38, rec.)
other explosives in any fishing boat shall constitute a presumption
that the said dynamite and/or blasting caps and explosives are Again, for committing the same violation on June 19,
being used for fishing purposes in violation of this Section, and 1963, a fine in the amount of P5,000.00 was imposed on the
that the possession or discover in any fishing boat or fish caught owners-operators of fishing boat Tony Lex VI pursuant to the
or killed by the use of dynamite or other explosives, under expert order of June 4, 1964 issued by the Commissioner of Fisheries
testimony, shall constitute a presumption that the owner, if (pp. 39-40, rec.)
present in the fishing boat, or the fishing crew have been fishing
with dynamite or other explosives." (Italics supplied). It appears, therefore, that since January 28,1964, the
fishing boat Tony Lex III was suspended from operating and was
Under Section 78 of the Fisheries Act, as amended, ordered moored at Pier 14, North Harbor, Manila (pp. 34, 46-47,
any person, association or corporation fishing in deep sea fishery rec.); and that the fishing vessel Tony Lex VI was suspended for
without the corresponding license prescribed in Sections 17 to 22 one year from May 24,1964 and was actually ordered forfeited to
Article V of the Fisheries Act or any other order or regulation the Government pursuant to the order of June 2, 1964 for
deriving force from its provisions, "shall be punished for each repeated violations of Section 12 of the Fisheries Act (pp. 37-38,
offense by a fine of not more than P5,000.00, or imprisonment, for rec.). As a matter of fact, when apprehended on August 5 or 6,
not more than one year, or both, in the discretion of the 1965, both vessels were found to be without any license or permit
Court; Provided, That in case of an association or corporation, the for coastwise trade or for fishing and unlawfully fishing with
President or manager shall be directly responsible for the acts of explosives, for which reason their owners and crew were
his employees or laborers if it is proven that the latter acted with accordingly indicted by the Provincial Fiscal of Palawan for illegal
his knowledge; otherwise the responsibility shall extend only as fishing with dynamite and without the requisite license (pp. 48-53,
far as fine is concerned: Provided, further, That in the absence of rec.)
a known owner of the vessel, the master, patron or person in
charge of such vessel shall be responsible for any violation of this As heretofore intimated, the two fishing boats were
Act: and Provided, further, That in case of a second apprehended on numerous occasions for fishing with dynamite
offense, thevessel together with its tackle, apparel, furniture and from March 28, 1963 to March 11, 1964, which violations private
stores shall be forfeited to the Government" (Emphasis supplied). respondent, as owner-operator, sought to compromise by offering
to pay a fine of P21,000.00 for all said prior violations.
Under Section 13 of Executive Order No. 389 of
December 23, 1950, reorganizing the Armed Forces of the Such previous violations of Sections 12, 17 and 18 of
Philippines, the Philippine Navy has the function, among others, the Fisheries Act committed by the two fishing boats, Tony Lex III
"to assist the proper governmental agencies in the enforcement of and Tony Lex VI, from March 28, 1963 until August 5 or 6, 1965,
laws and regulations pertaining to . . . Fishing . . . (46 OG 5905, rendered the said vessels subject to forfeiture under Sections 76
5911). and 78 of the Fisheries Act, as amended.

Section 2210 of the Tariff and Customs Code, as Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels
amended by PD No. 34 of October 27, 1972, authorized any and air crafts for violations of the customs laws have been the
official or person exercising police authority under the provisions traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a search
of the Code, to search and seize any vessel or air craft as well as warrant, because the vessel can be quickly moved out of the
any trunk, package, bag or envelope on board and to search any locality or jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be sought
person on board for any breach or violation of the customs and before such warrant could be secured; hence it is not practicable
tariff laws. to require a search warrant before such search or seizure can be
constitutionally effected (Papa vs. Mago, L-27360, Feb. 28, 1968,
When the Philippine Navy, upon request of the 22 SCRA 857, 871-74; Magoncia vs. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770, 774;
Fisheries Commissioner, apprehended on August 5 or 6, 1965 the Carroll vs. U.S. 267, pp. 132, 149, 158; Justice Fernando, The Bill
fishing boats Tony Lex III and Tony Lex VI, otherwise known of Rights, 1972 ed., p. 225; Gonzales, Philippine Constitutional
respectively as Srta. Agnes and Srta. Winnie, these vessels were Law, 1966 ed., p. 300).
found to be without the necessary license in violation of Section
903 of the Tariff and Customs Code and therefore subject to The same exception should apply to seizures of fishing
seizure under Section 2210 of the same Code, and illegally vessels breaching our fishery laws: They are usually equipped
fishing with explosives and without fishing license required by with powerful motors that enable them to elude pursuing ships of
Sections 17 and 18 of the Fisheries Law (pp. 46-47, rec.) the Philippine Navy or Coast Guard.

The operation of the fishing boat Tony Lex III was Another exception to the constitutional requirement of a
suspended pursuant to the order dated January 28, 1964 issued search warrant for a valid search and seizure, is a search or
by the Commissioner of Fisheries pending the final determination seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest (Alvero vs. Dizon, 76 Phil.
of the case against it for illegal fishing with explosives on January 637; Justice Fernando, The Bill of Rights, 1972 ed., p. 224).
21, 1964 (p. 34, rec.) and remained suspended until its Under our Rules of Court, a police officer or a private individual
apprehension on August 5 or 6, 1965 (p. 46, rec.) may, without a warrant, arrest a person (a) who has committed, is
actually committing or is about to commit an offense in his
For illegal fishing with explosives on March 23, 1963, presence; (b) who is reasonably believed to have committed an
the renewal of the fishing boat license of Tony Lex VI was offense which has been actually committed; or (c) who is a
suspended for one year from the time said boat was moored at prisoner who has escaped from confinement while serving a final
Pier 14 at North Harbor, Manila, without prejudice to the institution judgment or from temporary detention during the pendency of his
of a criminal case against its owner and/or operator, pursuant to ease or while being transferred from one confinement to another
the order dated May 19, 1964 issued by the Commissioner of (Sec. 6, Rule 113, Revised Rules of Court). In the case at bar, the
Fisheries (pp. 35-36, rec.), the motion for reconsideration of which members of the crew of the two vessels were caught in
order was denied by the Commissioner of Fisheries in an order flagrante illegally fishing with dynamite and without the requisite
dated August 17, 1964 (pp. 41-42, rec.) license. Thus their apprehension without a warrant of arrest while
committing a crime is lawful. Consequently, the seizure of the
For illegal fishing with dynamite on March 28, 1963, the vessel, its equipment and dynamites therein was equally valid as
operation of Tony Lex VI was suspended by the Commissioner of an incident to a lawful arrest.
Fisheries in an order dated April 1, 1963 (p. 62, rec.)
 The alleged compromise approved by the Secretary of 164 Fed. 884; Charles Barnes Co. vs. One Dredge Boat, 169
Agriculture and Natural Resources on September 13, 1965 (pp. Fed. 895, and Yu Con vs. Ipil, 11 Phil. 780).
63-64, 158-159, rec.) cannot be invoked by the respondents
because the said compromise referred to about thirty violations of The word boat it its ordinary sense, means any water
the fisheries law committed by the private respondent from March craft (Monongahela River Construction, etc. vs. Hardsaw, 77 NE
28, 1963 to March 11, 1964. The violations by the two vessels of 363, 365). The fishing boats Tony Lex III and Tony Lex VI are
private respondent by reason of which these vessels were likewise vessels within the meaning of the term vessel used in
apprehended and detained by the Philippine Navy upon request Sections 903 and 2210 of the Tariff and Customs Code.
of the Commissioner of Fisheries, were committed on August 5 or WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS HEREBY GRANTED
6, 1965. AND THE ORDER OF RESPONDENT JUDGE DATED
Moreover, the power to compromise would exist only OCTOBER 18, 1965, THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
before a criminal prosecution is instituted; otherwise the MANDATORY INJUNCTION ISSUED THEREUNDER AND THE
Department Secretary or any of his sub-alterns can render ORDER DATED NOVEMBER 23, 1965, ARE HEREBY SET
criminal prosecutions for violations of the fisheries law a mere ASIDE AS NULL AND VOID, WITH COSTS AGAINST PRIVATE
mockery. It is not in the public interest nor is it good policy to RESPONDENT.
sustain the viewpoint that the Department Secretary can Castro (Chairman), Esguerra, Muñoz
compromise criminal cases involving public, not private, offenses Palma and Martin, JJ ., concur.
after the indictment had been instituted in court. The fishing
vessels together with all their equipment and the dynamites found Teehankee, J ., took no part.
therein are not only evidence of the crime of illegal fishing but also
subject to forfeiture in favor of the Government as instruments of
||| (Roldan, Jr. v. Arca, G.R. No. L-25434, [July 25, 1975], 160 PHIL
the crime (Art. 45, Revised Penal Code, Sec. 78, Act No. 4003, as
343-359)
amended). Section 80(j) of Act No. 4003, as amended, precludes
such a compromise the moment the Fisheries Commissioner
decides to prosecute the criminal action in accordance with
Sections 76 and 78 of the other penal provisions of the fisheries
law. Furthermore, any compromise shall be upon the
recommendation of the Fisheries Commission (Section 80[i], Act
No. 4003), which did not recommend such a compromise for the
violation on August 5 or 6, 1965 of Section 12 in relation to
Sections 76 and 78 of Act No. 4003, as amended. On the
contrary, the Fisheries Commissioner requested the Provincial
Fiscal to institute the criminal cases (pp. 43-45, rec.) and the
Provincial Fiscal filed the corresponding informations docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. 3416 and 3417 on September '30,1965
against the owners and the members of the crew of the vessels
(pp. 48-53, rec.)
It should be noted that in the first indorsement dated
September 13, 1965 of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources approving the compromise fine of P21,000.00 for the
various violations committed previous to August 5 or 6, 1965 (pp.
34-42, 47, 58-64, 149-155, 158-159, rec.), the Department
Secretary "believes that the offer made by the company was an
implied admission of violations of said provisions of the Fisheries
Law and regulations, . . ." (pp. 63, 158, rec.). The said approval
was granted after the private respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration of the indorsement dated March 5, 1965 of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources disapproving the
offer by private respondent to pay the fine by way of compromise.
There can be no dispute that the term fishing
boat employed in the second paragraph of Section 12 of the
Fisheries Act applies to the vessels Tony Lex III and Tony Lex VI.
Even private respondent refers to said fishing boats as fishing
vessels "engaged in fishing operations" or "in commercial fishing"
in paragraph IV of its complaint in Civil Case No. 62799 (p. 13,
rec.), as well as in its various communications to the Fisheries
Commissioner (pp. 60-61, 65, 82, rec.). The two fishing vessels
Tony Lex III and Tony Lex VI likewise fall under the
term vessel used in Sections 17, 76 and 78, as well as the
term boats utilized in the second paragraph of Section 76 of the
Fisheries Act. They can also fall under the term fishing
equipment employed in Section 4 of Republic Act No. 3512:
because a fishing equipment is never complete and cannot be
effectively used in off-shore or deep-sea fishing without the fishing
boat or fishing vessel itself. And these two vessels of private
respondent certainly come under the term fishing
vessels employed in paragraph 5 of Section 4 of the
same Republic Act 3512 creating the Fisheries Commission.
Hence, no useful purpose can be served in trying to
distinguish between boat and vessel with reference to Tony Lex III
and Tony Lex VI. As a matter of fact, the accepted definition
of vesselincludes "every description of water craft, large or small,
used or capable of being used as a means of transportation on
water" (Cope versus Vallete, etc., 199 U.S. 625; U.S. vs. Holmes,
 EN BANC infringed, 4 or threatened to be infringed. What constitutes a
G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989 reasonable or unreasonable search and seizure in any particular
case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of
RICARDO C. VALMONTE AND UNION OF LAWYERS the circumstances involved. 5
AND ADVOCATES FOR PEOPLE'S RIGHTS
(ULAP), petitioners, vs. Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA AND NATIONAL CAPITAL stopped and searched without a search warrant by the military
REGION DISTRICT COMMAND, respondents. manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating the details
of the incidents which amount to a violation of his right against unlawful
Ricardo C. Valmonte for himself and his co-petitioners. search and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to determine
whether there was a violation of Valmonte's right against unlawful
DECISION search and seizure. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited.
Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is
PADILLA, J p: not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved
This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or according to the facts of each case. 6
temporary restraining order, seeking the declaration of checkpoints in
Valenzuela, Metro Manila or elsewhere, as unconstitutional and the Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a
dismantling and banning of the same or, in the alternative, to direct the vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, 7 or simply
respondents to formulate guidelines in the implementation of looks into a vehicle, 8 or flashes a light therein, 9 these do not
checkpoints, for the protection of the people. constitute unreasonable search.

Petitioner Ricardo C. Valmonte sues in his capacity as citizen of the The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and
Republic, taxpayer, member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines probably in other areas) may be considered as a security measure to
(IBP), and resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila; while petitioner Union enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective
of Lawyers and Advocates for People's Rights (ULAP) sues in its territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of
capacity as an association whose members are all members of the the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart
IBP. plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public security. In
this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban
The factual background of the case is as follows: centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly
reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and military men by
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command NPA "sparrow units," not to mention the abundance of unlicensed
(NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such
Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting urban centers, not all of which are reported in media, most likely
security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral brought about by deteriorating economic conditions — which all sum
areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, up to what one can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal
maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive times. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence
to the social, economic and political development of the National and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a
Capital Region. 1 As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the former
NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro should prevail.
Manila.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of
Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner that all
the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of
safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen,
disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within
their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society
check-ups, especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a and a peaceful community.
search warrant and/or court order. Their alleged fear for their safety
increased when, at dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply Finally, on 17 July 1988, military and police checkpoints in Metro
officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down Manila were temporarily lifted and a review and refinement of the rules
allegedly in cold blood by the members of the NCRDC manning the in the conduct of the police and military manning the checkpoints was
checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ordered by the National Capital Regional Command Chief and the
ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and for Metropolitan Police Director. 10
continuing to speed off inspite of warning shots fired in the air.
Petitioner Valmonte also claims that, on several occasions, he had WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
gone thru these checkpoints where he was stopped and his car
subjected to search/check-up without a court order or search warrant. SO ORDERED.

Petitioners further contend that the said checkpoints give the Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras,
respondents a blanket authority to make searches and/or seizures Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Cortes, Griño-Aquino,
without search warrant or court order in violation of the Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Constitution; 2 and, instances have occurred where a citizen, while not
killed, had been harassed.

Petitioners' concern for their safety and apprehension at being

harassed by the military manning the checkpoints are not sufficient
grounds to declare the checkpoints as per se illegal. No proof has
been presented before the Court to show that, in the course of their
routine checks, the military indeed committed specific violations
of petitioners' right against unlawful search and seizure or other rights.

In a case filed by the same petitioner organization, Union of Lawyers

and Advocates for People's Right (ULAP) vs. Integrated National
Police, 3 it was held that individual petitioners who do not allege that
any of their rights were violated are not qualified to bring the action, as
real parties in interest.

The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is

a personal right invocable only by those whose rights have been
 SECOND DIVISION meantime, the prosecution filed its comment/opposition 10 to the
G.R. No. 163108 February 23, 2005 petitioner's petition for bail. jur2005cd

GLENN CABALLES y CHUA, petitioner, vs. On May 13, 2003, the court issued an Order 11 declaring
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. EMMANUEL D. LAUREA, that the petition for bail was submitted for its resolution and denying
HON. BENJAMIN T. ANTONIO, and PEOPLE OF THE the petitioner's motion for an earlier trial date. On June 16, 2003, the
PHILIPPINES, respondents. trial court issued its Order 12 denying the petition for bail, on its finding
that the evidence of guilt against the petitioner was strong.
DECISION
During the trial of June 19, 2003, Dr. Marquez failed to
CALLEJO, SR., J p: appear before the court because, in the meantime, he had been
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the assigned to the Eastern Police District and failed to receive
Revised Rules of Court filed by the petitioner for the nullification of the thesubpoena issued to him by the court. The prosecution prayed for
Resolution of the Court of Appeals 1 which dismissed his petition for continuance, but the petitioner objected and invoked his right to
the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus for his release from detention speedy trial. The court, nevertheless, granted the motion and reset the
despite the pendency of People of the Philippines v. trial to July 17, 2003.
Glenn Caballes 2 for rape, and its resolution denying his motion for
reconsideration thereof. On June 27, 2003, the court issued a subpoena duces
tecum/ad testificandum to Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez requiring him to
The antecedents are as follows: appear for the trial set on July 17, 2003. 13

On November 19, 2001, petitioner Glenn Chua Caballes was On July 4, 2003, the petitioner filed a Motion for
charged with rape of a minor in the Regional Reconsideration of the court's Order dated June 16, 2003 denying his
Trial Court (RTC) of Malabon City. The case was docketed as Criminal petition for bail. His motion was set for hearing, also on July 17, 2003.
Case No. 25756-MN and raffled to Branch 169, presided by Judge However, the petitioner preempted the resolution of his motion for
Emmanuel D. Laurea. Because the petitioner was charged with a non- reconsideration and filed a Motion to Dismiss 14 the case on July 11,
bailable offense, he was detained. 2003 on the ground that his right to speedy trial had been violated. He
made the following allegations:
The petitioner was arraigned on February 7, 2002 and
pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. The prosecution presented 1. The hearings in the instant case
two (2) witnesses, namely, Venice Vera Pio, the private complainant, have more often than not been scheduled more
and her mother. The petitioner, through counsel, commenced his than one month apart;
cross-examination of Pio, but failed to complete the same. In January
2003, the petitioner engaged the services of a new counsel, Atty. Noel 2. In the hearing on April 30, 2003, in
S. Sorreda, who entered his appearance as defense counsel. 3 particular, the day before undersigned counsel
had filed a Manifestation stating inter alia that
During the trial of February 26, 2003, the petitioner his available dates for the next hearing may be
continued his cross-examination of Pio but still failed to terminate the "any Monday, Wednesday or Thursday for the
same. The trial was set on March 6, 2003 for the petitioner to terminate whole of May 2003 and the first half of June
his cross-examination of Pio. However, due to the illness of the private 2003, except on May 14 and 21" — yet Atty.
prosecutor, the trial on the said date did not proceed. The trial was Manalaysay asked for the next hearing on June
further reset to March 17, 2003 during which the petitioner continued 19 which is already outside or beyond the dates
with his cross-examination of the private complainant. Thereafter, the mentioned in the manifestation, and which was
continuation of trial was set on April 3, 21, and 30, 2003. On April 3, more than 1-1/2 months away, but which the
2003, the petitioner concluded his cross-examination of Pio. The Honorable Court nonetheless granted;
prosecution declared that its next witness would be Dr. Jose Arnel
Marquez, the Medico-Legal Officer of the Philippine National Police 3. Atty. Manalaysay has never been
(PNP) Crime Laboratory, who had conducted a medico-legal able to present any "good cause" as to how
examination of the private complainant, but stated that he had not come he was not able to present Dr. Marquez
been subpoenad. The prosecution prayed for the cancellation of the on April 30, 2003, and then again on June 19,
trial scheduled on April 21, 2003 to give the prosecution time to secure 2003; and as aforesaid, his absence on March
and cause the service of a subpoena duces tecum on him. The 6, 2003 has not been supported by any medical
petitioner conformed to the motion of the prosecution. cHaCAS certificate;

On April 28, 2003, the petitioner filed a petition for bail. 4 4. The first hearing in the instant case
was held on June 13, 2002, thus it has now
The trial of April 30, 2003 did not proceed because the been more than one year, or close to 400 days
petitioner's counsel filed a Manifestation 5 that his presence was ago since trial started; neither has there been
required in an execution sale in Cavite. The said counsel manifested any authorization from the Supreme Court that
that he reserved his right to cross-examine any witness the the trial period may exceed 180 days; cDaEAS
prosecution would present in case trial would proceed on that date; on
the other hand, in the event that the trial court would cancel the trial, he 5. There has been no statement by
would be available in May 2003 and during the first half of June 2003. the Honorable Court in any of its orders granting
continuance that "the ends of justice served by
The trial court reset the hearing of the case to 8:30 taking such action outweigh the best
a.m. of June 19, 2003 and gave the prosecution ten (10) days to file its interest of the public and the accused in a
opposition 6 to the petitioner's petition for bail. It likewise ordered the speedy trial;"
issuance of a subpoena to Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez to require him to
attend the trial on the said date. 6. As above stated, it appears that the
prosecution made a false statement before the
On May 5, 2003, the petitioner filed a motion 7 seeking an Honorable Court in claiming they had asked Dr.
earlier trial date, invoking his right to speedy trial under the Speedy Marquez to testify in the June 19, 2003 hearing,
Trial Act of 1998. He also filed a motion for the urgent resolutionof his when in fact they had not. 15
petition for bail. 8
Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez had apparently still not received
On May 12, 2003, the petitioner filed another the subpoena issued by the trial court, because of which the
motion 9 praying that the hearing scheduled on June 19, 2003 be prosecution again failed to present him as a witness during the
moved to an earlier date, preferably on May 26, 28 or 29, 2003. In the trial of July 17, 2003. The prosecution prayed for continuance, to which
the petitioner vigorously objected. The court, however, granted the is not a valid ground for continuance of the trial; (b) the trialcourt failed
motion and reset the trial to August 11, 2003. 16 to secure an extension of time of the trial period from the
Supreme Court; (c) the trial court should have given a precedence to
On July 24, 2003, Judge Laurea issued an the case, the charge therein being a heinous crime; (d) his petition for
Order 17 inhibiting himself from hearing the case "to avoid being a writ of habeas corpus was proper because his continued detention
misunderstood, to preserve his reputation for probity and objectivity had become illegal, following the prosecutor and the trial court's
and to live up to the ideal impartial administration of justice." The case violation of his right to a speedy trial, and the trialcourt's denial of his
was re-raffled to Branch 170, presided by Judge Benjamin T. Antonio, motion to dismiss the case and his petition for bail which was tainted
who calendared the case for trial on September 8, 2003. Nevertheless, with grave abuse of discretion; and (e) a writ of habeas corpus may be
on August 11, 2003, the petitioner filed a Motion for issued with the writ of certiorari for the purpose of review. However, the
Reconsideration 18 of Judge Laurea's Order dated July 24, 2003, CA denied the petitioner's motion for lack of merit.
which the latter denied, on the finding that no cogent reason was
presented to reconsider the same. 19 The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in this Court under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court reiterating the grounds contained in his
During the hearing on September 8, 2003, Judge Antonio motion for reconsideration of the CA decision. The petitioner averred
granted the private prosecutor's motion to be given five (5) days within that the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
which to oppose the petitioner's motion to dismiss. Judge Antonio also to excess or lack of jurisdiction in rendering its resolution, as well as
set the trial on September 18, 2003. 20 On the latter date, the the resolution denying his motion for reconsideration thereof.
trial court issued an Omnibus Order 21 denying the petitioner's motion
to dismiss. The trial court reasoned that there was no violation of the In its comment on the petition, the Office of the Solicitor
petitioner's right to speedy trial, considering that the apparent delays General submits that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is not the
could not be attributed to the fault of the prosecution alone. The proper remedy to assail the trial court's order denying his petition for
trial court noted that the petitioner also sought Postponements of the bail, motion to dismiss the case, and Judge Laurea's order of inhibition.
trials. The OSG posits that the petitioner was not deprived of his
constitutional right to a speedy disposition of his case as well as under
Anent the motion for reconsideration of the court's Order the Speedy Trial Act.
dated June 16, 2003 which denied the petition for bail, the
trial court considered the same as having been abandoned by the The issues for resolution are the following: (a) whether or not
petitioner upon the filing of his motion to dismiss the case without the decision of the CA is already final and executory; (b) whether the
waiting for the resolution of his motion for reconsideration on his proper remedy from the appellate court's denial of a petitioner for a writ
petition for bail. if habeas corpus is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court; and (c) if in the affirmative, whether or not the petitioner
The petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a is entitled to the issuance of the writ.
"Petition for Habeas Corpus and/or Certiorari and Prohibition." 22 On
October 2, 2003, the CA issued a Resolution requiring the petitioner to On the first issue, we find and so rule that the petitioner's
inform the court of his choice of remedy within five (5) days from notice recourse to this Court via a petition for certiorari from the
thereof. In compliance therewith, the petitioner filed a manifestation decision of the CA dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus is
with the appellate court that he had chosen his petition to be treated as inappropriate. Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Blg.129 provides that the
a petition for habeas corpus without prejudice "to the concomitant period for appeal from the judgment of any court in habeas
application of certiorari if the court considered the same necessary or corpus cases shall be forty-eight (48) hours from notice of the
appropriate to give effect to the writ of habeas corpus." judgment appealed from. While the said provision was not incorporated
in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court approved
The petitioner averred that (a) he was deprived of his right to Administrative Matter No. 01-1-03-SC amending Section 3, Rule
a speedy trial and his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of the 41of the said Rules, which took effect on July 15, 2001, thus:
case; (b) Judge Laurea erred in inhibiting himself from the case; (c) the
trial court committed grave abuse of its discretion in denying his SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal;
petition for bail; and (d) Judge Antonio had prejudged the case against appeal in habeas corpus cases.— The appeal
him. shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the judgment or final order appealed
On December 9, 2003, the CA issued its assailed Resolution from. Where a record on appeal is required, the
dismissing the petition, viz: appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a
record on appeal within thirty (30) days from
WHEREFORE, for being the wrong or notice of the judgment or final order. However,
improper remedy, the PETITION FOR HABEAS an appeal in habeas corpuscases shall be taken
CORPUS is DISMISSED. within forty-eight (48) hours from notice of the
judgment or final order appealed from.

The period of appeal shall be

SO ORDERED. 23 interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or
reconsideration. No motion for extension of time
According to the appellate court, while the petitioner to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration
manifested his preference that his petition be treated as a petition shall be allowed.
for habeas corpus,the same was not the proper remedy to review and
examine the proceedings before the trial court and as a relief from the Following the rule, the petitioner should have appealed to
petitioner's perceived oppressive situation in the trial court. The CA this Court from the CA decision denying his petition for a writ of habeas
further emphasized that a writ of habeas corpus is not a writ of error; corpus,as well as the denial of his motion for reconsideration thereof;
that it could not exercise its certiorari jurisdiction over the acts or instead, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
omission of the respondent judge as a concomitant remedy; and that Rules of Court, as amended. The well-settled rule is that certiorari is
the remedy for habeas corpus and certiorari are different in nature, not available where the aggrieved party's remedy of appeal is plain,
scope and purpose. The appellate court declared that the petitioner speedy and adequate in the ordinary course, the reason being
failed to present any evidence to prove that there was any intentional that certiorari cannot co-exist with an appeal or any other adequate
or deliberate delay caused to prejudice him; nor was there any malice remedy. The existence and availability of the right to appeal are
in the failure of the prosecution to promptly serve the subpoena duces antithetical to the availment of the special civil action
tecum/ad testificandum to its witnesses. The court also noted that the for certiorari.These two remedies are mutually exclusive. 24 An appeal
resetting of petitioner's case may also be attributed to the voluminous in this case would still have been a speedy and adequate remedy.
work of the RTC involved. HESIcT Consequently, when the petitioner filed his petition in this Court, the
decision of the CA was already final and executory. SEAHID
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said
decision contending that (a) the congestion of the trial court's calendar
 It bears stressing that a decision in a habeas corpus action governed by a different set of rules. Rule 2, Section 5(b) of the
stands in no different position than with any other proceeding and if the Rules of Court mandates that the joinder of causes of action shall not
appealed decision is to be reviewed by an appellate court, the remedy include special actions or actions governed by special rules, thus
is by writ of error because the error committed by the court is an proscribing the joinder of a special proceeding with a special civil
error of judgment and not an error of jurisdiction. 25 action.

Besides, as correctly held by the CA, a writ of habeas

corpus is not the proper remedy to assail the trial court's denial of the
petitioner's motion to dismiss the case, the denial of the petition for We also agree with the ruling of the CA that a petition for a
bail, as well as the voluntary inhibition of Judge Laurea. writ of habeas corpus is a remedy different from the special civil
action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a The writ of habeas corpus is a collateral attack on the processes,
special proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as orders, or judgment of the trial court, while certiorari is a direct
amended. In Ex Parte Billings,26 it was held that habeas corpus is attack of said processes, orders, or judgment on the
that of a civil proceeding in character. It seeks the enforcement of civil ground of lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to
rights. Resorting to the writ is not to inquire into the criminal excess or lack of jurisdiction. A writ of certiorari reaches only
act of which the complaint is made, but into the right of liberty, jurisdictional errors. It has no other use, except to bring before
notwithstanding the act and the immediate purpose to be served is the court a record material to be considered in exercising jurisdiction. A
relief from illegal restraint. The rule applies even when instituted to writ of certiorari reaches the record. On the other hand, a
arrest a criminal prosecution and secure freedom. When a prisoner writ of habeas corpus reaches the body but not the record; it also
petitions for a writ of habeas corpus,he thereby commences a suit and reaches jurisdictional matters but does not reach the record. However,
prosecutes a case in that court. 27 when jurisdiction is obtained by the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus,to bring the body of the person whose liberty is involved
Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor into court, and if it is necessary, to provide the record upon which the
intended as substitute for the trial court's function. 28 It cannot take the detention is based, that may be accomplished by using a
place of appeal, certiorari or writ of error. The writ cannot be used to writ of certiorari as an ancillary proceeding, i.e.,it is subordinate to or in
investigate and consider questions of error that might be raised relating aid of the primary action for the purpose of impeaching the record.
to procedure or on the merits. The inquiry in a habeas When a writ of certiorari is issued as the foundation of jurisdiction to
corpus proceeding is addressed to the question of whether the bring it and direct upon the validity of a judicial determination by any
proceedings and the assailed order are, for any reason, null and body or officer, jurisdictional questions only are reached, and such
void. 29 The writ is not ordinarily granted where the law provides for questions pertaining to the detention made by the officer or body
other remedies in the regular course, and in the absence ofexceptional particularly complained of. 40
circumstances. Moreover, habeas corpus should not be granted in
advance of trial. 30 The orderly course of trial must be pursued and the The petitioner manifested to the appellate court that his
usual remedies exhausted before resorting to the writ where petition should be treated as a petition for habeas corpus.Even then,
exceptional circumstances are extant. In another case, it was held the CA rightly dismissed the petition because the petitioner failed to
that habeas corpus cannot be issued as a writ of error or as a establish his right to the writ. The records show that the petitioner was
means of reviewing errors of law and irregularities not involving the charged with rape punishable by reclusion perpetua and was detained
questions of jurisdiction occurring during the course of the trial, subject based on the said charge; hence, if the evidence ofhis guilt is strong,
to the caveat that constitutional safeguards of human life and liberty he shall not be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal
must be preserved, and not destroyed. 31 It has also been held that prosecution. 41 There is no question that the trial court had jurisdiction
where restraint is under legal process, mere errors and irregularities, over the offense charged and over the person of the petitioner. The jail
which do not render the proceedings void, are not grounds for relief warden has the authority and, in fact, is mandated to detain the
by habeas corpusbecause in such cases, the restraint is not illegal. 32 petitioner until granted bail by the court, or the case against him
dismissed, or until he is acquitted after trial. The petitioner failed to
Habeas corpus is a summary remedy. It is analogous to a establish that his incarceration pendente lite was illegal, and likewise
proceeding in rem when instituted for the sole purpose of having the failed to establish exceptional circumstances warranting the
person of restraint presented before the judge in order that the issuance of a writ ofhabeas corpus by the appellate court. IASTDE
cause of his detention may be inquired into and his statements
final. 33 The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who In Galvez v. Court of Appeals,42 the Court ruled that a
seeks relief, but upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to petition for habeas corpus is not the proper remedy to assail the denial
be the unlawful authority. 34 Hence, the only parties before thereof:
the court are the petitioner (prisoner) and the person holding the
petitioner in custody, and the only question to be resolved is whether ...The original jurisdiction to grant or
the custodian has authority to deprive the petitioner of his deny bail rested with said respondent. The
liberty. 35 The writ may be denied if the petitioner fails to show facts correct course was for petitioner to invoke that
that he is entitled thereto ex merito justicias.36 jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to
bail, claiming a right to bail per se by
A writ of habeas corpus,which is regarded as a reason of the weakness of the evidence against
"palladium of liberty" is a prerogative writ which does not issue as a him. Only after that remedy was denied by the
matter of right but in the sound discretion of the court or judge. It, is, trial court should the review
however, a writ of right on proper formalities being made by jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and
proof. 37 Resort to the writ is to inquire into the criminal act of which a even then, not without first applying to
complaint is made but unto the right of liberty, notwithstanding the act, the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was
and the immediate purpose to be served is relief from illegal also available there. 43
restraint. 38 The primary, if not the only object of the writ of habeas
corpus ad subjuciendum is to determine the legality of the restraint The remedy of the petitioner from the Order of the
under which a person is held. 39 trial court denying his petition for bail was to file a petition
for certiorari in the CA if the trial court committed a grave abuse of its
Our review of the petitioner's material averments in his discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the said
petition before the CA reveals that it was a "petition for habeas order. 44 If the petitioner had done so, his petition would have been
corpus or, in the alternative, a petition for a writ of certiorari" The granted because as gleaned from the assailed order of the trialcourt, it
petitioner assailed therein the orders of the trial court denying his failed to summarize the testimonies of the private complainant and
petition for bail and his motion to dismiss on the ground that he was that of her mother. Hence, such order is invalid. 45 The
deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case against him, trial court would have had to issue another order containing the
and questioned Judge Laurea's order of inhibition. We agree with the summary of the testimonies of the private complainant and her mother,
CA that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus cannot be joined with the including its findings and conclusions. However, the petitioner would
special civil action for certiorari because the two remedies are still not be entitled to be released from detention in the meantime.
 It bears stressing that under the second right of the accused to speedy trial. In invoking
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 46 of the Rules of Court, the such right, the accused contends that the
voluntary inhibition of a Judge is addressed to his sound discretion for failure of the prosecution to present the medico-
just or valid reasons, the primary consideration being that the people's legal officer who examined the victim on two (2)
faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. 47 The petitioner should occasions, and the non-appearance of the
have thus filed a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition in the CA, private prosecutor on one occasion caused
instead of a petition for habeas corpus. undue delay in the proceedings of this case.

In cases where the right of the accused to a speedy trial is The prosecution vigorously opposed
violated by the prosecution, the remedy lies in the procedure provided the Motion to Dismiss and claimed that since
for under Republic Act No. 8493, as implemented by Rule 119of the the prosecution has not yet rested its case,
2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure. Section 8 of the said Rule provides: the Court may not be able to appreciate the
merits of the instant motion in the light of the
SEC. 8. Sanctions.— In any case in unfinished presentation of evidence for the
which private counsel for the accused, the prosecution and that the grounds relied by the
public attorney, or the prosecutor: defense do not touch on the sufficiency of the
prosecution's evidence to prove the guilt of the
(a) Knowingly allows the case to be accused beyond reasonable doubt, but rather
set for trial without disclosing that a necessary on the alleged delay and failure to present Dr.
witness would be unavailable for trial; Jose Arnel Marquez of the PNP Crime
Laboratory.
(b) Files a motion solely for delay
which he knows is totally frivolous and without After due consideration,
merit; the Court finds the instant motion untenable.
The alleged delay and failure to present the
(c) Makes a statement for the medico-legal officer cannot be attributed to the
purpose of obtaining continuance which he fault of the prosecution and/or the Court. The
knows to be false and which is material to the prosecution and the Court cannot encroach on
granting of a continuance; or the right of the medico-legal officer to appear
inasmuch as his schedule conflicted with the
(d) Willfully fails to proceed to trial hearings set for his appearance. Moreover,
without justification consistent with the delays assailed by defense counsel that
provisions hereof, the court may punish such violated accused' right to speedy trial are not all
counsel, attorney, or prosecutor, as follows: at the instance of the prosecution. In fact, the
defense, contributed to the delay since the
(1) By imposing on a counsel former defense counsel and even the present
privately retained in defense counsel sought postponements of the
connection with the hearings.
defense of an accused, a fine
not exceeding twenty Be that as it may, despite the non-
thousand pesos (P20,000.00); presentation of the medico-legal officer,
the Court (Branch 169) proceeded in resolving
(2) By imposing on any the Petition for Bail of the accused (albeit
appointed counsel de unfavorable to the cause ofthe accused) on the
oficio,public attorney, or basis of the sole testimony of the complainant,
prosecutor a fine not which is backed up by several jurisprudence to
exceeding five thousand this effect. The defense, filed a Motion for
pesos (P5,000.00);and Reconsideration of said denial after he has filed
a Motion to Dismiss. The filing of these
pleadings adds to the delay until the Presiding
(3) By denying any defense Judge who denied the Petition for Bail
counsel or prosecutor the voluntarily inhibited himself from this case. Then
right to practice before when the Motion to Dismiss was set for hearing,
the court trying the case for a the Court, in an attempt to expedite the
period not exceeding thirty proceedings, suggested for the parties to
(30) days. The punishment stipulate on the medical findings of the medico-
provided for by this section legal officer so as to dispense with his
shall be without prejudice to presentation. Defense counsel, however, would
any appropriate criminal not want to enter into such a stipulation. Hence,
action or other sanction another delay. 48
authorized under these Rules.
We agree with the petitioner that a petition for the issuance of a
If the trial court acted with grave abuse of its discretion writ of habeas corpus may be filed if one is deprived of his right to
amounting to excess of lack of jurisdiction in granting the prosecution's a speedy disposition of the case under Article IV, Section 16 ofthe
motion for the resetting of the trial over the petitioner's objections, the 1987 Constitution and of his right to due process. 49 However,
more appropriate remedy would have been to file a petition the petitioner never invoked in the trial court his constitutional
for certiorari and/or a petition for mandamus to compel the trial court to right to a speedy disposition of the case against him. What he
comply with the timeline provided for by the said Rule for trial and invoked was his right to a speedy trial under Rule 119 of the 2000
termination of the case. cADSCT Rules of Criminal Procedure. He invoked his constitutional right to
a speedy disposition of the case against him, for the first time,only
It was inappropriate for the petitioner to file a petition
in the Court of Appeals when he filed his petition for habeas
for habeas corpus assailing the trial court's order denying his motion to
corpus.
dismiss the case for failure to comply with the timeline provided for by
the said Rules. Reading and evaluating the assailed Order of the
trial court dated September 18, 2000, it cannot be gainsaid that
Even then, the petitioner failed to establish his claim that he
the court violated the right of the petitioner to speedy trial. Thus:
was deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case.
The instant motion is anchored on the In Marilyn Corpuz, et al., v. Sandiganbayan,50 the Court had the
alleged violation of and/or to enforce the occasion to state —
 The right of the accused to a speedy accused despite a delay, it must show two
trial and to a speedy disposition of the case things: (a) that the accused suffered no serious
against him was designed to prevent the prejudice beyond that which ensued from the
oppression of the citizen by holding criminal ordinary and inevitable delay; and (b) that there
prosecution suspended over him for an was no more delay than is reasonably
indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the attributable to the ordinary processes of justice.
administration of justice by mandating the
courts to proceed with reasonable dispatch in Closely related to the length of delay
the trial of criminal cases. Such right to a is the reason or justification of the State for such
speedy trial and a speedy disposition of a case delay. Different weights should be assigned to
is violated only when the proceeding is attended different reasons or justifications invoked by the
by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. State. For instance, a deliberate attempt to
The inquiry as to whether or not an accused has delay the trial in order to hamper or prejudice
been denied such right is not susceptible by the defense should be weighted heavily against
precise qualification. The concept of a speedy the State. Also, it is improper for the prosecutor
disposition is a relative term and must to intentionally delay to gain some tactical
necessarily be a flexible concept. TaDAHE advantage over the defendant or to harass or
prejudice him. On the other hand, the heavy
While justice is administered with case load of the prosecution or a missing
dispatch, the essential ingredient is orderly, witness should be weighted less heavily against
expeditious and not mere speed. It cannot be the State.
definitely said how long is too long in a system
where justice is supposed to be swift, but In this case, the petitioner was arraigned on February 7,
deliberate. It is consistent with delays and 2002. In the meantime, he was able to present only two witnesses. The
depends upon circumstances. It secures rights petitioner failed to terminate the cross-examination of the private
to the accused, but it does not preclude the complainant by the year 2002. The Court cannot determine the reason
rights of public justice. Also, it must be borne in for the delay because the records of the RTC are not before it.
mind that the rights given to the accused by Neither of the parties made any explanation for the delay; nor is there
the Constitution and the Rules of Court are any showing that the counsel of the petitioner complained about the
shields, not weapons; hence, courts are to give delay. Aside from the petitioner's claim that the private prosecutor
meaning to that intent. failed to give good cause for his failure to present Dr. Jose Arnel
Marquez during the trial dates April 30, 2003 and June 19, 2003, as
The Court emphasized in the same case that: well as to substantiate his absence during the trial of March 6, 2003
with a medical certificate, the petitioner failed to support his claim in his
A balancing test of applying societal pleadings before the CA and in this Court. On the other hand, the
interests and the rights of the accused counsel of the petitioner was absent during the trial on April 30, 2003
necessarily compels the court to approach because he had to attend an execution sale in Cavite. The petitioner's
speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis. counsel gave priority to the execution sale and asked for a resetting
despite the fact that his client, the petitioner, was detained for a quasi-
In determining whether the accused heinous crime. While it is true that the trial was reset to June 19, 2003,
has been deprived of his right to a speedy or more than one month from April 30, 2003, the petitioner's counsel
disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, himself manifested that he was available for trial during the first
four factors must be considered: (a) half ofJune 2003. There was a difference of only four (4) days from the
length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) trial date set by the court and the available dates suggested by the
the defendant's assertion of his right; and (d) petitioner's counsel. It bears stressing that trial dates cannot be set
prejudice to the defendant. Prejudice should be solely at the convenience of the petitioner's counsel. The trial dates
assessed in the light of the interest of the available in the calendar of the court and of the prosecutor must also
defendant that the speedy trial was designed to be taken into account. CADHcI
protect, namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial
incarceration; to minimize anxiety and Hence, it cannot be said that the petitioner was
concerns of the accused to trial; and to limit the deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case simply
possibility that his defense will be because the private prosecutor failed to submit a medical certificate for
impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last, his absence during the trial of March 6, 2003. The petitioner could
because the inability of a defendant adequately have asked the court to cite the private prosecutor in
to prepare his case skews the fairness of the contempt of court for his failure to submit the said certificate; he failed
entire system. There is also prejudice if the to do so. Moreover, the petitioner failed to establish any serious
defense witnesses are unable to recall prejudice by the delay of the trial, and that the State deliberately
accurately the events of the distant past. Even if delayed the trial to prejudice him.
the accused is not imprisoned prior to trial, he is
still disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is
and by living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion DENIED for lack of merit. No costs.
and often, hostility. His financial resources may
be drained, his association is curtailed, and he SO ORDERED.
is subjected to public obloquy.
Puno, Austria-Martinez, Tinga and Chico-Nazario,
Delay is a two-edged sword. It is the JJ., concur.
government that bears the burden of proving its
case beyond reasonable doubt. The ||| (Caballes v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 163108, [February 23,
passage of time may make it difficult or 2005], 492 PHIL 410-431)
impossible for the government to carry its
burden. The Constitution and the Rules do not
require impossibilities or extraordinary efforts,
diligence or exertion from courts or the
prosecutor, nor contemplate that such right shall
deprive the State of a reasonable
opportunity of fairly prosecuting criminals. As
held in Williams v. United States,for the
government to sustain its right to try the
 THIRD DIVISION On October 19, 1996, at about 10 o'clock in the evening,
G.R. No. 136860 January 20, 2003 Chief Inspector Benjamin Arceo, Tarlac Police Chief, held a briefing in
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff- connection with a tip which his office received that the two drug
appellee,vs.AGPANGA LIBNAO y KITTEN and ROSITA pushers, riding in a tricycle, would be making a delivery that night. An
NUNGA y VALENCIA, accused. Vs AGPANGA LIBNAO y hour later, the Police Alert Team installed a checkpoint in Barangay
KITTEN, accused-appellant. Salapungan to apprehend the suspects. Witness SPO1 Marlon
Gamotea, PO3 Florante Ferrer and SPO3 Roberto Aquino were
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. assigned to man the checkpoint.
Molintas & Molintas Law Office for accused-appellant.
At about 1:00 o'clock in the morning of the following day,
SYNOPSIS SPO1 Gamotea and PO3 Ferrer flagged down a passing tricycle. It
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial had two female passengers seated inside, who were later identified as
Court of Tarlac City finding appellant and her co-accused guilty of the appellant Agpanga Libnao and her co-accused Rosita Nunga. 3 In
violating Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the front of them was a black bag. Suspicious of the black bag and the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. For their conviction, each was two's uneasy behavior when asked about its ownership and content,
sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua. The the officers invited them to Kabayan Center No. 2 located at the
appellant argued that her arrest was unlawful and capitalized on the same barangay.They brought with them the black bag.
absence of a warrant for her arrest. She contended that at the time she
was apprehended by the police officers, she was not committing any Upon reaching the center, PO3 Ferrer fetched Barangay
offense but was merely riding a tricycle. She also impugned the search Captain Roy Pascual to witness the opening of the black bag. In the
made on her belongings as illegal as it was not done without a valid meantime, the two women and the bag were turned over to the
warrant or under circumstances when warrantless search is investigator on duty, SPO3 Arthur Antonio. As soon as
permissible. Consequently, she claimed that the evidence obtained the barangay captain arrived, the black bag was opened in the
therein were inadmissible against her. HDITCS presence of the appellant, her co-accused and personnel of the center.
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of the appellant. Found inside it were eight bricks of leaves sealed in plastic bags and
According to the Court, the general rule is that a search may be covered with newspaper. The leaves were suspected to be marijuana.
conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a search warrant
validly issued by a judge as provided in the Constitution. However, the To determine who owns the bag and its contents, SPO3
constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition against all Antonio interrogated the two. Rosita Nunga stated that it was owned by
searches and seizures. The warrantless search in this case is not the appellant. The latter, in turn, disputed this allegation. Thereafter,
bereft of a probable cause. It was also clear that at the time she was they were made to sign a confiscation receipt without the assistance of
apprehended, she was committing a criminal offense, transporting any counsel, as they were not informed of their right to have one.
prohibited drugs. Against the credible positive testimonies of the During the course of the investigation, not even close relatives of theirs
prosecution witnesses, appellant's defense of denial and alibi could not were present.
stand.
The seized articles were later brought to the PNP Crime
DECISION Laboratory in San Fernando, Pampanga on October 23, 1996.
Forensic Chemist Daisy P. Babu conducted a laboratory examination
PUNO, J p: on them. She concluded that the articles were marijuana leaves
weighing eight kilos. 4
Before us is an appeal from the Decision dated November For their part, both accused denied the accusation against
19, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Tarlac City, finding them. Rosita Nunga testified that in the evening of October 19, 1996,
appellant Agpanga Libnao and her co-accused Rosita Nunga guilty of she went to buy medicine for her ailing child at a pharmacy near the
violating Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the Tarlac Provincial Hospital. The child was suffering from diarrhea,
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. 1 For their conviction, each was occasioned by abdominal pain. To return to their house, she boarded a
sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion perpetuaand to pay a tricycle bound for Barangay Tariji, where she resides. Along the way,
fine of two million pesos. the tricycle she was riding was flagged down by a policeman at a
checkpoint in Barangay Salapungan. She was taken aback when the
Appellant and her co-accused were charged under the
officer invited her to the Kabayan Center. It was there that she was
following Information:
confronted with the black bag allegedly containing eight bricks of
"That on or about October 20, 1996 at marijuana leaves. She disputed owning the bag and knowing its
around 1:00 o'clock dawn, in the Municipality of contents. She also denied sitting beside the appellant in the
Tarlac, Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and passenger's seat inside the tricycle, although she admitted noticing a
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, male passenger behind the driver.
the above-named accused conspiring,
Remarkably, appellant did not appear in court and was only
confederating and helping with one another,
represented by her lawyer. The latter marked and submitted in
without being lawfully authorized, did then and
evidence an affidavit executed by one Efren Gannod, a security guard
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make
of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines in Tarlac, Tarlac. The sworn statement
delivery/transport with intent to sell marijuana
declared that at about 0220H on October 20, 1996, SPO2 Antonio
leaves wrapped in a transparent plastic
arrived at their terminal and arrested a certain woman who boarded
weighing approximately eight (8) kilos, which is
their Bus No. 983. The incident was recorded in the company's
in violation of Section 4, Article II of RA 6425,
logbook. Gannod, however, was not presented in court to attest that
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act
the woman referred in his affidavit was the appellant.
of 1972, as amended.
After trial, the court convicted appellant and her co-accused
CONTRARY TO LAW." 2
Rosita Nunga, thus:
During their arraignment, both entered a plea of Not Guilty.
"WHEREFORE, finding both accused
Trial on the merits ensued.
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
It appears from the evidence adduced by the prosecution violation of Article II, Section 4 of RA 6425 in
that in August of 1996, intelligence operatives of the Philippine relation to RA 7659, they are hereby sentenced
National Police (PNP) stationed in Tarlac, Tarlac began conducting to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion
surveillance operation on suspected drug dealers in the area. They perpetua and to pay a fine of two million pesos.
learned from their asset that a certain woman from Tajiri, Tarlac and a
SO ORDERED." 5
companion from Baguio City were transporting illegal drugs once a
month in big bulks.
 Aggrieved by the verdict, appellant interposed the present limited to visual inspection. 11 When a vehicle is stopped and
appeal. In her brief, she assigned the following errors: subjected to an extensive search, such would be constitutionally
permissible only if the officers made it upon probable cause, i.e.,upon
"1. The Honorable Regional Trial a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing
Court failed to appreciate the contention of the officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains as item, article or
defense that the right of accused against illegal object which by law is subject to seizure and destruction. 12
and unwarranted arrest and search was violated
by the police officers who arrested both In earlier decisions, we held that there was probable cause
accused. in the following instances: (a) where the distinctive odor of marijuana
emanated from the plastic bag carried by the accused; 13 (b) where an
2. The Honorable Court failed to informer positively identified the accused who was observed to be
appreciate the contention of the defense that acting suspiciously; 14 (c) where the accused who were riding a
the right of the accused to custodial jeepney were stopped and searched by policemen who had earlier
investigation was deliberately violated by the received confidential reports that said accused would transport a
peace officers who apprehended and quantity of marijuana; 15 (d) where Narcom agents had received
investigated the accused. information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada, Mountain Province
had in his possession prohibited drugs and when the Narcom agents
3. The Honorable Court miserably confronted the accused Caucasian because of a conspicuous bulge in
failed to evaluate the material inconsistencies in his waistline, he failed to present his passport and other identification
the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses papers when requested to do so; 16 (f) where the moving vehicle was
which inconsistencies cast doubt and make stopped and searched on the basis of intelligence information and
incredible the contention and version of the clandestine reports by a deep penetration agent or spy — one who
prosecution. participated in the drug smuggling activities of the syndicate to which
the accused belong — that said accused were bringing prohibited
4. The Honorable Court gravely drugs into the country; 17 (g) where the arresting officers had received
abused its discretion when it appreciated and a confidential information that the accused, whose identity as a drug
considered the documentary and object distributor was established in a previous test-buy operation, would be
evidence of the prosecution not formally offered boarding MV Dona Virginia and probably carrying shabu with
amounting to ignorance of the law." 6 him; 18 (h) where police officers received an information that the
accused, who was carrying a suspicious-looking gray luggage bag,
We are not persuaded by these contentions; hence, the would transport marijuana in a bag to Manila; 19 and (i) where the
appeal must be dismissed. appearance of the accused and the color of the bag he was carrying
fitted the description given by a civilian asset. 20
In arguing that her arrest was unlawful, appellant capitalizes
on the absence of a warrant for her arrest. She contends that at the The warrantless search in the case at bench is not bereft of
time she was apprehended by the police officers, she was not a probable cause. The Tarlac Police Intelligence Division had been
committing any offense but was merely riding a tricycle. In the same conducting surveillance operation for three months in the area. The
manner, she impugns the search made on her belongings as illegal as surveillance yielded the information that once a month, appellant and
it was done without a valid warrant or under circumstances when her co-accused Rosita Nunga transport drugs in big bulks. At 10:00 pm
warrantless search is permissible. Consequently, any evidence of October 19, 1996, the police received a tip that the two will be
obtained therein is inadmissible against her. transporting drugs that night riding a tricycle. Surely, the two were
intercepted three hours later, riding a tricycle and carrying a
These arguments fail to impress. The general rule is that a
suspicious-looking black bag, which possibly contained the drugs in
search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a
bulk. When they were asked who owned it and what its content was,
search warrant validly issued by a judge as provided in Article III,
both became uneasy. Under these circumstances, the warrantless
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, thus:
search and seizure of appellant's bag was not illegal. EaSCAH
"The right of the people to be secure
It is also clear that at the time she was apprehended, she
in their persons, houses, papers and effects
was committing a criminal offense. She was making a delivery or
against unreasonable searches and seizures of
transporting prohibited drugs in violation of Article II, Section 4 ofR.A.
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
No. 6425. Under the Rules of Court, one of the instances a police
inviolable, and no search warrant and warrant of
officer is permitted to carry out a warrantless arrest is when the person
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be arrested is caught committing a crime in flagrante delicto,thus:
to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the "Section 5. Arrest without Warrant;
complainant and the witnesses he may when lawful. — A peace officer or a private
produce, and particularly describing the place to person may, without warrant, arrest a person:
be searched and the persons or things to be
seized." 7 (a) When in his presence, the person
to be arrested has committed, is actually
The constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition against committing,or is attempting to commit an
all searches and seizures as it operates only against offense;
"unreasonable" searches and seizures. Searches and seizures
are as a rule unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued (b) When an offense has in fact just
search warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the fundamental been committed, and he has probable cause to
protection accorded by the search and seizure clause is that believe based on personal knowledge of facts
between persons and police must stand the protective authority of or circumstances that the person to be arrested
a magistrate clothed with power to issue or refuse to issue search has committed it; and
warrants and warrants of arrest. 8
Be that as it may, the requirement that a judicial warrant (c) When the person to be arrested is
must be obtained prior to the carrying out of a search and seizure is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
not absolute. There are certain familiar exceptions to the rule, one of establishment or place where he is serving final
which relates to search of moving vehicles. 9 Warrantless search and judgment or temporarily confined while his case
seizure of moving vehicles are allowed in recognition of the is pending, or has escaped while being
impracticability of securing a warrant under said circumstances as the transferred from one confinement to another.
vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which
xxx xxx xxx." 21 (italics supplied)
the warrant may be sought. 10 Peace officers in such cases, however,
are limited to routine checks where the examination of the vehicle is
 Appellant also takes issue of the fact that she was not the reason that it was unnecessary for them to do so. It was not shown
assisted by a lawyer when police officers interrogated her. She claimed that the driver was in complicity with the appellant and her co-accused
that she was not duly informed of her right to remain silent and to have in the commission of the crime.
competent counsel of her choice. Hence, she argues that the
confession or admission obtained therein should be considered To be sure, credence was properly accorded to the
inadmissible in evidence against her. testimonies of prosecution witnesses, who are law enforcers. When
police officers have no motive to testify falsely against the accused,
These contentions deserve scant attention. Appellant did not courts are inclined to uphold this presumption. 29 In this case, no
make any confession during her custodial investigation. In determining evidence has been presented to suggest any improper motive on the
the guilt of the appellant and her co-accused, the trial court based its part of the police enforcers in arresting the appellant.
decision on the testimonies of prosecution witnesses and on the
existence of the confiscated marijuana. We quote the relevant portion Against the credible positive testimonies of the prosecution
of its decision: witnesses, appellant's defense of denial and alibi cannot stand. The
defense of denial and alibi has been invariably viewed by the courts
"Earlier in the course of the with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted and is a common
proceedings, the court then presided by Judge and standard defense ploy in most cases involving violation of the
Angel Parazo, granted bail to accused Dangerous Drugs Act. 30 It has to be substantiated by clear and
Agpanga Libnao, ruling that the confiscation convincing evidence. 31 The sole proof presented in the lower court by
receipt signed by both accused (Exhibit "C") is the appellant to support her claim of denial and alibi was a sworn
inadmissible because they were not assisted by statement, which was not even affirmed on the witness stand by the
a counsel. Confronted with this same issue, this affiant. Hence, we reject her defense.
court finds the postulate to rest on good
authority and will therefore reiterate its IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant appeal is DENIED. The
inadmissibility. decision of the trial court finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense of violation of Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No.
Since the prosecution had not 6425 in relation to R.A. No. 7659, and sentencing her to an
presented any extrajudicial confession extracted imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of two million
from both accused as evidence of their guilt, the pesos is hereby AFFIRMED. EcATDH
court finds it needless to discuss any answer
given by both accused as a result of the police SO ORDERED.
interrogation while in their custody. By force of
necessity, therefore, the only issue to be Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona and Carpio
resolved by the court is whether or not, based Morales, JJ., concur.
on the prosecution's evidence, both accused
can be convicted." 22 (italics supplied). ||| (People v. Libnao y Kitten, G.R. No. 136860, [January 20, 2003],
443 PHIL 506-521)
Appellant then faults the trial court for appreciating and
taking into account the object and documentary evidence of the
prosecution despite the latter's failure to formally offer them. Absent
any formal offer, she argues that they again must be deemed
inadmissible.

The contention is untenable. Evidence not formally offered

can be considered by the court as long as they have been properly
identified by testimony duly recorded and they have themselves been
incorporated in the records of the case. 23 All the documentary and
object evidence in this case were properly identified, presented and
marked as exhibits in court, including the bricks of marijuana. 24 Even
without their formal offer, therefore, the prosecution can still establish
the case because witnesses properly identified those exhibits, and
their testimonies are recorded. 25Furthermore, appellant's counsel had
cross-examined the prosecution witnesses who testified on the
exhibits. 26

Appellant also assails the credibility of the testimonies of the

prosecution witnesses. She first cites the inconsistency between the
testimony of SPO1 Marlon Gamotea, who said that it was SPO2
Antonio who opened the black bag containing the marijuana; and that
of SPO2 Antonio, who declared that the bag was already open when
he arrived at the Kabayan Center. She then focuses on the police
officers' failure to remember the family name of the driver of the tricycle
where she allegedly rode, claiming that this is improbable and contrary
to human experience.

Again, appellant's arguments lack merit. The alleged

inconsistencies she mentions refer only to minor details and not to
material points regarding the basic elements of the crime. They are
inconsequential that they do not affect the credibility of the witnesses
nor detract from the established fact that appellant and her co-accused
were transporting marijuana. Testimonies of witnesses need only
corroborate each other on important and relevant details concerning
the principal occurrence. 27 The identity of the person who opened the
bag is clearly immaterial to the guilt of the appellant. Besides, it is to be
expected that the testimony of witnesses regarding the same incident
may be inconsistent in some aspects because different persons may
have different recollections of the same incident. 28

Likewise, we find nothing improbable in the failure of the

police officers to note and remember the name of the tricycle driver for
 Republic of the Philippines Arriving at the target site, Sgt. Ani proceeded to the house of Mari
SUPREME COURT Musa, while the rest of the NARCOM group positioned themselves at
Manila strategic places about 90 to 100 meters from Mari Musa's house.
THIRD DIVISION T/Sgt. Belarga could see what went on between Ani and suspect Mari
G.R. No. 96177 January 27, 1993 Musa from where he was. Ani approached Mari Musa, who came out
of his house, and asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said he wanted some
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. more stuff. Ani gave Mari Musa the P20.00 marked money. After
MARI MUSA y HANTATALU, accused-appellant receiving the money, Mari Musa went back to his house and came
back and gave Amado Ani two newspaper wrappers containing dried
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. marijuana. Ani opened the two wrappers and inspected the contents.
Pablo L. Murillo for accused-appellant. Convinced that the contents were marijuana, Ani walked back towards
his companions and raised his right hand. The two NARCOM teams,
ROMERO, J.: riding the two civilian vehicles, sped towards Sgt. Ani. Ani joined
The appellant, Mari Musa, seeks, in this appeal, the reversal of the Belarga's team and returned to the house.
decision, dated August 31, 1990,1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Zamboanga City, Branch XII, finding him guilty of selling marijuana in
At the time Sgt. Ani first approached Mari Musa, there were four
violation of Article II, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
persons inside his house: Mari Musa, another boy, and two women,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
one of whom Ani and Belarga later came to know to be Mari Musa's
wife. The second time, Ani with the NARCOM team returned to Mari
The information filed on December 15, 1989 against the appellant Musa's house, the woman, who was later known as Mari Musa's wife,
reads: slipped away from the house. Sgt. Belarga frisked Mari Musa but could
not find the P20.00 marked money with him. Mari Musa was then
asked where the P20.00 was and he told the NARCOM team he has
That on or about December 14, 1989, in the City of Zamboanga,
given the money to his wife (who had slipped away). Sgt. Belarga also
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
found a plastic bag containing dried marijuana inside it somewhere in
above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then and
the kitchen. Mari Musa was then placed under arrest and brought to
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell to one SGT. AMADO ANI,
the NARCOM office. At Suterville, Sgt. Ani turned over to Sgt. Belarga
two (2) wrappers containing dried marijuana leaves, knowing the same
the two newspaper-wrapped marijuana he had earlier bought from Mari
to be a prohibited drug.
Musa (Exhs. "C" & "D").

CONTRARY TO LAW.2
In the NARCOM office, Mari Musa first gave his name as Hussin Musa.
Later on, Mari Musa gave his true name — Mari Musa. T/Sgt. Jesus
Upon his arraignment on January 11, 1990, the appellant pleaded not Belarga turned over the two newspaper-wrapped marijuana (bought at
guilty.3 the buy-bust), the one newspaper-wrapped marijuana (bought at the
test-buy) and the plastic bag containing more marijuana (which had
been taken by Sgt. Lego inside the kitchen of Mari Musa) to the PC
At the trial, the prosecution presented three (3) witnesses, namely: (1)
Crime Laboratory, Zamboanga City, for laboratory examination. The
Sgt. Amado Ani, Jr. of the 9th Narcotics Command (NARCOM) of turnover of the marijuana specimen to the PC Crime Laboratory was
Zamboanga City, who acted as poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation by way of a letter-request, dated December 14, 1989 (Exh. "B"), which
made against the appellant; (2) T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga, also of the 9th
was stamped "RECEIVED" by the PC Crime Laboratory (Exh. "B-1")
Narcotics Command of Zamboanga City, who was the NARCOM team on the same day.
leader of the buy-bust operation; and (3) Athena Elisa P. Anderson, the
Document Examiner and Forensic Chemist of PC-INP Crime
Laboratory of Regional Command (RECOM) 9. The evidence of the Mrs. Athena Elisa P. Anderson, the Forensic Chemist of the PC Crime
prosecution was summarized by the trial court as follows: Laboratory, examined the marijuana specimens subjecting the same to
her three tests. All submitted specimens she examined gave positive
results for the presence of marijuana. Mrs. Anderson reported the
Prosecution evidence shows that in the morning of December 13, results of her examination in her Chemistry Report D-100-89, dated
1989, T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga, leader of a NARCOTICS COMMAND December 14, 1989, (Exh. "J", "J-1", "J-2", "J-3", "J-4" and "J-5"). Mrs.
(NARCOM) team based at Calarian, Zamboanga City, instructed Sgt.
Anderson identified in court the two newspaper wrapped marijuana
Amado Ani to conduct surveillance and test buy on a certain Mari bought at the buy-bust on December 14, 1989, through her initial and
Musa of Suterville, Zamboanga City. Information received from civilian the weight of each specimen written with red ink on each wrapper
informer was that this Mari Musa was engaged in selling marijuana in
(Exhs. "C-1" and "D-1"). She also identified the one newspaper-
said place. So Sgt. Amado Ani, another NARCOM agent, proceeded to wrapped marijuana bought at the test-buy on December 13, 1989,
Suterville, in company with a NARCOM civilian informer, to the house through her markings (Exh. "E-1"). Mrs. Anderson also identified her
of Mari Musa to which house the civilian informer had guided him. The
Chemistry Report (Exh. "J" & sub-markings.)
same civilian informer had also described to him the appearance of
Mari Musa. Amado Ani was able to buy one newspaper-wrapped dried
marijuana (Exh. "E") for P10.00. Sgt. Ani returned to the NARCOM T. Sgt. Belarga identified the two buy-bust newspaper wrapped
office and turned over the newspaper-wrapped marijuana to T/Sgt. marijuana through his initial, the words "buy-bust" and the words
Jesus Belarga. Sgt. Belarga inspected the stuff turned over to him and "December 14, 1989, 2:45 P.M." (written on Exhs. "C" and "D").
found it to be marijuana. Belarga also identified the receipt of the P20 marked money (with SN
GA955883) (Exh. "L"), dated December 14, 1989, and his signature
thereon (Exh.
The next day, December 14, 1989, about 1:30 P.M., a buy-bust was "L-1"). He also identified the letter-request, dated December 14, 1989,
planned. Sgt. Amado Ani was assigned as the poseur buyer for which
addressed to the PC Crime Laboratory (Exh. "B") and his signature
purpose he was given P20.00 (with SN GA955883) by Belarga. The thereon (Exh. "B-2") and the stamp of the PC Crime Laboratory
buy-bust money had been taken by T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga from M/Sgt. marked "RECEIVED" (Exh. "B-1").4
Noh Sali Mihasun, Chief of Investigation Section, and for which
Belarga signed a receipt (Exh. "L" & "L-l" ) The team under Sgt.
Foncargas was assigned as back-up security. A pre-arranged signal For the defense, the following testified as witnesses: (1) the accused-
was arranged consisting of Sgt. Ani's raising his right hand, after he appellant Mari H. Musa; and (2) Ahara R. Musa, his wife. The trial
had succeeded to buy the marijuana. The two NARCOM teams court summarized the version of the defense, thus:
proceeded to the target site in two civilian vehicles. Belarga's team was
composed of Sgt. Belarga, team leader, Sgt. Amado Ani, poseur
[O]n December 14, 1989, at about 1:30 in the afternoon, Mari Musa
buyer, Sgt. Lego and Sgt. Biong.
was in his house at Suterville, Zamboanga City. With him were his
wife, Ahara Musa, known as Ara, his one-year old child, a woman
manicurist, and a male cousin named Abdul Musa. About 1:30 that
afternoon, while he was being manicured at one hand, his wife was On December 14, 1989, at 1:30 p.m., two NARCOM teams in separate
inside the one room of their house, putting their child to sleep. Three vehicles headed by T/Sgt. Belarga and a certain Sgt. Foncardas went
NARCOM agents, who introduced themselves as NARCOM agents, to the place of operation, which was the appellant's house located in
dressed in civilian clothes, got inside Mari Musa's house whose door Laquian Compound, Suterville, Zamboanga City. Sgt. Ani was with the
was open. The NARCOM agents did not ask permission to enter the team of T/Sgt. Belarga, whose other members were Sgts. Lego and
house but simply announced that they were NARCOM agents. The Biong. 10 Sgt. Ani was given a marked P20.00 bill by T/Sgt. Belarga,
NARCOM agents searched Mari Musa's house and Mari Musa asked which was to be used in the operation.
them if they had a search warrant. The NARCOM agents were just
silent. The NARCOM agents found a red plastic bag whose contents,
Upon reaching the place, the NARCOM agents positioned themselves
Mari Musa said, he did not know. He also did not know if the plastic
at strategic places.11 Sgt. Ani approached the house. Outside the
bag belonged to his brother, Faisal, who was living with him, or his
house, the appellant asked Sgt. Ani what he wanted. Sgt. Ani asked
father, who was living in another house about ten arms-length away.
him for some more marijuana.12 Sgt. Ani gave him the marked P20.00
Mari Musa, then, was handcuffed and when Mari Musa asked why, the
bill and the appellant went inside the house and brought back two
NARCOM agents told him for clarification.
paper wrappers containing marijuana which he handed to Sgt.
Ani.13 From his position, Sgt. Ani could see that there were other
Mari Musa was brought in a pick-up, his wife joining him to the people in the house.14
NARCOM Office at Calarian, Zamboanga City. Inside the NARCOM
Office, Mari Musa was investigated by one NARCOM agent which
After the exchange, Sgt. Ani approached the other NARCOM agents
investigation was reduced into writing. The writing or document was
and made the pre-arranged signal of raising his right hand.15 The
interpreted to Mari Musa in Tagalog. The document stated that the
NARCOM agents, accompanied by Sgt. Ani, went inside the house
marijuana belonged to Mari Musa and Mari Musa was asked to sign it.
and made the arrest. The agents searched the appellant and unable to
But Mari Musa refused to sign because the marijuana did not belong to
find the marked money, they asked him where it was. The appellant
him. Mari Musa said he was not told that he was entitled to the
said that he gave it to his wife.16
assistance of counsel, although he himself told the NARCOM agents
he wanted to be assisted by counsel.
The Court, after a careful reading of the record, finds the testimony of
Sgt. Ani regarding the buy-bust operation, which resulted in the
Mari Musa said four bullets were then placed between the fingers of
apprehension, prosecution and subsequent conviction of the appellant,
his right hand and his fingers were pressed which felt very painful. The
to be direct, lucid and forthright. Being totally untainted by
NARCOM agents boxed him and Mari Musa lost consciousness. While
contradictions in any of the material points, it deserves credence.
Mari Musa was maltreated, he said his wife was outside the NARCOM
building. The very day he was arrested (on cross-examination Mari
Musa said it was on the next day), Mari Musa was brought to the The contention that the appellant could not have transacted with Sgt.
Fiscal's Office by three NARCOM agents. The fiscal asked him if the Ani because they do not know each other is without merit. The day
marijuana was owned by him and he said "not." After that single before the
question, Mari Musa was brought to the City Jail. Mari Musa said he buy-bust operation, Sgt. Ani conducted a test-buy and he successfully
did not tell the fiscal that he had been maltreated by the NARCOM bought a wrapper of marijuana from the appellant. Through this
agents because he was afraid he might be maltreated in the fiscal's previous transaction, Sgt. Ani was able to gain the appellant's
office. confidence for the latter to sell more marijuana to Sgt. Ani the following
day, during the buy-bust operation. Moreover, the Court has held that
what matters is not an existing familiarity between the buyer and the
Mari Musa denied the NARCOM agents' charge that he had sold two
seller, for quite often, the parties to the transaction may be strangers,
wrappers of marijuana to them; that he had received from them a
but their agreement and the acts constituting the sale and delivery of
P20.00 bill which he had given to his wife. He did not sell marijuana
the marijuana.17
because he was afraid that was against the law and that the person
selling marijuana was caught by the authorities; and he had a wife and
a very small child to support. Mari Musa said he had not been arrested The appellant, again to cast doubt on the credibility of Sgt. Ani, argues
for selling marijuana before.5 that it was impossible for the appellant to sell marijuana while his wife,
cousin and manicurist were present. But the place of the commission
of the crime of selling prohibited drugs has been held to be not
After trial, the trial court rendered the assailed decision with the
crucial18 and the presence of other people apart from the buyer and
following disposition:
seller will not necessarily prevent the consummation of the illegal sale.
As the Court observed in People v. Paco,19 these factors may
WHEREFORE, finding accused Mari Musa y Hantatalu guilty beyond sometimes camouflage the commission of the crime. In the instant
reasonable doubt of selling marijuana and pursuant to Sec. 4, Art II of case, the fact that the other people inside the appellant's house are
Rep. Act No. 6425, he is sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay the known to the appellant may have given him some assurance that these
fine of P20,000.00, the latter imposed without subsidiary people will not report him to the authorities.
imprisonment.6
The appellant, besides assailing Sgt. Ani's credibility, also questions
In this appeal, the appellant contends that his guilt was not proved the credibility of T/Sgt. Belarga. The appellant submits that since T/Sgt.
beyond reasonable doubt and impugns the credibility of the Belarga admitted that he was about 90 meters away from Sgt. Ani and
prosecution witnesses. the appellant, he could not have possibly witnessed the sale. The
appellant invokes People v.
Ale20 where the Court observed that from a distance of 10-15 meters, a
The appellant claims that the testimony of Sgt. Ani, the poseur-buyer,
policeman cannot distinguish between marijuana cigarette from
is not credible because: (1) prior to the buy-bust operation, neither Sgt.
ordinary ones by the type of rolling done on the cigarette sticks. And
Ani nor the other NARCOM agents were personally known by the
since T/Sgt. Belarga allegedly did not see the sale, the appellant
appellant or vice-versa; and (2) there was no witness to the alleged
contends that the uncorroborated testimony of Sgt. Ani can not stand
giving of the two wrappers of marijuana by the appellant to Sgt. Ani.
as basis for his conviction.

Sgt. Ani testified that on December 13, 1989, upon instruction by

People v. Ale does not apply here because the policeman in that case
T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga, he conducted a test-buy operation on the
testified that he and his companion were certain that the appellant
appellant whereby he bought one wrapper of marijuana for P15.00
therein handed marijuana cigarettes to the poseur-buyer based on the
from the latter.7 He reported the successful operation to T/Sgt. Belarga
appearance of the cigarette sticks. The Court rejected this claim,
on the same day.8 Whereupon, T/Sgt. Belarga conducted a conference
stating that:
to organize a buy-bust operation for the following day.9
This Court cannot give full credit to the testimonies of the prosecution The appellant next assails the seizure and admission as evidence of a
witnesses marked as they are with contradictions and tainted with plastic bag containing marijuana which the NARCOM agents found in
inaccuracies. the appellant's kitchen. It appears that after Sgt. Ani gave the pre-
arranged signal to the other NARCOM agents, the latter moved in and
arrested the appellant inside the house. They searched him to retrieve
Biñan testified that they were able to tell that the four cigarettes were
the marked money but didn't find it. Upon being questioned, the
marijuana cigarettes because according to him, the rolling of ordinary
appellant said that he gave the marked money to his wife.31 Thereafter,
cigarettes are different from those of marijuana cigarettes. (tsn,
T/Sgt. Belarga and Sgt. Lego went to the kitchen and noticed what
November 13, 1984, p. 10).
T/Sgt. Belarga described as a "cellophane colored white and stripe
hanging at the corner of the kitchen."32 They asked the appellant about
It is however, incredible to believe that they could discern the type of its contents but failing to get a response, they opened it and found
rolling done on those cigarettes from the distance where they were dried marijuana leaves. At the trial, the appellant questioned the
observing the alleged sale of more or less 10 to 15 meters.21 admissibility of the plastic bag and the marijuana it contains but the
trial court issued an Order ruling that these are admissible in
evidence.33
In the case at bar, however, T/Sgt. Belarga did not positively claim that
he saw the appellant hand over marijuana to Sgt. Ani. What he said
was that there was an exchange of certain articles between the two. Built into the Constitution are guarantees on the freedom of every
The relevant portion of T/Sgt. Belarga's testimony reads:22 individual against unreasonable searches and seizures by providing in
Article III, Section 2, the following:
Q Now, do you remember whether Sgt. Ani was able to reach the
house of Mari Musa? The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
A Yes, ma'am. nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
Q After reaching Mari Musa, did you see what happened (sic)? except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
A Yes, ma'am. witness he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the
Q Could you please tell us? persons or things to be seized.

A From our vehicle the stainless owner type jeep where Sgt. Lego, Sgt. Furthermore, the Constitution, in conformity with the doctrine laid down
Biong were boarded, I saw that Sgt. Ani proceeded to the house near in Stonehill v. Diokno, 34 declares inadmissible, any evidence obtained
the road and he was met by one person and later known as Mari Musa in violation of the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. 35
who was at the time wearing short pants and later on I saw that Sgt.
Ani handed something to him, thereafter received by Mari Musa and While a valid search warrant is generally necessary before a search
went inside the house and came back later and handed something to and seizure may be effected, exceptions to this rule are recognized.
Sgt. Ani. Thus, in Alvero v. Dizon,36 the Court stated that. "[t]he most important
exception to the necessity for a search warrant is the right of search
Contrary to the contention of the appellant, it was not impossible for and seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest."37
T/Sgt. Belarga to have seen, from a distance of 90-100 meters, Sgt.
Ani hand to the appellant "something" and for the latter to give to the Rule 126, Section 12 of the Rules of Court expressly authorizes a
former "something." warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest, thus:

Notwithstanding the fact that T/Sgt. Belarga could not have been Sec. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person
certain that what Sgt. Ani received from the appellant was marijuana lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons
because of the distance, his testimony, nevertheless, corroborated the or anything which may be used as proof of the commission
direct evidence, which the Court earlier ruled to be convincing, of an offense, without a search warrant.
presented by Sgt. Ani on the following material points: (1) T/Sgt.
Belarga instructed Sgt. Ani to conduct a surveillance and test-buy
operation on the appellant at Suterville, Zamboanga City on December There is no doubt that the warrantless search incidental to a lawful
13, 1989; 23 (2) later that same day, Sgt. Ani went back to their office arrest authorizes the arresting officer to make a search upon the
and reported a successful operation and turned over to T/Sgt. Belarga person of the person arrested. As early as 1909, the Court has ruled
one wrapper of marijuana; 24 (3) T/Sgt. Belarga then organized a team that "[a]n officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested
to conduct a buy-bust operation the following day; 25 (4) on December any money or property found upon his person which was used in the
14, 1989, T/Sgt. Belarga led a team of NARCOM agents who went to commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or which might
Suterville, Zamboanga City;26 (5) T/Sgt. Belarga gave a P20.00 marked furnish the prisoner with the means of committing
bill to Sgt. Ani which was to be used in the buy-bust operation; 27 (6) violence or of escaping, or which may be used as evidence in the trial
38
upon the arrival of the NARCOM agents in Suterville, Zamboanga City, of the cause . . . " Hence, in a buy-bust operation conducted to entrap
Sgt. Ani proceeded to the house of the appellant while some agents a drug-pusher, the law enforcement agents may seize the marked
stayed in the vehicles and others positioned themselves in strategic money found on the person
places;28 the appellant met Sgt. Ani and an exchange of articles took of the pusher immediately after the arrest even without arrest and
place.29 search warrants.39

The corroborative testimony of T/Sgt. Belarga strengthens the direct In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents searched the person of the
evidence given by Sgt. Ani. Additionally, the Court has ruled that the appellant after arresting him in his house but found nothing. They then
fact that the police officers who accompanied the poseur-buyer were searched the entire house and, in the kitchen, found and seized a
unable to see exactly what the appellant gave the poseur-buyer plastic bag hanging in a corner.
because of their distance or position will not be fatal to the
prosecution's case30 provided there exists other evidence, direct or
The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's
circumstantial, e.g., the testimony of the poseur-buyer, which is lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to
sufficient to prove the consummation of the sale of the prohibited drug include the premises or surroundings under his immediate
control.40 Objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to
be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be just the plastic bag and not the marijuana. The incriminating nature of
presented as evidence.41 the contents of the plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the
"plain view" of said object. It cannot be claimed that the plastic bag
clearly betrayed its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its
In Ker v. California42 police officers, without securing a search warrant
transprarency, or otherwise, that its contents are obvious to an
but having information that the defendant husband was selling
observer.48
marijuana from his apartment, obtained from the building manager a
passkey to defendants' apartment, and entered it. There they found the
defendant husband in the living room. The defendant wife emerged We, therefore, hold that under the circumstances of the case, the "plain
from the kitchen, and one of the officers, after identifying himself, view" doctrine does not apply and the marijuana contained in the
observed through the open doorway of the kitchen, a small scale atop plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot be presented in evidence
the kitchen sink, upon which lay a brick-shaped package containing pursuant to Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution.
green leafy substance which he recognized as marijuana. The
package of marijuana was used as evidence in prosecuting defendants
The exclusion of this particular evidence does not, however, diminish,
for violation of the Narcotic Law. The admissibility of the package was
in any way, the damaging effect of the other pieces of evidence
challenged before the U.S. Supreme Court, which held, after observing
presented by the prosecution to prove that the appellant sold
that it was not unreasonable for the officer to walk to the doorway of
marijuana, in violation of Article II, Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs
the adjacent kitchen on seeing the defendant wife emerge therefrom,
Act of 1972. We hold that by virtue of the testimonies of Sgt. Ani and
that "the discovery of the brick of marijuana did not constitute a search,
T/Sgt. Belarga and the two wrappings of marijuana sold by the
since the officer merely saw what was placed before him in full
appellant to Sgt. Ani, among other pieces of evidence, the guilt of the
view.43 The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the warrantless seizure of
appellant of the crime charged has been proved beyond reasonable
the marijuana was legal on the basis of the "plain view" doctrine and
doubt.
upheld the admissibility of the seized drugs as part of the prosecution's
evidence. 44
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court AFFIRMED.
The "plain view" doctrine may not, however, be used to launch
unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general
exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendant's guilt. SO ORDERED.
The "plain view" doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not
searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. 45 Furthermore, the Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Melo, JJ., concur.
U.S. Supreme Court stated the following limitations on the application
of the doctrine:

What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer in
each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of
which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating
the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification
— whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search
incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being
present unconnected with a search directed against the accused —
and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the
original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent
to the police that they have evidence before them; the "plain view"
doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from
one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges. 46

It has also been suggested that even if an object is observed in "plain

view," the "plain view" doctrine will not justify the seizure of the object
where the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the
"plain view" of the object.47 Stated differently, it must be immediately
apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be
evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.

In the instant case, the appellant was arrested and his person
searched in the living room. Failing to retrieve the marked money
which they hoped to find, the NARCOM agents searched the whole
house and found the plastic bag in the kitchen. The plastic bag was,
therefore, not within their "plain view" when they arrested the appellant
as to justify its seizure. The NARCOM agents had to move from one
portion of the house to another before they sighted the plastic bag.
Unlike Ker vs. California, where the police officer had reason to walk to
the doorway of the adjacent kitchen and from which position he saw
the marijuana, the NARCOM agents in this case went from room to
room with the obvious intention of fishing for more evidence.

Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in
one corner of the kitchen, they had no clue as to its contents. They had
to ask the appellant what the bag contained. When the appellant
refused to respond, they opened it and found the marijuana. Unlike Ker
v. California, where the marijuana was visible to the police officer's
eyes, the NARCOM agents in this case could not have discovered the
inculpatory nature of the contents of the bag had they not forcibly
opened it. Even assuming then, that the NARCOM agents
inadvertently came across the plastic bag because it was within their
"plain view," what may be said to be the object in their "plain view" was
 THIRD DIVISION return to Arturo Figueroa the motorcycle with
G.R. No. 97143 October 2, 1995 Motor Engine No. KIE 073574 taken from the
house of the Figueroas on November 10.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff- 1989." 2
appellee, vs. ARTURO FIGUEROA, accused-appellant.
this appeal is interposed by Arturo Figueroa (a) reiterating his
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. cdlex argument against the admissibility against him of evidence seized
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant. following a warrantless search and (b) challenging anew the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
DECISION
The appeal cannot be sustained. cdll
VITUG, J p:
The .45 caliber pistol, magazine and rounds of ammunition
Arturo Figueroa was charged with Illegal Possession of Firearm and were not unlawfully obtained. While we might concede difficulty in
Ammunition in an information that read: readily accepting the statement of the prosecution that the search was
conducted with consent freely given by appellant and members of his
household, it should be pointed out, in any case, that the search and
"The undersigned Assistant City seizure was done admittedly on the occasion of a lawful arrest. 3
Prosecutor accuses ARTURO FlGUEROA of
the crime of Illegal Possession of the Firearm A significant exception from the necessity for a search
and Ammunition, committed as follows: warrant is when the search and seizure is effected as an incident
to a lawful arrest 4 and so, in People vs. Musa, 5 this Court
"That on or about the 10th day of elaborated; thus —
November 1989 at San Francisco Subdivision,
Brgy. San Juan, Municipality of Gen. Trias, "The warrantless search and seizure,
Province of Cavite, Philippines and within the as an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- extend beyond the person of the one arrested to
named accused, did, then and there, willfully, include the premises or surrounding under his
unlawfully and feloniously have in his immediate control. Objects in the 'plain view' of
possession and control one (1) pistol cal. 45 an officer who has the right to be in the position
with defaced serial number with one magazine to have that view are subject to seizure and
and seven (7) live ammunitions for the said may be presented as evidence."
firearm without first having obtained the
necessary permit or license from competent Appellant faults the trial court for giving credence to the
authority to possess the same." 1 testimony given by witnesses for the prosecution despite what he
claims to be inconsistencies in their declarations. Appellant
When arraigned, the accused entered a plea of "Not particularly calls attention to the assertion of prosecution witness
Guilty"; thereupon, trial ensued. Sgt. Atas, to the effect that appellant was with a companion inside
a room when arrested and that the seized firearm was found
It would appear that on 10 November 1989, at around under the cushion of the bed, against the statement of Capt.
seven o'clock in the morning, Captain Lodivino Rosario, the Rosario, another prosecution witness, that appellant
Executive Officer of the 215th PC Company, and his men arrived was alone when arrested and that the gun was found under
at the residence of accused Arturo Figueroa at Barangay San appellant's bed. We do not consider these discrepancies to be so
Juan, San Francisco Subdivision, General Trias, Cavite, to serve major as to warrant a complete rejection of their questioned
a warrant for his arrest issued by the Regional Trial Court of testimony. It is not unnatural for witnesses of the same incident to
Makati, Branch 56, in Criminal Case No. 411 and Criminal Case somehow perceive differently and to thereby vary in their
No. 412 (for the crime of Illegal Possession of Ammunitions and respective accounts of the event. 6 The contradiction of witnesses
for Violation of Section 16, Art. III, Republic Act 6425). While on minor details is nothing unusual and should be expected. 7 We
serving the warrant of arrest, the officers noticed, strewn around, see no cogent reason for not according due respect to the
aluminum foil packages of different sizes in the sala. Suspecting findings of the trial court on the credibility of the witnesses.
thus the presence of "shabu" in the premises, the arresting
officers requested appellant, as well as his brother and sister, to Finally, it is claimed that appellant was just "framed-up."
acquiesce to a search of the house. The search yielded a .45 The conduct of the appellant following his arrest would belie this
caliber pistol, a magazine, seven live ammunitions, and a match allegation. Appellant himself admitted that he failed to complain
box containing an aluminum foil package with "shabu." about this matter when he was apprehended. Neither did he
Confronted, Figueroa denied ownership of the items. An inventory report the so-called "planting of the gun" to the police authorities
was conducted by the PC team, attested to by Barangay Captain nor did he bring it up before the Metropolitan Trial Judge when he
Bigornia, of the seized items. appeared for preliminary investigation. In fact, it would seem that
the only time appellant mentioned the alleged "frame-up" was
The accused, besides assailing the credibility of the when he testified at the trial of this case. No plausible reason was
witnesses for the prosecution, questioned the admissibility in given by appellant that would have prompted police authorities to
evidence of the firearm and rounds of ammunition which, he falsely impute a serious crime against him. Absent a strong
claims, were discovered and taken during warrantless search. showing to the contrary, we must accept the presumption of
On 30 October 1990, the trial court rendered a decision regularity in the performance of official duty. 8
finding the accused Arturo Figueroa guilty. WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in
From the judgment, the decretal portion of which reads toto. Costs against accused-appellant.
— SO ORDERED. LexLibris
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds the Feliciano and Romero, JJ., concur.
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged and is hereby sentenced to Melo, J., is on leave.
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua (life
imprisonment) and to pay the costs.
||| (People v. Figueroa, G.R. No. 97143, [October 2, 1995], 319 PHIL
"The firearm and ammunitions are 21-26)
confiscated and forfeited in favor of the
government.

"Capt. Lodivino Rosario, Executive

Officer, 215th PC Coy, is hereby ordered to
 THIRD DIVISION In an Information dated July 31, 1989, Asst. Quezon City
G.R. No. 99355 August 11, 1997 Prosecutor Perpetuo L.B. Alonzo accused Appellants Salazar and
Gotangugan, together with one "John Doe," of robbery with homicide
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. committed as follows: 3
DOMINGO SALAZAR y SEROMA alias "INGGO,"
MONCHITO GOTANGUGAN y SEVILLA alias "That on or about the 10th day of March 1989, in
"MONCHING" and JOHN Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
DOE,accused, DOMINGO SALAZAR y SEROMA alias, of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
"INGGO" and MONCHITO GOTANGUGAN y SEVILLA together, confederating with and mutually helping one another,
alias "MONCHING", accused-appellants. did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent
to gain and by means of violence upon person, rob one CRISPIN
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. GATMEN Y CEYNAS of his service firearm, a Squires Bingham
Cesar D. Turiano for private respondents. Cal. 38 Revolver with Serial No. 1096012 valued at P6,000.00,
Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the said
SYNOPSIS offended party thereof in the aforementioned amount; and that by
In an information the Asst. Prosecutor of QC accused reason of or on the occasion of the said robbery, said accused
appellants Domingo Salazar and Monchito Gotangugan, together with with intent to kill and without any justifiable cause, did then and
one "John Doe" of robbery with homicide committed against one there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, and assault the
Crispin Gatmen by robbing the victim of his service firearm pistol and person of said CRISPIN GATMEN Y CEYNAS, by stabbing the
stabbing him with a bladed weapon thereby inflicting him with serious latter, hitting him on the different parts of his body by the use of
and mortal wounds which causes his untimely death. Upon bladed weapon, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal
arraignment, appellants pleaded not guilty. After trial, the court a wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his
quo rendered a decision finding said appellants guilty beyond untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said
reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide and sentenced victim in such amount as may be awarded to them under the
them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay provisions of the Civil Code."
damages amounting to P30,000.00 plus P6,500.00 for the value of the
Upon arraignment, appellants pleaded not guilty. After trial
revolver. Appellants filed a direct appeal to the Supreme Court
proceeded in due course, the court a quo rendered the assailed
asserting that the trial court erred in giving full faith and credence to the Judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads: 4
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and in refusing to find that the
appellants were arrested without warrant, thus the evidence obtained "WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding
are inadmissible. both accused, Domingo Salazar y Seroma and Monchito
The Supreme Court ruled that appellants were guilty of two Gotangugan y Sevilla, guilty of the crime of Robbery with
separate felonies namely, homicide and theft, but not the special Homicide as charged in the information. They are both sentenced
complex crime of robbery with homicide. In the case under to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, to pay the heirs
consideration, appellants' primary intent remains an enigma. The fact of the deceased damages in the amount of P30,000.00, plus the
that appellants took the firearm after shooting the security guard did sum of P6,500.00 representing the value of the revolver taken by
not prove that their primary intent was to commit robbery. Where the both accused, plus all the accessory penalties provided for by
homicide is not conclusively shown committed for robbing the victim, or law, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to
where the robbery was not proven, there can be no conviction of pay the costs."
robbery with homicide. Anent the issue of credibility, the Court has
ruled that assessment of the trial court on the credibility of the The Facts
witnesses and their stories is well nigh conclusive on appeal, provided
Evidence for the Prosecution
it is not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight. In this case, the defense
has tried but miserably failed to establish any material inconsistencies The prosecution presented the following witnesses: Pfc.
or contradiction, which would justify a departure from this rule. On the Jose Antonio of the Quezon City Police, Eyewitnesses Vicente
issue that herein appellants were illegally arrested, the Court finds that Miranda, Jr. and Pedro Soriano, Dr. Dario L. Gajardo of the PC/INP
such arrest did not divest these eyewitness accounts with Crime Laboratory and Ben Felipe Dangza, Consultant/Manager of
constitutional infirmity as fruits of the poisonous tree. Considering that PUMA Security Agency. The Solicitor General, on behalf of the People,
their conviction could be secured on the strength of the testimonial summarized the facts as viewed by the prosecution: 5
evidence given in open court, which are not inadmissible in evidence,
the court finds no reason to belabor this matter. In view of the "On March 10, 1989, at or about 3:30 (a.m.), Vicente
foregoing, the appealed decision is modified and sentenced herein Miranda, Jr. and his friend Nestor Arriola were standing in the
appellants of two separate felonies, namely homicide and theft. corner of Road 1 and Visayas Avenue, Quezon City, about 12
Furthermore the indemnity is increased to P50,000.00 in line with the meters from Linda's Supermarket (TSN, October 31, 1989, pp. 3
prevailing jurisprudence. and 21). At about the same time, Pedro Soriano, who was himself
waiting for a ride, was standing in front of the Kambingan
DECISION Restaurant along Visayas Avenue and beside Linda's
Supermarket (TSN, November 6, 1989, p. 2-3). Moments later,
PANGANIBAN, J p: they saw appellants Domingo Salazar and Monchito Gotangugan
together with an unidentified companion approach the security
Although homicide (a crime against persons) is guard of Linda's Supermarket (TSN, October 31, 1989, pp. 3-4,
independently a graver offense than robbery (a crime against 27).
property), it is treated in the special complex crime of robbery with Salazar, Gotangugan and their
homicide as a mere incident committed by reason or on the occasion companion talked to the security guard, who
of the robbery. Unless the prosecution convincingly proves that the was later identified as Crispin Gatmen.
main purpose of the culprit(s) was the asportation of personal property Thereafter, Miranda saw Salazar pull out a 9-10
and that the death was merely incidental to such asportation, there can inches long dagger from his pocket, and pass
be no conviction for this special complex crime. cdtech the same to Gotangugan (Ibid., pp. 5, 15, 22).
Armed with the dagger, Gotangugan suddenly
Statement of the Case started stabbing Gatmen (Ibid., p. 5, 15, 16).
This principle is stressed by the Court as it rules on this
appeal from the Judgment 1 dated April 1, 1991 of the Regional Trial At that precise moment, Pedro
Court of Quezon City, Branch 104 2 which, acting as a special criminal Soriano, who was only about 10 to 15 meters
court, convicted Appellants Domingo Salazar y Seroma alias "Inggo" from Linda's Supermarket heard moans coming
and Monchito Gotangugan y Sevilla alias "Monching" of robbery with from the guardhouse in front of Linda's
homicide. Supermarket. He turned his head towards the
place where the moans were coming from and
saw Gatmen inside the guardhouse being (11) Stab wound, proximal phalange of the left
repeatedly stabbed by Gotangugan (TSN, index finger, measuring 2.2 by 1 cm.
November 6, 1989, pp. 2-6, 15-16).
(12) Incised wound, middle phalange of the right
Both Miranda and Soriano were able middle finger, measuring 1 by 0.5 cm.'
to witness and identify the malefactors because
the place where the incident happened was Evidence for the Defense
well-lighted (TSN, October 31, 1989, p. 22;
Appellants, testifying for themselves, set up the defense of
November 6, 1989, pp. 4-5).
alibi. The court a quo summarized their testimonies as follows: 6
While Gotangugan was stabbing
"DOMINGO SALAZAR, 30 years old,
Gatmen, Salazar stood close to Gotangugan,
and residing at c/o Bureau of Animal Industry,
while their unidentified companion acted as a
Visayas Avenue, Quezon City, testified that he
lookout (TSN, October 31, 1989, pp. 8, 15;
had been in that place for ten (10) years and
November 6, 1989, p. 16).
that during the early morning of July 27, 1989,
he was at their house sleeping, when all of a
Out of fear, Miranda and Arriola ran
sudden he was awakened because two persons
towards Tandang Sora. While running,
kicked him and with guns pointed at him, he
however, they saw Salazar and Gotangugan get
was ordered to stand up. The two persons
the revolver of Gatmen (TSN, October 31, 1989,
searched his things inside the house and asked
pp. 7-8). Soriano, on the other hand, left slowly
him where he hid his gun. Then, they dragged
but saw Salazar get the gun of Gatmen (TSN,
him out of his house. Outside the house, he was
November 6, 1989, pp. 6-7).
kicked, boxed and hit with the butt of the gun.
After getting the gun, Salazar, There were about five (5) people who went to
Gotangugan, and their unidentified companion his house, all armed. He denied any
left the scene of the crime (TSN, October 31, participation in the killing of the deceased
1989, p. 8; November 6, 1989, p. 7). because according to him, he was at his house
sleeping. He slept at 7:00 (p.m. on) March 9
Gatmen died as a consequence of and woke up at dawn, March 10. He was with
the following stab wounds, to wit: his wife Juanita Salazar, and his father-in-law.
They were sleeping side by side. He did not see
'(1) Hacked wound, frontal extending to the right Vicente Miranda and Pedro Soriano before he
pre-auricular region, measuring 10 by was arrested on July 27, 1989. However, he
1 cm, 8 cm from the anterior midline, admitted having seen Miranda and Soriano at
fracturing the frontal bone. the police headquarters at Sikatuna, peeping at
their cell. He often saw them at City Hall with
(2) Stab wound, right zygomatic region, policemen accompanying newly arrested
measuring 3 by 0.7 cm, 10 cm from persons.
the anterior midline, directed
posteriorwards and medialwards, MONCHITO GOTANGUGAN, 23
fracturing the right zygomatic bone. years old, married, vendor, and with residence
at Visayas Avenue, Quezon City testified that
(3) Incised wound, chin, measuring 1.2 by 0.3 he was not at the scene of the crime when the
cm, 2 cm right of the anterior midline. said incident took place and that on March 10,
1989, he was at Lucena City. On July 27, 1989,
(4) Stab wound, neck measuring 5 by 1.2 cm, he was at the house of his sister located at
crossing the anterior midline, 4 cm to Baex Compound, Visayas Avenue, Quezon
the right and 1 cm to the City, arriving in that place during the first week
posteriorwards and medialwards, of May 1989. In the morning of July 27, 1989,
lacerating the trachea, larynx and policemen forcibly entered his house and
esophagus. dragged him outside, ransacking his belongings
and bringing him at Sikatuna Police
(5) Stab wound, right clavicular region, Headquarters. He was accused of being a
measuring 8 by 2 cm, 7 cm from the 'Sparrow', hold-upper and 'akyat bahay', and
anterior midline, 3 cm deep, directed ordered to bring out firearms, but they did not
posteriorwards and medialwards, find anything. They mauled him at Sikatuna
fracturing the right clavicle. headquarters. While still at their house, he was
kicked and hit with the butt of the armalite. At
(6) Stab wound, interclavicular region, the Sikatuna headquarters, he was never
measuring 3 by 0.1 cm, 6 cm from the informed by the police that he participated in the
anterior midline. killing of the security guard in front of Linda's
Supermarket in the morning. He had never seen
(7) Linear abrasion, left mammary region, the witnesses presented by the prosecution,
measuring 3 by 0.1 cm, 6 cm from the however, he saw them at the City hall together
anterior midline. with policemen and other detainees." cdtai
(8) Lacerated wound, palmar aspect of the left Ruling of the Trial Court
hand, measuring 5 by 2 cm, 3 cm
lateral to its anterior midline. The trial court brushed aside the alibi interposed by
appellants, branding it as an inherently weak defense. It gave full
(9) Lacerated wound, palmar aspect of the right credence to the accounts of the eyewitnesses for the prosecution, as
hand, measuring 4 by 2 cm, along its no evidence was adduced to refute them or to show why said
anterior midline. eyewitnesses would testify falsely against appellants. Quite the
contrary, the "prosecution evidence (was) clear and convincing." The
(10) Lacerated wound, middle phalange of the bare allegation of the defense that they were "assets and informants"
left small finger, measuring 1 by 0.1 of the apprehending policemen was disbelieved. Thus, it rendered the
cm. aforementioned six-page Judgment of conviction.
 Hence, this appeal direct to this Court, the penalty defense, Miranda was thus not credible as he was not clear as to who
being reclusion perpetua. between the two appellants actually pulled out the dagger and stabbed
the victim. But when questioned specifically on this point, the witness
Assignment of Errors clarified the sequence of events from the act of pulling out the dagger
to the actual stabbing. Said the witness: 9
In their Brief, 7 appellants attack the prosecution evidence
for its lack of probative value to outweigh their alibi and to sustain their
"Q. You said one of the three men pulled out a
conviction. They allege that the eyewitnesses' testimonies suffer from
bladed instrument. Will you tell the
material inconsistencies and contradictions that cast serious doubt on
Honorable Court how far were you
their credibility. Specifically, the following errors were imputed to the
from these three persons who were
court a quo: 8
then in these conversation with the
security guard?
"I
A. From the witness stand up to that corner, sir.
The lower court erred in giving full
faith and credence to the testimonies of
FISCAL BELTRAN:
prosecution witnesses Vicente Miranda and
Pedro Soriano since a more conscientious About a distance of 12 meters. I am proposing
scrutiny of their testimonies will show that they that the distance pointed to by the
are highly incredible and consistently witness is about 12 meters.
contradicting and improbable.
xxx xxx xxx
II
FISCAL BELTRAN:
The lower court erred in convicting
both the accused-appellants since the evidence Q. You said that one of the three persons pulled
presented by the prosecution failed to prove out a bladed instrument. What did you
beyond reasonable doubt the offense charged. do after pulling out this bladed
instrument?
III
A. I saw him, sir, stab the guard.
The lower court erred in refusing and
failing to find that the herein accused-appellants Q. The same person who pulled out this bladed
were arrested without warrant and therefore all instrument was the same one who
evidence obtained after such illegal arrest are stabbed the security guard?
inadmissible.
A. No, sir. He handed the bladed instrument to
IV the other person, sir.
The lower court committed serious xxx xxx xxx
error amounting to grave abuse of discretion in
finding that the testimonies of the prosecution Q. Were you able to see the face of this person
witnesses Vicente Miranda and Pedro Soriano whom you said pulled out this bladed
were not refuted because the defense instrument?
interposed by the accused is alibi."
A. Yes, sir."
These alleged errors will be discussed by the Court under
the general heading "Credibility of Witnesses and Sufficiency of Nor are we persuaded by appellants' contention that the
Evidence." In addition, the Court will tackle, motu proprio, the issue of witness' sworn statement to the police shows that the one who pulled
whether appellants may be held liable for the special complex crime of out the dagger was the same person who stabbed the victim. The
robbery with homicide, in the light of the proven facts. pertinent portion of his statement reads: 10

The Court's Ruling "06.T Anong kinalaman mo sa pangyayaring

yon, kung mayroon?
The Court finds appellants guilty of two separate felonies;
namely, homicide and theft, but not of the special complex crime of
S Mangyari po, ay napadaan ho ako noon,
robbery with homicide.
kasama ko yong mga kaibigan ko, sa
may harap ng Linda's Grocery sa may
Credibility of Witnesses and
kanto ng Road 1, at Visayas Avenue.
Sufficiency of Evidence Noong mga oras na yon (3:30 AM) ay
nakita ko na yong guardya na
As in most criminal cases, appellants contend that the nakabantay doon sa may grocery ay
court a quo erred in bestowing credence on the testimony of parang may sinita na tatlong lalaki,
prosecution witnesses. Appellants assail the credibility of the tapos mamaya-maya, yong isang
eyewitnesses by pointing out several inconsistencies in their lalaki ay tinapik niya sa puwit yong
testimonies which render them "highly improbable and consistently kasama at bigla na lamang bumunot
impossible." ng dagger at inundayan ng saksak
yong guwardya, mga tatlong sunud-
Two Different Persons Produced the sunod, tapos atras ng atras naman
yong gwardya hanggang napasandal
Dagger and Stabbed the Victim doon sa may guard house at doon
siya natumba tapos hinablot niya
per Miranda's Testimony yong baril ng gwardya tapos nag-
takbuhan na sila patungo sa
We disagree with appellants' contention that, during the squatteros (sic) area sa may likuran
direct examination, Prosecution Witness Miranda wobbled particularly ng Agriculture building, yong BAEX
on who between the appellants stabbed the victim. The defense ho.
segregated Miranda's testimony, quoting and highlighting separate
portions thereof to show alleged inconsistencies. According to the
 07.T Bale ilan ka-tao ang sumaksak sa guardia, We disagree. The guardhouse was actually an outpost, 17 a
noong makita mo? structure open on all sides. The guard was sitting under its roof and his
assailants were standing outside the roof. One of them was behind him
S Yong isa lang na maliit, na medyo kalbo, at and relieving himself. In this light, it is easy to understand the absence
yong isa naman medyo pa-pilay-pilay of discrepancy in the witness' testimony on this point.
ay siya tumapik sa kalbo na parang
nag-uutos na saksakin yong guardya, Appellant Gotangugan Stabbed the Victim
yong isa naman ay doon sa may pinto
ng Linda's Grocery na tinitingnan Appellants claim that the witness was uncertain as to who
naman niya yong kandadado (sic) ng actually stabbed the victim. While it is true that initially he made a
pinto." mistake in pinpointing the culprits in the courtroom, this was the result
only of his lack of familiarity with appellants' names. However, despite
While there may have been some vagueness in the answer his initial confusion, his identification of the culprit who delivered the
to Question "06," the clarification in the succeeding statement, i.e., the fatal stab wound was categorical. This is clearly shown in the
reply to Question "07," sufficiently explains the witness' story. It must transcripts of the trial: 18
be remembered that ex parte affidavits are generally considered
incomplete and inaccurate and will not prevail over the witness' "Q. Earlier, you pointed to two persons inside
statements on the stand. 11 That the defense labels Miranda's the courtroom as having participated
answers as "inconsistencies" appears to this Court to be merely a in the stabbing of Crispin Gatmen, the
strained interpretation of the witness' testimony. first one gave his name as Monchito
Gotangugan, will you tell the
The Number of Stabs Inflicted is a Minor Matter Honorable Court what was the special
participation of Monchito Gotangugan
Appellants make a mountain out of Miranda's admission on in the stabbing?
cross-examination that he was not sure how many times Gotangugan
stabbed the victim vis-a-vis his earlier statement that one of appellants A. The gun was handed over to him.
stabbed the victim thrice. There is really no inconsistency here. And
even if we grant that there is, the alleged conflict pertains to an COURT:
insignificant detail that is not material to the question of who killed the
deceased. The general rule is that inconsistencies and contradictions Gun?
in minor and trivial matters do not impair a witness' credibility. 12 The
ambivalence of a witness on the exact number of stabs inflicted on the A. Yes, Your Honor.
victim does not detract from the obvious fact that the victim was killed
by Gotangugan, as clearly and positively testified to by Miranda. FISCAL BELTRAN:
Indeed, in a startling event like a killing, it is difficult for a witness to
Q. How about the other person, this
keep tab of the exact number of strokes the killer made. It is enough
Domingo Salazar, what did he do?
that the witness gives a fair estimate. The important thing is that the
stabbing took place, the victim died and the witness identified the
A. He was the one who stabbed the victim.
culprit(s).
Q. Who stabbed the victim?
Distance Did Not Necessarily
A. The bald one, sir.
Hinder Perception
INTERPRETER:
The contention that Miranda did not really see the culprits'
faces deserves scant consideration. The distance of the witness from Witness pointing to a person by the name of
the stabbing incident was only 12 meters. That the crime happened Monchito Gotangugan.
before dawn (about 3:30 a.m.) is immaterial because the place was
lighted. 13 The witness' remark that he was far from the situs of the ATTY. OSORIO:
crime merely meant that he was not near enough to hear the culprits'
whispered conversation, but he was near enough to see their faces Your Honor, may I reiterate the witness to
and their felonious deed. 14 aisadc speak louder.
Appellants denigrate the witness' story that he ran closer to FISCAL BELTRAN:
the locus criminis while witnessing the stabbing. They claim that the
natural tendency would be to run farther away. However, under the Q. Alright. You pointed to Monchito Gotangugan
circumstances, the witness did not really intend to come closer to the as the one who stabbed Crispin
scene of the crime. What he did was to go to the area of Tandang Sora Gatmen. How about the other person
where there was a public market and where, expectably, there would you pointed to, what did he do?
be people even at such an early hour. The area towards the city hall,
on the other hand, was unlit and deserted, as the government buildings A. After the bald one stabbed the victim, sir, the
there were still closed. Besides, since the witness was on his way to big one took the gun from the security
his house in Teachers' Village, he had to go to Tandang Sora, at that guard."
time, to get a ride. Hence, the witness' reaction was not unnatural. In
fact, it was most prudent under the circumstances. Indeed, the foregoing testimony demonstrates that while the
witness was confused as to the name of the culprit, he was certain
No Two Versions of the Event in Soriano's Testimony about his identity.

The defense contends that the other eyewitness, Soriano, Eyewitnesses' Accounts Are
did not actually see the stabbing incident, much less the person who
stabbed the victim. Appellants claim that Soriano presented two Consistent with Each Other
versions of the incident. According to one version given during direct
examination, the witness allegedly stated that the security guard was The defense claims that the testimonies of the two
seated outside the guardhouse and that one of the accused urinated eyewitnesses materially contradicted each other in two ways. First,
behind him. Thereafter, the latter stabbed the victim. 15 In the other Miranda allegedly said that the security guard was standing when he
version given during cross-examination, the victim was allegedly inside was stabbed while Soriano stated that he was sitting down. Second,
the guardhouse when one of the culprits stabbed the victim. 16 Miranda testified that one of the culprits produced the dagger and the
other stabbed the victim with it. Soriano, on the other hand, said that
only one person produced the dagger and thereafter stabbed the on occasion of the robbery, the crime
victim. of homicide shall have been
committed, . . ." (Emphasis supplied)
We have examined the Appellants' Brief and the records of
this case and we have found no factual basis for the strained The Spanish version of Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal
inferences of the defense. From Miranda's sworn statement, the Code reads: "1.0 — Con la pena de reclusion perpetua a muerte,
defense deduced that the security guard was standing outside the cuando con motivo o con ocasion del robo resultare homicidio." Chief
outpost. But this deduction is not supported by said sworn statement or Justice Ramon C. Aquino explains that the use of the words "con
by the witness' testimony in court. Miranda never said that the victim motivo . . . del robo" permits of no interpretation other than that the
was standing up or was outside the guardhouse when he was stabbed. intent of the actor must supply the connection between the homicide
and the robbery in order to constitute the complex offense. If that intent
Both witnesses agreed that the person who stabbed the comprehends the robbery, it is immaterial that the homicide may in
victim was Gotangugan. Both eyewitnesses corroborated each other in point of time immediately precede instead of follow the robbery. Where
identifying Salazar as the one who drew the dagger from his jacket and the original design comprehends robbery, and homicide is perpetrated
then handed it to Gotangugan. With the dagger, Gotangugan stabbed by reason or on the occasion of the consummation of the former, the
the security guard. The insistence of the defense on this supposed crime committed is the special complex offense, even if homicide
"contradiction" simply has no basis. precedes the robbery by an appreciable interval of time. On the other
hand, if the original criminal design does not clearly comprehend
Time and again, this Court has ruled that the assessment of robbery, but robbery follows the homicide as an afterthought or as a
the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their stories is well- minor incident of the homicide, the criminal acts should be viewed as
nigh conclusive on appeal, provided it is not tainted with arbitrariness constitutive of two offenses and not of a single complex offense.
or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and Robbery with homicide arises only when there is a direct relation, an
influence. 19 In this case, the defense has tried but failed to establish intimate connection, between the robbery and the killing, even if the
any material inconsistency or contradiction which would justify a killing is prior to, concurrent with, or subsequent to the
departure from this rule. robbery. 24 cdtai
Compared with the evidence submitted by the prosecution, On the other hand, robbery with homicide under Article 294
appellants' denial and alibi cannot possibly be given more probative of the Code is distinguished from the complex crime punished in Article
weight than the clear and positive identification provided by no less 48, which contemplates a situation where one offense is a necessary
than two credible eyewitnesses. 20 means to commit the other or where a single act results in two or more
offenses. The homicide in Article 294(1) is not necessary for the
Granting arguendo that appellants were illegally arrested, accomplishment of the robbery. 25 However, it could be committed to
such arrest did not invest these eyewitness accounts with avoid future identification of the robbers or as a consequence or
constitutional infirmity as "fruits of the poisonous tree." Considering incident thereof.
that their conviction could be secured on the strength of the testimonial
evidence given in open court which are not inadmissible in evidence, Robo con homicidio is an indivisible offense, a special
the court finds no reason to further belabor the matter. complex crime. The penalty for robbery with homicide is more severe
because the law sees, in this crime, that men placed lucre above the
Elements of Robo con Homicidio value of human life, thus, justifying the imposition of a more severe
In prosecuting robbery with homicide cases, the government penalty than that for simple homicide or robbery. In view of said graver
needs to prove the following elements: (1) the taking of personal penalty, jurisprudence exacts a stricter requirement before convicting
property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons; (2) the accused of this crime. Where the homicide is not conclusively
the property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is done shown to have been committed for the purpose of robbing the victim,
with animo lucrandi; and (4) by reason of the robbery or on the or where the robbery was not proven, there can be no conviction
occasion thereof, homicide (used in its generic sense) is committed. 21 for robo con homicidio. 26

In this case, the prosecution has convincingly proven that (1) In the case under consideration, appellants' primary intent
appellants asported a gun with violence and intimidation against the remains an enigma. For this reason, we cannot affirm appellants'
victim; (2) the gun belonged to the deceased; and (3) the security conviction for robbery with homicide. The fact that appellants took the
guard was killed. Animus lucrandi is presumed when there is proof firearm after shooting the security guard did not prove that their
of asportation. 22 All of these facts are supported by the testimonies of primary intent was to commit robbery. It shows that they committed an
competent eyewitnesses presented by the prosecution. unlawful taking of property, but it does not exclude the possibility that
this was merely an afterthought. Any conclusion as to
There is, however, no showing that the death of the security their primary criminal intent based on the proven facts is speculative
guard occurred merely by reason or on the occasion of the robbery. and without adequate basis.
The prosecution was silent on appellants' primary criminal intent. Did
they intend to kill the security guard in order to steal the gun? Or did In view of the facts established and consistent with
they intend only to kill him, the taking of the gun being merely an jurisprudence, the Court can convict appellants only of the separate
afterthought? The prosecution did not prove either of the two offenses of theft and homicide, which were both duly proven. This
propositions, and the court a quo failed to elaborate on this point. Court is cognizant of the fact that the Information accused appellants
Thus, we cannot affirm appellants' conviction of the crime charged in of the crime of "robbery with homicide." Nonetheless, it is axiomatic
the Information. that the nature and character of the crime charged are determined not
by the designation of the specific crime but by the facts alleged in the
In several cases, the Court has already ruled that a Information. Thus, in People vs. Ponciano, 27 the Court through Mr.
conviction for robbery with homicide requires certitude that the robbery Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. held:
was the main purpose and objective of the criminals and that the killing
was merely incidental, resulting merely by reason or on the occasion of ". . . In the case at bar, the direct
the robbery. 23 Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code specifically relation or intimate connection between the
states: robbery and the killing was not established.

"Art. 294. Robbery with violence We therefore, follow the rule laid
against or intimidation of persons — Penalties. down in People v. Manalang [170 SCRA 149,
— Any person guilty of robbery with the use of 163, February 9, 1989], 28 to wit:
violence against or intimidation of any person
shall suffer: We already had several occasions to
hold that if the original design was not to commit
1. the penalty or reclusion robbery but that the idea of taking the personal
perpetua to death, when by reason or property of another with intent to gain came to
the mind of the offender after the homicide only
 as an afterthought or as a minor incident in the
homicide, the criminal acts should be viewed as
constituting two distinct offenses and not as a
single complex crime; the crimes would be
either homicide or murder, as the case may be,
and theft. (People v. Atanacio, et al., No. L-
11844, November 29, 1960, 110 Phil.
1032; People v. Elizaga, 86 Phil. 364
[1950];People v. Glore, 87 Phil. 739 [1950])'"
(Emphasis supplied)

Thus, appellants should be held guilty of homicide under

Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code and theft under Article 309 of
the same Code. We also hold that treachery aggravated the killing.
The attack was sudden and without warning, affording the security
guard no chance to defend himself. 29 As it was not alleged in the
Information, it cannot be used to qualify the killing to murder. However,
treachery can still be considered as a generic aggravating
circumstance. 30

While it was proven during the trial that the stolen pistol was
worth P6,500.00, 31 the Information placed the value at P6,000.00
only. However, the appellant did not object to the higher valuation and
is thus deemed to have waived his right to avail of the lower penalty
under paragraph 3 of Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code.
Consequently, appellants may be penalized for theft under Article 309
(2) of the said Code. 32

It is scarcely necessary to point out that there was

conspiracy between appellants, because they clearly acted in concert
and with a unified criminal design. 33 The eyewitness accounts tell us
that one of the assailants touched the other appellant's behind to signal
the start of the attack against the security guard. Salazar then pulled
out the dagger which Gotangugan used to stab the victim.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Judgment is hereby MODIFIED

as follows:

(1) Appellants are hereby found GUILTY of the

separate offense of homicide and
SENTENCED to the indeterminate
sentence of ten years and one day
of prision mayor, as minimum, to
seventeen years, four months and
one day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.

(2) The indemnity ex delicto imposed by the trial

court is INCREASED to fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) in line with
prevailing jurisprudence. 34

(3) Appellants are found also GUILTY of the

separate offense of theft in
accordance with Article 309 (2) of the
Revised Penal Code and
SENTENCED to the indeterminate
penalty of six months and one day
of prision correccional, as minimum,
to four years and two months and one
day also of prision correccional, as
maximum.

(4) Costs against appellants. cdll

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C .J ., Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco,

JJ ., concur.

||| (People v. Salazar y Seroma, G.R. No. 99355, [August 11, 1997],
342 PHIL 745-769)
 G.R. No. L-69401 and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by
RIZAL ALIH, NASIM ALIH, AISAN ALIH, MIJAL ALIH, OMAR ALIH,
the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be
EDRIS MUKSAN, MULSIDI WARADIL, BILLY ASMAD RAMSID
authorized by law, after examination under oath or
ASALI, BANDING USMAN, ANGGANG HADANI, WARMIKHAN
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
HAPA, GABRAL JIKIRI, ALLAN TAN, MUJAHIRIN MARAJUKI,
produce, and particularly describing the place to be
KENNEDY GONZALES, URDUJA ALIH, MERLA ALIH, and
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
NURAISA ALIH VDA DE FEROLINO, petitioners,
vs.
MAJOR GENERAL DELFIN C. CASTRO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS It was also declared in Article IV, Section 4(2) that-
COMMANDER SOUTHCOM AND REGIONAL UNIFIED COMMAND,
REGION IX, ZAMBOANGA CITY, COLONEL ERNESTO CALUPIG,
Sec. 4(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE SPECIAL
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE) AND INTERNAL DEFENSE
any proceeding.
COMMAND, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS IdC MAJOR ARNOLD
BLANCO IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE
PHILIPPINE MARINES AND 1ST LIEUTENANT DARWIN GUERRA The respondents, while admitting the absence of the required such
IN HIS CAPACITY AS ACTS SUPERVISOR, INTERNAL DEFENSE warrant, sought to justify their act on the ground that they were acting
COMMAND, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. under superior orders. 8 There was also the suggestion that the
measure was necessary because of the aggravation of the peace and
order problem generated by the assassination of Mayor Cesar
CRUZ, J.:
Climaco. 9

On November 25, 1984, a contingent of more than two hundred

Superior orders" cannot, of course, countermand the
Philippine marines and elements of the home defense forces raided
Constitution. The fact that the petitioners were suspected of
the compound occupied by the petitioners at Gov. Alvarez street,
the Climaco killing did not excuse the constitutional short-
Zamboanga City, in search of loose firearms, ammunition and other
cuts the respondents took. As eloquently affirmed by the
explosives. 1
U.S. Supreme Court in Ex parte Milligan: 10

The military operation was commonly known and dreaded as a "zona,"

The Constitution is a law for rulers and people, equally in
which was not unlike the feared practice of the kempeitai during the
war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection
Japanese Occupation of rounding up the people in a locality, arresting
all classes of men, at all times and under all circumstances.
the persons fingered by a hooded informer, and executing them
No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was
outright (although the last part is not included in the modern
ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its
refinement).
provisions can be suspended during any of the great
exigencies of government.
The initial reaction of the people inside the compound was to resist the
invasion with a burst of gunfire. No one was hurt as presumably the
The precarious state of lawlessness in Zamboanga City at the time in
purpose was merely to warn the intruders and deter them from
question certainly did not excuse the non-observance of the
entering. Unfortunately, as might be expected in incidents like this, the
constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures.
situation aggravated soon enough. The soldiers returned fire and a
There was no state of hostilities in the area to justify, assuming it
bloody shoot-out ensued, resulting in a number of casualties. 2
could, the repressions committed therein against the petitioners.

The besieged compound surrendered the following morning, and

It is so easy to say that the petitioners were outlaws and deserved the
sixteen male occupants were arrested, later to be finger-printed,
arbitrary treatment they received to take them into custody; but that is
paraffin-tested and photographed over their objection. The military also
a criminal argument. It is also fallacious. Its obvious flaw lies in the
inventoried and confiscated nine M16 rifles, one M14 rifle, nine rifle
conclusion that the petitioners were unquestionably guilty on the
grenades, and several rounds of ammunition found in the premises. 3
strength alone of unsubstantiated reports that they were stockpiling
weapons.
On December 21, 1984, the petitioners came to this Court in a petition
for prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction and
The record does not disclose that the petitioners were wanted
restraining order. Their purpose was to recover the articles seized from
criminals or fugitives from justice. At the time of the "zona," they were
them, to prevent these from being used as evidence against them, and
merely suspected of the mayor's slaying and had not in fact even been
to challenge their finger-printing, photographing and paraffin-testing as
investigated for it. As mere suspects, they were presumed innocent
violative of their right against self-incrimination.4
and not guilty as summarily pronounced by the military.

The Court, treating the petition as an injunction suit with a prayer for
Indeed, even if were assumed for the sake of argument that they were
the return of the articles alleged to have been illegally seized, referred
guilty, they would not have been any less entitled to the protection of
it for hearing to Judge Omar U. Amin of the regional trial court,
the Constitution, which covers both the innocent and the guilty. This is
Zamboanga City. 5 After receiving the testimonial and documentary
not to say, of course, that the Constitution coddles criminals. What it
evidence of the parties, he submitted the report and recommendations
does simply signify is that, lacking the shield of innocence, the guilty
on which this opinion is based. 6
need the armor of the Constitution, to protect them, not from a
deserved sentence, but from arbitrary punishment. Every person is
The petitioners demand the return of the arms and ammunition on the entitled to due process. It is no exaggeration that the basest criminal,
ground that they were taken without a search warrant as required by ranged against the rest of the people who would condemn him outright,
the Bill of Rights. This is confirmed by the said report and in fact is still, under the Bill of Rights, a majority of one.
admitted by the respondents, "but with avoidance. 7
If the respondents did not actually disdain the Constitution when they
Article IV, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution, which was in force at the made their illegal raid, they certainly gave every appearance of doing
time of the incident in question, provided as follows: so. This is truly regrettable for it was incumbent on them, especially
during those tense and tindery times, to encourage rather than
undermine respect for the law, which it was their duty to uphold.
Sec. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
In acting as they did, they also defied the precept that "civilian authority legacy of the law of force be discarded and that there be a return to the
is at all times supreme over the military" so clearly proclaimed in the force and rule of law."
1973 Constitution. 11 In the instant case, the respondents simply by-
passed the civil courts, which had the authority to determine whether
All of us must exert efforts to make our country truly free and
or not there was probable cause to search the petitioner's premises.
democratic, where every individual is entitled to the full protection of
Instead, they proceeded to make the raid without a search warrant on
the Constitution and the Bill of Rights can stand as a stolid sentinel for
their own unauthorized determination of the petitioner's guilt.
all, the innocent as well as the guilty, including the basest of criminals.

The respondents cannot even plead the urgency of the raid because it
WHEREFORE, the search of the petitioners' premises on November
was in fact not urgent. They knew where the petitioners were. They
25, 1984, is hereby declared ILLEGAL and all the articles seized as a
had every opportunity to get a search warrant before making the raid. If
result thereof are inadmissible in evidence against the petitioners in
they were worried that the weapons inside the compound would be
any proceedings. However, the said articles shall remain in custodia
spirited away, they could have surrounded the premises in the
legis pending the outcome of the criminal cases that have been or may
meantime, as a preventive measure. There was absolutely no reason
later be filed against the petitioners.
at all why they should disregard the orderly processes required by the
Constitution and instead insist on arbitrarily forcing their way into the
petitioner's premises with all the menace of a military invasion. SO ORDERED.

Conceding that the search was truly warrantless, might not the search Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez,
and seizure be nonetheless considered valid because it was incidental Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes,
to a legal arrest? Surely not. If all the law enforcement authorities have JJ., concur.
to do is force their way into any house and then pick up anything they
see there on the ground that the occupants are resisting arrest, then
we might as well delete the Bill of Rights as a fussy redundancy.

When the respondents could have easily obtained a search warrant

from any of the TEN civil courts then open and functioning in
Zamboanga City, 12 they instead simply barged into the beleaguered
premises on the verbal order of their superior officers. One cannot just
force his way into any man's house on the illegal orders of a superior,
however lofty his rank. Indeed, even the humblest hovel is protected
from official intrusion because of the ancient rule, revered in all free
regimes, that a man's house is his castle.

It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may enter; the
rain may enter. But the King of England may not enter. All
the forces of the Crown dare not cross the threshold of the
ruined tenement. 13

If the arrest was made under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court
in connection with a crime about to be committed, being committed, or
just committed, what was that crime? There is no allegation in the
record of such a justification. Parenthetically, it may be observed that
under the Revised Rule 113, Section 5(b), the officer making the arrest
must have personal knowledge of the ground therefor as stressed in
the recent case of People v. Burgos.14

If follows that as the search of the petitioners' premises was violative of

the Constitution, all the firearms and ammunition taken from the raided
compound are inadmissible in evidence in any of the proceedings
against the petitioners. These articles are "fruits of the poisonous
tree. 15 As Judge Learned Hand observed, "Only in case the
prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that
it cannot profit by their wrong, will the wrong be repressed. 16 Pending
determination of the legality of such articles, however, they shall
remain in custodia legis, subject to such appropriate disposition as the
corresponding courts may decide. 17

The objection to the photographing, fingerprinting and paraffin-testing

of the petitioners deserves slight comment. The prohibition against
self-incrimination applies to testimonial compulsion only. As Justice
Holmes put it in Holt v. United States, 18 "The prohibition of compelling
a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself is a
prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence
when it may be material."

The fearful days of hamleting salvaging, "zona" and other dreaded

operations should remain in the past, banished with the secret
marshals and their covert license to kill without trial. We must be done
with lawlessness in the name of law enforcement. Those who are
supposed to uphold the law must not be the first to violate it. As Chief
Justice Claudio Teehankee stressed in his concurring opinion
in Lacanilao v. De Leon, 19 "It is time that the martial law regime's
 REPUBLIC ACT No. 4200 the telephone number involved and its location; (2) the identity of the
peace officer authorized to overhear, intercept, or record the
AN ACT TO PROHIBIT AND PENALIZE WIRE TAPPING AND communications, conversations, discussions, or spoken words; (3) the
OTHER RELATED VIOLATIONS OF THE PRIVACY OF
offense or offenses committed or sought to be prevented; and (4) the
COMMUNICATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
period of the authorization. The authorization shall be effective for the
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by period specified in the order which shall not exceed sixty (60) days
all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any from the date of issuance of the order, unless extended or renewed by
wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly the court upon being satisfied that such extension or renewal is in the
overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by public interest.
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
dictaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise All recordings made under court authorization shall, within forty-eight
described: hours after the expiration of the period fixed in the order, be deposited
with the court in a sealed envelope or sealed package, and shall be
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the accompanied by an affidavit of the peace officer granted such authority
act or acts penalized in the next preceding sentence, to knowingly stating the number of recordings made, the dates and times covered
possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such by each recording, the number of tapes, discs, or records included in
record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word the deposit, and certifying that no duplicates or copies of the whole or
secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in the any part thereof have been made, or if made, that all such duplicates
manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other or copies are included in the envelope or package deposited with the
person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either court. The envelope or package so deposited shall not be opened, or
verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether the recordings replayed, or used in evidence, or their contents
complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, That the use of revealed, except upon order of the court, which shall not be granted
such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal except upon motion, with due notice and opportunity to be heard to the
investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not person or persons whose conversation or communications have been
be covered by this prohibition. recorded.

Section 2. Any person who willfully or knowingly does or who shall aid, The court referred to in this section shall be understood to mean the
permit, or cause to be done any of the acts declared to be unlawful in Court of First Instance within whose territorial jurisdiction the acts for
the preceding section or who violates the provisions of the following which authority is applied for are to be executed.
section or of any order issued thereunder, or aids, permits, or causes
such violation shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by Section 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence,
imprisonment for not less than six months or more than six years and contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any
with the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification from part thereof, or any information therein contained obtained or secured
public office if the offender be a public official at the time of the by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not
commission of the offense, and, if the offender is an alien he shall be be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or
subject to deportation proceedings. administrative hearing or investigation.

Section 3. Nothing contained in this Act, however, shall render it Section 5. All laws inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are
unlawful or punishable for any peace officer, who is authorized by a hereby repealed or accordingly amended.
written order of the Court, to execute any of the acts declared to be
unlawful in the two preceding sections in cases involving the crimes of Section 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
treason, espionage, provoking war and disloyalty in case of war,
piracy, mutiny in the high seas, rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to Approved: June 19, 1965
commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit
sedition, inciting to sedition, kidnapping as defined by the Revised
Penal Code, and violations of Commonwealth Act No. 616, punishing
espionage and other offenses against national security: Provided, That
such written order shall only be issued or granted upon written
application and the examination under oath or affirmation of the
applicant and the witnesses he may produce and a showing: (1) that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that any of the crimes
enumerated hereinabove has been committed or is being committed or
is about to be committed: Provided, however, That in cases involving
the offenses of rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion,
inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, and
inciting to sedition, such authority shall be granted only upon prior
proof that a rebellion or acts of sedition, as the case may be, have
actually been or are being committed; (2) that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that evidence will be obtained essential to the
conviction of any person for, or to the solution of, or to the prevention
of, any of such crimes; and (3) that there are no other means readily
available for obtaining such evidence.

The order granted or issued shall specify: (1) the identity of the person
or persons whose communications, conversations, discussions, or
spoken words are to be overheard, intercepted, or recorded and, in the
case of telegraphic or telephonic communications, the telegraph line or
 Republic of the Philippines CHUCHI — Eh, di sana —
SUPREME COURT
Manila
ESG — Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasi wala kang utak.
FIRST DIVISION
Akala mo ba makukuha ka dito kung hindi ako.
G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995

SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner, vs. CHUCHI — Mag-eexplain ako.

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S.
GARCIA, respondents.
ESG — Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo, makaalala ka
KAPUNAN, J.: kung paano ka puma-rito. "Putang-ina" sasabi-sabihin mo kamag-anak
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the ng nanay at tatay mo ang mga magulang ko.
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private
respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office, ESG — Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka sa loob, nasa labas
allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious ka puwede ka ng hindi pumasok, okey yan nasaloob ka umalis ka
mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and doon.
personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public policy."1
CHUCHI — Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng mga taga Union.
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the
event and sought moral damages, attorney's fees and other expenses
of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests ESG — Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong kalimutan na hindi ka
and other reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion. The transcript makakapasok kung hindi ako. Kung hindi mo kinikilala yan okey lang
on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of sa akin, dahil tapos ka na.
the confrontation made by petitioner.2 The transcript reads as follows:
CHUCHI — Ina-ano ko m'am na utang na loob.
Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) — Good Afternoon M'am.
ESG — Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob, kasi kung baga sa no,
Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) — Ano ba ang nangyari sa 'yo, nilapastangan mo ako.
nakalimot ka na kung paano ka napunta rito, porke member ka na,
magsumbong ka kung ano ang gagawin ko sa 'yo. CHUCHI — Paano kita nilapastanganan?

CHUCHI — Kasi, naka duty ako noon. ESG — Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako makikipagusap sa 'yo.
Lumabas ka na. Magsumbong ka.3
ESG — Tapos iniwan no. (Sic)
As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the
CHUCHI — Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses na nila akong binalikan, said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private
sabing ganoon — respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to
prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of
ESG — Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung (sic) mag explain private communication, and other purposes." An information charging
ka, kasi hanggang 10:00 p.m., kinabukasan hindi ka na pumasok. petitioner of violation of the said Act, dated October 6, 1988 is quoted
Ngayon ako ang babalik sa 'yo, nag-aaply ka sa States, nag-aaply ka herewith:
sa review mo, kung kakailanganin ang certification mo, kalimutan mo
na kasi hindi ka sa akin makakahingi.
INFORMATION

CHUCHI — Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon i-cocontinue ko

up to 10:00 p.m. The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses Socorro D. Ramirez
of Violation of Republic Act No. 4200, committed as follows:

ESG — Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka pumasok dito sa

hotel. Magsumbong ka sa Union kung gusto mo. Nakalimutan mo na That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in Pasay City Metro
kung paano ka nakapasok dito "Do you think that on your own Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this honorable court,
makakapasok ka kung hindi ako. Panunumbyoyan na kita the above-named accused, Socorro D. Ramirez not being authorized
(Sinusumbatan na kita). by Ester S. Garcia to record the latter's conversation with said
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
the use of a tape recorder secretly record the said conversation and
CHUCHI — Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty ko. thereafter communicate in writing the contents of the said recording to
other person.
ESG — Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon ng mga no (sic)
ko. Contrary to law.

ESG — Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka pumasok sa hotel, kung Pasay City, Metro Manila,
on your own merit alam ko naman kung gaano ka "ka bobo" mo. September 16, 1988.
Marami ang nag-aaply alam kong hindi ka papasa.

CHUCHI — Kumuha kami ng exam noon.

ESG — Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.

CHUCHI — Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr. Tamayo

ESG — Kukunin ka kasi ako.

 be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either
impossible 11 or absurb
C or would lead to an injustice. 12
U
N
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire
E
Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and
T
Other Purposes," provides:
A

A
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not
s
being authorized by all the parties to any private
s
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or
t
cable, or by using any other device or
.
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or
record such communication or spoken word by
C
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone
i dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or
or
t
tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
y
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for
F
any person, not authorized
i by all the parties to any private
communication to secretly
s record such communication by means of a
tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party
c
sought to be penalizeda by the statute ought to be a party other than or
different from those l involved in the private communication. The
statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such
recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any".
Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded,
the Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute "even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private
an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. In an order May 3, conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will)
1989, the trial court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with qualify as a violator" 13 under this provision of R.A. 4200.
petitioner that 1) the facts charged do not constitute an offense under
R.A. 4200; and that 2) the violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a
the taping of a communication by a person other than a participant to A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports
the respondent court's conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our
the communication.4
lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape
recording of private conversations or communications taken either by
From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for the parties themselves or by third persons. Thus:
Review on Certiorari with this Court, which forthwith referred the case
to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution (by the First Division) of June
19, 1989. xxx xxx xxx

On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its Senator Tañada: That qualified only "overhear".
assailed Decision declaring the trial court's order of May 3, 1989 null
and void, and holding that: Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted or
recorded, the element of secrecy would not
[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense appear to be material. Now, suppose, Your Honor,
the recording is not made by all the parties but by
punishable under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. In thus
quashing the information based on the ground that some parties and involved not criminal cases that
the facts alleged do not constitute an offense, the would be mentioned under section 3 but would
cover, for example civil cases or special
respondent judge acted in grave abuse of
discretion correctible by certiorari.5 proceedings whereby a recording is made not
necessarily by all the parties but perhaps by some
in an effort to show the intent of the parties
Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for because the actuation of the parties prior,
Reconsideration which respondent Court of Appeals denied in its simultaneous even subsequent to the contract or
Resolution6 dated June 19, 1990. Hence, the instant petition. the act may be indicative of their intention.
Suppose there is such a recording, would you say,
Your Honor, that the intention is to cover it within
Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue"7 that the
the purview of this bill or outside?
applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping
of a private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation. She
contends that the provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of Senator Tañada: That is covered by the purview of
a private conversation by a party other than those involved in the this bill, Your Honor.
communication.8 In relation to this, petitioner avers that the substance
or content of the conversation must be alleged in the Information,
otherwise the facts charged would not constitute a violation of R.A. Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be used
not in the prosecution of offense but as evidence
4200.9 Finally, petitioner agues that R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a
"private communication," not a "private conversation" and that to be used in Civil Cases or special proceedings?
consequently, her act of secretly taping her conversation with private
respondent was not illegal under the said act. 10 Senator Tañada: That is right. This is a complete
ban on tape recorded conversations taken without
We disagree. the authorization of all the parties.

First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a Senator Padilla: Now, would that be reasonable,
statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the your Honor?
law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would
 Senator Tañada: I believe it is reasonable means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under
because it is not sporting to record the observation Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his
of one without his knowing it and then using it COMMENT before the respondent court: "Nowhere (in the said law) is
against him. It is not fair, it is not sportsmanlike. If it required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of
the purpose; Your honor, is to record the intention the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should
of the parties. I believe that all the parties should be professed." 14
know that the observations are being recorded.
Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication"
Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility of in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include "private conversations"
recorders. narrows the ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a point
of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin
word communicare, meaning "to share or to impart." In its ordinary
Senator Tañada: Well no. For example, I was to
signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting
say that in meetings of the board of directors
signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting,
where a tape recording is taken, there is no
as in a conversation, 15 or signifies the "process by which meanings or
objection to this if all the parties know. It is but fair
thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of
that the people whose remarks and observations
symbols (as language signs or gestures)" 16 These definitions are
are being made should know that the observations
broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive
are being recorded.
communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely to include
the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between
Senator Padilla: Now, I can understand. petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office.
Any doubts about the legislative body's meaning of the phrase "private
communication" are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms
Senator Tañada: That is why when we take "conversation" and "communication" were interchangeably used by
statements of persons, we say: "Please be Senator Tañada in his Explanatory Note to the bill quoted below:
informed that whatever you say here may be used
against you." That is fairness and that is what we
demand. Now, in spite of that warning, he makes It has been said that innocent people have nothing
damaging statements against his own interest, to fear from their conversations being overheard.
well, he cannot complain any more. But if you are But this statement ignores the usual nature
going to take a recording of the observations and of conversations as well the undeniable fact that
remarks of a person without him knowing that it is most, if not all, civilized people have some aspects
being taped or recorded, without him knowing that of their lives they do not wish to expose.
what is being recorded may be used against him, I Free conversationsare often characterized by
think it is unfair. exaggerations, obscenity, agreeable falsehoods,
and the expression of anti-social desires of views
not intended to be taken seriously. The right to
xxx xxx xxx
the privacy of communication, among others, has
expressly been assured by our Constitution.
(Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584, Needless to state here, the framers of our
March 12, 1964) Constitution must have recognized the nature
of conversations between individuals and the
significance of man's spiritual nature, of his
Senator Diokno: Do you understand, Mr. Senator, feelings and of his intellect. They must have
that under Section 1 of the bill as now worded, if a known that part of the pleasures and satisfactions
party secretly records a public speech, he would of life are to be found in the unaudited, and free
be penalized under Section 1? Because the exchange of communication between individuals
speech is public, but the recording is done — free from every unjustifiable intrusion by
secretly. whatever means.17

Senator Tañada: Well, that particular aspect is not In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 18 a case which dealt with
contemplated by the bill. It is the communication the issue of telephone wiretapping, we held that the use of a telephone
between one person and another person — not extension for the purpose of overhearing a private conversation without
between a speaker and a public. authorization did not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone extension
devise was neither among those "device(s) or arrangement(s)"
xxx xxx xxx enumerated therein, 19 following the principle that "penal statutes must
be construed strictly in favor of the accused." 20 The instant case turns
on a different note, because the applicable facts and circumstances
(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity, and the
March 12, 1964) statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized "recording" of private
communications with the use of tape-recorders as among the acts
xxx xxx xxx punishable.

The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is
with the above-quoted deliberations from the Congressional Record, clear and unambiguous and leaves us with no discretion, the instant
therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that petition is hereby DENIED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private Costs against petitioner.
communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not
distinguish. SO ORDERED.

Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of Padilla, Davide, Jr. and Bellosillo JJ., concur.
the statute. The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged
in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of
secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications Hermosisima, Jr., J., is on leave.
by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that
an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by
 Republic of the Philippines Twenty minutes later, complainant called up again to ask Laconico if
SUPREME COURT he was agreeable to the conditions. Laconico answered 'Yes'.
Manila Complainant then told Laconico to wait for instructions on where to
SECOND DIVISION deliver the money. (tsn, March 10, 1983, pp. 2-12).
G.R. No. L-69809 October 16, 1986
Complainant called up again and instructed Laconico to give the
EDGARDO A. GAANAN, petitioner, vs.
money to his wife at the office of the then Department of Public
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and PEOPLE OF THE
Highways. Laconico who earlier alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
the Criminal Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary,
insisted that complainant himself should receive the money. (tsn,
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
March 10, 1982, pp. 26-33). When he received the money at the Igloo
This petition for certiorari asks for an interpretation of Republic Act
Restaurant, complainant was arrested by agents of the Philippine
(RA) No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act, on the
Constabulary.
issue of whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited
devices in Section 1 of the Act, such that its use to overhear a private
conversation would constitute unlawful interception of communications Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he
between the two parties using a telephone line. heard complainant demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case
for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant to the
complainant for robbery/extortion which he filed against complainant.
The facts presented by the People and narrated in the respondent
Since appellant listened to the telephone conversation without
court's decision are not disputed by the petitioner.
complainant's consent, complainant charged appellant and Laconico
with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act.
In the morning of October 22, 1975, complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and
his client Manuel Montebon were in the living room of complainant's
After trial on the merits, the lower court, in a decision dated November
residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for
22, 1982, found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1
direct assault which they filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu
of Republic Act No. 4200. The two were each sentenced to one (1)
against Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided on the proposed
year imprisonment with costs. Not satisfied with the decision, the
conditions, complainant made a telephone call to Laconico (tsn,
petitioner appealed to the appellate court.
August 26, 1981, pp. 3-5).

On August 16, 1984, the Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the

That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer,
decision of the trial court, holding that the communication between the
to come to his office and advise him on the settlement of the direct
complainant and accused Laconico was private in nature and,
assault case because his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on
therefore, covered by Rep. Act No. 4200; that the petitioner overheard
a business trip. According to the request, appellant went to the office of
such communication without the knowledge and consent of the
Laconico where he was briefed about the problem. (Exhibit 'D', tsn,
complainant; and that the extension telephone which was used by the
April 22, 1982, pp. 4-5).
petitioner to overhear the telephone conversation between complainant
and Laconico is covered in the term "device' as provided in Rep. Act
When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly No. 4200.
listen to the telephone conversation through a telephone extension so
as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the settlement.
In this petition for certiorari, the petitioner assails the decision of the
Appellant heard complainant enumerate the following conditions for
appellate court and raises the following issues; (a) whether or not the
withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault.
telephone conversation between the complainant and accused
Laconico was private in nature; (b) whether or not an extension
(a) the P5,000.00 was no longer acceptable, and that the figure had telephone is covered by the term "device or arrangement" under Rep.
been increased to P8,000.00. A breakdown of the P8,000.00 had been Act No. 4200; (c) whether or not the petitioner had authority to listen or
made together with other demands, to wit: (a) P5,000.00 no longer for overhear said telephone conversation and (d) whether or not Rep. Act
the teacher Manuel Montebon, but for Atty. Pintor himself in No. 4200 is ambiguous and, therefore, should be construed in favor of
persuading his client to withdraw the case for Direct Assault against the petitioner.
Atty. Laconico before the Cebu City Fiscal's Office;
Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 4200 provides:
(b) Public apology to be made by Atty. Laconico before the students of
Don Bosco Technical High School;
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being
authorized by all the parties to any private communication or
(c) Pl,000.00 to be given to the Don Bosco Faculty club; spoken word, to tap any wire or cable or by using any other
device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or
record such communication or spoken word by using a
(d) transfer of son of Atty. Laconico to another school or another
device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
section of Don Bosco Technical High School;
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however
otherwise described:
(e) Affidavit of desistance by Atty. Laconico on the Maltreatment case
earlier filed against Manuel Montebon at the Cebu City Fiscal's Office,
It shall be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not
whereas Montebon's affidavit of desistance on the Direct Assault Case
in the act or acts penalized in the next preceeding sentence,
against Atty. Laconico to be filed later;
to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc
record, or any other such record, or copies thereof, of any
(f) Allow Manuel Montebon to continue teaching at the Don Bosco communication or spoken word secured either before or
Technical School; after the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by
this law; or to replay the same for any other person or
persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either
(g) Not to divulge the truth about the settlement of the Direct Assault verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof,
Case to the mass media; whether complete or partial, to any other person: Provided,
that the use of such record or any copies thereof as
(h) P2,000.00 attorney s fees for Atty. Pintor. (tsn, August 26, 1981, evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses
pp. 47-48). mentioned in Section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this
prohibition.
We rule for the petitioner. removed and can be transferred away from one place to another and
to be plugged or attached to a main telephone line to get the desired
communication corning from the other party or end.
We are confronted in this case with the interpretation of a penal statute
and not a rule of evidence. The issue is not the admissibility of
evidence secured over an extension line of a telephone by a third The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or
party. The issue is whether or not the person called over the telephone arrangement" for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or
and his lawyer listening to the conversation on an extension line should recording the communication. There must be either a physical
both face prison sentences simply because the extension was used to interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device
enable them to both listen to an alleged attempt at extortion. or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken
words.
There is no question that the telephone conversation between
complainant Atty. Pintor and accused Atty. Laconico was "private" in An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a
the sense that the words uttered were made between one person and dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of
another as distinguished from words between a speaker and a public. RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the
It is also undisputed that only one of the parties gave the petitioner the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case
authority to listen to and overhear the caller's message with the use of was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for
an extension telephone line. Obviously, complainant Pintor, a member ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory construction that in order to
of the Philippine bar, would not have discussed the alleged demand for determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and
an P8,000.00 consideration in order to have his client withdraw a direct phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated
assault charge against Atty. Laconico filed with the Cebu City Fiscal's expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered
Office if he knew that another lawyer was also listening. We have to in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. (see Commissioner of
consider, however, that affirmance of the criminal conviction would, in Customs v. Esso Estandard Eastern, Inc., 66 SCRA 113,120).
effect, mean that a caller by merely using a telephone line can force
the listener to secrecy no matter how obscene, criminal, or annoying
In the case of Empire Insurance Com any v. Rufino (90 SCRA 437,
the call may be. It would be the word of the caller against the listener's.
443-444), we ruled:

Because of technical problems caused by the sensitive nature of

Likewise, Article 1372 of the Civil Code stipulates that 'however
electronic equipment and the extra heavy loads which telephone
general the terms of a contract may be, they shall not be understood to
cables are made to carry in certain areas, telephone users often
comprehend things that are distinct and cases that are different from
encounter what are called "crossed lines". An unwary citizzen who
those upon which the parties intended to agree.' Similarly, Article 1374
happens to pick up his telephone and who overhears the details of a
of the same Code provides that 'the various stipulations of a contract
crime might hesitate to inform police authorities if he knows that he
shall be interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense
could be accused under Rep. Act 4200 of using his own telephone to
which may result from all of them taken jointly.
secretly overhear the private communications of the would be
criminals. Surely the law was never intended for such mischievous
results. xxx xxx xxx

The main issue in the resolution of this petition, however, revolves Consequently, the phrase 'all liabilities or obligations of the decedent'
around the meaning of the phrase "any other device or arrangement." used in paragraph 5(c) and 7(d) should be then restricted only to those
Is an extension of a telephone unit such a device or arrangement as listed in the Inventory and should not be construed as to comprehend
would subject the user to imprisonment ranging from six months to six all other obligations of the decedent. The rule that 'particularization
years with the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification followed by a general expression will ordinarily be restricted to the
for a public officer or deportation for an alien? Private secretaries with former' is based on the fact in human experience that usually the
extension lines to their bosses' telephones are sometimes asked to minds of parties are addressed specially to the particularization, and
use answering or recording devices to record business conversations that the generalities, though broad enough to comprehend other fields
between a boss and another businessman. Would transcribing a if they stood alone, are used in contemplation of that upon which the
recorded message for the use of the boss be a proscribed offense? or minds of the parties are centered. (Hoffman v. Eastern Wisconsin R.,
for that matter, would a "party line" be a device or arrangement under etc., Co., 134 Wis. 603, 607, 115 NW 383, cited in Francisco, Revised
the law? Rules of Court (Evidence), 1973 ed, pp. 180-181).

The petitioner contends that telephones or extension telephones are Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA No.
not included in the enumeration of "commonly known" listening or 4200, although not exclusive to that enumerated therein, should be
recording devices, nor do they belong to the same class of enumerated construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature,
electronic devices contemplated by law. He maintains that in 1964, that is, instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping
when Senate Bill No. 9 (later Rep. Act No. 4200) was being considered the main line of a telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation
in the Senate, telephones and extension telephones were already or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being
widely used instruments, probably the most popularly known overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of common
communication device. usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting or
recording a telephone conversation.
Whether or not listening over a telephone party line would be
punishable was discussed on the floor of the Senate. Yet, when the bill An extension telephone is an instrument which is very common
was finalized into a statute, no mention was made of telephones in the especially now when the extended unit does not have to be connected
enumeration of devices "commonly known as a dictaphone or by wire to the main telephone but can be moved from place ' to place
dictagraph, detectaphone or walkie talkie or tape recorder or however within a radius of a kilometer or more. A person should safely presume
otherwise described." The omission was not a mere oversight. that the party he is calling at the other end of the line probably has an
Telephone party lines were intentionally deleted from the provisions of extension telephone and he runs the risk of a third party listening as in
the Act. the case of a party line or a telephone unit which shares its line with
another. As was held in the case of Rathbun v. United States (355,
U.S. 107, 2 L Ed 2d 137-138):
The respondent People argue that an extension telephone is
embraced and covered by the term "device" within the context of the
aforementioned law because it is not a part or portion of a complete set Common experience tells us that a call to a particular telephone
of a telephone apparatus. It is a separate device and distinct set of a number may cause the bell to ring in more than one ordinarily used
movable apparatus consisting of a wire and a set of telephone receiver instrument. Each party to a telephone conversation takes the risk that
not forming part of a main telephone set which can be detached or the other party may have an extension telephone and may allow
another to overhear the conversation. When such takes place there wonderful. But what this bill intends to prohibit is the use of tape record
has been no violation of any privacy of which the parties may and other electronic devices to intercept private conversations which
complain. Consequently, one element of 605, interception, has not later on will be used in court.
occurred.
It can be readily seen that our lawmakers intended to discourage,
In the same case, the Court further ruled that the conduct of the party through punishment, persons such as government authorities or
would differ in no way if instead of repeating the message he held out representatives of organized groups from installing devices in order to
his hand-set so that another could hear out of it and that there is no gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail or gain
distinction between that sort of action and permitting an outsider to use some unwarranted advantage over the telephone users. Consequently,
an extension telephone for the same purpose. the mere act of listening, in order to be punishable must strictly be with
the use of the enumerated devices in RA No. 4200 or others of similar
nature. We are of the view that an extension telephone is not among
Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed
such devices or arrangements.
strictly in favor of the accused. Thus, in case of doubt as in the case at
bar, on whether or not an extension telephone is included in the phrase
"device or arrangement", the penal statute must be construed as not WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the then
including an extension telephone. In the case of People v. Purisima, 86 Intermediate Appellate Court dated August 16, 1984 is ANNULLED
SCRA 542, 562, we explained the rationale behind the rule: and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of
violation of Rep. Act No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-
Wiretapping Act.
American jurisprudence sets down the reason for this rule to be the
tenderness of the law of the rights of individuals; the object is to
establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, SO ORDERED.
and the discretion of the court limited. (United States v. Harris, 177 US
305, 44 L Ed 780, 20 S Ct 609; Braffith v. Virgin Islands (CA3) 26 F2d
Feria (Chairman), Fernan, Alampay and Paras, JJ., concur.
646; Caudill v. State, 224 Ind 531, 69 NE2d; Jennings v.
Commonwealth, 109 VA 821,63 SE 1080, all cited in 73 Am Jur 2d
452). The purpose is not to enable a guilty person to escape
punishment through a technicality but to provide a precise definition of
forbidden acts." (State v. Zazzaro, 20 A 2d 737, quoted in Martin's
Handbook on Statutory Construction, Rev. Ed. pp. 183-184).

In the same case of Purisima, we also ruled that on the construction or

interpretation of a legislative measure, the primary rule is to search for
and determine the intent and spirit of the law. A perusal of the Senate
Congressional Records will show that not only did our lawmakers not
contemplate the inclusion of an extension telephone as a prohibited
device or arrangement" but of greater importance, they were more
concerned with penalizing the act of recording than the act of merely
listening to a telephone conversation.

xxx xxx xxx

Senator Tañada. Another possible objection to that is entrapment

which is certainly objectionable. It is made possible by special
amendment which Your Honor may introduce.

Senator Diokno.Your Honor, I would feel that entrapment would be

less possible with the amendment than without it, because with the
amendment the evidence of entrapment would only consist of
government testimony as against the testimony of the defendant. With
this amendment, they would have the right, and the government
officials and the person in fact would have the right to tape record their
conversation.

Senator Tañada. In case of entrapment, it would be the government.

Senator Diokno. In the same way, under this provision, neither party
could record and, therefore, the court would be limited to saying:
"Okay, who is more credible, the police officers or the defendant?" In
these cases, as experienced lawyers, we know that the Court go with
the peace offices.

xxx xxx xxx

Senator Diokno. The point I have in mind is that under these

conditions, with an agent outside listening in, he could falsify the
testimony and there is no way of checking it. But if you allow him to
record or make a recording in any form of what is happening, then the
chances of falsifying the evidence is not very much.

Senator Tañada. Your Honor, this bill is not intended to prevent the
presentation of false testimony. If we could devise a way by which we
could prevent the presentation of false testimony, it would be
 SECOND DIVISION appealed the said order to this Court on a petition for certiorari, this
G.R. No. 107383 February 20, 1996 Court issued a restraining order on aforesaid date which order
CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner, vs. temporarily set aside the order of the trial court. Hence, during the
COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN, respondents enforceability of this Courts order, respondents request for petitioner to
admit the genuineness and authenticity of the subject annexes cannot
DECISION be looked upon as malpractice. Notably, petitioner Dr. Martin finally
admitted the truth and authenticity of the questioned annexes. At that
MENDOZA, J.: point in time, would it have been malpractice for respondent to use
petitioners admission as evidence against him in the legal separation
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, case pending in the Regional Trial Court of Makati? Respondent
affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) submits it is- not malpractice.
which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers taken by her
from private respondents clinic without the latters knowledge and
consent. Significantly, petitioners admission was done not thru his counsel
but by Dr. Martin himself under oath. Such verified admission
The facts are as follows: constitutes an affidavit, and, therefore, receivable in evidence against
him. Petitioner became bound by his admission. For Cecilia to avail
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent herself of her husbands admission and use the same in her action for
Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her legal separation cannot be treated as malpractice.
husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a
driver and private respondents secretary, forcibly opened the drawers Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case
and cabinet in her husbands clinic and took 157 documents consisting amounts to no more than a declaration that his use of the documents
of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged and papers for the purpose of securing Dr. Martins admission as to
paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martins their genuiness and authenticity did not constitute a violation of the
passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized injunctive order of the trial court. By no means does the decision in that
for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for case establish the admissibility of the documents and papers in
disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed question.
against her husband.
It cannot be overemphasized that if Atty. Felix, Jr. was acquitted
Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the of the charge of violating the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the
documents and papers and for damages against petitioner. The case trial court, it was only because, at the time he used the documents and
was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X, which, after papers, enforcement of the order of the trial court was temporarily
trial, rendered judgment for private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, restrained by this Court. The TRO issued by this Court was eventually
declaring him the capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in lifted as the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner against the trial
paragraph 3 of plaintiffs Complaint or those further described in the courts order was dismissed and, therefore, the prohibition against the
Motion to Return and Suppress and ordering Cecilia Zulueta and any further use of the documents and papers became effective again.
person acting in her behalf to immediately return the properties to Dr.
Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible
moral damages and attorneys fees; and to pay the costs of the suit. in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of
The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable3 is no less
petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and representatives were applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved
enjoined from using or submitting/admitting as evidence the by her husbands infidelity) who is the party against whom the
documents and papers in question. On appeal, the Court of Appeals constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition. prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order [from a] court
or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by
There is no question that the documents and papers in question law.4 Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained
belong to private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, and that they were inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.5
taken by his wife, the herein petitioner, without his knowledge and
consent. For that reason, the trial court declared the documents and The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one
papers to be properties of private respondent, ordered petitioner to of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in
return them to private respondent and enjoined her from using them in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person,
evidence. In appealing from the decision of the Court of Appeals by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to
affirming the trial courts decision, petitioners only ground is that privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever
in Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso Felix, Jr.,1 this Court ruled that the available to him or to her.
documents and papers (marked as Annexes A-i to J-7 of respondents
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between
comment in that case) were admissible in evidence and, therefore,
the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may
their use by petitioners attorney, Alfonso Felix, Jr., did not constitute
testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected
malpractice or gross misconduct. For this reason it is contended that
spouse while the marriage subsists.6 Neither may be examined without
the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court
the consent of the other as to any communication received in
instead of dismissing private respondents complaint.
confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for
Petitioners contention has no merit. The case against Atty. Felix, specified exceptions.7 But one thing is freedom of communication;
Jr. was for disbarment. Among other things, private respondent, Dr. quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows
Alfredo Martin, as complainant in that case, charged that in using the with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that
documents in evidence, Atty. Felix, Jr. committed malpractice or gross each owes to the other.
misconduct because of the injunctive order of the trial court. In
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of
dismissing the complaint against Atty. Felix, Jr., this Court took note of
merit.
the following defense of Atty. Felix, Jr. which it found to be impressed
with merit:2 SO ORDERED.
On the alleged malpractice or gross misconduct of respondent Regalado (Chairman), Romero, and Puno, JJ., concur.
[Alfonso Felix, Jr.], he maintains that:

xxx xxx xxx

4. When respondent refiled Cecilias case for legal separation before

the Pasig Regional Trial Court, there was admittedly an order of the
Manila Regional Trial Court prohibiting Cecilia from using the
documents Annex A-I to J-7. On September 6, 1983, however having