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Review of Seal Designs On The Apollo Spacecraft

Finkbeiner, Joshua R., Dunlap, Jr., Patrick H., Steinetz, Bruce M., and Daniels, Christopher C., "Review of Seal Designs on the Apollo Spacecraft," JSR, Vol. 45, No. 5, 2008.
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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
162 views11 pages

Review of Seal Designs On The Apollo Spacecraft

Finkbeiner, Joshua R., Dunlap, Jr., Patrick H., Steinetz, Bruce M., and Daniels, Christopher C., "Review of Seal Designs on the Apollo Spacecraft," JSR, Vol. 45, No. 5, 2008.
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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JOURNAL OF SPACECRAFT AND ROCKETS

Vol. 45, No. 5, September–October 2008

Review of Seal Designs on the Apollo Spacecraft

Joshua R. Finkbeiner,∗ Patrick H. Dunlap Jr.,† and Bruce M. Steinetz‡


NASA John H. Glenn Research Center at Lewis Field, Cleveland, Ohio 44135
and
Christopher C. Daniels§
The University of Akron, Akron, Ohio 44325-3901
DOI: 10.2514/1.27188
The Apollo spacecraft required a variety of seal designs to support human spaceflight to the moon and to return the
crews safely to Earth. High-temperature seals were required for gaps in the thermal protection system to protect the
underlying structures from the high heating environment of superorbital reentry. Reliable pressure seals were also
required to prevent the loss of habitable atmosphere during missions to the moon. A review is presented of some of the
seals used on the Apollo spacecraft, including the seal in the gap between the heat shield and back shell and seals for
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penetrations through the heat shield, docking hatches, windows, and the capsule pressure hull. A brief discussion of
seal requirements for the Orion spacecraft is also presented.

I. Introduction lunar reentries, but still subject to high thermal loads and heat fluxes
imposed upon the TPS.
T HE Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) is currently being
designed by NASA to replace the space shuttle for human
missions to low Earth orbit (LEO) and to enable long duration
Orion can be compared most closely with the Apollo spacecraft
relative to other historical human spacecraft in terms of mission
exploration missions to the moon and Mars. Orion will carry as many profile, time in space, and reentry conditions, and so the design of
as six astronauts to the International Space Station (ISS), where it will seals for Orion may be initiated by examining seals used on the
remain docked for up to 6 months to serve as a “lifeboat” escape Apollo command module. This paper presents a review of seal
capsule. At the end of its mission, the Orion spacecraft will return the technologies used on Apollo. As part of this review, the authors took
crew to Earth and another Orion will carry a replacement crew to the several photographs of seals on the Apollo/Skylab 3 command
ISS. Orion will also carry four astronauts to lunar orbit, where it will module, which was launched in 1973 and is currently on display in
serve as a staging platform supporting human excursions to the lunar the Visitor Center at the NASA John H. Glenn Research Center at
surface. Eventually, Orion may remain unmanned in lunar orbit for Lewis Field. Photographs from other command modules are also
as long as 6 months while the astronauts reside in a permanent lunar featured when these capsules are better suited to show particular
surface base. Orion is also envisioned to serve as an Earth reentry details of specific seals.
vehicle at the conclusion of a human mission to Mars. Additional
details of the mission profiles envisioned for Orion are described
in [1]. II. Overview of Seals on the Apollo Command Module
The Orion spacecraft will require advanced seals to prevent the The Apollo command module required seals in several locations,
loss of habitable atmosphere to space and to prevent the ingress of including pressure seals to minimize the loss of crew cabin
high enthalpy reentry gases into penetrations through the thermal atmosphere while in space and thermal seals to prevent the influx of
protection system (TPS). Long duration space missions require high enthalpy reentry gases through gaps in the TPS and into
robust seals to minimize the amount of crew cabin atmospheric temperature-sensitive regions of the vehicle. A description of the
leakage. Missions to the moon or Mars will not be able to quickly command module is first presented to provide the background for
return to Earth in case of excessive atmospheric losses, and so the understanding the requirements of the seals used on Apollo. Included
crew cabin pressure seals must be reliable for long mission durations. in this discussion is a description of the TPS and the reentry
At the conclusion of lunar exploration missions, the Orion capsule environment to which the vehicle was exposed. Seals for penetra-
will encounter the most severe reentry environment for a human tions through the heat shield, such as gaps between heat shield
spacecraft since the Apollo program. Atmospheric reentry at the components and mechanisms for attaching the command module to
conclusion of human missions to Mars will generate temperatures the service module, are then discussed. Finally, the design details of
exceeding those generated during lunar returns. Orion will also enter pressure seals for sealing the crew cabin atmosphere are presented.
the atmosphere from missions to LEO on a trajectory less severe than
A. Description of the Apollo Command Module and Reentry
Environment
Presented as Paper 5259 at the AIAA/ASME/SAE/ASEE 42nd Joint
Propulsion Conference and Exhibit, Sacramento, CA, 10–12 July 2006; The mission of the Apollo spacecraft was to carry three astronauts
received 8 May 2007; revision received 29 July 2008; accepted for to lunar orbit, to serve as a staging platform for an excursion to the
publication 29 July 2008. This material is declared a work of the U.S. lunar surface by two of the astronauts, and finally to return all three
Government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. astronauts safely to Earth. The Apollo capsule was also used for
Copies of this paper may be made for personal or internal use, on condition missions to LEO, initially for system testing in preparation for lunar
that the copier pay the $10.00 per-copy fee to the Copyright Clearance Center, missions and later for missions to the Skylab Space Station and for
Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923; include the code 0022-4650/ the Apollo/Soyuz Test Project. An overview of the Apollo program
08 $10.00 in correspondence with the CCC. including the Apollo spacecraft is provided in [2], and Fig. 1 shows

Mechanical Engineer, Materials and Structures Division, 21000
the launch configuration of the Apollo spacecraft. The spacecraft was
Brookpark Road. Member AIAA.

Mechanical Engineer, Materials and Structures Division, 21000
composed of two separate modules: the command module that
Brookpark Road. Member AIAA. housed the crew and served as a reentry vehicle for return to Earth,

Senior Technologist, Materials and Structures Division, 21000 and the service module that housed the propulsion system and
Brookpark Road. Fellow AIAA. provided logistics such as oxygen and electrical power. Figure 2
§
Research Assistant Professor, College of Engineering. Member AIAA. shows a schematic diagram of the Apollo command module. A third
900
FINKBEINER ET AL. 901

Fig. 3 Description of hypersonic flowfield surrounding Apollo


command module during reentry (Fig. 1 in [6]).

distributed over the command module and exhibited a stagnation


region on the aft heat shield and both the attached and separated flow
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regions on the crew compartment heat shield. The crew compartment


heat shield was subjected to lower heating than the aft heat shield
(particularly in the separated flow region), which impacted both the
design and performance of the TPS seals in this region.
Four unmanned Apollo flights were conducted to experimentally
verify theoretical predictions of pressure and heat transfer on the
command module. The unmanned Apollo AS-201 and AS-202
missions were flown to experimentally quantify the reentry
environment from LEO. The qualitative behavior of the heat transfer
measurements agreed with theoretical predictions [6,7]. Recent
computational fluid dynamic (CFD) analyses of the reentry
environment from LEO were performed for the conical portion of the
Apollo capsule and demonstrated good agreement with the LEO
flight data, enhancing confidence in the ability of CFD to predict the
reentry environment of Orion [8].
Data were also gathered from the unmanned Apollo 4 and 6
superorbital flights, which entered the Earth’s atmosphere at
velocities typical of a direct lunar return. Flight measurements of heat
transfer to the aft heat shield demonstrated good agreement with
models for both convective and radiative heating. However, the heat
Fig. 1 Launch configuration of the Apollo spacecraft (Fig. 4-2 in [2]). flux measurements on the crew compartment heat shield were much
lower than predicted, falling short of heat flux measurements at
similar locations during reentries from LEO. This was attributed to
the increased rate of growth of the boundary layer caused by
upstream ablative mass injection from the aft heat shield [5,6].
Ablative mass injection during superorbital reentry affected the flight
data downstream of the injection region, whereas mass injection
during reentry from LEO significantly affected only the localized
data on the aft heat shield.

B. Description of the Apollo Command Module Heat Shield


The Apollo TPS was made from a fiberglass honeycomb filled
with AVCOAT 5026-39G ablator, an epoxy–novalac resin
reinforced with quartz fibers and phenolic microballoons [9]. The
TPS contained several gaps and penetrations that required thermal
Fig. 2 Apollo Block II command module (Fig. 5 in [4]). seals to prevent the ingestion of high enthalpy reentry gases. Figure 4
shows the aft heat shield, the crew compartment heat shield, and the
module, the lunar module, was designed to carry two astronauts to forward heat shield, which constitute the three command module
the lunar surface and was used for Apollo missions starting with heat shield subassemblies. Figure 5 shows that the aft heat shield was
Apollo 9 and ending with Apollo 17 (an unmanned lunar module was subjected to the highest surface temperatures and heat fluxes of the
also flown for Apollo 5). Further details of the Apollo spacecraft can three subassemblies and, as such, was designed with the greatest
be found in [3], which used modern computer aided design (CAD) thickness of ablator. The crew compartment heat shield protected the
software to create a three-dimensional engineering model of the pressure hull and crew cabin from the thermal environment of
Apollo command and service modules to show how the intricate reentry. The forward heat shield protected the parachutes, flotation
systems of the spacecraft were assembled. balloons, and other equipment located at the top of the vehicle and
The Apollo command module was subjected to the most severe was jettisoned at the end of the mission to allow for parachute
reentry environment in the history of human spaceflight. The deployment.
command module heat shield design was based on two entry All three sections of the heat shield (aft, crew compartment, and
trajectories: one that would result in the maximum total heat load to forward heat shields) were manufactured by first bonding fiberglass
the vehicle, and one that was based on physiological acceleration honeycomb to a stainless steel honeycomb substructure with HT-424
limits of the human body and would result in the maximum heat flux adhesive tape [9]. The bond line was inspected to ensure that a good
[4,5]. As shown in Fig. 3, flow and heat transfer were not uniformly bond had been achieved, after which the assembly was cured. After
902 FINKBEINER ET AL.

Fig. 4 Apollo command module heat shield separated into its three
components (Fig. 3 in [9]).

Fig. 6 View of the Apollo command module aft heat shield showing
compression pad locations (Fig. 9c in [25]).
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Fig. 5 Notional temperature distribution on the command module heat


shield and corresponding ablator thickness (Fig. 2 in [9]).

curing, each of the approximately 370,000 honeycomb cells was


manually filled with AVCOAT ablator using a device similar to a Fig. 7 Sectional view of shear pad and tension tie bolt used to transfer
loads from the service module to command module (Fig. 6 in [4]).
high-pressure caulking gun [10]. The filled honeycomb was furnace
cured, after which it was finish machined on a numerically controlled
lathe. The heat shield was x-ray inspected, and all detected voids 1. Aft Heat Shield
were drilled out and refilled with AVCOAT. The completed heat The aft heat shield contained several types of penetrations to allow
shield and an underlying insulating layer were attached to the for the attachment of the command module to the service module.
command module pressure hull using mechanical fasteners for the aft Figure 6 shows the locations of six high-density fiberglass–laminate
heat shield and fiberglass slip stringers for the crew compartment pads that were installed near the outer circumference of the aft heat
heat shield. The slip stringers allowed relative movement of the crew shield to transfer compressive loads between the service and
compartment heat shield and minimized loads on the seals and TPS command modules. Three of the pads (numbers 1, 3, and 5 in Fig. 6)
materials between the aft heat shield and the crew compartment heat also transferred shear and tensile loads via steel tension tie bolts,
shield. which passed through the ablative heat shield and were fastened to
the command module’s aluminum substructure. A section view of a
C. Seals for the Thermal Protection System of the Apollo Command compression pad with an accompanying tension tie bolt is shown in
Module Fig. 7. The outer circumference of the tension tie bolt was sealed with
Penetrations through the TPS of the Apollo command module RTV silicone to prevent the ingestion of high enthalpy reentry gases,
required thermal seals to prevent the ingestion of high enthalpy and a layer of Marionite insulation minimized thermal conduction
reentry gases. Seals for the TPS were subjected to the high heat fluxes from the tension tie bolt to the surrounding stainless steel
and temperatures of the reentry environment and were constructed substructure. Before reentry, explosive charges were used to break
from high-temperature materials. The following subsections review the tension tie bolts and separate the service module from the
the literature and original Apollo drawings and discuss the designs of command module [11]. During reentry, the exposed tips of the
various thermal seals for the Apollo command module aft heat shield, tension tie bolts melted flush with the surrounding fiberglass pads,
crew compartment heat shield, forward heat shield, and the TPS for whereas temperature measurements at the bases of the bolts exhibited
the reaction control system (RCS) motors and access panels. no significant response [4]. A photograph of a compression pad on
Most of the thermal seals used on the Apollo command module the Apollo 11 command module is shown in Fig. 8, although it
were composed of high-temperature silicones, including room- appears that the tension tie bolt was removed after recovery of the
temperature vulcanized (RTV) silicones. High-temperature silicones vehicle as part of the postmission inspection of the heat shield.
exhibit ablative properties at temperatures exceeding their maximum In addition to the fiberglass compression pad and the tension tie
use temperatures. As described in the following subsections, bolt location, Fig. 8 also shows two ablator plugs used to protect the
inspections of the seals on the Apollo/Skylab 3 capsule revealed mechanical fasteners attaching the aft heat shield to the command
evidence of ablation, particularly for seals in the high-temperature module structure. A section view of the ablator plug and mechanical
regions of the aft heat shield and the aft heat shield-to-crew fastener is shown in Fig. 9. The outer circumference of the ablator
compartment heat shield interface gap. plug does not appear to have been sealed because of the close
FINKBEINER ET AL. 903

Fig. 8 Apollo 11 heat shield penetrations for the attachment of the


command module to service module.
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Fig. 10 Ablator plug hole on Apollo/Skylab 3 aft heat shield.

Fig. 9 Mechanical attachment of the heat shield to substructure with


protective ablator plug (Apollo drawing V36-320000).

tolerance between the access hole and the ablator plug as well as the
minimal flow rate through the circumferential gap due to flow
stagnation at the base of the hole. Figure 10, a photograph of an
ablator plug location on the Apollo/Skylab 3 command module,
shows no evidence of a seal or seal material around the circumference
of the hole. The penetration through the AVCOAT in Fig. 10 may
represent postmission destructive removal of the ablator plug.
Each command module contained both an oxidizer and a fuel
dump plug in the aft heat shield. Figure 8 shows the plug covering the Fig. 11 RCS fuel dump plug on Apollo/Skylab 3 command module.
oxidizer dump port on the Apollo 11 command module, and Fig. 11
shows the plug covering the fuel dump port on the Apollo/Skylab
3 command module. The gaps between these plugs and the heat
shield were sealed with GE RTV 560. In the event of an abort within was allowed to cure in place. After the silicone had cured, the aft heat
the first 42 s after liftoff, the oxidizer and fuel dump plugs would be shield was detached from the command module, which pulled the
jettisoned using small pyrotechnic charges [11]. The RCS elastomer gasket away from the crew compartment heat shield
monomethylhydrazine fuel and nitrogen tetroxide oxidizer would sealing surface. An identical process was used to form the outer
then be dumped through the ports to ensure that they would not pose a gasket (Fig. 12b) in the gap between the ablator sections of the two
fire or chemical hazard to the astronauts and recovery crews [12–14]. heat shields. A photograph of the outside of the aft heat shield-to-
Both sets of dump plug seals shown in Figs. 8 and 11 show strong crew compartment heat shield interface region including the
evidence of ablative mass loss at their outer surfaces. elastomer gasket and the fiberglass closeout material is shown in
Fig. 13. Of particular note is the rough appearance of the gasket outer
surface caused by ablation at high temperatures.
2. Aft Heat Shield-to-Crew Compartment Heat Shield Interface Gap The primary difference in shape between the inner and outer
The interface gap between the aft heat shield and crew gaskets was that the inner gasket sealed around a V-shaped tooth that
compartment heat shield was sealed with two elastomer gaskets, as was machined into the crew compartment heat shield stainless steel
shown in Fig. 12. The inner gasket (Fig. 12a) was formed first and honeycomb. This tooth served two functions. First, it provided a
sealed the gap between the upper stainless steel honeycomb structure means of aligning the aft heat shield to the crew compartment heat
and the adjoining lower connection ring. Versilube G-300 (a release shield before securing the assembly with mechanical fasteners. An
agent) was first applied to the crew compartment stainless steel accurate alignment between the heat shield structures was necessary
honeycomb surface. The aft heat shield and crew compartment heat to avoid forward- or backward-facing steps in the finished command
shield were attached to the command module using mechanical module heat shield and the high localized heating that would result
fasteners and fiberglass slip stringers, respectively. Then, from such steps. Second, the tooth would function as a labyrinth seal
GE RTV 560 [15] was applied to the connection ring surface and and form a tortuous flow path in the event of a gasket breech.
904 FINKBEINER ET AL.

Fig. 14 Apollo/Skylab 3 RCS roll motors showing silicone thermal


seals.
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Fig. 15 Apollo/Skylab 3 access panel corner emphasizing silicone


thermal seal. The seal contains razor cuts to allow for panel removal.

photograph of one of the Apollo/Skylab 3 RCS roll motors and its


RTV seals is shown in Fig. 14, whereas the location of the RCS roll
motors on the Apollo capsule can be seen in Fig. 2. The RCS motor
was mounted into an access panel that also included RTV seals
around its perimeter. Figure 15 shows a close-up view of the corner
of a similar access panel. The outer seal appears to have been cut with
a razor along its inner perimeter for postflight servicing and
Fig. 12 Section drawings of silicone gasket used in Apollo heat shield- inspection of the internal components. Unlike the silicone-based
to-crew compartment heat shield interface gap (Apollo drawings V36- thermal seals located on the aft heat shield and the aft heat shield-to-
320000 and V16-320000). crew compartment heat shield interface gap, the silicone seals on the
crew compartment heat shield exhibit little evidence of ablation and
qualitatively demonstrate the relatively benign thermal environment
imposed upon the crew compartment heat shield. The surrounding
AVCOAT material also exhibits little evidence of charring or
ablation.

4. Forward Heat Shield


The forward heat shield was separated from the crew compartment
heat shield by a small gap that required seals to prevent the ingestion
of reentry gases. Because the forward heat shield was jettisoned
before parachute deployment, it could not adhere to the crew
compartment heat shield. However, the low heat transfer rates
measured on the forward heat shield mitigated the adhesion
concerns. Most of the gap circumference between the two heat shield
subassemblies was sealed with an elastomer bulb seal believed to be
heat vulcanized elastomer gum stock conforming to MIL ZZ-R-765.
Fig. 13 Apollo/Skylab 3 aft heat shield-to-crew compartment heat The bulb seal is shown on the right-hand side of Fig. 16, a downward-
shield interface region, including the outer silicone gasket seal and looking photograph of a portion of the forward compartment of the
fiberglass closeout for the AVCOAT ablator. Apollo/Skylab 3 capsule. The groove outboard of the seal appears to
have served as a seating location for the forward heat shield.
Figure 16 also shows the side of the upper RCS pitch motor, which
3. Crew Compartment Heat Shield was housed in the forward compartment of the command module.
The crew compartment heat shield contained several penetrations, The forward heat shield included a conformal notch that fit around
both for access to the interior of the vehicle and for the RCS motors. the perimeter of the upper RCS pitch motor, as shown in Fig. 4. Both
After the crew compartment heat shield was attached to the command sides of the RCS motor housing were sealed with silicone gaskets,
module, RTV 560 was poured into the gaps around the access panels and the lower corner of the motor appears to have been sealed with
and the RCS nozzles, where it was allowed to cure in place [4]. A molded or injected silicone.
FINKBEINER ET AL. 905
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Fig. 17 RTV-sealed aluminum joint inside the Apollo/Skylab 3


forward tunnel.

Fig. 16 Downward-looking photograph of top of Apollo/Skylab 3


vehicle showing forward heat shield mounting location and seals. Apollo 1 fire, and the excess nitrogen was allowed to leak to space
after launch until it was replaced with the nominal 100%, 5 psi
oxygen atmosphere [17].
Finally, it should be noted that the seals in Fig. 16 appear to have The cabin atmospheric leakage from the Apollo capsules was
been exposed to low heat loads, as evidenced by the apparent lack of qualified on the ground before flight. The capsules were pressurized
thermal damage on their outer surfaces. This is expected in light of to 5.1 psig of air to simulate the 5 psi differential pressure that would
the low heating measurements on the forward heat shield during drive seal leakage in space, and the subsequent pressure decay was
unmanned test flights of the command module [5–7]. recorded over a period of time. The leakage measurements from the
ground tests were higher than the leakage measurements while in
D. Seals for Penetrations of the Apollo Command Module Crew space; this was due to the increased cabin atmospheric density
Cabin resulting from the elevated absolute pressure for ground tests
The Apollo command module pressure hull contained several (20 psia for ground tests vs 5 psia in space) and the fact that the
penetrations that required seals to prevent the loss of habitable cabin critical pressure ratio across the leakage paths was exceeded while
atmosphere. The leakage rate of each command module was the capsule was in space and thereby resulted in choked flow [16].
carefully measured before its mission, and enough spare oxygen was
carried in the service module to account for any losses. All the Apollo 2. Riveted and Bolted Joints
command modules and lunar modules were leak tested on the ground Aluminum panels in the Apollo command module were riveted or
to confirm a specified maximum allowable leakage of 4:8 lbm=day bolted together to form portions of the pressure hull and were sealed
of air [16]. with RTV. A typical RTV-sealed joint between two aluminum
The following subsection first discusses the atmosphere in the panels in the Apollo/Skylab 3 forward tunnel can be seen in Fig. 17. It
crew cabin pressure hull to describe the environment against which is thought that RTV-sealed joints such as the one shown in the figure
the seals had to function. Descriptions of the seals used to contain the accounted for the majority of unplanned atmospheric losses from the
pressure in the Apollo crew cabin are presented next, including the Apollo command module [16].
RTV seals used along the riveted and bolted joints, seals for the two
hatches, and seals for the telescope and sextant assembly. 3. Unified Crew Hatch
The Apollo unified crew hatch (UCH) was designed and
1. Description of the Apollo Command Module Crew Cabin Atmosphere implemented in response to the inability of astronauts Grissom,
For lunar missions, the cabin atmosphere of the Apollo command White, and Chaffee to quickly egress from the Apollo 1 fire. The
module was composed of 100% O2 at a pressure of 5 psi [17], which newly designed hatch combined the previously separated pressure
is slightly higher than the partial pressure of oxygen at a standard hatch and heat shield hatch into a single, outward-opening hatch. The
temperature and pressure (STP) of roughly 3.4 psi but below the new hatch could be opened in 3 s, and all three astronauts could
pressure at which oxygen toxicity becomes a concern (Skylab egress in under 30 s [19]. A schematic drawing showing the overhead
missions used a 5 psi atmosphere composed of 26% N2 to reduce the view of a partially open UCH is shown in Fig. 18 and illustrates both
risk of fire [18]). The low cabin pressure provided several benefits to the pressure seal and the thermal seal used on the hatch. The location
the Apollo capsules. First, the additional weight of inert gases (e.g., of the UCH on the Apollo capsule can be seen in Fig. 2.
nitrogen) as well as the associated tanks, plumbing, and other support A thermal lip seal was included to prevent the ingestion of reentry
structures for additional gases did not have to be carried into orbit, gases into the gap around the hatch perimeter, although the UCH was
thus reducing the overall vehicle launch weight. Also, the walls of the located on the leeward side of the capsule during reentry and was
Apollo command module and lunar module could be made lighter therefore subject to low thermal loads. The Apollo/Skylab 3 mission
than the designs for a cabin pressure of 14.7 psi. Finally, the 100% command module UCH and its high-temperature silicone thermal
oxygen environment had precedent in that it had been flown on the seal is shown in Fig. 19. The thermal seal was in contact with the
Mercury and Gemini missions. The capsule atmosphere mixture hatch frame at a contact angle such that it was angled toward the
during launch was changed to 40% nitrogen in response to the outboard side of the capsule. Air in the cavity between the pressure
906 FINKBEINER ET AL.

Fig. 20 Hatch frame on the Apollo/Skylab 3 command module. A


residual discoloration can be seen where the UCH knife edge engaged
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into the elastomer gasket.

Fig. 18 Schematic drawing (top view) of the Apollo unified crew hatch
(Fig. 6 in [19]).

Fig. 19 UCH hatch thermal seal on Apollo/Skylab 3 command module.

seal and the thermal seal could escape during ascent across the
thermal seal because the differential pressure would reduce the
contact pressure of the seal. The cavity pressure therefore decayed to
near-vacuum conditions during a mission. During reentry, the
external pressure on the seal would increase, thereby increasing the
contact pressure of the seal against the hatch frame. This enhanced
the effectiveness of the thermal seal.
Figure 18 also shows the location of a sealed groove near the base
of the hatch frame. This groove, also visible in the command module
hatch frame in Fig. 20, separated the heat shield from the pressure
vessel and allowed movement of the heat shield due to thermal
expansion and pressure loads. The groove was sealed with what
appears to be the same silicone material as the thermal seal and
prevented hot gases from entering the volume separating the heat
shield and pressure vessel. Fig. 21 Apollo docking assembly (Fig. 9 in [20]).
The pressure seal on the Apollo UCH was composed of an
elastomer gasket attached to the command module hatch frame with
RTV and an adjoining knife edge formed into the UCH perimeter. 4. Command Module Forward Tunnel and Docking Ring
The knife edge can be seen on the outer perimeter of the hatch door in Figure 21 shows a schematic diagram of the forward tunnel
Fig. 18 immediately outboard of the latches and linkage mechanism, assembly used to dock the command module to the lunar module.
and the gasket can be seen in Fig. 20. The knife edge embedded into The docking ring was attached to the command module tunnel ring
the elastomer gasket when the hatch was fully closed, forming an and served as a mounting structure for the latches, electrical connec-
effective pressure seal. A line of discoloration can be seen on the tions, and probe assembly for docking with the lunar module. The
gasket where the hatch knife edge came into contact with the gasket docking assembly contained several seals: a pressure seal and a ther-
surface. mal seal on the forward tunnel hatch, a pressure seal at the junction
FINKBEINER ET AL. 907

Fig. 22 Drawing of the inboard side of the Apollo command module


forward tunnel hatch (Fig. A-1 in [20]).
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Fig. 24 Forward tunnel and pressure seal on forward tunnel of Apollo/


Skylab 3 command module.

Fig. 23 Stowed forward tunnel hatch from Apollo 17 (NASA


photograph AS17-162-24054).

between the command module tunnel ring and the docking ring,
two pressure seals at the junction between the docking ring and the
lunar module tunnel ring, and a pressure seal on the lunar module
hatch.
Figure 22 shows a diagram of the inboard side of the forward tun-
nel hatch, which includes call outs to an outboard thermal seal and an
inboard knife edge that constitutes part of the pressure seal. The ther-
mal seal prevented the ingestion of high enthalpy reentry gases into
the gap around the hatch. Figure 23, a photograph of the stowed hatch
taken during the Apollo 17 mission, shows the thermal O-ring seal.
The thermal seal was compressed against the forward tunnel wall
near the location denoted with the number 7 in Fig. 24, a photograph
of the forward tunnel in the Apollo/Skylab 3 command module. The
thermal seal was not as large as that of the UCH because the thermal
environment at the apex of the conical portion of the command
module was minimal and did not impose a heavy thermal load onto
the seal.
The forward tunnel hatch also contained a pressure seal similar to
the UCH knife edge denoted in Fig. 22, which embedded into an elas-
tomer gasket attached circumferentially around the forward tunnel.
The elastomer gasket can be seen in the Apollo/Skylab 3 forward
tunnel in Fig. 24. When the outboard side of the hatch was exposed to
vacuum conditions (e.g., the command module was not docked to the
Fig. 25 Section view of Apollo/Skylab 3 command module docking ring
lunar module), the pressure differential across the hatch served to
(Apollo drawing V36-316290).
provide a positive engagement of the knife edge into the elastomer
gasket and therefore improved the performance of the seal. The
pressure equalization valve shown on the hatch in Fig. 22 allowed the Figure 21 shows the sealed surfaces between the docking ring and
docking ring tunnel to be pressurized after the lunar module had the command module tunnel ring and also between the docking ring
docked to the command module. Once the internal and external and the lunar module tunnel ring. Figure 25 presents a section view of
pressures had been equalized, the latches were disengaged and the the docking ring, including one of the alignment petals, and provides
hatch was removed and stowed inside the command module [20]. the best understanding of the docking ring seals. The “foot” of the
908 FINKBEINER ET AL.
Downloaded by 2405:8100:8000:5ca1::50b:5d87 on December 13, 2019 | http://arc.aiaa.org | DOI: 10.2514/1.27188

Fig. 26 Photograph of Apollo/Skylab 3 command module tunnel ring.

docking ring was bolted into the command module tunnel ring and
contained a single permanent pressure seal believed to be either an
O-ring or bulb seal. Any leakage around the docking ring foot would
have to travel through a tortuous path including two metal-to-metal
contact surfaces upstream of the pressure seal and several metal-to-
metal contact surfaces downstream of the seal. Figure 25 also shows
the location of the charge holder that housed the pyrotechnic used to
separate the docking ring from the command module after the return Fig. 27 Window locations on the Apollo command module (Fig. 1 in
of the lunar module from the lunar surface and subsequent jettison of [21]).
the lunar module [11,20]. Figure 26 shows the Apollo/Skylab 3 tun-
nel ring and, in particular, the groove where the docking ring was in-
stalled. A remnant footprint of the docking ring is visible in the around the perimeters of the windows [21]. Once the silicone had
groove, along with the charge holder. Based on Fig. 25, the perma- cured, the cavity between the inner windows was evacuated and
nent pressure seal was installed directly underneath the docking ring backfilled with 7.0 psia nitrogen gas. A multilayer silicone resin-
footprint. impregnated fiberglass insulator with an RTV 511 coating was
Figure 25 also shows the location of the two bulb pressure seals bonded with RTV 511 [21] to the outboard perimeter of the inner
that mated to the lunar module tunnel ring. The petal structure visible window panes to minimize the heat conduction to the inner windows
in Fig. 25 provided the centering alignment between the lunar during reentry. The outer heat shield window was attached using a
module tunnel ring and docking ring when, after hard capture by the glass cloth reinforced heat-molded silicone rubber that was bonded
probe assembly, the lunar module would be retracted into the in place with RTV 560 [21].
docking ring to compress and engage the seals. The seal design Window 1 and its associated seals and insulation layer from
provided large resilience for offsets in the docking alignment caused Apollo/Skylab 3 are shown in Fig. 29. A portion of the outer
by differences in thermal growth or manufacturing tolerances while RTV 511 coating was damaged, exposing the fiberglass insulation.
also ensuring that the seals would be retained in the docking ring Also, the outer heat shield silica pane is missing from the capsule and
when the lunar module undocked to land on the lunar surface. may have been removed after recovery of the vehicle.

5. Command Module Windows


The Apollo command module included five windows, as shown in
Fig. 27. The side and hatch windows were used for general 6. Sextant and Telescope
observation and photography, whereas the rendezvous windows An assembly consisting of a sextant and a scanning telescope,
(windows 2 and 4) were oriented in the forward direction (X in the shown in Fig. 30, was installed on the windward surface of the crew
figure) and provided visual guidance for docking. compartment heat shield of the Apollo command module. The
Figure 28 shows the construction of each of the three types of inclusion of the sextant represented a significant sealing challenge.
windows, including the seals necessary to prevent both cabin The sextant penetrated both the pressure hull and the crew
atmosphere loss and reentry gas ingestion. The windows were made compartment heat shield on the windward side of the vehicle. The
of two aluminosilicate glass inner pressure panes and a fused sextant was free to rotate and was capable of some movement along
amorphous silica outer heat shield pane. Each of the inner window the axis of rotation. The sealing challenge was overcome using the
panes was coated on both sides with an antireflective coating to seal design shown in the schematic diagram in Fig. 31. The flexible
reduce glare. The outer pane was coated on the outside with a thermal seal prevented the flow of high enthalpy reentry gas into the
magnesium–fluoride coating and on the inside with a blue–red cavity between the cabin and the TPS wall while allowing movement
coating to block both infrared and ultraviolet solar radiation [21,22]. of the sextant TPS with respect to the cabin [4]. Additionally, the slip
The seal around the pressure windows was formed by injecting ring seal around the sextant prevented high enthalpy gas flow along
RTV 560 around the perimeters of the two inner panes and allowing the outside circumference of the sextant and into the cabin. The slip
the silicone to cure in place. The RTV was held in place while it was ring seal also minimized habitable atmospheric losses from the crew
curing by heat-molded silicone elastomer dams that were installed cabin along the outer circumference of the rotating optics.
FINKBEINER ET AL. 909

Fig. 30 Sextant and telescope assembly on Apollo/Skylab 3.


Downloaded by 2405:8100:8000:5ca1::50b:5d87 on December 13, 2019 | http://arc.aiaa.org | DOI: 10.2514/1.27188

Fig. 31 Sectional view of Apollo command module sextant port (Fig. 7


in [4]).

A. Seal Needs for the Orion Spacecraft Thermal Protection System


The Orion spacecraft will require advanced seals for its TPS to
account for its larger size, updated lunar reentry trajectories, and
Mars reentry trajectories. The Orion spacecraft will have a heat shield
diameter of 16.5 ft, more than 25% greater than that of Apollo. The
larger Orion heat shield size will result in a decreased convective
heating rate and an increased radiative heating rate during reentry
Fig. 28 Apollo command module windows: a) side windows 1 and 5 [23]. The larger Orion heat shield also introduces the potential for
(Fig. 2 in [21]), b) rendezvous windows 2 and 4 (Fig. 3 in [21]), and increased deflections at sealing interfaces due to both thermal
c) hatch window 3 (Fig. 4 in [21]). expansion and loading from pressure and inertial forces. The larger
heat shield also presents the potential for larger manufacturing
tolerance stackups, which may result in variable TPS gap sizes as
well as misalignments of the TPS carrier structures during vehicle
assembly. The presence of variable TPS gap sizes and increased gap
deflections requires the use of seals that are more resilient than those
used in similar locations on the Apollo heat shield so that they can
follow the changes in gap sizes and remain in contact with adjacent
sealing surfaces throughout a mission. Finally, the Orion TPS may be
subjected to a more severe reentry environment than Apollo. For
example, a Mars reentry trajectory would have an increased reentry
velocity over lunar returns and would subject the Orion TPS seals to
greater heat flux and heat load than those imposed on the Apollo
spacecraft.

B. Seal Needs for the Orion Spacecraft Crew Cabin


Fig. 29 Window 1 on Apollo/Skylab 3. The outer heat shield silica pane The mission requirements for Orion differ from those of Apollo,
is not present. and so the Orion vehicle will require the development of advanced
seals to prevent the loss of cabin air. The allowable leakage from
Orion will be less than 0:33 lbm=day [1], more than an order of
III. Challenges for Orion Seal Design magnitude less than the 4:8 lbm=day allowable leakage from Apollo
The seal designs used on Apollo provide a good starting point for [16]. The reduced leakage limit is due to several factors and can be
those that will be used on the Orion spacecraft because the Apollo achieved by improved construction techniques, such as welded
seal designs were employed successfully in the environments in panels (instead of riveted and bolted joints) [16], as well as improved
which Orion will operate. However, as Orion will differ from Apollo seal designs.
both in terms of design and in mission profile, the seal requirements The leakage limit for Orion is less than that for the Apollo
for Orion are somewhat different than those of Apollo. The following spacecraft for several reasons. First, the missions anticipated for the
subsections briefly discuss the starting points for the design of seals Orion spacecraft are expected to last as long as 6 months [1]. By
for the Orion spacecraft and how the sealing needs for Orion differ comparison, Apollo 17 was in space for only 14 days for its lunar
from those of Apollo. mission and Apollo/Skylab 4 (the longest-duration mission for an
910 FINKBEINER ET AL.

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leakage seal designs than those used for Apollo. TPS seals on Orion Mechanisms Symposium: Jet Propulsion Laboratory, 1969, pp. 157–
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sizes due to potential stackups in manufacturing tolerances resulting [21] Leger, L. J., and Bricker, R. W., “Apollo Experience Report—Window
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crew cabin pressure; increased mission duration, which increases [23] Williams, S. D., Curry, D. M., Bouslog, S. A., and Rochelle, W. C.,
both the total leakage and potential for seal degradation due to the “Thermal Protection System Design Studies for Lunar Crew Module,”
space environment; and increased exposed surface area, on which Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets, Vol. 32, No. 3, 1995, pp. 456–462.
leaks may form. doi:10.2514/3.26637
[24] Daniels, C. C., De Groh, H. C., III, Dunlap, P. H., Jr., Finkbeiner, J. R.,
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[25] Hillje, E. R., “Entry Aerodynamics at Lunar Return Conditions
The authors would like to thank David Lowenfeld from the Visitor
Obtained from the Flight of Apollo 4 (AS-501),” NASA TN D-5399,
Center at the NASA John H. Glenn Research Center at Lewis Field, 1969.
whose help in examining the Apollo/Skylab 3 command module was
invaluable, and Conley Thatcher of Boeing Corporation, for his K. Wurster
insight into the materials used as seals on the Apollo spacecraft. Associate Editor

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