VOL. 5, NO. 8, AUGUST 1968 J.

SPACECRAFT 927

Development of the Apollo Launch Escape System

J. F. MCCARTHY JR.,* J. IAN DoDDs,f AND R. S. CROWDER^
North American Rockwell Corporation, Downey, Calif.

This paper outlines the development of the Apollo launch escape system (LES) from the
formulation of the basic system requirements through tests. A brief review of previous escape
systems is presented to provide a frame of reference for the Apollo effort. The LES require-
ments are divided into those associated with pad abort, abort in the high dynamic pressure
region, and abort at high altitudes where the absence of aerodynamic stability causes escape
vehicle tumbling. A description of the major launch escape system elements is given together
with a review of system operation. Dynamic analysis of the system characteristics necessitated
the development of sophisticated digital computer programs, and an extensive wind-tunnel
program was necessary to define the aerodynamic characteristics of the launch escape vehicle
over a wide range of Mach numbers.
Downloaded by 121.200.6.58 on December 7, 2019 | http://arc.aiaa.org | DOI: 10.2514/3.29390

Introduction prise the launch escape vehicle (LEV). A representative as-

cent trajectory of the Saturn/Apollo vehicle is illustrated in
T HE stringent requirements for crew safety resulted in
strong emphasis on the launch escape system (LES) early
in the Apollo program. Safe mission abort must be provided
Fig. 2. The LES provides the capability to abort the mission
up to a point following second-stage ignition where the dy-
namic pressure is sufficiently low to abort using service mod-
from the time the Apollo is on the pad prior to launch vehicle ule propulsion. To minimize payload penalty, the system is
lift-off to after successful second-stage ignition at 300,000 ft jettisoned as soon as the service module offers an effective
and Mach number 10. A few words about the history of abort capability.
crew escape systems will put this effort into perspective. The launch vehicle emergency detection system (EDS)
The aircraft ejection seat was developed during World War II, monitors critical launch vehicle parameters, and emergency
when it was realized that muscular effort was no longer suffi- conditions are displayed to the crew to indicate the necessity
cient to jettison the canopy and clear the aircraft. Next, the for abort action as indicated in Table 1. The EDS can ini-
ejection seat thruster was supplemented by rocket power. tiate an automatic LES abort in the event of extremely time
Today, for the F-lll aircraft, the entire cockpit section is critical conditions occurring during the early part of the first-
used for an escape capsule and is lowered to the ground by stage burn. Such conditions are loss of thrust on two or more
parachute. Air bags cushion the impact and act as notation engines of the first stage and excessive vehicle angular rates
gear, and the entire capsule provides a good survival shelter. (in excess of 3°/sec in pitch and yaw and 20°/sec in roll) nor-
Since the launch vehicles used in Project Mercury (Red- mally associated with an engine hardover malfunction. Con-
stone and Atlas) were not specifically designed for manned current with abort initiation, emergency detection system pro-
flight, the requirement for a highly reliable launch abort vides launch vehicle engine cut-off action except for the first
system took on new importance. The escape system adopted 30 sec following lift-off, during which period this aetion is in-
was a solid-propellant tractor rocket attached to the space- hibited for range safety reasons.
craft by a tower. The payload penalty was minimized by The LEV must be able to separate from a diverging, and
jettisoning the escape rocket and tower after Atlas staging under certain situations, a thrusting launch vehicle. Abort
while the velocity was still relatively low. After the escape initiation conditions selected will be in excess of the levels that
tower had been jettisoned, the posigrade rockets would be could be expected in a normal mission, but additional weight
used for escape. The Gemini spacecraft was able to use or system complexity due to the LES must be minimized.
ejection seats because of a reduced fireball hazard with hy- Thus, the LES must be designed to minimize the effect on the
pergolic propellants used in the Titan launch vehicle. The Apollo command module (CM) of the blast overpressures
entry retrorocket system provided an abort capability at resulting from a launch vehicle explosion and of the aero-
higher altitudes. Ejec ion seats also provided an emergency dynamic forces and inertial loads associated with the abort
crew recovery system in the event of failure of the parachute trajectory. Temperatures imposed on the parachute system
system following a normal mission. as it deploys in the vicinity of the burning launch vehicle im-
This paper defines the Apollo LES requirements, discusses pose requirements in terms of the acceptable separation time
development of the configuration in response to these require-
ments, describes system operation, and summarizes the flight
qualification program used to man-rate the system. LAUNCH ESCAPE SYSTEM-
System Design Requirements and Considerations BOOST PROTECTIVE COVER-
COMMAND MODULE^.
The Apollo spacecraft consists of the components above the X
APEX
instrument unit as shown in Fig. 1. The LES and CM corn- SERVICE MODULE—~i\ <:^7 COVER

Presented as Paper 67-853 at the AIAA 4th Annual Meeting

and Technical Display, Anaheim, Calif., October 23-27, 1967; ADAPTER
submitted February 13, 1968; revision received April 18, 1968. LUNAR
MODULE
The work reported was done under NASA Contract NAS9-150.
* Vice President, Research, Engineering, and Test Space Di- INSTRUMENT UNIT
vision. Associate Fellow AIAA.
-S-IVB
t Manager, Manned Systems, Space Division. Associate
Fellow AIAA.
t Project Engineer, Apollo Aerodynamics, Space Division.
Member AIAA. Fig. 1 The Apollo spacecraft.
 928 MCCARTHY, DODDS, AND CHOWDER J. SPACECRAFT

ALT 100 N Ml x CANARDS (2) BOOST PROTECTIVE

600,000 r-
-o COVER \
PITCH CONTROL MOTOR \

500,000 - ORBIT ACQUISITION

S-IVB IGNITION
400,000 -

ALT
(FT) 300,000

LAUNCH
200,000 - ESCAPE
MOTOR

100,000

°0 500 1000 1500 Fig. 4 Launch escape vehicle.

RANGE (N Ml)

Fig. 2 Saturn/Apollo ascent trajectory. combination of initial abort a and divergence rate and launch
escape vehicle aerodynamic stability. Plume impingement
histories. Finally, flight characteristics of the launch escape loads make it mandatory that the vehicle does not tumble
vehicle must not impose conditions that exceed human tole- while the launch escape motor is burning during these q0 max
rances limits. aborts.
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Vehicle tumbling can be prevented by aerodynamic stabi-

Requirements by Mission Phase lization up to 70,000 ft. At higher altitudes, aerodynamic
stabilization becomes ineffective, and the escape vehicle
In the systems analysis used to define the design config- motor thrust-vector alignment relative to the launch escape
uration, it was found that abort situations could be divided vehicle's center of gravity (e.g.) and the initial launch vehicle
into four regions: pad abort, transonic abort, abort at max- angular motions cause tumbling. Near 70,000 ft, tumbling
imum freestream dynamic pressure (g0max) and high-altitude will occur when the divergence due to a worst-case tolerance
abort (Fig. 3). For pad abort, the separation distance time of thrust-vector alignment, relative to the vehicle e.g., is addi-
history and the range at touchdown must be sufficient to avoid tive to a launch-vehicle divergence. Because of the low %
overheating of the parachute system due to proximity to the the resultant crew accelerations will not be excessive. How-
possible launch vehicle fireball, and the minimum altitude ever, significant plume impingement loads on the CM will re-
and g0 must be compatible with the safe parachute system sult. At higher altitudes the LES motor plume is sufficiently
operation. overexpanded that, even though it envelopes the CM, there
During a transonic abort, a high peak suction condition is is no critical loading condition.
generated as a result of the curvature of the flowfield around For abort just prior to normal jettison, the LES vehicle
the interface between the CM and the service module. As experiences several minutes of exoatmospheric flight along a
the CM begins to separate, this low-pressure condition evac- ballistic trajectory. The primary problem at this time is to
uates the forward end of the service module causing increased assure correct vehicle attitude and rotational rate to avoid
command module base drag. These proximity effects are excessive acceleration on the crew during atmospheric re-
significant with separations up to approximately 1 diam entry.
(~ 12 ft) and significantly impair separation with the result
that this transonic abort condition defines the minimum Normal Mission and Recovery Interface Requirements
allowable thrust/weight ratio of the launch escape vehicle.
The g0 max abort provides a critical case for plume impinge- The presence of the LES should not cause any undesirable
ment on the conical surface of the CM. In the event of an flow conditions that would lead to excessive static or dynamic
abort from a diverging launch vehicle, the combination of the loads or cause significant launch-vehicle payload penalties
larger plumes associated with the increased altitude, the high during boost. Wind-tunnel tests indicate that the LES acts
go that accentuates the bending of the plume towards the as an aerodynamic "spike" favorably influencing the flow-
CM, and the LEV angle-of-attack (a) variations act together field around the vehicle. The LES and the boost protective
to produce a critical structural loading condition on the com- cover must be jettisoned on a normal mission shortly after
mand module. To minimize any structural weight penalty second-stage ignition. This jettison must provide satisfac-
due to this abort condition, it is necessary to select the correct tory separation without recontact. The LES jettison motor
is normally used for this separation, but the launch escape
motor is used as a backup. Whichever mode of jettison is
used, it is mandatory that the boost protective cover main-
tain its structural integrity long enough to prevent pieces of

Table 1 EDS abort clues

MACH Launch vehicle function Display
NUMBER
Excessive rate Indicator light
Total angle of attack Analog display from Q-ball
Guidance failure Indicator light
Propellant tank pressure Analog displays
Engine status Indicator light for low thrust also
indicates stage separation
S-II stage second plane Indicator light
600 800 Separation
DYNAMIC PRESSURE (PSF) Abort request Light indicating ground control ad-
vising immediate manual abort
Fig. 3 Critical abort regions.
 AUGUST 1968 DEVELOPMENT OF THE APOLLO LAUNCH ESCAPE SYSTEM 929

APEX COVER EFFECT & DAMP

ELS ARMED T O W E R , BPC, JETTISONED TURN-AROUND
(14.4 SEC) ELS ARMED MANEUVER
& DOCKING PROBE
CANARDS (14 SEC) BELOW MACH 3.8 .
JETTISONED (14 SEC) DEPLOYED
(11 SEC) TOWER, BPC,
& DOCKING
PROBE
JETTISONED
AT 24,000 FT

LE MOTOR
IGNITED

APEX COVER
JETTISONED
AT 24,000 FT
+.4 SEC

Fig. 5 Low-altitude abort mode.

Fig. 6 High-altitude abort mode.

it from recontacting the spacecraft or the launch vehicle-
The inertial loads resulting from combined translational and
rotational motion, particularly in the case of backup jettison abort altitude and range requirements define the minimum
using the launch escape motor, make this a stringent boost total impulse. The maximum thrust level limit was based on
protective cover design requirement. crew acceleration tolerance considerations because of com-
At the appropriate time following any abort, the LES and bined translational and rotational motion following a high-
Downloaded by 121.200.6.58 on December 7, 2019 | http://arc.aiaa.org | DOI: 10.2514/3.29390

apex cover of the CM must be jettisoned and the parachute altitude abort. Whereas total impulse is relatively insensitive
system deployed. Providing CM dynamic conditions, in- to temperature variation, Fig. 7 shows the influence of
cluding qQ, angular rate, and an a from which it is possible to propellant grain temperature on thrust level, which has a
jettison the apex cover and deploy the parachute system, rep- significant effect in launch escape vehicle (LEV) performance.
resented one of the major problem areas in the design of the This temperature sensitivity is typical for the three solid-
launch escape system. propellant motors, but is only important on the launch escape
motor. The propellant temperature variations result from
ambient soak temperature on the pad prior to launch; aero-
System Operation and Configuration Description dynamic heating during the short duration boost is not
The LEV configuration is shown in Fig. 4. Abort sequences sufficient to alter significantly the propellant grain tempera-
are illustrated in Figs. 5 and 6 and can be divided into three ture. Other factors, such as propellant composition and
altitude regions: low altitude (pad abort to 30,000 ft), inter- nozzle throat geometry variation, also influence the thrust
mediate altitude (30,000 ft to 100,000 ft), and high altitude characteristics. These effects are minimized by careful
(100,000 ft to LES jettison). The sequence of events for the production control and elaborate acceptance test procedures
first few seconds of abort flight is common to aborts in any of such as static firing of sample grains1 throughout motor
the three regions. It consists of 1) abort initiation by astro- manufacturing.
naut or by EDS, 2) booster engine cutoff (only for aborts More critical than thrust level is precise alignment of the
after 30 sec of launch vehicle flight time), 3) command mod- thrust vector. Because of the high vehicle thrust/weight
ule/service module interface separation, 4) launch escape and ratio and because the launch escape vehicle relies solely on
pitch-control-motor ignition and reaction-control-system pro- aerodynamic stabilization, uncertainties in thrust-vector
pellant dump (only during aborts initiated up to 42 sec after alignment relative to the vehicle e.g. have a major effect on
lift-off), and 5) canard deployment 11 sec after abort initia- the vehicle trajectory and may even induce vehicle tumbling.
tion. The thrust vector is off-set from the motor centerline by 2.75°
Initiation of the earth landing system (parachute sequence)
can occur either 16 sec after abort initiation or during descent
at approximately 24,000 ft if abort occurs above 30,000 ft.
For aborts initiated above 100,000 ft, a special procedure has
been established because of the lower aerodynamic stability STUDS &
FRANGIBLE
encountered; following LES motor burnout, the crew is to NUTS TOWER
JETTISON
establish a specific pitch rate using the reaction control sys- MOTOR

tem to avoid acquiring an undesirable trim condition and

LAUNCH ESCAPE MOTOR
associated adverse acceleration during subsequent descent.

The Jettison, Escape, and Pitch-Control Motors -BOOST

PROTECTIVE
The solid-propellant jettison motor (Fig. 7) has a sea-level COVER

maximum thrust of 32,000 Ib with a burn time of 1.0 sec.

It separates the LES and the boost protective cover from the
CM on the normal mission or following LES abort prior to
TOWER JETTISON MOTOR
parachute system deployment. Separation from the thrusting
launch vehicle on a normal mission is the critical design case. / N

The thrust vector is offset from the centerline by approxi-

mately 4° to provide trajectory separation from the path of
the thrusting launch vehicle. This thrust-vector offset is
obtained by differential sizing of the throats of the two op-
posing nozzles.
The launch escape motor has a nominal sea-level thrust of I \
154,000 Ib and a sea-level total impulse of 557,600 Ib-sec. TIME-SEC TIME-SEC
Its thrust level is defined by the separation requirements from
the launch vehicle for transonic and gmax aborts. The pad Fig. 7 Launch escape system.
 930 MCCARTHY, DODDS, AND CHOWDER J. SPACECRAFT

launch escape system motor thrust vector. The tower

structure near the LES motor nozzles was designed to mini-
mize plume impingement on its structural members. This
approach minimizes heating rates on the structure and avoids
concern for any uncertainty in the effective thrust-vector
alignment that would result from differential impingement
from the unevenly sized nozzles.
The lower ends of the tower legs enter wells on the apex
cover and are attached to the command module by explosively
operated frangible nuts. The leg wells on the apex cover are
shaped to allow satisfactory withdrawal of the tower for all
normal mission and abort jettison conditions. For redun-
dancy, the four frangible nuts (one per leg) are operated by
dual initiators. This separation interface is particularly
Fig. 8 Launch escape vehicle trim points. critical to crew safety, because all of the four tower legs must
be released before it is possible to separate the apex cover and
deploy the parachute systems.
to position it near the off-set e.g. Careful design and manu-
facturing procedures and use of optical thrust-vector align-
ment techniques allowed the thrust vector to be adjusted in Canard System
the field relative to the actual vehicle e.g., with ± 0.30°, which
is an acceptable level for trajectory dispersions and vehicle This system reorients the LEV shortly after abort to
minimize undesirable "eyeballs-out" acceleration following
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stability
Early in the Apollo program, consideration was given to the high-altitude aborts, and reorient the CM to the normal entry
possibility of using an active thrust-vector-control system attitude for apex cover jettison and subsequent parachute
that would have compensated for variations in abort inita- deployment. The canard surfaces are deployed by a pyro-
tion conditions, thrust-vector alignment, e.g. position, and technically operated actuator 11 sec after abort initiation.
aerodynamic characteristics. Consideration of system reli- This delay was established by the time critical pad abort case.
ability and the additional development time and cost led to The requirement for a system to reorient the CM stems
selection of the current "passive" system which required the from the existence of a stable trim point for the CM in the
addition of approximately 1000 Ib of ballast forward of the apex forward condition. Thus, if the LES were jettisoned
LES jettison motor to provide adequate aerodynamic stabil- while the launch escape vehicle were in stable flight following
ity. It was also necessary to add a pitch-control motor to abort, the CM could trim apex forward resulting in severe
shape the pad abort trajectory. eyeballs-out accelerations and adverse attitude for apex cover
Another design trade-off involved the cant angle of the jettison and parachute deployment. The reorientation and
four motor nozzles relative to the vehicle centerline. Too subsequent stabilization of the CM following abort repre-
small a cant would cause excessive plume impingement sented one of the more difficult problems, and several alter-
pressures on the command module surface during motor native schemes were evaluated before the canard approach
burning, while an excessive cant angle would reduce the effec- was finally selected. The canard system develops the aero-
tive thrust level and require a larger, heavier launch escape dynamic moment to accomplish the reorientation and is
motor. The cant angle selected was 35°. effective for aborts up to approximately 100,000 ft. For
Reference 1 provides a complete discussion of the LES higher-altitude aborts, the LEV will tumble immediately
motor development and qualification program. The Apollo following abort, and, hence, there is no need for the canard to
standard initiator, which was the standard electroexplosive provide initial reorientation. These abort trajectories have a
interface device used to ignite the motor ignition system, short exoatmospheric phase, and the canard surface provide
was qualified by more than 450 firings. These tests covered orientation and stabilization during the subsequent re-entry.
the full spectrum of expected environments. Similar qualifi- Wind-tunnel tests indicate that, at hypersonic Mach numbers,
cation programs were accomplished on the other two motors there is a weak static trim point during motor-forward flight
in the LES. which is caused by interaction of the shock wave from the LES
The pitch-control motor's sea-level thrust is 3400 Ib with a motor with the CM. It was found that additional canard
burning time of \ sec. It provides an initial angular rate surface area was not a practical means of eliminating this
and consequent attitude displacement of the LES vehicle trim point. The secondary statically stable LEV trim point
immediately following abort initiation. The resultant above Mach 3.8 is shown in Fig. 8 between a = 12° and a
rotation provides the necessary lateral range. Studies were = 22°. The accompanying canard configuration phase-plane
undertaken to see whether the same lateral range could be plot shows the relative strength of the primary and secondary
accomplished by appropriate positioning of the LES motor trim points. Analytical investigations have shown that the
thrust vector relative to the e.g., thereby eliminating the need LEV is captured at one of the two trim points in a dynamic
for a pitch-control motor. However, dynamic stability pressure environment of g0 = 10 psf, so the minimum pitch
studies showed that the pitch-control motor provided the rate necessary to avoid the secondary trim region is approxi-
required trajectory with a greater margin of stability from mately 2°/sec. As a result, these aborts employ a procedure
the tumbling boundary. It is disabled for abort beyond 42 that requires the crew to induce a vehicle pitch rate (0 « 5°/
sec after lift-off, because adequate lateral separation from the sec) using the command module reaction control system.
launch vehicle can be achieved without it then, and its firing This procedure makes it impossible for the LEV to be cap-
would represent an unnecessary destabilizing influence on the tured in the weak "motor-forward" trim condition.
vehicle. An apparently simple alternate solution to the problem of
reorientation prior to re-entry following high-altitude aborts
Tower
which was considered involved jettisoning the LES following-
burnout and stabilizing of the command module in the cor-
The tower is a welded, tubular, titanium structure covered rect re-entry attitude by the crew using onboard attitude
with insulation to minimize the effect of heating during boost displays. Analysis indicates that these displays may be
and following abort. The forward end of the tower attaches disoriented by vehicle tumbling, requiring the crew to reorient
to the structural skirt of the launch escape motor. The attach- the spacecraft by visual reference to the ground through the
ment has a screw adjustment to permit the alignment of the CM windows. The time criticality of this maneuver and the
 AUGUST 1968 DEVELOPMENT OF THE APOLLO LAUNCH ESCAPE SYSTEM 931

possibility of the CM entering apex forward or tumbling in

the event that it were not accomplished prior to the re-entry
interface made this approach undesirable unless the onboard
attitude display can be verified to be functioning correctly,
The ability of the canard system to provide vehicle damp-
ing subsequent to reorientation is limited, because the large
wake from the command module interacts with the launch
escape system. As a result, the rotational motion of the
launch escape vehicle reaches a limit cycle condition with an
a range of ±45°. The drag of the oscillating LEV during
this terminal descent is not greatly increased over that for a
stable CM while the weight is increased as a result of the
presence of the launch escape system. Hence, the design ; .
requirements of both qQ and a variations which are imposed on Iit!PlB^
parachute system deployment are considerably in excess of Fig. 9 Hot-jet model.
those associated with a normal mission. The canard sys-
tem must be designed for deployment at high % and it must separation and the relative orientation of the two bodies to
withstand the heating associated with descent from the the wind vector. Proximity effects can also be significant
maximum launch escape system abort altitude at Mach 10. during the separation of tower and boost protective cover
Cork insulation is added to the Inconel canard surfaces to from the CM following abort and during the separation of the
provide satisfactory heat protection. apex cover from the CM. Vehicle aerodynamic damping
characteristics, always of concern for a configuration that
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Sequencer System
relies on passive aerodynamic stabilization, had to be deter-
The sequence of events from abort initiation to touchdown mined for the launch escape vehicle with and without the
is controlled automatically by an electrical sequencing sys- canard surface deployed.
tem such that, in the event of a temporarily incapacitated In view of foregoing considerations, the prediction of vehicle
crew, the command module will be safely recovered. Pro- dynamics requires the determination of the static force and
visions are made for manual override of the automatic func- moment coefficients as functions of the angles of attack and
tions. The sequencing system controls the firing circuits that sideslip, Mach number, thrust coefficient, and proximity ef-
initiate the pyrotechnically operated functions such as motor fects. Vehicle aerodynamic damping characteristics were
ignition, canard system deployment, tower separation, etc. also required as a function of Mach number in the vicinity of
The sequencer system is redundant from the battery through the two trim points of primary interest.
the electroexplosive interface. Parallel redundancy insures The nonaerodynamic factors that influence vehicle dy-
automatic functional operation in the event of a failure in namics are the launch escape motor thrust time history, the
either system, whereas serial redundancy eliminates premature large destabilizing movement of the e.g. because of depletion
system operation due to a single failure. Manual backup of propellant, and the rapid variation in qQ during oscillations
is used in the event of a failure causing delayed system opera- of the vehicle. Sophisticated three- and six-degree-of-freedom
tion. digital computer programs were necessary to handle the large
The sequencer mechanization employs electromagnetic amount of stored data and to undertake the step-by-step,
relay switching with solid-state time delay units. During the time-dependent solution of the dynamics of this vehicle.
initial design phase of the sequencer system, use of a solid-state To conserve computer time, the trajectory was broken down
mechanization rather than an electromechanical approach by phase, and special versions of the basic program (with only
was considered. Considerations of circuit isolation, electro- the appropriate subroutines and data storage) were used for
magnetic interference, and over-all system reliability led to each phase. These programs were used to predict margins,
the use of the more conventional relay mechanization. optimum LES thrust-vector alignment and ballast require-
System analysis techniques utilizing computer programs ments, the accelerations imposed on the crew, and dynamic
based on Boolean algebra were used to validate the logic of the conditions at apex cover and parachute system deployment.
total sequencer system.
Wind-Tunnel Testing
Flight Dynamics Analysis
A wind-tunnel program involving approximately 3000 hr of
The LEV has aerodynamic characteristics that vary grossly testing was necessary to determine static aerodynamic char-
over the a range of interest and cannot be linearized. To acteristics, aerodynamic damping derivatives, and surface
predict vehicle motion following canard deployment, it was pressure distributions as functions of independent variables
necessary to define the characteristics throughout the full discussed previously.2 Special tests were necessary to deter-
360° of rotation.3 In addition, the Mach number range of mine the aerodynamic characteristics with the LES motor
interest varies from 0 to 10, depending on the conditions at burning (jet on).
abort initiation, and can vary over a wide range for any The initial static stability tests were used to determine the
given abort. Although the launch escape vehicle is aero- vehicle configuration that provided maximum static stability.
dynamically symmetric prior to canard deployment, the Geometric parameters, such as tower length, were selected
vehicle is dynamically asymmetric because of the offset e.g. from this information. Subsequent tests were undertaken to
of the command module. Moreover, the motor plumes measure static stability and critical aerodynamic loads over
shadow the CM producing a pronounced destabilizing effect, the appropriate ranges of M and a. for the LEV with and
and aerodynamic symmetry is lost, further complicating the without the canard surfaces deployed.
analysis. The aerodynamic effect of the motor plumes was The potential influence of the LES motor plumes on both
correlated with the nondimensional thrust coefficient (CT = vehicle stability and structural loads on the CM was recog-
T/q0s where CT is thrust coefficient, T is thrust, g0 is freestream nized early in the program. Accordingly, a hot-jet model was
dynamic pressure, and s is reference area) and parameters that designed (Fig. 9) that used H202 fed to the model through the
control the degree of plume expansion (Pe/P0, where Pe is support sting and then decomposed over a catalyst pack to
nozzle exit pressure, and PQ is freestream static pressure).4 simulate the jet plumes. Through careful design, it was pos-
Proximity effects between the LEV and the service module sible to install the H202 system while maintaining the scaled
during the initial part of separation depend on axial and lateral geometry of the LEV. Aerodynamic forces, moments, and
 932 MCCARTHY, DODDS, AND CHOWDER J. SPACECRAFT

excellent, but somewhat unprogrammed, demonstration of the

SATURN LAUNCH
TRAJECTORY effectiveness of the LES. On this flight, a Little Joe II con-
trol system malfunction resulted in breakup of the launch
PLANNED BP-22 vehicle. This triggered abort initiation through a hot-wire
HIGH-ALTITUDE ABORT
sensing system on the launch vehicle. Examination of the
results of the subsequent power-on tumbling abort (Space-
craft 002) test led to the conclusion that repeat of the in-
tended high-altitude abort was not justified from an over-all
program point of view.
A C T U A L BP-22 A B O R T (LJ-II FAILURE) The last flight utilized a spacecraft structure (Spacecraft
• S Y S T E M P E R F O R M A N C E DURING
A B O R T FROM UNPLANNED FAILURE 002) and was conducted to demonstrate LEV performance and
-6 & B P - 2 3 A PAD A B O R T S
structural integrity following an abort at 70,000 ft. This test
condition represents the lowest altitude and highest q0 at
• TIMING SEQUENCE
which tumbling of the LEV could be expected to occur on an
operational mission.
Fig. 10 Apollo launch abort flight test program.
All test vehicles were heavily instrumented to provide sur-
face and internal pressures and temperatures, angle-of-attack,
vehicle attitude and rotational rates, vehicle accelerations, key
surface pressures were measured over the appropriate ranges of event times, and subsystem performance. Ground-base
Downloaded by 121.200.6.58 on December 7, 2019 | http://arc.aiaa.org | DOI: 10.2514/3.29390

M, a, and simulated thrust levels representative of the LES tracking yielded position, velocity, vehicle attitude, flight-path
motor during burning and thrust tail-off. The tests were ac- angle, % and M as functions of flight time. Onboard and
complished in the 16-ft transonic tunnel of NASA Langley ground-based motion picture coverage produced considerable
Research Center. Power-on tests were also conducted in the qualitative data on system operation. Good agreement be-
presence of a simulated service module to define proximity ef- tween computer simulation and actual performance over a
fects during initial separation of the LEV from the service wide range of flight conditions demonstrated that escape
module. vehicle behavior could be accurately predicted for any abort
A smaller scale LEV model using air to simulate the exhaust initiation point.
plumes was tested at the Arnold Engineering Development Launch escape system/launch-vehicle compatibility and
Center, Von Karman Facility, to obtain power-on stability normal LES jettison have been demonstrated by several
and pressure distribution data at higher Mach numbers.3?4 flights of Saturn launch vehicles from Cape Kennedy. In
Many other special-purpose wind-tunnel tests were con- addition, LES jettison using the backup mode (LES motor)
ducted, such as apex cover separation tests, component air- was demonstrated on one flight.
loads tests in which vehicle component forces and moments
were isolated and measured, acoustic tests, and escape vehicle
dynamic stability tests with and without canard surfaces de- Conclusions
ployed. The dynamic stability tests utilized dynamically The evolution from the design requirements to a system
similar models supported on an air bearing located at the that has the demonstrated capability to successfully deliver
vehicle e.g. the crew from a malfunctioning launch vehicle represents one
of the significant accomplishments of the early part of the
Flight Qualification Program Apollo program. A multidisciplinary effort involving close
cooperation of engineering, manufacturing, and flight opera-
Six full-scale vehicle flight qualification tests were conducted tions was necessary. A total systems analysis with particu-
at the White Sands Missile Range, N. M., between November lar consideration of the interaction of the LES with the inter-
1963 and January 1966 to man-rate the launch escape system. facing systems was necessary to develop LES system require-
Abort initiation flight conditions representative of the most ments. Extensive use was made of wind-tunnel testing and
critical that could be experienced during a Saturn launch were dynamic analysis techniques to develop the configuration. A
selected. Little Joe II launch vehicles designed specifically carefully planned and extensive full-scale development test
for this program incorporated various combinations of solid- program demonstrated over-all system and critical subsystem
propellant motors to obtain the desired abort conditions. performance. The preceding discussion illustrates both the
Launch-vehicle stabilization was by fixed aerodynamic sur- complexity of the launch abort problem and the thoroughness
faces. An aerodynamic and a reaction control system and a with which the system was developed. This approach is
simple guidance system were also provided. representative of the attention given to all issues involving
An examination of those abort conditions that were most crew safety on the Apollo program.
critical, either in terms of requirements or design implementa-
tion, led to the selection of test points to demonstrate pad
abort, transonic abort, grmax abort, power-on tumbling abort at References
approximately 70,000 ft, and high-altitude abort at 100,000 ft. 1
Babcock, D. L. and Wiltse, P. D., "Motor Vehicle Interfaces
An abbreviated statement of the objectives of each test is in the Apollo Launch Escape System," Paper 65-152, Feb. 1965,
given in Fig. 10. The abort conditions that were represented AIAA.
2
were based on the high-performance side of the Saturn launch Mosely, W. C., Jr. and Martino, J. C., "Apollo Wind Tunnel
envelope. An initial angular rate (0) and a at abort initiation Testing Program—Historical Development of General Configura-
were also introduced when appropriate to simulate a diverg- tions," TN D3748, Dec. 1966, NASA.
3
Moseley, W. C., Jr. and Redd, B., "Aerodynamic Stability
ence of a malfunctioning Saturn launch vehicle. Real-time Characteristics of the Apollo Launch Escape Vehicle (LEV) with
control of abort initiation from the ground was necessary to Canard Surfaces Deployed," TN D4280, Dec. 1967, NASA.
obtain the desired test conditions. 4
Moseley, W. C., Jr. and Hondros, J. G., "Aerodynamic Sta-
All tests, except the high-altitude abort (Boilerplate 22), bility Characteristics of the Apollo Launch Escape Vehicle,"
met their primary test objectives. Boilerplate 22 gave an TN D3964, June 1967, NASA.