University of the Philippines College of Law

3-D

Topic Impeachment
Case No. G.R. No. 193966 February 19, 2014
Case Name Design Sources Intl vs Eristingcol
Ponente SERENO, CJ.:

1. Design Sources International, Inc. ("Petitioner Corporation") is a distributor of Pergo flooring. Sometime in
1998, the Private Respondent bought the said brand of flooring of the "Cherry Blocked" type from the
Petitioner Corporation. The flooring was installed in her house.
2. On February 24, 2000, the Private Respondent discovered that the Pergo flooring installed had unsightly
bulges at the joints and seams. The Private Respondent informed the Petitioners of these defects and the
former insisted on the repair or replacement of the flooring at the expense of the latter.
3. After several inspections of the alleged defective flooring, meetings between the parties and exchanges of
correspondence, the Petitioner Corporation was given until May 31, 2000 to replace the installed flooring.
Nevertheless, on the deadline, the Petitioner Corporation did not comply with the demand of the Private
Respondent. A complaint for damages was thus filed by the Private Respondent before the RTC.
4. On February 8, 2006, Kenneth Sy, one of the Petitioners' witnesses, testified in open court. Immediately after
his testimony, Stephen Sy from Design Source was also supposed to testify, but Atty. Fortun said that he
plans to ask the court that Stephen be excluded because he has already heard the whole testimony of
Kenneth, his colleague. In the end, the counsel for petitioners moved for continuance
5. On 22 March 2006, petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the Order, but their motion was denied by the
RTC on the ground that "the Court deems it no longer necessary to allow Stephen Sy from testifying when a
different witness could testify on matters similar to the intended testimony of the former. The Order also
stated that "to allow Stephen Sy from testifying would work to the disadvantage of the plaintiff as he already
heard the testimony of witness Kenneth Sy.
6. 2nd MR denied.
7. CA: found no sufficient basis that herein respondent previously asked for the exclusion of other witnesses. It
was the duty of respondent’s counsel to ask for the exclusion of other witnesses, without which, there was
nothing to prevent Stephen from hearing the testimony of petitioners’ other witnesses. Nevertheless,
following the doctrine laid down in People v. Sandal, the appellate court ruled that the RTC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Orders considering that petitioners failed to show that
Stephen’s testimony would bolster their position. Moreover, from the Manifestation of petitioners’ counsel, it
appears that petitioners had another witness who could give a testimony similar to Stephen’s.
8. Hence, this petition. Petitioners raise the following errors allegedly committed by the CA:
a. Finding that the preclusion of Stephen Sy from testifying as a witness in the trial of the case did not
amount to grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Pozon.
b. Applying the case of People vs. Sandal in justifying the order of exclusion issued by Judge Pozon,
precluding Stephen Sy from testifying as witness.
c. Concluding that the petitioners had another witness that could have given a similar testimony as that
of Stephen Sy.

Issue Ratio
W/N YES.
Judge
Pozon As aptly found by the CA, respondent failed to substantiate her claim that there was a prior
committe request for the exclusion of other witnesses during the presentation of Kenneth. Respondent did
d GAD not even allege in her Comment that there was any such request. Excluding future witnesses from
when in the courtroom at the time another witness is testifying, or ordering that these witnesses be kept
preclude separate from one another, is primarily to prevent them from conversing with one another. The
d purpose is to ensure that the witnesses testify to the truth by preventing them from being
Stephen influenced by the testimonies of the others. In other words, this measure is meant to prevent
Sy from connivance or collusion among witnesses. The efficacy of excluding or separating witnesses has
testifying long been recognized as a means of discouraging fabrication, inaccuracy, and collusion. However,
 University of the Philippines College of Law
3-D

as a without any motion from the opposing party or order from the court, there is nothing in the rules
witness that prohibits a witness from hearing the testimonies of other witnesses.

There is nothing in the records of this case that would show that there was an order of exclusion
from the RTC, or that there was any motion from respondent’s counsel to exclude other witnesses
from the courtroom prior to or even during the presentation of the testimony of Kenneth. We are
one with the CA in finding that under such circumstances, there was nothing to prevent Stephen
from hearing the testimony of Kenneth. Therefore, the RTC should have allowed Stephen to testify
for petitioners.

The RTC and the CA, however, moved on to determine the materiality of the testimony of
Stephen, which became their basis for not allowing the latter to testify.1âwphi1 Applying Sandal,
the CA ruled that the absence of a showing of how his testimony would bolster the position of
petitioners saved the judgment of the RTC in issuing the order of exclusion.

SC agree with petitioners that the application of Sandal is misplaced. Contrary to the present
case, in Sandal there was a court order for exclusion which was disregarded by the witness. The
defiance of the order led to the exercise by the court of its discretion to admit or reject the
testimony of the witness who had defied its order. Again, in this case, there was no order or
motion for exclusion that was defied by petitioners and their witnesses. Thus, the determination of
the materiality of Stephen's testimony in relation to the strengthening of petitioners' defense was
uncalled for.

Without any prior order or at least a motion for exclusion from any of the parties, a court
cannot simply allow or disallow the presentation of a witness solely on the ground that the
latter heard the testimony of another witness. It is the responsibility of respondent's counsel to
protect the interest of his client during the presentation of other witnesses. If respondent actually
believed that the testimony of Kenneth would greatly affect that of Stephen's, then respondent's
counsel was clearly remiss in his duty to protect the interest of his client when he did not raise the
issue of the exclusion of the witness in a timely manner.

RULING

In view thereof, the RTC is hereby ordered to allow the presentation of Stephen Sy as witness for petitioners.
Accordingly, petitioners' Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction or Temporary Restraining
Order is now rendered moot.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED.

SO ORDERED.