VICARIOUS LIABILITY

Doctrinal Rulings:

Exonde vs Capuno: It is true that under A2180, "teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while
they are under their custody", but this provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution. Here neither the
head of that school, nor the city school's supervisor, could be held liable for the negligent act of Dante because he was not a student of an institute of arts and
trades as provided by law.

The civil liability which the law impose upon the father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by the minor
children who live with them, is obvious. This is necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the
"duty of supporting them, keeping them in their company, educating them and instructing them in proportion to their means", while, on the other hand, gives
them the "right to correct and punish them in moderation". The only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised
all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.

Tamargo vs CA: Under the Civil Code, the basis of parental liability for the torts of a minor child is the relationship existing between the parents and the minor
child living with them and over whom, the law presumes, the parents exercise supervision and control.

The SC do not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time
when adopting parents had no actual or physically custody over the adopted child. Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for
adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold that
parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen
and which they could not have prevented would be unfair and unconscionable. Such a result, moreover, would be inconsistent with the philosophical and policy
basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a little differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the adopting parents could have
arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort was committed.

Parental authority is provisionally vested in the adopting parents during the period of trial custody, i.e., before the issuance of a decree of adoption, precisely
because the adopting parents are given actual custody of the child during such trial period. In the instant case, the trial custody period either had not yet begun
or had already been completed at the time of the air rifle shooting; in any case, actual custody of Adelberto was then with his natural parents, not the adopting
parents.

Amadora vs CA:
St. Mary’s Academy vs Carpitanos: In the law of torts, the governing principle is that the protective custody of the school heads and teachers is
mandatorily substituted for that of the parents, and hence, it becomes their obligation as well as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision of the
students' activities during the whole time that they are at attendance in the school, including recess time, as well as to take the necessary precautions to
protect the students in their custody from dangers and hazards that would reasonably be anticipated, including injuries that some student themselves may
inflict willfully or through negligence on their fellow students.

The unfortunate death resulting from the fight between students could have been avoided, should the defendants complied with their duty of providing
adequate supervision over the activities of the students in the school premises to protect their students from harm, whether at the hands of fellow students or
other parties. At any rate, the law holds them liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability, in compliance with the last paragraph of Article 2180, Civil
Code, by "(proving) that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage." There is nothing in the law that requires that for such
liability to attach the pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live and board in the school.

Phil Rbbit vs Phil American: The terms "employers" and "owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise" used in article 2180 embrace the
manager of a corporation owning a truck, the reckless operation of which allegedly resulted in the vehicular accident from which the damage arose.

Hence, no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., in connection with the vehicular
accident because he himself may be regarded as an employee or dependent of his employer, Phil-American Forwarders, Inc.

Del Carmen vs Bacoy: The registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to third
persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets.

☑ Defense available for a registered owner of vehicle:

Equitable vs Suyom: The registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons
for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets.

 Equitable may not be held subsidiarily liable for civil liability because he is not the employer. But he can be held primarily liable for quasi-delict
because he is the registered owner.
Martin vs CA: Whether or not engaged in any business or industry, the employer under Article 2180 (5) is liable for the torts committed by his employees
within the scope of their assigned task. But it is necessary first to establish the employment relationship. Once this is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold
the employer liable, that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed.

Q: When employer is liable under A2180 (5)?

Q: Difference between employer’s liability under A2180 (5) and the employer’s subsidiary liability under A103, RPC?
A: In A103, the employer must engaged in an industry while under A2189, the employer need not be engages in any industry.

Q: Difference between A2180 (4) and A2180 (5)

Merrit vs Government: The responsibility of the state is limited to cases wherein it acts through a special agent; a special agent is one who receives a
definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official. This does not apply to any executive agent
who is an employee of the acting administration and who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his
office and which are regulated by law and the regulations.

Municipality of San Juan vs CA: For liability to arise under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, ownership of the roads, streets, bridges, public buildings and
other public works, is not a controlling factor, it being sufficient that a province, city or municipality has control or supervision thereof.
1. Parents

EXCONDE VS CAPUNO

FACTS:
Dante Capuno was a member of the Boy Scouts Organization and a student of the Bilintawak Elementary School. He attended a parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal
in said city upon instruction of the city school's supervisor. From the school Dante, with other students, boarded a jeep and when the same started to run, he took
hold of the wheel and drove it while the driver sat on his left side. They have not gone far when the jeep turned turtle and two of its passengers, Amado Ticzon and
Isidore Caperiña, died as a consequence.

Dante Capuno, son of Delfin Capuno, was accused of double homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Isidoro Caperina and Amado Ticzon. During
the trial, Sabina Exconde, as mother of the deceased Isidoro Caperina, reserved her right to bring a separate civil action for damages against the accused. After
trial, Dante Capuno was found guilty of the crime charged and, on appeal, the CA affirmed the decision. Dante Capuno was only (15) years old when he committed
the crime.

In line with her reservation, Sabina Exconde filed the present action against Delfin Capuno and his son Dante Capuno asking for damages for the death of her son
Isidoro Caperiña. Defendants set up the defense that if anyone should be held liable for the death of Isidoro Caperina, he is Dante Capuno and not his father
Delfin because at the time of the accident, the former was not under the control, supervision and custody, of the latter. This defense was sustained by the lower
court and, as a consequence it only convicted Dante Capuno to pay the damages claimed in the complaint. From decision, plaintiff appealed to the CA but the
case was certified to us on the ground that the appeal only involves questions of law.

Plaintiff contends that defendant Delfin Capuno is liable for the damages in question jointly and severally with his son Dante because at the time the latter
committed the negligent act which resulted in the death of the victim, he was a minor and was then living with his father, and inasmuch as these facts are not
disputed, the civil liability of the father is evident.

ISSUE: W/N Delfin Capuno should be held jointly and solidarily liable for damages with his son.

HELD: Yes. The SC affirmed the contention of the plaintiff.

It is true that under the law above quoted, "teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are
under their custody", but this provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution. Here Dante capuno was
then a student of the Balintawak Elementary School and as part of his extra-curricular activity, he attended the parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal upon instruction of
the city school's supervisor. And it was in connection with that parade that Dante boarded a jeep with some companions and while driving it, the accident occurred.
In the circumstances, it is clear that neither the head of that school, nor the city school's supervisor, could be held liable for the negligent act of Dante because he
was not then a student of an institute of arts and trades as provided by law.

The civil liability which the law impose upon the father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by the minor
children who live with them, is obvious. This is necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the "duty
of supporting them, keeping them in their company, educating them and instructing them in proportion to their means", while, on the other hand, gives them the
"right to correct and punish them in moderation". The only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.

TAMARGO VS CA

CUADRA VS MONFORT
FACTS: Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria Teresa Monfort, 13, were classmates in Grade Six at the Mabini Elementary School in Bacolod City. One day, their
teacher assigned them, together with three other classmates, to weed the grass in the school premises. While thus engaged, Maria Teresa Monfort found a plastic
headband. Jokingly she said aloud that she had found an earthworm and, evidently to frighten Cuadra, tossed the object at her. At that precise moment the latter
turned around to face her friend, and the object hit her right eye.

The next day, the eye became swollen and it was then that the girl related the incident to her parents, who thereupon took her to a doctor for treatment. Despite
the medical efforts, however, Maria Teresa Cuadra completely lost the sight of her right eye.
A civil action was filed by the parents against Alfonso Monfort, Maria Teresa Monfort's father. The trial court ordered the father to pay the damages caused by his
minor child.

ISSUE: W/N the father is liable for the damage caused by the act of his minor child.

HELD: No.
There is nothing from which it may be inferred that the defendant could have prevented the damage by the observance of due care, or that he was in any way
remiss in the exercise of his parental authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the act which caused it.
On the contrary, his child was at school, where it was his duty to send her and where she was, as he had the right to expect her to be, under the care
and supervision of the teacher. And as far as the act which caused the injury was concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual among children at play and
which no parent, however careful, would have any special reason to anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed
any trait in the child's character which would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed to her parents.

The victim, no doubt, deserves no little commiseration and sympathy for the tragedy that befell her. But if the defendant is at all obligated to compensate her
suffering, the obligation has no legal sanction enforceable in court, but only the moral compulsion of good conscience.

2. Guardians
Articles 216 and 218, FC Articles 2180-2181, Civil Code

3. Teachers and Heads of Institutions

AMADORA VS CA

ST. MARY'S ACADEMY VS CARPITANOS

FACTS: St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996. A facet of the enrollment campaign was the visitation of
schools from where prospective enrollees were studying. Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group. Sherwin, along with other high school students
rode a Mitsubishi jeep owned by Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School, Larayan, Dapitan City. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II
then 15 years old and a student of the same school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle.

Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident. Spouses William Carpitanos and Lucia Carpitanos filed a case against James
Daniel II and his parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St. Mary’s Academy before the RTC of Dipolog City.

The RTC rendered judgment holding St. Mary's Academy liable for damages, and the Daniels' parents subsidiarily liable. James Daniel II and Villanueva were
absolved of liability. The CA affirmed the decision of RTC and ruled that the the school is liable under A218 and A219 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE: W/N St. Mary's Academy and Daniel’s parents are liable for damages?
HELD: No. The SC reversed the decision of CA.
Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental authority over a minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody: (1)
the school, its administrators and teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care. This special parental authority and responsibility
applies to all authorized activities, whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. Thus, such authority and responsibility
applies to field trips, excursions and other affairs of the pupils and students outside the school premises whenever authorized by the school or its teachers.

Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor, those exercising special parental authority are principally and solidarily liable for
damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor while under their supervision, instruction, or custody.

However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because
the negligence must have a causal connection to the accident. In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner was the proximate
cause of the death of the victim. It was admitted that the immediate cause of the accident was not the negligence of petitioner or the reckless driving of James
Daniel II, but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.
Considering it was the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by Villanueva which caused the accident, an
event over which St. Mary’s Academy had no control, and which was the proximate cause of the accident, the school may not be held liable for the death resulting
from such accident.

Thus, it is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who is Villanueva, who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos
because the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused
the latter while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets.

PALISOC VS BRILLANTES

FACTS: Dominador Palisoc and defendant Virgilio L. Daffon were classmates and, together with another classmate Desiderio Cruz were in the laboratory room
located on the ground floor. At that time the classes were in recess, Cruz and Daffon were working on a machine while Dominador Palisoc was merely looking on
at them. Daffon made a remark to the effect that Palisoc was acting like a foreman. Because of this remark Palisoc slapped slightly Daffon on the face. Daffon, in
retaliation, gave Palisoc a strong flat blow on the face, followed by other fist blows to the stomach. Palisoc retreated, but Daffon followed him and both exchanged
blows until Palisoc stumbled on an engine block causing him to fall face downward. Palisoc became pale and fainted. First aid was administered to him but he was
not revived, so he was immediately taken to a hospital. He never regained consciousness.

Spouses Palisoc filed an action for the recovery of damages against Antonio Brillantes, former sole proprietor of Manila Technical Institute, Teodosio Valenton, the
president of the school; Santiago Quibulue, instructor of the class to which the deceased belonged; and Virgilio L. Daffon, a fellow student of the deceased.

The trial court rendered a decision ordering Daffon (classmate) to pay for damages and absolving from liability the three officials of the school, holding that Article
2180 does not apply, which decision was based on the ruling held in Mercado v. CA wherein it was ruled that heads and teachers of arts and trades are liable for
damages caused by their pupils and students only if the student who inflicted the fatal fistblows on the victim "lived and boarded with his teacher or the other
defendants officials of the school. Which decision was based also in the ruling held in Ecxonde vs Capuno wherein the provision on the liability of heads and
teachers under A2180 applies only to an institution of arts and trades (non-academic) and not to any academic educational institution.

ISSUE: W/N the president of the school (Valenton) and the instructor (Quibulue) of the class to which the deceased belonged are liable under A2180 for the act of
Daffon.

HELD: Yes. They are liable jointly and severally for damages to Spouses Palisoc for the death of the latter's minor son at the hands of defendant Daffon at the
school's laboratory room. No liability attaches to defendant Brillantes as a mere member of the school's board of directors. The school itself cannot be held
similarly liable, since it has not been properly impleaded as party defendant (kase ung school is incorporated sya, so Corporation sya).
In the law of torts, the governing principle is that the protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of the parents, and
hence, it becomes their obligation as well as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision of the students' activities during the whole time that they are at
attendance in the school, including recess time, as well as to take the necessary precautions to protect the students in their custody from dangers and hazards that
would reasonably be anticipated, including injuries that some student themselves may inflict willfully or through negligence on their fellow students.

The unfortunate death resulting from the fight between students could have been avoided, should the defendants complied with their duty of providing adequate
supervision over the activities of the students in the school premises to protect their students from harm, whether at the hands of fellow students or other parties.
At any rate, the law holds them liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability, in compliance with the last paragraph of Article 2180, Civil Code, by
"(proving) that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage." There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to
attach the pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live and board in the school.

4. Owners and Managers of Establishments

PHILIPPINE RABBIT VS PHIL AMERICAN

FACTS: Pineda drove recklessly a freight truck, owned by Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., along the national highway at Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. The truck
bumped the bus driven by Pangalangan, which was owned by Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. As a result of the bumping, Pangalangan suffered injuries and the
bus was damaged and could not be used for seventy-nine days, thus depriving the company of earnings.

The bus company and bus driver filed a complaint for damages against Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., Balingit, who is the manager of the corporation, and
Pineda, the truck driver.
Balingit contended that he was not the employer of Pineda; and that Balingit as the manager of Phil American is not the manager of an establishment
contemplated in article 2180 of the Civil Code, the action being based upon quasi-delict.

The trial court dismissed the action as to Balingit affirming the contention of Balingit.

ISSUE: W/N the terms "employers" and "owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise" used in article 2180 embrace the manager of a corporation
owning a truck, the reckless operation of which allegedly resulted in the vehicular accident from which the damage arose.

HELD: No. The SC held that those terms do not include the manager of a corporation. It may be gathered from the context of article 2180 that the term "manager"
is used in the sense of "employer".

Hence, under the allegations of the complaint, no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., in
connection with the vehicular accident because he himself may be regarded as an employee or dependent of his employer, Phil-American Forwarders, Inc.

PANTRANCO VS BAESA

FACTS: On June 12, 1981, at approximately 7:00 o'clock in the morning, spouses Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa and their three children (Harold, Marcelino, and
Maricar), along with spouses David Ico and Fe Ico, their son Erwin Ico and seven other persons, were on board a passenger jeepney on their way to Malalam
River, Isabela, to have a picnic in celebration of spouses Baesa’s 5th wedding anniversary.

David Ico was driving. Upon reaching the highway, the jeepney turned right at a speed of about 20 KPH. A PANTRANCO bus from Aparri, on-route to Manila,
encroached on the jeepney's lane while negotiating a curve, and collided with it. David Ico, spouses Ceasar Baesa and Marilyn Baesa and two of their children,
died while the rest of the passengers sustained injuries. The jeepney is extensively damaged. The driver of the bus went into hiding, and has never been seen.
Maricar Baesa through her guardian, and Fe Ico filed separate actions for damages arising from quasi-delict against PANTRANCO. PANTRANCO alleged that the
negligence of the jeepney driver was the proximate cause of the accident, and invoked the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its bus
driver, Ambrosio Ramirez, that the fact that Ramirez was employed and remained as its driver only means that he underwent the same rigid selection process and
was subjected to the same strict supervision imposed by petitioner on all applicants and employees.

The trial court rendered a decision ordering PANTRANCO to pay damages to the plaintiff and ruled that no sufficient evidence were shown to proved that
PANTRANCO exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employee. The decision was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE: W/N PANTRANCO observed diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees.

HELD: No. The mere issuance of rules and regulations and the formulation of various company policies on safety, without showing that they are being complied
with, are not sufficient to exempt petitioner from liability arising from the negligence of its employee. It is incumbent upon petitioner to show that in recruiting and
employing the erring driver, the recruitment procedures and company policies on efficiency and safety were followed. Petitioner failed to do this.

The SC believes that the evidence submitted by the defendant to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the case of Ramirez, as a
company driver is far from sufficient. No support evidence has been adduced. The professional driver’s license of Ramirez has not been produced. There is no
proof that he is between 25 to 38 years old. There is also no proof as to his educational attainment, his age, his weight and the fact that he is married or not.
Neither are the result of the written test, psychological and physical test, among other tests, have been submitted in evidence. His NBI or police clearances and
clearances from previous employment were not marked in evidence. No evidence was presented that Ramirez actually and really attended the seminars.

DEL CARMEN VS BACOY

Defense of Del Carmen: the provision on vicarious liability of the employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code requires (1) the existence of employer-employee
relationship; and (2) that the employee was acting within the scope of his employment when the tort occurred. He stressed that Allan acted beyond the scope of
his employment when he drove the jeep. Allan was not acting in the performance of his duty.

SC: Article 2180 should defer to the settled doctrine concerning accidents involving registered motor vehicles, that is, the registered owner of any vehicle, even if
not used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle was being driven on the
highways or streets.

☑ Defense available for a registered owner of vehicle:

Defense of Del Carmen: the vehicle was carnapped by Allan and his five companions despite the obstacles surrounding the parking area and the weight of the
jeep.

SC: The negligence of Del Carmen is proved through the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur by the CA which was affirmed by the SC.

The requisites are all present in this case. First, no person just walking along the road would suddenly be sideswiped and run over by an on-rushing vehicle unless
the one in charge of the said vehicle had been negligent. Second, the jeep which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of Oscar Jr. as its owner. When
Oscar Jr. entrusted the ignition key to Rodrigo, he had the power to instruct him with regard to the specific restrictions of the jeeps use, including who or who may
not drive it. As he is aware that the jeep may run without the ignition key, he also has the responsibility to park it safely and securely and to instruct his driver
Rodrigo to observe the same precaution. Lastly, there was no showing that the death of the victims was due to any voluntary action or contribution on their part.

EQUITABLE VS SUYOM
5. Employers

MARTIN VS CA

FACTS: Ernesto Martin was the owner of a private car. At around 2 o'clock in the morning, while being driven by Nestor Martin, it crashed into a Meralco electric
post on Valley Golf Road, in Antipolo, Rizal. The car was wrecked and the pole severely damaged. Meralco subsequently demanded reparation from Ernesto
Martin, but the demand was rejected. Consequently, Meralco sued him for damages as alleged employer of Nestor Martin. The petitioner's main defense was that
Nestor Martin was not his employee.

The trial court ruled in favor of Meralco and ordered Ernesto Martin to pay damages to Meralco based on the presumption that Nestor was an employee of
Ernesto. The decision was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE: W/N Ernesto Martin is liable for the damages caused by the act of Nestor Martin as an employer under A2180.

HELD: No. Under A2180, Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned
tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

Whether or not engaged in any business or industry, the employer under Article 2180 is liable for the torts committed by his employees within the scope of their
assigned task. But it is necessary first to establish the employment relationship. Once this is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable,
that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed.

In the case at bar, no evidence whatsoever was adduced by the plaintiff to show that the defendant was the employer of Nestor Martin at the time of the accident.
The employment relationship between Ernesto Martin and Nestor Martin could not be presumed, it is necessary for the plaintiff to establish it by evidence and
Meralco had the burden of proof to show that there was an employer-employee relationship.

6. State

MERRIT VS GOVERNMENT

FACTS: The plaintiff, riding on a motorcycle, was going toward the western part of Calle Padre Faura, passing along the west side thereof at a speed of ten to
twelve miles an hour. Upon crossing Taft Avenue and when he was ten feet from the southwestern intersection of said streets, the General Hospital ambulance,
upon reaching said avenue, instead of turning toward the south, after passing the center thereof, so that it would be on the left side of said avenue, as is
prescribed by the ordinance and the Motor Vehicle Act, turned suddenly and unexpectedly and long before reaching the center of the street, into the right side of
Taft Avenue, without having sounded any whistle or horn, by which movement it struck the plaintiff, who was already six feet from the southwestern point or from
the post place there.

The plaintiff suffered from fractures to the skull, material injury to the grey matter and brain and a broken right leg as a result of the collision. He was mentally and
physically impaired such that he lost his efficiency in constructing wooden buildings, which was his occupation.

Act No. 2457 was enacted specifically to authorize E.Merritt to bring suit against the Government “in order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his
motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital, and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said
collision.”
The trial court found the chauffeur of ambulance negligent and hold that the Government is liable for damages sustained by Merrit as a result of the collision.

ISSUE: W/N the chauffeur of the ambulance is considered as a special agent, for which the Government was made liable for his negligent act.
HELD: No. Under A2180, “The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should have been caused by the official
to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable.”

The responsibility of the state is limited to cases wherein it acts through a special agent; a special agent is one who receives a definite and fixed order or
commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official. This does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the acting
administration and who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and
the regulations.

Therefore, the State is only liable for the acts of its agents, officers and employees when they act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article
1903 (now Article 2180); and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent for which the State is made liable.

GUILATCO VS CITY OF DAGUPAN

FACTS: Florentina Guilatco, a Court Interpreter, was about to board a tricycle along a sidewalk when she accidentally fell into a manhole that was partially
covered by a concrete flower pot leaving a gaping hole about 2 ft long by 1 ½ feet wide and 150 cm deep. Florentina suffered a fracture on her right leg and as
result thereof, had to be hospitalized.

Florentina averred that she suffered mental and physical pain, and that she has difficulty in locomotion. She became incapable of reporting for duty within quite
some time and thus lost income. She also lost weight, and is no longer her former jovial self. Florentina sued the City of Dagupan and City Engr. Alfredo Tango.

Defendant Alfredo Tangco is a City Engineer of Dagupan City, an ex-officio Highway Engineer, City Engineer of the Public Works, and Building Official for
Dagupan City. He admitted that as City Engineer of Dagupan City, he supervises the maintenance of said manholes or drainage system and sees to it that they
are properly covered, and the job is specifically done by his subordinates, Mr. Santiago de Vera (Maintenance Foreman) and Engr. Ernesto Solermo also a
maintenance Engineer. He also admitted that in his capacity as ex-officio Highway Engineer for Dagupan City he exercises supervision and control over National
roads, including the Perez Blvd. where the incident happened.

The City contends that Perez Boulevard, where the fatal drainage hole is located, is a national road that is not under the control or supervision of the City of
Dagupan. Hence, no liability should attach to the city. It submits that it is actually the Ministry of Public Highways that has control or supervision through the
Highway Engineer which, by mere coincidence, is held concurrently by the same person who is also the City Engineer of Dagupan.

The trial court held the City of Dagupan liable and dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint as to the City Engineer. The appellate court reversed the ruling on the ground
that no evidence was presented to prove that the City of Dagupan had "control or supervision" over the Boulevard, where the manhole is located.

ISSUE: W/N the City of Dagupan is liable for damages sustained by Guilatco.

HELD: Yes. The City of Dagupan is liable for damages. The liability of public corporations for damages arising from injuries suffered by pedestrians by reason of
the defective condition of roads is expressed in the Art. 2189 of Civil Code, which states: “Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the
death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their
control or supervision”.

For liability to attach, it is not even necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the province, city or municipality. The article only requires that either
control or supervision is exercised over the defective road or street.

In the case at bar, this control or supervision is provided for in the charter of Dagupan City and is exercised through the City Engineer. This function of supervision
over streets, public buildings, and other public works is coursed through a Maintenance Foreman and a Maintenance Engineer. Although these last two officials
are employees of the National Government, they are detailed with the City of Dagupan and receive instruction and supervision from the city through the City
Engineer.

There is, therefore, no doubt that the City Engineer exercises control or supervision over the public works in question. Hence, the liability of the city to the petitioner
under article 2198 of the Civil Code is clear.

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN VS CA

FACTS: Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) engaged the services of K.C. Waterworks System Construction (KC), the former engaged the
services of the latter to install water service connections.

KC was given a Job Order by the South Sector Office of MWSS to conduct and effect excavations at the corner of M. Paterno and Santolan Road, San Juan,
Metro Manila, a national road, for the laying of water pipes and tapping of water to the respective houses of water concessionaires.

In the evening of 31 May 1988, Priscilla Chan was driving her Toyota Crown car on the right side of Santolan Road. With her on board the car and seated on the
right front seat was Assistant City Prosecutor Laura Biglang-awa.The road was flooded as it was then raining hard. Suddenly, the left front wheel of the car fell on
a manhole where the workers of KC had earlier made excavations. As a result, the humerus on the right arm of Prosecutor Biglang-awa was fractured.

Consequent to the foregoing incident, Biglang-awa filed before the RTC at Pasig, Metro Manila a complaint for damages against MWSS, the Municipality of San
Juan and a number of San Juan municipal officials.

After due proceedings, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Biglang-awa adjudging MWSS and the Municipality of San Juan jointly and severally liable to
her.

Defense of Mun. Of San Juan:

SC: For liability to arise under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, ownership of the roads, streets, bridges, public buildings and other public works, is not a controlling
factor, it being sufficient that a province, city or municipality has control or supervision thereof.

The term regulate found in the provision of Section 149 can only mean that petitioner municipality exercises the power of control, or, at the very least, supervision
over all excavations for the laying of gas, water, sewer and other pipes within its territory.

The SC emphasized that the regulation provided for in Sec. 149, LGC is not modified by the term municipal road. And neither can it be fairly inferred from the
same provision of Section 149 that petitioners power of regulation vis--vis the activities therein mentioned applies only in cases where such activities are to be
performed in municipal roads.

Municipality’s liability for injuries caused by its failure to regulate the drilling and excavation of the ground for the laying of gas, water, sewer, and other pipes,
attaches regardless of whether the drilling or excavation is made on a national or municipal road, for as long as the same is within its territorial jurisdiction.