2/22/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 385

VOL. 385, JULY 31, 2002 607

Coquilla vs. Commission on Elections

*
G.R. No. 151914. July 31, 2002.

TEODULO M. COQUILLA, petitioner, vs. THE HON.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MR. NEIL M.
ALVAREZ, respondents.

Remedial Law; Motions; Pro Forma; Mere reiteration in a

motion for reconsideration of the issues raised by the parties and
passed upon by the court does not make a motion pro-forma.—The
motion for reconsideration was not pro forma and its filing did
suspend the period for filing the petition for certiorari in this case.
The mere reiteration in a motion for reconsideration of the issues
raised by the parties and passed upon by the court does not make
a motion pro forma; otherwise, the movant’s remedy would not be
a reconsideration of the decision but a new trial or some other
remedy.

_______________

* EN BANC.

608

608 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Coquilla vs. Commission on Elections

Election Law; Residence is to be understood not in its common

acceptation as referring to “dwelling” or “habitation” but rather to
“domicile” or legal residence.—The term “residence” is to be
understood not in its common acceptation as referring to
“dwelling” or “habitation,” but rather to “domicile” or legal
residence, that is, “the place where a party actually or
constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter
where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to
return and remain (animus manendi).” A domicile of origin is

www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001706d719350be9b1162003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/18
2/22/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 385

acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where

the child’s parents reside and continues until the same is
abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice).
Same; Same; Naturalization in a foreign country results in an
abandonment of domicile in the Philippines.—In Caasi v. Court of
Appeals, this Court ruled that immigration to the United States
by virtue of a “greencard,” which entitles one to reside
permanently in that country, constitutes abandonment of domicile
in the Philippines. With more reason then does naturalization in
a foreign country result in an abandonment of domicile in the
Philippines.
Same; Same; Registration as a voter does not bar the filing of
a subsequent case questioning a candidate’s lack of residency.—
Petitioner nonetheless says that his registration as a voter of
Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar in January 2001 is conclusive of his
residency as a candidate because §117 of the Omnibus Election
Code requires that a voter must have resided in the Philippines
for at least one year and in the city or municipality wherein he
proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the
election. As held in Nuval v. Guray, however, registration as a
voter does not bar the filing of a subsequent case questioning a
candidate’s lack of residency.
Same; Proceedings for denial or cancellation of a certificate of
candidacy are summary in nature.—Petitioner was not denied due
process because the COMELEC failed to act on his motion to be
allowed to present evidence. Under §5(d), in relation to §7, of R.A.
No. 6646 (Electoral Reforms Law of 1987), proceedings for denial
or cancellation of a certificate of candidacy are summary in
nature. The holding of a formal hearing is thus not de rigeur. In
any event, petitioner cannot claim denial of the right to be heard
since he filed a Verified Answer, a Memorandum and a
Manifestation, all dated March 19, 2001, before the COMELEC in
which he submitted documents relied by him in this petition,
which, contrary to petitioner’s claim, are complete and intact in
the records.

609

VOL. 385, JULY 31, 2002 609

Coquilla vs. Commission on Elections

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

Certiorari.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Franklin Delano M. Sacmar for petitioner.
     Jonathan M. Agnes for private respondent.
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001706d719350be9b1162003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 2/18
2/22/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 385

          Christopher L. Moscare collaborating counsel for

private respondent.

MENDOZA, J.:
1
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the resolution,
dated July 19, 2001, of the Second Division of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), ordering the
cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of petitioner
Teodulo M. Coquilla for the position of mayor of Oras,
Eastern Samar in the May 14, 2001 elections and the
order, dated January 30, 2002, of the COMELEC en banc
denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Coquilla was born on February 17, 1938 of
Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew up and
resided there until 1965, when he joined the United States2
Navy. He was subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen.
From 1970 to 1973, petitioner thrice3 visited the Philippines
while on leave from the U.S. Navy. Otherwise, even after
his retirement from the U.S. Navy in 1985, he remained in
the United States.
On October 15, 1998, petitioner came to the Philippines
and took out a residence certificate, although he continued
making several trips to the United States, the last of which4
took place on July 6, 2000 and lasted until August 5, 2000.
Subsequently, petitioner

_______________

1 Per Presiding Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion and concurred in by

Commissioners Mehol K. Sadain and Florentino A. Tuazon, Jr.
2 The records do not disclose when petitioner became a U.S. citizen.
3 Records, pp. 167-169.
4 Petitioner’s U.S. passport for 1998-2008 shows the following dates of
arrival in the Philippines and dates of departure for the United States:
arrival—October 15, 1998, departure—November 3, 1998; arrival—
December 20, 1998 (with no record of corresponding departure); arrival—
October 16, 1999, departure—November 1, 1999; arrival—June 23, 2000,

610

610 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Coquilla vs. Commission on Elections

5
applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 8171 to the Special
Committee on Naturalization. His application was
approved on November 7, 2000, and, on November 10,

www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001706d719350be9b1162003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 3/18
2/22/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 385

2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines.

Petitioner was issued Certificate of Repatriation No.
000737 on November 10, 2000 and Bureau of Immigration
Identification Certificate No. 115123 on November 13,
2000.
On November 21, 2000, petitioner applied for
registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar. His
application was approved 6 by the Election Registration
Board on January 12, 2001. On February 27, 2001, he filed
his certificate of candidacy stating therein that he had7 been
a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for “two (2) years.”
On March 5, 2001, respondent Neil M. Alvarez, who was
the incumbent mayor of Oras and who was running for
reelection, sought the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate
of candidacy on the ground that the latter had made a
material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy
by stating that he had been a resident of Oras for two years
when in truth he had resided therein for only about six
months since November 10, 2000, when he took his oath as
a citizen of the Philippines.
The COMELEC was unable to render judgment on the
case before the elections on May 14, 2001. Meanwhile,
petitioner was voted for and received the highest number of
votes (6,131) against private respondent’s 5,752 votes, or a
margin of 379 votes. On May 17, 2001, petitioner was
proclaimed 8mayor of Oras by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers. He subsequently took his oath of office.

_______________

ober 16, 1999, departure—November 1, 1999; arrival—June 23, 2000,

departure—July 6, 2000; arrival—August 5, 2000 (Records, pp. 227-228).
5 This law, entitled AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE REPATRIATION
OF FILIPINO WOMEN WHO HAVE LOST THEIR PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP BY MARRIAGE TO ALIENS AND NATURAL-BORN
FILIPINOS, applies to former natural-born Filipinos who have lost their
Philippine citizenship on account of economic or political necessity. It
would appear that petitioner was repatriated under this law on the
ground that he lost his Philippine citizenship on account of economic
necessity.
6 Petition, Annex “O”, p. 56.
7 Id., Annex “C”, p. 34.
8 Id., Annex “H”, p. 46.

611

VOL. 385, JULY 31, 2002 611

Coquilla vs. Commission on Elections
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001706d719350be9b1162003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 4/18
2/22/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 385

On July 19, 2001, the Second Division of the COMELEC

granted private respondent’s petition and ordered the
cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy on the
basis of the following findings:

Respondent’s frequent or regular trips to the Philippines and stay

in Oras, Eastern Samar after his retirement from the U.S. Navy
in 1985 cannot be considered as a waiver of his status as a
permanent resident or immigrant . . . of the U.S.A. prior to
November 10, 2000 as would qualify him to acquire the status of
residency for purposes of compliance with the one-year residency
requirement of Section 39 (a) of the Local Government Code of
1991 in relation to Sections 65 and 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code. The one (1) year residency requirement contemplates of the
actual residence of a Filipino citizen in the constituency where he
seeks to be elected.
All things considered, the number of years he claimed to have
resided or stayed in Oras, Eastern Samar since 1985 as an
American citizen and permanent resident of the U.S.A. before
November 10, 2000 when he reacquired his Philippine citizenship
by [repatriation] cannot be added to his actual residence thereat
after November 10, 2000 until May 14, 2001 to cure his deficiency
in days, months, and year to allow or render him eligible to run
for an elective office in the Philippines. Under such
circumstances, by whatever formula of computation used,
respondent is short of the 9one-year residence requirement before
the May 14, 2001 elections.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but his motion

was denied by the COMELEC en banc on January 30,
2002. Hence this petition.

I.

Two questions must first be resolved before considering the

merits of this case: (a) whether the 30-day period for
appealing the resolution of the COMELEC was suspended
by the filing of a motion for reconsideration by petitioner
and (b) whether the COMELEC retained jurisdiction to
decide this case notwithstanding the proclamation of
petitioner.
A. With respect to the first question, private respondent
contends that the petition in this case should be dismissed
because it

_______________

9 Resolution, p. 7-8; Rollo, pp. 30-31 (emphasis added).

www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001706d719350be9b1162003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 5/18
2/22/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 385

612

612 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Coquilla vs. Commission on Elections

was filed late; that the COMELEC en banc had denied

petitioner’s motion for reconsideration for being pro forma;
and that, pursuant to Rule 19, §4 of the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure, the said motion did not suspend the running
of the 30-day period for filing this petition. He points out
that petitioner received a copy of the resolution, dated July
19, 2001, of the COMELEC’s Second Division on July 28,
2001, so that he had only until August 27, 2001 within
which to file this petition. Since the petition in this case
was filed on February 11, 2002, the same should be
considered as having been filed late and should be
dismissed.
Private respondent’s contention has no merit.
Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides
in pertinent parts:

Sec. 2. Period for Filing Motions for Reconsideration.—A motion

to reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a Division
shall be filed within five days from the promulgation thereof.
Such motion, if not pro-forma, suspends the execution for
implementation of the decision, resolution, order, or ruling.
Sec. 4. Effect of Motion for Reconsideration on Period to Appeal.
—A motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or ruling,
when not pro forma, suspends the running of the period to elevate
the matter to the Supreme Court.

The five-day period for filing a motion for reconsideration

under Rule 19, §2 should be counted from the receipt of the
decision, 10resolution, order, or ruling of the COMELEC
Division. In this case, petitioner received a copy of the
resolution of July 19, 2001 of the COMELEC’s Second
Division on July 28, 2001. Five days later, on August 2,
2001, he filed his motion for reconsideration. On February
6, 2002, he received a copy of the order, dated January 30,
2002, of the COMELEC en banc denying his motion for
reconsideration. Five days later, on February 11, 2002, he
filed this petition for certiorari. There is no question,
therefore, that petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the
resolution of the COMELEC Second Division, as well as his
petition for certiorari to set aside the order of the
COMELEC en banc, was filed within the period pro-

_______________
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001706d719350be9b1162003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 6/18
2/22/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 385

10 Bulaong v. COMELEC, 220 SCRA 745 (1993).

613

VOL. 385, JULY 31, 2002 613

Coquilla vs. Commission on Elections

vided for in Rule 19, §2 of the COMELEC Rules of

Procedure and in Art. IX (A), §7 of the Constitution.
It is contended, however, that petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc did not
suspend the running of the period for filing this petition
because the motion was pro forma and, consequently, this
petition should have been filed on or before August 27,
2001. It was actually filed, however, only on February 11,
2002. Private respondent cites the finding of the
COMELEC en banc that—

An incisive examination of the allegations in the Motion for

Reconsideration shows that the same [are] a mere rehash of his
averments contained in his Verified Answer and Memorandum.
Neither did respondent raise new matters that would sufficiently
warrant a reversal of the assailed resolution 11
of the Second
Division. This makes the said Motion pro forma.

We do not think this contention is correct. The motion for

reconsideration was not pro forma and its filing did
suspend the period for filing the petition for certiorari in
this case. The mere reiteration in a motion for
reconsideration of the issues raised by the parties and
passed upon by the court does not make a motion pro
forma; otherwise, the movant’s remedy would not be a
reconsideration
12
of the decision but a new trial or13 some
other remedy. But, as we have held in another case:

Among the ends to which a motion for reconsideration is

addressed, one is precisely to convince the court that its ruling is
erroneous and improper, contrary to the law or the evidence; and
in doing so, the movant has to dwell of necessity upon the issues
passed upon by the court. If a motion for reconsideration may not
discuss these issues, the consequence would be that after a
decision is rendered, the losing party would be confined to filing
only motions for reopening and new trial.

_______________

11 Order, pp. 1-2; Rollo, pp. 32-33.

12 Siy v. Court of Appeals, 138 SCRA 536 (1985); Continental Cement
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 184 SCRA 728 (1990).
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001706d719350be9b1162003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 7/18
2/22/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 385

13 Guerra Enterprises Company, Inc. v. Court of First Instance of Lanao

del Sur, 32 SCRA 314, 317 (1970).

614

614 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Coquilla vs. Commission on Elections

Indeed, in the cases where a motion for reconsideration

was held to be pro forma, the motion was so 14held because
(1) it was a second motion for reconsideration, or (2) it did
not comply with the rule that the motion must specify the
findings and conclusions alleged to15 be contrary to law or
not supported by the evidence, 16
or (3) it failed to
substantiate the alleged errors, or (4) it merely 17alleged
that the decision in question was contrary to law, 18
or (5)
the adverse party was not given notice thereof. The 16-
page motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner in the
COMELEC en banc suffers from none of the foregoing
defects, and it was error for the COMELEC en banc to rule
that petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was pro forma
because the allegations raised therein are a mere “rehash”
of his earlier pleadings or did not raise “new matters.”
Hence, the filing of the motion suspended the running of
the 30-day period to file the petition in this case, which, as
earlier shown, was done within the reglementary period
provided by law.
B. As stated before, the COMELEC failed to resolve
private respondent’s petition for cancellation of petitioner’s
certificate of candidacy before the elections on May 14,
2001. In the meantime, the votes were canvassed and
petitioner was proclaimed elected with a margin of 379
votes over private respondent. Did the COMELEC thereby
lose authority to act on the petition filed by private
respondent?
R.A. No. 6646 provides:

_______________

14 Manila Trading v. Enriquez, 1 SCRA 1056 (1961); City of Cebu

v. Mendoza, 62 SCRA 440 (1975); Debuque v. Climaco, 99 SCRA
353 (1980); Garcia v. Echiverri, 132 SCRA 631 (1984);
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Island Garment
Manufacturing Corporation, 153 SCRA 665 (1987); Vda. de
Espina v. Abaya, 196 SCRA 312 (1991).
15A similar rule is found in Rule 19, §3 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure.
16 Villarica v. Court of Appeals, 57 SCRA 24 (1974).

www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001706d719350be9b1162003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 8/18
2/22/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 385

17Jessena v. Hervas, 83 SCRA 799 (1978); Marikina Valley

Development Corporation v. Flojo, 251 SCRA 87 (1995); Nieto v.
De los Angeles, 109 SCRA 229 (1981).
18Sembrano v. Ramirez, 166 SCRA 30 (1988); Pojas v. Gozo-
Dadole, 192 SCRA 575 (1990); Bank of the Philippine Islands v.
Far East Molasses Corporation, 198 SCRA 689 (1991).

615

VOL. 385, JULY 31, 2002 615

Coquilla vs. Commission on Elections

SECTION 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.—Any candidate who

has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for
any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the
winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission
shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or
protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor,
may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt
is strong. (Emphasis added)
SECTION 7. Petition to Deny Due Course To or Cancel a
Certificate of Candidacy.—The procedure hereinabove provided
shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881.

The rule then is that candidates who are disqualified by

final judgment before the election shall not be voted for and
the votes cast for them shall not be counted. But those
against whom no final judgment of disqualification had
been rendered may be voted for and proclaimed, unless, on
motion of the complainant, the COMELEC suspends their
proclamation because the grounds for their disqualification
or cancellation of their certificates of candidacy are strong.
Meanwhile, the proceedings for disqualification of
candidates or for the cancellation or denial of certificates of
candidacy, which have been begun before the elections,
should continue even after such elections 19
and proclamation
of the winners.
20
In Abella v. COMELEC and Salcedo II v.
COMELEC, the candidates whose certificates of
candidacy were the subject of petitions for cancellation
were voted for and, having received the highest number of
votes, were duly proclaimed winners. This Court, in the
first case, affirmed and, in the second, reversed the
decisions of the COMELEC rendered after the
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001706d719350be9b1162003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 9/18
2/22/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 385

proclamation of candidates, not on the ground that the

latter had been divested of jurisdiction upon the
candidates’ proclamation but on the merits.

_______________

19 201 SCRA 253 (1991).

20 312 SCRA 447 (1999).

616

616 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Coquilla vs. Commission on Elections

II.

On the merits, the question is whether petitioner had been

a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at least one (1) year
before the elections held on May 14, 2001 as he represented
in his certificate of candidacy. We find that he had not.
First, §39(a) of the Local Government Code (R.A No.
7160) provides:

Qualifications.—(a) An elective local official must be a citizen of

the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality,
city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan,
the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for
at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election;
and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or
dialect. (Emphasis added)

The term “residence” is to be understood not in its common21

acceptation as referring to “dwelling” or 22
“habitation,” but
rather to “domicile” or legal residence, that is, “the place
where a party actually or constructively has his permanent
home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any
given time, eventually
23
intends to return and remain
(animus manendi).” A domicile of origin is acquired by
every person at birth. It is usually the place where the
child’s parents reside and continues until the same is
abandoned
24
by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of
choice).
In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin in
Oras by becoming a U.S. citizen after enlisting in the U.S.
Navy in 1965. From then on and until November 10, 2000,
when he reacquired Philippine citizenship, petitioner was
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001706d719350be9b1162003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 10/18
2/22/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 385

an alien without any right to reside in the Philippines save

as our immigration laws may have allowed him to stay as a
visitor or as a resident alien.

_______________

21 Uytengsu v. Republic, 95 Phil. 890, 894 (1954).

22 Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645 (1928); Gallego v. Verra, 73 Phil. 453
(1941); Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 226 SCRA 408 (1993).
23 Aquino v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 400, 420 (1995).
24 25 AM. JUR. 2d, §11.

617

VOL. 385, JULY 31, 2002 617

Coquilla vs. Commission on Elections

Indeed, residence in the United States is a requirement for

naturalization as a U.S. citizen. Title 8, §1427(a) of the
United States Code provides:

Requirements of naturalization .—Residence

(a) No person, except as otherwise provided in this subchapter,

shall be naturalized unless such applicant. (1) immediately
preceding the date of filing his application for naturalization has
resided continuously, after being lawfully admitted for permanent
residence, within the United States for at least five years and
during the five years immediately preceding the date of filing his
petition has been physically present therein for periods totaling at
least half of that time, and who has resided within the State or
within the district of the Service in the United States in which the
applicant filed the application for at least three months, (2) has
resided continuously within the United States from the date of
the application up to the time of admission to citizenship, and (3)
during all the period referred to in this subsection has been and
still is a person of good moral character, attached to the principles
of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the
good order and happiness of the United States. (Emphasis added)
25
In Caasi v. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that
immigration to the United States by virtue of a
“greencard,” which entitles one to reside permanently in
that country, constitutes abandonment of domicile in the
Philippines. With more reason then does naturalization in
a foreign country result in an abandonment of domicile in
the Philippines.

www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001706d719350be9b1162003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 11/18
2/22/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 385

Nor can petitioner contend that he was “compelled to

adopt American citizenship”
26
only by reason of his service in
the U.S. armed forces. It is noteworthy that petitioner was
repatriated not under R.A. No. 2630, which applies to the
repatriation of those who lost their Philippine citizenship
by accepting commission in the Armed Forces of the United
States, but under R.A. No. 8171, which, as earlier
mentioned, provides for the repatriation of, among others,
natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account
of political or economic necessity. In any event, the fact is
that, by having been naturalized abroad, he lost his
Philippine

_______________

25 191 SCRA 229 (1990).

26 Petition, p. 6; Rollo, p. 8.

618

618 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Coquilla vs. Commission on Elections

citizenship and with it his residence in the Philippines.

Until his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship on
November 10, 2000, petitioner did not reacquire his legal
residence in this country.
Second, it is not true, as petitioner contends, that he
reestablished residence in this country in 1998 when he
came back to prepare for the mayoralty elections of Oras by
securing a Community Tax Certificate in that year and by
“constantly declaring” to his townmates of his intention to
seek repatriation
27
and run for mayor in the May 14, 2001
elections. The status of being an alien and a non-resident
can be waived either separately, when one acquires the
status of a resident alien before acquiring Philippine
citizenship, or at the same time when one acquires
Philippine citizenship. As an alien, 28an individual may
obtain an immigrant visa under §13 of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1948 and an Im-

_______________

27 Id., pp. 9-11; id., pp. 11-13.

28 This provision states:

“Under the conditions set forth in this Act, there may be admitted in the
Philippines immigrants, termed “quota immigrants” not in excess of fifty (50) of

www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001706d719350be9b1162003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 12/18
2/22/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 385

any one nationality or without nationality for any one calendar year, except that
the following immigrants, termed “nonquota immigrants,” may be admitted
without regard to such numerical limitations.
The corresponding Philippine Consular representative abroad shall investigate
and certify the eligibility of a quota immigrant previous to his admission into the
Philippines. Qualified and desirable aliens who are in the Philippines under
temporary stay may be admitted within the quota, subject to the provisions of the
last paragraph of section 9 of this Act.

(a) The wife or the husband or the unmarried child under twenty-one years of
age of a Philippine citizen, if accompanying or following to join such
citizen;
(b) A child of alien parents born during the temporary visit abroad of the
mother, the mother having been previously lawfully admitted into the
Philippines for permanent residence, if the child is accompanying or
coming to join a parent and applies for admission within five years from
the date of its birth;
(c) A child born subsequent to the issuance of the immigration visa of the
accompanying parent, the visa not having expired;

619

VOL. 385, JULY 31, 2002 619

Coquilla vs. Commission on Elections

29
migrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) and thus waive his
status as a non-resident. On the other hand, he may
acquire Philippine citizenship by naturalization under C.A.
No. 473, as amended, or, if he is a former Philippine
national, he may reacquire Philippine 30
citizenship by
repatriation or by an act of Congress, in which case he
waives not only his status as an alien but also his status as
a non-resident alien.
In the case at bar, the only evidence of petitioner’s
status when he entered the country on October 15, 1998,
December 20, 1998, October 16, 1999, and June 23, 2000 is
the statement “Philippine Immigration [-] Balikbayan” in
his 1998-2008 U.S. passport. As for his entry on August 5,
2000, the stamp
31
bore the added inscription “good for one
year stay.” Under §2 of R.A. No. 6768 (An Act Instituting
a Balikbayan Program), the term balikbayan includes a

_______________

(d) A woman who was citizen of the Philippines and who lost her
citizenship because of her marriage to an alien or by reason of the
loss of Philippine citizenship by her husband, and her unmarried

www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001706d719350be9b1162003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 13/18
2/22/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 385

child under twenty-one years of age, if accompanying or following

to join her;
(e) A person previously lawfully admitted into the Philippines for
permanent residence, who is returning from a temporary visit
abroad to an unrelinquished residence in the Philippines. (As
amended by Sec. 5, Rep. Act No. 503.)
(f) The wife or the husband or the unmarried child under twenty-one
years of age, of an alien lawfully admitted into the Philippines for
permanent residence prior to the date on which this Act becomes
effective and who is resident therein, if such wife, husband, or
child applies for admission within a period of two years following
the date on which this Act becomes effective;
(g) A natural born citizen of the Philippines, who has been
naturalized in a foreign country, and is returning to the
Philippines for permanent residence, including the spouse and
minor children, shall be considered a non-quota immigrant for
purposes of entering the Philippines (As amended by Rep. Act No.
4376, approved June 19, 1965).”

29 See R. LEDESMA, AN OUTLINE OF PHILIPPINE IMMIGRATION

AND CITIZENSHIP LAWS 135 (1999).
30 C.A. No. 63, §2.
31 Records, pp. 227-228.

620

620 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Coquilla vs. Commission on Elections

former Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in a

foreign country and comes or returns to the Philippines
and, if so, he is entitled, among others, to a “visa-free entry
to the Philippines for a period of one (1) year” (§3[c]). It
would appear then that when petitioner entered the
country on the dates in question, he did so as a visa-free
balikbayan visitor whose stay as such was valid for one
year only. Hence, petitioner can only be held to have
waived his status as an alien and as a non-resident only on
November 10, 2000 upon taking his 32
oath as a citizen of the
Philippines under R.A. No. 8171. He lacked the requisite
residency to qualify him for the mayorship of Oras, Eastern
Samar.
Petitioner 33invokes the ruling in Frivaldo v. Commission
on Elections in support of his contention that the
residency requirement in §39(a) of the Local Government
Code includes the residency of one who is not a citizen of
the Philippines. Residency, however, was not an issue in

www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001706d719350be9b1162003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 14/18
2/22/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 385

that case and this Court did not make any ruling on the
issue now at bar. The question in Frivaldo was whether
petitioner, who took his oath of repatriation on the same
day that his term as governor of Sorsogon began on June
30, 1995, complied with the citizenship requirement under
§39(a). It was held that he had, because citizenship may be
possessed even on the day the candidate assumes office.
But in the case of residency, as already noted, §39(a) of the
Local Government Code requires that the candidate must
have been a resident of the municipality “for at least one
(1) year immediately preceding the day of the election.”
Nor can petitioner invoke this Court’s ruling in Bengson
34
III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. What
the Court held in that case was that, upon repatriation, a
former natural-born

_______________

32 The COMELEC considered November 10, 2000 as the date of

petitioner’s repatriation. Section 2 of R.A. No. 8171 provides, however,
“Repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil
registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration
shall thereupon cancel the pertinent alien certificate of registration and
issue the certificate of identification as Filipino citizen to the repatriated
citizen.”
33 257 SCRA 727 (1996).
34 G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001, 357 SCRA 545.

621

VOL. 385, JULY 31, 2002 621

Coquilla vs. Commission on Elections

Filipino is deemed to have recovered his original status as

a natural-born citizen.
Third, petitioner nonetheless says that his registration
as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar in January 2001
is conclusive of his residency as a candidate because §117
of the Omnibus Election Code requires that a voter must
have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in
the city or municipality wherein he proposes to vote for at
least six months immediately
35
preceding the election. As
held in Nuval v. Guray, however, registration as a voter
does not bar the filing of a subsequent case questioning a
candidate’s lack of residency.
Petitioner’s invocation of the liberal interpretation of
election laws cannot avail him any. As held in Aquino v.
36
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001706d719350be9b1162003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 15/18
2/22/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 385
36
Commission on Elections:

A democratic government is necessarily a government of laws. In

a republican government those laws are themselves ordained by
the people. Through their representatives, they dictate the
qualifications necessary for service in government positions. And
as petitioner clearly lacks one of the essential qualifications for
running for membership in the House of Representatives, not
even the will of a majority or plurality of the voters of the Second
District of Makati City would substitute for a requirement
mandated by the fundamental law itself.

Fourth, petitioner was not denied due process because the

COMELEC failed to act on his motion to be allowed to
present evidence. Under §5(d), in relation to §7, of R.A. No.
6646 (Electoral Reforms Law of 1987), proceedings for
denial or cancellation of a certificate of candidacy are
summary in nature. The holding of a formal hearing is thus
not de rigeur. In any event, petitioner cannot claim denial
of the right to be heard since he filed a Verified Answer, a
Memorandum and a Manifestation, all dated March 19,
2001, before the COMELEC in which he submitted
documents relied by him in this petition, which, contrary to
petitioner’s claim, are complete and intact in the records.

_______________

35 54 Phil. 645 (1928).

36 248 SCRA 400, 429 (1995).

622

622 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Coquilla vs. Commission on Elections

III.

The statement in petitioner’s certificate of candidacy that

he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for “two
years” at the time he filed such certificate is not true. The
question is whether the COMELEC was justified in
ordering the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy for
this reason. We hold that it was. Petitioner made a false
representation of a material fact in his certificate of
candidacy, thus rendering such certificate liable to
cancellation. The Omnibus Election Code provides:

www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001706d719350be9b1162003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 16/18
2/22/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 385

SEC. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy.—The certificate of

candidacy shall state that the person filing it is announcing his
candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for
said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the
province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or
district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to
which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post
office address for all election purposes; his profession or
occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of
the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a
permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the
obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts
stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his
knowledge.
SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy.—A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to
cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person
exclusively on the ground that any material representation
contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false.
The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five
days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and
shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than
fifteen days before the election.

Indeed, it has been held that a candidate’s statement in her

certificate of candidacy for the position of governor of Leyte
that she
37
was a resident of Kananga, Leyte when this was
not so or that the candidate was a “natural-born” Filipino
when in fact he had be-

_______________

37 Abella v. Larazabal, 180 SCRA 509 (1989); Abella v. COMELEC, 201

SCRA 253 (1991).

623

VOL. 385, JULY 31, 2002 623

Coquilla vs. Commission on Elections

38
come an Australian citizen constitutes a ground for the
cancellation of a certificate of candidacy. On 39the other
hand, we held in Salcedo II v. COMELEC that a
candidate who used her husband’s family name even
though their marriage was void was not guilty of
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001706d719350be9b1162003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 17/18
2/22/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 385

misrepresentation concerning a material fact. In the case

at bar, what is involved is a false statement concerning a
candidate’s qualification for an office for which he filed the
certificate of candidacy. This is a misrepresentation of a
material fact justifying the cancellation of petitioner’s
certificate of candidacy. The cancellation of petitioner’s
certificate of candidacy in this case is thus fully justified.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the
resolution of the Second Division of the Commission on
Elections, dated July 19, 2001, and the order, dated
January 30, 2002 of the Commission on Elections en banc
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

     Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,

Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez and Corona, JJ.,
concur.

Petition dismissed, resolution and order affirmed.

Note.—Intention to acquire a domicile without actual

residence in the locality does not result in acquisition of
domicile nor does the fact of physical presence without
intention. (Domino vs. Commission on Elections, 310 SCRA
546 [1999])

——o0o——

_______________

38 Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, 211 SCRA 297 (1992).

39 312 SCRA 447 (1999).

624

© Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001706d719350be9b1162003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 18/18