H o l i d a y   I n n   M a n i l a   a n d / o r   H u b e r t   L i n e r   a n d   B a b y Disquitado vs.

NLRC and
Elena Honasan (1993)

Petitioner: Holiday Inn Manila and/or Hubert Liner and Baby Disquitado
Respondent: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Second Division) and ELENA HONASAN

Doctrine: Probation is the period during which the  employer may determine if the employee is
qualified for possible inclusion in the regular force.

FACTS:
1. Elena Honasan applied for employment with the Holiday Inn and was on  April 15, 1991,
accepted for “on-the-job training” as a telephone operator for a period of three weeks
2. On May13, 1992, after completing her training, she was employed on a “probationary basis” for
a period of six months ending November12.
3. Employment contract stipulated Hotel could terminate her probationary employment at any time
prior to the expiration of the six-month period in the event of her failure (a) to learn or progress in her; (b) ) to
faithfully observe and comply with the hotel rules and the instructions and orders of her superiors; or (c) to
perform her duties according to hotel standards.
4. N o v e m b e r 8 , 1 9 9 1 , f o u r d a y s b e f o r e t h e   e x p i r a t i o n o f   t h e s t i p u l a t e d deadline. Holiday
Inn notified her of her dismissal, on the ground that her performance had not come up to the standards of the
Hotel.
5. Honasan filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, claiming that she was already a regular
employee at the time of her separation and so was entitled to  full security of tenure.
L a b o r   A r b i t e r ,   w h o   h e l d   t h a t   h e r   separation was justified, dismissed the complaint.
6. NLRC reversed, Honasan had become a regular employee and so could not be dismissed as
a probationer 

ISSUES:
1. WON the appeal was filed on time. – Y
2. WON she was a regular employee at the time of her dismissal. – Y

RULING + RATIO:
1 . YES. On the timeliness of the appeal, it is well-settled that all notices which a party is entitled
to receive must be coursed through his counsel of record. Consequently, the running of  the reglementary
period is reckoned from the date of receipt of the judgment by the counsel of the appellant.
Counsel received the decision of the Labor Arbiter on May 18, 1992. Appeal had already
been filed by Honasan herself, on May 8, 1992.

2 . YES. Honasan was placed by the petitioner on probation twice, first during her on-the-job

training for three weeks, and next during another period of six months, ostensibly in accordance with
Article 281. Her probation clearly exceeded the period of six months prescribed by this article. Probation is
the period during which the employer may determine if the employee is qualified for possible inclusion in
the regular force. In the case at bar, the period was for three weeks, during Honasan’s on-the-job-training.
When her services were continued after this training, the petitioners in effect recognized that she had
passed probation and was qualified to be a regular employee.
Honasan was certainly under obser1ation during her three-week on-the-job training. If her services
proved unsatisfactory then, she could have been dropped as early as during that period.
Even if it be supposed that the probation did not end with the three-week period of on-the-job training, there is
still no reason why that period should not be included in the stipulated six-month period of probation. Under this
more lenient approach, she had become a regular employee of Holiday Inn and acquired full security of tenure as
of October 15,1991.
We find in the Hotel’s system of double probation a transparent scheme to circumvent the plain
mandate of the law and make it easier for it to dismiss its employees even after they shall ha1e already
passed probation. The petitioners had ample time to summarily terminate Honasan’s
services during her period of probation if they were deemed unsatisfactory. Not having done so, they may
dismiss her now only upon proof of any of the legal grounds for the separation of regular employees, to be
established according to the prescribed procedure.

DISPOSITION: the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against petitioners. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. 74246 January 26, 1989
MARIWASA MANUFACTURING, INC., and ANGEL T. DAZO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. VICENTE LEOGARDO, JR., in his capacity as Deputy Minister of Ministry of Labor and
Employment judgment, and JOAQUIN A. DEQUILA, respondents.
FACTS:
Joaquin A. Dequila (or Dequilla) was hired on probation by Mariwasa Manufacturing, Inc. as a general utility
worker on January 10, 1979. After 6 months, he was informed that his work was unsatisfactory and had failed to
meet the required standards. To give him another chance, and with Dequila’s written consent, Mariwasa
extended Dequila’s probationary period for another three months: from July 10 to October 9, 1979. Dequila’s
performance, however, did not improve and Mariwasa terminated his employment at the end of the extended
period.
Dequila filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Mariwasa and its VP for Administration, Angel T. Dazo,
and violation of Presidential Decrees Nos. 928 and 1389.
DIRECTOR OF MINISTRY OF LABOR: Complaint is dismissed. Termination is justified. Thus, Dequila
appeals to the Minister of Labor.
MINISTER OF LABOR: Deputy Minister Vicente Leogardo, Jr. held that Dequila was already a regular
employee at the time of his dismissal, thus, he was illegally dismissed. (Initial order: Reinstatement with full
backwages. Later amended to direct payment of Dequila’s backwages from the date of his dismissal to
December 20, 1982 only.)
ISSUE: WON employer and employee may, by agreement, extend the probationary period of employment
beyond the six months prescribed in Art. 282 of the Labor Code?
RULING:  YES, agreements stipulating longer probationary periods may constitute lawful exceptions to the
statutory prescription limiting such periods to six months.
The SC in its decision in Buiser vs. Leogardo, Jr. (1984) said that “Generally, the probationary period of
employment is limited to six (6) months. The exception to this general rule is when the parties to an employment
contract may agree otherwise, such as when the same is established by company policy or when the same is
required by the nature of work to be performed by the employee. In the latter case, there is recognition of the
exercise of managerial prerogatives in requiring a longer period of probationary employment, such as in the
present case where the probationary period was set for eighteen (18) months, i.e. from May, 1980 to October,
1981 inclusive, especially where the employee must learn a particular kind of work such as selling, or when the
job requires certain qualifications, skills experience or training.”
In this case, the extension given to Dequila could not have been pre-arranged to avoid the legal consequences of
a probationary period satisfactorily completed.  In fact, it was ex gratia, an act of liberality on the part of his
employer affording him a second chance to make good after having initially failed to prove his worth as an
employee. Such an act cannot now unjustly be turned against said employer’s account to compel it to keep on its
payroll one who could not perform according to its work standards.
By voluntarily agreeing to an extension of the probationary period, Dequila in effect waived any benefit
attaching to the completion of said period if he still failed to make the grade during the period of extension. By
reasonably extending the period of probation, the questioned agreement actually improved the probationary
employee’s prospects of demonstrating his fitness for regular employment.
Petition granted. Order of Deputy Minister Leogardo reversed.
WOODRIDGE SCHOOL (now known as WOODRIDGE COLLEGE, INC.), Petitioner,
vs. JOANNE C. PE BENITO and RANDY T. BALAGUER, Respondents.
Facts:
Woodridge School hired Joanne C. Pe Benito and Randy T. Balaguer as probationary high school teachers. Their
contracts of employment covered a three (3) year probationary period. Respondents, together with twenty other
teachers, presented petitioner with a Manifesto Establishing Relevant Issues Concerning the School. Petitioner
sent two separate Memoranda to respondents placing them under preventive suspension for a period of thirty
days for maligning the school. Petitioner issued respondents their Notice of Termination, informing respondents
that they did not qualify as regular employees for their failure to meet the performance standards made known to
them at the start of their probationary period. Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.
Issue:
Whether respondents are regular employees.

Held:
Respondents were not regular or permanent employees; they had not yet completed three (3) years of satisfactory
service as academic personnel that would have entitled them to tenure as permanent employees in accordance
with the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools. A probationary employee is one who, for a given period of
time, is being observed and evaluated to determine whether or not he is qualified for permanent employment. A
probationary appointment affords the employer an opportunity to observe the skill, competence and attitude of a
probationer. The word "probationary," as used to describe the period of employment, implies the purpose of the
term or period. While the employer observes the fitness, propriety and efficiency of a probationer to ascertain
whether he is qualified for permanent employment, the probationer at the same time seeks to prove to the
employer that he has the qualifications to meet the reasonable standards for permanent employment. Petitioner
failed to substantiate their claim by documentary evidence. Considering that respondents were on probation for
three years, and they were subjected to yearly evaluation by the students and by the school administrators
(principal and vice-principal), it is safe to assume that the results thereof were definitely documented. As such,
petitioner should have presented the evaluation reports and other related documents to support its claim, instead
of relying solely on the affidavits of their witnesses. The unavoidable inference, therefore, remains that the
respondents’ dismissal is invalid.
G.R. No. 169905 : September 7, 2011
ST. PAUL COLLEGE QUEZON CITY, SR. LILIA THERESE TOLENTINO, SPC, SR. BERNADETTE
RACADIO, SPC, and SR. SARAH MANAPOL, Petitioners, v. REMIGIO MICHAEL A. ANCHETA II
and CYNTHIA A. ANCHETA, Respondent.
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:

Remigio Michael was hired by the St. Paul College (SPCQC) as a teacher in the Gen. Education Dept. with a
probationary rank in SY 1996-1997 which was renewed the following year. His wife, Cynthia was was also hired
as a part time teacher of the Mass Comm Dept in the 2nd Sem SY 1996-1997 and her appointment was renewed
for SY 1997-1998. February 1998, the spouses both wrote a letter addressed to Sr. Lilia asking for their contract
to be renewed which was indeed granted by the College Council as evidenced by a letter sent by petitioner.

April 22,1998, a letter, whose signatures includes that of the respondents, was sent to Sr. Bernadette. The said
letter contain teachers sentiments regarding school policies. However, April 21, 1998, a letter written by the
latter was shown, reiterating the conversation of Sr. Bernadette and Remigio regarding the non compliance of
respondent to instructional school policies. Accordingly, Sr. Bernadette wrote a letter endorsing the termination
of the spouses. Respondents submitted their comments however they were still terminated and their letter for
reconsideration denied thus the filling of a complaint for illegal dismissal which was dismissed by both NLRC
and LA but was granted by the CA. Petitioners MR was denied hence the present petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the spouses were illegally dismissed.

HELD:.

LABOR LAW
The Court finds that there was a valid and just cause for dismissal. The Labor Code commands that before an
employer may legally dismiss an employee from the service, the requirement of substantial and procedural due
process must be complied with. Under the requirement of substantial due process, the grounds for termination of
employment must be based on just or authorized causes. Petitioner school charged respondent Remigio Michael
of non-compliance with a school policy regarding the submission of final test questions to his program
coordinator for checking or comment which was admitted by the respondent in his letter. Respondent Remigio
Michael's spouse shared the same defenses and admissions as to the charges against her. The plain admissions of
the charges against them were the considerations taken into account by the petitioner school in their decision not
to renew the respondent spouses' employment contracts. This is a right of the school that is mandated by law and
jurisprudence. It is the prerogative of the school to set high standards of efficiency for its teachers since quality
education is a mandate of the Constitution. Schools cannot be required to adopt standards which barely satisfy
criteria set for government recognition. The same academic freedom grants the school the autonomy to decide
for itself the terms and conditions for hiring its teacher, subject of course to the overarching limitations under the
Labor Code.

LABOR LAW
A probationary employee or probationer is one who is on trial for an employer, during which the latter
determines whether or not he is qualified for permanent employment. The probationary employment is intended
to afford the employer an opportunity to observe the fitness of a probationary employee while at work, and to
ascertain whether he will become an efficient and productive employee. The word probationary, as used to
describe the period of employment, implies the purpose of the term or period, not its length. It is important that
the contract of probationary employment specify the period or term of its effectivity. The failure to stipulate its
precise duration could lead to the inference that the contract is binding for the full three-year probationary
period. Therefore, the letters sent by petitioner, which were void of any specifics cannot be considered as
contracts. The closest they can resemble to are that of informal correspondence among the said individuals. As
such, petitioner school has the right not to renew the contracts of the respondents, the old ones having been
expired at the end of their terms.
GRANTED
TAMSON'S ENTERPRISES, INC., NELSON LEE, LILIBETH ONG and JOHNSON NG, Petitioners,vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ROSEMARIE L. SY, Respondents.

G.R. No. 192881; November 16, 2011

Keyword: Dismissal - four days prior to the completion of the 6-month probationary period.

FACTS:
Respondent Rosemarie Sy was hired by petitioner Tamson’s as Assistant to the Company President Nelson Lee.
Despite the title, she did not act as such because, per instruction of petitioner Lee, she was directed to act as
payroll officer, though she actually worked as apayroll clerk.

Four days before she completed her sixth month of working in petitioner Tamson’s, petitioner Johnson Ng, the
Sales Project Manager, called her to a meeting with him and petitioner Lee. During the meeting, they informed
respondent Sy that her services would be terminated due to inefficiency.

Respondent Sy claimed that the remarks of her superiors about her alleged inefficiency were ill-motivated and
made without any basis. Her dismissal was highly suspicious as it took place barely four days prior to the
completion of her six-month probationary period. The petitioners did not show her any evaluation or appraisal
report regarding her alleged inefficient performance. As she was terminated without an evaluation on her
performance, she was deprived of the opportunity to be regularly part of the company and to be entitled to the
benefits and privileges of a regular employee.

Respondent Sy then filed a case for illegal dismissal.

The ELA rendered a decision in favor of respondent Sy.

The NLRC reversed the ELA’s decision.

The CA, however, reversed the NLRC's decision. It explained that at the time respondent Sy was engaged as a
probationary employee she was not informed of the standards that she should meet to become a regular
employee. Citing the ruling in
Clarion Printing House, Inc v. NLRC, the CA stated that where an employee hired on probationary basis was not
informed of the standards that would qualify her as a regular employee, she was deemed to have been hired from
day one as a regular employee. As a regular employee, she was entitled to security of tenure and could be
dismissed only fora just cause and after due compliance with procedural due process. The CA added that the
petitioners did not observe due process in dismissing respondent Sy.

Petitioners insist that they substantially complied with the requirements of the law having apprised respondent
Sy of her status as probationary employee. The standard, though not written, was clear that her continued
employment would depend on her over-all performance of the assigned tasks, and that the same was made
known to her since day one of her employment. According to the petitioners, reasonable standard of employment
does not require written evaluation of respondent Sy’s function. It is enough that she was informed of her duties
and that her performance was later rated below satisfactory by the Management.

Respondent Sy counters that she was illegally terminated from service and insists that the petitioners cannot
invoke her failure to qualify as she was not informed of the standards or criteria which she should have met for
regular employment. Moreover, no proof was shown as to her alleged poor work performance. She was
unceremoniously terminated to prevent her from becoming a regular employee and be entitled to the benefits as
such.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the termination of respondent Sy, a probationary employee, was valid.

RULING:
No. Article 281 of the Labor Code (P r o b a t i o n a r y e m p l o y m e n t ) which provides that
probationary employment shall not exceed six months from the date the employee started working, unless it is
covered by an apprenticeship agreement stipulating a longer period. The services of an employee who has been
engaged in a probationary basis may be terminated for a just cause or when he fails to qualify as a regular
employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of
his engagement. An employee who is allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular
employee.

Furthermore, Section 2, Rule I, Book VI of the Implementing Rules (Security of tenure) provides: (a) In
cases of regular employment the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for just or
authorized causes as provided by law, and subject to the requirements of due process.
 
(b) The foregoing shall also apply in cases of probationary employment; Provided however, that in such cases,
termination of employment due to failure of the employee to qualify in accordance with the standards of the
employer made known to the former at thetime of engagement may also be a ground for termination of
employment.

Xxx
(d) In all cases of termination of employment, the following standards of due process shall be substantially
observed:
Xxx
If the termination is brought about by the completion of a contract or phase thereof, or by failure of an employee
to meet the standards of the employer in the case of probationary employment, it shall be sufficient that a written
notice is served the employee, within a reasonable time from the effective date of termination.
 
There is probationary employment where the employee upon his engagement is made to undergo a trial period
during which the employer determines his fitness to qualify for regular employment based on reasonable
standards made known to him at the time of engagement. While the employer observes the fitness, propriety and
efficiency of a probationer to ascertain whether he is qualified for permanent employment, the probationer, on
the other hand, seeks to prove to the employer that he has the qualifications to meet the reasonable standards for
permanent employment. Thus, the word probationary, as used to describe the period of employment, implies the
purpose of the term or period, not its length.

It is settled that even if probationary employees do not enjoy permanent status, they are accorded the
constitutional protection of security of tenure. This means they may only be terminated for a just cause or when
they otherwise fail to qualify as regular employees in accordance with reasonable standards made known to them
by the employer at the time of their engagement. 

As Article 281 clearly states, a probationary employee can be legally terminated either:

(1) for a just cause; or (2) when the employee fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with the
reasonable standards made known to him by the employer at the start of the employment. Nonetheless, the power
of the employer to terminate an employee on probation is not without limitations. First, this power must be
exercised in accordance with the specific requirements of the contract. Second, the dissatisfaction on the part of
the employer must be real and in good faith, not feigned so as to circumvent the contract or the law; and third,
there must be no unlawful discrimination in the dismissal. In termination cases, the burden of proving just or
valid cause for dismissing an employee rests on the employer.

In the case at bar, petitioners failed to convey to respondent Sy the standards upon which she should measure
up to be considered for regularization and how the standards had been applied in her case. Petitioners could not
also present concrete and competent evidence establishing her alleged incompetence.

Therefore, the standards under which respondent Sy would qualify as a regular employee not having been
communicated to her at the start of her probationary period, she is then qualified as a regular employee.

Even on the assumption that respondent Sy indeed failed to meet the standards set by them and made known to
the former at the time of her engagement, still, the termination was flawed for failure to give the required notice
to respondent Sy. In this case, the petitioners failed to comply with the requirement of a written notice. Notably,
respondent Sy was merely verbally informed that her employment would be terminated on February 28, 2007, as
admitted by the petitioners.

Considering that the petitioners failed to observe due process in dismissing her, the dismissal had no legal
sanction.
 MAJURINE L. MAURICIO
VS
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
475 SCRA 323 (2005)
One of the inherent powers of courts which should apply in equal force to quasi-judicial bodies is to amend and
control its processes so as to make them conformable to law and justice. This includes the right to reverse itself,
especially when in its opinion it has committed an error or mistake in judgment and adherence to its decision
would cause injustice.
Majurine L. Mauricio (Majurine) started working as an Administrative Assistant in the Legal Department of the
Manila Banking Corporation as a probationary employee. As a pre-employment requirement, the bank directed
the submission by Mauricio of some required documents. However, she failed to do so. She was advised that the
processing of her regularization as employee would be held in abeyance. The bank gave her extension dates
twice with information that her failure to do so would cause the termination of her employment. Despite
the deadline given her, she still failed to comply with the requirements.
Mauricio, informed the bank that she could not secure a clearance from her previous employer, the Manila
Bankers Life Insurance Corporation (MBLIC), a sister company of the bank, as she had a pending case with it.
She requested that any action relative to her employment be held in abeyance as she was still following up the
early resolution of the case. In response, the bank denied her request. Thus, she filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal, unpaid salary, and moral and exemplary damages against the bank before the Labor Arbiter, but such
was dismissed.
On Mauricio’s appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), reversed the decision of the
Labor Arbiter (LA). On the bank’s Motion for Reconsideration, however, the NLRC, reinstated in toto the
Decision of the LA. Mauricio thereupon challenged via Certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals
(CA). The CA affirmed the NLRC decision.
ISSUE
Whether or not NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion when it reversed its original Decision and reinstated
in toto Decision of the Labor Arbiter
HELD
There is nothing ―radical and highly questionable‖ with the NLRC reversing its original decision if supported
with substantial evidence. Respecting Mauricio’s contention that in its earlier Decision, the NLRC already
passed upon the arguments raised by respondents in their Motion for Reconsideration before it, Mauricio herself
provides the answer when she quotes in her present petition what she terms as ―the trenchant observation of the
High Court‖.
In her petition, while Mauricio quotes at length the September 24, 2001 original decision of the NLRC,
she fails to explain why the NLRC should not have reversed it and why the Court of Appeals should not have
sustained the reversal. And what error of law should be reviewed by this Court, Mauricio likewise fails to point
out.
One of the inherent powers of courts which should apply in equal force to quasi-judicial bodies is to amend and
control its processes so as to make them conformable to law and justice. This includes the right to reverse itself,
especially when in its opinion it has committed an error or mistake in judgment and adherence to its decision
would cause injustice. This, the NLRC exercised which bore the imprimatur of the CA. Mauricio has, however,
failed to advance any meritorious ground why the Court should disturb such exercise.
G.R. No. 177937, January 19, 2011
ROBINSONS GALLERIA/ROBINSONS SUPERMARKET CORPORATION and/or JESS MANUEL,
petitioners, vs. IRENE R. RANCHEZ, respondents.
NACHURA, J.:

FACTS:

Respondent Ranchez was a probationary employee for 5 months. She was hired as a cashier by Robinsons
sometime within that period. Two weeks after she was hired, she reported the loss of cash which she had placed
in the company locker. She offered to pay for the lost amount but the Operations Manager of Robinsons had her
strip-searched then reported her to the police even though they found nothing on her person. An information for
Qualified Theft was filed with the Quezon City Regional Trial Court. She was detained for 2 weeks for failure to
immediately post bail. Weeks later, respondent Ranchez filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages. A
year later, Robinsons sent to respondent by mail a notice of termination and/or notice of expiration of
probationary employment.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for illegal dismissal, alleging that at the time of filing respondent
Ranchez had not yet been terminated. She was merely investigated. However, the NLRC reversed this ruling,
stating that Ranchez was illegally dismissed and that Robinson's should reinstate her. It held that Ranchez was
deprived of due process when she was strip-searched and sent to jail for two weeks because such amounted to
constructive dismissal, making it impossible for the respondent to continue under the employment. Even though
she was merely a probationary employee, the lapse of the probationary contract did not amount to a valid
dismissal because there was already an unwarranted constructive dismissal beforehand.

The NLRC denied Robinson's motion for reconsideration. The CA affirmed the decision of the NLRC.
ISSUE: Whether respondent was illegally terminated from employment by petitioners
HELD: The petition is unmeritorious.
LABOR LAW: Probationary employees; termination of employment
There is probationary employment when the employee upon his engagement is made to undergo a trial period
during which the employer determines his fitness to qualify for regular employment based on reasonable
standards made known to him at the time of engagement.

A probationary employee, like a regular employee, enjoys security of tenure. However, in cases of probationary
employment, aside from just or authorized causes of termination, an additional ground is provided under Article
281 of the Labor Code, i.e., the probationary employee may also be terminated for failure to qualify as a regular
employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of
the engagement. Thus, the services of an employee who has been engaged on probationary basis may be
terminated for any of the following:
(1) a just or
(2) an authorized cause; and
(3) when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards prescribed by the
employer.

Article 277(b) of the Labor Code mandates that the employer shall furnish the worker, whose employment is
sought to be terminated, a written notice containing a statement of the causes of termination, and shall afford the
latter ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of a representative if he so desires,
in accordance with company rules and regulations pursuant to the guidelines set by the Department of Labor and
Employment.

In the instant case, based on the facts on record, petitioners failed to accord respondent substantive and
procedural due process. The haphazard manner in the investigation of the missing cash, which was left to the
determination of the police authorities and the Prosecutor's Office, left respondent with no choice but to cry foul.
Administrative investigation was not conducted by petitioner Supermarket. On the same day that the missing
money was reported by respondent to her immediate superior, the company already pre-judged her guilt without
proper investigation, and instantly reported her to the police as the suspected thief, which resulted in her
languishing in jail for two weeks.

The due process requirements under the Labor Code are mandatory and may not be replaced with police
investigation or court proceedings. An illegally or constructively dismissed employee, respondent is entitled to:
(1) either reinstatement, if viable, or separation pay, if reinstatement is no longer viable; and (2) backwages.
These two reliefs are separate and distinct from each other and are awarded conjunctively.

In this case, since respondent was a probationary employee at the time she was constructively dismissed by
petitioners, she is entitled to separation pay and backwages. Reinstatement of respondent is no longer viable
considering the circumstances.

DENIED
 CASE  2011-0047: ROBINSONS GALLERIA/ ROBINSONS SUPERMARKET CORPORATION
AND/OR JESS MANUEL VS. IRENE R. RANCHEZ (G.R. NO. 177937, 19 JANUARY 2011,
NACHURA, J.) SUBJECTS: PROBATIONARY EMPLOYMENT; CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL;
BACKWAGES. (BRIEF TITLE: ROBINSONS GALLERIA VS. RACHEZ)
CASE DIGEST:
THE FACTS;
SANCHEZ WAS A PROBATIONARY EMPLOYEE. SHE REPORTED LOSS OF P20K TO
MANAGEMENT. MANAGEMENT REPORTED MATTER TO POLICE. SANCHEZ WAS JAILED FOR
TWO WEEKS AND CHARGED FOR QUALIFIED THEFT. SHE FILED CASE FOR ILLEGAL DISMISSAL.
LABOR ARBITER DISMISSED COMPLAINT BUT ORDERED REINSTATEMENT. NLRC RULED THAT
THERE WAS CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL AND ORDERED REINSTATEMENT AND BACKWAGES.
CA AFFIRMED BUT RULED THAT SEPARATION PAY WOULD BE PAID IN LIEU OF
REINSTATEMENT.
THE ISSUE:
WHETHER THERE WAS ILLEGAL DIMISSAL. HOW MUCH BACKWAGES SHOULD BE PAID.
THE RULING:
YES. SANCHEZ WAS NOT AFFORDED DUE PROCESS. AS PROBATIONERY EMPLOYEE, SHE
COULD BE DISMISSED FOR JUST CAUSE, AUTHORIZED CAUSE OF FOR FAILURE TO MEET THE
STANDARDS SET. IF IT WAS DUE TO JUST CAUSE SHE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN THE
OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT HER SIDE. POLICE INVESTIGATION CANNOT BE A SUBSTITUTE.
BACKWAGES SHALL BE COMPUTED FROM THE DATE SHE WAS ILLEGALLY DISMISSED TO THE
DATE HER PROBATIONARY EMPLOYMENT ENDS.
 
OTHER LEGAL ISSUES:
WHEN IS THERE PROBATIONARY EMPLOYMENT?
          There is probationary employment when the employee upon his engagement is made to undergo a trial
period during which the employer determines his fitness to qualify for regular employment based on reasonable
standards made known to him at the time of engagement.
DOES A PROBATIONARY EMPLOYEE ENJOY SECURITY OF TENURE? YES.
          A probationary employee, like a regular employee, enjoys Security of tenure.
WHAT ARE THE GROUNDS FOR TERMINATING A PROBATIONARY EMPLOYEE.
THERE ARE THREE GROUNDS WHILE IN THE CASE OF REGULAR EMPLOYEES, THERE ARE
ONLY TWO GROUNDS.
 However, in cases of probationary employment, aside from just or authorized causes of termination, an
additional ground is provided under Article 281 of the Labor Code, i.e., the probationary employee may also be
terminated for failure to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by
the employer to the employee at the time of the engagement.  Thus, the services of an employee who has been
engaged on probationary basis may be terminated for any of the following: (1) a just or (2) an authorized cause;
and  (3) when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards prescribed by the
employer. 
WHAT IS THE DUE PROCESS REQUIRED IN TERMINATING AN EMPLOYEE?  
          Article 277(b) of the Labor Code mandates that subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of
tenure and their right to be protected against dismissal, except for just and authorized cause and without
prejudice to the requirement of notice under Article 283 of the same Code, the employer shall furnish the
worker, whose employment is sought to be terminated, a written notice containing a statement  of the causes of
termination, and shall afford the latter ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of
a representative if he so desires, in accordance with company rules and regulations pursuant to the guidelines set
by the Department of Labor and Employment.
 
IN THE INSTANT CASE WAS THERE DUE PROCESS FOLLOWED?
NO. 
          In the instant case, based on the facts on record, petitioners failed to accord respondent substantive and
procedural due process. The haphazard manner in the investigation of the missing cash, which was left to the
determination of the police authorities and the Prosecutor’s Office, left respondent with no choice but to cry foul.
Administrative investigation was not conducted by petitioner Supermarket.  On the same day that the missing
money was reported by respondent to her immediate superior, the company already pre-judged her guilt without
proper investigation, and instantly reported her to the police as the suspected thief, which resulted in her
languishing in jail for two weeks.  
 
IS DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS MANDATORY? BUT THE POLICE INVESTIGATOR HAS
RULED THAT THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE THAT QUALIFIED THEFT WAS COMMITTED. 
          As correctly pointed out by the NLRC, the due process requirements under the Labor Code are mandatory
and may not be supplanted by police investigation or court proceedings. The criminal aspect of the case is
considered independent of the administrative aspect. Thus, employers should not rely solely on the findings of
the Prosecutor’s Office. They are mandated to conduct their own separate investigation, and to accord the
employee every opportunity to defend himself.  Furthermore, respondent was not represented by counsel when
she was strip-searched inside the company premises or during the police investigation, and in the preliminary
investigation before the Prosecutor’s Office.
 
HOW WAS RESPONDENT DISMISSED?
SHE WAS CONSTRUCTIVELY DISMISSED. 
          Respondent was constructively dismissed by petitioner Supermarket effective October 30, 1997. It was
unreasonable for petitioners to charge her with abandonment for not reporting for work upon her release in jail. It
would be the height of callousness to expect her to return to work after suffering in jail for two weeks. Work had
been rendered unreasonable, unlikely, and definitely impossible, considering the treatment that was accorded
respondent by petitioners.
 
WHAT IS THE BASIS FOR SEPARATION PAY IN LIEU OF REINSTATEMENT? 
          As to respondent’s monetary claims, Article 279 of the Labor Code provides that an employee who is
unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges, to full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to other benefits or their monetary equivalent
computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.
However, due to the strained relations of the parties, the payment of separation pay has been considered an
acceptable alternative to reinstatement, when the latter option is no longer desirable or viable.  On the one hand,
such payment liberates the employee from what could be a highly oppressive work environment.  On the other,
the payment releases the employer from the grossly unpalatable obligation of maintaining in its employ a worker
it could no longer trust.
           Thus, as an illegally or constructively dismissed employee, respondent is entitled to: (1) either
reinstatement, if viable, or separation pay, if reinstatement is no longer viable; and (2) backwages. These two
reliefs are separate and distinct from each other and are awarded conjunctively.
 In this case, since respondent was a probationary employee at the time she was constructively dismissed by
petitioners, she is entitled to separation pay and backwages. Reinstatement of respondent is no longer viable
considering the circumstances.
 

HOW MUCH BACKWAGES BE AWARDED TO RESPONDENT?

FROM THE TIME SHE WAS DISMISSED TO THE TIME HER PROBATIONARY EMPLOYMENT
ENDED.
          However, the backwages that should be awarded to respondent shall be reckoned from the time of her
constructive dismissal until the date of the termination of her employment, i.e., from October 30, 1997 to March
14, 1998.  The computation should not cover the entire period from the time her compensation was withheld up
to the time of her actual reinstatement. This is because respondent was a probationary employee, and the lapse of
her probationary employment without her appointment as a regular employee of petitioner Supermarket
effectively severed the employer-employee relationship between the parties. 
          In all cases involving employees engaged on probationary basis, the employer shall make known to its
employees the standards under which they will qualify as regular employees at the time of their engagement.
Where no standards are made known to an employee at the time, he shall be deemed a regular employee, unless
the job is self-descriptive, like maid, cook, driver, or messenger.  However, the constitutional policy of providing
full protection to labor is not intended to oppress or destroy management. Naturally, petitioner Supermarket
cannot be expected to retain respondent as a regular employee considering that she lost P20,299.00 while acting
as a cashier during the probationary period. The rules on probationary employment should not be used to
exculpate a probationary employee who acts in a manner contrary to basic knowledge and common sense, in
regard to which, there is no need to spell out a policy or standard to be met.
 MAGIS YOUNG ACHIEVERS' LEARNING CENTER and MRS. VIOLETA T. CARIÑO
v. ADELAIDA P. MANALO

G.R. No. 178835, February 13, 2009

 
FACTS:

 Respondent Adelaida P. Manalo was hired as a teacher and acting principal of petitioner Magis Young
Achievers’ Learning Center
 on March 29, 2003, respondent wrote a letter of resignation addressed to Violeta T. Cariño, directress
of petitioner
 March 31, 2003, respondent received a letter of termination from petitioner
 The letter stated that the position of PRINCIPAL will be abolished next school year therefore respondent
cannot renew her contract anymore
 On April 4, 2003, respondent instituted against petitioner a Complaint for illegal dismissal and non-
payment of 13th month pay, with a prayer for reinstatement, award of full backwages and moral and exemplary
damages.
 respondent claimed that her termination violated the provisions of her employment contract, and that the
alleged abolition of the position of Principal was not among the grounds for termination by an employer
under Article282. She also claimed that she was terminated from service for the alleged expiration of her
employment, but that her contract did not provide for a fixed term or period
 Petitioner, in its position paper countered that respondent was legally terminated because the one-year
probationary period, from April 1, 2002 to March 3, 2003, had already lapsed

ISSUE:
1. W/N RESIGNATION OF RESPONDENT MANALO DID NOT BECOME EFFECTIVE DUE
TOALLEGED LACK OF ACCEPTANCE (YES)
2. W/N RESPONDENT MANALO IS A PERMANENT EMPLOYEE (NO)
3. W/N CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT BETWEEN PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT DID
NOTSTIPULATE A PERIOD. (YES)
4. W/N RESPONDENT WAS ILLEGALLY DISMISSED (YES)

RATIO:

1. RESIGNATION OF RESPONDENT
 The SC agreed with the CA that the resignation of the respondent is not valid, not only because there was
no express acceptance thereof by the employer, but because there is a cloud of doubt as to the voluntariness of
respondent’s resignation.
 Voluntary resignation is made with the intention of relinquishing an office, accompanied by the act
of abandonment. It is the acceptance of an employee’s resignation that renders it operative
 In this case, respondent actively pursued her illegal dismissal case against petitioner, such that she cannot
be said to have voluntarily resigned from her job

2. EMPLOYMENT STATUS
 A probationary employee or probationer is one who is on trial for an employer, during which the latter
determines whether or not he is qualified for permanent employment
 the employer may set or fix a probationary period within which the latter may test and observe the conduct
of the former before hiring him permanently
 however, the law sets a maximum "trial period" during which the employer may test the fitness and
efficiency of the employee.
 Article 281 of the Labor Code: shall not exceed six (6) months
G.R. No. 192571 July 23, 2013
ABBOTT LABORATORIES, PHILIPPINES, CECILLE A. TERRIBLE, EDWIN D. FEIST, MARIA
OLIVIA T. YABUTMISA, TERESITA C. BERNARDO, AND ALLAN G. ALMAZAR, Petitioners, 
vs. PEARLIE ANN F. ALCARAZ, Respondent.
FACTS:
On June 27, 2004, Abbott Laboratories, Philippines published in major broadsheet that it is in need of Medical
and Regulatory Affairs Manager stating therein the responsibilities and qualifications of said position. On
December 7, 2004, Abbott formally offered Alcaraz the abovementioned position which was an item under the
company’s Hospira Affiliate Local Surveillance Unit (ALSU) department. On February 12, 2005, Alcaraz signed
an employment contract which stated, inter alia, that she was to be placed on probation for a period of six (6)
months beginning February 15, 2005 to August 14, 2005. She underwent pre-employment orientation where she
was briefed on her duties and responsibilities. On March 3, 2005, Alcaraz received an e-mail from the HR
Director explaining the procedure for evaluating the performance of probationary employees and further
indicated that Abbott had only one evaluation system for all of its employees. Alcaraz was also given copies of
Abbott’s Code of Conduct and Probationary Performance Standards and Evaluation and Performance Excellence
Orientation Modules which she had to apply in line with her task of evaluating the Hospira ALSU staff. On April
12, 2005, Alcaraz received an e-mail from Misa requesting immediate action on the staff’s performance
evaluation as their probationary periods were about to end. This Alcaraz eventually submitted. On May 16, 2005,
Alcaraz was called to a meeting with her immediate supervisor and the former HR Director where she was
informed that she failed to meet the regularization standards for the position of Regulatory Affairs Manager.
Thereafter she was asked to tender her resignation, else they be forced to terminate her services. She filed a case
of illegal dismissal against Abott and its officers. LA dismissed her complaint for lack of merit. NLRC reversed
and set aside the LA’s ruling and ordered Abott to reinstate and pay Alcaraz moral and exemplary damages. CA
affirmed NLRC decision.
ISSUE(S):
(1) Whether or not Alcaraz was sufficiently informed of the reasonable standards to qualify her as a regular
employee; and
(2) Whether or not Alcaraz was validly terminated from her employment.
HELD:
(1) Yes, Alcaraz was sufficiently informed of the reasonable standards. The employer is made to comply with
two (2) requirements when dealing with a probationary employee: first, the employer must communicate the
regularization standards to the probationary employee; and second, the employer must make such
communication at the time of the probationary employee’s engagement. If the employer fails to comply with
either, the employee is deemed as a regular and not a probationary employee. A punctilious examination of the
records reveals that Abbott had indeed complied with the above-stated requirements. This conclusion is largely
impelled by the fact that Abbott clearly conveyed to Alcaraz her duties and responsibilities as Regulatory Affairs
Manager prior to, during the time of her engagement, and the incipient stages of her employment.
(2) A probationary employee, like a regular employee, enjoys security of tenure. However, in cases of
probationary employment, aside from just or authorized causes of termination, an additional ground is provided
under Article 295 of the Labor Code, i.e., the probationary employee may also be terminated for failure to
qualify as a regular employee in accordance with the reasonable standards made known by the employer to the
employee at the time of the engagement. A different procedure is applied when terminating a probationary
employee; the usual two-notice rule does not govern. Section 2, Rule I, Book VI of the Implementing Rules of
the Labor Code states that "if the termination is brought about by the failure of an employee to meet the
standards of the employer in case of probationary employment, it shall be sufficient that a written notice is
served the employee, within a reasonable time from the effective date of termination." As the records show,
Alcaraz's dismissal was effected through a letter dated May 19, 2005 which she received on May 23, 2005 and
again on May 27, 2005. Stated therein were the reasons for her termination, i.e., that after proper evaluation,
Abbott determined that she failed to meet the reasonable standards for her regularization considering her lack of
time and people management and decision-making skills, which are necessary in the performance of her
functions as Regulatory Affairs Manager. Undeniably, this written notice sufficiently meets the criteria set forth
above, thereby legitimizing the cause and manner of Alcaraz’s dismissal as a probationary employee under the
parameters set by the Labor Code.