In Re Estate of Ferdinand E.

Marcos Human Rights Litigation: Agapita Trajano; Archimedes Trajano, Plaintiffs-

FACTS:  In August of 1977, Ferdinand Marcos was President of the Philippines, Marcos-Manotoc was
the National Chairman of the Kabataang Baranggay, and Fabian Ver was in charge of military
intelligence. Archimedes Trajano was a student at the Mapua Institute of Technology. On the 31st of
August, Trajano went to an open forum discussion at which Marcos-Manotoc was speaking. When
Trajano asked a question about her appointment as director of an organization, he was kidnapped,
interrogated, and tortured to death by military intelligence personnel who were acting under Ver's
direction, pursuant to martial law declared by Marcos, and under the authority of Ver, Marcos, and
Marcos-Manotoc. He was tortured and murdered for his political beliefs and activities. Marcos-Manotoc
controlled the police and military intelligence personnel who tortured and murdered Trajano, knew they
were taking him to be tortured, and caused Trajano's death.

In February of 1986, Marcos, Marcos-Manotoc, General Ver and others left the Philippines and arrived at
Hickam Air Force Base in Hawaii. On March 20, 1986, Agapita Trajano filed her complaint in the United
States District Court for the District of Hawaii. The complaint seeks damages on behalf of the estate of
Archimedes Trajano for false imprisonment, kidnapping, wrongful death, and a deprivation of rights, and
on behalf of Trajano's mother for emotional distress. Default was entered against Marcos-Manotoc on
May 29, 1986. The District Court of Hawaii concluded that the torture and death of Trajano was a
violation of fundamental human rights constituted a tort in violation of the law of nations under the Alien
Tort Statute and awarded damages of $4l6 million and attorney’s fees.
ISSUE: Whether or not the US Court have jurisdiction over the case filed by Agapita Trajano.
RULING: Absent jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, there is no dispute that the
only possible jurisdictional basis for Trajano's action is the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350. Section
1350 provides: The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.
We start with the face of the statute. It requires a claim by an alien, a tort, and a violation of international
law. Trajano's complaint alleges that she and her son were citizens of the Philippines, and that her
claims for relief arise under wrongful death statutes and various international declarations. There is no
doubt, as the district court found, that causing Trajano's death was wrongful, and is a tort. Nor, in view of
Marcos-Manotoc's default, is there any dispute that Trajano's death was caused by torture. And, as we
have recently held, "it would be unthinkable to conclude other than that acts of official torture violate
customary international law."
We believe, therefore, that Trajano's suit as an alien for the tort of wrongful death, committed by military
intelligence officials through torture prohibited by the law of nations, is within the jurisdictional grant of
1350. Marcos-Manotoc argues, however, that the district court erred in assuming jurisdiction of a tort
committed by a foreign state's agents against its nationals outside of the United States, and having no
nexus to this country. If 1350 were construed to confer jurisdiction under these circumstances, she
asserts, it would exceed the constitutional limits on federal court jurisdiction under Article III of the
Constitution. We disagree.
Regardless of the extent to which other principles may appropriately be relied upon, the prohibition
against official torture "carries with it the force of a jus cogens norm," which " 'enjoys the highest status
within international law.' As our survey of the scholarly and judicial opinion in Siderman reflects, there is
widespread agreement on this; "all states believe [torture] is wrong, all that engage in torture deny it, and
no state claims a sovereign right to torture its own citizens. Under international law, any state that
engages in official torture violates jus cogens." We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in
founding jurisdiction on a violation of the jus cogens norm prohibiting official torture.
At most, Marcos-Manotoc argues, the district court had jurisdiction under 1350 to determine whether
Trajano had a separate, substantive cause of action; none exists, she contends, because neither the
treaties set out in the complaint nor the law of nations provides a private cause of action. Thus, to the
extent the court's decision relies upon either treaties or international law, Marcos-Manotoc submits it is
erroneous. The district court in fact agreed with Marcos-Manotoc that 1350 is simply a jurisdictional
statute and creates no cause of action itself. It proceeded to determine damages on default under
Philippine law. From this we assume that the court did not rely on treaties or international law to provide
the cause of action, only to establish federal jurisdiction. Indeed, the complaint alleges that Trajano's
claims arise under wrongful death statutes, as well as international law. Since Marcos-Manotoc's appeal
is only to the extent the district court founded Trajano's right to sue on treaties or the law of nations, it
lacks merit because the tort is admitted. That it was committed in violation of international law supplies
the jurisdictional key to federal court under § 1350. We cannot say the district court erred.
The district court's approach comports with the view that the First Congress enacted the predecessor to
§ 1350 to provide a federal forum for transitory torts (a tort action which follows the tortfeasor wherever
he goes), whenever such actions implicate the foreign relations of the United States. The district court's
approach also allows the "law of nations" and "treaty" prongs of § 1350 to be treated consistently, in that
the cause of action comes from municipal tort law and not from the law of nations or treaties of the
United States. This avoids the anomalous result which troubled Judge Bork in Tel-Oren, that whereas
Filartiga found a private right of action by implying it from principles of international law, no private cause
of action can ever be implied from a non-self-executing treaty.
For these reasons we affirm the judgment in Trajano's favor. Her suit as an alien against Marcos-
Manotoc for having caused the wrongful death of her son, by official torture in violation of a jus cogens
norm of international law, properly invokes the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts under §
1350.