ENELYN E. PEÑA v. NLRC, GR No.

100629, 1996-07-05
Facts:
Petitioners were teachers at the Naga Parochial School in Naga City. They had been employed there for
more than three years and as a consequence, had enjoyed permanent status. On May 4, 1998, however,
they were given notice of the termination of their employment on the ground... that they failed to obtain a
minimum efficiency rating of 85% in the two previous schoolyears as required in the teacher's manual of
respondent school.
On appeal, the NLRC reversed on the ground that the petitioners had been sufficiently warned after failing
to obtain the required efficiency rating in the two preceding schoolyears (1985-1986 and 1986-1987) and
given time to improve their skills and performance. Nonetheless,... considering the length of service of
petitioners, the NLRC awarded them separation pay equal to one month for every year of service.
In the present petition, petitioners invoke the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools of the Department
of Education (1970), pursuant to which full-time teachers, who have rendered three consecutive years of
satisfactory service, are considered permanent and entitled to... security of tenure
Petitioners argue that to require a minimum efficiency rating of 85% is unreasonable and unfair because,
by any other standard, the average grade is 75%.
Petitioners do not complain of unreasonable grading by school authorities. The fact is that the evaluation
of their performance left nothing to be desired
In the evaluation of teachers' efficiency, not only the performance in actual teaching is considered but, in
addition, such other factors as personality traits, educational attainment, professional growth, pupils'
management and discipline, preparation/submission of reports,... teaching experience are taken into
account.
What petitioners complain against is that the criteria by which their performance were evaluated varied
from year to year as shown by the fact that prior to the schoolyear 1985-1986, a rating of 85% was
considered "good" and not merely "satisfactory."
Petitioners argue that termination of employment is such a harsh and drastic measure to take against
them.
Issues:
This petition for certiorari  to set aside the decision dated December 28, 1990, of the National Labor
Relations Commission reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter and sustaining the termination of
petitioner's employment.
Petitioner filed a complaint for dismissal which the Labor Arbiter, after hearing, found to be well founded
Ruling:
Petitioners claim that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in approving the termination of their
employment. They maintain that the criteria used by the respondent school for rating them were
unreasonable.
We find the petition to be without merit.
HEREFORE, t
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
GEN. EMMANUEL BAUTISTA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
(AFP), GEN. EDUARDO AÑO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OF THE
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (ISAFP), GEN. HERNANDO IRIBERRI, IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMANDING GENERAL
OF THE PHILIPPINE ARMY, GEN. BENITO ANTONIO T. DE LEON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE
5TH INFANTRY DIVISION, AND PC/SUPT. MIGUEL DE MAYO LAUREL, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHIEF OF THE ISABELA
PROVINCIAL POLICE OFFICE., Petitioners, -versus – ATTY. MARIA CATHERINE DANNUG-SALUCON, Respondent.

G.R. No. 221862, EN BANC, January 23, 2018, BERSAMIN, J.

Verily, proceedings related to the petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo should allow not only direct evidence,
but also circumstantial evidence. Under Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, even hearsay testimony may be considered by the amparo
court provided such testimony can lead to conclusions consistent with the admissible evidence adduced. What the
respondent obviously established is that the threats to her right to life, liberty and security were neither imaginary nor
contrived, but real and probable. The gunning down of her paralegal Bugatti after he had relayed to her his observation
that they had been under surveillance was the immediate proof of the threat. The purpose and noble objectives of the
special rules on the writ of amparo may be rendered inutile if the rigid standards of evidence applicable in ordinary
judicial proceedings were not tempered with such flexibility.

FACTS:

Respondent was at a lunch meeting with the relatives of a detained political prisoner client who was allegedly among
several leaders of people's organizations/sectoral organizations who were falsely charged in a murder and frustrated
murder case pending before the RTC of Lagawe, Ifugao. William Bugatti, her paralegal who was working with her on said
case and who was also an activist and human rights defender, informed her that he had personally observed that
surveillance was being conducted on them. Thus, he suggested certain security measures for her own protection.
Respondent realized
the significance of Bugatti's advice when he was fatally gunned down later that evening. Respondent had
asked him early that very day to identify the names, ranks and addresses of the handler/s of the
prosecution witness in the Lagawe case.

That same evening, respondent was informed by a client working as a civilian asset for the PNP Intelligence
Section that the Regional Intelligence of the PNP issued a directive to PNP Burgos, Isabela, respondent's
hometown, to conduct a background investigation on her and to confirm whether she was a "Red Lawyer."
On March 31, 2014, respondent again received a call from her confidential informant, confirming that she
was indeed the subject of surveillance. Upon further investigation, respondent discovered that individuals
riding on motorcycles questioned vendors in front of respondent’s office as to where she went, with whom,
what time she usually returned and who stayed behind in the office whenever she left. Also that a member
of the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) of the Criminal Investigation Detection Group (CIDG) came to the
law office, asking for the respondent, but without telling her secretary why he was looking for her, that
soldiers came to respondent's office in the guise of asking her to notarize documents and insisted on leaving
the document and picking it up later on when respondent arrived.

In her petition, thus, respondent posited that the above-described acts, taking into consideration previous
incidents where human rights lawyers, human rights defenders, political activists and defenders, were killed
or abducted after being labeled as "communists" and being subjected to military surveillance, may be
interpreted as preliminary acts leading to the abduction and/or killing of respondent.

Petitioners categorically denied respondent's allegations that she was ever under surveillance by the
military and/or police under the command of petitioner’s officials. Petitioners also objected to the
impleading of other petitioners in their official capacities, allegedly under the doctrine of command
responsibility, maintaining that it can only be invoked in a full-blown criminal or administrative case and not
in a summary amparo proceeding.

Petitioners also alleged that upon receipt of the CA Resolution promulgated on April 22, 2014, they
immediately exerted efforts to conduct an inquiry and to gather information about the purported threats
on the life, liberty and security of the respondent. Petitioners also noted that respondent's testimony
consisted of mere unverified accounts from an unknown person whose identity respondent did not want to
reveal. Respondent could not categorically identify and link any of the said individuals to petitioners,
claiming only that they were military-looking men.

The CA rendered the assailed decision granting the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data. The CA
found that petitioner has substantially proven by substantial evidence her entitlement to the writs of
amparo and habeas data.

ISSUES:

I. Whether or not the CA erred in admitting and considering Atty. Salucon's evidence despite
being largely based on hearsay information. (NO)

II. Whether or not the CA erred in finding Atty. Salucon's evidence sufficient to justify the
granting of the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data. (NO)
 III. Whether or not the CA erred in directing the petitioners to exert extraordinary diligence and
efforts to conduct further investigation in order to determine the veracity of Atty. Salucon's
alleged harassment and surveillance. (NO)

RULING:

I.

In Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, the Court adopted the standard of totality of evidence for granting the privilege of
the writ of amparo, explaining:

“The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in their totality, and
to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is consistent
with the admissible evidence adduced. In other words, we reduce our rules to the most basic test of reason
— i.e., to the relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency with all other pieces of
adduced evidence. Thus, even hearsay evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this basic minimum test.”

Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis cited the ruling in Velasquez Rodriguez, wherein the InterAmerican Court of Human
Rights (IACHR) took note that enforced disappearances could generally be proved only through
circumstantial or indirect evidence or by logical inference; and that it would be impossible otherwise to
prove that an individual had been made to disappear because of the State's virtual monopoly of access to
pertinent evidence, or because the deliberate use of the State's power to destroy pertinent evidence was
inherent in the practice of enforced disappearances. Hence, the reliance on circumstantial evidence and
hearsay testimony of witnesses is permissible.

Under the totality of evidence standard, hearsay testimony may be admitted and appreciated depending
on the facts and circumstances unique to each petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo provided
such hearsay testimony is consistent with the admissible evidence adduced. Yet, such use of the standard
does not unquestioningly authorize the automatic admissibility of hearsay evidence in all amparo
proceedings. The matter of the admissibility of evidence should still depend on the facts and circumstances
peculiar to each case.

II

The petition for the writ of amparo partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial
evidence to make the appropriate interim and permanent reliefs available to the petitioner.

Upon due consideration of the facts and circumstances enumerated by the respondent's petition, the CA
opined that it would be all the more difficult to obtain direct evidence to prove the respondent's
entitlement to the privilege of the writ of amparo because no extrajudicial killing or enforced
disappearance had yet occurred. Indeed, her petition referred to acts that merely threatened to violate her
rights to life, liberty and security, or that could be appreciated only as preliminary steps to her probable
extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance. Even so, it would be uncharacteristic for the courts,
especially this Court, to simply told their arms and ignore the palpable threats to her life, liberty and
security and just wait for the irreversible to happen to her. The direct evidence might not come at all, given
the abuse of the State's power to destroy evidence being inherent in enforced disappearances or
extrajudicial killings.
Verily, proceedings related to the petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo should allow not only
direct evidence, but also circumstantial evidence. Under Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, even hearsay testimony
may be considered by the amparo court provided such testimony can lead to conclusions consistent
with the admissible evidence adduced. What the respondent obviously established is that the threats
to her right to life, liberty and security were neither imaginary nor contrived, but real and probable. The
gunning down of her paralegal Bugatti after he had relayed to her his observation that they had been
under surveillance was the immediate proof of the threat. The purpose and noble objectives of the
special rules on the writ of amparo may be rendered inutile if the rigid standards of evidence applicable
in ordinary judicial proceedings were not tempered with such flexibility.

III

The directive of the CA for the petitioners to exert extraordinary diligence in conducting further
investigations was valid and proper. In Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, the Court spelled out the two-fold burden
that the public authorities had to discharge in situations of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, viz.:

“The burden for the public authorities to discharge in these situations, under the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo, is twofold. The first is to ensure that all efforts at disclosure and investigation are undertaken
under pain of indirect contempt from this Court when governmental efforts are less than what the
individual situations require. The second is to address the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is
preserved and his or her liberty and security restored.

The petitioners (and their successors in office), by merely issuing orders to their subordinates under
their respective commands and relying on the latter's reports without conducting independent
investigations on their own to determine the veracity of the respondent's allegations, did not discharge
the two-fold burden. Thereby, they did not exercise extraordinary diligence. They could not escape the
responsibility of conducting the investigation with extraordinary diligence by deflecting the
responsibility to other investigatory agencies of the Government. The duty of extraordinary diligence
pertains to them, and to no other.