DISINI VS SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

G.R. No. 20335, February 18, 2014, En Banc, Abad, J.

DOCTRINE: Libel in the cyberspace can of course stain a person’s image with just one click of the
mouse. Scurrilous statements can spread and travel fast across the globe like bad news. Moreover,
cyberlibel often goes hand in hand with cyberbullying that oppresses the victim, his relatives, and friends,
evoking from mild to disastrous reactions. Still, a governmental purpose, which seeks to regulate the use
of this cyberspace communication technology to protect a person’s reputation and peace of mind, cannot
adopt means that will unnecessarily and broadly sweep, invading the area of protected freedoms

FACTS: The present petition seeks to declare several provisions of R.A. 10175, the Cybercrime
Prevention Act of 2012 unconstitutional and void. Under, the cybercrime law aims to regulate access to
and use of the cyberspace. Using his laptop or computer, a person can connect to the internet, a system
that links him to other computers and enable him to access virtual libraries and encyclopaedias for all
kinds of information that he needs for research, study, amusement, upliftment, or pure curiosity; Post
billboard-like notices or messages, including pictures and videos, for the general public or for special
audiences like associates, classmates, or friends and read postings from them; and the likes.

This is cyberspace, a system that accommodates millions and billions of simultaneous and
ongoing individual accesses to and uses of the internet. And because linking with the internet opens up a
user to communications from others, the ill-motivated can use the cyberspace for committing theft by
hacking into or surreptitiously accessing his bank account or credit card or defrauding him through false
representations. The wicked can use the cyberspace, too, for illicit trafficking in sex or for exposing to
pornography guileless children who have access to the internet. For this reason, the government has a
legitimate right to regulate the use of cyberspace and contain and punish wrongdoings. The government
certainly has the duty and the right to prevent these tomfooleries from happening and punish their
perpetrators, hence the Cybercrime Prevention Act.

However, the petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating
undesirable cyberspace activities violate certain of their constitutional rights. The government of course
asserts that the law merely seeks to reasonably put order into cyberspace activities, punish wrongdoings,
and prevent hurtful attacks on the system. One of the sections that petitioners impugn is Sec 4 (c) 4 of the
law which makes Libel or the unlawful or prohibited acts of liber as defined in Art 355 of the RPC
committed through a computer system or any other similar means which may be devised in the future.
They argue that the libel provision of the penal code and in effect the libel provisions of the cybercrime
law carry with them the requirement of “presumed malice” even when the last jurisprudence already
replaces it with the hight standard of “actual malice: as a basis for conviction. Petitioners argue that
inferring “presumed malice” from the accused’s defamatory statement by virtue of Article 354 of the
penal code infringes on his constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. They like wise attach the
constitutionality of Sec 5 of the law which penalises the act of aiding or abetting in the commission of
cybercrime.

ISSUE/S:
1.Whether section 4(c)4 that penalizes online libel is constitutional.
2.Whether section 5 that penalises aiding or abetting and attempt in the commission of cybercrime with
respect to section 4(c)4 on online liber is constitutional.
RULING:

1. YES. Libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that the government has an obligation to
protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyberlibel is actually not a new crime since
Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the penal code, already punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4)
above merely affirms that online defamation constitutes “similar means” for committing libel. But the
Court’s acquiescence goes only insofar as the cybercrime law penalizes the author of the libelous
statement or article. Cyberlibel brings with it certain intricacies, unheard of when the penal code
provisions on libel were enacted. The culture associated with internet media is distinct from that of
print. The internet is characterized as encouraging a freewheeling, anything-goes writing style. In a
sense, they are a world apart in terms of quickness of the reader’s reaction to defamatory statements
posted in cyberspace, facilitated by one-click reply options offered by the networking site as well as by
the speed with which such reactions are disseminated down the line to other internet users. Moreover,
there is “actual malice” or malice in fact when the offender makes the defamatory statement with the
knowledge that it is false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. The reckless
disregard standard used here requires a high degree of awareness of probable falsity. There must be
sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the accused in fact entertained serious doubts as to the
truth of the statement he published. Gross or even extreme negligence is not sufficient to establish
actual malice.

2. NO. Libel in the cyberspace can of course stain a person’s image with just one click of the mouse.
Scurrilous statements can spread and travel fast across the globe like bad news. Moreover, cyberlibel
often goes hand in hand with cyberbullying that oppresses the victim, his relatives, and friends, evoking
from mild to disastrous reactions. Still, a governmental purpose, which seeks to regulate the use of this
cyberspace communication technology to protect a person’s reputation and peace of mind, cannot adopt
means that will unnecessarily and broadly sweep, invading the area of protected freedoms. If such means
are adopted, self-inhibition borne of fear of what sinister predicaments await internet users will suppress
otherwise robust discussion of public issues. Democracy will be threatened and with it, all liberties. Penal
laws should provide reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of facts to
prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. The terms “aiding or abetting” constitute broad sweep
that generates chilling effect on those who express themselves through cyberspace posts, comments, and
other messages. Hence, Section 5 of the cybercrime law that punishes “aiding or abetting” libel on the
cyberspace is a nullity.