[A.C. No. 4148.

July 30, 1998]

REMEDIOS RAMIREZ TAPUCAR, complainant, vs. ATTY. LAURO L. TAPUCAR, respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

In a letter-complaint dated November 22, 1993, complainant Remedios Ramirez Tapucar sought the
disbarment of her husband, Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar, on the ground of continuing grossly immoral conduct
for cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen) Pea under scandalous circumstances.[1]

Prior to this complaint, respondent was already administratively charged four times for conduct
unbecoming an officer of the court. in Administrative Matter No. 1740, resolved on April 11, 1980,
respondent, at that time the Judge of Butuan City, was meted the penalty of six months suspension
without pay,[2] while in Administrative Matter Nos. 1720, 1911 and 2300-CFI, which were consolidated,
[3] this Court on January 31, 1981 ordered the separation from service of respondent.[4]

Now he faces disbarment.

The records reveal the following facts:

From the Report and Recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline, it appears that complainant
and respondent were married on October 29, 1953 at the Sacred Heart Roman Catholic Church in
Quezon City. They established their residence in Antipolo, Rizal, were eight of their eleven children were
born. In 1962 respondent relocated his family to Dadiangas, Cotabato (Now General Santos City), where
his last three children were born and where he practiced his profession until his appointment as a CFI
Judge in Butuan City on January 30, 1976.

In August, 1976, shortly after being appointed as CFI Judge, respondent began cohabiting with a certain
Elena (Helen) Pea, in Nasipit, Agusan Del Norte. On December 28, 1977 Elena gave birth to their first
child, named Ofelia Sembrano Pea.
In view of this cohabitation, a certain Atty. Tranquilino Calo filed an administrative complaint against
respondent for immorality. After investigation, the penalty of suspension from office for a period of six
months without pay was meted by this Court upon respondent.[5]

Despite this penalty, respondent still continued to cohabit with Elena, giving rise to another charge of
immorality and other administrative cases, such as conduct unbecoming an officer of the court, and
grossly immoral conduct. These cases were consolidated and after investigation, this Court ordered his
dismissal and separation from the service.[6]

But his dismissal as a judge did not impel respondent to mend his ways. He continued living with Elena,
which resulted in the birth on September 20, 1989, of their second child named Laella Pea Tapucar.
Moreover, he completely abandoned complainant and his children by her.

Respondent later moved from Nasipit, Agusan del Norte back to Antipolo, Rizal, bringing along Elena and
their two children. And on March 5, 1992, respondent contracted marriage with Elena in a ceremony
solemnized by Metropolitan Trial Court Judge Isagani A. Geronimo of Antipolo, Rizal. This was done
while the respondents marriage to complainant subsists, as nothing on record shows the dissolution
thereof.

Complainant, in the meanwhile, had migrated to United States of America upon her retirement from the
government service in 1990. However, her children, who remained in Antipolo, kept her posted of the
misery they allegedly suffered because of their fathers acts, including deception and intrigues against
them. Thus, despite having previously withdrawn a similar case which she filed in 1976, complainant was
forced to file the present petition for disbarment under the compulsion of the material impulse to shield
and protect her children from the despotic and cruel acts of their own father. Complainant secured the
assistance of her eldest daughter, Atty. Ma. Susana Tapucar-Baua, to represent her in this case.

Consistent with Section 20, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the matter was referred to the Commission
on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation.
After conducting a thorough investigation, the Commission through Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez
recommended that respondent be disbarred, and his name be stricken off the roll of attorneys. Mainly,
this was premised on the ground that, notwithstanding sanctions previously imposed upon him by the
Honorable Supreme Court, respondent continued the illicit liaison with Elena.[7]
In his report Commissioner Fernandez noted that, instead of contradicting the charges against him,
respondent displayed arrogance, and even made a mockery of the law and the Court, as when he said:

I have been ordered suspended by Supreme Court for two months without pay in 1980 for having a
mistress, the same girl Ms. Elena (Helen) Pea, now my wife. Being ordered separated in later
administrative case constitute double jeopardy. If now disbarred for marrying Ms. Elena Pea will
constitute triple jeopardy. If thats the law so be it.[8]

Based on said report, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, passed on May 17,
1997, a Resolution adopting the Commissioners recommendation, as follows:

RESOLUTION NO. XII-97-97

Adm. Case No. 4148

Remedios Ramirez Tapucar vs. Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-titled case, herein made part of the
Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation therein to be fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, Respondent Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar is hereby
DISBARRED and that his name be stricken off the roll of attorneys.

We find the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Fernandez, as approved and adopted by the
Board of Governors of IBP, more than sufficient to justify and support the foregoing Resolution, herein
considered as the recommendation to this Court by said Board pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 12(b), of the
Rules of Court.* We are in agreement that respondents actuations merit the penalty of disbarment.

Well settled is the rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent for admission to the
legal profession, but it must also remain intact in order to maintain ones good standing in that exclusive
and honored fraternity.[9] There is perhaps no profession after that of the sacred ministry in which a
high-toned morality is more imperative than that of law.[10] The Code of Professional Responsibility
mandates that:
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.*

As this Court often reminds members of the Bar, they must live up to the standards and norms expected
of the legal profession, by upholding the ideals and tenets embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility always. Lawyers must maintain a high standards of legal proficiency, as well as morality
including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. For they are at all times subject to the scrutinizing eye of
public opinion and community approbation. Needless to state, those whose conduct both public and
private fails this scrutiny would have to be disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings, penalized
accordingly.

Moreover, it should be recalled that respondent here was once a member of the judiciary, a fact that
aggravates this professional infractions. For having occupied that place of honor in the Bench, he knew a
judges actuations ought to be free from any appearance of impropriety.[11] For a judge is the visible
representation of the law, more importantly, of justice. Ordinary citizens consider him as a source of
strength that fortifies their will to obey the law.[12] Indeed, a judge should avoid the slightest infraction
of the law in all of his actuations, lest it be a demoralizing example to others.[13] Surely, respondent
could not have forgotten the Code of Judicial Conduct entirely as to lose its moral imperatives.[14]

Like a judge who is held to a high standard of integrity and ethical conduct,[15] an attorney-at-law is also
invested with public trust. Judges and lawyers serve in the administration of justice. Admittedly, as
officers of the court, lawyers must ensure the faith and confidence of the public that justice is
administered with dignity and civility. A high degree or moral integrity is expected of a lawyer in the
community where he resides. He must maintain due regard for public decency in an orderly society.

A lawyer is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession by faithfully
performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients.[16] Exacted from him, as a
member of the profession charged with the responsibility to stand as a shield in the defense of what is
right, are such positive qualities of decency, truthfulness and responsibility that have been
compendiously described as moral character. To achieve such end, every lawyer needs to strive at all
times to honor and maintain the dignity of his profession, and thus improve not only the public regard
for the Bar but also the administration of justice.
On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend a lawyer for misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity,
and good demeanor, thus proving unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.[17]

The power to disbar, however, is one to be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of
misconduct which seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court of
and member of the bar.[18] For disbarment proceedings are intended to afford the parties thereto full
opportunity to vindicate their cause before disciplinary action is taken, to assure the general public that
those who are tasked with the duty of administering justice are competent, honorable, trustworthy men
and women in whom the Courts and the clients may repose full confidence.

In the case of Obusan vs. Obusan, Jr.,[19] a complaint for disbarment was filed against a member of the
bar by his wife. She was able to prove that he had abandoned his wife and their son; and that he had
adulterous relations with a married but separated woman. Respondent was not able to overcome the
evidence presented by his wife that he was guilty of grossly immoral conduct. In another case,[20] a
lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who had
borne him a child. The Court held that respondent failed to maintain the highest degree of morality
expected and required of a member of a bar.

In the present case, the record shows that despite previous sanctions imposed upon by this Court,
respondent continued his illicit liaison with a woman other than lawfully-wedded wife. The report of the
Commissioner assigned to investigate thoroughly the complaint found respondent far from contrite; on
the contrary, he exhibited a cavalier attitude, even arrogance; in the face of charges against him. The IBP
Board of Governors, tasked to determine whether he still merited the privileges extended to a member
of the legal profession, resolved the matter against him. For indeed, evidence of grossly immoral
conduct abounds against him and could not be explained away. Keeping a mistress, entering into
another marriage while a prior one still subsists, as well as abandoning and/or mistreating complainant
and their children, show his disregard of family obligations, morality and decency, the law and the
lawyers oath. Such gross misbehavior over a long period of time clearly shows a serious flaw in
respondents character, his moral indifference to scandal in the community, and his outright defiance of
established norms. All these could not but put the legal profession in disrepute and place the integrity of
the administration of justice in peril, hence the need for strict but appropriate disciplinary action.

IN VIEW THEREOF, respondent Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar is hereby DISBARRED. The Clerk of Court is
directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.

2.

FRANCISCO SALVADOR B. G.R. No. 156643

ACEJAS III,

Petitioner, Present:

Panganiban, CJ,

Chairman,

- versus - Ynares-Santiago,

Austria-Martinez,

Callejo, Sr., and

Chico-Nazario, JJ

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.

x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- x

VLADIMIR S. HERNANDEZ, G.R. No. 156891

Petitioner,
- versus -

Promulgated:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent. June 27, 2006

x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- x

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, CJ:

his Court defers to the Sandiganbayans evaluation of the factual issues. Not having heard any cogent
reasons to justify an exception to this rule, the Court adopts the anti-graft courts findings. In any event,
after meticulously reviewing the records, we find no ground to reverse the Sandiganbayan.

The Case

Before us are consolidated Petitions for Review[1] assailing the March 8, 2002 Decision,[2] and the
January 3[3] and 14, 2003[4] Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 20194. Francisco SB.
Acejas III and Vladimir S. Hernandez were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of direct bribery
penalized under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code.

Vladimir S. Hernandez, Victor D. Conanan, SPO3 Expedito S. Perlas, Francisco SB. Acejas III and Jose P.
Victoriano were charged on February 8, 1994, in an Information that reads thus:

That on or about January 12, 1994, or sometime prior thereto in the City of Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused VLADIMIR S. HERNANDEZ and
VICTOR CONANAN, being then employed both as Immigration officers of the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation, Intramuros, Manila, hence are public officers, taking advantage of their official positions
and committing the offense in relation to office, conspiring and confederating with Senior Police Officer
3 EXPEDITO S. PERLAS of the Western Police District Command, Manila, together with co-accused Atty.
FRANCISCO SB. ACEJAS III, of the LUCENARIO, MARGATE, MOGPO, TIONGCO & ACEJAS LAW OFFICES,
and co-accused JOSE P. VICTORIANO, a private individual, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously demand, ask, and/or extort One Million (P1,000,000.00) PESOS from the spouses BETHEL
GRACE PELINGON and Japanese TAKAO AOYAGI and FILOMENO PELINGON, JR., in exchange for the
return of the passport of said Japanese Takao Aoyagi confiscated earlier by co-accused Vladimir S.
Hernandez and out of said demand, the complainants Bethel Grace Pelingon, Takao Aoyagi and
Filomeno Pelingon, Jr. produced, gave and delivered the sum of Twenty Five Thousand (P25,000.00)
Pesos in marked money to the above-named accused at a designated place at the Coffee Shop, Ground
Floor, Diamond Hotel, Ermita, Manila, causing damage to the said complainants in the aforesaid amount
of P25,000.00, and to the prejudice of government service.[5]

After trial, all the accused -- except Victoriano -- were convicted. The challenged Decision disposed as
follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Vladimir S. Hernandez, Victor D. Conanan, Expedito S. Perlas
and Francisco SB. Acejas III are hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Direct
Bribery, and are sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten
(10) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to seven (7) years and four (4) months of prision mayor,
as maximum, and to pay a fine of three million pesos (P3,000,000.00). Accused Vladimir S. Hernandez
and Victor D. Conanan shall also suffer the penalty of special temporary disqualification. Costs against
the accused.
On ground of reasonable doubt, accused Jose P. Victoriano is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
The surety bond he posted for his provisional liberty is cancelled. The Hold Departure Order against him
embodied in this Courts Order dated July 24, 2000 is recalled.[6]

The first Resolution acquitted Conanan and denied reconsideration of the other accused. The second
Resolution denied Petitioner Acejas Motion for New Trial.

Hence, petitioners now seek recourse in this Court.[7]

The Facts

The facts[8] are narrated by the Sandiganbayan as follows:

At around 4:00 to 5:00 p.m. of December 17, 1993, accused Bureau of Immigration and Deportation
(BID) Intelligence Agent Vladimir Hernandez, together with a reporter, went to the house of Takao
Aoyagi and Bethel Grace Pelingon-Aoyagi at 27 Pacific Drive, Grand Villa, Sto. Nio, Paraaque, Metro
Manila. His purpose was to serve Mission Order No. 93-04-12 dated December 13, 1993, issued by BID
Commissioner Zafiro Respicio against Takao Aoyagi, a Japanese national. Hernandez told Takao Aoyagi,
through his wife, Bethel Grace, that there were complaints against him in Japan and that he was
suspected to be a Yakuza big boss, a drug dependent and an overstaying alien.

To prove that he had done nothing wrong, Takao Aoyagi showed his passport to Hernandez who issued
an undertaking (Exh. B) which Aoyagi signed. The undertaking stated that Takao Aoyagi promised to
appear in an investigation at the BID on December 20, 1993, and that as a guarantee for his appearance,
he was entrusting his passport to Hernandez. Hernandez acknowledged receipt of the passport.
On December 18, 1993, Bethel Grace Aoyagi called accused Expedito Dick Perlas[9] and informed him
about the taking of her husbands passport by Hernandez. Perlas told her he would refer their problem
to his brother-in-law, Atty. Danton Lucenario of the Lucenario, Margate, Mogpo, Tiongco and Acejas III
Law Firm. It was at the Sheraton Hotel that Perlas introduced the Aoyagis to Atty. Lucenario. They
discussed the problem and Atty. Lucenario told the Aoyagis not to appear before the BID on December
20, 1993.

As advised by Atty. Lucenario, Takao Aoyagi did not appear before the BID. Instead, Atty. Rufino M.
Margate of the Lucenario Law Firm filed with the BID an Entry of Appearance (Exh. 6 Acejas). Atty.
Margate requested for copies of any complaint-affidavit against Takao Aoyagi and asked what the
ground was for the confiscation of x x x Aoyagis passport.

Hernandez prepared a Progress Report (Exh. 5 Hernandez) which was submitted to Ponciano M. Ortiz,
the Chief of Operations and Intelligence Division of the BID. Ortiz recommended that Takao Aoyagi, who
was reportedly a Yakuza and a drug dependent, be placed under custodial investigation.

In the evening of December 22, 1993 at the Diamond Hotel, the Aoyagis met accused Atty. Francisco
Acejas III who was then accompanied by Perlas. Atty. Acejas informed them that it would be he who
would handle their case. A Contract for Legal Services (Exh. D) dated December 22, 1993 was entered
into by Takao Aoyagi and Atty. Acejas, who represented the Lucenario Law Firm.

In the morning of December 23, 1993, Perlas and Atty. Acejas accompanied the Aoyagis to the Domestic
Airport as the latter were going to Davao. It was here that Takao Aoyagi paid Atty. Acejas P40,000.00,
P25,000 of which is 50% of the acceptance fee, and the P15,000.00 is for filing/docket fee (Exh. O). The
Aoyagis were able to leave only in the afternoon as the morning flight was postponed.

On December 24, 1993, while attending a family reunion, Bethel Grace Pelingon-Aoyagi informed her
brother, Filomeno Jun Pelingon, Jr., about her husbands passport.

On January 2, 1994, Jun Pelingon talked to BID Commissioner Zafiro Respicio in Davao and told the latter
of Takao Aoyagis problem with the BID. Respicio gave Pelingon his calling card and told Pelingon to call
him up in his office. That same day, Jun Pelingon and Mr. and Mrs. Aoyagi flew back to Manila.
On January 5, 1994, Jun Pelingon, Dick Perlas, Atty. Acejas, Vladimir Hernandez, Vic Conanan and Akira
Nemoto met at the Aristocrat Restaurant in Roxas Boulevard.

Another meeting was arranged at the Manila Nikko Hotel in Makati on January 8, 1994 with Jun
Pelingon, Perlas, Atty. Acejas and Hernandez attending.

On January 11, 1994, on account of the alleged demand of P1 million for the return of Takao Aoyagis
passport, Jun Pelingon called up Commissioner Respicio. The latter referred him to Atty. Angelica
Somera, an NBI Agent detailed at the BID. It was Atty. Carlos Saunar, also of the NBI, and Atty. Somera
who arranged the entrapment operation.

On January 12, 1994, Vladimir Hernandez returned the passport to Takao Aoyagi at the Coffee Shop of
the Diamond Hotel. The NBI Team headed by Attorneys Saunar and Somera arrested Dick Perlas, Atty.
Acejas and Jose Victoriano after the latter picked up the brown envelope containing marked money
representing the amount being allegedly demanded. Only Perlas, Acejas and Victoriano were brought to
the NBI Headquarters.[10]

Version of the Prosecution

Testifying for the prosecution were Bethel Grace Pelingon Aoyagi, Filomeno Jun Basaca Pelingon, Jr., and
Carlos Romero Saunar.[11]

The prosecution evidence showed that it was during a meeting on January 5, 1994, when P1 million as
consideration for the passport was demanded. Conanan averred that Aoyagi was a drug trafficker and
Yakuza member. The money was to be used to settle the alleged problem and to facilitate the
processing of a permanent visa. When Pelingon negotiated to lower the amount demanded, Conanan
stated that there were many of them in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID).[12]
During the second meeting held at Hotel Nikko, Pelingon was informed that the press and government
enforcers were after Aoyagi. Hernandez asked for a partial payment of P300,000, but Pelingon said that
the whole amount would be given at just one time to avoid another meeting.[13]

After talking to Commissioner Respicio on January 11, 1994,[14] Pelingon called up Dick Perlas to
schedule the exchange.

Regarding the involvement of Petitioner Acejas, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) adds the
following facts:

1.2. On 5 January 1994, [Acejas] and Perlas met Pelingon at the Aristocrat Restaurant. [Acejas] informed
Pelingon that he would file a P1 million lawsuit against the BID agents who confiscated the passport of
Takao Aoyagi. [Acejas] showed Pelingon several papers, which allegedly were in connection with the
intended lawsuit. However, when Hernandez and Conanan arrived at the Aristocrat Restaurant, [Acejas]
never mentioned to the BID agents the P1 million lawsuit. [Acejas] just hid the papers he earlier showed
to Pelingon inside his [Acejas] bag.

1.3. [Acejas] was present when Hernandez proposed that Takao Aoyagi pay the amount of P1 million in
exchange for the help he would extend to him (Takao) in securing a permanent visa in the Philippines.
[Acejas], who was Aoyagis lawyer, did nothing.

1.4. On 10 January 1994, [Acejas], Pelingon, Perlas and Hernandez met at the Hotel Nikko. Thereat,
Hernandez informed the group that certain government officials and even the press were after Takao
Aoyagi. Hernandez said that Takao Aoyagi can make a partial payment of P300,000.00. Pelingon
however, assured the group that Takao Aoyagi would pay in full the amount of P1 million so as not to set
another meeting date. [Acejas] kept quiet throughout the negotiations.

xxxxxxxxx

1.5.a. [Acejas] was present during the entrapment that took place at the Diamond Hotel. Hernandez
handed the passport to [Acejas], who handed it then to Perlas and thereafter to Takao Aoyagi. After
Takao Aoyagi went over his confiscated passport, Bethel Grace handed to Hernandez the envelope[15]
containing the supposed P1 million. Hernandez refused and motioned that [Acejas] be the one to
receive it. [Acejas] willingly got the envelope and placed it beside him and Perlas.

x x x before Hernandez handed out Aoyagis pass- port, he reminded the group of their earlier agreement
of kaliwaan, i.e., that after the passport is released, the Aoyagis should give the P1 million.[16]

Version of the Defense

Vladimir S. Hernandez, Expedito S. Perlas, Francisco SB. Acejas III, Victor D. Conanan and Ponciano M.
Ortiz testified for the defense.[17]

To the Sandiganbayans narration, Hernandez adds:

6. x x x [Hernandez], an intelligence agent of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID), went to
the house of Private Respondents Takao and Bethel Grace Aoyagi to enforce and serve a Mission Order
issued and assigned to him by BID Commissioner Zafiro Respicio on December 13, 1993, for the arrest of
Takao Aoyagi.

7. When Bethel Grace showed [Hernandez] her husbands passport, [Hernandez] found out that the
latters [authority] to stay had already been duly extended. He invited private respondents to go with
him to the BID office. They declined, but made a written undertaking to appear at the BID office for
investigation on December 20, 1993. As security for said undertaking, Bethel Grace Aoyagi entrusted to
[Hernandez] her husbands passport, receipt of which [Hernandez], in return, acknowledge[d] in the
same instrument.

8. On January 19, 1994, [Hernandez] signified that the record of Aoyagi has been cleared and that he can
pick up his passport at the BID office. In connection therewith, [Hernandez] was invited by Perlas to
make the return at a lunchtime meeting to be held at the Diamond Hotel Coffee Shop. Upon arrival
thereat, [Hernandez] gave the passport to Atty. Acejas, Aoyagis counsel, and within less than ten
minutes, he left the coffee shop.[18]

In his Petition, Acejas narrates some more occurrences as follows:

1. 18th December 1993 The law firm of Lucenario Margate Mogpo Tiongco & Acejas was engaged by the
spouses Takao Aoyagi and Bethel Grace Pelingon Aoyagi. x x x.

xxxxxxxxx

3. 22nd December 1993

a) The managing partner of the law firm, Atty. Lucenario, briefed [Acejas] about the facts regarding the
confiscation by agents of the BID of the passport belonging to a Japanese client. x x x.

b) Thereafter, [Acejas] was tasked by Atty. Lucenario to meet his brother-in-law Mr. Expedito Perlas,
who happened to be a policeman and a friend of Mr. Takao Aoyagi. Thus, [Acejas] met Mr. Perlas for the
first time in the afternoon of this date.

c) Also, for the first time, [Acejas] met the clients, spouses Aoyagis, at the Diamond Hotel, where they
were staying. x x x [Acejas] advised them that the law firm decided that the clients can file an action for
Replevin plus Damages for the recovery of the Japanese passport.

d) The CONTRACT FOR LEGAL SERVICES was signed between the client and the law firm, thru [Acejas] as
partner thereof. x x x The amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php.50,000.00) was agreed to be paid by way
of Case Retainers/Acceptance Fees, which was supposed to be payable upon (the) signing (t)hereof, and
the sum of Php.2,000.00 by way of appearance fee. However, the client proposed to pay half only of the
acceptance fee (Php.25,000.00), plus the estimated judicial expenses for the filing or docket fees
(Php.15,000.00). x x x It was then further agreed that the balance of Php.25,000.00 was supposed to be
given upon the successful recovery of the Japanese passport.
e) The clients informed [Acejas] that they are supposed to leave for Davao the following day on the 23rd
because they will spend their Christmas in Davao City; but they promised that they will be back on the
26th, which is a Sunday, so that on the 27th, which is a Monday, the complaint against the BID officers
will have to be filed in Court.

xxxxxxxxx

6. 27th December 1993 (T)he law office received word from Mr. Perlas that the Japanese did not come
back on the 26th (December), x x x so that the case cannot be filed on the 27th instead (it has) to wait
for clients instruction.

7. 4th January 1994 In the late afternoon, the law firm received a telephone call from Mr. Perlas
informing (it) that the Japanese is already in Manila and he was requesting for an appointment with any
of the lawyer of the law firm on January 5, 1994.

8. 5th January 1994 [Acejas] met for the first time Mr. Filomeno Pelingon Jr. including a certain Nimoto
Akira.

x x x.

b) [Acejas] told Mr. Pelingon Jr. that all the pleadings are ready for filing but, of course, the Japanese
client and the wife should first read the complaint and sign if they want to pursue the filing of the
complaint against the BID agents.

c) For the first time, Mr. Pelingon advised against the intended filing of the case. x x x He instead
suggested that he wants to directly negotiate with the BID agents.

d) Thereafter, Mr. Pelingon instructed Mr. Dick Perlas to contact the BID agent who confiscated the
Japanese passport. Mr. Perlas and Mr. Pelingon were able to contact the BID agent.
e) For the first time [Acejas] saw Mr. Hernandez, when the latter arrived and also accused Victor
Conanan. In the course of the meeting, a confrontation ensued between [Acejas] and [Hernandez]
concerning the legal basis for the confiscation of the passport. [Acejas] demanded for the return of the
Japanese passport x x x. Mr. Hernandez said that if there are no further derogatory report concerning
the Japanese client, then in a matter of week (from January 5 to 12), he will return the passport.

f) [Acejas] gave an ultimatum to Mr. Hernandez that if the Japanese passport will not be returned in one
(1) weeks time, then (the law firm) will pursue the filing of the replevin case plus the damage suit against
him including the other BID agents.

g) x x x Mr. Pelingon Jr. for the second time advised against the filing thereof saying that his Japanese
brother-in-law would like to negotiate or in his own words magbibigay naman [i.e. will give money
anyway].

9. 8th January 1994

a) Again, Mr. Perlas called the law office and informed x x x that the Japanese client is now in Manila.
Petitioner attended the meeting they arranged in (Makati) and meet Dick Perlas, Vladimir Hernandez
and Pelingon Jr. x x x.

b) x x x according to Pelingon Jr., the Japanese does not want to meet with anybody because anyway
they are willing to pay or negotiate.

c) [Hernandez was also] present at the meeting and [Acejas] met him for the second time. x x x [Acejas]
said that if [Hernandez] will not be able to return the passport on or before January 12, 1994, then the
law firm will have no choice but to file the case against him x x x. Again, for the third time Mr. Pelingon
warned against the filing of the case because he said that he would directly negotiate with the BID
agents.

d) The Makati meeting ended up with the understanding that Mr. Hernandez will have to undertake the
return [of] the Japanese passport on or before January 12, 1994.
10. 12th January 1994

a) Mr. Perlas called up the law office informing that the Japanese client was already in Manila and was
requesting for an appointment with the lawyers at lunchtime of January 12 at the Diamond Hotel where
he was billeted.

xxxxxxxxx

c) x x x x x x x x x

At this meeting, the Japanese was inquiring on the status of the case and he was wondering why the
Japanese passport is not yet recovered when according to him he has already paid for the attorney fees.
And so, [Acejas] explained to him that the case has to be filed and they still have to sign the complaint,
the Special Power of Attorney and the affidavit relative to the filing of replevin case. But the Japanese
would not fully understand. So, Pelingon Jr. again advised against the filing of the case saying that since
there is no derogatory record of Mr. Aoyagi at the BID office, then the BID agents should return the
Japanese passport.

xxxxxxxxx

e) Thereafter, Pelingon, Jr. and Dick Perlas x x x tried to contact Mr. Hernandez. Since, they were able to
contact the latter, we waited until around 2:00 p.m.. When Mr. Hernandez came, he said that the
Japanese client is cleared at the BID office and so, he can return the Japanese passport and he gave it to
[Acejas]. x x x When [Acejas] received the Japanese passport, (he) checked the authenticity of the
documents and finding that it was in good order, (he) attempted to give it to the Japanese client.

Very strangely when [Acejas] tried to hand-over the Japanese passport to the Japanese across the table,
the Japanese was motioning and wanted to get the passport under the table. x x x [Acejas] found it
strange. (He) x x x thought that it was a Japanese custom to receive things like that under the table. But
nonetheless, [Acejas] did not give it under the table and instead passed it on to Mr. Dick Perlas who was
seated at (his) right. And so, it was Mr. Dick Perlas who took the passport from [Acejas] and finally
handed it over to Mr. Aoyagi. x x x. After that, there was a little chat between Mr. Hernandez and the
client, and Mr. Hernandez did not stay for so long and left.
Still, thereafter, (w)hen the Japanese passport was received, Bethel Grace Aoyagi and [Acejas] were
talking and she said since the Japanese passport had been recovered, they are now willing to pay the
Php.25,000.00 balance of the acceptance fee.

Mrs. Aoyagi was giving [Acejas] a brown envelope but she want[ed] Mr. Hernandez to receive it while
Mr. Hernandez was still around standing. But Mr. Hernandez did not receive it.

Since, the payment is due to the law firm, [Acejas] received the brown envelope.

xxxxxxxxx

Not long after, [Acejas] saw his companion, accused Mr. Victoriano, who was signaling something as if
there was a sense of urgency. [Acejas] immediately stood up and left hurriedly. When [Acejas]
approached Mr. Victoriano, he said that the car which [Acejas] parked in front of the Diamond Hotel
gate, somebody took the car. [Acejas] went out and checked and realized that it was valet parking so it
was the parking attendant who took the car and transferred the car to the parking area. [Acejas]
requested Mr. Victoriano to get (the) envelope and the coat, at the table.

g) When [Acejas] went out, [Acejas] already looked for the parking attendant to get the car. When the
car arrived, [Acejas] just saw from the doors of the Diamond Hotel Mr. Jose Victoriano and Mr. Dick
Perlas coming out already in handcuffs and collared by the NBI agents. They then were taken to the NBI,
except the accused Vladimir Hernandez.[19]

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

The Sandiganbayan ruled that the elements of direct bribery,[20] as well as conspiracy in the
commission of the crime,[21] had been proven. Hernandez and Conanan demanded money;[22] Perlas
negotiated and dealt with the complainants;[23] and Acejas accepted the payoff and gave it to Perlas.
[24]
Victoriano was acquitted on reasonable doubt.[25] Although he had picked up the envelope containing
the payoff, this act did not sufficiently show that he had conspired with the other accused.[26]

The Sandiganbayan did not give credence to the alleged belief of Acejas that the money was the balance
of the law firms legal fees.[27] If he had indeed believed that the money was payable to him, he should
have kept and retained it. The court then inferred that he had merely been pretending to protect his
clients rights when he threatened to file a suit against Hernandez.[28]

The January 3, 2003 Resolution acquitted Conanan and denied the Motions for Reconsideration of
Hernandez, Acejas and Perlas. According to the Sandiganbayan, Conanan was not shown to be present
during the meetings on January 8 and 12, 1994.[29] His presence during one of those meetings, on
January 5, 1994, did not conclusively show his participation as a co-conspirator.

The January 14, 2003 Resolution denied Acejas Supplemental Motion, which prayed for a new trial.

The Issues

Petitioner Hernandez raises the following issues:

I. Whether or not respondent court erred in ruling that [Hernandez] was part of the conspiracy to extort
money from private respondents, despite lack of clear and convincing evidence.

II. Whether or not the Honorable Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it overlooked the
fact that the legal requisites of the crime are not completely present as to warrant [Hernandez]
complicity in the crime charged.
III. Whether or not respondent Sandiganbayan, 5th Division, ruled erroneously when it relied solely on
the naked and uncorroborated testimonies of the late Filomeno Jun Pelingon, Jr. in order to declare the
existence of a conspiracy to commit bribery, as well as the guilt of the accused.

IV. Whether or not [respondent] courts acquittal of co-accused Victor Conanan and its conviction of
[Hernandez] for the offense as charged effectively belies the existence of a conspiracy.

V. Whether or not the respondent Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of, or in excess of jurisdiction when it found [Hernandez] guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of direct bribery.[30]

On the other hand, Petitioner Acejas simply enumerates the following points:

1. The Conspiracy Theory

2. The presence of lawyer-client relationship; duty to clients cause; lawful performance of duties

3. Instigation not entrapment

4. Credibility of witness and testimony

5. Affidavit of desistance; effect: creates serious doubts as to the liability of the accused

6. Elements of bad faith

7. Elements of the crime (direct bribery)

8. Non-presentation of complaining victim tantamount to suppression of evidence[31]

In the main, petitioners are challenging the finding of guilt against them. The points they raised are
therefore intertwined and will be discussed jointly.
The Courts Ruling

The Petitions have no merit.

Main Issue:

Finding of Guilt

The crime of direct bribery exists when a public officer 1)

agrees to perform an act that constitutes a crime in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present;
2) accepts the gift in consideration of the execution of an act that does not constitute a crime; or 3)
abstains from the performance of official duties.[32]

Petitioners were convicted under the second kind of direct bribery, which contained the following
elements: 1) the offender was a public officer, 2) who received the gifts or presents personally or
through another, 3) in consideration of an act that did not constitute a crime, and 4) that act related to
the exercise of official duties.[33]

Hernandez claims that the prosecution failed to show his involvement in the crime. Allegedly, he was
merely implementing Mission Order No. 93-04-12, which required him to investigate Takao Aoyagi.[34]
The passport was supposed to have been voluntarily given to him as a guarantee to appear at the BID
office, but he returned it upon the instruction of his superior.[35]

The chain of circumstances, however, contradicts the contention of Hernandez. It was he who had taken
the passport of Takao Aoyagi.[36] On various dates,[37] he met with Takao and Bethel Grace Aoyagi,
and also Pelingon, regarding the return of the passport. Hernandez then asked for a down payment on
the payoff,[38] during which he directed Bethel Grace to deliver the money to Acejas.[39]

Bethel Grace Aoyagis testimony, which was confirmed by the other witnesses, proceeded as follows:

PROSECUTOR MONTEMAYOR:

Q: When Vlademir Hernandez arrived, what happened?

A: He got the passport from his pocket and passed it on to Atty. Acejas, sir.

Q: What happened after he gave the passport to Atty. Acejas?

A: [Acejas] gave the passport to Mr. Expedito Perlas, sir.

Q: After that, what happened?

A: Then, [Perlas] gave it to Mr. Aoyagi, sir.

Q: The passport?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And when Mr. Aoyagi received the passport, what did you do or what did Mr. Aoyagi do?

A: He checked all the pages and he kept it, sir.

xxxxxxxxx

Q: What did you do with that money after Mr. Aoyagi received the passport?
A: Because our agreement is that after giving the passport we would give the money so when Mr. Perlas
handed to my husband the passport, I gave the money placed on my lap to my husband and he passed it
to Mr. Hernandez who refused the same.

ATTY. ACEJAS:

Your Honor, please, may I just make a clarification that when the witness referred to the money it
pertains to the brown envelope which allegedly contains the money x x x .

AJ ESCAREAL:

Noted.

PROSECUTOR MONTEMAYOR:

Q: Did Mr. Hernandez got hold or touched the envelope?

A: No, sir.

Q: When he [did] not want to receive the envelope, what did your husband do?

A: When Mr. Vlademir Hernandez refused to receive the money, he pointed to Atty. Acejas so my
husband handed it to Atty. Acejas who received the same and later on passed it to Mr. Perlas.

Q: When Mr. Hernandez pointed to Atty. Acejas, did he say anything?

A: None, sir, he just motioned like this.

INTERPRETER:

Witness motioning by [waving] her two (2) hands, left and right.
PROSECUTOR MONTEMAYOR:

Q: And at the same time pointed to Atty. Acejas?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And your husband gave the envelope to Atty. Acejas?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And Atty. Acejas, in turn, handed the said envelope to whom?

A: Expedito Perlas, sir.

Q: Did Expedito Perlas [receive] that envelope?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: After that, what happened?

A: Mr. Perlas put the money on his side in between him and Atty. Acejas, sir.

Q: And then, what happened?

A: After the money was placed where it was, we were surprised, I think, it happened in just seconds[.]
Mr. Vlademir Hernandez immediately left and then all of a sudden somebody came and picked up the
envelope, sir.[40]

Significantly, Hernandez does not address the lingering questions about why Takao Aoyagi or his
representatives had to negotiate for the retrieval of the passport during the meetings held outside the
BID. Ponciano Ortiz, chief of the Operation and Intelligence Division of the BID, testified that it was not a
standard operating procedure to officially return withheld passports in such locations.[41] It can readily
be inferred that Hernandez had an ulterior motive for withholding the passport for some time despite
the absence of any legal purpose.

Also, Hernandez cannot claim innocence based on Conanans acquittal.[42] While the testimony of
Pelingon was the only evidence linking Conanan to the conspiracy,[43] there was an abundance of
evidence showing Hernandezs involvement.

Acejas, on the other hand, belies his involvement in the conspiracy. He attacks the prosecutions version
that he was silent during the negotiations for the return of the passport.[44] According to him, he kept
giving Hernandez an ultimatum to return the passport, with threats to file a court case.

Acejas testified that he had wanted to file a case against Hernandez, but was prevented by Spouses
Aoyagi. His supposed preparedness to file a case against Hernandez might have just been a charade and
was in fact belied by Pelingons testimony regarding the January 5, 1994 meeting:

ATTY. VALMONTE:

Q: Who arrived first at Aristocrat Restaurant, you or Acejas?

A: Acejas arrived together with Dick Perlas[. T]hey arrived ahead of me, sir.

xxxxxxxxx

Q: When the three (3) of you were talking that was the time that Atty. Acejas was showing you
documents that he was going to file [a] P1 million damage suit against Hernandez?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Now, is it not that when Hernandez and Cunanan arrived and you were talking with each other, Atty.
Acejas also threatened, reiterated his threat to Hernandez that he would file [a] P1 million damage suit
should Hernandez [fails] to return the passport?
A: When the group [was] already there, the P1 million [damage suit] was not [anymore] mentioned, sir.
[45]

Even assuming that Acejas negotiated for the return of the passport on his clients behalf, he still failed
to justify his actions during the entrapment operation. The witnesses all testified that he had received
the purported payoff. On this point, we recount the testimony of Bethel Grace Aoyagi:

PROSECUTOR MONTEMAYOR:

xxxxxxxxx

Q: When he [did] not want to receive the envelope, what did your husband do?

A: When Mr. Vlademir Hernandez refused to receive the money, he pointed to Atty. Acejas so my
husband handed it to Atty. Acejas who received the same and later on passed it to Mr. Perlas.

Q: When Mr. Hernandez pointed to Atty. Acejas, did he say anything?

A: None, sir, he just motioned like this.

INTERPRETER:

Witness motioning by [waving] her two (2) hands, left and right.

PROSECUTOR MONTEMAYOR:

Q: And at the same time pointed to Atty. Acejas?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: And your husband gave the envelope to Atty. Acejas?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And Atty. Acejas, in turn, handed the said envelope to whom?

A: Expedito Perlas, sir.

xxxxxxxxx

Q: After that, what happened?

A: Mr. Perlas put the money on his side in between him and Atty. Acejas, sir.

Q: And then, what happened?

WITNESS:

A: After the money was placed where it was, we were surprised, I think, it happened in just seconds[.]
Mr. Vladimir Hernandez immediately left and then all of a sudden somebody came and picked up the
envelope, sir.

PROSECUTOR MONTEMAYOR:

Q: Do you know the identity of that somebody who picked up the envelope?

xxxxxxxxx
A: Victoriano, sir.[46]

Acejas failed to justify why he received the payoff money. It would be illogical to sustain his contention
that the envelope represented the balance of his firms legal fees. That it was given to Hernandez
immediately after the return of the passport leads to the inescapable conclusion that the money was a
consideration for the return. Moreover, Acejas should have kept the amount if he believed it to be his.
The Court agrees with the Sandiganbayans pronouncement on this point:

x x x. If he believed that the brown envelope contained the balance of the acceptance fee, how come he
passed it to Perlas? His passing the brown envelope to Perlas only proves that the same did not contain
the balance of the acceptance fee; otherwise, he should have kept and retained it. Moreover, the three
prosecution witnesses testified that the brown envelope was being given to Hernandez who refused to
accept the same. This further shows that the brown envelope was not for the balance of the acceptance
fee because, if it were, why was it given to Hernandez.

xxxxxxxxx

Acejas defense was further weakened by the fact that his testimony as to why he left immediately after
the brown envelope was given to him was uncorroborated. He should have presented accused
Victoriano to corroborate his testimony since it was the latter who allegedly called him and caused him
to leave their table. This, he did not do. The ineluctable conclusion is that he was, indeed, in cahoots
with his co-accused.[47]

Lawyers Duty
Acejas alleges that the Sandiganbayan failed to appreciate his lawyer-client relationship with the
complainants. He was supposedly only acting in their best interest[48] and had the right to be present
when the passport was to be returned.[49]

True, as a lawyer, it was his duty to represent his clients in dealing with other people. His presence at
Diamond Hotel for the scheduled return of the passport was justified. This fact, however, does not
support his innocence

Acejas, however, failed to act for or represent the interests of his clients. He knew of the payoff, but did
nothing to assist or protect their rights, a fact that strongly indicated that he was to get a share. Thus, he
received the money purporting to be the payoff,

even if he was not involved in the entrapment operation. The facts revealed that he was a conspirator.

The Court reminds lawyers to follow legal ethics[50] when confronted by public officers who extort
money. Lawyers must decline and report the matter to the authorities.[51] If the extortion is directed at
the client, they must advise the client not to perform any illegal act. Moreover, they must report it to
the authorities, without having to violate the attorney-client privilege.[52] Naturally, they must not
participate in the illegal act.[53]

Acejas did not follow these guidelines. Worse, he conspired with the extortionists.

Instigation

Also futile is the contention of petitioners that Pelingon instigated the situation to frame them into
accepting the payoff.[54] Instigation is the employment of ways and means to lure persons into the
commission of an offense in order to prosecute them.[55] As opposed to entrapment, criminal intent
originates in the mind of the instigator.[56]
There was no instigation in the present case, because the chain of circumstances showed an extortion
attempt. In other words, the criminal intent originated from petitioners, who had arranged for the
payoff.

During the cross-examination of Bethel Grace Aoyagi, pertinent was Associate Justice Escareal clarifying
question as follows:

AJ ESCAREAL:

[Q:] Did Mr. Hernandez say anything when he returned the passport to your husband?

A: He did not say anything except that he instructed [the] group to abide with the agreement that upon
handing of the passport, the money would also be given immediately (magkaliwaan).[57]

Alleged Discrepancies

According to Acejas, Pelingons testimonies given in his Complaint-Affidavit, Supplemental-Affidavit,

inquest testimony, testimony in court, and two Affidavits of Desistance were contradictory.[58] He cites
these particular portions of Pelingons Affidavit:

5. That having been enlightened of the case, and conscious that I might be prosecuting innocent men, I
have decided on my own disposition, not to further testify against any of the accused in the
Sandiganbayan or in any court or tribunal, regarding the same cause of action.

6. That this affidavit of desistance to further prosecute is voluntarily executed, and that no reward,
promise, consideration, influence, force or threat was executed to secure this affidavit.[59]
Pelingon testified that he had executed the Affidavit of Desistance because of a threat to his life.[60] He
did not prepare the Affidavit; neither was it explained to him. Allegedly, his true testimony was in the
first Complaint-Affidavit that he had executed.[61]

By appearing and testifying during the trial, he effectively repudiated his Affidavit of Desistance. An
affidavit of desistance must be ignored when pitted against positive evidence given on the witness
stand.[62]

Acejas has failed to identify the other material points that were allegedly inconsistent. The Court
therefore adopts the Sandiganbayans finding that these were minor details that were not indicative of
the lack of credibility of the prosecution witnesses.[63] People v. Eligino[64] is in point:

x x x. While witnesses may differ in their recollections of an incident, it does not necessarily follow from
their disagreement that all of them should be disbelieved as liars and their testimony completely
discarded as worthless. As long as the mass of testimony jibes on material points, the slight clashing
statements neither dilute the witnesses credibility nor the veracity of their testimony. Thus,
inconsistencies and contradictions referring to minor details do not, in any way, destroy the credibility of
witnesses, for indeed, such inconsistencies are but natural and even enhance credibility as these
discrepancies indicate that the responses are honest and unrehearsed.[65]

Suppression of Evidence

Acejas further raises the issue of suppression of evidence. Aoyagi, from whom the money was
supposedly demanded, should have been presented by the prosecution as a witness.[66]

The discretion on whom to present as prosecution witnesses falls on the People.[67] The freedom to
devise a strategy to convict the accused belongs to the prosecution.[68] Necessarily, its decision on
which evidence, including which witnesses, to present cannot be dictated by the accused or even by the
trial court.[69] If petitioners believed that Takao Aoyagis testimony was important to their case, they
should have presented him as their witness.[70]
Finally, Acejas claims that his Comment/Objection to the prosecutions Formal Offer of Evidence was not
resolved by the Sandiganbayan.[71] In that Comment/Objection, he had noted the lateness in the filing
of the Formal Offer of Evidence.

It may readily be assumed that the Sandiganbayan admitted the prosecutions Formal Offer of Evidence
upon the promulgation of its Decision. In effect, Acejas Comment/Objection was deemed immaterial. It
could not overrule the finding of guilt. Further, it showed no prayer that the Sandiganbayan needed to
act upon.[72]

Finally we reiterate that, as a rule, factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are conclusive upon this Court.
[73] We are convinced that these were clearly based on the evidence adduced in this case.

In sum, we find that the prosecution proved the elements of direct bribery. First, there is no question
that the offense was committed by a public officer. BID Agent Hernandez extorted money from the
Aoyagi spouses for the return of the passport and the promise of assistance in procuring a visa.
Petitioner Acejas was his co-conspirator. Second, the offenders received the money as payoff, which
Acejas received for the group and then gave to Perlas. Third, the money was given in consideration of
the return of the passport, an act that did not constitute a crime. Fourth, both the confiscation and the
return of the passport were made in the exercise of official duties.

For taking direct part in the execution of the crime, Hernandez and Acejas are liable as principals.[74]
The evidence shows that the

parties conspired to extort money from Spouses Aoyagi. A conspiracy exists even if all the parties did not
commit the same act, if the participants performed specific acts that indicated unity of purpose in
accomplishing a criminal design.[75] The act of one is the act of all.

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

3. EN BANC
A.C. NO. 10050 December 3, 2013

VICTORIA C. HEENAN, Complainant,

vs.

ATTY. ERLINA ESPEJO, Respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

This resolves the administrative complaint filed by Victoria Heenan (Victoria) against Atty. Erlina Espejo
(Atty. Espejo) before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for violation of lawyer’s oath, docketed as CBD Case No. 10-2631.

The Facts

Sometime in January 2009, Victoria met Atty. Espejo through her godmother, Corazon Eusebio
(Corazon). Following the introduction, Corazon told Victoria that Atty. Espejo was her lawyer in need of
money and wanted to borrow two hundred fifty thousand pesos (PhP 250,000) from her (Victoria).
Shortly thereafter, Victoria went to the house of Corazon for a meeting with Atty. Espejo where they
discussed the terms of the loan. Since Atty. Espejo was introduced to her as her godmother’s lawyer,
Victoria found no reason to distrust the former. Hence, during the same meeting, Victoria agreed to
accomodate Atty. Espejo and there and then handed to the latter the amount of PhP 250,000. To secure
the payment of the loan, Atty. Espejo simultaneously issued and turned over to Victoria a check1 dated
February 2, 2009 for two hundred seventy-five thousand pesos (PhP 275,000) covering the loan amount
and agreed interest. On due date, Atty. Espejo requested Victoria to delay the deposit of the check for
the reason that she was still waiting for the release of the proceeds of a bank loan to fund the check.
However, after a couple of months of waiting, Victoria received no word from Atty. Espejo as to whether
or not the check was already funded enough. In July 2009, Victoria received an Espejo-issued check
dated July 10, 2009 in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (PhP 50,000)2 representing the interest which
accrued due to the late payment of the principal obligation. Victoria deposited the said check but, to her
dismay, the check bounced due to insufficiency of funds. Atty. Espejo failed to pay despite Victoria’s
repeated demands. Worried that she would not be able to recover the amount thus lent, Victoria
decided to deposit to her account the first check in the amount of PhP 275,000, but without notifying
Atty. Espejo of the fact. However, the said check was also dishonored due to insufficiency of funds.
Victoria thereafter became more aggressive in her efforts to recover her money. She, for instance,
personally handed to Atty. Espejo a demand letter dated August 3, 2009.3

When Atty. Espejo still refused to pay, Victoria filed a criminal complaint against Atty. Espejo on August
18, 2009 for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and Estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, before the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office.4

Atty. Espejo disregarded the notices and subpoenas issued by the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office
which she personally received and continued to ignore Victoria’s demands. She attended only one (1)
scheduled preliminary investigation where she promised to pay her loan obligation.5

In November 2009, Atty. Espejo issued another check dated December 8, 2009 in the amount of two
hundred seventy five thousand pesos (PhP 275,000.). However, to Victoria’s chagrin, the said check
was again dishonored due to insufficiency of funds.6 Atty. Espejo did not file any counter-affidavit or
pleading to answer the charges against her. On November 17, 2009, the case was submitted for
resolution without Atty. Espejo’s participation.7 Victoria thereafter filed the instant administrative
case against Atty. Espejo before the CBD. On March 1, 2010, the CBD, through Director for Bar Discipline
Alicia A. Risos-Vidal, issued an Order8 directing Atty. Espejo to submit her Answer to Victoria’s
administrative complaint failing which would render her in default. The warning, notwithstanding, Atty.
Espejo did not submit any Answer. On May 5, 2010, IBP Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Malala
(Commissioner Villanueva-Malala) notified the parties to appear for a mandatory conference set on June
2, 2010. The notice stated that non-appearance of either of the parties shall be deemed a waiver of her
right to participate in further proceedings.9

At the mandatory conference, only Victoria appeared.10

Thus, Commissioner Villanueva-Malala issued an Order11 noting Atty. Espejo’s failure to appear during
the mandatory conference and her failure to file an Answer. Accordingly, Atty. Espejo was declared in
default. Victoria, on the other hand, was directed to file her verified position paper, which she filed on
June 11, 2010.12
Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

In its Report and Recommendation13 dated July 15, 2010, the CBD recommended the suspension of
Atty. Espejo from the practice of law and as a member of the Bar for a period of five (5) years.

The CBD reasoned:

The failure of a lawyer to answer the complaint for disbarment despite due notice and to appear on the
scheduled hearings set, shows his flouting resistance to lawful orders of the court and illustrates his
deficiency for his oath of office as a lawyer, which deserves disciplinary sanction.

Moreover, respondent[’s] acts of issuing checks with insufficient funds and despite repeated demands
[she] failed to comply with her obligation and her disregard and failure to appear for preliminary
investigation and to submit her counter-affidavit to answer the charges against her for Estafa and
Violation of BP 22, constitute grave misconduct that also warrant disciplinary action against respondent.

On December 14, 2012, the Board of Governors passed a Resolution14 adopting the Report and
Recommendation of the CBD with the modification lowering Atty. Espejo’s suspension from five (5)
years to two (2) years. Atty. Espejo was also ordered to return to Victoria the amount of PhP 250,000
within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice with legal interest reckoned from the time the demand was
made. The Resolution reads:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported
by the evidence on record and applicable laws and rules, and considering respondent’s grave
misconduct, Atty. Erlinda Espejo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years and
Ordered to Return to complainant the amount of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand (₱250,000.00) Pesos
within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice with legal interest reckoned from the time the demand was
made.
On August 8, 2013, the CBD transmitted to this Court the Notice of the Resolution pertaining to
Resolution No. XX-2012-419 along with the records of this case.15

The Court’s Ruling

We sustain the findings of the IBP and adopt its recommendation in part.1âwphi1 Atty. Espejo did not
deny obtaining a loan from Victoria or traverse allegations that she issued unfunded checks to pay her
obligation. It has already been settled that the deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of
worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned.16

Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to
their clients. In Tomlin II v. Moya II, We explained that the prompt payment of financial obligations is
one of the duties of a lawyer, thus:

In the present case, respondent admitted his monetary obligations to the complaint but offered no
justifiable reason for his continued refusal to pay. Complainant made several demands, both verbal and
written, but respondent just ignored them and even made himself scarce. Although he acknowledged
his financial obligations to complainant, respondent never offered nor made arrangements to pay his
debt. On the contrary, he refused to recognize any wrong doing nor shown remorse for issuing
worthless checks, an act constituting gross misconduct. Respondent must be reminded that it is his duty
as a lawyer to faithfully perform at all times his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his
clients. As part of his duties, he must promptly pay his financial obligations.17

The fact that Atty. Espejo obtained the loan and issued the worthless checks in her private capacity and
not as an attorney of Victoria is of no moment. As We have held in several cases, a lawyer may be
disciplined not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession but also for gross misconduct
outside of his professional capacity. While the Court may not ordinarily discipline a lawyer for
misconduct committed in his non- professional or private capacity, the Court may be justified in
suspending or removing him as an attorney where his misconduct outside of the lawyer’s professional
dealings is so gross in character as to show him morally unfit and unworthy of the privilege which his
licenses and the law confer.18
In Wilkie v. Limos, We reiterated that the issuance of a series of worthless checks, which is exactly what
Atty. Espejo committed in this case, manifests a lawyer’s low regard for her commitment to her oath,
for which she may be disciplined. Thus:

We have held that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn against a
closed account indicates a lawyer’s unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on her. It shows a
lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render her unworthy of public confidence. The
issuance of a series of worthless checks also shows the remorseless attitude of respondent, unmindful to
the deleterious effects of such act to the public interest and public order. It also manifests a lawyer’s
low regard to her commitment to the oath she has taken when she joined her peers, seriously and
irreparably tarnishing the image of the profession she should hold in high esteem.

xxxx

In Barrios v. Martinez, we disbarred the respondent who issued worthless checks for which he was
convicted in the criminal case filed against him. In Lao v. Medel, we held that the deliberate failure to
pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may
be sanctioned with one-year suspension from the practice of law. The same sanction was imposed on
the respondent-lawyer in Rangwani v. Dino having been found guilty of gross misconduct for issuing bad
checks in payment of a piece of property the title of which was only entrusted to him by the
complainant.19

Further, the misconduct of Atty. Espejo is aggravated by her unjustified refusal to obey the orders of the
IBP directing her to file an answer to the complaint of Victoria and to appear at the scheduled
mandatory conference. This constitutes blatant disrespect for the IBP which amounts to conduct
unbecoming a lawyer. In Almendarez, Jr. v. Langit, We held that a lawyer must maintain respect not only
for the courts, but also for judicial officers and other duly constituted authorities, including the IBP:

The misconduct of respondent is aggravated by his unjustified refusal to heed the orders of the IBP
requiring him to file an answer to the complaint-affidavit and, afterwards, to appear at the mandatory
conference. Although respondent did not appear at the conference, the IBP gave him another chance to
defend himself through a position paper. Still, respondent ignored this directive, exhibiting a blatant
disrespect for authority. Indeed, he is justly charged with conduct unbecoming a lawyer, for a lawyer is
expected to uphold the law and promote respect for legal processes. Further, a lawyer must observe
and maintain respect not only to the courts, but also to judicial officers and other duly constituted
authorities, including the IBP. Under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the Court has empowered the IBP
to conduct proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys.20

Undoubtedly, Atty. Espejo’s issuance of worthless checks and her blatant refusal to heed the directives
of the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office and the IBP contravene Canon 1, Rule 1.01; Canon 7, Rule 7.03;
and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provide:

CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. Rule 1.01. – A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. CANON 7 – A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD
THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR. Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession. CANON 11 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT
DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICES AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.

We find the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years, as recommended by the
IBP, commensurate under the circumstances. We, however, cannot sustain the IBP’s recommendation
ordering Atty. Espejo to return the money she borrowed from Victoria. In disciplinary proceedings
against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a
member of the Bar. Our only concern is the determination of respondent’s administrative liability. Our
findings have no material bearing on other judicial action which the parties may to choose me against
each other. Furthermore, disciplinary proceedings against lawyers do not involve a trial of an action, but
rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. The only question for
determination in these proceedings is whether or not the attorney is still fit to be allowed to continue as
a member of the Bar. Thus, this Court cannot rule on the issue of the amount of money that should be
returned to the complainant.22

WHEREFORE, We find Atty. Erlinda B. Espejo GUILTY of gross misconduct and violating Canons 1, 7 and
11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. We SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for two
(2) years affective immediately.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all
courts, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant and recorded in the
personal files of respondent.
4.

SPS. AMADOR and ROSITA A.C. No. 7434

TEJADA,

Petitioners, Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,

CARPIO MORALES,

- versus - TINGA, and

VELASCO, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:

ATTY. ANTONIUTTI K. PALAA,

Respondent. August 23, 2007

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Petitioners-spouses Rosita and Amador Tejada filed a Complaint Affidavit before the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) to initiate disbarment proceedings against respondent Atty. Antoniutti K. Palaa for
his continued refusal to settle his long overdue loan obligation to the complainants, in violation of his
sworn duty as a lawyer to do justice to every man and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

More specifically, the complaint alleges that:

3. Sometime on January, 2001, respondent lawyer Antoniutti K. Palana taking advantage of his special
knowledge as a lawyer represented to the petitioners that he has an alleged parcel of land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. (73196) 16789 and that he needs an amount of One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P100,000.00) so that he could reconstitute the torrens title on the same;

4. Respondent then induced by sweet promises and assurances petitioners spouses to finance such
undertaking with a solemn commitment on his part that after he has already reconstituted such torrens
title, he will deliver the same to the petitioners spouses as security for the amount they had financed;

Thereafter, petitioner spouses shall earn an amount of P70,000.00 from the P100,000.00 they had
financed or all and [sic] all, respondent lawyer shall pay petitioner spouses a total amount of
P170,000.00;

5. The agreement between the petitioner spouses and respondent lawyer, Antoniutti K. Palana in this
regard is being partly evidenced by their written agreement thereon dated January 12, 2001, a xerox
copy of which is hereto attached as Annex A. Likewise, the receipt by the respondent of the P100,000.00
is being evidenced in the bottom part of page 1 of the agreement;

6. Under the clear terms of their agreement, respondent lawyer Antoniutti K. Palana solemnly assured
petitioner spouses that he will reconstitute, deliver the reconstituted title and give the P170,000.00 to
the petitioners spouses all within a period of three months reckoned from their execution of their
written agreement dated January 12, 2001;

7. However, after respondent lawyer, Antoniutti K. Palana had gotten the P100,000.00 amount from the
petitioner spouses, respondent from that time on up to the present had intentionally evaded the
performance of his due, just, legal and demandable obligations to petitioner spouses.

It turned out that all his assurances that he had a torrens title, he will reconstitute the same and deliver
an amount of P170,000.00 to petitioner spouses were all fraudulent representations on his part or else
were only fictitious in character to defraud petitioner spouses of their hard owned monies;
xxxx

9. Legal demands had already been made to respondent lawyer to fulfill all his moral and legal
responsibilities to petitioner spouses but all of said demands simply went unheeded. A xerox copy of the
two legal demand letters to respondent lawyer in this regard is hereto attached as Annex B and C.[1]

Despite due notice, respondent failed to file his answer to the complaint as required by the Commission
on Bar Discipline of the IBP. Respondent likewise failed to appear on the scheduled date of the
mandatory conference despite due notice.

Thus, on March 10, 2005, the IBP declared respondent to have waived his right to submit evidence and
to participate further in the proceedings of the case.

After a careful consideration of the pleadings and evidence submitted by the complainants ex parte,
Investigating Commissioner Elpidio G. Soriano III submitted his February 1, 2006 Report to the IBP Board
of Governors, recommending respondent's suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months.

Based on said Report, petitioners were able to satisfactorily prove the following: that Rosita Tejada and
respondent and his companion executed a written agreement (Annex A); that respondent received the
amount of one hundred thousand pesos (PhP 100,000) from Rosita Tejada pursuant to said agreement;
and that petitioners sent a demand letter to respondent (Annex C), but, until now, respondent has failed
to settle his obligation. Petitioners, however, failed to present evidence to show that respondent
fraudulently represented himself to be the owner of the aforesaid lot. Noting respondents indifference
to the proceedings of the case, the Investigating Commissioner cited Ngayan v. Tugade,[2] where the
Supreme Court considered respondents failure to answer the complaint and his failure to appear in four
hearings below as evidence of his flouting resistance to a lawful order of the court, and illustrate his
despiciency to his oath of office in violation of Section 3, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

Thus, for respondents misconduct, the Investigating Commissioner recommended respondents

suspension for a period of three (3) months, guided by Supreme Court rulings in analogous cases, viz:
Sanchez v. Somoso,[3] where the lawyer was suspended for six (6) months for having issued personal
checks from a closed bank account and subsequently refused to pay for his medical expenses despite
demand after the checks were dishonored; Constantino v. Saludares,[4] where the lawyer was
suspended for three (3) months for his unwarranted refusal to pay a personal loan despite demand; and
Lizaso v. Amante,[5] where the lawyer was suspended indefinitely for his failure to return and account
for the money delivered to him for investment purposes.[6]

In its November 18, 2006 Resolution, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved said report and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, considering Respondent's continued refusal to
settle his obligation to the complainants and for his failure to participate in the proceedings before the
Commission of Bar Discipline.[7]

After a review of the records and especially sans the submittal of any response or evidence from
respondent, we find no reason to disturb the findings of Commissioner Soriano.

Respondent, like all other members of the bar, is expected to always live up to the standards embodied
in the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly the following Canons, viz:

CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law
and for legal processes.

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.02 A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.

CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support
the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A high sense of morality, honesty, and
fair dealing is expected and required of a member of the bar. Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. The nature of the office of a lawyer requires that s/he shall be of good moral character. This
qualification is not only a condition precedent to the admission to the legal profession, but its continued
possession is essential to maintain ones good standing in the profession.[8]

Indeed, the strength of the legal profession lies in the dignity and integrity of its members. As
previously explained in Sipin-Nabor v. Baterina:

A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The trust and
confidence necessarily reposed by clients requires in the attorney a high standard and appreciation of
his duty to his clients, his profession, the courts and the public. The bar must maintain a high standard
of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. Generally speaking, a lawyer can do honor to
the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his
clients. To this end, members of the legal fraternity can do nothing that might tend to lessen in any
degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the profession.[9]

In the instant case, respondents unjustified withholding of petitioners money years after it became due
and demandable demonstrates his lack of integrity and fairness, and this is further highlighted by his
lack of regard for the charges brought against him. Instead of meeting the charges head on, respondent
did not bother to file an answer nor did he participate in the proceedings to offer a valid explanation for
his conduct.

The Court has emphatically stated that when the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not
enough that s/he denies the charges against him; s/he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence
against him/her. S/he must show proof that s/he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity
which at all times is expected of him/her.[10]

Finally, respondents acts, which violated the Lawyer's Oath to delay no man for money or malice as well
as the Code of Professional Responsibility, warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanctions against him.
With respect to the recommendation to suspend respondent Palaa for three (3) months, we find that
the sanction is not commensurate to the breach committed and disrespect to the Court exhibited by the
erring member of the bar. We increase the suspension to six (6) months in view of our ruling in
Barrientos v. Libiran-Meteoro.[11]

We find that the complainants could not have been defrauded without the representations of
respondent that he can easily have the torrens title of his lot reconstituted with his special knowledge as
a legal practitioner as long as he is provided PhP 100,000 to finance the reconstitution. Respondent
knew that his representations were false since the filing fee for a petition for reconstitution in 2001 was
only PhP 3,145, and other expenses including the publication of the filing of the petition could not have
cost more than PhP 20,000. It is clear that he employed deceit in convincing complainants to part with
their hard earned money and the latter could not have been easily swayed to lend the money were it
not for his misrepresentations and failed promises as a member of the bar. Moreover, when he failed to
pay his just and legal obligation, he disobeyed the provisions of the Civil Code which is one of the
substantive laws he vowed to uphold when he took his oath as a lawyer. Lastly, to aggravate his
misconduct, he totally ignored the directives of the IBP to answer the complaint when he fully knew as a
lawyer that the compulsory bar organization was merely deputized by this Court to undertake the
investigation of complaints against lawyers, among which is the instant complaint. In short, his
disobedience to the IBP is in reality a gross and blatant disrespect to the Court. Lawyers fully know, as
respondent is aware or at least is assumed to know, that lawyers like him cannot disobey the orders and
resolutions of the Court. Failing in this duty as a member of the bar which is being supervised by the
Court under the Constitution, we find that a heavier sanction should fall on respondent.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Antoniutti K. Palaa is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months and is ordered to settle his loan obligation to petitioners-spouses Amador and
Rosita Tejada within two (2) months from the date of this Decisions promulgation.

This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

5.
ANTERO J. POBRE,

Complainant,

- versus -

Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSOR- SANTIAGO,

Respondent.

A.C. No. 7399

Present:

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.,

Acting Chairperson,

CARPIO MORALES,*

VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA, and

PERALTA, JJ.

Promulgated:

August 25, 2009

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

In his sworn letter/complaint dated December 22, 2006, with enclosures, Antero J. Pobre invites the
Courts attention to the following excerpts of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiagos speech delivered on
the Senate floor:

x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated,

debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a
country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his
cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be
surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x
x x.

To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the speaker towards then
Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the Court and constituted direct contempt
of court. Accordingly, Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions be taken
against the lady senator.

In her comment on the complaint dated April 25, 2007, Senator Santiago, through counsel, does not
deny making the aforequoted statements. She, however, explained that those statements were covered
by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she delivered in the
discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its committee. The purpose of her speech, according to
her, was to bring out in the open controversial anomalies in governance with a view to future remedial
legislation. She averred that she wanted to expose what she believed to be an unjust act of the Judicial
Bar Council [JBC], which, after sending out public invitations for nomination to the soon to-be vacated
position of Chief Justice, would eventually inform applicants that only incumbent justices of the
Supreme Court would qualify for nomination. She felt that the JBC should have at least given an
advanced advisory that non-sitting members of the Court, like her, would not be considered for the
position of Chief Justice.
The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the provision of Article VI, Section 11 of the
Constitution, which provides: A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all offenses
punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in
session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate
in the Congress or in any committee thereof. Explaining the import of the underscored portion of the
provision, the Court, in Osmea, Jr. v. Pendatun, said:

Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every
legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose is to enable
and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success for
it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech and that he should be
protected from resentment of every one, however, powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may
occasion offense.[1]

As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative privilege is founded upon long experience and arises
as a means of perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of the legislative department. Without
parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its equivalent, would degenerate into a polite and ineffective
debating forum. Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative
duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public good. The privilege would be of little value if
they could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of
the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a judges speculation as to the
motives.[2]

This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the institution of
parliamentary immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the
importance of the legislative and oversight functions of the Congress that enable this representative
body to look diligently into every affair of government, investigate and denounce anomalies, and talk
about how the country and its citizens are being served. Courts do not interfere with the legislature or
its members in the manner they perform their functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms.
Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by the
member of the Congress does not destroy the privilege.[3] The disciplinary authority of the assembly[4]
and the voters, not the courts, can properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in the name of
parliamentary immunity.[5]
For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for disbarment or
disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a
disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court. It is felt, however, that this could not be the last word
on the matter.

The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a member of the
Bar, used in her speech and its effect on the administration of justice. To the Court, the lady senator has
undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good professional conduct. It is at once apparent that her
statements in question were intemperate and highly improper in substance. To reiterate, she was
quoted as stating that she wanted to spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his
cohorts in the Supreme Court, and calling the Court a Supreme Court of idiots.

The lady senator alluded to In Re: Vicente Sotto.[6] We draw her attention to the ensuing passage in
Sotto that she should have taken to heart in the first place:

x x x [I]f the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of this Court and believe that they
cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and
disorder and perhaps chaos would be the result.

No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the courts should be allowed to erode
the peoples faith in the judiciary. In this case, the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which respectively provide:

Canon 8, Rule 8.01.A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.

Canon 11.A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to the judicial officers
and should insist on similar conduct by others.
Senator/Atty. Santiago is a cut higher than most lawyers. Her achievements speak for themselves. She
was a former Regional Trial Court judge, a law professor, an oft-cited authority on constitutional and
international law, an author of numerous law textbooks, and an elected senator of the land. Needless to
stress, Senator Santiago, as a member of the Bar and officer of the court, like any other, is duty-bound to
uphold the dignity and authority of this Court and to maintain the respect due its members. Lawyers in
public service are keepers of public faith and are burdened with the higher degree of social
responsibility, perhaps higher than their brethren in private practice.[7] Senator Santiago should have
known, as any perceptive individual, the impact her statements would make on the peoples faith in the
integrity of the courts.

As Senator Santiago alleged, she delivered her privilege speech as a prelude to crafting remedial
legislation on the JBC. This allegation strikes the Court as an afterthought in light of the insulting tenor of
what she said. We quote the passage once more:

x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated,

debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a
country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his
cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be
surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x
x x. (Emphasis ours.)

A careful re-reading of her utterances would readily show that her statements were expressions of
personal anger and frustration at not being considered for the post of Chief Justice. In a sense,
therefore, her remarks were outside the pale of her official parliamentary functions. Even parliamentary
immunity must not be allowed to be used as a vehicle to ridicule, demean, and destroy the reputation of
the Court and its magistrates, nor as armor for personal wrath and disgust. Authorities are agreed that
parliamentary immunity is not an individual privilege accorded the individual members of the
Parliament or Congress for their personal benefit, but rather a privilege for the benefit of the people and
the institution that represents them.

To be sure, Senator Santiago could have given vent to her anger without indulging in insulting rhetoric
and offensive personalities.
Lest it be overlooked, Senator Santiagos outburst was directly traceable to what she considered as an
unjust act the JBC had taken in connection with her application for the position of Chief Justice. But
while the JBC functions under the Courts supervision, its individual members, save perhaps for the Chief
Justice who sits as the JBCs ex-officio chairperson,[8] have no official duty to nominate candidates for
appointment to the position of Chief Justice. The Court is, thus, at a loss to understand Senator
Santiagos wholesale and indiscriminate assault on the members of the Court and her choice of critical
and defamatory words against all of them.

At any event, equally important as the speech and debate clause of Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution is
Sec. 5(5) of Art. VIII of the Constitution that provides:

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of the law, the Integrated Bar, and
legal assistance to the underprivileged. (Emphasis ours.)

The Court, besides being authorized to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in
all courts, exercises specific authority to promulgate rules governing the Integrated Bar with the end in
view that the integration of the Bar will, among other things:

(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own forum, from the
assaults that politics and self interest may level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality
and independence;

xxxx
(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards x x x.[9]

In Re: Letter Dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda,[10] we reiterated our pronouncement in
Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer[11] that the duty of attorneys to the courts can only be maintained by
rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which they are bound to uphold. The
Court wrote in Rheem of the Philippines:

x x x As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that [i]t is the duty of a lawyer to
maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the
judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance. That same canon, as a corollary,
makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against unjust criticism and clamor.
And more. The attorneys oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be with all good fidelity x x x
to the courts.

Also, in Sorreda, the Court revisited its holding in Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel[12] that:

A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the
ends of justice. His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity,
not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Faith in the courts, a lawyer should seek to
preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the
attainment of the liberties of the people. Thus has it been said of a lawyer that [a]s an officer of the
court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and
regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice.[13]

The lady senator belongs to the legal profession bound by the exacting injunction of a strict Code.
Society has entrusted that profession with the administration of the law and dispensation of justice.
Generally speaking, a lawyer holding a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar
for misconduct committed while in the discharge of official duties, unless said misconduct also
constitutes a violation of his/her oath as a lawyer.[14]

Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their private capacity, as long as their
misconduct reflects their want of probity or good demeanor,[15] a good character being an essential
qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for continuance of such privilege. When the
Code of Professional Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks of conduct or misconduct, the reference
is not confined to ones behavior exhibited in connection with the performance of lawyers professional
duties, but also covers any misconduct, whichalbeit unrelated to the actual practice of their
professionwould show them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which their license
and the law invest in them.[16]

This Court, in its unceasing quest to promote the peoples faith in courts and trust in the rule of law, has
consistently exercised its disciplinary authority on lawyers who, for malevolent purpose or personal
malice, attempt to obstruct the orderly administration of justice, trifle with the integrity of courts, and
embarrass or, worse, malign the men and women who compose them. We have done it in the case of
former Senator Vicente Sotto in Sotto, in the case of Atty. Noel Sorreda in Sorreda, and in the case of
Atty. Francisco B. Cruz in Tacordan v. Ang[17] who repeatedly insulted and threatened the Court in a
most insolent manner.

The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on Senator/Atty. Santiago for
what otherwise would have constituted an act of utter disrespect on her part towards the Court and its
members. The factual and legal circumstances of this case, however, deter the Court from doing so,
even without any sign of remorse from her. Basic constitutional consideration dictates this kind of
disposition.

We, however, would be remiss in our duty if we let the Senators offensive and disrespectful language
that definitely tended to denigrate the institution pass by. It is imperative on our part to re-instill in
Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to respect courts of justice, especially this Tribunal, and remind her
anew that the parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to members of Congress is not to protect
them against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as the peoples representatives, to
perform the functions of their office without fear of being made responsible before the courts or other
forums outside the congressional hall.[18] It is intended to protect members of Congress against
government pressure and intimidation aimed at influencing the decision-making prerogatives of
Congress and its members.

The Rules of the Senate itself contains a provision on Unparliamentary Acts and Language that enjoins a
Senator from using, under any circumstance, offensive or improper language against another Senator or
against any public institution.[19] But as to Senator Santiagos unparliamentary remarks, the Senate
President had not apparently called her to order, let alone referred the matter to the Senate Ethics
Committee for appropriate disciplinary action, as the Rules dictates under such circumstance.[20] The
lady senator clearly violated the rules of her own chamber. It is unfortunate that her peers bent
backwards and avoided imposing their own rules on her.

Finally, the lady senator questions Pobres motives in filing his complaint, stating that disciplinary
proceedings must be undertaken solely for the public welfare. We cannot agree with her more. We
cannot overstress that the senators use of intemperate language to demean and denigrate the highest
court of the land is a clear violation of the duty of respect lawyers owe to the courts.[21]

Finally, the Senator asserts that complainant Pobre has failed to prove that she in fact made the
statements in question. Suffice it to say in this regard that, although she has not categorically denied
making such statements, she has unequivocally said making them as part of her privilege speech. Her
implied admission is good enough for the Court.

WHEREFORE, the letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre against Senator/Atty. Miriam Defensor-Santiago is,
conformably to Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution, DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

6.

ANTONIO CONLU,

Complainant,

- versus -
ATTY. IRENEO AREDONIA, JR.,

Respondent.

A.C. No. 4955

Present:

VELASCO, JR., Chairperson,

PERALTA,

ABAD,

VILLARAMA, JR.,* and

MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:

September 12, 2011

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Before the Court is a complaint[1] for disbarment with a prayer for damages instituted by Antonio Conlu
(Antonio) against Atty. Ireneo Aredonia, Jr. (Atty. Ireneo) on grounds of gross negligence and dereliction
of sworn duty.
Antonio was the defendant in Civil Case No. 1048, a suit for Quieting of Title and Recovery of a Parcel of
Land commenced before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Silay City, Negros Occidental.[2] He engaged
the services of Atty. Ireneo to represent him in the case. On March 16, 1995, the RTC rendered
judgment[3] adverse to Antonio. Therefrom, Atty. Ireneo, for Antonio, appealed to the Court of Appeals
(CA) whereat the recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 50075.

The CA, per its Resolution of February 10, 1997, eventually dismissed the appeal for non-filing of the
appellants brief within the reglementary period. Antonio got wind of the dismissal from his wife who
verified the status of the case when she happened to be in Manila. When confronted about the
dismissal action, Atty. Ireneo promised to seek reconsideration, which he did, but which the appellate
court later denied for belated filing of the motion.

In that motion[4] he prepared and filed, Atty. Ireneo averred receiving the adverted February 10, 1997
CA Resolution[5] only on April 25, 1997, adding in this regard that the person in the law office who
initially received a copy of said resolution was not so authorized. However, the CA denied the motion for
having been filed out of time. As the CA would declare in a subsequent resolution dated December 3,
1997, there was a valid receipt by Atty. Ireneo, as shown by the registry return card with his signature,
of a copy of the CAs February 10, 1997 Resolution. Accordingly, as the CA wrote, the motion for
reconsideration of the February resolution which bore the mailing date May 8, 1997 cannot but be
considered as filed way out of time.

In light of these successive setbacks, a disgusted Antonio got the case records back from Atty. Ireneo
and personally filed on October 13, 1997 another motion for reconsideration. By Resolution of
December 3, 1997, the CA again denied[6] this motion for the reason that the prejudicial impact of the
belated filing by his former counsel of the first motion for reconsideration binds Antonio.

Forthwith, Antonio elevated his case to the Court on a petition for certiorari but the Court would later
dismiss the petition and his subsequent motion to reconsider the denial.

Such was the state of things when Antonio lodged this instant administrative case for disbarment with a
prayer for damages. To support his claim for damages, Antonio asserts having suffered sleepless nights,
mental torture and anguish as a result of Atty. Ireneos erring ways, besides which Antonio also lost a
valuable real property subject of Civil Case No. 1048.
Following Atty. Ireneos repeated failure to submit, as ordered, his comment, a number of extensions of
time given notwithstanding,[7] the Court referred the instant case, docketed as Administrative Case No.
4955, to its Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation.

Acting on OBCs Report and Recommendation[8] dated November 23, 2000, the Court, by Resolution of
January 31, 2001, directed Atty. Ireneo to show cause within ten (10) days from noticelater successively
extended via Resolutions dated July 16 and 29, 2002why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or
held in contempt for failing to file his comment and to comply with the filing of it.

In separate resolutions, the Court (a) imposed on Atty. Ireneo a fine of PhP 2,000;[9] (b) ordered his
arrest but which the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) cannot effect for the reason: whereabouts
unknown;[10] (c) considered him as having waived his right to file comment; and (d) referred the
administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for report, investigation and
recommendation.[11]

At the IBP, Atty. Ireneo desisted from addressing his administrative case, his desistance expressed by not
attending the mandatory conference or filing the required position paper. On the basis of the pleadings,
the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) found Ireneo liable for violating Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and
1.03 and Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended his
suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with warning. The salient portions of
the investigating commissioners Report and Recommendation[12] read as follows:

Uncontroverted and uncontested are respondents inability to file appellants Brief, his futile attempts to
mislead the Court of Appeals that he did not personally received [sic] the resolution of dismissal. His
filing of the Motion for Reconsideration five (5) months late. [sic]

Aggravated by his failure to file his comment in the instant administrative complaint despite his
numerous motions for extension to file the same. [sic]

He is even adamant to comply with the show cause order of the bar confidant. The series of snobbish
actuations in several resolution of the Supreme Court enjoining him to make the necessary pleading.
[sic]
By Resolution No. XVIII-2008-523, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved said report and
recommendation of the CBD.[13]

We agree with the inculpatory findings of the IBP but not as to the level of the penalty it recommended.

Res ipsa loquitur. Atty. Ireneo had doubtless been languid in the performance of his duty as Antonios
counsel. He neglected, without reason, to file the appellants brief before the CA. He failed, in short, to
exert his utmost ability and to give his full commitment to maintain and defend Antonios right. Antonio,
by choosing Atty. Ireneo to represent him, relied upon and reposed his trust and confidence on the
latter, as his counsel, to do whatsoever was legally necessary to protect Antonios interest, if not to
secure a favorable judgment. Once they agree to take up the cause of a client, lawyers, regardless of the
importance of the subject matter litigated or financial arrangements agreed upon, owe fidelity to such
cause and should always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on them.[14] And to add insult
to injury, Atty. Ireneo appeared not to have taken any effort to personally apprise Antonio of the
dismissal of the appeal, however personally embarrassing the cause for the dismissal might have been.
As mentioned earlier, Antonio came to know about the outcome of his appeal only after his wife took
the trouble of verifying the case status when she came to Manila. By then, all remedies had been lost.

It must be remembered that a retained counsel is expected to serve the client with competence and
diligence. This duty includes not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to the counsels care and giving
the client sound legal advice, but also properly representing the client in court, attending scheduled
hearings, preparing and filing required pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases with reasonable
dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for the client or the court to prod him or her to
do so. The lawyer should not be sitting idly by and leave the rights of the client in a state of uncertainty.
[15]

The failure to file a brief resulting in the dismissal of an appeal constitutes inexcusable negligence.[16]
This default translates to a violation of the injunction of Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, respectively providing:

CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

xxxx
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the clients request for information.

As if his lack of candor in his professional relationship with Antonio was not abhorrent enough, Atty.
Ireneo tried to mislead the appellate court about the receipt of a copy of its February 10, 1997
Resolution dismissing the appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 50075. He denied personally receiving such copy, but
the CA found and declared that he himself received said copy. The CA arrived at this conclusion thru the
process of comparing Atty. Ireneos signature appearing in the pleadings with that in the registry return
card. Both signatures belong to one and the same person. Needless to stress, Atty. Ireneo had under the
premises indulged in deliberate falsehood, contrary to the self-explanatory prescriptions of Canon 1,
Rule 1.01 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01, which provide:

CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE
RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCEDURES.

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

xxxx

CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice. (Emphasis supplied.)
We cannot write finis to this case without delving into and addressing Atty. Ireneos defiant stance
against the Court as demonstrated by his repetitive disregard of its resolution to file his comment on the
basic complaint. After requesting and securing no less than three (3) extensions of time to file his
comment, he simply closed, so to speak, communication lines. And when ordered to give an explanation
through a show-cause directive for not complying, he asked for and was granted a 30-day extension. But
the required comment never came. When the Court eventually directed the NBI to arrest him, he just
left his last known address and could not be located.

The Courts patience has been tested to the limit by what in hindsight amounts to a lawyers impudence
and disrespectful bent. At the minimum, members of the legal fraternity owe courts of justice respect,
courtesy and such other becoming conduct so essential in the promotion of orderly, impartial and
speedy justice. What Atty. Ireneo has done was the exact opposite. What is clear to the Court by now is
that Ireneo was determined all along not to submit a comment and, in the process, delay the resolution
of the instant case. By asking several extensions of time to submit one, but without the intention to so
submit, Ireneo has effectively trifled with the Courts processes, if not its liberality. This cannot be
tolerated. It cannot be allowed to go unpunished, if the integrity and orderly functioning of the
administration of justice is to be maintained. And to be sure, Atty. Ireneo can neither defeat this Courts
jurisdiction over him as a member of the bar nor evade administrative liability by the mere ruse of
concealing his whereabouts.[17] Manifestly, he has fallen short of the diligence required of every
member of the Bar. The pertinent Canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON 12 A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER HIS DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY
AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

xxxx

Rule 12.03 A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs,
let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.

Rule 12.04 A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse Court
processes. (Emphasis supplied.)

A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for gross misconduct or for transgressions defined by the rules
as grounds to strip a lawyer of professional license.[18] Considering, however, the serious consequences
of either penalty, the Court will exercise its power to disbar or suspend only upon a clear, convincing,
and satisfactory proof of misconduct that seriously affects the standing of a lawyer as an officer of the
court and as member of the bar.

In Heirs of Tiburcio F. Ballesteros, Sr. v. Apiag,[19] the Court penalized a lawyer who failed to file a pre-
trial brief and other pleadings, such as position papers, leading to the dismissal of the case with six
months suspension. In Soriano v. Reyes,[20] We meted a one-year suspension on a lawyer for
inexcusable negligence, the latter having failed to file a pre-trial brief leading to the dismissal of the case
and failure to prosecute in another case, and omitting to apprise complainant of the status of the two
cases with assurance of his diligent attention to them.

In this case, Atty. Ireneo should be called to task for the interplay of the following: his inexcusable
negligence that resulted in the dismissal of Antonios appeal, coupled by his lack of candor in not
apprising Antonio of the status of his appealed case; his attempt to mislead the CA in a vain bid to evade
the consequence of the belated filing of a motion for reconsideration; and, last but not least, his cavalier
disregard of the Courts directives primarily issued to resolve the charges brought against him by
Antonio. We deem it fitting that Atty. Ireneo be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one
year, up from the penalty recommended by the IBP Board of Governors. This should serve as a constant
reminder of his duty to respect courts of justice and to observe that degree of diligence required by the
practice of the legal profession. His being a first offender dictates to large degree this leniency.

The prayer for damages cannot be granted. Let alone the fact that Antonio chose not to file his position
paper before the IBP-CBD and, therefore, was unable to satisfactorily prove his claim for damages, a
proceeding for disbarment or suspension is not in any sense a civil action; it is undertaken and
prosecuted for public welfare. It does not involve private interest and affords no redress for private
grievance.[21]

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ireneo Aredonia, Jr. is declared GUILTY of inexcusable negligence,
attempting to mislead the appellate court, misuse of Court processes, and willful disobedience to lawful
orders of the Court. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year
effective upon his receipt of this Resolution, with WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts
will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.
6. FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 8261, March 11, 2015

JESSIE T. CAMPUGAN AND ROBERT C. TORRES, Complainants, v. ATTY. FEDERICO S. TOLENTINO, JR.,
ATTY. RENATO G. CUNANAN, ATTY. DANIEL F. VICTORIO, JR., AND ATTY. ELBERT T. QUILALA,
Respondents.

A.C. No. 8725

JESSIE T. CAMPUGAN AND ROBERT C. TORRES, Complainants, v. ATTY. CONSTANTE P. CALUYA, JR., AND
ATTY. ELBERT T. QUILALA, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

In this consolidated administrative case, complainants Jessie T. Campugan and Robert C. Torres seek the
disbarment of respondents Atty. Federico S. Tolentino, Jr., Atty. Daniel F. Victorio, Jr., Atty. Renato G.
Cunanan, Atty. Elbert T. Quilala and Atty. Constante P. Caluya, Jr. for allegedly falsifying a court order
that became the basis for the cancellation of their annotation of the notice of adverse claim and the
notice of lis pendens in the Registry of Deeds in Quezon City.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Antecedents

Atty. Victorio, Jr. had replaced Atty. Edgardo Abad as counsel of the complainants in a civil action they
brought to seek the annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-290546 of the Registry of
Deeds of Quezon City in the first week of January 2007 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Quezon City
(Civil Case No. Q-07-59598). They impleaded as defendants Ramon and Josefina Ricafort, Juliet Vargas
and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. They caused to be annotated on TCT No. N-290546 their
affidavit of adverse claim, as well as the notice of lis pendens.1 Atty. Tolentino, Jr. was the counsel of
defendant Ramon and Josefina Ricafort.

In their sworn complaint for disbarment dated April 23, 2009 (later docketed as A.C. No. 8261),2 the
complainants narrated that as the surviving children of the late Spouses Antonio and Nemesia Torres,
they inherited upon the deaths of their parents a residential lot located at No. 251 Boni Serrano Street,
Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-64333(35652) of
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City;3 that on August 24, 2006, they discovered that TCT No. RT-
64333(35652) had been unlawfully cancelled and replaced by TCT No. N-290546 of the Register of Deeds
of Quezon City under the names of Ramon and Josefina Ricafort;4 and that, accordingly, they
immediately caused the annotation of their affidavit of adverse claim on TCT No. N-290546.

It appears that the parties entered into an amicable settlement during the pendency of Civil Case No. Q-
07-59598 in order to end their dispute,5 whereby the complainants agreed to sell the property and the
proceeds thereof would be equally divided between the parties, and the complaint and counterclaim
would be withdrawn respectively by the complainants (as the plaintiffs) and the defendants. Pursuant to
the terms of the amicable settlement, Atty. Victorio, Jr. filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint dated
February 26, 2008,6 which the RTC granted in its order dated May 16, 2008 upon noting the defendants'
lack of objection thereto and the defendants' willingness to similarly withdraw their counterclaim.7

The complainants alleged that from the time of the issuance by the RTC of the order dated May 16,
2008, they could no longer locate or contact Atty. Victorio, Jr. despite making several phone calls and
visits to his office; that they found out upon verification at the Register of Deeds of Quezon City that
new annotations were made on TCT No. N-290546, specifically: (1) the annotation of the letter-request
appearing to be filed by Atty. Tolentino, Jr.8 seeking the cancellation of the affidavit of adverse claim
and the notice of lis pendens annotated on TCT No. N-290546; and (2) the arinotation of the decision
dated May 16, 2008 rendered in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598 by the RTC, Branch 95, in Quezon City,
granting the complainants' Motion to Withdraw Complaint;9 and that a copy of the letter-request dated
June 30, 2008 addressed to Atty. Quilala, Registrar of Deeds of Quezon City, disclosed that it was
defendant Ramon Ricafort who had signed the letter.

Feeling aggrieved by their discovery, the complainants filed an appeal en consulta with the Land
Registration Authority (LRA), docketed as Consulta No. 4707, assailing the unlawful cancellation of their
notice of adverse claim and their notice of lis pendens under primary entries PE-2742 and PE-3828-9,
respectively. The LRA set Consulta No. 4707 for hearing on March 30, 2009, and directed the parties to
submit their respective memoranda and/or supporting documents on or before such scheduled
hearing.10 However, the records do not disclose whether Consulta No. 4707 was already resolved, or
remained pending at the LRA.

Unable to receive any response or assistance from Atty. Victorio, Jr. despite their having paid him for his
professional services, the complainants felt that said counsel had abandoned their case. They submitted
that the cancellation of their notice of adverse claim and their notice of lis pendens without a court
order specifically allowing such cancellation resulted from the connivance and conspiracy between Atty.
Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr., and from the taking advantage of their positions as officials in the
Registry of Deeds by respondents Atty. Quilala, the Chief Registrar, and Atty. Cunanan, the acting
Registrar and signatory of the new annotations. Thus, they claimed to be thereby prejudiced.

On July 6, 2009, the Court required the respondents to comment on the verified complaint.11

Atty. Victorio, Jr. asserted in his Comment dated August 17, 200912 that complainant Robert Torres had
been actively involved in the proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598, which included the mediation
process; that the complainants, after having aggressively participated in the drafting of the amicable
settlement, could not now claim that they had been deceived into entering the agreement in the same
way that they could not feign ignorance of the conditions contained therein; that he did not commit any
abandonment as alleged, but had performed in good faith his duties as the counsel for the complainants
in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598; that he should not be held responsible for their representation in other
proceedings, such as that before the LRA, which required a separate engagement; and that the only
payment he had received from the complainants were those for his appearance fees of P1,000.00 for
every hearing in the RTC.

In his Comment dated August 24, 2009,13 Atty. Tolentino, Jr. refuted the charge of conspiracy, stressing
that he was not acquainted with the other respondents, except Atty. Victorio, Jr. whom he had met
during the hearings in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598; that although he had notarized the letter-request
dated June 30, 2008 of Ramon Ricafort to the Register of Deeds, he had no knowledge about how said
letter-request had been disposed of by the Register of Deeds; and that the present complaint was the
second disbarment case filed by the complainants against him with no other motive except to harass
and intimidate him.
Atty. Quilala stated in his Comment dated September 1, 200914 that it was Atty. Caluya, Jr., another
Deputy Register of Deeds, who was the actual signing authority of the annotations that resulted in the
cancellation of the affidavit of adverse claim and the notice of lis pendens on TCT No. N-290546; that the
cancellation of the annotations was undertaken in the regular course of official duty and in the exercise
of the ministerial duty of the Register of Deeds; that no irregularity occurred or was performed in the
cancellation of the annotations; and that the Register of Deeds was impleaded in Civil Case No. Q-07-
59598 only as a nominal party, thereby discounting any involvement in the proceedings in the case.

Atty. Cunanan did not file any comment.15

As the result of Atty. Quilala's allegation in his Comment in A.C. No. 8261 that it had been Atty. Caluya,
Jr.'s signature that appeared below the cancelled entries, the complainants filed another sworn
disbarment complaint dated August 26, 2010 alleging that Atty. Caluya, Jr. had forged the signature of
Atty. Cunanan.16 This disbarment complaint was docketed as A.C. No. 8725, and was later on
consolidated with A.C. No. 826117 because the complaints involved the same parties and rested on
similar allegations against the respondents.

Atty. Quilala filed his Comment in A.C. No. 8725 to belie the allegation of forgery and to reiterate the
arguments he had made in A.C. No. 8261.18 On his part, Atty. Caluya, Jr. manifested that he adopted
Atty. Quilala's Comment.19

Ruling

We dismiss the complaints for disbarment for being bereft of merit.

Well entrenched in this jurisdiction is the rule that a lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct
committed either in his professional or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether his conduct renders him
unworthy to continue as an officer of the Court.20 Verily, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates all lawyers to uphold at all times the dignity and integrity of the Legal
Profession. Lawyers are similarly required under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the same Code not to engage in
any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct. Failure to observe these tenets of the Code of
Professional Responsibility exposes the lawyer to disciplinary sanctions as provided in Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court, as amended, viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. — A member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before the admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party
to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The complainants' allegations of the respondents' acts and omissions are insufficient to establish any
censurable conduct against them.

Section 10 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) enumerates the general
duties of the Register of Deeds, as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Section 10. General functions of Registers of Deeds. - x x x

It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for
registration dealing with real or personal property which complies with all the requisites for registration.
He shall see to it that said instrument bears the proper documentary science stamps and that the same
are properly canceled. If the instrument is not registrable, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof
and inform the presenter of such denial in writing, stating the ground or reason therefor, and advising
him of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance with Section 117 of this Decree. (Emphasis supplied)

The aforementioned duty of the Register of Deeds is ministerial in nature.21 A purely ministerial act or
duty is one that an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in
obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment
upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and
gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary, not
ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when its discharge requires neither the exercise of official
discretion nor the exercise of judgment.22

In Gabriel v. Register of Deeds of Rizal,23 the Court underscores that registration is a merely ministerial
act of the Register of Deeds, explaining:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

xxx [W]hether the document is invalid, frivolous or intended to harass, is not the duty of a Register of
Deeds to decide, but a court of competent jurisdiction, and that it is his concern to see whether the
documents sought to be registered conform with the formal and legal requirements for such
documents.
In view of the foregoing, we find no abuse of authority or irregularity committed by Atty. Quilala, Atty.
Cunanan, and Atty. Caluya, Jr. with respect to the cancellation of the notice of adverse claim and the
notice of lis pendens annotated on TCT No. N-290546. Whether or not the RTC order dated May 16,
2008 or the letter-request dated June 30, 2008 had been falsified, fraudulent or invalid was not for them
to determine inasmuch as their duty to examine documents presented for registration was limited only
to what appears on the face of the documents. If, upon their evaluation of the letter-request and the
RTC order, they found the same to be sufficient in law and t]o be in conformity with existing
requirements, it became obligatory for them to perform their ministerial duty without unnecessary
delay.24

Should they be aggrieved by said respondents' performance of duty, complainants were not bereft of
any remedy because they could challenge the performance of duty by bringing the matter by way of
consulta with the LRA, as provided by Section 11725 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. But, as enunciated
in Gabriel v. Register of Deeds of Rizal,26 it was ultimately within the province of a court of competent
jurisdiction to resolve issues concerning the validity or invalidity of a document registered by the
Register of Deeds.

The complainants charge Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr. with having conspired with each other
to guarantee that the parties in Civil Case No. Q-59598 would enter into the amicable settlement, and
then to cause the cancellation of the affidavit of adverse claim and notice of lis pendens annotated on
TCT No. N-290546. The complainants further fault Atty. Victorio, Jr. with having abandoned their cause
since the issuance of the RTC of its order dated May 16, 2008.

The complainants' charges are devoid of substance.

Although it is not necessary to prove a formal agreement in order to establish conspiracy because
conspiracy may be inferred from the circumstances attending the commission of an act, it is nonetheless
essential that conspiracy be established by clear and convincing evidence.27 The complainants failed in
this regard. Outside of their bare assertions that Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr. had conspired
with each other in order to cause the dismissal of the complaint and then discharge of the annotations,
they presented no evidence to support their allegation of conspiracy. On the contrary, the records
indicated their own active pjarticipation in arriving at the amicable settlement with the defendants in
Civil Case No. Q-07-59598. Hence, they could not now turn their backs on the amicable settlement that
they had themselves entered into.
Even assuming that Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr. initiated ahd participated in the settlement
of the case, there was nothing wrong in their doing so. It was actually their obligation as lawyers to do
so, pursuant to Rule 1.04, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

RULE 1.04 - A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or settle a controversy if it will admit of a
fair settlement.

In fine, the presumption of the validity of the amicable settlement of the complainants and the
defendants in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598 subsisted.28

Anent the complainants' charge of abandonment against Atty. Victorio, Jr., Rule 18.03 and Rule 18.04,
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility are applicable, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the client's request for information.

There is no issue that the complainants engaged the services of Atty. Victorio, Jr. as their counsel in Civil
Case No. Q-07-59598. Atty. Victorio, Jr. served as such counsel. With Atty. Victorio, Jr. assistance, the
complainants obtained a fair settlement consisting in receiving half of the proceeds of the sale of the
property in litis, without any portion of the proceeds accruing to counsel as his legal fees. The
complainants did not competently and persuasively show any unfaithfulness on the part of Atty.
Victorio, Jr. as far as their interest in the litigation was concerned. Hence, Atty. Victorio, Jr. was not liable
for abandonment.

Atty. Victorio, Jr. could not be faulted for the perceived inattention to any other matters subsequent to
the termination of Civil Case No. Q-07-59598. Unless otherwise expressly stipulated between them at
any time during the engagement, the complainants had no right to assume that Atty. Victorio, Jr.'s legal
representation was indefinite as to extend to his representation of them in the LRA. The Law Profession
did not burden its members with the responsibility of indefinite service to the clients; hence, the
rendition of professional services depends on the agreement between the attorney and the client. Atty.
Victorio, Jr.'s alleged failure to respond to the complainants' calls or visits, or to provide them with his
whereabouts to enable them to have access to him despite the termination of his engagement in Civil
Case No. Q-07-59598 did not equate to abandonment without the credible showing that he continued
to come under the professional obligation towards them after the termination of Civil Case No. Q-07-
59598.cralawred

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the baseless disbarment complaints against Atty. Federico S.
Tolentino, Jr., Atty. Renato G. Cunanan, Atty. Daniel F. Victorio, Jr., Atty. Elbert T. Quilala and Atty.
Constante P. Caluya, Jr.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

7. EN BANC

A.C. No. 6732 October 22, 2013

ATTY. OSCAR L. EMBIDO, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, WESTERN VISA
YAS, REGIONAL OFFICE NBI-WEVRO), FOR SAN PEDRO, ILOILO CITY, Complainant,

vs.

ATTY. SALVADOR N. PE, JR., ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR, SAN JOSE, ANTIQUE, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

A lawyer who forges a court decision and represents it as that of a court of law is guilty of the gravest
misconduct and deserves the supreme penalty of disbarment.

The Case
Before this Court is the complaint for disbarment against Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Atty. Salvador
N Pe, Jr. respondent) of San Jose, Antique for his having allegedly falsified an in existent decision of
Branch 64 of the Regional Trial Court stationed in Bugasong, Antique (RTC) instituted by the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Western Visayas Regional Office, represented by Regional Director Atty.
Oscar L. Embido.

Antecedent

On July 7, 2004, Atty. Ronel F. Sustituya, Clerk of Court of the RTC, received a written communication
from Mr. Ballam Delaney Hunt, a Solicitor in the United Kingdom (UK). The letter requested a copy of
the decision dated February 12, 1997 rendered by Judge Rafael O. Penuela in Special Proceedings Case
No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna, whose petitioner
was one Shirley Quioyo.1

On September 9, 2004, the RTC received another letter from Mr. Hunt, reiterating the request for a copy
of the decision in Special Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of
Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna.2

Judge Penuela instructed the civil docket clerk to retrieve the records of Special Proceedings Case No.
084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna. It was then
discovered that the RTC had no record of Special Proceedings No. 084 wherein Shirley Quioyo was the
petitioner. Instead, the court files revealed that Judge Penuela had decided Special Proceedings No. 084
entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rolando Austria, whose petitioner was
one Serena Catin Austria.

Informed that the requested decision and case records did not exist,3 Mr. Hunt sent a letter dated
October 12, 2004 attaching a machine copy of the purported decision in Special Proceedings No. 084
entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna that had been presented
by Shirley Quioyo in court proceedings in the UK.4

After comparing the two documents and ascertaining that the document attached to the October 12,
2004 letter was a falsified court document, Judge Penuela wrote Mr. Hunt to apprise him of the
situation.5
The discovery of the falsified decision prompted the Clerk of Court to communicate on the situation in
writing to the NBI, triggering the investigation of the falsification.6

In the meanwhile, Dy Quioyo, a brother of Shirley Quioyo, executed an affidavit on March 4, 2005,7
wherein he stated that it was the respondent who had facilitated the issuance of the falsified decision in
Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey
Laserna for a fee of ₱60,000.00. The allegations against the respondent were substantially corroborated
by Mary Rose Quioyo, a sister of Shirley Quioyo, in an affidavit dated March 20, 2005.8

The NBI invited the respondent to explain his side,9 but he invoked his constitutional right to remain
silent. The NBI also issued subpoenas to Shirley Quioyo and Dy Quioyo but only the latter appeared and
gave his sworn statement.

After conducting its investigation, the NBI forwarded to the Office of the Ombudsman for Visayas the
records of the investigation, with a recommendation that the respondent be prosecuted for falsification
of public document under Article 171, 1 and 2, of the Revised Penal Code, and for violation of Section
3(a) of Republic Act 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).10 The NBI likewise recommended
to the Office of the Court Administrator that disbarment proceedings be commenced against the
respondent.11 Then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (now a Member of the Court) officially
endorsed the recommendation to the Office of the Bar Confidant.12

Upon being required by the Court, the respondent submitted his counter-affidavit,13 whereby he denied
any participation in the falsification. He insisted that Dy Quioyo had sought his opinion on Shirley’s
petition for the annulment of her marriage; that he had given advice on the pertinent laws involved and
the different grounds for the annulment of marriage; that in June 2004, Dy Quioyo had gone back to him
to present a copy of what appeared to be a court decision;14 that Dy Quioyo had then admitted to him
that he had caused the falsification of the decision; that he had advised Dy Quioyo that the falsified
decision would not hold up in an investigation; that Dy Quioyo, an overseas Filipino worker (OFW), had
previously resorted to people on Recto Avenue in Manila to solve his documentation problems as an
OFW; and that he had also learned from Atty. Angeles Orquia, Jr. that one Mrs. Florencia Jalipa, a
resident of Igbalangao, Bugasong, Antique, had executed a sworn statement before Police Investigator
Herminio Dayrit with the assistance of Atty. Orquia, Jr. to the effect that her late husband, Manuel
Jalipa, had been responsible for making the falsified document at the instance of Dy Quioyo.15
Thereafter, the Court issued its resolution16 treating the respondent’s counter-affidavit as his
comment, and referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation.

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

In a report and recommendation dated June 14, 2006,17 Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the IBP Investigating
Commissioner, found the respondent guilty of serious misconduct and violations of the Attorney’s
Oath and Code of Professional Responsibility , and recommended his suspension from the practice of
law for one year. She concluded that the respondent had forged the purported decision of Judge
Penuela by making it appear that Special Proceedings No. 084 concerned a petition for declaration of
presumptive death of Rey Laserna, with Shirley Quioyo as the petitioner, when in truth and in fact the
proceedings related to the petition for declaration of presumptive death of Rolando Austria, with Serena
Catin Austria as the petitioner;18 and that the respondent had received ₱60,000.00 from Dy Quioyo for
the falsified decision. She rationalized her conclusions thusly:

Respondent’s denials are not worthy of merit. Respondent contends that it was one Manuel Jalipa
(deceased) who facilitated the issuance and as proof thereof, he presented the sworn statement of the
widow of Florencia Jalipa (sic). Such a contention is hard to believe. In the first place, if the decision was
obtained in Recto, Manila, why was it an almost verbatim reproduction of the authentic decision on file
in Judge Penuela’s branch except for the names and dates? Respondent failed to explain this.
Secondly, respondent did not attend the NBI investigation and merely invoked his right to remain silent.
If his side of the story were true, he should have made this known in the investigation. His story
therefore appears to have been a mere afterthought. Finally, there is no plausible reason why Dy Quioyo
and his sister, Mary Rose Quioyo would falsely implicate him in this incident.19

In its Resolution No. XVII-2007-063 dated February 1, 200,20 the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved, with modification, the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner by
suspending the respondent from the practice of law for six years.

On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVIII-2008-70921 denying the
respondent’s motion for reconsideration and affirming Resolution No. XVII-2007-063. The IBP Board of
Governors then forwarded the case to the Court in accordance with Section 12(b), Rule 139-B22 of the
Rules of Court.
On January 11, 2011, the Court resolved: (1) to treat the respondent’s comment/opposition as his
appeal by petition for review; (2) to consider the complainant’s reply as his comment on the petition
for review; (3) to require the respondent to file a reply to the complainant’s comment within 10 days
from notice; and (4) to direct the IBP to transmit the original records of the case within 15 days from
notice.

Ruling

We affirm the findings of the IBP Board of Governors. Indeed, the respondent was guilty of grave
misconduct for falsifying a court decision in consideration of a sum of money.

The respondent’s main defense consisted in blanket denial of the imputation. He insisted that he had
had no hand in the falsification, and claimed that the falsification had been the handiwork of Dy Quioyo.
He implied that Dy Quioyo had resorted to the shady characters in Recto Avenue in Manila to resolve
the problems he had encountered as an OFW, hinting that Dy Quioyo had a history of employing
unscrupulous means to achieve his ends.

However, the respondent’s denial and his implication against Dy Quioyo in the illicit generation of the
falsified decision are not persuasive. Dy Quioyo’s categorical declaration on the respondent’s
personal responsibility for the falsified decision, which by nature was positive evidence, was not
overcome by the respondent’s blanket denial, which by nature was negative evidence.23

Also, the imputation of wrongdoing against Dy Quioyo lacked credible specifics and did not command
credence.1âwphi1 It is worthy to note, too, that the respondent filed his counter-affidavit only after the
Court, through the en banc resolution of May 10, 2005, had required him to comment.24 The
belatedness of his response exposed his blanket denial as nothing more than an after thought.

The respondent relied on the sworn statement supposedly executed by Mrs. Jalipa that declared that
her deceased husband had been instrumental in the falsification of the forged decision. But such
reliance was outrightly worthless, for the sworn statement of the wife was rendered unreliable due to
its patently hearsay character. In addition, the unworthiness of the sworn statement as proof of
authorship of the falsification by the husband is immediately exposed and betrayed by the falsified
decision being an almost verbatim reproduction of the authentic decision penned by Judge Penuela in
the real Special Proceedings Case No. 084.

In light of the established circumstances, the respondent was guilty of grave misconduct for having
authored the falsification of the decision in a non-existent court proceeding. Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility demands that all lawyers should uphold at all times the dignity and integrity
of the Legal Profession. Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "a lawyer shall
not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession." Lawyers
are further required by Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility not to engage in any
unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.

Gross immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or fraudulent transactions can justify
a lawyer’s disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.25 Specifically, the deliberate
falsification of the court decision by the respondent was an act that reflected a high degree of moral
turpitude on his part. Worse, the act made a mockery of the administration of justice in this country,
given the purpose of the falsification, which was to mislead a foreign tribunal on the personal status of a
person. He thereby became unworthy of continuing as a member of the Bar.

It then becomes timely to remind all members of the Philippine Bar that they should do nothing that
may in any way or degree lessen the confidence of the public in their professional fidelity and
integrity.26 The Court will not hesitate to wield its heavy hand of discipline on those among them who
wittingly and willingly fail to meet the enduring demands of their Attorney’s Oath for them to:

x x x support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities therein; xxx do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; x x x not wittingly or
willingly promote or sue on groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; x x x
delay no man for money or malice, and x x x conduct themselves as lawyers according to the best of
their knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to their clients x x x.

No lawyer should ever lose sight of the verity that the practice of the legal profession is always a
privilege that the Court extends only to the deserving, and that the Court may withdraw or deny the
privilege to him who fails to observe and respect the Lawyer’s Oath and the canons of ethical conduct
in his professional and private capacities. He may be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law
not only for acts and omissions of malpractice and for dishonesty in his professional dealings, but also
for gross misconduct not directly connected with his professional duties that reveal his unfitness for the
office and his unworthiness of the principles that the privilege to practice law confers upon him.27
Verily, no lawyer is immune from the disciplinary authority of the Court whose duty and obligation are
to investigate and punish lawyer misconduct committed either in a professional or private capacity.28
The test is whether the conduct shows the lawyer to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity,
and good demeanor, and whether the conduct renders the lawyer unworthy to continue as an officer of
the Court.29 WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS AND PRONOUNCES ASST. PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR
SALVADOR N. PE, JR. guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and DISBARS him effective upon receipt of this decision.

The Court DIRECTS the Bar Confidant to remove the name of ASST. PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR
SALVADOR N. PE, JR. from the Roll of Attorneys.

This decision is without prejudice to any pending or contemplated proceedings to be initiated against
ASST. PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N. PE, JR.

Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts of the country and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

8. THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 6057 June 27, 2006

PETER T. DONTON, Complainant,

vs.

ATTY. EMMANUEL O. TANSINGCO, Respondent.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a disbarment complaint against respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco ("respondent") for
serious misconduct and deliberate violation of Canon 1,1 Rules 1.012 and 1.023 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility ("Code").

The Facts

In his Complaint dated 20 May 2003, Peter T. Donton ("complainant") stated that he filed a criminal
complaint for estafa thru falsification of a public document4 against Duane O. Stier ("Stier"), Emelyn A.
Maggay ("Maggay") and respondent, as the notary public who notarized the Occupancy Agreement.

The disbarment complaint arose when respondent filed a counter-charge for perjury5 against
complainant. Respondent, in his affidavit-complaint, stated that:

5. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT dated September 11, 1995 was prepared and notarized by me under
the following circumstances:

A. Mr. Duane O. Stier is the owner and long-time resident of a real property located at No. 33 Don Jose
Street, Bgy. San Roque, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City.

B. Sometime in September 1995, Mr. Stier – a U.S. citizen and thereby disqualified to own real property
in his name – agreed that the property be transferred in the name of Mr. Donton, a Filipino.
C. Mr. Stier, in the presence of Mr. Donton, requested me to prepare several documents that would
guarantee recognition of him being the actual owner of the property despite the transfer of title in the
name of Mr. Donton.

D. For this purpose, I prepared, among others, the OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT, recognizing Mr. Stier’s
free and undisturbed use of the property for his residence and business operations. The OCCUPANCY
AGREEMENT was tied up with a loan which Mr. Stier had extended to Mr. Donton.6

Complainant averred that respondent’s act of preparing the Occupancy Agreement, despite
knowledge that Stier, being a foreign national, is disqualified to own real property in his name,
constitutes serious misconduct and is a deliberate violation of the Code. Complainant prayed that
respondent be disbarred for advising Stier to do something in violation of law and assisting Stier in
carrying out a dishonest scheme.

In his Comment dated 19 August 2003, respondent claimed that complainant filed the disbarment case
against him upon the instigation of complainant’s counsel, Atty. Bonifacio A. Alentajan,7 because
respondent refused to act as complainant’s witness in the criminal case against Stier and Maggay.
Respondent admitted that he "prepared and notarized" the Occupancy Agreement and asserted its
genuineness and due execution.

In a Resolution dated 1 October 2003, the Court referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

In her Report dated 26 February 2004 ("Report"), Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan ("Commissioner
San Juan") of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found respondent liable for taking part in a "scheme
to circumvent the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of land in the Philippines."
Commissioner San Juan recommended respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for two years
and the cancellation of his commission as Notary Public.
In Resolution No. XVI-2004-222 dated 16 April 2004, the IBP Board of Governors adopted, with
modification, the Report and recommended respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for six
months.

On 28 June 2004, the IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as provided under
Section 12(b), Rule 139-B8 of the Rules of Court.

On 28 July 2004, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration before the IBP. Respondent stated that
he was already 76 years old and would already retire by 2005 after the termination of his pending cases.
He also said that his practice of law is his only means of support for his family and his six minor children.

In a Resolution dated 7 October 2004, the IBP denied the motion for reconsideration because the IBP
had no more jurisdiction on the case as the matter had already been referred to the Court.

The Ruling of the Court

The Court finds respondent liable for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code.

A lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client which will involve defiance of the
laws which he is bound to uphold and obey.9 A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who
connives in violating the law commits an act which justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer.10

By his own admission, respondent admitted that Stier, a U.S. citizen, was disqualified from owning real
property.11 Yet, in his motion for reconsideration,12 respondent admitted that he caused the transfer
of ownership to the parcel of land to Stier. Respondent, however, aware of the prohibition, quickly
rectified his act and transferred the title in complainant’s name. But respondent provided "some
safeguards" by preparing several documents,13 including the Occupancy Agreement, that would
guarantee Stier’s recognition as the actual owner of the property despite its transfer in
complainant’s name. In effect, respondent advised and aided Stier in circumventing the constitutional
prohibition against foreign ownership of lands14 by preparing said documents.
Respondent had sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus, he violated his oath and the Code when he
prepared and notarized the Occupancy Agreement to evade the law against foreign ownership of lands.
Respondent used his knowledge of the law to achieve an unlawful end. Such an act amounts to
malpractice in his office, for which he may be suspended.15

In Balinon v. De Leon,16 respondent Atty. De Leon was suspended from the practice of law for three
years for preparing an affidavit that virtually permitted him to commit concubinage. In In re: Santiago,17
respondent Atty. Santiago was suspended from the practice of law for one year for preparing a contract
which declared the spouses to be single again after nine years of separation and allowed them to
contract separately subsequent marriages.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco GUILTY of violation of Canon 1 and Rule
1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Emmanuel
O. Tansingco from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
respondent’s personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of
Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

9.

ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ,

Complainant,

- versus -

ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA,

Respondent.
x-------------------------x

RE: OATH-TAKING OF ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA, INCOMING PRESIDENT OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF
THE PHILIPPINES

x-------------------------x

IN THE MATTER OF THE REMOVAL OF ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA FROM THE IBP BOARD OF
GOVERNORS AS EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT AND GOVERNOR

IN THE MATTER OF THE LETTER-COMPLAINT OF ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA DATED MAY 18, 2005 TO
FORTHWITH DENY/DISAPPROVE THE IBP RESOLUTION UNJUSTLY, ILLEGALLY, ARBITRARILY, AND
ABRUPTLY REMOVING HIM FROM THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE IBP FOR ABSOLUTE LACK OF
BASIS AND FOR FLAGRANT DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS.

A.C. No. 6697

Bar Matter No. 1227

A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC

Present:

PANGANIBAN, C. J.,

PUNO,

QUISUMBING,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,

CARPIO,

MARTINEZ,

CORONA,

CARPIO MORALES,

CALLEJO,

AZCUNA,

TINGA,

CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA and

VELASCO JJ.

Promulgated:

July 25, 2006

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

Per Curiam:

Before Us are three consolidated cases revolving around Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Governor
and Executive Vice-President (EVP) Atty. Leonard de Vera. The first pertains to a disbarment case
questioning Atty. de Veras moral fitness to remain as a member of the Philippine Bar, the second refers
to Atty. de Veras letter-request to schedule his oath taking as IBP National President, and the third case
concerns the validity of his removal as Governor and EVP of the IBP by the IBP Board. The resolution of
these cases will determine the national presidency of the IBP for the term 2005-2007.

A.C. No. 6697

The Office of the Bar Confidant, which this Court tasked to make an investigation, report and
recommendation on subject case,[1] summarized the antecedents thereof as follows:
In a Complaint dated 11 April 2005, complainant Zoilo Antonio Velez moved for the suspension and/or
disbarment of respondent Atty. Leonard de Vera based on the following grounds:

1) respondents alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension order rendered against

him by the State Bar of California; and

2) respondents alleged violation of the so-called rotation rule enunciated in Administrative

Matter No. 491 dated 06 October 1989 (in the Matter: 1989 IBP Elections).

Complainant averred that the respondent, in appropriating for his own benefit funds due his client, was
found to have performed an act constituting moral turpitude by the Hearing Referee Bill Dozier, Hearing
Department San Francisco, State Bar of California in Administrative Case No. 86-0-18429. Complainant
alleged that the respondent was then forced to resign or surrender his license to practice law in the said
state in order to evade the recommended three (3) year suspension. Complainant asserted that the
respondent lacks the moral competence necessary to lead the countrys most noble profession.

Complainant, likewise, contended that the respondent violated the so-called rotation rule provided for
in Administrative Matter No. 491 when he transferred to IBP Agusan del Sur Chapter. He claimed that
the respondent failed to meet the requirements outlined in the IBP By-Laws pertaining to transfer of
Chapter Membership. He surmised that the respondents transfer was intended only for the purpose of
becoming the next IBP National President. Complainant prayed that the respondent be enjoined from
assuming office as IBP National President.

Meanwhile, in his Comment dated 2 May 2005, respondent stated that the issues raised in above-
mentioned Complaint were the very issues raised in an earlier administrative case filed by the same
complainant against him. In fact, according to him, the said issues were already extensively discussed
and categorically ruled upon by this Court in its Decision dated 11 December 2005 in Administrative
Case No. 6052 (In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard De Vera). Respondent prayed that the instant
administrative complaint be dismissed following the principle of res judicata.

On 15 June 2005, both parties appeared before the Office of the Bar Confidant for presentation of
evidence in support of their respective allegations.
Subsequently, in a Memorandum dated 20 June 2005, complainant maintained that there is substantial
evidence showing respondents moral baseness, vileness and depravity, which could be used as a basis
for his disbarment. Complainant stressed that the respondent never denied that he used his clients
money. Complainant argued that the respondent failed to present evidence that the Supreme Court of
California accepted the latters resignation and even if such was accepted, complainant posited that this
should not absolve the respondent from liability.

Moreover, complainant added that the principle of res judicata would not apply in the case at bar. He
asserted that the first administrative case filed against the respondent was one for his disqualification. x
x x.

Bar Matter No. 1227

A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC

As earlier adverted to, Bar Matter No. 1227 refers to Atty. de Veras letter-request to this Court to
schedule his oath taking as IBP National President. A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC, on the other hand, is a letter-
report dated 19 May 2005 of IBP National President Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz (IBP President Cadiz)
furnishing this Court with the IBPs Resolution, dated 13 May 2005, removing Atty. De Vera as member of
the IBP Board and as IBP EVP, for committing acts inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP in general.[2]

The controversy in Bar Matter No. 1227 and A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC arose from the regular meeting of the
IBP Board of Governors held on 14 January 2005. In said meeting, by 2/3 vote (6 voting in favor and 2
against), the IBP Board approved the withdrawal of the Petition filed before this Court docketed as
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, et al. vs. Senate of the Philippines, et al. Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, SC-R165108. The Petition was intended to question the legality and/or
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9227, authorizing the increase in the salaries of judges and justices,
and to increase filing fees.[3]

The two IBP Governors who opposed the said Resolution approving the withdrawal of the above-
described Petition were herein respondent Governor and EVP de Vera and Governor Carlos L. Valdez.[4]
On 19 January 2005, IBP President Cadiz informed this Court of the decision taken by the IBP Board to
withdraw the afore-mentioned Petition. Attached to his letter was a copy of the IBP Boards 14 January
2005 Resolution.[5]

On 15 April 2005, Bar Matter No. 1227, pertaining to Atty. de Veras request for oathtaking as National
President, was filed. The same was subsequently consolidated with A.C. No. 6697, the disbarment case
filed against Atty. de Vera.[6]

On 22 April 2005, a plenary session was held at the 10th National IBP Convention at the CAP-Camp John
Hay Convention Center, Baguio City. It was at this forum where Atty. de Vera allegedly made some
untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies in connection with the IBP Boards Resolution to
withdraw the Petition questioning the legality of Republic Act No. 9227.[7]

On 10 May 2005, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining Atty. de Vera from
assuming office as IBP National President.[8]

On 12 May 2005, IBP Gov. Romulo A. Rivera wrote IBP National President Cadiz a letter wherein he
prayed for the removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the IBP Board for having committed acts which
were inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP.[9]

On 13 May 2005, in the 20th Regular Meeting of the Board held at the Waterfront Hotel, Cebu City, the
IBP Board, by 2/3 vote, resolved to remove Atty. de Vera as member of the IBP Board of Governors and
as IBP Executive Vice President.[10] Quoted hereunder is the dispositive portion of said Resolution:

NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, that Governor Leonard S. de Vera is

REMOVED as a member of the IBP Board of Governors and Executive Vice President for committing acts
inimical to the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP, to wit:

1. For making untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies in public about the Supreme Court
and members of the IBP Board of Governors, during the Plenary Session of the IBP 10th National
Convention of Lawyers, held at CAP-Camp John Hay Convention Center on 22 April 2005, making it
appear that the decision of the IBP Board of Governors to withdraw the PETITION docketed as
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, et al. vs. The Senate of the Philippines, et al.,
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer for the Issuance of A Temporary Restraining Order or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction, S.C.-R. 165108, was due to influence and pressure from the Supreme
Court of the Philippines;

2. For making said untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies that brought the IBP Board of
Governors and the IBP as a whole in public contempt and disrepute;

3. For violating Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers which mandates that
A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should
insist on similar conduct by others, by making untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies during
the Plenary Session of the IBP 10th National Convention of Lawyers in Baguio City;

4. For instigating and provoking some IBP chapters to embarrass and humiliate the IBP Board of
Governors in order to coerce and compel the latter to pursue the aforesaid PETITION;

5. For falsely accusing the IBP National President, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, during the Plenary Session of
the 10th National Convention in Baguio City of withholding from him a copy of Supreme Court
Resolution, dated 25 January 2005, granting the withdrawal of the PETITION, thereby creating the wrong
impression that the IBP National President deliberately prevented him from taking the appropriate
remedies with respect thereto, thus compromising the reputation and integrity of the IBP National
President and the IBP as a whole.[11]

On 18 May 2005, Atty. de Vera aired his sentiments to this Court by writing the then Hon. Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. a letter captioned as Urgent Plea to Correct a Glaring Injustice of the IBP Board of
Governors; Vehement Protest to the Board Resolution Abruptly Removing Atty. Leonard de Vera from
the Board of Governors in Patent Violation of Due Process; Petition to Deny/Disapprove the Completely
Unjustified and Highly Arbitrary Resolution Precipitately Ousting Atty. de Vera from the Board of
Governors in Less Than Twenty Four (24) Hours from Notice and Judgment Without Formal
Investigation.[12]
In the said letter, Atty. de Vera strongly and categorically denied having committed acts inimical to the
IBP and its Board. He alleged that on the basis of an unverified letter-complaint filed by IBP Governor
Rivera, the IBP Board voted to expel him posthaste, without just cause and in complete disregard of
even the minimum standards of due process. Pertinent portions of his letter read:

It is evident that the Board of Governors has committed a grave and serious injustice against me
especially when, as the incumbent Executive Vice President of the IBP, I am scheduled to assume my
position as National President of the IBP on July 1, 2005. x x x

I was denied the very basic rights of due process recognized by the Supreme Court even in
administrative cases:

1. The denial of the right to answer the charges formally or in writing. The complaint against
me was in writing.

2. The denial of the right to answer the charges within a reasonable period of time after receipt
of the complaint.

3. The denial of the right to a fair hearing.

4. The denial of the right to confront the accuser and the witnesses against me. I challenged
Gov. Rivera to testify under oath so I could question him. He refused. I offered to testify under oath so I
could be questioned. My request was denied.

5. The denial of my right to present witnesses on my behalf.

6. The denial of my right to an impartial judge. Governor Rivera was my accuser, prosecutor,
and judge all at the same time.
7. Gov. Riveras prejudgment of my case becomes even more evident because when his motion
to expel me was lost in a 5-3 votes (due to his inhibition to vote), Gov. Rivera asked for another round of
voting so he can vote to support his own complaint and motion to expel me.[13] (Emphasis and
underscoring in original.)

On 27 May 2005, the IBP Board responded to the 18 May 2005 letter of Atty. de Vera.[14] In their Reply,
the IBP Board explained to this Court that their decision to remove Atty. de Vera was based on valid
grounds and was intended to protect itself from a recalcitrant member. Among the grounds cited and
elucidated by the IBP Board were the following:

(i) Atty. de Vera engaged himself in a negative media campaign and solicited resolutions from
IBP Chapters to condemn the IBP Board of Governors for its decision to withdraw the PETITION, all with
the end in view of compelling or coercing the IBP Board of Governors to reconsider the decision to
withdraw the PETITION.

(ii) Atty. de Vera embarrassed, humiliated and maligned the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP
National President in public or during the Plenary Session at the 10th National Convention of Lawyers.

(iii) Rather than pacify the already agitated solicited speakers (at the plenary session), Atty. de
Vera fanned the fire, so to speak, and went to the extent of making untruthful statements, innuendos
and blatant lies about the Supreme Court and some members of the IBP Board of Governors. He
deliberately and intentionally did so to provoke the members of the IBP Board of Governors to engage
him in an acrimonious public debate and expose the IBP Board of Governors to public ridicule.

(iv) Atty. de Vera uttered untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies, e.g., that some of
the members of the IBP Board of Governors voted in favor of the withdrawal of the petition (without
mentioning names) because nakakahiya kasi sa Supreme Court, nakakaawa kasi ang Supreme Court, kasi
may mga kaibigan tayo sa Court. He made it appear that the IBP Board of Governors approved the
resolution, withdrawing the petition, due to influence or pressure from the Supreme Court.[15]
The IBP Board explained that Atty. de Veras actuation during the Plenary Session was the last straw that
broke the camels back. He committed acts inimical to the interest of the IBP Board and the IBP; hence,
the IBP Board decided to remove him.

On 3 June 2005, Atty. de Vera furnished the Court with copies of resolutions and a position paper
coming from various IBP Chapters all condemning his expulsion from the IBP Board and as IBP EVP.[16]

On 15 June 2005, IBP President Cadiz informed Chief Justice Davide that in a special meeting of the IBP
Board held at the EDSA Shangri-la Plaza on 13 June 2005, the IBP Board took note of the vacancy in the
position of the IBP EVP brought about by Atty. de Veras removal. In his stead, IBP Governor Pura
Angelica Y. Santiago was formally elected and declared as IBP EVP.[17]

On 17 June 2005, Atty. de Vera protested against the election of Atty. Santiago.[18] On 20 June 2005,
Atty. Santiago voluntarily relinquished the EVP position through a letter addressed to the IBP Board.[19]
Thus, on 25 June 2005, during its last regular meeting, the IBP Board elected a new EVP in the person of
IBP Governor Jose Vicente B. Salazar to replace Atty. Santiago.

On 28 June 2005, IBP National President Cadiz, through a letter addressed to Chief Justice Davide,
reported to this Court Atty. Salazars election.[20] IBP National President Cadiz also requested, among
other things, that Atty. Salazars election be approved and that he be allowed to assume as National
President in the event that Atty. de Vera is disbarred or suspended from the practice of law or should his
removal from the 2003-2005 Board of Governors and as EVP is approved by this Court.[21] Also on 28
June 2005, Atty. de Vera protested the election of Atty. Salazar.[22]

In his Extended Comment[23] dated 25 July 2005, Atty. de Vera maintained that there was absolutely no
factual or legal basis to sustain the motion to remove him from the IBP Board because he violated no
law. He argued that if the basis for his removal as EVP was based on the same grounds as his removal
from the IBP Board, then his removal as EVP was likewise executed without due notice and without the
least compliance with the minimum standards of due process of law.

Atty. de Vera strongly averred that, contrary to the utterly false and malicious charges filed against him,
the speakers at the Plenary Session of the Baguio Convention, although undeniably impassioned and
articulate, were respectful in their language and exhortations, not once undermining the stature of the
IBP in general and the IBP Board of Governors in particular. He posited that speaking in disagreement
with the Resolution of the Board during the Conventions Plenary Session is not a valid cause to remove
or expel a duly-elected member of the IBP Board of Governors; and the decision to remove him only
shows that the right to freedom of speech or the right to dissent is not recognized by the incumbent IBP
Board.

Anent the charges that he accused the National President of withholding a copy of this Courts
Resolution granting the withdrawal of the Petition questioning the legality of Republic Act No. 9227,
Atty. de Vera avowed that he made no such remarks. As regards the election of a new IBP EVP, Atty. de
Vera contended that the said election was illegal as it was contrary to the provisions of the IBP By-Laws
concerning national officers, to wit:

Section. 49. Term of office. - The President and the Executive Vice President shall hold office for a term
of two years from July 1 following their election until 30 June of their second year in office and until their
successors shall have been duly chosen and qualified.

In the event the President is absent or unable to act, his functions and duties shall be performed by the
Executive Vice President, and in the event of death, resignation, or removal of the President, the
Executive Vice President shall serve as Acting President for the unexpired portion of the term. In the
event of death, resignation, removal or disability of both the President and the Executive Vice President,
the Board of Governors shall elect an Acting President to hold office for the unexpired portion of the
term or during the period of disability.

Unless otherwise provided in these By-Laws, all other officers and employees appointed by the
President with the consent of the Board shall hold office at the pleasure of the Board or for such term as
the Board may fix.[24]

To bolster his position, Atty. de Vera stressed that when both the President and the EVP die, resign, are
removed, or are disabled, the IBP By-Laws only provides for the election of an Acting President and that
no mention for an election for EVP was made. Thus, when such election for EVP occurs, such is contrary
to the express provision of the IBP By-Laws.
Atty. de Vera also argued that even if he were validly removed as IBP EVP, his replacement should come
from Eastern Mindanao and not from any other region, due to the Rotation Rule embodied in par. 2,
Section 47, Article VII of the IBP By-Laws.

In response to Atty. de Veras averments, the 2003-2005 IBP Board, through its counsel, submitted a
Reply dated 27 January 2006 and clarified as follows:

(i) The IBP Board of Governors is vested with sufficient power and authority to protect itself
from an intractable member by virtue of Article VI, Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws;

(ii) Atty. de Vera was removed as a member of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP not because of his
disagreement with the IBP Boards position but because of the various acts that he committed which the
IBP Board determined to be inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP as a whole;

(iii) Atty. de Vera cannot exculpate himself from liability by invoking his constitutional right to
Free Speech because, as a member of the Bar, it is his sworn duty to observe and maintain the respect
due to the courts and to judicial officers and to insist on similar conduct by others;

(iv) The IBP Board, in effecting the removal of Atty. de Vera, observed the fundamental principles
of due process. As the records would bear, Atty. de Vera was duly notified of the Regular Meeting of the
IBP Board held on 13 May 2004; was furnished a copy of Governor Riveras Letter-Complaint the day
before the said meeting; was furnished a copy of the said Meetings Agenda; and was allowed to
personally defend himself and his accuser, Gov. Rivera;

(v) Atty. de Vera was validly removed because the required number of votes under Section 44 of
the IBP By-Laws to remove Atty. de Vera as a member of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP was duly
complied with;

(vi) Atty. de Veras replacement as IBP EVP need not come from Eastern Mindanao Region
because: (a) the rotation rule under Article VII, Section 47, par. 2 of the IBP By-Laws had already been
complied with when Atty. de Vera, who hails from Eastern Mindanao, was elected IBP EVP; and (b) the
rotation rule need not be enforced if the same will not be practicable, possible, feasible, doable or
viable; and, finally, that
(vii) Atty. Salazar was validly elected as IBP EVP and, thus, should now be allowed to take his oath
as IBP National President.[25]

The Courts Ruling

AC No. 6697

In his Memorandum[26] dated 20 June 2005, complainant tendered the following issues for the
consideration of the Court:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT ATTORNEY LEONARD S. DEVERA (sic) COMMITED MALPRACTICE

WHICH AMOUNTED TO MORAL T[U]RPITUDE IN THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA AND IN THE
PHILIPPINES, IN THE COURSE OF HIS PRACTICE OF LAW.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE OATH OF OFFICE AS LAWYER IS ATTACHED TO THE PERSON OF ATTORNEY
LEONARD S. DEVERA (sic) WHEREVER HE MAY GO AND NOT NECESSARILY BOUND BY THE TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION OF THE PHILIPPINES.

III.
WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE MORAL T[U]RPITUDE, AS BASIS FOR
DISBARMENT OF RESPONDENT IN AN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING.

IV.

WHETHER OR NOT RES JUDICATA APPLIES IN THIS CASE, DUE TO ADMIN. CASE NO. [6052][27]

The disposition of the first three related issues hinges on the resolution of the fourth issue.
Consequently, we will start with the last issue.

A.C. No. 6052 is not a bar to the filing of the present administrative case.

In disposing of the question of res judicata, the Bar Confidant opined:

To reiterate, the instant case for suspension and/or disbarment against respondent Leonard De Vera is
grounded on the following:

1) respondents alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension order rendered against

him by the State Bar in California; and

2) respondents alleged violation of the so-called rotation rule enunciated in Administrative

Matter No. 491 dated 06 October 1989 (In the Matter: 1989 IBP Elections).

It appears that the complainant already raised the said issues in an earlier administrative case against
the respondent. Verily, these issues were already argued upon by the parties in their respective
pleadings, and discussed and ruled upon by this Court in its Decision dated 11 December 2003 in
Administrative Matter No. 6052 (In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard de Vera).
As such, with respect to the first issue, this Court held that:

As for the administrative complaint filed against him by one of his clients when he was practicing law in
California, which in turn compelled him to surrender his California license to practice law, he maintains
that it cannot serve as basis for determining his moral qualification (or lack of it) to run for the position
he is aspiring for. He explains that there is as yet no final judgment finding him guilty of the
administrative charge, as the records relied upon by the petitioners are mere preliminary findings of a
hearing referee which are recommendatory findings of an IBP Commissioner on Bar Discipline which are
subject to the review of and the final decision of the Supreme Court. He also stresses that the
complainant in the California administrative case has retracted the accusation that he misappropriated
the complainants money, but unfortunately the retraction was not considered by the investigating
officer. xxx

On the administrative complaint that was filed against respondent De Vera while he was still practicing
law in California, he explained that no final judgment was rendered by the California Supreme Court
finding him guilty of the charge. He surrendered his license to protest the discrimination he suffered at
the hands of the investigator and he found it impractical to pursue the case to the end. We find these
explanations satisfactory in the absence of contrary proof. It is a basic rule on evidence that he who
alleges a fact has the burden to prove the same. In this case, the petitioners have not shown how the
administrative complaint affects respondent De Vera's moral fitness to run for governor.

On the other hand, as regards the second issue:

Petitioners contend that respondent de Vera is disqualified for the post because he is not really from
Eastern Mindanao. His place of residence is in Paraaque and he was originally a member of the PPLM IBP
Chapter. He only changed his IBP Chapter membership to pave the way for his ultimate goal of attaining
the highest IBP post, which is the national presidency. Petitioners aver that in changing his IBP
membership, respondent De Vera violated the domicile rule.

The contention has no merit. Under the last paragraph of Section 19, Article II, a lawyer included in the
Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court can register with the particular IBP Chapter of his preference or
choice, thus:

xxx
It is clearly stated in the aforequoted section of the By-Laws that it is not automatic that a lawyer will
become a member of the chapter where his place of residence or work is located. He has the discretion
to choose the particular chapter where he wishes to gain membership. Only when he does not register
his preference that he will become a member of the Chapter of the place where he resides or maintains
office. The only proscription in registering one's preference is that a lawyer cannot be a member of more
than one chapter at the same time.

The same is provided in Section 29-2 of the IBP By-Laws. In fact, under this Section, transfer of IBP
membership is allowed as long as the lawyer complies with the conditions set forth therein, thus:

xxx

The only condition required under the foregoing rule is that the transfer must be made not less than
three months prior to the election of officers in the chapter to which the lawyer wishes to transfer.

In the case at bar, respondent De Vera requested the transfer of his IBP membership to Agusan del Sur
on 1 August 2001. One month thereafter, IBP National Secretary Jaime M. Vibar wrote a letter addressed
to Atty. Amador Z. Tolentino, Jr., Secretary of IBP PPLM Chapter and Atty. Lyndon J. Romero, Secretary
of IBP Agusan del Sur Chapter, informing them of respondent de Vera's transfer and advising them to
make the necessary notation in their respective records. This letter is a substantial compliance with the
certification mentioned in Section 29-2 as aforequoted. Note that de Vera's transfer was made effective
sometime between 1 August 2001 and 3 September 2001. On 27 February 2003, the elections of the IBP
Chapter Officers were simultaneously held all over the Philippines, as mandated by Section 29.a of the
IBP By-Laws which provides that elections of Chapter Officers and Directors shall be held on the last
Saturday of February of every other year. Between 3 September 2001 and 27 February 2003, seventeen
months had elapsed. This makes respondent de Vera's transfer valid as it was done more than three
months ahead of the chapter elections held on 27 February 2003.

In the case of Romulo G. Dinsay vs. Atty. Leopoldo D. Cioco (Administrative Case No. 2995, 27 November
1996), this Court declared that:
The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to the exercise
of the [Courts] administrative powers.

In the said case, respondent Clerk of Court Cioco was dismissed from service for grave misconduct highly
prejudicial to the service for surreptitiously substituting the bid price in a Certificate of Sale from
P3,263,182.67 to only P730,000.00. Thereafter a complaint for disbarment was filed against the
respondent on the basis of the same incident. Respondent, interposing res judicata, argued that he may
no longer be charged on the basis of the same incident. This Court held that while the respondent is in
effect being indicted twice for the same misconduct, this does not amount to double jeopardy as both
proceedings are admittedly administrative in nature. This Court qualified that, in the first case, the
respondent was proceeded against as an erring court personnel under the Courts supervisory power
over courts while, in the second case, he was disciplined as a lawyer under the Courts plenary authority
over membersof the legal profession.

In subsequent decisions of this Court, however, it appears that res judicata still applies in administrative
cases. Thus, in the case of Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera vs. Judge William Layague (Administrastive Matter
No. RTJ-93-986), this Court ruled that:

While double jeopardy does not lie in administrative cases, it would be contrary to equity and
substantial justice to penalize respondent judge a second time for an act which he had already answered
for.

Likewise, in the recent case of Executive Judge Henry B. Basilia vs. Judge Amado L. Becamon, Lolita Delos
Reyes and Eddie Delos Reyes (Administrative Matter No. MTJ-02-1404, 14 December 2004), this Court
held that:

Applying the principle of res judicata or bar by prior judgment, the present administrative case becomes
dismissible.

xxx
Under the said doctrine, a matter that has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction must
be deemed to have been finally and conclusively settled if it arises in any subsequent litigation between
the same parties and for the same cause. It provides that

[a] final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the
rights of the parties and their privies; and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving
the same claim, demand, or cause of action. Res judicata is based on the ground that the party to be
affected, or some other with whom he is in privity, has litigated the same matter in the former action in
a court of competent jurisdiction, and should not be permitted to litigate it again.

This principle frees the parties from undergoing all over again the rigors of unnecessary suits and
repetitious trials. At the same time, it prevents the clogging of court dockets. Equally important, res
judicata stabilizes rights and promotes the rule of law.

In the instant administrative case, it is clear that the issues raised by the complainant had already been
resolved by this Court in an earlier administrative case. The complainants contention that the principle
of res judicata would not apply in the case at bar as the first administrative case was one for
disqualification while the instant administrative complaint is one for suspension and/or disbarment
should be given least credence. It is worthy to note that while the instant administrative complaint is
denominated as one for suspension and/or disbarment, it prayed neither the suspension nor the
disbarment of the respondent but instead merely sought to enjoin the respondent from assuming office
as IBP National President.[28]

Contrary to the findings of the Bar Confidant, Adm. Case No. 6052 entitled, In Re: Petition to Disqualify
Atty. Leonard de Vera, on Legal and Moral Grounds, From Being Elected IBP Governor for Eastern
Mindanao in the May 31 IBP Election and promulgated on 11 December 2003 does not constitute a bar
to the filing of Adm. Case No. 6697. Although the parties in the present administrative case and in Adm.
Case No. 6052 are identical, their capacities in these cases and the issues presented therein are not the
same, thereby barring the application of res judicata.

In order that the principle of res judicata may be made to apply, four essential conditions must concur,
namely: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the
case must be a judgment or order on the merits, and (4) there must be between the first and second
action identity of parties, identity of subject matter, and identity of causes of action.[29] In the absence
of any one of these elements, Atty. de Vera cannot argue res judicata in his favor.
It is noteworthy that the two administrative cases involve different subject matters and causes of action.
In Adm. Case No. 6052, the subject matter was the qualification of Atty. de Vera to run as a candidate
for the position of IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao. In the present administrative complaint, the
subject matter is his privilege to practice law. In the first administrative case, complainants cause of
action was Atty. de Veras alleged violation or circumvention of the IBP By-laws. In the present
administrative case, the primary cause of action is Atty. de Veras alleged violation of lawyers oath and
the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Finally, the two administrative cases do not seek the same relief. In the first case, the complainants
sought to prevent Atty. de Vera from assuming his post as IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao. In the
present case, as clarified by complainant in his Memorandum, what is being principally sought is Atty. de
Veras suspension or disbarment.

The distinctions between the two cases are far from trivial. The previous case was resolved on the basis
of the parties rights and obligations under the IBP By-laws. We held therein that Atty. de Vera cannot be
disqualified from running as Regional Governor as there is nothing in the present IBP By-laws that
sanctions the disqualification of candidates for IBP governors. Consequently, we stressed that the
petition had no firm ground to stand on. Likewise, we held that the complainants therein were not the
proper parties to bring the suit as the IBP By-laws prescribes that only nominees - which the
complainants were not - can file with the IBP President a written protest against the candidate. The
Courts statement, therefore, that Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified on the ground that he was not
morally fit was mere obiter dictum. Precisely, the IBP By-laws do not allow for pre-election
disqualification proceedings; hence, Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified on the basis of the
administrative findings of a hearing officer of the State Bar of California suspending him from the
practice of law for three years. We held in that case that

There is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that one must be morally fit before he can run
for IBP governorship. For one, this is so because the determination of moral fitness of a candidate lies in
the individual judgment of the members of the House of Delegates. Indeed, based on each member's
standard of morality, he is free to nominate and elect any member, so long as the latter possesses the
basic requirements under the law. For another, basically the disqualification of a candidate involving lack
of moral fitness should emanate from his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law by this
Court, or conviction by final judgment of an offense which involves moral turpitude.[30]
What this simply means is that absent a final judgment by the Supreme Court in a proper case declaring
otherwise, every lawyer aspiring to hold the position of IBP Regional Director is presumed morally fit.
Any person who begs to disagree will not be able to find a receptive audience in the IBP through a
petition for disqualification but must first file the necessary disbarment or suspension proceeding
against the lawyer concerned.

And this is precisely what complainant has chosen to do in the instant case. As his petition is sufficient in
form and substance, we have given it due course pursuant to Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. And,
considering that this case is not barred by the prior judgment in Adm. Case No. 6052, the only issue left
for consideration is whether or not Atty. de Vera can be suspended or disbarred under the facts of the
case and the evidence submitted by complainant.

The recommendation of the hearing officer of the State Bar of California, standing alone, is not proof of
malpractice.

In the case of the Suspension From The Practice of Law In The Territory of Guam of Atty. Leon G.
Maquera,[31] we were confronted with the question of whether or not a member of the Philippine Bar,
who is concomitantly an attorney in a foreign jurisdiction and who was suspended from the practice of
law in said foreign jurisdiction, can be sanctioned as member of the Philippine Bar for the same
infraction committed in the foreign jurisdiction.

We take the issue in Atty. Maquera one notch higher in the case of Atty. de Vera who was admitted to
the practice of law in a foreign jurisdiction (State Bar of California, U.S.A.) and against whom charges
were filed in connection with his practice in said jurisdiction. However, unlike the case of Atty. Maquera,
no final judgment for suspension or disbarment was meted against Atty. de Vera despite a
recommendation of suspension of three years as he surrendered his license to practice law before his
case could be taken up by the Supreme Court of California.

In Maquera, we emphasized that the judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer in a foreign
jurisdiction does not automatically result in his suspension or disbarment in the Philippines as the acts
giving rise to his suspension are not grounds for disbarment and suspension in this jurisdiction.
Judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer may transmute into a similar judgment of suspension
in the Philippines only if the basis of the foreign courts action includes any of the grounds for
disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction. We likewise held that the judgment of the foreign court
merely constitutes prima facie evidence of unethical acts as lawyer.

The Maquera ruling is consistent with Rule 39, Section 48, of the Rules of Court which provides:

Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. - The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal
of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:

xxxx

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

In Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Inc. v. Fasgi Enterprises, Inc.,[32] we explained that [a] foreign
judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until a contrary
showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of due notice in the
foreign forum.

In herein case, considering that there is technically no foreign judgment to speak of, the
recommendation by the hearing officer of the State Bar of California does not constitute prima facie
evidence of unethical behavior by Atty. de Vera. Complainant must prove by substantial evidence the
facts upon which the recommendation by the hearing officer was based. If he is successful in this, he
must then prove that these acts are likewise unethical under Philippine law.

There is substantial evidence of malpractice on the part of Atty. de Vera independent of the
recommendation of suspension by the hearing officer of the State Bar of California
Section 27 of Rule 138 of our Rules of Court states:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. A member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or
for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other
disciplinary agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground
for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove
enumerated.

The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie
evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension.[33]

Disciplinary action against a lawyer is intended to protect the court and the public from the misconduct
of officers of the court and to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise
this important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable men in whom courts and clients may
repose confidence.[34] The statutory enunciation of the grounds for disbarment on suspension is not to
be taken as a limitation on the general power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent
power of the court over its officers cannot be restricted.[35]

Malpractice ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed by a lawyer. Section
27 gives a special and technical meaning to the term Malpractice.[36] That meaning is in consonance
with the elementary notion that the practice of law is a profession, not a business.[37]
Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that which violates the rules on ethical code of his profession
or which is unbecoming a member of that profession.[38]

Now, the undisputed facts:

1. An administrative case against Atty. de Vera was filed before the State Bar of California,
docketed then as Adm. Case No. 86-0-18429. It arose from an insurance case Atty. de Vera handled
involving Julius Willis, III who figured in an automobile accident in 1986. Atty. de Vera was authorized by
the elder Willis (father of Julius who was given authority by the son to control the case because the
latter was then studying in San Diego California) for the release of the funds in settlement of the case.
Atty. de Vera received a check in settlement of the case which he then deposited to his personal
account;[39]

2. The Hearing referee in the said administrative case recommended that Atty. de Vera be
suspended from the practice of law for three years;[40] and

3. Atty. de Vera resigned from the California Bar which resignation was accepted by the
Supreme Court of California.[41]

Atty. de Vera vehemently insists that the foregoing facts do not prove that he misappropriated his
clients funds as the latters father (the elder Willis) gave him authority to use the same and that,
unfortunately, the hearing officer did not consider this explanation notwithstanding the fact that the
elder Willis testified under oath that he expected de Vera might use the money for a few days.

By insisting that he was authorized by his clients father and attorney-in-fact to use the funds, Atty. de
Vera has impliedly admitted the use of the Willis funds for his own personal use.

In fact, Atty. de Vera did not deny complainants allegation in the latters memorandum that he (de Vera)
received US$12,000.00 intended for his client and that he deposited said amount in his personal account
and not in a separate trust account and that, finally, he spent the amount for personal purposes.[42]

At this point, it bears stressing that in cases filed before administrative and quasi-judicial bodies, a fact
may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence or that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.[43] It means such
evidence which affords a substantial basis from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred.[44]

Beyond doubt, the unauthorized use by a lawyer of his clients funds is highly unethical. Canon 16 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility is emphatic about this, thus:

CANON 16. A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY
COME TO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.

Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of
others kept by him.

In Espiritu v. Ulep[45] we held that

The relation between attorney and client is highly fiduciary in nature. Being such, it requires utmost
good faith, loyalty, fidelity and disinterestedness on the part of the attorney. Its fiduciary nature is
intended for the protection of the client.

The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates every lawyer to hold in trust all money and properties
of his client that may come into his possession. Accordingly, he shall account for all money or property
collected or received for or from the client. Even more specific is the Canon of Professional Ethics:

The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes
advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client.
Money of the client or collected for the client or other trust property coming into the possession of the
lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly and should not under any circumstances be
commingled with his own or be used by him.

Consequently, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds or property held by him on behalf of
his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use to the
prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, his client. It is a gross violation of general
morality as well as of professional ethics; it impairs the public confidence in the legal profession and
deserves punishment.

Lawyers who misappropriate the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional ethics
and are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. Those who are guilty of such
infraction may be disbarred or suspended indefinitely from the practice of law. (Emphases supplied.)

In herein case, as it is admitted by Atty. de Vera himself that he used his clients money for personal use,
he has unwittingly sealed his own fate since this admission constitutes more than substantial evidence
of malpractice. Consequently, Atty. de Vera now has the burden of rebutting the evidence which he
himself supplied.

In his defense, Atty. de Vera claims that he was duly authorized by the elder Willis to use the funds
intended for the latters son. Atty. de Vera also points out that he had restituted the full amount of
US$12,000.00 even before the filing of the administrative case against him in the State Bar of California.
[46]

Aside from these self-serving statements, however, we cannot find anywhere in the records of this case
proof that indeed Atty. de Vera was duly authorized to use the funds of his client. In Radjaie v. Atty.
Alovera[47] we declared that

When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges
against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him. He must show proof that
he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him.
Atty. de Vera cannot rely on the statement made by the hearing officer that the elder Willis had indeed
testified that he expected de Vera might use the money for a few days. As Atty. de Vera had vigorously
objected to the admissibility of the document containing this statement, he is now estopped from
relying thereon. Besides, that the elder Willis expected de Vera might use the money for a few days was
not so much an acknowledgment of consent to the use by Atty. de Vera of his clients funds as it was an
acceptance of the probability that Atty. de Vera might, indeed, use his clients funds, which by itself did
not speak well of the character of Atty. de Vera or the way such character was perceived.

In the instant case, the act of Atty. de Vera in holding on to his clients money without the latters
acquiescence is conduct indicative of lack of integrity and propriety. It is clear that Atty. de Vera, by
depositing the check in his own account and using the same for his own benefit is guilty of deceit,
malpractice, gross misconduct and unethical behavior. He caused dishonor, not only to himself but to
the noble profession to which he belongs. For, it cannot be denied that the respect of litigants to the
profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member of the profession betrays their trust and
confidence.[48] Respondent violated his oath to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his client.

Nevertheless, we do not agree with complainants plea to disbar respondent from the practice of law.
The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution.[49] Where any lesser penalty can accomplish
the end desired, disbarment should not be decreed.

In Mortera v. Pagatpatan,[50] we imposed upon Atty. Pagatpatan two years suspension from his practice
of law for depositing the funds meant for his client to his personal account without the latters
knowledge. In Reyes v. Maglaya;[51] Castillo v. Taguines;[52] Espiritu v. Atty. Cabredo IV,[53] the
respondents were meted one year suspension each for failing to remit to their clients monies in the
amounts of P1,500.00; P500.00, and P51,161.00, respectively, received by them for their clients without
the latters permission. In Dumadag v. Atty. Lumaya,[54] we indefinitely suspended respondent for
failure to remit to his client the amount of the measly sum of P4,344.00 representing the amount
received pursuant to a writ of execution. Considering the amount involved here US$12,000.00, we
believe that the penalty of suspension for two (2) years is appropriate.

Transferring IBP membership to a chapter where the lawyer is not a resident of is not a ground for his
suspension or disbarment
Complainant insists that Atty. de Veras transfer of membership from the Pasay, Paraaque, Las Pias and
Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter to the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter is a circumvention of the rotation rule as
it was made for the sole purpose of becoming IBP National President. Complainant stresses that Atty. de
Vera is not a resident of Agusan del Sur nor does he hold office therein.

In Adm. Case No. 6052, we held that Atty. de Veras act of transferring to another IBP Chapter is not a
ground for his disqualification for the post of IBP Governor as the same is allowed under Section 19 of
the IBP By-Laws with the qualification only that the transfer be made not less than three months
immediately preceding any chapter election.

As it was perfectly within Atty. de Veras right to transfer his membership, it cannot be said that he is
guilty of unethical conduct or behavior. And while one may incessantly argue that a legal act may not
necessarily be ethical, in herein case, we do not see anything wrong in transferring to an IBP chapter
that -- based on the rotation rule will produce the next IBP EVP who will automatically succeed to the
National Presidency for the next term. Our Code of Professional Responsibility as well as the Lawyers
Oath do not prohibit nor punish lawyers from aspiring to be IBP National President and from doing
perfectly legal acts in accomplishing such goal.

Bar Matter No. 1227

Administrative Matter No. 05-5-15-SC

To resolve Bar Matter No. 1227 and Administrative Matter No. 05-5- 15-SC, the following issues must be
addressed:

I. Whether the IBP Board of Governors acted with grave abuse of discretion in removing Atty.
de Vera as Governor and EVP of the IBP on 13 May 2005.
 i. Whether the IBP Board of Governors complied with
administrative due process in removing Atty. de Vera.

ii. Whether the IBP removed Atty. De Vera for just and valid cause.

II. Whether Governor Salazar was validly elected as EVP of the IBP on 25 June 2005, and can
consequently assume the Presidency of the IBP for the term 2005-2007.

The IBP Board observed due process in its removal of Atty. de Vera as IBP Governor

We start the discussion with the veritable fact that the IBP Board is vested with the power to remove
any of its members pursuant to Section 44, Article VI of the IBP By-Laws, which states:

Sec. 44. Removal of members. If the Board of Governors should determine after proper inquiry that any
of its members, elective or otherwise, has for any reason become unable to perform his duties, the
Board, by resolution of the Majority of the remaining members, may declare his position vacant, subject
to the approval of the Supreme Court.

Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be removed for cause, including three consecutive
absences from Board meetings without justifiable excuse, by resolution adopted by two-thirds of the
remaining members of the Board, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court.

In case of any vacancy in the office of Governor for whatever cause, the delegates from the region shall
by majority vote, elect a successor from among the members of the Chapter to which the resigned
governor is a member to serve as governor for the unexpired portion of the term. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the aforementioned section, a member of the IBP Board may be removed for cause by resolution
adopted by two-thirds (2/3) of the remaining members of the Board, subject to the approval of this
Court.

In the main, Atty. de Vera questions his removal from the Board of Governors on procedural and
substantive grounds. He argues that he was denied very basic rights of due process recognized by the
Honorable Court even in administrative cases like the right to answer formally or in writing and within
reasonable time, the right to present witnesses in his behalf, the right to a fair hearing. Atty. de Vera
protests the fact that he was not able to cross-examine the complainant, IBP Gov. Romulo H. Rivera
(Atty. Rivera) and that Atty. Rivera voted as well for his expulsion which made him accuser, prosecutor
and judge at the same time. Atty. de Vera emphasized the fact that Atty. Rivera initially inhibited himself
from voting on his own motion. However, when his inhibition resulted in the defeat of his motion as the
necessary 2/3 votes could not be mustered, Atty. Rivera asked for another round of voting so he could
vote to support his own motion.

The IBP Board counters that since its members were present during the plenary session, and personally
witnessed and heard Atty. de Veras actuations, an evidentiary or formal hearing was no longer
necessary. Since they all witnessed and heard Atty. de Vera, it was enough that he was given an
opportunity to refute and answer all the charges imputed against him. They emphasized that Atty. de
Vera was given a copy of the complaint and that he was present at the Board Meeting on 13 May 2005
wherein the letter-complaint against him was part of the agenda. Therein, he was given the opportunity
to be heard and that, in fact, Atty. de Vera did argue his case.

We are in agreement with the IBP Board.

First, it needs stressing that the constitutional provision on due process safeguards life, liberty and
property.[55] It cannot be said that the position of EVP of the IBP is property within the constitutional
sense especially since there is no right to security of tenure over said position as, in fact, all that is
required to remove any member of the board of governors for cause is a resolution adopted by 2/3 of
the remaining members of the board.

Secondly, even if the right of due process could be rightfully invoked, still, in administrative proceedings,
the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain ones side.[56] At the outset, it is here
emphasized that the term due process of law as used in the Constitution has no fixed meaning for all
purposes due to the very nature of the doctrine which, asserting a fundamental principle of justice
rather than a specific rule of law, is not susceptible of more than one general statement.[57] The phrase
is so elusive of exact apprehension,[58] because it depends on circumstances and varies with the subject
matter and the necessities of the situation.[59]

Due process of law in administrative cases is not identical with judicial process for a trial in court is not
always essential to due process. While a day in court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, it is
otherwise in administrative proceedings since they rest upon different principles. The due process
clause guarantees no particular form of procedure and its requirements are not technical. Thus, in
certain proceedings of administrative character, the right to a notice or hearing are not essential to due
process of law. The constitutional requirement of due process is met by a fair hearing before a regularly
established administrative agency or tribunal. It is not essential that hearings be had before the making
of a determination if thereafter, there is available trial and tribunal before which all objections and
defenses to the making of such determination may be raised and considered. One adequate hearing is
all that due process requires. What is required for hearing may differ as the functions of the
administrative bodies differ.[60]

The right to cross-examine is not an indispensable aspect of due process.[61] Nor is an actual hearing
always essential[62] especially under the factual milieu of this case where the members of the IBP Board
-- upon whose shoulders the determination of the cause for removal of an IBP governor is placed subject
to the approval of the Supreme Court all witnessed Atty. de Veras actuations in the IBP National
Convention in question.

It is undisputed that Atty. de Vera received a copy of the complaint against him and that he was present
when the matter was taken up. From the transcript of the stenographic notes of the 13 May 2005
meeting wherein Atty. de Vera was removed, it is patent that Atty. de Vera was given fair opportunity to
defend himself against the accusations made by Atty. Rivera.

Atty. de Vera, however, additionally questions the fact that Atty. Rivera, who authored the complaint
against him, also voted for his expulsion making him accuser, prosecutor and judge at the same time.
Atty. de Vera likewise laments the fact that Atty. Rivera initially inhibited himself from voting but when
this resulted in the defeat of his motion for lack of the necessary 2/3 vote, he agreed to another round
of voting and that, this time, he voted in favor of his motion.

For the record, of the nine governors comprising the IBP Board, six voted for Atty. de Veras expulsion
(including Atty. Rivera) while 3 voted against it (including Atty. de Vera).
Section 44 (second paragraph) of the IBP By-Laws provides:

Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be removed for cause, including three consecutive
absences from Board meetings without justifiable excuse, by resolution adopted by two-thirds of the
remaining members of the Board, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied.)

Under the rules, a resolution for expulsion of an IBP Governor is done via a resolution adopted by 2/3 of
the remaining members. The phrase remaining members refers to the members exclusive of the
complainant member and the respondent member. The reason therefore is that such members are
interested parties and are thus presumed to be unable to resolve said motion impartially. This being the
case, the votes of Attys. Rivera and de Vera should be stricken-off which means that only the votes of
the seven remaining members are to be counted. Of the seven remaining members, five voted for
expulsion while two voted against it which still adds up to the 2/3 vote requirement for expulsion.

The IBP Board removed Atty. de Vera as IBP Governor for just and valid cause

All the concerned parties to this case agree that what constitutes cause for the removal of an IBP
Governor has not been defined by Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws albeit it includes three consecutive
absences from Board meetings without justifiable excuse. Thus, the IBP Board argues that it is vested
with sufficient power and authority to protect itself from an intractable member whose removal was
caused not by his disagreement with the IBP Board but due to various acts committed by him which the
IBP Board considered as inimical to the IBP Board in particular and the IBP in general.

Atty. de Vera, on the other hand, insists that speaking in disagreement with the Resolution of the Board
during the Conventions Plenary Session is not a valid cause to remove or expel a duly-elected member of
the IBP Board of Governors and the decision to remove him only shows that the right to freedom of
speech or the right to dissent is not recognized by the IBP Board.
After weighing the arguments of the parties and in keeping with the fundamental objective of the IBP to
discharge its public responsibility more effectively, we hereby find that Atty. de Veras removal from the
IBP Board was not capricious or arbitrary.

Indubitably, conflicts and disagreements of varying degrees of intensity, if not animosity, are inherent in
the internal life of an organization, but especially of the IBP since lawyers are said to disagree before
they agree.

However, the effectiveness of the IBP, like any other organization, is diluted if the conflicts are brought
outside its governing body for then there would be the impression that the IBP, which speaks through
the Board of Governors, does not and cannot speak for its members in an authoritative fashion. It would
accordingly diminish the IBPs prestige and repute with the lawyers as well as with the general public.

As a means of self-preservation, internecine conflicts must thus be adjusted within the governing board
itself so as to free it from the stresses that invariably arise when internal cleavages are made public.

The doctrine of majority rule is almost universally used as a mechanism for adjusting and resolving
conflicts and disagreements within the group after the members have been given an opportunity to be
heard. While it does not efface conflicts, nonetheless, once a decision on a contentious matter is
reached by a majority vote, the dissenting minority is bound thereby so that the board can speak with
one voice, for those elected to the governing board are deemed to implicitly contract that the will of the
majority shall govern in matters within the authority of the board.[63]

The IBP Board, therefore, was well within its right in removing Atty. de Vera as the latters actuations
during the 10th National IBP Convention were detrimental to the role of the IBP Board as the governing
body of the IBP. When the IBP Board is not seen by the bar and the public as a cohesive unit, it cannot
effectively perform its duty of helping the Supreme Court enforce the code of legal ethics and the
standards of legal practice as well as improve the administration of justice.

In view of the importance of retaining group cohesiveness and unity, the expulsion of a member of the
board who insists on bringing to the public his disagreement with a policy/resolution approved by the
majority after due discussion, cannot be faulted. The effectiveness of the board as a governing body will
be negated if its pronouncements are resisted in public by a board member.
Indeed, when a member of a governing body cannot accept the voice of the majority, he should resign
therefrom so that he could criticize in public the majority opinion/decision to his hearts content;
otherwise, he subjects himself to disciplinary action by the body.

The removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the Board of Governors ipso facto meant his removal as EVP
as well

The removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the Board of Governors ipso facto meant his removal as EVP
as well. Section 47, Article VII of the By-Laws of the IBP provides:

SEC. 47. National Officers. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a President and Executive Vice
President to be chosen by the Board of Governors from among nine (9) regional governors, as much as
practicable, on a rotation basis. x x x

Thus, to be EVP of the IBP, one must necessarily be a member of IBP Board of Governors. Atty. de Veras
removal from the Board of Governors, automatically disqualified him from acting as IBP EVP. To insist
otherwise would be contrary to Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.

The Court will not interfere with the Resolution of the IBP Board to remove Atty. de Vera since it was
rendered without grave abuse of discretion

While it is true that the Supreme Court has been granted an extensive power of supervision over the
IBP,[64] it is axiomatic that such power should be exercised prudently. The power of supervision of the
Supreme Court over the IBP should not preclude the IBP from exercising its reasonable discretion
especially in the administration of its internal affairs governed by the provisions of its By-Laws. The IBP
By-Laws were precisely drafted and promulgated so as to define the powers and functions of the IBP and
its officers, establish its organizational structure, and govern relations and transactions among its
officers and members. With these By-Laws in place, the Supreme Court could be assured that the IBP
shall be able to carry on its day-to-day affairs, without the Courts interference.
It should be noted that the general charge of the affairs and activities of the IBP has been vested in the
Board of Governors. The members of the Board are elective and representative of each of the nine
regions of the IBP as delineated in its By-Laws.[65] The Board acts as a collegiate body and decides in
accordance with the will of the majority. The foregoing rules serve to negate the possibility of the IBP
Board acting on the basis of personal interest or malice of its individual members. Hence, the actions
and resolutions of the IBP Board deserve to be accorded the disputable presumption[66] of validity,
which shall continue, until and unless it is overcome by substantial evidence and actually declared
invalid by the Supreme Court. In the absence of any allegation and substantial proof that the IBP Board
has acted without or in excess of its authority or with grave abuse of discretion, we shall not be
persuaded to overturn and set aside the Boards action or resolution.

There is no question that the IBP Board has the authority to remove its members as provided in Article
VI, Section 44[67] of the IBP By-Laws. Issue arises only as to whether the IBP Board abused its authority
and discretion in resolving to remove Atty. de Vera from his post as an IBP Governor and EVP. As has
been previously established herein, Atty. de Veras removal from the IBP Board was in accordance with
due process and the IBP Board acted well within the authority and discretion granted to it by its By-
Laws. There being no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the IBP Board, we find no reason to
interfere in the Boards resolution to remove Atty. de Vera.

The election of Atty. Salazar by the IBP Board as IBP EVP in replacement of Atty. De Vera was conducted
in accordance with the authority granted to the Board by the IBP By-Laws

In the same manner, we find no reason to disturb the action taken by the 2003-2005 IBP Board of
Governors in holding a special election to fill-in the vacant post resulting from the removal of Atty. de
Vera as EVP of the IBP since the same is a purely internal matter, done without grave abuse of
discretion, and implemented without violating the Rules and By-Laws of the IBP.

With the removal of Atty. de Vera from the Board, by virtue of the IBP Board Resolution dated 13 May
2005, he was also removed from his post as EVP; thus, there was a resultant vacancy in the position of
IBP EVP.

Article VI, Section 41(g) of the IBP By-Laws expressly grants to the Board the authority to fill vacancies,
however arising, in the IBP positions, subject to the provisions of Section 8 of the Integration Rule,[68]
and Section 11 (Vacancies),[69] Section 44 (Removal of members),[70] Section 47 (National officers),[71]
Section 48 (other officers),[72] and Section 49 (Terms of Office)[73] of the By-Laws. The IBP Board has
specific and sufficient guidelines in its Rules and By-Laws on how to fill-in the vacancies after the
removal of Atty. de Vera. We have faith and confidence in the intellectual, emotional and ethical
competencies of the remaining members of the 2005-2007 Board in dealing with the situation within
the bounds of the IBP Rules and By-Laws.

The election by the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors of a new EVP, who will assume the Presidency for
the term 2005-2007, was well within the authority and prerogative granted to the Board by the IBP By-
Laws, particularly Article VII, Section 47, which provides that [t]he EVP shall automatically become
President for the next succeeding term. The phrase for the next succeeding term necessarily implies that
the EVP that should succeed Atty. Cadiz as IBP President for the next succeeding term (i.e., 2005-2007)
should come from the members of the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors. Hence, in A.M. No. 05-7-19-
SC, we restrained now IBP EVP Feliciano Bautista from assuming the position of Acting President
because we have yet to resolve the question as to who shall succeed Atty. Cadiz from the 2003-2005 IBP
Board of Governors.

Accordingly, the elections of Governor Santiago on 13 June 2005 as IBP EVP, and thereafter, Governor
Salazar on 25 June 2005, as the new IBP EVP, upon the relinquishment of Gov. Santiago of the position,
were valid.

Neither can this Court give credence to the argument of Atty. De Vera that, assuming his removal as IBP
Governor and EVP was valid, his replacement as IBP EVP should come from Eastern Mindanao Region
pursuant to the rotation rule set forth in Article VII, Section 47, of the IBP By-Laws.

According to Article VII, Section 47, of the IBP By-Laws, the EVP shall be chosen by the Board of
Governors from among the nine Regional Governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis. This is
based on our pronouncements in Bar Matter 491, wherein we ruled:

ORDER

xxxx

3. The former system of having the IBP President and Executive Vice-President elected by the Board of
Governors (composed of the governors of the nine [9] IBP regions) from among themselves (as provided
in Sec. 47, Art. VII, Original IBP By-Laws) should be restored. The right of automatic succession by the
Executive Vice-President to the presidency upon the expiration of their two-year term (which was
abolished by this Court's resolution dated July 9, 1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) should be as it is hereby
restored.

4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive Vice-President shall automatically succeed
to the office of president. The incoming board of governors shall then elect an Executive Vice-President
from among themselves. The position of Executive Vice-President shall be rotated among the nine (9)
IBP regions. One who has served as president may not run for election as Executive Vice-President in a
succeeding election until after the rotation of the presidency among the nine (9) regions shall have been
completed; whereupon, the rotation shall begin anew.

xxxx

(Emphasis Supplied)

In Bar Matter 491, it is clear that it is the position of IBP EVP which is actually rotated among the nine
Regional Governors. The rotation with respect to the Presidency is merely a result of the automatic
succession rule of the IBP EVP to the Presidency. Thus, the rotation rule pertains in particular to the
position of IBP EVP, while the automatic succession rule pertains to the Presidency. The rotation with
respect to the Presidency is but a consequence of the automatic succession rule provided in Section 47
of the IBP By-Laws.

In the case at bar, the rotation rule was duly complied with since upon the election of Atty. De Vera as
IBP EVP, each of the nine IBP regions had already produced an EVP and, thus, the rotation was
completed. It is only unfortunate that the supervening event of Atty. de Veras removal as IBP Governor
and EVP rendered it impossible for him to assume the IBP Presidency. The fact remains, however, that
the rotation rule had been completed despite the non-assumption by Atty. de Vera to the IBP
Presidency.

Moreover, the application of the rotation rule is not a license to disregard the spirit and purpose of the
automatic succession rule, but should be applied in harmony with the latter. The automatic succession
rule affords the IBP leadership transition seamless and enables the new IBP National President to attend
to pressing and urgent matters without having to expend valuable time for the usual adjustment and
leadership consolidation period. The time that an IBP EVP spends assisting a sitting IBP President on
matters national in scope is in fact a valuable and indispensable preparation for the eventual succession.
It should also be pointed out that this wisdom is further underscored by the fact that an IBP EVP is
elected from among the members of the IBP Board of Governors, who are serving in a national capacity,
and not from the members at large. It is intrinsic in the IBP By-Laws that one who is to assume the
highest position in the IBP must have been exposed to the demands and responsibilities of national
leadership.

It would therefore be consistent with the purpose and spirit of the automatic succession rule for
Governor Salazar to assume the post of IBP President. By electing the replacement EVP from among the
members of the 2003-2005 Board of Governors, the IBP benefits from the experience of the IBP EVP of
2003-2005 in this case, Governor Salazar who would have served in a national capacity prior to his
assumption of the highest position.

It will also be inconsistent with the purpose and spirit of the automatic succession rule if the EVP for the
term 2003-2005 will be elected exclusively by the members of the House of Delegates of the Eastern
Mindanao region. This Court notes that the removal of Atty. De Vera in 13 May 2005 was about a month
before the expiration of the term of office of the 2003-2005 Board of Governors. Hence, the
replacement Governor would not have been able to serve in a national capacity for two years prior to
assuming the IBP Presidency.

In any case, Section 47 of the IBP Rules uses the phrase as much as practicable to clearly indicate that
the rotation rule is not a rigid and inflexible rule as to bar exceptions in compelling and exceptional
circumstances.

It is in view of the foregoing that the argument advanced by Atty. De Vera that the IBP national
presidency should be assumed by a nominee from Eastern Mindanao region from where he comes, can
not hold water. It would go against the intent of the IBP By-Laws for such a nominee would be bereft of
the wealth of experience and the perspective that only one who is honed in service while serving in a
national post in the IBP would have.

We therefore rule that the IBP Board of Governors acted in accordance with the IBP By-Laws, in electing
Atty. Salazar as IBP EVP and in ensuring a succession in the leadership of the IBP. Had the Board of
Governors not done so, there would have been no one qualified to assume the Presidency of the IBP on
1 July 2005, pursuant to Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we rule as follows:

1) SUSPEND Atty. Leonard de Vera in A.C. No. 6697 from the practice of law for TWO (2) YEARS,
effective from the finality of this Resolution. Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal
record of Atty. Leonard de Vera and copies furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office
of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts;

2) DISMISS the letter-complaint of Atty. Leonard de Vera, dated 18 May 2005, in A.M. No. 05-5-
15-SC, praying for the disapproval of the Resolution, dated 13 May 2005, of the Board of Governors of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines removing him from his posts as Governor and Executive Vice
President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the said Resolution having been rendered without
grave abuse of discretion;

3) AFFIRM the election by the Board of Governors of Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar as Executive
Vice President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the remainder of the term 2003-2005, such
having been conducted in accordance with its By-Laws and absent any showing of grave abuse of
discretion; and

4) DIRECT Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar to immediately take his oath of office and assume the
Presidency of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the term 2005-2007 in accordance with the
automatic succession rule in Article VII, Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws, upon receipt of this Resolution.

SO ORDERED.

10.
PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, A.C. No. 6672
Complainant,
Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,
- versus - CORONA,
 LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and
BERSAMIN, JJ.

ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO,

Respondent. Promulgated:

September 4, 2009

x-----------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

This is a complaint for disbarment [1] filed by Pedro Linsangan

of the Linsangan Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against Atty.
Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of
professional services.

Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of

paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his clients [2] to transfer legal
representation. Respondent promised them financial assistance [3]
and expeditious collection on their claims. [4] To induce them to hire
his services, he persistently called them and sent them text
messages.

To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn

affidavit[5] of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail
upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and
utilize respondent’s services instead, in exchange for a loan of
P50,000. Complainant also attached “respondent’s” calling card:[6]
Front

NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
LAW OFFFICE
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal

1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01 Tel: 362-7820

6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar Fax: (632) 362-7821
Grace Park, Caloocan City Cel.: (0926) 2701719

Back
SERVICES OFFERED:
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.

(emphasis supplied)

Hence, this complaint.

Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and

authorizing the printing and circulation of the said calling card. [7]

The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar

Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. [8]

Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in

its report and recommendation, [9] found that respondent had
encroached on the professional practice of complainant, violating
Rule 8.02[10] and other canons[11] of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against
soliciting cases for gain, personally or through paid agents or
brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 138 [12] of the Rules of Court.
Hence, the CBD recommended that respondent be reprimanded
with a stern warning that any repetition would merit a heavier
penalty.

We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of

respondent but we modify the recommended penalty.

The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by

respondent into complainant’s professional practice in violation of
Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means employed by respondent in
furtherance of the said misconduct themselves constituted distinct
violations of ethical rules.

Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must

adhere to, including the manner by which a lawyer’s services are to
be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides:

CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES

SHALL USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE
INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of
law is a profession and not a business; lawyers should not advertise
their talents as merchants advertise their wares. [13] To allow a
lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the
practice of law, degrade the profession in the public’s estimation
and impair its ability to efficiently render that high character of
service to which every member of the bar is called. [14]

Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:

RULE 2.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO OR PERMIT TO BE DONE ANY

ACT DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO SOLICIT LEGAL BUSINESS.

Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose
of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers. [15]
Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment. [16]

Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the

CPR which provides:

RULE 1.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR ANY CORRUPT MOTIVE OR

INTEREST, ENCOURAGE ANY SUIT OR PROCEEDING OR DELAY
ANY MAN’S CAUSE.

This rule proscribes “ambulance chasing” (the solicitation of almost

any kind of legal business by an attorney, personally or through an
agent in order to gain employment) [17] as a measure to protect the
community from barratry and champerty.[18]

Complainant presented substantial evidence [19] (consisting of

the sworn statements of the very same persons coaxed by Labiano
and referred to respondent’s office) to prove that respondent indeed
solicited legal business as well as profited from referrals’ suits.
 Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his
answer, he later admitted it during the mandatory hearing.

Through Labiano’s actions, respondent’s law practice was

benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer representation
on the strength of Labiano’s word that respondent could produce a
more favorable result.

Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited

employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the
CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

With regard to respondent’s violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR,

settled is the rule that a lawyer should not steal another lawyer’s
client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better
service, good result or reduced fees for his services. [20] Again the
Court notes that respondent never denied having these seafarers in
his client list nor receiving benefits from Labiano’s “referrals.”
Furthermore, he never denied Labiano’s connection to his office.[21]
Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep into
another’s legal practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02
of the CPR.

Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his

clients as borrowers, respondent violated Rule 16.04:

Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless
the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by
independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except,
 when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a
legal matter he is handling for the client.

The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client.
The only exception is, when in the interest of justice, he has to
advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographer’s fees
for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for
surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client.

The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer’s independence of

mind so that the free exercise of his judgment may not be adversely
affected.[22] It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case he
is handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the client’s
cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection with
the client’s case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the
subject matter of the case or an additional stake in its outcome. [23]
Either of these circumstances may lead the lawyer to consider his
own recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement
which may take care of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of
the client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the client’s
cause.[24]

As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes

malpractice[25] which calls for the exercise of the Court’s disciplinary
powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants serious
sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective client for the
purpose of obtaining employment.[26] Thus, in this jurisdiction, we
adhere to the rule to protect the public from the Machiavellian
machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the nobility of
the legal profession.

Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including

violation of the prohibition on lending money to clients), the
sanction recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a wimpy
slap on the wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly incommensurate
to its findings.

A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence

by petitioner. A lawyer’s best advertisement is a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on
his character and conduct.[27] For this reason, lawyers are only
allowed to announce their services by publication in reputable law
lists or use of simple professional cards.

Professional calling cards may only contain the following

details:

(a) lawyer’s name;

(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;
(c) address;
(d) telephone number and
(e) special branch of law practiced.[28]

Labiano’s calling card contained the phrase “with financial

assistance.” The phrase was clearly used to entice clients (who
already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of
loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure
clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of
their financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass
commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and deserved no
place in the legal profession. However, in the absence of substantial
evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to rule
that respondent was personally and directly responsible for the
printing and distribution of Labiano’s calling cards.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for

violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of one year effective immediately from receipt of this
resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same
or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the

Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines, and
be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office
of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all courts.

SO ORDERED.
11. G.R. No. 172776 December 17, 2008

COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION, petitioner,

vs.

ATTY. FELINA S. DASIG, respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This is a Rule 45 petition for review1 of the 15 September 20032 Decision and 18 May 2008 Resolution3
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61302.

The factual antecedents of the case follows.

Respondent Felina Dasig (Dasig) was the Chief Education Program Specialist of the Standards
Development Division, Office of Programs and Standards, of petitioner Commission on Higher Education
(CHED). She had also served as the officer-in-charge of the Legal Affairs Service (LAS) of the CHED.

In a Memorandum dated 9 October 1998,4 the Director of the LAS brought to the attention of the CHED
several complaints on the alleged anomalous activities of Dasig during her stint as the officer-in-charge
of LAS. Attached to the memorandum were the sworn affidavits of the complainants.5 The complainants
consisted of Rosalie Dela Torre (Dela Torre), Rocella Eje (Eje) and Jacqueline Ng (Ng), students who
applied to have their names corrected in their scholastic records to conform with their birth certificates;
Maximina Sister (Sister), the CHED Human Resource Management Assistant assigned to the Records
Unit; and Don Cesar Mamaril (Mamaril), Leysamin Tebelin (Tebelin), Joemar Delgado (Delgado), and
Ellen Grace Nugpo (Nugpo), all from the CHED LAS staff. All the students alleged that Dasig tried to exact
money from them under the pretense of attorney's fees in connection with their requests for correction
of names in their academic records. Dasig's former staff at the LAS corroborated the allegations of the
students. They also alleged that Dasig attempted to persuade them to participate in anomalous
activities. Sister, in turn, claimed that Dasig refused to return the Official Record Book of the CHED which
the latter borrowed from her.

Dasig submitted a Memorandum6 and a Counter-Affidavit7 to answer the charges against her. In her
memorandum, she denied all the charges against her. She alleged that it was not within the CHED's
power to entertain the request for change of name so she advised the students to file petitions in court.
Dasig denied that the alleged closed-door meeting on 3 September 1998 with her former staff at the LAS
in which she tried to persuade them to accept P20,000.00 from Ng had ever taken place for she was
then allegedly in the Office of the Chairman for the Investigation and Performance Audit of Dr. Jaime
Gellor, then President of the Central Mindanao University. As to the charge that she improperly took the
Official Record Book on 7 September 1998 at around 3:00 p.m. and refused to return the same, Dasig
insisted that she was inside the LAS hearing room during that time conducting the preliminary
conference on the administrative complaint filed by Dr. Aleli Cornista against Dr. Magdalena Jasmin, Dr.
Perlita Cabilangan, Dr. Arsenia Lumba, and Dr. Teresita de Leon, all from CHED Region 3, together with
Special Investigators Buenaventura Macatangay (Macatangay) and Eulando Lontoc (Lontoc).

In her counter-affidavit,8 Dasig explained that she had not offered her services as a lawyer to any person
and that she had never represented any clients other than the immediate members of her family ever
since she was admitted to the bar. Dasig denied the allegation that she had offered to look for a lawyer
for the petitioners since it was inconceivable to have a lawyer who would accept P5,000.00 as attorney's
fees.

The CHED formed a hearing committee and designated the members to investigate the complaints
against Dasig in Resolution No. 166-98.9 Dela Torre and Eje were not able to participate in the hearings
conducted by the committee for they could not be notified in their given addresses while Ng and Dasig
chose not to participate despite notice. However, Mamaril, Tebelin, Delgado, and Nugpo all affirmed
before the

committee the veracity of Ng's claim that Dasig solicited money from him and attested to the fact that
Dasig even called them together with Macatangay and Lontoc for an emergency closed door meeting at
the LAS conference room at around 4:00 p.m. on 3 September 1998. Dasig allegedly told them that Ng
was willing to pay P20,000.00 for the publication of her request for correction of name and persuaded
them to accept said amount for the purchase of a television and VHS player for their office and that any
excess money would be divided equally among them. They all objected to Dasig's suggestion.10

The hearing committee concluded that there was substantial evidence on record to hold Dasig liable for
dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and
recommended that she be dismissed. The CHED found that the complaints against Dasig were
substantiated and affirmed the recommendation of the hearing committee to dismiss her from the
service as her actions constituted gross misconduct, dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service.11 The Civil Service

Commission (CSC) upheld the decision of the CHED12 and denied Dasig's motion for reconsideration.13
Dasig filed a petition for review under Rule 43 with the Court of Appeals and raised four issues before
it.14 The first issue was whether Dasig was denied due process of law; the second was whether the CSC
erred in not giving weight to the 1 June 1999 Resolution of CHED Chairman Angel Alcala (Alcala)
absolving her from any administrative liability; the third was whether the CSC erred in not considering
evidence discovered after her dismissal which would have materially affected the result of the case; and
the fourth or last was whether the CSC erred in not considering that the penalty of dismissal imposed on
her was too harsh and oppressive taking into account her thirty years of government service.

While the case was pending before the appellate court, this Court came out with a Resolution dated 1
April 200315 which ordered the disbarment of Dasig. Several high-ranking officers of the CHED filed an
administrative case for disbarment against Dasig, charging her with gross misconduct in violation of the
Attorney's Oath "for having used her public office to secure financial spoils to the detriment of the
dignity and reputation of the CHED" with one of the grounds for disbarment being Dasig's exaction of
money from Dela Torre, Eje and Ng. In the administrative case, the Court affirmed the following findings
of fact:

In this case, the record shows that the respondent, on various occasions, during her tenure as OIC, Legal
Services, CHED, attempted to extort from Betty C. Mangohon, Rosalie B. Dela Torre, Rocella G. Eje, and
Jacqueline N. Ng sums of money as consideration for her favorable action on their pending applications
or requests before her office. The evidence remains unrefuted, given the respondent's failure, despite
the opportunities afforded her by this Court and the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline to comment on
the charges. We find that respondent's misconduct as a lawyer of the CHED is of such a character as to
affect her qualification as a member of the Bar, for as a lawyer, she ought to have known that it was
patently unethical and illegal for her to demand sums of money as consideration for the approval of
applications and requests awaiting action by her office.16 (Emphasis supplied.)

The Court denied with finality the motion for reconsideration of Dasig in a resolution dated 17 June
2003.17 Despite the Court's findings in the disbarment proceeding, the Court of Appeals, however, gave
a different assessment of the evidence on record as it found that Dasig was only "moonlighting" when
she offered her legal services to the students who were requesting the CHED to change their names
appearing in their academic records to conform to their birth certificates. The money which Dasig had
asked from the students was, as found by the appellate court, for "attorney's fees" and other litigation
expenses. The appellate court held that the acts of Dasig had constituted only simple misconduct.

Only the aspect of the Court of Appeals' decision finding Dasig liable only for simple misconduct is
subject to review before this Court. The appellate court decided all the first three issues in favor of the
CHED. It held that administrative due process was complied with since Dasig was given a fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain her side. It also declared the 1 June 1999 resolution of CHED
Chairman Alcala absolving Dasig invalid and without legal effect since it was he alone who signed it,
contrary to the collegial structure of the CHED. And it gave scant attention to the additional affidavits
submitted by Dasig as they were not presented during the proceedings before the CHED in line with the
rule that no question, issue, or evidence shall be entertained on appeal unless it was raised in the court
or agency below.

The Court of Appeals explained its "moonlighting" approach, thus:

After a close perusal of the vital portions of Jacqueline S. Ng's Affidavit, We find that Petitioner was
trying to collect the money from the three students as her attorney's fees and for the purpose of
covering the expenses which shall be incurred in instituting the appropriate action or proceeding in
court- filing fee, publication, etc. for the correction of the name of said student affiant.18

xxxx

We are of the well-considered view, that [p]etitioner was not trying to use the influence of her position
to cause the correction of the names of the students within the CHED. It can be safely assumed that as a
lawyer, [p]etitioner is fully aware that an error in a person's name may only be legally corrected upon
the filing of the necessary Special Proceeding under the Rules of Court, specifically Rule 108. Analy[z]ing
[p]etitioner's acts, therefore, [w]e hold that she was merely trying to engage in the private practice of
the legal profession while employed at the CHED. This is a classic case of "moonlighting", that is, holding
an additional job in addition to a regular one. We are perfectly mindful of [p]etitioner's indiscretion, and
so hold that her acts were improper and unbecoming of a public servant, more particularly of one with a
relatively high and responsible position like her. Simply put, [p]etitioner's acts must not be condoned,
particularly considering that she even attempted to persuade her former staff at the Legal Affairs
Services Office to partake of and materially benefit from her would-be earnings in the aborted deal with
the three students.19 x x x.

After having been apprised of the Court's factual findings in the disbarment case against Dasig, the Court
of Appeals maintained its decision and denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Specifically, it
held thus:
The foregoing ruling of the Highest Court of the Land notwithstanding, [w]e still do not find the
propriety of modifying [o]ur conclusion that petitioner should be held administratively liable only for the
less serious infraction of Simple Misconduct. Verily, the disbarment proceedings against petitioner was
predicated in part upon the provisions of the Attorney's Oath which contained more stringent and rigid
standards by which a lawyer's act must be tested, whereas [w]e examine petitioner's conduct by using
the rules as fixed by the CSC as well as jurisprudence. But more importantly, aside from the difference in
the laws applied, [w]e cannot defer to and take bearing with the ruling of the Supreme Court
considering that there is a significant variance between the undisputed facts as found by the High Court
in the disbarment proceedings against petitioner, on one hand, and the material factual backdrop upon
which [w]e tested petitioner's conduct in public service, on the other. It must be emphasized that
petitioner did not participate in the disbarment proceedings, and as a necessary consequence of her
omission it became automatically undisputed, and thus glaring in the eyes of the High Court, that she
extorted money from the students by way of consideration for a favorable resolution of the students'
applications and formal requests for the correction of their names, which were purportedly pending
before petitioner's office at the CHED.20 x x x.

The lone issue raised in the present petition is whether the Court of Appeals had correctly held Dasig
liable only for simple misconduct.

The Court finds the present petition meritorious.

The Court of Appeals committed a monumental blunder when it arrived at findings of fact different from
those of the Court in the disbarment case. It is inexplicable why the appellate court would propound and
insist on its "moonlighting" conclusion when even Dasig herself had denied offering her services to
anyone in the first place. It was only after the Court of Appeals had come up with such finding that Dasig
incorporated it into her theory of defense, belatedly arguing that she should not be held liable for
"moonlighting" since the CHED allows limited practice of law pursuant to an alleged CHED memorandum
dated 16 January 1995 entitled, "Authorizing Lawyers of the Commission to Engage in Limited Practice of
Profession."

Despite having been apprised of the Court's findings in the disbarment case which should be a matter of
judicial notice21 in the first place, the Court of Appeals still insisted on its divergent finding and
disregarded the Court's decision ordering the disbarment of Dasig in which one of the determinative
facts in issue was whether Dasig had attempted to extort money from Dela Torre, Eje and Ng who in
turn had wanted to have their academic records corrected to conform to their birth certificates.
Apart from its mandated duty to take judicial notice of the resolution in the disbarment case, the Court
of Appeals is bound by this Court's findings and conclusions in the said resolution in accordance with the
doctrine of "stare decisis et non quieta movere."22 Although the administrative case is different from
the disbarment case, the parties are different and trials were conducted separately, there can only be
one truth: Dasig had attempted to extort money from the students. For the sake of certainty, a
conclusion reached in one case should be applied to that which follows, if the facts are substantially the
same, even though the parties may be different. Otherwise, one would be subscribing to the sophistry:
truth on one side of the Pyrenees, falsehood on the other!23

Obstinately, the appellate court sought to justify its presumptuously aberrant stance on the alleged
circumstance that Dasig had not participated in the disbarment case. A careful look at the Court's
decision shows that Dasig had been duly informed of the disbarment case when the Court in a
resolution dated 3 February 1999 required her to file a Comment on the charges against her. The
resolution was sent to the same address she had used in filing the petition for review with the Court of
Appeals. She likewise chose not to comply with the order of the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline dated 6 February 2001 which had
directed her to submit an Answer to the Complaint. The IBP Commission had directed her anew to file
her Answer in an order dated 8 January 2002, but again she failed to comply with the directive.24
Although Dasig had chosen not to respond to the complaints against her, she was still able to file a
motion for reconsideration, which this Court denied with finality. Clearly, Dasig was given sufficient
opportunity to respond to the charges against her.

The Court of Appeals asserted that "petitioner did not participate in the disbarment proceedings, and as
a necessary consequence of her omission it became automatically undisputed, and thus glaring in the
eyes of the High Court, that she extorted money from the students."25 In more comprehensible terms,
the appellate court declared that petitioner did not participate in the disbarment proceedings; and
because of her non-participation the conclusion on her extortion activity was unquestioned and
appeared ineluctable from the Court's perspective. It is worth noting that disbarment proceedings are
under the administration of the Supreme Court under the Rules of Court26 pursuant to its constitutional
mandate.27 Thus, the statements of the Court of Appeals constitute a desultory assault on the
institutional integrity of this Court, aside from being incorrect and illogical.

Indeed, the remarks tend to erode and undermine the people's trust and confidence in the judiciary,
ironically coming from one of its subordinate courts. No lower court justice or judge may deride,
chastise or chide the Supreme Court. And the "with due respect" approach that preceded the remarks as
a veneer cannot justify much less obliterate the lack of respect which the remarks evince. In fact, it is the
duty of lower courts to obey the decisions of the Supreme Court and render obeisance to its status as
the apex of the hierarchy of courts. "A becoming modesty of inferior courts demands conscious
realization of the position that they occupy in the interrelation and operation of the integrated judicial
system of the nation."28 "There is only one Supreme Court from whose decision all other courts should
take their bearings," so declared Justice J. B. L. Reyes.29

Quite obviously, when this Court dispensed the supreme penalty on Dasig in the disbarment case based
on the factual milieu it had upheld, the Court of Appeals should have done no less by affirming the most
severe penalty imposable under the law which the CHED and the CSC had inflicted on Dasig in the
administrative case that involved the same factual milieu. But, alas, the appellate court unjustifiably
chose to reduce the penalty by downgrading the administrative offense.

The Court of Appeals erred when it found that Dasig had merely attempted to practice law while
employed at the CHED in offering her services to the three students for the correction of their names
through judicial proceedings under Rule 108. The procedure under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court was
not applicable to the students who only wanted to correct entries in their academic records to conform
to their birth certificates. Rule 108 is for the purpose of correcting or canceling entries in the civil
registry involving (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments
of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions;
(i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l)
civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o)
changes of name.30 Hence, there is no justification for Dasig to ask for money under the guise of
attorney's fees and litigation expenses when it was her duty as the officer-in-charge of LAS to either
approve or disapprove the students' request to change entries in their academic records to conform to
their birth certificates.

From another perspective, the appellate court erred when it disregarded the factual findings of the
CHED. It ignored the well-settled rule that by reason of the special knowledge and expertise of
administrative agencies over matters falling under their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass
judgment thereon; hence, factual findings of quasi-judicial and administrative bodies are accorded not
only great respect but even finality by this Court when they are supported by substantial evidence.31
The gauge of substantial evidence,32 which is the least demanding in the hierarchy of evidence, is
satisfied since there are reasonable grounds to believe that Dasig is guilty of the charges against her
which led to her dismissal from service. And neither Dasig nor the Court of Appeals was able to show
gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law on the part of the CHED and the CSC. The findings of the
administrative agencies were further bolstered when the Court arrived at similar findings of fact in the
disbarment case, in which the quantum of proof is preponderance of evidence. In evaluating the same
evidence as this Court in the disbarment case, it is truly inconceivable how the Court of Appeals could
have arrived at its "moonlighting" finding.

However, the accrued leave credits of Dasig shall not be forfeited despite the imposition of the penalty
of dismissal from government service. The forfeiture of leave credits is not one of the accessory
penalties of dismissal from service imposed by Section 5833 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Court of Appeals' Decision and Resolution
dated 15 September 2003 and 18 May 2008 respectively are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and Civil Service
Commission Resolution No. 001302 affirming the CHED Resolution dated 29 November 1999 is hereby
REINSTATED with the MODIFICATION that the accessory penalty of forfeiture of leave credits be deleted.
Hence, Felina Dasig is ORDERED to be DISMISSED from the service with cancellation of civil service
eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in
government service, including that in government-owned or controlled corporations.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Presiding Justice, Court of Appeals, Manila, for
dissemination to the Associate Justices, Court of Appeals, for their information and guidance.

12.

SO ORDERED.

12.

G.R. No. 104599 March 11, 1994

JON DE YSASI III, petitioner,

vs.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FOURTH DIVISION), CEBU CITY, and JON DE YSASI,
respondents.
F.B. Santiago, Nalus & Associates for petitioner.

Ismael A. Serfino for private respondent.

REGALADO, J.:

The adage that blood is thicker than water obviously stood for naught in this case, notwithstanding the
vinculum of paternity and filiation between the parties. It would indeed have been the better part of
reason if herein petitioner and private respondent had reconciled their differences in an extrajudicial
atmosphere of familial amity and with the grace of reciprocal concessions. Father and son opted instead
for judicial intervention despite the inevitable acrimony and negative publicity. Albeit with distaste, the
Court cannot proceed elsewise but to resolve their dispute with the same reasoned detachment
accorded any judicial proceeding before it.

The records of this case reveal that petitioner was employed by his father, herein private respondent, as
farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao in Hinigaran, Negros Occidental sometime in April, 1980. Prior
thereto, he was successively employed as sales manager of Triumph International (Phil.), Inc. and later
as operations manager of Top Form Manufacturing (Phil.), Inc. His employment as farm administrator
was on a fixed salary, with other allowances covering housing, food, light, power, telephone, gasoline,
medical and dental expenses.

As farm administrator, petitioner was responsible for the supervision of daily activities and operations of
the sugarcane farm such as land preparation, planting, weeding, fertilizing, harvesting, dealing with third
persons in all matters relating to the hacienda and attending to such other tasks as may be assigned to
him by private respondent. For this purpose, he lived on the farm, occupying the upper floor of the
house there.

Following his marriage on June 6, 1982, petitioner moved to Bacolod City with his wife and commuted to
work daily. He suffered various ailments and was hospitalized on two separate occasions in June and
August, 1982. In November, 1982, he underwent fistulectomy, or the surgical removal of the fistula, a
deep sinuous ulcer. During his recuperation which lasted over four months, he was under the care of Dr.
Patricio Tan. In June, 1983, he was confined for acute gastroenteritis and, thereafter, for infectious
hepatitis from December, 1983 to January, 1984.

During the entire periods of petitioner's illnesses, private respondent took care of his medical expenses
and petitioner continued to receive compensation. However, in April, 1984, without due notice, private
respondent ceased to pay the latter's salary. Petitioner made oral and written demands for an
explanation for the sudden withholding of his salary from Atty. Apolonio Sumbingco, private
respondent's auditor and legal adviser, as well as for the remittance of his salary. Both demands,
however, were not acted upon.

Petitioner then filed an action with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC, for brevity),
Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI, Bacolod City, on October 17, 1984, docketed therein as RAB Case No.
0452-84, against private respondent for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights and payment of full back wages, thirteenth month pay for 1983, consequential, moral
and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees.

On July 31, 1991, said complaint for illegal dismissal was dismissed by the NLRC,1 holding that petitioner
abandoned his work and that the termination of his employment was for a valid cause, but ordering
private respondent to pay petitioner the amount of P5,000.00 as penalty for his failure to serve notice of
said termination of employment to the Department of Labor and Employment as required by Batas
Pambansa Blg. 130 and consonant with this Court's ruling in Wenphil Corporation vs. National Labor
Relations Commission, et al.2 On appeal to the Fourth Division of the NLRC, Cebu City, said decision was
affirmed in toto.3

His motion for reconsideration4 of said decision having been denied for lack of merit,5 petitioner filed
this petition presenting the following issues for resolution: (1) whether or not the petitioner was illegally
dismissed; (2) whether or not he is entitled to reinstatement, payment of back wages, thirteenth month
pay and other benefits; and (3) whether or not he is entitled to payment of moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees because of illegal dismissal. The discussion of these issues will necessarily
subsume the corollary questions presented by private respondent, such as the exact date when
petitioner ceased to function as farm administrator, the character of the pecuniary amounts received by
petitioner from private respondent, that is, whether the same are in the nature of salaries or pensions,
and whether or not there was abandonment by petitioner of his functions as farm administrator.
In his manifestation dated September 14, 1992, the Solicitor General recommended a modification of
the decision of herein public respondent sustaining the findings and conclusions of the Executive Labor
Arbiter in RAB Case No. 0452-84,6 for which reason the NLRC was required to submit its own comment
on the petition. In compliance with the Court's resolution of November 16, 1992,7 NLRC filed its
comment on February 12, 1992 largely reiterating its earlier position in support of the findings of the
Executive Labor Arbiter.8

Before proceeding with a discussion of the issues, the observation of the labor arbiter is worth noting:

This case is truly unique. What makes this case unique is the fact that because of the special relationship
of the parties and the nature of the action involved, this case could very well go down (in) the annals of
the Commission as perhaps the first of its kind. For this case is an action filed by an only son, his father's
namesake, the only child and therefore the only heir against his own father.9

Additionally, the Solicitor General remarked:

. . . After an exhaustive reading of the records, two (2) observations were noted that may justify why this
labor case deserves special considerations. First, most of the complaints that petitioner and private
respondent had with each other, were personal matters affecting father and son relationship. And
secondly, if any of the complaints pertain to their work, they allow their personal relationship to come in
the way.10

I. Petitioner maintains that his dismissal from employment was illegal because of want of just
cause therefor and non-observance of the requirements of due process. He also charges the NLRC with
grave abuse of discretion in relying upon the findings of the executive labor arbiter who decided the
case but did not conduct the hearings thereof.

Private respondent, in refutation, avers that there was abandonment by petitioner of his functions as
farm administrator, thereby arming private respondent with a ground to terminate his employment at
Hacienda Manucao. It is also contended that it is wrong for petitioner to question the factual findings of
the executive labor arbiter and the NLRC as only questions of law may be appealed for resolution by this
Court. Furthermore, in seeking the dismissal of the instant petition, private respondent faults herein
petitioner for failure to refer to the corresponding pages of the transcripts of stenographic notes,
erroneously citing Sections 15(d) and 16(d), Rule 44 (should be Section 16[c] and [d],
Rule 46 and Section 1[g], Rule 50) of the Rules of Court, which provide that want of page references to
the records is a ground for dismissal of an appeal.

Prefatorily, we take advertence of the provisions of Article 221 of the Labor Code that technical rules of
evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling, and that every and all reasonable
means to speedily and objectively ascertain the facts in each case shall be availed of, without regard to
technicalities of law or procedure in the interest of due process.

It is settled that it is not procedurally objectionable for the decision in a case to be rendered by a judge,
or a labor arbiter for that matter, other than the one who conducted the hearing. The fact that the judge
who heard the case was not the judge who penned the decision does not impair the validity of the
judgment,11 provided that he draws up his decision and resolution with due care and makes certain
that they truly and accurately reflect conclusions and final dispositions on the bases of the facts of and
evidence submitted in the case.12

Thus, the mere fact that the case was initially assigned to Labor Arbiter Ricardo T. Octavio, who
conducted the hearings therein from December 5, 1984 to July 11, 1985, and was later transferred to
Executive Labor Arbiter Oscar S. Uy, who eventually decided the case, presents no procedural infirmity,
especially considering that there is a presumption of regularity in the performance of a public officer's
functions,13 which petitioner has not successfully rebutted.

We are constrained to heed the underlying policy in the Labor Code relaxing the application of technical
rules of procedure in labor cases in the interest of due process, ever mindful of the long-standing legal
precept that rules of procedure must be interpreted to help secure, not defeat, justice. For this reason,
we cannot indulge private respondent in his tendency to nitpick on trivial technicalities to boost his
arguments. The strength of one's position cannot be hinged on mere procedural niceties but on solid
bases in law and jurisprudence.

The fundamental guarantees of security of tenure and due process dictate that no worker shall be
dismissed except for just and authorized cause provided by law and after due process.14 Article 282 of
the Labor Code enumerates the causes for which an employer may validly terminate an employment, to
wit:

(a) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or
representative in connection with his work; (b) gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly
authorized representative; (d) commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of
his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and (e) other
causes analogous to the foregoing.

The employer may also terminate the services of any employee due to the installation of labor saving
devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the
establishment or undertaking, unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the pertinent
provisions of the Labor Code, by serving a written notice on the workers and the Department of Labor
and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof, with due entitlement to the
corresponding separation pay rates provided by law.15 Suffering from a disease by reason whereof the
continued employment of the employee is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his and his co-
employee's health, is also a ground for termination of his services provided he receives the prescribed
separation pay.16 On the other hand, it is well-settled that abandonment by an employee of his work
authorizes the employer to effect the former's dismissal from employment.17

After a careful review of the records of this case, we find that public respondent gravely erred in
affirming the decision of the executive labor arbiter holding that petitioner abandoned his employment
and was not illegally dismissed from such employment. For want of substantial bases, in fact or

in law, we cannot give the stamp of finality and conclusiveness normally accorded to the factual findings
of an administrative agency, such as herein public respondent NLRC,18 as even decisions of
administrative agencies which are declared "final" by law are not exempt from judicial review when so
warranted. 19

The following perceptive disquisitions of the Solicitor General on this point deserve acceptance:

It is submitted that the absences of petitioner in his work from October 1982 to December 1982, cannot
be construed as abandonment of work because he has a justifiable excuse. Petitioner was suffering from
perennial abscess in the peri-anal around the anus and fistula under the medical attention of Dr. Patricio
Tan of Riverside Medical Center, Inc., Bacolod City (Tsn, Vol. III, Dr. Tan, February 19, 1986 at 20-44).

This fact (was) duly communicated to private respondent by medical bills sent to Hacienda Manucao
(Tsn, Vol. III, Dr. Tan, January 22, 1987 at 49-50).
During the period of his illness and recovery, petitioner stayed in Bacolod City upon the instruction(s) of
private respondent to recuperate thereat and to handle only administrative matters of the hacienda in
that city. As a manager, petitioner is not really obliged to live and stay 24 hours a day inside Hacienda
Manucao.

xxx xxx xxx

After evaluating the evidence within the context of the special circumstances involved and basic human
experience, petitioner's illness and strained family relation with respondent Jon de Ysasi II may be
considered as justifiable reason for petitioner Jon de Ysasi III's absence from work during the period of
October 1982 to December 1982. In any event, such absence does not warrant outright dismissal
without notice and hearing.

xxx xxx xxx

The elements of abandonment as a ground for dismissal of an employee are as follows:

(1) failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) clear intention
to sever the employer-employee tie (Samson Alcantara, Reviewer in Labor and Social Legislation, 1989
edition, p. 133).

This Honorable Court, in several cases, illustrates what constitute abandonment. In Dagupan Bus
Company v. NLRC (191 SCRA 328), the Court rules that for abandonment to arise, there must be a
concurrence of the intention to abandon and some overt act from which it may be inferred that the
employee has no more interest to work. Similarly, in Nueva Ecija I Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. NLRC (184
SCRA 25), for abandonment to constitute a valid cause for termination of employment, there must be a
deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment. . . Mere absence is not
sufficient; it must be accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply
does not want to work anymore.

There are significant indications in this case, that there is no abandonment. First, petitioner's absence
and his decision to leave his residence inside Hacienda Manucao, is justified by his illness and strained
family relations. Second he has some medical certificates to show his frail health. Third, once able to
work, petitioner wrote a letter (Annex "J") informing private respondent of his intention to assume again
his employment. Last, but not the least, he at once instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal when he
realized he was unjustly dismissed. All these are indications that petitioner had no intention to abandon
his employment.20

The records show that the parties herein do not dispute the fact of petitioner's confinement in the
hospital for his various afflictions which required medical treatment. Neither can it be denied that
private respondent was well aware of petitioner's state of health as the former admittedly shouldered
part of the medical and hospital bills and even advised the latter to stay in Bacolod City until he was fit
to work again. The disagreement as to whether or not petitioner's ailments were so serious as to
necessitate hospitalization and corresponding periods for recuperation is beside the point. The fact
remains that on account of said illnesses, the details of which were amply substantiated by the
attending physician,21 and as the records are bereft of any suggestion of malingering on the part of
petitioner, there was justifiable cause for petitioner's absence from work. We repeat, it is clear,
deliberate and unjustified refusal to resume employment and not mere absence that is required to
constitute abandonment as a valid ground for termination of employment.22

With his position as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao, petitioner unmistakably may be classified
as a managerial employee23 to whom the law grants an amount of discretion in the discharge of his
duties. This is why when petitioner stated that "I assigned myself where I want to go,"24 he was simply
being candid about what he could do within the sphere of his authority. His duties as farm administrator
did not strictly require him to keep regular hours or to be at the office premises at all times, or to be
subjected to specific control from his employer in every aspect of his work. What is essential only is that
he runs the farm as efficiently and effectively as possible and, while petitioner may definitely not qualify
as a model employee, in this regard he proved to be quite successful, as there was at least a showing of
increased production during the time that petitioner was in charge of farm operations.

If, as private respondent contends, he had no control over petitioner during the years 1983 to 1984, this
is because that was the period when petitioner was recuperating from illness and on account of which
his attendance and direct involvement in farm operations were irregular and minimal, hence the
supervision and control exercisable by private respondent as employer was necessarily limited. It goes
without saying that the control contemplated refers only to matters relating to his functions as farm
administrator and could not extend to petitioner's personal affairs and activities.

While it was taken for granted that for purposes of discharging his duties as farm administrator,
petitioner would be staying at the house in the farm, there really was no explicit contractual stipulation
(as there was no formal employment contract to begin with) requiring him to stay therein for the
duration of his employment or that any transfer of residence would justify the termination of his
employment. That petitioner changed his residence should not be taken against him, as this is
undeniably among his basic rights, nor can such fact of transfer of residence per se be a valid ground to
terminate an employer-employee relationship.

Private respondent, in his pleadings, asserted that as he was yet uncertain of his son's intention of
returning to work after his confinement in the hospital, he kept petitioner on the payroll, reported him
as an employee of the hacienda for social security purposes, and paid his salaries and benefits with the
mandated deductions therefrom until the end of December, 1982. It was only in January, 1983 when he
became convinced that petitioner would no longer return to work that he considered the latter to have
abandoned his work and, for this reason, no longer listed him as an employee. According to private
respondent, whatever amount of money was given to petitioner from that time until

April, 1984 was in the nature of a pension or an allowance or mere gratuitous doles from a father to a
son, and not salaries as, in fact, none of the usual deductions were made therefrom. It was only in April,
1984 that private respondent completely stopped giving said pension or allowance when he was
angered by what he heard petitioner had been saying about sending him to jail.

Private respondent capitalizes on the testimony of one Manolo Gomez taken on oral deposition
regarding petitioner's alleged statement to him, "(h)e quemado los (p)ue(n)tes de Manucao" ("I have
burned my bridges with Manucao") as expressive of petitioner's intention to abandon his job. In addition
to insinuations of sinister motives on the part of petitioner in working at the farm and thereafter
abandoning the job upon accomplishment of his objectives, private respondent takes the novel position
that the agreement to support his son after the latter abandoned the administration of the farm legally
converts the initial abandonment to implied voluntary resignation.25

As earlier mentioned, petitioner ripostes that private respondent undoubtedly knew about petitioner's
illness and even paid for his hospital and other medical bills. The assertion regarding abandonment of
work, petitioner argues, is further belied by his continued performance of various services related to the
operations of the farm from May to the last quarter of 1983, his persistent inquiries from his father's
accountant and legal adviser about the reason why his pension or allowance was discontinued since
April, 1984, and his indication of having recovered and his willingness and capability to resume his work
at the farm as expressed in a letter dated September 14, 1984.26 With these, petitioner contends that it
is immaterial how the monthly pecuniary amounts are designated, whether as salary, pension or
allowance, with or without deductions, as he was entitled thereto in view of his continued service as
farm administrator.27
To stress what was earlier mentioned, in order that a finding of abandonment may justly be made there
must be a concurrence of two elements, viz.: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid
or justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship, with the
second element as the more determinative factor and being manifested by some overt acts. Such intent
we find dismally wanting in this case.

It will be recalled that private respondent himself admitted being unsure of his son's plans of returning
to work. The absence of petitioner from work since mid-1982, prolonged though it may have been, was
not without valid causes of which private respondent had full knowledge. As to what convinced or led
him to believe that petitioner was no longer returning to work, private respondent neither explains nor
substantiates by any reasonable basis how he arrived at such a conclusion.

Moreover, private respondent's claim of abandonment cannot be given credence as even after January,
1983, when private respondent supposedly "became convinced" that petitioner would no longer work at
the farm, the latter continued to perform services directly required by his position as farm
administrator. These are duly and correspondingly evidenced by such acts as picking up some farm
machinery/equipment from G.A. Machineries, Inc.,28 claiming and paying for additional farm equipment
and machinery shipped by said firm from Manila to Bacolod through Zip Forwarders,29 getting the
payment of the additional cash advances for molasses for crop year 1983-1984 from Agrotex
Commodities, Inc.,30 and remitting to private respondent through

Atty. Sumbingco the sums collected along with receipts for medicine and oil.31

It will be observed that all of these chores, which petitioner took care of, relate to the normal activities
and operations of the farm. True, it is a father's prerogative to request or even command his child to run
errands for him. In the present case, however, considering the nature of these transactions, as well as
the property values and monetary sums involved, it is unlikely that private respondent would leave the
matter to just anyone. Prudence dictates that these matters be handled by someone who can be trusted
or at least be held accountable therefor, and who is familiar with the terms, specifications and other
details relative thereto, such as an employee. If indeed petitioner had abandoned his job or was
considered to have done so by private respondent, it would be awkward, or even out of place, to expect
or to oblige petitioner to concern himself with matters relating to or expected of him with respect to
what would then be his past and terminated employment. It is hard to imagine what further authority
an employer can have over a dismissed employee so as to compel him to continue to perform work-
related tasks:
It is also significant that the special power of attorney32 executed

by private respondent on June 26, 1980 in favor of petitioner, specifically stating —

xxx xxx xxx

That I, JON de YSASI, Filipino, of legal age, married, and a resident of Hda. Manucao, hereinafter called
and referred to as PRINCIPAL, am a sugarcane planter, BISCOM Mill District, and a duly accredited
planter-member of the BINALBAGAN-ISABELA PLANTERS' ASSOCIATION, INC.;

That as such planter-member of BIPA, I have check/checks with BIPA representing payment for all
checks and papers to which I am entitled to (sic) as such planter-member;

That I have named, appointed and constituted as by these presents

I HEREBY NAME, APPOINT AND CONSTITUTE as my true and lawful ATTORNEY-IN-FACT

JON de YSASI III

whose specimen signature is hereunder affixed, TO GET FOR ME and in my name, place and stead, my
check/checks aforementioned, said ATTORNEY-IN-FACT being herein given the power and authority to
sign for me and in my name, place and stead, the receipt or receipts or payroll for the said check/checks.
PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that my said ATTORNEY-IN-FACT cannot cash the said check/checks, but to turn
the same over to me for my proper disposition.

That I HEREBY RATIFY AND CONFIRM the acts of my

Attorney-in-Fact in getting the said check/checks and signing the receipts therefor.

That I further request that my said check/checks be made a "CROSSED CHECK".

xxx xxx xxx

remained in force even after petitioner's employment was supposed to have been terminated by reason
of abandonment. Furthermore, petitioner's numerous requests for an explanation regarding the
stoppage of his salaries and benefits,33 the issuance of withholding tax reports,34 as well as
correspondence reporting his full recovery and readiness to go back to work,35 and, specifically, his
filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal are hardly the acts of one who has abandoned his work.

We are likewise not impressed by the deposition of Manolo Gomez, as witness for private respondent,
ascribing statements to petitioner supposedly indicative of the latter's intention to abandon his work.
We perceive the irregularity in the taking of such deposition without the presence of petitioner's
counsel, and the failure of private respondent to serve reasonably advance notice of its taking to said
counsel, thereby foreclosing his opportunity to

cross-examine the deponent. Private respondent also failed to serve notice thereof on the Regional
Arbitration Branch No. VI of the NLRC, as certified to by Administrative Assistant Celestina G. Ovejera of
said office.36 Fair play dictates that at such an important stage of the proceedings, which involves the
taking of testimony, both parties must be afforded equal opportunity to examine and cross-examine a
witness.

As to the monthly monetary amounts given to petitioner, whether denominated as salary, pension,
allowance or ex gratia handout, there is no question as to petitioner's entitlement thereto inasmuch as
he continued to perform services in his capacity as farm administrator. The change in description of said
amounts contained in the pay slips or in the receipts prepared by private respondent cannot be deemed
to be determinative of petitioner's employment status in view of the peculiar circumstances above set
out. Besides, if such amounts were truly in the nature of allowances given by a parent out of concern for
his child's welfare, it is rather unusual that receipts therefor37 should be necessary and required as if
they were ordinary business expenditures.

Neither can we subscribe to private respondent's theory that petitioner's alleged abandonment was
converted into an implied voluntary resignation on account of the father's agreement to support his son
after the latter abandoned his work. As we have determined that no abandonment took place in this
case, the monthly sums received by petitioner, regardless of designation, were in consideration for
services rendered emanating from an employer-employee relationship and were not of a character that
can qualify them as mere civil support given out of parental duty and solicitude. We are also hard put to
imagine how abandonment can be impliedly converted into a voluntary resignation without any positive
act on the part of the employee conveying a desire to terminate his employment. The very concept of
resignation as a ground for termination by the employee of his employment38 does not square with the
elements constitutive of abandonment.

On procedural considerations, petitioner posits that there was a violation by private respondent of the
due process requirements under the Labor Code for want of notice and hearing.39 Private respondent,
in opposition, argues that Section 2, Rule XIV, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code applies only to cases where the employer seeks to terminate the services of an employee on any
of the grounds enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor Code, but not to the situation obtaining in
this case where private respondent did not dismiss petitioner on any ground since it was petitioner who
allegedly abandoned his employment.40

The due process requirements of notice and hearing applicable to labor cases are set out in Rule XIV,
Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code in this wise:

Sec. 2. Notice of Dismissal. — Any employer who seeks to dismiss a worker shall furnish him a written
notice stating the particular acts or omission(s) constituting the grounds for his dismissal. In cases of
abandonment of work, notice shall be served at the worker's last known address.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 5. Answer and hearing. — The worker may answer the allegations as stated against him in the
notice of dismissal within a reasonable period from receipt of such notice. The employer shall afford the
worker ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if
he so desires.

Sec. 6. Decision to dismiss. — The employer shall immediately notify a worker in writing of a decision
to dismiss him stating clearly the reasons therefor.

Sec. 7. Right to contest dismissal. — Any decision taken by the employer shall be without prejudice to
the right of the worker to contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with the
Regional Branch of the Commission.
xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 11. Report of dismissal. — The employer shall submit a monthly report to the Regional Office having
jurisdiction over the place of work at all dismissals effected by him during the month, specifying therein
the names of the dismissed workers, the reasons for their dismissal, the dates of commencement and
termination of employment, the positions last held by them and such other information as may be
required by the Ministry for policy guidance and statistical purposes.

Private respondent's argument is without merit as there can be no question that petitioner was denied
his right to due process since he was never given any notice about his impending dismissal and the
grounds therefor, much less a chance to be heard. Even as private respondent controverts the
applicability of the mandatory twin requirements of procedural due process in this particular case, he in
effect admits that no notice was served by him on petitioner. This fact is corroborated by the
certification issued on September 5, 1984 by the Regional Director for Region VI of the Department of
Labor that no notice of termination of the employment of petitioner was submitted thereto.41

Granting arguendo that there was abandonment in this case, it nonetheless cannot be denied that
notice still had to be served upon the employee sought to be dismissed, as the second sentence of
Section 2 of the pertinent implementing rules explicitly requires service thereof at the employee's last
known address, by way of substantial compliance. While it is conceded that it is the employer's
prerogative to terminate an employee, especially when there is just cause therefor, the requirements of
due process cannot be lightly taken. The law does not countenance the arbitrary exercise of such a
power or prerogative when it has the effect of undermining the fundamental guarantee of security of
tenure in favor of the employee.42

On the executive labor arbiter's misplaced reliance on the Wenphil case, the Solicitor General rejoins as
follows:

The Labor Arbiter held thus:

While we are in full agreement with the respondent as to his defense of implied resignation and/or
abandonment, records somehow showed that he failed to notify the Department of
Labor and Employment for his sons' (sic)/complainants' (sic) aba(n)donment as required by BP 130. And
for this failure, the other requisite for a valid termination by an employer was not complied with. This
however, would not work to invalidate the otherwise (sic) existence of a valid cause for dismissal. The
validity of the cause of dismissal must be upheld at all times provided however that sanctions must be
imposed on the respondent for his failure to observe the notice on due process requirement. (Wenphil
Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 80587). (Decision Labor Arbiter, at 11-12, Annex "C" Petition), . . .

This is thus a very different case from Wenphil Corporation v. NLRC, 170 SCRA 69. In Wenphil, the rule
applied to the facts is: once an employee is dismissed for just cause, he must not be rewarded

re-employment and backwages for failure of his employer to observe procedural due process. The public
policy behind this is that, it may encourage the employee to do even worse and render a mockery of the
rules of discipline required to be observed. However, the employer must be penalized for his infraction
of due process. In the present case, however, not only was petitioner dismissed without due process,
but his dismissal is without just cause. Petitioner did not abandon his employment because he has a
justifiable excuse.43

II. Petitioner avers that the executive labor arbiter erred in disregarding the mandatory provisions
of Article 279 of the Labor Code which entitles an illegally dismissed employee to reinstatement and
back wages and, instead, affirmed the imposition of the penalty of P5,000.00 on private respondent for
violation of the due process requirements. Private respondent, for his part, maintains that there was
error in imposing the fine because that penalty contemplates the failure to submit the employer's report
on dismissed employees to the DOLE regional office, as required under Section 5 (now, Section 11), Rule
XIV of the implementing rules, and not the failure to serve notice upon the employee sought to be
dismissed by the employer.

Both the Constitution and the Labor Code enunciate in no uncertain terms the right of every worker to
security of tenure.44 To give teeth to this constitutional and statutory mandates, the Labor Code spells
out the relief available to an employee in case of its denial:

Art. 279. Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate
the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is
unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits of their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of actual
reinstatement.
Clearly, therefore, an employee is entitled to reinstatement with full back wages in the absence of just
cause for dismissal.45 The Court, however, on numerous occasions has tempered the rigid application of
said provision of the Labor Code, recognizing that in some cases certain events may have transpired as
would militate against the practicability of granting the relief thereunder provided, and declares that
where there are strained relations between the employer and the employee, payment of back wages
and severance pay may be awarded instead of reinstatement,46 and more particularly when managerial
employees are concerned.47 Thus, where reinstatement is no longer possible, it is therefore appropriate
that the dismissed employee be given his fair and just share of what the law accords him.48

We note with favor and give our imprimatur to the Solicitor General's ratiocination, to wit:

As a general rule, an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights and to his backwages computed from the time his compensation was
withheld up to the time of his reinstatement. (Morales vs. NLRC, 188 SCRA 295). But in Pacific Cement
Company, Inc. vs. NLRC, 173 SCRA 192, this Honorable Court held that when it comes to reinstatement,
differences should be made between managers and the ordinary workingmen. The Court concluded that
a company which no longer trusts its managers cannot operate freely in a competitive and profitable
manner. The NLRC should know the difference between managers and ordinary workingmen. It cannot
imprudently order the reinstatement of managers with the same ease and liberality as that of rank and
file workers who had been terminated. Similarly, a reinstatement may not be appropriate or feasible in
case of antipathy or antagonism between the parties (Morales, vs. NLRC, 188 SCRA 295).

In the present case, it is submitted that petitioner should not be reinstated as farm administrator of
Hacienda Manucao. The present relationship of petitioner and private respondent (is) so strained that a
harmonious and peaceful employee-employer relationship is hardly possible.49

III. Finally, petitioner insists on an award of moral damages, arguing that his dismissal from
employment was attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted oppression, or was contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy. He further prays for exemplary damages to serve as a deterrent against
similar acts of unjust dismissal by other employers.

Moral damages, under Article 2217 of the Civil Code, may be awarded to compensate one for diverse
injuries such as mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, and social humiliation,
provided that such injuries spring from a wrongful act or omission of the defendant which was the
proximate cause thereof.50 Exemplary damages, under Article 2229, are imposed by way of example or
correction for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
They are not recoverable as a matter of right, it being left to the court to decide whether or not they
should be adjudicated.51

We are well aware of the Court's rulings in a number of cases in the past allowing recovery of moral
damages where the dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted an act
oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy,52 and
of exemplary damages if the dismissal was effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner.53
We do not feel, however, that an award of the damages prayed for in this petition would be proper even
if, seemingly, the facts of the case justify their allowance. In the aforestated cases of illegal dismissal
where moral and exemplary damages were awarded, the dismissed employees were genuinely without
fault and were undoubtedly victims of the erring employers' capricious exercise of power.

In the present case, we find that both petitioner and private respondent can equally be faulted for
fanning the flames which gave rise to and ultimately aggravated this controversy, instead of sincerely
negotiating a peaceful settlement of their disparate claims. The records reveal how their actuations
seethed with mutual antagonism and the undeniable enmity between them negates the likelihood that
either of them acted in good faith. It is apparent that each one has a cause for damages against the
other. For this reason, we hold that no moral or exemplary damages can rightfully be awarded to
petitioner.

On this score, we are once again persuaded by the validity of the following recommendation of the
Solicitor General:

The Labor Arbiter's decision in RAB Case No. 0452-84 should be modified. There was no voluntary
abandonment in this case because petitioner has a justifiable excuse for his absence, or such absence
does not warrant outright dismissal without notice and hearing. Private respondent, therefore, is guilty
of illegal dismissal. He should be ordered to pay backwages for a period not exceeding three years from
date of dismissal. And in lieu of reinstatement, petitioner may be paid separation pay equivalent to one
(1) month('s) salary for every year of service, a fraction of six months being considered as one (1) year in
accordance with recent jurisprudence (Tan, Jr. vs. NLRC, 183 SCRA 651). But all claims for damages
should be dismissed, for both parties are equally at fault.54
The conduct of the respective counsel of the parties, as revealed by the records, sorely disappoints the
Court and invites reproof. Both counsel may well be reminded that their ethical duty as lawyers to
represent their clients with

zeal55 goes beyond merely presenting their clients' respective causes in court. It is just as much their
responsibility, if not more importantly, to exert all reasonable efforts to smooth over legal conflicts,
preferably out of court and especially in consideration of the direct and immediate consanguineous ties
between their clients. Once again, we reiterate that the useful function of a lawyer is not only to
conduct litigation but to avoid it whenever possible by advising settlement or withholding suit. He is
often called upon less for dramatic forensic exploits than for wise counsel in every phase of life. He
should be a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, rather than a virtuoso of
technicality in the conduct of litigation.56

Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that "(a) lawyer shall encourage
his client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement." On this point, we
find that both counsel herein fell short of what was expected of them, despite their avowed duties as
officers of the court. The records do not show that they took pains to initiate steps geared toward
effecting a rapprochement between their clients. On the contrary, their acerbic and protracted
exchanges could not but have exacerbated the situation even as they may have found favor in the
equally hostile eyes of their respective clients.

In the same manner, we find that the labor arbiter who handled this regrettable case has been less than
faithful to the letter and spirit of the Labor Code mandating that a labor arbiter "shall exert all efforts
towards the amicable settlement of a labor dispute within his jurisdiction."57 If he ever did so, or at
least entertained the thought, the copious records of the proceedings in this controversy are barren of
any reflection of the same.

One final word. This is one decision we do not particularly relish having been obliged to make. The task
of resolving cases involving disputes among members of a family leaves a bad taste in the mouth and an
aversion in the mind, for no truly meaningful and enduring resolution is really achieved in such
situations. While we are convinced that we have adjudicated the legal issues herein squarely on the
bases of law and jurisprudence, sans sentimentality, we are saddened by the thought that we may have
failed to bring about the reconciliation of the father and son who figured as parties to this dispute, and
that our adherence here to law and duty may unwittingly contribute to the breaking, instead of the
strengthening, of familial bonds. In fine, neither of the parties herein actually emerges victorious. It is
the Court's earnest hope, therefore, that with the impartial exposition and extended explanation of
their respective rights in this decision, the parties may eventually see their way clear to an ultimate
resolution of their differences on more convivial terms.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is hereby SET ASIDE.
Private respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioner back wages for a period not exceeding three (3) years,
without qualification or deduction,58 and, in lieu of reinstatement, separation pay equivalent to one (1)
month for every year of service, a fraction of six (6) months being considered as one (1) whole year.

SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR:

13. THIRD DIVISION

JONAR SANTIAGO, A.C. No. 6252

Complainant,

Present:

Panganiban, J.,

Chairman,

- versus - Sandoval-Gutierrez,

Corona, and

Carpio Morales,* JJ

Promulgated:

Atty. EDISON V. RAFANAN,

Respondent. October 5, 2004

x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- x

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

otaries public are expected to exert utmost care in the performance of their duties, which are impressed
with public interest. They are enjoined to comply faithfully with the solemnities and requirements of the
Notarial Law. This Court will not hesitate to mete out appropriate sanctions to those who violate it or
neglect observance thereof.

__________________

* On leave.

The Case and the Facts

Before us is a verified Complaint[1] filed by Jonar Santiago, an employee of the Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology (BJMP), for the disbarment of Atty. Edison V. Rafanan. The Complaint was
filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on
January 16, 2001. It charged Atty. Rafanan with deceit; malpractice or other gross misconduct in office
under Section 27 of Rule 138[2] of the Rules of Court; and violation of Canons 1.01, 1.02 and 1.03[3],
Canon 5[4], and Canons 12.07[5] and 12.08

of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

In his Report, IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid Jr. summarized the allegations of the
complainant in this wise:
x x x. In his Letter-Complaint, Complainant alleged, among others, that Respondent in notarizing several
documents on different dates failed and/or refused to: a)make the proper notation regarding the cedula
or community tax certificate of the affiants; b) enter the details of the notarized documents in the
notarial register; and c) make and execute the certification and enter his PTR and IBP numbers in the
documents he had notarized, all in violation of the notarial provisions of the Revised Administrative
Code.

Complainant likewise alleged that Respondent executed an Affidavit in favor of his client and offered the
same as evidence in the case wherein he was actively representing his client. Finally, Complainant
alleges that on a certain date, Respondent accompanied by several persons waited for Complainant
after the hearing and after confronting the latter disarmed him of his sidearm and thereafter uttered
insulting words and veiled threats.[6]

On March 23, 2001, pursuant to the January 19, 2001 Order of the CBD,[7] Atty. Rafanan filed his
verified Answer.[8] He admitted having administered the oath to the affiants whose Affidavits were
attached to the verified Complaint. He believed, however, that the

non-notation of their Residence Certificates in the Affidavits and the Counter-affidavits was allowed.

He opined that the notation of residence certificates applied only to documents acknowledged by a
notary public and was not mandatory for affidavits related to cases pending before courts and other
government offices. He pointed out that in the latter, the affidavits, which were sworn to before
government prosecutors, did not have to indicate the residence certificates of the affiants. Neither did
other notaries public in Nueva Ecija -- some of whom were older practitioners -- indicate the affiants
residence certificates on the documents they notarized, or have entries in their notarial register for
these documents.

As to his alleged failure to comply with the certification required by Section 3 of Rule 112[9] of the Rules
of Criminal Procedure, respondent explained that as counsel of the affiants, he had the option to comply
or not with the certification. To nullify the Affidavits, it was complainant who was duty-bound to bring
the said noncompliance to the attention of the prosecutor conducting the preliminary investigation.
As to his alleged violation of Rule 12.08 of the CPR, respondent argued that lawyers could testify on
behalf of their clients on substantial matters, in cases where [their] testimony is essential to the ends of
justice. Complainant charged respondents clients with attempted murder. Respondent averred that
since they were in his house when the alleged crime occurred, his testimony is very essential to the ends
of justice.

Respondent alleged that it was complainant who had threatened and harassed his clients after the
hearing of their case by the provincial prosecutor on January 4, 2001. Respondent requested the
assistance of the Cabanatuan City Police the following day, January 5, 2001, which was the next
scheduled hearing, to avoid a repetition of the incident and to allay the fears of his clients. In support of
his allegations, he submitted Certifications[10] from the Cabanatuan City Police and the Joint
Affidavit[11] of the two police officers who had assisted them.

Lastly, he contended that the case had been initiated for no other purpose than to harass him, because
he was the counsel of Barangay Captain Ernesto Ramos in the cases filed by the latter before the
ombudsman and the BJMP against complainant.

After receipt of respondents Answer, the CBD, through Commissioner Tyrone R. Cimafranca, set the case
for hearing on June 5, 2001, at two oclock in the afternoon. Notices[12] of the hearing were sent to the
parties by registered mail. On the scheduled date and time of the hearing, only complainant appeared.
Respondent was unable to do so, apparently because he had received the Notice only on June 8, 2001.
[13] The hearing was reset to July 3, 2001 at two oclock in the afternoon.

On the same day, June 5, 2001, complainant filed his Reply[14] to the verified Answer of respondent.
The latters Rejoinder was received by the CBD on July 13, 2001.[15] It also received complainants Letter-
Request[16] to dispense with the hearings. Accordingly, it granted that request in its Order[17] dated
July 24, 2001, issued through Commissioner Cimafranca. It thereby directed the parties to submit their
respective memoranda within fifteen days from receipt of the Order, after which the case was to be
deemed submitted for resolution.

The CBD received complainants Memorandum[18] on September 26, 2001. Respondent did not file any.
The IBPs Recommendation

On September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2003-172[19] approving
and adopting the Investigating Commissioners Report that respondent had violated specific
requirements of the Notarial Law on the execution of a certification, the entry of such certification in the
notarial register, and the indication of the affiants residence certificate. The IBP Board of Governors
found his excuse for the violations unacceptable. It modified, however, the recommendation[20] of the
investigating commissioner by increasing the fine to P3,000 with a warning that any repetition of the
violation will be dealt with a heavier penalty.

The other charges -- violation of Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; and Canons 1.01 to 1.03,
12.07 and 12.08 of the CPR -- were dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

The Courts Ruling

We agree with the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.

Respondents Administrative Liability

Violation of the Notarial Law

The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public. They are required to certify
that the party to every document acknowledged before them has presented the proper residence
certificate (or exemption from the residence tax); and to enter its number, place of issue and date as
part of such certification.[21] They are also required to maintain and keep a notarial register; to enter
therein all instruments notarized by them; and to give to each instrument executed, sworn to, or
acknowledged before [them] a number corresponding to the one in [their] register [and to state therein]
the page or pages of [their] register, on which the same is recorded.[22] Failure to perform these duties
would result in the revocation of their commission as notaries public.[23]

These formalities are mandatory and cannot be simply neglected, considering the degree of importance
and evidentiary weight attached to notarized documents. Notaries public entering into their
commissions are presumed to be aware of these elementary requirements.

In Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos,[24] the Court explained the value and meaning of notarization as follows:

The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be overemphasized. Notarization is not an
empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those
who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private document
into a public document thus making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its
authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts,
administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed
by a notary public and appended to a private instrument.

For this reason, notaries public should not take for granted the solemn duties pertaining to their office.
Slipshod methods in their performance of the notarial act are never to be countenanced. They are
expected to exert utmost care in the performance of their duties,[25] which are dictated by public policy
and are impressed with public interest.

It is clear from the pleadings before us -- and respondent has readily admitted -- that he violated the
Notarial Law by failing to enter in the documents notations of the residence certificate, as well as the
entry number and the pages of the notarial registry.
Respondent believes, however, that noncompliance with those requirements is not mandatory for
affidavits relative to cases pending before the courts and government agencies. He points to similar
practices of older notaries in Nueva Ecija.

We cannot give credence to, much less honor, his claim. His belief that the requirements do not apply to
affidavits is patently irrelevant. No law dispenses with these formalities. Au contraire, the Notarial Law
makes no qualification or exception. It is appalling and inexcusable that he did away with the basics of
notarial procedure allegedly because others were doing so. Being swayed by the bad example of others
is not an acceptable justification for breaking the law.

We note further that the documents attached to the verified Complaint are the Joint Counter-Affidavit
of respondents clients Ernesto Ramos and Rey Geronimo, as well as their witnesses Affidavits relative to
Criminal Case No. 69-2000 for attempted murder, filed by complainants brother against the
aforementioned clients. These documents became the basis of the present Complaint.

As correctly pointed out by the investigating commissioner, Section 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure expressly requires respondent as notary -- in the absence of any fiscal, state
prosecutor or government official authorized to administer the oath -- to certify that he has personally
examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their
affidavits. Respondent failed to do so with respect to the subject Affidavits and Counter-Affidavits in the
belief that -- as counsel for the affiants -- he was not required to comply with the certification
requirement.

It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for the law and legal processes.[26] They are expected to be in the forefront in the observance
and maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries with it the obligation to be well-informed of the
existing laws and to keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence.[27] It
is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully comply with such
duty, they may not be able to discharge competently and diligently their obligations as members of the
bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to committing mistakes.

Where notaries public are lawyers, a graver responsibility is placed upon them by reason of their solemn
oath to obey the laws.[28] No custom or age-old practice provides sufficient excuse or justification for
their failure to adhere to the provisions of the law. In this case, the excuse given by respondent
exhibited his clear ignorance of the Notarial Law, the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the importance of
his office as a notary public.

Nonetheless, we do not agree with complainants plea to disbar respondent from the practice of law.
The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution.[29] Disbarment will be imposed as a penalty
only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the character of the lawyer as
an officer of the court and a member of the bar. Where any lesser penalty can accomplish the end
desired, disbarment should not be decreed.[30] Considering the nature of the infraction and the
absence of deceit on the part of respondent, we believe that the penalty recommended by the IBP
Board of Governors is a sufficient disciplinary measure in this case.

Lawyer as Witness for Client

Complainant further faults respondent for executing before Prosecutor Leonardo Padolina an affidavit
corroborating the defense of alibi proffered by respondents clients, allegedly in violation of Rule 12.08
of the CPR: A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client.

Rule 12.08 of Canon 12 of the CPR states:

Rule 12.08 A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client, except:

a) on formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or custody of an instrument and the
like;

b) on substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is essential to the ends of justice, in
which event he must, during his testimony, entrust the trial of the case to another counsel.

Parenthetically, under the law, a lawyer is not disqualified from being a witness,[31] except only in
certain cases pertaining to privileged communication arising from an attorney-client relationship.[32]
The reason behind such rule is the difficulty posed upon lawyers by the task of dissociating their relation
to their clients as witnesses from that as advocates. Witnesses are expected to tell the facts as they
recall them. In contradistinction, advocates are partisans -- those who actively plead and defend the
cause of others. It is difficult to distinguish the fairness and impartiality of a disinterested witness from
the zeal of an advocate. The question is one of propriety rather than of competency of the lawyers who
testify for their clients.

Acting or appearing to act in the double capacity of lawyer and witness for the client will provoke unkind
criticism and leave many people to suspect the truthfulness of the lawyer because they cannot believe
the lawyer as disinterested. The people will have a plausible reason for thinking, and if their sympathies
are against the lawyers client, they will have an opportunity, not likely to be neglected, for charging, that
as a witness he fortified it with his own testimony. The testimony of the lawyer becomes doubted and is
looked upon as partial and untruthful.[33]

Thus, although the law does not forbid lawyers from being witnesses and at the same time counsels for
a cause, the preference is for them to refrain from testifying as witnesses, unless they absolutely have
to; and should they do so, to withdraw from active management of the case.[34]

Notwithstanding this guideline and the existence of the Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan in favor of
his clients, we cannot hastily make him administratively liable for the following reasons:

First, we consider it the duty of a lawyer to assert every remedy and defense that is authorized by law
for the benefit of the client, especially in a criminal action in which the latters life and liberty are at
stake.[35] It is the fundamental right of the accused to be afforded full opportunity to rebut the charges
against them. They are entitled to suggest all those reasonable doubts that may arise from the evidence
as to their guilt; and to ensure that if they are convicted, such conviction is according to law.

Having undertaken the defense of the accused, respondent, as defense counsel, was thus expected to
spare no effort to save his clients from a wrong conviction. He had the duty to present -- by all fair and
honorable means -- every defense and mitigating circumstance that the law permitted, to the end that
his clients would not be deprived of life, liberty or property, except by due process of law.[36]

The Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan was clearly necessary for the defense of his clients, since it
pointed out the fact that on the alleged date and time of the incident, his clients were at his residence
and could not have possibly committed the crime charged against them. Notably, in his Affidavit,
complainant does not dispute the statements of respondent or suggest the falsity of its contents.

Second, paragraph (b) of Rule 12.08 contemplates a situation in which lawyers give their testimonies
during the trial. In this instance, the Affidavit was submitted during the preliminary investigation which,
as such, was merely inquisitorial.[37] Not being a trial of the case on the merits, a preliminary
investigation has the oft-repeated purposes of securing innocent persons against hasty, malicious and
oppressive prosecutions; protecting them from open and public accusations of crime and from the
trouble as well as expense and anxiety of a public trial; and protecting the State from useless and
expensive prosecutions.[38] The investigation is advisedly called preliminary, as it is yet to be followed
by the trial proper.

Nonetheless, we deem it important to stress and remind respondent to refrain from accepting
employment in any matter in which he knows or has reason to believe that he may be an essential
witness for the prospective client. Furthermore, in future cases in which his testimony may become
essential to serve the ends of justice, the canons of the profession require him to withdraw from the
active prosecution of these cases.

No Proof of Harassment

The charge that respondent harassed complainant and uttered insulting words and veiled threats is not
supported by evidence. Allegation is never equivalent to proof, and a bare charge cannot be equated
with liability.[39] It is not the self-serving claim of complainant but the version of respondent that is
more credible, considering that the latters allegations are corroborated by the Affidavits of the police
officers and the Certifications of the Cabanatuan City Police.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Edison V. Rafanan is found guilty of violating the Notarial Law and Canon 5 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby FINED P3,000 with a warning that similar infractions in
the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

14. FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 6672 September 4, 2009

PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, Complainant,

vs.

ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

This is a complaint for disbarment1 filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan & Linsangan
Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional
services.

Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his
clients2 to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them financial assistance3 and
expeditious collection on their claims.4 To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called them
and sent them text messages.

To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit5 of James Gregorio attesting that
Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize
respondent’s services instead, in exchange for a loan of ₱50,000. Complainant also attached
"respondent’s" calling card:6

Front

NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
LAW OFFFICE

CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES

W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

Fe Marie L. Labiano

Paralegal

1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01

6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar

Grace Park, Caloocan City Tel: 362-7820

Fax: (632) 362-7821

Cel.: (0926) 2701719

Back

SERVICES OFFERED:

CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE

TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN

REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,

INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH

AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS

ABROAD.

1avvphi1

(emphasis supplied)

Hence, this complaint.

Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulation of the
said calling card.7

The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.8

Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and recommendation,9 found
that respondent had encroached on the professional practice of complainant, violating Rule 8.0210 and
other canons11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule
against soliciting cases for gain, personally or through paid agents or brokers as stated in Section 27,
Rule 13812 of the Rules of Court. Hence, the CBD recommended that respondent be reprimanded with a
stern warning that any repetition would merit a heavier penalty.

We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we modify the
recommended penalty.
The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into complainant’s
professional practice in violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means employed by respondent in
furtherance of the said misconduct themselves constituted distinct violations of ethical rules.

Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the manner by which a
lawyer’s services are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides:

CANON 3 - A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and
objective information or statement of facts.

Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not a business;
lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares.13 To allow a lawyer to
advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice of law, degrade the profession in the
public’s estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render that high character of service to which
every member of the bar is called.14

Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:

RULE 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.

Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through
paid agents or brokers.15 Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment.16

Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:

RULE 1.03. A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or
delay any man’s cause.
This rule proscribes "ambulance chasing" (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an
attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain employment)17 as a measure to protect the
community from barratry and champerty.18

Complainant presented substantial evidence19 (consisting of the sworn statements of the very same
persons coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondent’s office) to prove that respondent indeed
solicited legal business as well as profited from referrals’ suits.

Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later admitted it during the
mandatory hearing.

Through Labiano’s actions, respondent’s law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed
to transfer representation on the strength of Labiano’s word that respondent could produce a more
favorable result.

Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and
Canon 3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.1avvphi1

With regard to respondent’s violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a lawyer should
not steal another lawyer’s client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service,
good result or reduced fees for his services.20 Again the Court notes that respondent never denied
having these seafarers in his client list nor receiving benefits from Labiano’s "referrals." Furthermore,
he never denied Labiano’s connection to his office.21 Respondent committed an unethical, predatory
overstep into another’s legal practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.

Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers, respondent violated
Rule 16.04:

Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully
protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a
client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he
is handling for the client.
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when in the interest of
justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographer’s fees for transcript of
stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the
client.

The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer’s independence of mind so that the free exercise of his
judgment may not be adversely affected.22 It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case he is
handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the client’s cause. If the lawyer lends money to
the client in connection with the client’s case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject
matter of the case or an additional stake in its outcome.23 Either of these circumstances may lead the
lawyer to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement which may
take care of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his duty of undivided
fidelity to the client’s cause.24

As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice25 which calls for the exercise of
the Court’s disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants serious sanctions for
initiating contact with a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining employment.26 Thus, in this
jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to protect the public from the Machiavellian machinations of
unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the nobility of the legal profession.

Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the prohibition on lending
money to clients), the sanction recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the
wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly incommensurate to its findings.

A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyer’s best
advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his
character and conduct.27 For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce their services by
publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional cards.

Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:

(a) lawyer’s name;

(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;

(c) address;

(d) telephone number and

(e) special branch of law practiced.28

Labiano’s calling card contained the phrase "with financial assistance." The phrase was clearly used to
entice clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans to finance
their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking
advantage of their financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded the
integrity of the bar and deserved no place in the legal profession. However, in the absence of substantial
evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to rule that respondent was personally and
directly responsible for the printing and distribution of Labiano’s calling cards.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and
Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one year effective immediately from receipt
of this resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall
be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme
Court of the Philippines, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the
Court Administrator to be circulated to all courts.

SO ORDERED.

14. ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office,
complainant, vs. ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, respondent.
[G.R. No. 157053. August 19, 2003]

ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, petitioner, vs. IBP COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE and ATTY. ISMAEL G.
KHAN, JR., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office,
respondents.

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that appeared in the July 5, 2000 issue of
the newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads: ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE Specialist 532-
4333/521-2667.[1]

Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of the Supreme Court,
called up the published telephone number and pretended to be an interested party. She spoke to Mrs.
Simbillo, who claimed that her husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in handling annulment
cases and can guarantee a court decree within four to six months, provided the case will not involve
separation of property or custody of children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that her husband charges a fee of
P48,000.00, half of which is payable at the time of filing of the case and the other half after a decision
thereon has been rendered.

Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public Information Office revealed
that similar advertisements were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of the Manila Bulletin and
August 5, 2000 issue of The Philippine Star.[2]

On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and
Chief of the Public Information Office, filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo
for improper advertising and solicitation of his legal services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.[3]

In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that advertising and solicitation
per se are not prohibited acts; that the time has come to change our views about the prohibition on
advertising and solicitation; that the interest of the public is not served by the absolute prohibition on
lawyer advertising; that the Court can lift the ban on lawyer advertising; and that the rationale behind
the decades-old prohibition should be abandoned. Thus, he prayed that he be exonerated from all the
charges against him and that the Court promulgate a ruling that advertisement of legal services offered
by a lawyer is not contrary to law, public policy and public order as long as it is dignified.[4]

The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation.[5] On June 29, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline passed Resolution No. XV-
2002-306,[6] finding respondent guilty of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court, and suspended him from the practice of
law for one (1) year with the warning that a repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more severely.
The IBP Resolution was noted by this Court on November 11, 2002.[7]

In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration,[8] which was denied by the
IBP in Resolution No. XV-2002-606 dated October 19, 2002[9]

Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 157053 entitled, Atty. Rizalino
T. Simbillo, Petitioner versus IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., Asst. Court
Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office, Respondents. This petition was consolidated with
A.C. No. 5299 per the Courts Resolution dated March 4, 2003.

In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were required to manifest whether or not they were
willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings.[10] Complainant filed his
Manifestation on April 25, 2003, stating that he is not submitting any additional pleading or evidence
and is submitting the case for its early resolution on the basis of pleadings and records thereof. [11]
Respondent, on the other hand, filed a Supplemental Memorandum on June 20, 2003.

We agree with the IBPs Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV-2002-606.

Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:

Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.
Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.

Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party
without authority to do so.

It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business.[12] It is a profession in which
duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a
money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits.[13] The gaining
of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration.[14] The duty to public service and to the
administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their
personal interests or what they owe to themselves.[15] The following elements distinguish the legal
profession from a business:

1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which one may attain the
highest eminence without making much money;

2. A relation as an officer of the court to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity,
integrity and reliability;

3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;

4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to
current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with
their clients.[16]
There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself admits that he
caused the publication of the advertisements. While he professes repentance and begs for the Courts
indulgence, his contrition rings hollow considering the fact that he advertised his legal services again
after he pleaded for compassion and after claiming that he had no intention to violate the rules. Eight
months after filing his answer, he again advertised his legal services in the August 14, 2001 issue of the
Buy & Sell Free Ads Newspaper.[17] Ten months later, he caused the same advertisement to be
published in the October 5, 2001 issue of Buy & Sell.[18] Such acts of respondent are a deliberate and
contemptuous affront on the Courts authority.

What adds to the gravity of respondents acts is that in advertising himself as a self-styled Annulment of
Marriage Specialist, he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and undermines not only the stability but also the
sanctity of an institution still considered sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of permissiveness
in our society. Indeed, in assuring prospective clients that an annulment may be obtained in four to six
months from the time of the filing of the case,[19] he in fact encourages people, who might have
otherwise been disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so.

Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation to
be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is made in a modest and
decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the bar.[20] Thus, the use of simple signs
stating the name or names of the lawyers, the office and residence address and fields of practice, as well
as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible. Even the use of calling
cards is now acceptable.[21] Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards
of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief biographical and informative data is likewise allowable. As
explicitly stated in Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.:[22]

Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyers name and the names
of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law
practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation,
degrees and other educational distinctions; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal
authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and committees
thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law
lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients
regularly represented.

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally for
other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and
informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit
his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management, or contents of which are calculated or
likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower dignity or standing of the profession.

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement
of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and
special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm
or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of
the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but
not under a designation of special branch of law. (emphasis and italics supplied)

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found GUILTY of violation of
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of
Court. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon receipt of this
Resolution. He is likewise STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt
with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

15.

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-41862 February 7, 1992

B. R. SEBASTIAN ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner,

vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS, EULOGIO B. REYES, NICANOR G. SALAYSAY, in his capacity as Provincial Sheriff
of Rizal, and ANTONIO MARINAS, in his capacity as Deputy Sheriff, respondents.

Benito P. Fabie for petitioner.

Ildefonso de Guzman-Mendiola for private respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is a petition for prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary injunction, to review the
Resolution dated 10 November 1975 of respondent Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. No. 53546-R denying
petitioner's motion to reinstate its appeal, earlier dismissed for failure to file the Appellant's Brief.

The material operative facts of this case, as gathered from the pleadings of the parties, are not disputed.
Eulogio B. Reyes, now deceased, filed an action for damages with the then Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, against the Director of Public Works, the Republic of the
Philippines and petitioner herein, B. R. Sebastian Enterprises, Inc. The case was docketed as Civil Case
No. 757-R. 1

On 7 May 1973, the trial court rendered a decision finding petitioner liable for damages but absolving
the other defendants. 2

Petitioner, thru its counsel, the law firm of Baizas, Alberto and Associates, timely appealed the adverse
decision to the respondent Court of Appeals, which docketed the case as C.A.-G.R. No. 53546-R. 3

During the pendency of the appeal, the plaintiff-appellee therein, Eulogio B. Reyes, died. Upon prior
leave of the respondent Court, he was substituted by his heirs — Enrique N. Reyes, Felicisima R.
Natividad, Donna Marie N. Reyes and Renne Marie N. Ryes — who are now the private respondents in
this present petition.

On 19 February 1974, petitioner, thru its then counsel of record, received notice to file Appellant's Brief
within 45 days from receipt thereof. It had, therefore, until 5 April 1974 within which to comply.

Counsel for petitioner failed to file the Brief; thus, on 9 July 1974, respondent Court issued a Resolution
requiring said counsel to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file the
Appellant's Brief within the reglementary period. 4 A copy of this Resolution was received by counsel for
petitioner on 17 July 1974. 5

As the latter failed to comply with the above Resolution, respondent Court, on 9 September 1974, issued
another Resolution this time dismissing petitioner's appeal:

It appearing that counsel for defendant-appellant failed to show cause why the appeal should not be
dismissed (for failure to file the appellant's brief within the reglementary period which expired on April
5, 1974) within the period of 10 days fixed in the resolution of July 9, 1974, copy of which was received
by said counsel on July 17, 1974; . . . 6
On 28 September 1974, petitioner, this time thru the BAIZAS LAW OFFICE, filed a motion for
reconsideration 7 of the resolution dismissing its appeal alleging that as a result of the death of Atty.
Crispin Baizas, senior partner in the law firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES, the affairs of the said
firm are still being settled between Atty. Jose Baizas (son of Crispin Baizas) and Atty. Ruby Alberto, the
latter having established her own law office; furthermore, Atty. Rodolfo Espiritu, the lawyer who
handled this case in the trial court and who is believed to have also attended to the preparation of the
Appellant's Brief but failed to submit it through oversight and inadvertence, had also left the firm.

In its Resolution of 9 October 1974, respondent Court denied the motion for reconsideration, stating
that:

Upon consideration of the motion of counsel for defendant-appellant, praying, on the grounds therein
stated, that the resolution of September 9, 1974, dismissing the appeal, be set aside, and that appellant
be granted a reasonable period of time within which to file its brief: considering that six (6) months had
elapsed since the expiration of the original period and more than two and one-half (2-½) months since
counsel received copy of the resolution requiring him to show cause why the appeal should not be
dismissed for failure to file brief; Motion Denied. 8

No action having been taken by petitioner from the above Resolution within the period to file a petition
for review, the same became final and executory, and the records of the case were remanded to the
court of origin for execution.

The trial court issued a writ of execution on 21 October 1975. 9 Pursuant thereto, respondent Provincial
Sheriff and Deputy Sheriff attached petitioner's Hough Pay Loader with Hercules Diesel Engine and
issued on 5 November 1975 a Notice of Sheriff's Sale, scheduling for Friday, 14 November 1975 at 10:00
o'clock in the morning, the auction sale thereof. 10

On 6 November 1975, petitioner filed with respondent Court a Motion to Reinstate Appeal with Prayer
for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction 11 dated 5 November 1975, and containing the following
allegations:

1. That late as it may be, this Honorable Court has the inherent power to modify and set aside its
processes, in the interest of justice, especially so in this case when the case was dismissed on account of
the untimely death of Atty. Crispin D. Baizas, counsel of BRSEI (B.R. Sebastian Enterprises, Inc.).
2. That to dismiss the case for failure to file the appellant's brief owing to the untimely death of
the late Atty. Crispin D. Baizas would be tantamount to denying BRSEI its (sic) day in court, and is,
therefore, a clear and unmistakable denial of due process on the part of BRSEI.

3. That to reinstate BRSEI's appeal would not impair the rights of the parties, since all that BRSEI is
asking for, is a day in court to be heard on appeal in order to have the unfair, unjust and unlawful
decision, set aside and reversed.

The respondent Court denied the said motion in its Resolution of 10 November 1975: 12

. . . it appearing that appellant was represented by the law firm of Baizas, Alberto & Associates, and
while Atty. Baizas died on January 16, 1974, his law firm was not dissolved since it received the notice to
file brief on February 19, 1974, and the copy of the Resolution of July 9, 1974, requiring appellant to
show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed was received by the law firm on July 17, 1974 and
no cause was shown; . . .

Hence, on 13 November 1975, petitioner filed the original petition 13 in this case against the Court of
Appeals, Eulogio B. Reyes, Nicanor G. Salaysay, as Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, and Antonio Marinas, as
Deputy Sheriff. The petition likewise prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order.

In the Resolution of 13 November 1975, this Court required respondents to comment on the petition
within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, and issued a Temporary Restraining Order. 14

On 12 January 1976, respondents filed a Partial Comment on the Petition with a Motion to Suspend the
Proceedings 15 on the ground that respondent Eulogio B. Reyes is already dead and his lawful heirs had
already been ordered substituted for him during the pendency of the appeal before the respondent
Court of Appeals.

In the Resolution of 21 January 1976, this Court ordered petitioner to amend its petition within then (10)
days from receipt of notice, and suspended the filing of respondents' Comment until after the
amendment is presented and admitted. 16
In compliance therewith, petitioner filed on 9 February 1976 a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended
Petition to which it attached the said Amended Petition. 17 The amendment consists in the substitution
of Eulogio B. Reyes with his heirs.

This Court admitted the Amended Petition 18 and required the respondents to file their Comment
within ten (10) days from notice thereof, which they complied with on 5 April 1976. 19 Petitioner filed
its Reply to the Comment on 29 April 1976. 20

In the Resolution of 12 May 1976, this Court denied the petition for lack of merit: 21

L-41862 (B.R. Sebastian Enterprises, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et. al.). — Considering the allegations,
issues and arguments adduced in the amended petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the
Court of Appeals, respondents' comment thereon, as well as petitioner's reply to said comment, the
Court Resolved to DENY the petition for lack of merit.

However, on 31 May 1976, petitioner filed a motion for its reconsideration 22 claiming that since it was
deprived of the right to appeal without fault on its part, the petition should be given due course.

Respondents submitted on 22 July 1976 their Comment 23 to said Motion for Reconsideration.

On 10 September 1976, this Court resolved to reconsider 24 its Resolution of 12 May 1976 and required
both parties to submit simultaneously their respective Memoranda within thirty (30) days from notice
thereof.

Petitioner submitted its Memorandum on 5 November 1976 25 while respondents submitted theirs on
22 November 1976. 26 On 29 November 1976, this Court deemed the present case submitted for
decision. 27
The sole issue to be addressed is whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals gravely abused its
discretion in denying petitioner's motion to reinstate its appeal, previously dismissed for failure to file
the Appellant's Brief.

Petitioner, in its Memorandum, extensively expounds on respondent Court's authority to reinstate

dismissed appeals and cites as basis thereof the decision of this Court in Heirs of Clemente Celestino vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., 28 Indeed, in said case, this Court affirmed the resolution of the Court of
Appeals — reinstating an appeal after being dismissed for failure by the appellants therein to file their
brief, and after entry of judgment and remand of the records to the lower court — and cancelled the
entry of judgment, requiring the lower court to return the records to the Court of Appeals and admit
appellant's brief. Said case, however, had a peculiar or singular factual situation" which prompted the
Court of Appeals to grant the relief and which this Court found sufficient to justify such action. As this
Court, through Associate Justice Ramon Aquino, said:

We are of the opinion that under the peculiar or singular factual situation in this case and to forestall a
miscarriage of justice the resolution of the Court of Appeals reinstating the appeal should be upheld.

That Court dismissed the appeal of the Pagtakhans in the mistaken belief that they had abandoned it
because they allegedly failed to give to their counsel the money needed for paying the cost of printing
their brief.

But presumably the Appellate Court realized later that fraud might have been practised on appellants
Pagtakhans since their oppositions were not included in the record on appeal. In (sic) sensed that there
was some irregularity in the actuations of their lawyer and that Court (sic) itself had been misled into
dismissing the appeal.

Counsel for the Pagtakhans could have furnished them with copies of his motions for extension of time
to file brief so that they would have known that the Court of Appeals had been apprised of their alleged
failure to defray the cost of printing their brief and they could have articulated their reaction directly to
the Court. Counsel could have moved in the Appellate Court that he be allowed to withdraw from the
case or that the Pagtakhans be required to manifest whether they were still desirous of prosecuting
their appeal or wanted a mimeographed brief to be filed for them (See People vs. Cawili, L-30543,
August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 728). Since counsel did none of those things, his representation that the
appellants had evinced lack of interest in pursuing their appeal is difficult to believe.
If the appellate court has not yet lost its jurisdiction, it may exercise its discretion in reinstating an
appeal, having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case and the demands of substantial justice
(Alquiza vs. Alquiza, L-23342, February 10, 1968, 22 SCRA 494, 66 O.G. 276; C. Vda. de Ordoveza vs.
Raymundo, 62 Phil. 275; Chavez vs. Ganzon, 108 Phil. 6).

But even if it has already lost jurisdiction over the appeal by reason of the remand of the record to the
lower court, it, nevertheless, has the inherent right to recall the remittitur or the remand of the record
to the lower court if it had rendered a decision or issued a resolution which was induced by fraud
practised upon it. Such a right is not affected by the statutory provision that after the record has been
remanded, the appellate court has no further jurisdiction over the appeal (5 Am Jur. 2nd 433 citing
Lovett vs. State, 29 Fla. 384, 11 So. 176; 84 ALR 595; State vs. Ramirez, 34 Idaho 623, 203 Pac. 279).

In the instant case, no fraud is involved; what obtain is simple negligence on the part of petitioner's
counsel, which is neither excusable nor unavoidable. Petitioner thus failed to demonstrate sufficient
cause to warrant a favorable action on its plea.

As held in Chavez, et al. vs. Ganzon, et al., 29 and reiterated in Negros Stevedoring Co., Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, 30 We said:

Granting that the power or discretion to reinstate an appeal that had been dismissed is included in or
implied from the power or discretion to dismiss an appeal, still such power or discretion must be
exercised upon a showing of good and sufficient cause, in like manner as the power or discretion vested
in the appellate court to allow extensions of time for the filing of briefs. There must be such a showing
which would call for, prompt and justify its exercise (sic). Otherwise, it cannot and must not be upheld.

To justify its failure to file the Appellant's Brief, petitioner relies mainly on the death of Atty. Crispin
Baizas and the supposed confusion it brought to the firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES. It says: 31

Petitioner, thru its president Bernardo R. Sebastian, engaged the services of Atty. Crispin D. Baizas to
handle its defense in Civil Case No. 757-R; however, it appears that Atty. Baizas entered petitioner's case
as a case to be handled by his law firm operating under the name and style "Crispin D. Baizas &
Associates." Hence, the Answer to the complaint, Answer to Cross-Claim, and Answer to Fourth-party
Complaint filed for petitioner in said case, evince that the law firm "Crispin D. Baizas & Associates"
represents petitioner in the action.

After rendition of the assailed Decision of the trial court, petitioner's counsel appears to have changed
its firm name to "Baizas, Alberto & Associates." The appeal was thus pursued for petitioner by the law
firm "Baizas, Alberto & Associates."

On January 16, 1974, Atty. Crispin D. Baizas died as a result of a brief heart attack. In consequence (sic)
of his death, the law firm "Baizas, Alberto & Associates" was in a terribly confused state of affairs. In
effect, said law firm was dissolved. Atty. Ruby Alberto formed her own law office and other associates
left the dissolved law firms (sic) joining other offices or putting up their own. Atty. Jose Baizas, son of
deceased Crispin D. Baizas, took over the management of why may have been left of his father's office, it
appearing that some, if not many, cases of the defunct office were taken over by the associates who left
the firm upon its dissolution.

But, none of the former partners and associates/assistants of the dissolved law firm filed the required
appellant's brief for herein petitioner in its appealed case before the respondent Court of Appeals. No
notice was served upon petitioner by any of the surviving associates of the defunct law firm that its
appellant's brief was due for filing or that the law office had been dissolved and that the law office had
been dissolved and that none of the lawyers herein formerly connected desired to handle the appealed
case of petitioner. . . .

The circumstances that the law firm "Baizas, Alberto & Associates" was dissolved and that none of the
associates took over petitioner's case, and no notice of such state of affairs was given to petitioner who
could have engaged the services of another lawyer to prosecute its appeal before respondent Court,
constitutes (sic) an UNAVOIDABLE CASUALTY that entitles petitioner to the relief prayed for. On the
other hand, the non-dissolution of said law firm "Baizas, Alberto & Associates" will not defeat
petitioner's claim for relief since, in such event, the said firm had ABANDONED petitioner's cause, which
act constitutes fraud and/or reckless inattention the result of which is deprivation of petitioner's day in
court. In the abovementioned Yuseco case, this Honorable Court had emphatically and forcefully
declared that it will always be disposed to grant relief to parties aggrieved by perfidy, fraud, reckless
inattention and downright incompetence of lawyers, which has the consequence of depriving their day
(sic) in court.
We find no merit in petitioner's contentions. Petitioner's counsel was the law firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO &
ASSOCIATES and not merely Atty. Crispin Baizas. Hence, the death of the latter did not extinguish the
lawyer-client relationship between said firm and petitioner.

In Gutierrez & Sons, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 32 the appeal filed by the law firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO &
ASSOCIATES on behalf of respondent therein was dismissed for failure to comply with the requisites
enumerated in the Rules of Court; the excuse presented by said counsel was also the death of Atty.
Crispin Baizas. This Court held therein that:

The death of Attorney Baizas was not a valid excuse on the part of his associates for not attending to
Alvendia's appeal, supposing arguendo that his office was solely entrusted with the task of representing
Alvendia in the Court of Appeals. Attorney Espiritu (not Attorney Baizas) was the one actually
collaborating with Viola in handling Alvendia's case. He did not file a formal appearance in the Court of
Appeals.

Undoubtedly, there was inexcusable negligence on the part of petitioner's counsel in failing to file the
Appellant's Brief. As revealed by the records, petitioner's counsel, the BAIZAS ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES
law firm, received the notice to file Brief on 19 February 1974. It failed to do so within the 45 days
granted to it. Said law firm also received a copy of the respondent Court's Resolution of 9 July 1974
requiring it to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file the Brief within the
reglementary period. Petitioner chose not to comply with it, thus compelling the respondent Court to
issue on 9 September 1974 a Resolution dismissing the appeal, a copy of which the former also received.
Then, on 28 September 1974, the BAIZAS LAW OFFICE moved for reconsideration of the said Resolution
which respondent Court denied in its Resolution of 9 October 1974. Nothing more was heard from
petitioner until after a year when, on 6 November 1975, it filed the instant petition in reaction to the
issuance of a writ of execution by the trial court following receipt of the records for the respondent
Court.

The "confusion" in the office of the law firm following the death of Atty. Crispin Baizas is not a valid
justification for its failure to file the Brief. With Baizas' death, the responsibility of Atty. Alberto and his
Associates to the petitioner as counsel remained until withdrawal by the former of their appearance in
the manner provided by the Rules of Court. This is so because it was the law firm which handled the
case for petitioner before both the trial and appellate courts. That Atty. Espiritu, an associate who was
designated to handle the case, later left the office after the death of Atty. Baizas is of no moment since
others in the firm could have replaced him.. Upon receipt of the notice to file Brief, the law firm should
have re-assigned the case to another associate or, it could have withdrawn as counsel in the manner
provided by the Rules of Court so that the petitioner could contract the services of a new lawyer.

In the Negros Stevedoring case, supra., this Court held:

The negligence committed in the case at bar cannot be considered excusable, nor (sic) is it unavoidable.
Time and again the Court has admonished law firms to adopt a system of distributing pleadings and
notices, whereby lawyers working therein receive promptly notices and pleadings intended for them, so
that they will always be informed of the status of their cases. Their Court has also often repeated that
the negligence of clerks which adversely affect the cases handled by lawyers, is binding upon the latter.

Compounding such negligence is the failure of the BAIZAS LAW OFFICE, which filed on 28 September
1974 the motion for reconsider the Resolution of 9 September 1974, to take any further appropriate
action after the respondent Court denied said motion on 9 October 1974. The appearance of said
counsel is presumed to be duly authorized by petitioner. The latter has neither assailed nor questioned
such appearance.

The rule is settled that negligence of counsel binds the client. 33

Moreover, petitioner itself was guilty of negligence when it failed to make inquiries from counsel
regarding its case. As pointed out by respondents, the president of petitioner corporation claims to be
the intimate friend of Atty. Crispin Baizas; hence, the death of the latter must have been known to the
former. 34 This fact should have made petitioner more vigilant with respect to the case at bar. Petitioner
failed to act with prudence and diligence, thus, its plea that they were not accorded the right to
procedural due process cannot elicit either approval or sympathy. 35

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that there was failure to show a good and sufficient cause which
would justify the reinstatement of petitioner's appeal. Respondent Court of Appeals did not them
commit any grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioner's motion to reinstate its appeal.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED and the temporary restraining order issued in this case is
lifted.
Costs against petitioner.

IT SO ORDERED.

DIANA RAMOS,

Complainant,

A. C. No. 6788

(Formerly, CBD 382)

-versus-

Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,

CARPIO,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CORONA,

CARPIO MORALES,

AZCUNA,

TINGA,

CHICO-NAZARIO,*

GARCIA,

VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA and

REYES, JJ.

ATTY. JOSE R. IMBANG,

Respondent.

Promulgated:

August 23, 2007

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

This is a complaint for disbarment or suspension[1] against Atty. Jose R. Imbang for multiple violations of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.

THE COMPLAINT

In 1992, the complainant Diana Ramos sought the assistance of respondent Atty. Jose R. Imbang in filing
civil and criminal actions against the spouses Roque and Elenita Jovellanos.[2] She gave respondent
P8,500 as attorney's fees but the latter issued a receipt for P5,000 only.[3]

The complainant tried to attend the scheduled hearings of her cases against the Jovellanoses. Oddly,
respondent never allowed her to enter the courtroom and always told her to wait outside. He would
then come out after several hours to inform her that the hearing had been cancelled and rescheduled.
[4] This happened six times and for each appearance in court, respondent charged her P350.

After six consecutive postponements, the complainant became suspicious. She personally inquired
about the status of her cases in the trial courts of Bian and San Pedro, Laguna. She was shocked to learn
that respondent never filed any case against the Jovellanoses and that he was in fact employed in the
Public Attorney's Office (PAO).[5]

RESPONDENT'S DEFENSE

According to respondent, the complainant knew that he was in the government service from the very
start. In fact, he first met the complainant when he was still a district attorney in the Citizen's Legal
Assistance Office (predecessor of PAO) of Bian, Laguna and was assigned as counsel for the
complainant's daughter.[6]

In 1992, the complainant requested him to help her file an action for damages against the Jovellanoses.
[7] Because he was with the PAO and aware that the complainant was not an indigent, he declined.[8]
Nevertheless, he advised the complainant to consult Atty. Tim Ungson, a relative who was a private
practitioner.[9] Atty. Ungson, however, did not accept the complainant's case as she was unable to
come up with the acceptance fee agreed upon.[10] Notwithstanding Atty. Ungson's refusal, the
complainant allegedly remained adamant. She insisted on suing the Jovellanoses. Afraid that she might
spend the cash on hand, the complainant asked respondent to keep the P5,000 while she raised the
balance of Atty. Ungson's acceptance fee.[11]

A year later, the complainant requested respondent to issue an antedated receipt because one of her
daughters asked her to account for the P5,000 she had previously given the respondent for safekeeping.
[12] Because the complainant was a friend, he agreed and issued a receipt dated July 15, 1992.[13]

On April 15, 1994, respondent resigned from the PAO.[14] A few months later or in September 1994, the
complainant again asked respondent to assist her in suing the Jovellanoses. Inasmuch as he was now a
private practitioner, respondent agreed to prepare the complaint. However, he was unable to finalize it
as he lost contact with the complainant.[15]

RECOMMENDATION OF THE IBP

Acting on the complaint, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) where the complaint was filed, received evidence from the parties. On November 22, 2004, the
CBD submitted its report and recommendation to the IBP Board of Governors.[16]

The CBD noted that the receipt[17] was issued on July 15, 1992 when respondent was still with the PAO.
[18] It also noted that respondent described the complainant as a shrewd businesswoman and that
respondent was a seasoned trial lawyer. For these reasons, the complainant would not have accepted a
spurious receipt nor would respondent have issued one. The CBD rejected respondent's claim that he
issued the receipt to accommodate a friend's request.[19] It found respondent guilty of violating the
prohibitions on government lawyers from accepting private cases and receiving lawyer's fees other than
their salaries.[20] The CBD concluded that respondent violated the following provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from a client.

Rule 18.01. A lawyer should not undertake a legal service which he knows or should know that he is not
qualified to render. However, he may render such service if, with the consent of his client, he can obtain
as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is competent on the matter.

Thus, it recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for three years and ordered
him to immediately return to the complainant the amount of P5,000 which was substantiated by the
receipt.[21]

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the findings of the CBD that respondent violated
Rules 1.01, 16.01 and 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It, however, modified the CBD's
recommendation with regard to the restitution of P5,000 by imposing interest at the legal rate,
reckoned from 1995 or, in case of respondent's failure to return the total amount, an additional
suspension of six months.[22]

THE COURT'S RULING

We adopt the findings of the IBP with modifications.

Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty and integrity.[23] More specifically, lawyers
in government service are expected to be more conscientious of their actuations as they are subject to
public scrutiny. They are not only members of the bar but also public servants who owe utmost fidelity
to public service.[24]

Government employees are expected to devote themselves completely to public service. For this
reason, the private practice of profession is prohibited. Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees provides:

Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. -- In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and
employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following constitute prohibited acts
and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto, public officials and employees during their
incumbency shall not:

xxx xxx xxx

(1) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided
that such practice will not conflict with their official function.[25]

Thus, lawyers in government service cannot handle private cases for they are expected to devote
themselves full-time to the work of their respective offices.

In this instance, respondent received P5,000 from the complainant and issued a receipt on July 15, 1992
while he was still connected with the PAO. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-
client relationship.[26] Respondent's admission that he accepted money from the complainant and the
receipt confirmed the presence of an attorney-client relationship between him and the complainant.
Moreover, the receipt showed that he accepted the complainant's case while he was still a government
lawyer. Respondent clearly violated the prohibition on private practice of profession.

Aggravating respondent's wrongdoing was his receipt of attorney's fees. The PAO was created for the
purpose of providing free legal assistance to indigent litigants.[27] Section 14(3), Chapter 5, Title III,
Book V of the Revised Administrative Code provides:

Sec. 14. xxx

The PAO shall be the principal law office of the Government in extending free legal assistance to
indigent persons in criminal, civil, labor, administrative and other quasi-judicial cases.[28]

As a PAO lawyer, respondent should not have accepted attorney's fees from the complainant as this was
inconsistent with the office's mission.[29] Respondent violated the prohibition against accepting legal
fees other than his salary.

Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE
RESPECT FOR THE LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Every lawyer is obligated to uphold the law.[30] This undertaking includes the observance of the above-
mentioned prohibitions blatantly violated by respondent when he accepted the complainant's cases and
received attorney's fees in consideration of his legal services. Consequently, respondent's acceptance of
the cases was also a breach of Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility because the
prohibition on the private practice of profession disqualified him from acting as the complainant's
counsel.
Aside from disregarding the prohibitions against handling private cases and accepting attorney's fees,
respondent also surreptitiously deceived the complainant. Not only did he fail to file a complaint against
the Jovellanoses (which in the first place he should not have done), respondent also led the complainant
to believe that he really filed an action against the Jovellanoses. He even made it appear that the cases
were being tried and asked the complainant to pay his appearance fees for hearings that never took
place. These acts constituted dishonesty, a violation of the lawyer's oath not to do any falsehood.[31]

Respondent's conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good moral character required of all
lawyers, specially one occupying a public office. Lawyers in public office are expected not only to refrain
from any act or omission which tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government
but also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty
and fair dealing. A government lawyer is a keeper of public faith and is burdened with a high degree of
social responsibility, higher than his brethren in private practice.[32]

There is, however, insufficient basis to find respondent guilty of violating Rule 16.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Respondent did not hold the money for the benefit of the complainant but
accepted it as his attorney's fees. He neither held the amount in trust for the complainant (such as an
amount delivered by the sheriff in satisfaction of a judgment obligation in favor of the client)[33] nor
was it given to him for a specific purpose (such as amounts given for filing fees and bail bond).[34]
Nevertheless, respondent should return the P5,000 as he, a government lawyer, was not entitled to
attorney's fees and not allowed to accept them.[35]

WHEREFORE, Atty. Jose R. Imbang is found guilty of violating the lawyers oath, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and
Canon 18, Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby DISBARRED
from the practice of law and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. He is also
ordered to return to complainant the amount of P5,000 with interest at the legal rate, reckoned from
1995, within 10 days from receipt of this resolution.

Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal records of respondent in the Office of the Bar
Confidant and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of
the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

16. A.C. No. 6707 March 24, 2006

GISELA HUYSSEN, Complainant,

vs.

ATTY. FRED L. GUTIERREZ, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This treats of a Complaint1 for Disbarment filed by Gisela Huyssen against respondent Atty. Fred L.
Gutierrez.

Complainant alleged that in 1995, while respondent was still connected with the Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation (BID), she and her three sons, who are all American citizens, applied for Philippine Visas
under Section 13[g] of the Immigration Law. Respondent told complainant that in order that their visa
applications will be favorably acted upon by the BID they needed to deposit a certain sum of money for
a period of one year which could be withdrawn after one year. Believing that the deposit was indeed
required by law, complainant deposited with respondent on six different occasions from April 1995 to
April 1996 the total amount of US$20,000. Respondent prepared receipts/vouchers as proofs that he
received the amounts deposited by the complainant but refused to give her copies of official receipts
despite her demands. After one year, complainant demanded from respondent the return of US$20,000
who assured her that said amount would be returned. When respondent failed to return the sum
deposited, the World Mission for Jesus (of which complainant was a member) sent a demand letter to
respondent for the immediate return of the money. In a letter dated 1 March 1999, respondent
promised to release the amount not later than 9 March 1999. Failing to comply with his promise, the
World Mission for Jesus sent another demand letter. In response thereto, respondent sent complainant
a letter dated 19 March 1999 explaining the alleged reasons for the delay in the release of deposited
amount. He enclosed two blank checks postdated to 6 April and 20 April 1999 and authorized
complainant to fill in the amounts. When complainant deposited the postdated checks on their due
dates, the same were dishonored because respondent had stopped payment on the same. Thereafter,
respondent, in his letter to complainant dated 25 April 1999, explained the reasons for stopping
payment on the checks, and gave complainant five postdated checks with the assurance that said checks
would be honored. Complainant deposited the five postdated checks on their due dates but they were
all dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds or payment thereon was ordered
stopped by respondent. After respondent made several unfulfilled promises to return the deposited
amount, complainant referred the matter to a lawyer who sent two demand letters to respondent. The
demand letters remained unheeded.

Thus, a complaint2 for disbarment was filed by complainant in the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

On 15 November 2000, Victor C. Fernandez, Director for Bar Discipline, required3 respondent to submit
his answer within 15 days from receipt thereof.

In his Counter-Affidavit dated 2 July 2001,4 respondent denied the allegations in the complaint claiming
that having never physically received the money mentioned in the complaint, he could not have
appropriated or pocketed the same. He said the amount was used as payment for services rendered for
obtaining the permanent visas in the Philippines. Respondent explained thus:

a) Through a close-friend, Jovie Galaraga, a Pastor and likewise a friend of the complainant, the latter
was introduced to me at my office at the Bureau of Immigration with a big problem concerning their
stay in the Philippines, herself and three sons, one of which is already of major age while the two others
were still minors then. Their problem was the fact that since they have been staying in the Philippines
for almost ten (10) years as holders of missionary visas (9G) they could no longer extend their said status
as under the law and related polic[i]es of the government, missionary visa holders could only remain as
such for ten (10) years after which they could no longer extend their said status and have to leave the
country.

b) Studying their case and being U.S. Citizen (sic), I advised them that they better secure a permanent
visa under Section 3 of the Philippine Immigration Law otherwise known as Quota Visa and thereafter,
provided them with list of the requirements in obtaining the said visa, one of which is that the applicant
must have a $40,000 deposited in the bank. I also inform that her son Marcus Huyssen, who was already
of major age, has to have the same amount of show money separate of her money as he would be
issued separate visa, while her two minor children would be included as her dependents in her said visa
application. I advised them to get a lawyer (sic), complainant further requested me to refer to her to a
lawyer to work for their application, which I did and contacted the late Atty. Mendoza, an Immigration
lawyer, to do the job for the complainant and her family.
c) The application was filed, processed and followed-up by the said Atty. Mendoza until the same was
finished and the corresponding permanent visa were obtained by the complainant and her family. Her
son Marcus Huyssen was given an independent permanent visa while the other two were made as
dependents of the complainant. In between the processing of the papers and becoming very close to
the complainant, I became the intermediary between complainant and their counsel so much that every
amount that the latter would request for whatever purpose was coursed through me which request
were then transmitted to the complainant and every amount of money given by the complainant to
their counsel were coursed thru me which is the very reason why my signature appears in the vouchers
attached in the complaint-affidavit;

d) That as time goes by, I noticed that the amount appeared to be huge for services of a lawyer that I
myself began to wonder why and, to satisfy my curiosity, I met Atty. Mendoza and inquired from him
regarding the matter and the following facts were revealed to me:

1) That what was used by the complainant as her show money from the bank is not really her money but
money of World Mission for Jesus, which therefore is a serious violation of the Immigration Law as there
was a misrepresentation. This fact was confirmed later when the said entity sent their demand letter to
the undersigned affiant and which is attached to the complaint-affidavit;

2) That worst, the same amount used by the complainant, was the very same amount used by her son
Marcus Huyssen, in obtaining his separate permanent visa. These acts of the complainant and her son
could have been a ground for deportation and likewise constitute criminal offense under the
Immigration Law and the Revised Penal Code. These could have been the possible reason why
complainant was made to pay for quite huge amount.

e) That after they have secured their visas, complainant and her family became very close to
undersigned and my family that I was even invited to their residence several times;

f) However after three years, complainant demanded the return of their money given and surprisingly
they want to recover the same from me. By twist of fate, Atty. Mendoza is no longer around, he died
sometime 1997;

g) That it is unfortunate that the real facts of the matter is now being hidden and that the amount of
money is now being sought to be recovered from me;
h) That the fact is I signed the vouchers and being a lawyer I know the consequences of having signed
the same and therefore I had to answer for it and pay. I tried to raised the fund needed but up to the
present my standby loan application has not been released and was informed that the same would only
be forthcoming second week of August. The same should have been released last March but was
aborted due to prevalent condition. The amount to be paid, according to the complainant has now
become doubled plus attorney’s fees of P200,000.00.

Complainant submitted her evidence on 4 September 2002 and April 2003, and filed her Formal Offer of
Evidence on 25 August 2003.

On several occasions, the complaint was set for reception of respondent’s evidence but the scheduled
hearings (11 settings) were all reset at the instance of the respondent who was allegedly out of the
country to attend to his client’s needs. Reception of respondent’s evidence was scheduled for the
last time on 28 September 2004 and again respondent failed to appear, despite due notice and without
just cause.

On 5 November 2004, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan submitted her report5
recommending the disbarment of respondent. She justified her recommendation in this manner:

At the outset it should be noted that there is no question that respondent received the amount of
US$20,000 from complainant, as respondent himself admitted that he signed the vouchers (Annexes A
to F of complainant) showing his receipt of said amount from complainant. Respondent however claims
that he did not appropriate the same for himself but that he delivered the said amount to a certain Atty.
Mendoza. This defense raised by respondent is untenable considering the documentary evidence
submitted by complainant. On record is the 1 March 1999 letter of respondent addressed to the World
Mission for Jesus (Annex H of Complaint) where he stated thus:

"I really understand your feelings on the delay of the release of the deposit but I repeat, nobody really
intended that the thing would happen that way. Many events were the causes of the said delay
particularly the death of then Commissioner L. Verceles, whose sudden death prevented us the needed
papers for the immediate release. It was only from compiling all on the first week of January this year,
that all the said papers were recovered, hence, the process of the release just started though some
important papers were already finished as early as the last quarter of last year. We are just going
through the normal standard operating procedure and there is no day since January that I do not make
any follow – ups on the progress of the same."

and his letter dated 19 March 1999 (Annex L of Complaint) where he stated thus:

"I am sending you my personal checks to cover the refund of the amount deposited by your good self in
connection with the procurement of your permanent visa and that of your family. It might take some
more time before the Bureau could release the refund as some other pertinent papers are being still
compiled are being looked at the files of the late Commissioner Verceles, who approved your visa and
who died of heart attack. Anyway, I am sure that everything would be fine later as all the documents
needed are already intact. This is just a bureaucratic delay."

From the above letters, respondent makes it appear that the US$20,000 was officially deposited with
the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. However, if this is true, how come only Petty Cash Vouchers
were issued by respondent to complainant to prove his receipt of the said sum and official receipts
therefore were never issued by the said Bureau? Also, why would respondent issue his personal checks
to cover the return of the money to complainant if said amount was really officially deposited with the
Bureau of Immigration? All these actions of respondent point to the inescapable conclusion that
respondent received the money from complainant and appropriated the same for his personal use. It
should also be noted that respondent has failed to establish that the "late Atty. Mendoza" referred to in
his Counter-Affidavit really exists. There is not one correspondence from Atty. Mendoza regarding the
visa application of complainant and his family, and complainant has also testified that she never met this
Atty. Mendoza referred to by respondent.

Considering that respondent was able to perpetrate the fraud by taking advantage of his position with
the Board of Special Inquiry of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, makes it more reprehensible
as it has caused damage to the reputation and integrity of said office. It is submitted that respondent
has violated Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which reads:

"A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private
interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties."

On 4 November 2004, the IBP Board of Governors approved6 the Investigating Commissioner’s report
with modification, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence
on record and applicable laws and rules, and considering respondent’s violation of Rule 6.02 of Canon
6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez is hereby DISBARRED from the
practice of law and ordered to return the amount with legal interest from receipt of the money until
payment. This case shall be referred to the Office of the Ombudsman for prosecution for violation of
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Acts and to the Department of Justice for appropriate administrative
action.

We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should be severely sanctioned.

We begin with the veritable fact that lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official task
have more restrictions than lawyers in private practice. Want of moral integrity is to be more severely
condemned in a lawyer who holds a responsible public office.7

It is undisputed that respondent admitted8 having received the US$20,000 from complainant as shown
by his signatures in the petty cash vouchers9 and receipts10 he prepared, on the false representation
that that it was needed in complainant’s application for visa with the BID. Respondent denied he
misappropriated the said amount and interposed the defense that he delivered it to a certain Atty.
Mendoza who assisted complainant and children in their application for visa in the BID.11 Such defense
remains unsubstantiated as he failed to submit evidence on the matter. While he claims that Atty.
Mendoza already died, he did not present the death certificate of said Atty. Mendoza. Worse, the action
of respondent in shifting the blame to someone who has been naturally silenced by fate, is not only
impudent but downright ignominious. When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not
enough that he deny the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence
against him.12 He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at
all times is expected of him. In the case at bar, respondent clearly fell short of his duty. Records show
that even though he was given the opportunity to answer the charges and controvert the evidence
against him in a formal investigation, he failed, without any plausible reason, to appear several times
whenever the case was set for reception of his evidence despite due notice.

The defense of denial proferred by respondent is, thus, not convincing. It is settled that denial is
inherently a weak defense. To be believed, it must be buttressed by a strong evidence of non-culpability;
otherwise, such denial is purely self-serving and is with nil evidentiary value.
When respondent issued the postdated checks as his moral obligation, he indirectly admitted the
charge. Such admissions were also apparent in the following letters of respondent to complainant:

1) Letter13 dated 01 March 1992, pertinent portion of which reads:

Be that as it may, may I assure you for the last time that the said deposit is forthcoming, the latest of
which is 09 March 1999. Should it not be released on said date, I understand to pay the same to you out
of my personal money on said date. No more reasons and no more alibis. Send somebody here at the
office on that day and the amount would be given to you wether (sic) from the Bureau or from my own
personal money.

2) Letter14 dated 19 March 1999, reads in part:

I am sending you my personal checks to cover the refund of the amount deposited by your goodself in
connection with the procurement of your permanent visa and that of your family.

It might take some more time before the Bureau could release the refund as some other pertinent
papers are still being compiled and are being looked at the files of the late Commissioner Verceles, who
approved your visa and who died of heart attack. Anyway, I am sure that everything would be fine later
as all the documents needed are already intact. This is just a bureaucratic delay.

xxxx

As you would see, I have to pay you in peso. I have issued you 2 checks, one dated April 6, 1999 and the
other one dated April 20, 1999. I leave the amount vacant because I would want you to fill them up on
their due dates the peso equivalent to $10,000 respectively. This is to be sure that the peso equivalent
of your P20,000 would be well exchanged. I have postdated them to enable me to raise some more
pesos to cover the whole amount but don’t worry as the Lord had already provided me the means.

3) Letter15 dated 25 April 1999 provides:

Anyway, let me apologize for all these troubles. You are aware that I have done my very best for the
early return of your money but the return is becoming bleak as I was informed that there are still papers
lacking. When I stopped the payment of the checks I issued, I was of the impression that everything is
fine, but it is not. I guess it is time for me to accept the fact that I really have to personally return the
money out of my own. The issue should stop at my end. This is the truth that I must face. It may hurt me
financially but it would set me free from worries and anxieties.

I have arranged for a loan from money lenders and was able to secure one last Saturday the releases of
which are on the following:

May 4, 1999- 200,000

May 11, 1999 -200,000

May 20, 1999-200,000

June 4, 1999-200,000

I have given my property (lot situated in the province) as my collateral.

I am therefore putting an end to this trouble. I am issuing four checks which I assure you will be
sufficiently funded on their due dates by reason of my aforestated loans. Just bear with me for the last
time, if any of these checks, is returned, don’t call me anymore. Just file the necessary action against
me, I just had to put an end to this matter and look forward. x x x

4) Letter16 dated 12 May 1999, which reads:

The other day I deposited the amount of P289,000 to the bank to cover the first check I issued. In fact I
stopped all payments to all other checks that are becoming due to some of my creditors to give
preference to the check I issued to you.

This morning when I went to the Bank, I learned that the bank instead of returning the other checks I
requested for stop payment - instead honored them and mistakenly returned your check. This was a
very big surprise to me and discouragement for I know it would really upset you.

In view of this I thought of sending you the amount of P200,000 in cash which I initially plan to withdraw
from the Bank. However, I could not entrust the same amount to the bearer nor can I bring the same to
your place considering that its quite a big amount. I am just sending a check for you to immediately
deposit today and I was assured by the bank that it would be honored this time.

Normally, this is not the actuation of one who is falsely accused of appropriating the money of another.
As correctly observed by the Investigating Commissioner, respondent would not have issued his
personal checks if said amount were officially deposited with the BID. This is an admission of
misconduct.

Respondent’s act of asking money from complainant in consideration of the latter’s pending
application for visas is violative of Rule 1.0117 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits
members of the Bar from engaging or participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts.
Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of Rule 6.0218 of the Code which bars lawyers in government
service from promoting their private interest. Promotion of private interest includes soliciting gifts or
anything of monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval of his office or which may be
affected by the functions of his office.19 Respondent’s conduct in office betrays the integrity and good
moral character required from all lawyers, especially from one occupying a high public office. A lawyer in
public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to lessen the
trust and confidence of the citizenry in government; he must also uphold the dignity of the legal
profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer
in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social
responsibility, perhaps higher than his brethren in private practice.

In a desperate attempt to put up a smoke or to camouflage his misdeed, he went on committing another
by issuing several worthless checks, thereby compounding his case.
In a recent case, we have held that the issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross misconduct,20 as
the effect "transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and
touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee
or holder, but also an injury to the public since the circulation of valueless commercial papers can very
well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the
welfare of society and the public interest. Thus, paraphrasing Black’s definition, a drawer who issues
an unfunded check deliberately reneges on his private duties he owes his fellow men or society in a
manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or good morals."21

Consequently, we have held that the act of a person in issuing a check knowing at the time of the
issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the
payment of the check in full upon its presentment, is also a manifestation of moral turpitude.22

Respondent’s acts are more despicable. Not only did he misappropriate the money of complainant;
worse, he had the gall to prepare receipts with the letterhead of the BID and issued checks to cover up
his misdeeds. Clearly, he does not deserve to continue, being a member of the bar.

Time and again, we have declared that the practice of law is a noble profession. It is a special privilege
bestowed only upon those who are competent intellectually, academically and morally. A lawyer must
at all times conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients and the public at large, with
honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach. He must faithfully perform his duties to society, to
the bar, to the courts and to his clients. A violation of the high standards of the legal profession subjects
the lawyer to administrative sanctions which includes suspension and disbarment.23 More importantly,
possession of good moral character must be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the
privilege of law practice; otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege.24

Indeed, the primary objective of administrative cases against lawyers is not only to punish and discipline
the erring individual lawyers but also to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the courts
and the public from the misconduct of lawyers, and to remove from the legal profession persons whose
utter disregard of their lawyer’s oath have proven them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed
in them as members of the bar.25 These pronouncement gain practical significance in the case at bar
considering that respondent was a former member of the Board of Special Inquiry of the BID. It bears
stressing also that government lawyers who are public servants owe fidelity to the public service, a
public trust. As such, government lawyers should be more sensitive to their professional obligations as
their disreputable conduct is more likely to be magnified in the public eye.26
As a lawyer, who was also a public officer, respondent miserably failed to cope with the strict demands
and high standards of the legal profession.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a lawyer may be disbarred or
suspended by this Court for any of the following acts: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in
office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude ; (6) violation of
the lawyer’s oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (8) willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so.27

In Atty. Vitriolo v. Atty. Dasig,28 we ordered the disbarment of a lawyer who, during her tenure as OIC,
Legal Services, Commission on Higher Education, demanded sums of money as consideration for the
approval of applications and requests awaiting action by her office. In Lim v. Barcelona,29 we also
disbarred a senior lawyer of the National Labor Relations Commission, who was caught by the National
Bureau of Investigation in the act of receiving and counting money extorted from a certain person.

Respondent’s acts constitute gross misconduct; and consistent with the need to maintain the high
standards of the Bar and thus preserve the faith of the public in the legal profession, respondent
deserves the ultimate penalty of expulsion from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers.30

WHEREFORE, Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and ordered to return
the amount he received from the complainant with legal interest from his receipt of the money until
payment. This case shall be referred to the Office of the Ombudsman for criminal prosecution for
violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Acts and to the Department of Justice for appropriate
administrative action. Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Bar Confidant to be spread on the
records of the respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters; and
the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
17.

JOVITO S. OLAZO,

Complainant,

- versus -

JUSTICE DANTE O. TINGA (Ret.),

Respondent.

A.M. No. 10-5-7-SC

Present:

CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,

CARPIO MORALES,

*VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BRION,

PERALTA,

BERSAMIN,

DEL CASTILLO,

ABAD,

VILLARAMA, JR.,

PEREZ,

MENDOZA, and

SERENO, JJ.

Promulgated:

December 7, 2010

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before us is the disbarment case against retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga
(respondent) filed by Mr. Jovito S. Olazo (complainant). The respondent is charged of violating Rule 6.02,
[1] Rule 6.03[2] and Rule 1.01[3] of the Code of Professional Responsibility for representing conflicting
interests.

Factual Background

In March 1990, the complainant filed a sales application covering a parcel of land situated in Barangay
Lower Bicutan in the Municipality of Taguig. The land (subject land) was previously part of Fort Andres
Bonifacio that was segregated and declared open for disposition pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476,[4]
issued on January 7, 1986, and Proclamation No. 172,[5] issued on October 16, 1987.

To implement Proclamation No. 172, Memorandum No. 119 was issued by then Executive Secretary
Catalino Macaraig, creating a Committee on Awards whose duty was to study, evaluate, and make a
recommendation on the applications to purchase the lands declared open for disposition. The
Committee on Awards was headed by the Director of Lands and the respondent was one of the
Committee members, in his official capacity as the Congressman of Taguig and Pateros (from 1987 to
1998); the respondents district includes the areas covered by the proclamations.

The First Charge: Violation of Rule 6.02

In the complaint,[6] the complainant claimed that the respondent abused his position as Congressman
and as a member of the Committee on Awards when he unduly interfered with the complainants sales
application because of his personal interest over the subject land. The complainant alleged that the
respondent exerted undue pressure and influence over the complainants father, Miguel P. Olazo, for the
latter to contest the complainants sales application and claim the subject land for himself. The
complainant also alleged that the respondent prevailed upon Miguel Olazo to accept, on various dates,
sums of money as payment of the latters alleged rights over the subject land. The complainant further
claimed that the respondent brokered the transfer of rights of the subject land between Miguel Olazo
and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, who is the nephew of the respondents deceased wife.

As a result of the respondents abuse of his official functions, the complainants sales application was
denied. The conveyance of rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez and his sales application were
subsequently given due course by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
The Second Charge: Violation of Rule 6.03

The second charge involves another parcel of land within the proclaimed areas belonging to Manuel
Olazo, the complainants brother. The complainant alleged that the respondent persuaded Miguel Olazo
to direct Manuel to convey his rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. As a result of the
respondents promptings, the rights to the land were transferred to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.

In addition, the complainant alleged that in May 1999, the respondent met with Manuel for the purpose
of nullifying the conveyance of rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The complainant
claimed that the respondent wanted the rights over the land transferred to one Rolando Olazo, the
Barangay Chairman of Hagonoy, Taguig. The respondent in this regard executed an Assurance where he
stated that he was the lawyer of Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.

The Third Charge: Violation of Rule 1.01

The complainant alleged that the respondent engaged in unlawful conduct considering his knowledge
that Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez was not a qualified beneficiary under Memorandum No. 119. The
complainant averred that Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez is not a bona fide resident of the proclaimed areas
and does not qualify for an award. Thus, the approval of his sales application by the Committee on
Awards amounted to a violation of the objectives of Proclamation No. 172 and Memorandum No. 119.

The complainant also alleged that the respondent violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 since he engaged in
the practice of law, within the one-year prohibition period, when he appeared as a lawyer for Ramon
Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez before the Committee on Awards.

In his Comment,[7] the respondent claimed that the present complaint is the third malicious charge filed
against him by the complainant. The first one was submitted before the Judicial and Bar Council when
he was nominated as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court; the second complaint is now pending
with the Office of the Ombudsman, for alleged violation of Section 3(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended.

With his own supporting documents, the respondent presented a different version of the antecedent
events.
The respondent asserted that Miguel Olazo owned the rights over the subject land and he later
conveyed these rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. Miguel Olazos rights over the subject land and the
transfer of his rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez were duly recognized by the Secretary of the DENR
before whom the conflict of rights over the subject land (between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez, on one hand, and the complainant on the other hand) was brought. In its decision, the DENR
found Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez a qualified applicant, and his application over the subject land was given
due course. The respondent emphasized that the DENR decision is now final and executory. It was
affirmed by the Office of the President, by the Court of Appeals and by the Supreme Court.

The respondent also advanced the following defenses:

(1) He denied the complainants allegation that Miguel Olazo told him (complainant) that the respondent
had been orchestrating to get the subject land. The respondent argued that this allegation was without
corroboration and was debunked by the affidavits of Miguel Olazo and Francisca Olazo, the
complainants sister.

(2) He denied the complainants allegation that he offered the complainant P50,000.00 for the subject
land and that he (the respondent) had exerted undue pressure and influence on Miguel Olazo to claim
the rights over the subject land. The respondent also denied that he had an inordinate interest in the
subject land.

(3) He claimed that there was nothing wrong in signing as a witness in Miguel Olazos affidavit where the
latter asserted his rights over the subject land. The affidavit merely attested to the truth.

(4) He asserted that he and Miguel Olazo were cousins and that the latter decided to sell his rights over
the subject land for the medical treatment of his heart condition and the illness of his daughter,
Francisca Olazo. The respondent insisted that the money he extended to them was a form of loan.

(5) The respondents participation in the transaction between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez
involved the payment of the loan that the respondent extended to Miguel Olazo.
(6) Manuels belated and secondhand allegation in his Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000,
regarding what his father told him, cannot prevail over his earlier Sinumpaang Salaysay with Francisca
Olazo, dated August 2, 1997. In the said Sinumpaang Salaysay, Manuel categorically asserted that his
father Miguel Olazo, not the complainant, was the farmer-beneficiary. Manuel also expressed his
agreement to the transfer of rights (Pagpapatibay Sa Paglilipat Ng Karapatan) in favor of Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez, and the withdrawal of his fathers application to give way to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguezs
application.

(7) The complainants allegation that the respondent had pressured and influenced Miguel Olazo to sell
the subject land was not sufficient as it was lacking in specificity and corroboration. The DENR decision
was clear that the complainant had no rights over the subject land.

The respondent additionally denied violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He
alleged that during his third term as Congressman from 1995 to 1997, the conflicting applications of the
complainant, Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez were not included in the agenda for
deliberation of the Committee on Awards. Rather, their conflicting claims and their respective
supporting documents were before the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of the DENR. This office
ruled over the conflicting claims only on August 2, 2000. This ruling became the basis of the decision of
the Secretary of the DENR.

Similarly, the respondent cannot be held liable under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility since the provision applies to lawyers in the government service who are allowed by law
to engage in private law practice and to those who, though prohibited from engaging in the practice of
law, have friends, former associates and relatives who are in the active practice of law.[8] In this regard,
the respondent had already completed his third term in Congress and his stint in the Committee on
Awards when he represented Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez on May 24, 1999.

Lastly, the respondent claimed that he cannot be held liable under Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility since he did not intervene in the disposition of the conflicting applications of the
complainant and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez because the applications were not submitted to the
Committee on Awards when he was still a member.

The Courts Ruling

Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for
misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official.[9] He may be disciplined by this Court
as a member of the Bar only when his misconduct also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer.[10]

The issue in this case calls for a determination of whether the respondents actions constitute a breach of
the standard ethical conduct first, while the respondent was still an elective public official and a member
of the Committee on Awards; and second, when he was no longer a public official, but a private lawyer
who represented a client before the office he was previously connected with.

After a careful evaluation of the pleadings filed by both parties and their respective pieces of evidence,
we resolve to dismiss the administrative complaint.

Accountability of a government lawyer in public office

Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility highlights the continuing standard of ethical conduct
to be observed by government lawyers in the discharge of their official tasks. In addition to the standard
of conduct laid down under R.A. No. 6713 for government employees, a lawyer in the government
service is obliged to observe the standard of conduct under the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Since public office is a public trust, the ethical conduct demanded upon lawyers in the government
service is more exacting than the standards for those in private practice. Lawyers in the government
service are subject to constant public scrutiny under norms of public accountability. They also bear the
heavy burden of having to put aside their private interest in favor of the interest of the public; their
private activities should not interfere with the discharge of their official functions.[11]

The first charge involves a violation of Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It imposes
the following restrictions in the conduct of a government lawyer:

A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private
interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.
The above provision prohibits a lawyer from using his or her public position to: (1) promote private
interests; (2) advance private interests; or (3) allow private interest to interfere with his or her public
duties. We previously held that the restriction extends to all government lawyers who use their public
offices to promote their private interests.[12]

In Huyssen v. Gutierrez,[13] we defined promotion of private interest to include soliciting gifts or

anything of monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval of his or her office, or may be
affected by the functions of his or her office. In Ali v. Bubong,[14] we recognized that private interest is
not limited to direct interest, but extends to advancing the interest of relatives. We also ruled that
private interest interferes with public duty when the respondent uses the office and his or her
knowledge of the intricacies of the law to benefit relatives.[15]

In Vitriolo v. Dasig,[16] we found the act of the respondent (an official of the Commission on Higher
Education) of extorting money from persons with applications or requests pending before her office to
be a serious breach of Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[17] We reached the same
conclusion in Huyssen, where we found the respondent (an employee of the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation) liable under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, based on the evidence
showing that he demanded money from the complainant who had a pending application for visas before
his office.[18]

Similarly, in Igoy v. Soriano[19] we found the respondent (a Court Attorney of this Court) liable for
violating Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, after considering the evidence showing
that he demanded and received money from the complainant who had a pending case before this Court.

Applying these legal precepts to the facts of the case, we find the absence of any concrete proof that the
respondent abused his position as a Congressman and as a member of the Committee on Awards in the
manner defined under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

First, the records do not clearly show if the complainants sales application was ever brought before the
Committee on Awards. By the complaints own account, the complainant filed a sales application in
March 1990 before the Land Management Bureau. By 1996, the complainants sales application was
pending before the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of the DENR due to the conflicting claims of
Miguel Olazo, and, subsequently, of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The records show that it was only on
August 2, 2000 that the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of the DENR rendered its decision, or after
the term of the respondents elective public office and membership to the Committee on Awards, which
expired in 1997.

These circumstances do not show that the respondent did in any way promote, advance or use his
private interests in the discharge of his official duties. To repeat, since the sales application was not
brought before the Committee on Awards when the respondent was still a member, no sufficient basis
exists to conclude that he used his position to obtain personal benefits. We note in this regard that the
denial of the complainants sales application over the subject land was made by the DENR, not by the
Committee on Awards.

Second, the complainants allegation that the respondent orchestrated the efforts to get the subject land
does not specify how the orchestration was undertaken. What appears clear in the records is the
uncorroborated Sinumpaang Salaysay of Miguel Olazo, dated May 25, 2003,[20] categorically stating
that the respondent had no interest in the subject land, and neither was he a contracting party in the
transfer of his rights over the subject land. In the absence of any specific charge, Olazos disclaimer is the
nearest relevant statement on the respondents alleged participation, and we find it to be in the
respondents favor.

Third, the other documents executed by Miguel Olazo, that the complainant presented to support his
claim that the respondent exerted undue pressure and influence over his father (namely: the letter,
dated June 22, 1996, to the DENR Regional Director-NCR;[21] the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 12,
1996;[22] and the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 17, 1996[23]), do not contain any reference to the
alleged pressure or force exerted by the respondent over Miguel Olazo. The documents merely showed
that the respondent helped Miguel Olazo in having his farm lots (covered by the proclaimed areas)
surveyed. They also showed that the respondent merely acted as a witness in the Sinumpaang Salaysay
dated July 17, 1996. To our mind, there are neutral acts that may be rendered by one relative to
another, and do not show how the respondent could have influenced the decision of Miguel Olazo to
contest the complainants sales application. At the same time, we cannot give any credit to the
Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000, of Manuel. They are not only hearsay but are contrary to
what Miguel Olazo states on the record. We note that Manuel had no personal knowledge, other than
what Miguel Olazo told him, of the force allegedly exerted by the respondent against Miguel Olazo.

In turn, the respondent was able to provide a satisfactory explanation - backed by corroborating
evidence - of the nature of the transaction in which he gave the various sums of money to Miguel Olazo
and Francisca Olazo in the year 1995. In her affidavits dated May 25, 2003[24] and July 21, 2010,[25]
Francisca Olazo corroborated the respondents claim that the sums of money he extended to her and
Miguel Olazo were loans used for their medical treatment. Miguel Olazo, in his Sinumpaang Salaysay
dated May 25, 2003, asserted that some of the money borrowed from the respondent was used for his
medical treatment and hospitalization expenses.

The affidavit of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez further corroborated the respondents claim that the latters
involvement was limited to being paid the loans he gave to Miguel Olazo and Francisca Olazo. According
to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, he and Miguel Olazo agreed that a portion of the loan would be directly
paid by Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez to the respondent and the amount paid would be considered as part of
the purchase price of the subject land.[26]

It also bears stressing that a facial comparison of the documentary evidence, specifically the dates when
the sums of money were extended by the respondent on February 21, 1995, September 2, 1995 and
October 17, 1995, and the date when the Deed of Conveyance[27] over the subject land was executed
or on October 25, 1995, showed that the sums of money were extended prior to the transfer of rights
over the subject land. These pieces of evidence are consistent with the respondents allegation that
Miguel Olazo decided to sell his rights over the subject land to pay the loans he obtained from the
respondent and, also, to finance his continuing medical treatment.

Private practice of law after separation from public office

As proof that the respondent was engaged in an unauthorized practice of law after his separation from
the government service, the complainant presented the Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000,
of Manuel and the document entitled Assurance where the respondent legally represented Ramon Lee
and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. Nevertheless, the foregoing pieces of evidence fail to persuade us to
conclude that there was a violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In Cayetano v. Monsod,[28] we defined the practice of law as any activity, in and out of court, that
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. Moreover, we
ruled that to engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the
profession; to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service
requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.
Under the circumstances, the foregoing definition should be correlated with R.A. No. 6713 and Rule 6.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility which impose certain restrictions on government lawyers to
engage in private practice after their separation from the service.

Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 reads:

Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and

omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the
following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. Public officials and employees during their
incumbency shall not:

xxxx

(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; x x x

These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after resignation, retirement, or
separation from public office, except in the case of subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional
concerned cannot practice his profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be
with, in which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply.

As a rule, government lawyers are not allowed to engage in the private practice of their profession
during their incumbency.[29] By way of exception, a government lawyer can engage in the practice of
his or her profession under the following conditions: first, the private practice is authorized by the
Constitution or by the law; and second, the practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with his or her
official functions.[30] The last paragraph of Section 7 provides an exception to the exception. In case of
lawyers separated from the government service who are covered under subparagraph (b) (2) of Section
7 of R.A. No. 6713, a one-year prohibition is imposed to practice law in connection with any matter
before the office he used to be with.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility echoes this restriction and prohibits lawyers, after
leaving the government service, to accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in
which he had intervened while in the said service. The keyword in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is the term intervene which we previously interpreted to include an act of a person who
has the power to influence the proceedings.[31] Otherwise stated, to fall within the ambit of Rule 6.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the respondent must have accepted engagement or
employment in a matter which, by virtue of his public office, he had previously exercised power to
influence the outcome of the proceedings.

As the records show, no evidence exists showing that the respondent previously interfered with the
sales application covering Manuels land when the former was still a member of the Committee on
Awards. The complainant, too, failed to sufficiently establish that the respondent was engaged in the
practice of law. At face value, the legal service rendered by the respondent was limited only in the
preparation of a single document. In Borja, Sr. v. Sulyap, Inc.,[32] we specifically described private
practice of law as one that contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or
customarily holding ones self to the public as a lawyer.

In any event, even granting that respondents act fell within the definition of practice of law, the
available pieces of evidence are insufficient to show that the legal representation was made before the
Committee on Awards, or that the Assurance was intended to be presented before it. These are matters
for the complainant to prove and we cannot consider any uncertainty in this regard against the
respondents favor.

Violation of Rule 1.01

Rule 1.01 prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, immoral or deceitful conduct. From the above
discussion, we already struck down the complainants allegation that respondent engaged in an
unauthorized practice of law when he appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez
before the Committee on Awards.

We find that a similar treatment should be given to the complainants claim that the respondent violated
paragraph 4(1)[33] of Memorandum No. 119 when he encouraged the sales application of Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez despite his knowledge that his nephew was not a qualified applicant. The matter of Joseph
Jeffrey Rodriguezs qualifications to apply for a sales application over lots covered by the proclaimed
areas has been resolved in the affirmative by the Secretary of the DENR in the decision dated April 3,
2004,[34] when the DENR gave due course to his sales application over the subject land. We are, at this
point, bound by this finding.

As pointed out by the respondent, the DENR decision was affirmed by the Office of the President, the
Court of Appeals[35] and, finally, the Court, per our Minute Resolution, dated October 11, 2006, in G.R.
No. 173453. In our Resolution, we dismissed the petition for review on certiorari filed by the
complainant after finding, among others, that no reversible error was committed by the Court of
Appeals in its decision.[36]

All told, considering the serious consequences of the penalty of disbarment or suspension of a member
of the Bar, the burden rests on the complainant to present clear, convincing and satisfactory proof for
the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers.[37] The respondent generally is under no obligation to
prove his/her defense,[38] until the burden shifts to him/her because of what the complainant has
proven. Where no case has in the first place been proven, nothing has to be rebutted in defense.[39]

With this in mind, we resolve to dismiss the administrative case against the respondent for the
complainants failure to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the former committed unethical
infractions warranting the exercise of the Courts disciplinary power.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the administrative case for violation of Rule 6.02, Rule
6.03 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, filed against retired Supreme Court
Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga, for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

18

EN BANC

A.C. No. 6705 March 31, 2006

RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a disbarment complaint against Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and for defying the prohibition against private practice of law while working
as government prosecutor.

The Facts

Ruthie Lim-Santiago ("complainant") is the daughter of Alfonso Lim and Special Administratrix of his
estate. 1 Alfonso Lim is a stockholder and the former President of Taggat Industries, Inc. 2

Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio ("respondent") was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of
Taggat Industries, Inc. 3 until his appointment as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tuguegarao, Cagayan
in 1992. 4

Taggat Industries, Inc. ("Taggat") is a domestic corporation engaged in the operation of timber
concessions from the government. The Presidential Commission on Good Government sequestered it
sometime in 1986, 5 and its operations ceased in 1997. 6

Sometime in July 1997, 21 employees of Taggat ("Taggat employees") filed a criminal complaint entitled
"Jesus Tagorda, Jr. et al. v. Ruthie Lim-Santiago," docketed as I.S. No. 97-240 ("criminal complaint"). 7
Taggat employees alleged that complainant, who took over the management and control of Taggat after
the death of her father, withheld payment of their salaries and wages without valid cause from 1 April
1996 to 15 July 1997. 8
Respondent, as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, was assigned to conduct the preliminary investigation. 9
He resolved the criminal complaint by recommending the filing of 651 Informations 10 for violation of
Article 288 11 in relation to Article 116 12 of the Labor Code of the Philippines. 13

Complainant now charges respondent with the following violations:

1. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Respondent, being
the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat, knew the operations of Taggat very
well. Respondent should have inhibited himself from hearing, investigating and deciding the case filed
by Taggat employees. 14 Furthermore, complainant claims that respondent instigated the filing of the
cases and even harassed and threatened Taggat employees to accede and sign an affidavit to support
the complaint. 15

2. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor

Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of engaging in the private practice of law while
working as a government prosecutor. Complainant presented evidence to prove that respondent
received P10,000 as retainer’s fee for the months of January and February 1995, 16 another P10,000
for the months of April and May 1995, 17 and P5,000 for the month of April 1996. 18

Complainant seeks the disbarment of respondent for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and for defying the prohibition against private practice of law while working as
government prosecutor.

Respondent refutes complainant’s allegations and counters that complainant was merely aggrieved by
the resolution of the criminal complaint which was adverse and contrary to her expectation. 19
Respondent claims that when the criminal complaint was filed, respondent had resigned from Taggat for
more than five years. 20 Respondent asserts that he no longer owed his undivided loyalty to Taggat. 21
Respondent argues that it was his sworn duty to conduct the necessary preliminary investigation. 22
Respondent contends that complainant failed to establish lack of impartiality when he performed his
duty. 23 Respondent points out that complainant did not file a motion to inhibit respondent from
hearing the criminal complaint 24 but instead complainant voluntarily executed and filed her counter-
affidavit without mental reservation. 25

Respondent states that complainant’s reason in not filing a motion to inhibit was her impression that
respondent would exonerate her from the charges filed as gleaned from complainant’s statement
during the hearing conducted on 12 February 1999:

xxx

Q. (Atty. Dabu). What do you mean you didn’t think he would do it, Madam Witness?

A. Because he is supposed to be my father’s friend and he was working with my Dad and he was
supposed to be trusted by my father. And he came to me and told me he gonna help me. x x x. 26

Respondent also asserts that no conflicting interests exist because he was not representing Taggat
employees or complainant. Respondent claims he was merely performing his official duty as Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor. 27 Respondent argues that complainant failed to establish that respondent’s act
was tainted with personal interest, malice and bad faith. 28

Respondent denies complainant’s allegations that he instigated the filing of the cases, threatened and
harassed Taggat employees. Respondent claims that this accusation is bereft of proof because
complainant failed to mention the names of the employees or present them for cross-examination. 29

Respondent does not dispute his receipt, after his appointment as government prosecutor, of retainer
fees from complainant but claims that it
was only on a case-to-case basis and it ceased in 1996. 30 Respondent contends that the fees were paid
for his consultancy services and not for representation. Respondent submits that consultation is not the
same as representation and that rendering consultancy services is not prohibited. 31 Respondent, in his
Reply-Memorandum, states:

x x x [I]f ever Taggat paid him certain amounts, these were paid voluntarily by Taggat without the
respondent’s asking, intended as token consultancy fees on a case-to-case basis and not as or for
retainer fees. These payments do not at all show or translate as a specie of ‘conflict of interest’.
Moreover, these consultations had no relation to, or connection with, the above-mentioned labor
complaints filed by former Taggat employees. 32

Respondent insists that complainant’s evidence failed to prove that when the criminal complaint was
filed with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Cagayan, respondent was still the retained counsel or
legal consultant. 33

While this disbarment case was pending, the Resolution and Order issued by respondent to file 651
Informations against complainant was reversed and set aside by Regional State Prosecutor of Cagayan
Rodolfo B. Cadelina last 4 January 1999. 34 Hence, the criminal complaint was dismissed. 35

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines’ Investigating Commissioner Ma. Carmina M. Alejandro-Abbas
("IBP Commissioner Abbas") heard the case 36 and allowed the parties to submit their respective
memoranda. 37 Due to IBP Commissioner Abbas’ resignation, the case was reassigned to
Commissioner Dennis A.B. Funa ("IBP Commissioner Funa"). 38

After the parties filed their memoranda and motion to resolve the case, the IBP Board of Governors
issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-479 ("IBP Resolution") dated 4 November 2004 adopting with
modification 39 IBP Commissioner Funa’s Report and Recommendation ("Report") finding respondent
guilty of conflict of interests, failure to safeguard a former client’s interest, and violating the
prohibition against the private practice of law while being a government prosecutor. The IBP Board of
Governors recommended the imposition of a penalty of three years suspension from the practice of law.
The Report reads:
Now the issue here is whether being a former lawyer of Taggat conflicts with his role as Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor in deciding I.S. No. 97-240. A determination of this issue will require the test of
whether the matter in I.S. No. 97-240 will conflict with his former position of Personnel Manager and
Legal Counsel of Taggat.

I.S. No. 97-240 was filed for "Violation of Labor Code" (see Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutors
Office, Annex "B" of Complaint). Herein Complainant, Ruthie Lim-Santiago, was being accused as having
the "management and control" of Taggat (p. 2, Resolution of the Prov. Pros. Office, supra).

Clearly, as a former Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat, herein Respondent undoubtedly
handled the personnel and labor concerns of Taggat. Respondent, undoubtedly dealt with and related
with the employees of Taggat. Therefore, Respondent undoubtedly dealt with and related with
complainants in I.S. No. 97-240. The issues, therefore, in I.S. No. 97-240, are very much familiar with
Respondent. While the issues of unpaid salaries pertain to the periods 1996-1997, the mechanics and
personalities in that case are very much familiar with Respondent.

A lawyer owes something to a former client. Herein Respondent owes to Taggat, a former client, the
duty to "maintain inviolate the client’s confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will
injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously represented him" (Natam v. Capule, 91 Phil.
640; p. 231, Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 4th ed.)

Respondent argues that as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, he does not represent any client or any
interest except justice. It should not be forgotten, however, that a lawyer has an immutable duty to a
former client with respect to matters that he previously handled for that former client. In this case,
matters relating to personnel, labor policies, and labor relations that he previously handled as Personnel
Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat. I.S. No. 97-240 was for "Violation of the Labor Code." Here lies
the conflict. Perhaps it would have been different had I.S. No. 97-240 not been labor-related, or if
Respondent had not been a Personnel Manager concurrently as Legal Counsel. But as it is, I.S. No. 97-
240 is labor-related and Respondent was a former Personnel Manager of Taggat.

xxxx
While Respondent ceased his relations with Taggat in 1992 and the unpaid salaries being sought in I.S.
No. 97-240 were of the years 1996 and 1997, the employees and management involved are the very
personalities he dealt with as Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat. Respondent dealt with
these persons in his fiduciary relations with Taggat. Moreover, he was an employee of the corporation
and part of its management.

xxxx

As to the propriety of receiving "Retainer Fees" or "consultancy fees" from herein Complainant while
being an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, and for rendering legal consultancy work while being an
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, this matter had long been settled. Government prosecutors are
prohibited to engage in the private practice of law (see Legal and Judicial Ethics, Ernesto Pineda, 1994
ed., p. 20; People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109; Aquino v. Blanco 70 Phil. 647). The act of being a legal
consultant is a practice of law. To engage in the practice of law is to do any of those acts that are
characteristic of the legal profession (In re: David, 93 Phil. 461). It covers any activity, in or out of court,
which required the application of law, legal principles, practice or procedures and calls for legal
knowledge, training and experience (PLA v. Agrava, 105 Phil. 173; People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 111;
Cayetano v. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210).

Respondent clearly violated this prohibition.

As for the secondary accusations of harassing certain employees of Taggat and instigating the filing of
criminal complaints, we find the evidence insufficient.

Accordingly, Respondent should be found guilty of conflict of interest, failure to safeguard a former
client’s interest, and violating the prohibition against the private practice of law while being a
government prosecutor. 40

The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as provided under Section 12(b), Rule
139-B 41 of the Rules of Court.

The Ruling of the Court

The Court exonerates respondent from the charge of violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility ("Code"). However, the Court finds respondent liable for violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility against unlawful conduct. 42 Respondent committed unlawful
conduct when he violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees or Republic Act No. 6713 ("RA 6713").

Canon 6 provides that the Code "shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their
official duties." 43 A government lawyer is thus bound by the prohibition "not [to] represent conflicting
interests." 44 However, this rule is subject to certain limitations. The prohibition to represent conflicting
interests does not apply when no conflict of interest exists, when a written consent of all concerned is
given after a full disclosure of the facts or when no true attorney-client relationship exists. 45 Moreover,
considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, clear
preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty. 46

Respondent is also mandated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 not to engage in "unlawful x x x conduct."
Unlawful conduct includes violation of the statutory prohibition on a government employee to "engage
in the private practice of [his] profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that
such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with [his] official functions." 47

Complainant’s evidence failed to substantiate the claim that respondent represented conflicting
interests

In Quiambao v. Bamba, 48 the Court enumerated various tests to determine conflict of interests. One
test of inconsistency of interests is whether the lawyer will be asked to use against his former client any
confidential information acquired through their connection or previous employment. 49 In essence,
what a lawyer owes his former client is to maintain inviolate the client’s confidence or to refrain from
doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously represented him. 50

In the present case, we find no conflict of interests when respondent handled the preliminary
investigation of the criminal complaint filed by Taggat employees in 1997. The issue in the criminal
complaint pertains to non-payment of wages that occurred from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997. Clearly,
respondent was no longer connected with Taggat during that period since he resigned sometime in
1992.
In order to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests, evidence must be presented to
prove that respondent used against Taggat, his former client, any confidential information acquired
through his previous employment. The only established participation respondent had with respect to
the criminal complaint is that he was the one who conducted the preliminary investigation. On that
basis alone, it does not necessarily follow that respondent used any confidential information from his
previous employment with complainant or Taggat in resolving the criminal complaint.

The fact alone that respondent was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat and
the case he resolved as government prosecutor was labor-related is not a sufficient basis to charge
respondent for representing conflicting interests. A lawyer’s immutable duty to a former client does
not cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyer’s employment with the client. The intent of
the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the client’s interests only on matters that he
previously handled for the former client and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client
relationship has terminated.

Further, complainant failed to present a single iota of evidence to prove her allegations. Thus,
respondent is not guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of the Code.

Respondent engaged in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor

The Court has defined the practice of law broadly as –

x x x any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service,
which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." 51

"Private practice of law" contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily
holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer. 52
Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy services to Taggat intermittently and he was not a
retained counsel of Taggat from 1995 to 1996 as alleged. This argument is without merit because the
law does not distinguish between consultancy services and retainer agreement. For as long as
respondent performed acts that are usually rendered by lawyers with the use of their legal knowledge,
the same falls within the ambit of the term "practice of law."

Nonetheless, respondent admitted that he rendered his legal services to complainant while working as a
government prosecutor. Even the receipts he signed stated that the payments by Taggat were for
"Retainer’s fee." 53 Thus, as correctly pointed out by complainant, respondent clearly violated the
prohibition in RA 6713.

However, violations of RA 6713 are not subject to disciplinary action under the Code of Professional
Responsibility unless the violations also constitute infractions of specific provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Certainly, the IBP has no jurisdiction to investigate violations of RA 6713 –
the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees – unless the acts involved
also transgress provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Here, respondent’s violation of RA 6713 also constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which
mandates that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
Respondent’s admission that he received from Taggat fees for legal services while serving as a
government prosecutor is an unlawful conduct, which constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01.

Respondent admitted that complainant also charged him with unlawful conduct when respondent
stated in his Demurrer to Evidence:

In this instant case, the complainant prays that the respondent be permanently and indefinitely
suspended or disbarred from the practice of the law profession and his name removed from the Roll of
Attorneys on the following grounds:

xxxx
d) that respondent manifested gross misconduct and gross violation of his oath of office and in his
dealings with the public. 54

On the Appropriate Penalty on Respondent

The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based
on the surrounding facts. 55

Under Civil Service Law and rules, the penalty for government employees engaging in unauthorized
private practice of profession is suspension for six months and one day to one year. 56 We find this
penalty appropriate for respondent’s violation in this case of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio GUILTY of violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio from
the practice of law for SIX MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
respondent’s personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of
Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

18.

G.R. No. 109870 December 1, 1995

EDILBERTO M. CUENCA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

RESOLUTION

FRANCISCO, J.:

After his petition for review of the Court of Appeals' judgment1 affirming his conviction for violation of
the "Trust Receipts Law" (Presidential Decree No. 115) was denied by this Court in a Resolution dated
February 9, 1994,2 petitioner filed on July 6, 1994 a pleading entitled "SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL WITH
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL"3 setting forth, in relation to the motion for new
trial:

6. The Motion for New Trial shall be grounded on newly discovered evidence and excusible (sic)
negligence, and shall be supported by affidavits of:

(i) an officer of private complainant corporation who will exculpate petitioner;

(ii) an admission against interest by a former officer of the owner of Ultra Corporation (the
Corporation that employed petitioner), which actually exercised control over the affairs of Ultra; and

(iii) the petitioner wherein he will assert innocence for the first time and explain why he was unable
to do so earlier.

The Court in its July 27, 1994 Resolution,4 among other things, granted the substitution but denied the
motion for leave to file motion for new trial, "the petition having been already denied on February 9,
1994."
Notwithstanding, petitioner on August 8, 1994 filed a "MOTION TO ADMIT ATTACHED MOTION FOR
NEW TRIAL",5 and a "MANIFESTATION AND SECOND MOTION TO ADMIT" on August 17, 1994.6 The
Court thereafter required the Solicitor General to comment on said motion and manifestation within ten
(10) days from notice, in a Resolution dated September 7, 1994.7

In the Comment filed after three (3) extensions of time were given by the Court,8 the Solicitor General
himself recommends that petitioner be entitled to a new trial, proceeding from the same impression
that a certain Rodolfo Cuenca's (petitioner's brother) sworn statement is an admission against interest
which may ultimately exonerate petitioner from criminal liability. The full text of Mr. Rodolfo Cuenca's
"Affidavit"9 reads:

RODOLFO M. CUENCA, Filipino, of legal age, with the residence at Urdaneta Village, Makati, Metro
Manila, after being duly sworn and (sic) state that:

1. During the years 1967 until February 1983, I was the President and Chief Executive Officer of
Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP).

2. During that period, I controlled an effective majority of the voting shares of stock of CDCP.

3. Sometime in 1974, upon my initiative, CDCP together with its affiliated companies, organized a
number of wholly-owned service corporations. One of these was Ultra International Trading
Corporation, whose purpose was to serve and supply the needs of CDCP and its other subsidiaries with
lower value goods and using Ultra's financial resources.

4. The directors in Ultra Corporation were nominees of CDCP, and received the instructions directly
from me and or Mr. Pedro Valdez, Chairman of CDCP.

5. From Ultra's inception, my brother, Mr. Edilberto M. Cuenca was appointed President and Chief
Executive Officer. On March, 1979, I instructed Ultra through my brother, Mr. Edilberto Cuenca to
purchase for CDCP various steel materials. These materials were received by CDCP and are covered by
the trust receipts which are the subject of this case.
6. In 1980, CDCP suffered cashflow problems, and consciously omitted payment to Ultra for the
delivery of the said steel materials. As a nominee of CDCP, Mr. Edilberto M. Cuenca merely acted as
agent for CDCP. As such, CDCP provided him with the guarantees needed to persuade China Bank to
issue the said trust receipts. On the basis of such guarantees, along with informal assurances issued by
CDCP to China Bank that the transactions of Ultra were undertaken for and on behalf of CDCP and CDCP
Mining Corporation, Ultra was able to obtain credit facilities, among which included the trust receipts
subject of this case.

7. However, Mr. Edilberto M. Cuenca had no power to cause the payment of said trust receipts
because the common Treasurer and controller of both CDCP and Ultra, Ms. Nora Vinluan, acted under
my control and I did not allow her to make the appropriate payments.

8. To my knowledge, CDCP has not paid Ultra the amounts corresponding to the materials covered
by the trust receipts subject of this case.

9. By the time final demand to pay on the trust receipts were (sic) served in 1984, Mr. Edilberto
Cuenca was no longer president of Ultra Corporation and could not have possibly cause (sic) Ultra
Corporation to pay.

10. I have executed this affidavit in order to accept personal responsibility for the trust receipts
subject of this case and to exculpate Mr. Edilberto Cuenca of the criminal charges which he has asked
this Honorable Court to review.

11. Accordingly, I also undertake to pay the civil obligations arising from the subject trust receipts.

(Sgd.)

RODOLFO M. CUENCA

Affiant
And the Solicitor General had this to say:

Ordinarily, it is too late at this stage to ask for a new trial.

However, the sworn statement of Rodolfo Cuenca is a declaration against his own interests under
Section 38, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court and it casts doubt on the culpability of his brother Edilberto
Cuenca, the petitioner. Hence, the alleged confession of guilt should be given a hard look by the Court.

The People is inclined to allow petitioner to establish the genuineness and due execution of his brother's
affidavit in the interest of justice and fair play.

Under Rule 6.01 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, prosecutors who represent the
People of the Philippines in a criminal case are not duty bound to seek conviction of the accused but to
see that justice is done. Said Rule 6.01 of Canon 6 states:

Canon 6 — These canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official
tasks.

Rule 6.01 — The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to convict but to see that
justice is done. The suppression of facts or the concealment of witnesses capable of establishing the
innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible and is cause for disciplinary action. (Emphasis
supplied.)

The above duty is well founded on the instruction of the U.S. Supreme Court in Berger v. United States,
295 U.S. 78 (1935) that prosecutors represent a sovereign "whose obligation to govern impartially is
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore in a criminal prosecution is
not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done (Time to Rein in the Prosecution, by Atty. Bruce
Fein, published on p. 11, The Lawyers Review, July 31, 1994). (Emphasis supplied.)10
Although in "Goduco v. CA" (14 SCRA 282 [1965]) decided some twenty (20) years ago, this Court ruled
that it is not authorized to entertain a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial predicated on
allegedly newly discovered evidence the rationale of which being:

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is conclusive as to the facts, and cannot be reviewed by the
Supreme Court. Accordingly, in an appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court, the latter has no
jurisdiction to entertain a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, for only
questions of fact are involved therein.

the rule now appears to have been relaxed, if not abandoned, in subsequent cases like "Helmuth, Jr. v.
People"11 and "People v. Amparado".12

In both cases, the Court, opting to brush aside technicalities and despite the opposition of the Solicitor
General, granted new trial to the convicted accused concerned on the basis of proposed testimonies or
affidavits of persons which the Court considered as newly discovered and probably sufficient evidence to
reverse the judgment of conviction. Being similarly circumstanced, there is no nagging reason why
herein petitioner should be denied the same benefit. It becomes all the more plausible under the
circumstances considering that the "People" does not raise any objection to a new trial, for which
reason the Solicitor General ought to be specially commended for displaying once again such
statesmanlike gesture of impartiality. The Solicitor General's finest hour, indeed.

WHEREFORE, petitioner's Motion For New Trial is hereby GRANTED. Let the case be RE-OPENED and
REMANDED to the court of origin for reception of petitioner's evidence.

SO ORDERED.

19. OMAR P. ALI, complainant, vs. ATTY. MOSIB A. BUBONG, respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:
This is a verified petition for disbarment[1] filed against Atty. Mosib Ali Bubong for having been found
guilty of grave misconduct while holding the position of Register of Deeds of Marawi City.

It appears that this disbarment proceeding is an off-shoot of the administrative case earlier filed by
complainant against respondent. In said case, which was initially investigated by the Land Registration
Authority (LRA), complainant charged respondent with illegal exaction; indiscriminate issuance of
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-2821 in the names of Lawan Bauduli Datu, Mona Abdullah,[2]
Ambobae Bauduli Datu, Matabae Bauduli Datu, Mooamadali Bauduli Datu, and Amenola Bauduli Datu;
and manipulating the criminal complaint filed against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and others for violation
of the Anti-Squatting Law. It appears from the records that the Baudali Datus are relatives of
respondent.[3]

The initial inquiry by the LRA was resolved in favor of respondent. The investigating officer, Enrique
Basa, absolved respondent of all the charges brought against him, thus:

It is crystal clear from the foregoing that complainant not only failed to prove his case but that he has no
case at all against respondent Mosib Ali Bubong. Wherefore, premises considered, it is respectfully
recommended that the complaint against respondent be dismissed for lack of merit and evidence.[4]

The case was then forwarded to the Department of Justice for review and in a report dated 08
September 1992, then Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon exonerated respondent of the charges of
illegal exaction and infidelity in the custody of documents. He, however, found respondent guilty of
grave misconduct for his imprudent issuance of TCT No. T-2821 and manipulating the criminal case for
violation of the Anti-Squatting Law instituted against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and the latters co-
accused. As a result of this finding, Secretary Drilon recommended respondents dismissal from service.

On 26 February 1993, former President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 41 adopting in
toto the conclusion reached by Secretary Drilon and ordering respondents dismissal from government
service. Respondent subsequently questioned said administrative order before this Court through a
petition for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition[5] claiming that the Office of the President did not
have the authority and jurisdiction to remove him from office. He also insisted that respondents[6] in
that petition violated the laws on security of tenure and that respondent Reynaldo V. Maulit, then the
administrator of the LRA committed a breach of Civil Service Rules when he abdicated his authority to
resolve the administrative complaint against him (herein respondent).
In a Resolution dated 15 September 1994, we dismissed the petition for failure on the part of petitioner
to sufficiently show that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
questioned order.[7] Respondent thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied with
finality in our Resolution of 15 November 1994.

On the basis of the outcome of the administrative case, complainant is now before us, seeking the
disbarment of respondent. Complainant claims that it has become obvious that respondent had proven
himself unfit to be further entrusted with the duties of an attorney[8] and that he poses a serious threat
to the integrity of the legal profession.[9]

In his Comment, respondent maintains that there was nothing irregular with his issuance of TCT No. T-
2821 in the name of the Bauduli Datus. According to him, both law[10] and jurisprudence support his
stance that it was his ministerial duty, as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City, to act on applications for
land registration on the basis only of the documents presented by the applicants. In the case of the
Bauduli Datus, nothing in the documents they presented to his office warranted suspicion, hence, he
was duty-bound to issue TCT No. T-2821 in their favor.

Respondent also insists that he had nothing to do with the dismissal of criminal complaint for violation
of the Anti-Squatting Law allegedly committed by Hadji Serad Abdullah and the latters co-defendants.
Respondent explains that his participation in said case was a result of the two subpoenas duces tecum
issued by the investigating prosecutor who required him to produce the various land titles involved in
said dispute. He further claims that the dismissal of said criminal case by the Secretary of Justice was
based solely on the evidence presented by the parties. Complainants allegation, therefore, that he
influenced the outcome of the case is totally unjustified.

Through a resolution dated 26 June 1995,[11] this Court referred this matter to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation. Acting on this resolution, the IBP
commenced the investigation of this disbarment suit. On 23 February 1996, Commissioner Victor C.
Fernandez issued the following order relative to the transfer of venue of this case. The pertinent portion
of this order provides:

ORDER
When this case was called for hearing, both complainant and respondent appeared.

The undersigned Commissioner asked them if they are willing to have the reception of evidence vis--vis
this case be done in Marawi City, Lanao del Sur before the president of the local IBP Chapter. Both
parties agreed. Accordingly, transmit the records of this case to the Director for Bar Discipline for
appropriate action.[12]

On 30 March 1996, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution approving Commissioner Fernandezs
recommendation for the transfer of venue of this administrative case and directed the Western
Mindanao Region governor to designate the local IBP chapter concerned to conduct the investigation,
report, and recommendation.[13] The IBP Resolution states:

Resolution No. XII-96-153

Adm. Case No. 4018

Omar P. Ali vs. Atty. Mosib A. Bubong

RESOLVED TO APPROVE the recommendation of Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez for the Transfer of
Venue of the above-entitled case and direct the Western Mindanao Region Governor George C. Jabido
to designate the local IBP Chapter concerned to conduct the investigation, report and recommendation.

Pursuant to this resolution, Atty. Benjamin B. Bernardino, Director for Bar Discipline, wrote a letter
dated 23 October 1996 addressed to Governor George C. Jabido, President of IBP Cotabato Chapter
requesting the latter to receive the evidence in this case and to submit his recommendation and
recommendation as directed by the IBP Board of Governors.[14]

In an undated Report and Recommendation, the IBP Cotabato Chapter[15] informed the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) that the investigating panel[16] had sent notices to both
complainant and respondent for a series of hearings but respondent consistently ignored said notices.
The IBP Cotabato Chapter concluded its report by recommending that respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for five years.
On 01 July 1998, respondent filed a motion dated 30 June 1998 praying for the transmittal of the records
of this case to the Marawi City-Lanao del Sur Chapter of the IBP pursuant to Resolution No. XII-96-153 as
well as Commissioner Fernandezs Order dated 23 February 1996.

Commissioner Fernandez thereafter ordered the investigating panel of IBP Cotabato Chapter to
comment on respondents motion.[17] Complying with this directive, the panel expressed no opposition
to respondents motion for the transmittal of the records of this case to IBP Marawi City.[18] On 25
September 1998, Commissioner Fernandez ordered the referral of this case to IBP Marawi City for the
reception of respondents evidence.[19] This order of referral, however, was set aside by the IBP Board
of Governors in its Resolution No. XIII-98-268 issued on 4 December 1998. Said resolution provides:

RESOLVED to DENY the ORDER of Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez for the transmittal of the case
records of the above-entitled case to Marawi City, rather he is directed to re-evaluate the
recommendation submitted by Cotabato Chapter and report the same to the Board of Governors.[20]

Prior to the issuance of Resolution No. XIII-98-268, respondent filed on 08 October 1998 a motion
praying that the recommendation of the IBP Cotabato Chapter be stricken from the records.[21]
Respondent insists that the investigating panel constituted by said IBP chapter did not have the
authority to conduct the investigation of this case since IBP Resolution XII-96-153 and Commissioner
Fernandezs Order of 23 February 1996 clearly vested IBP Marawi City with the power to investigate this
case. Moreover, he claims that he was never notified of any hearing by the investigating panel of IBP
Cotabato Chapter thereby depriving him of his right to due process.

Complainant opposed[22] this motion arguing that respondent is guilty of laches. According to
complainant, the report and recommendation submitted by IBP Cotabato Chapter expressly states that
respondent was duly notified of the hearings conducted by the investigating panel yet despite these,
respondent did nothing to defend himself. He also claims that respondent did not even bother to submit
his position paper when he was directed to do so. Further, as respondent is a member of IBP Marawi
City Chapter, complainant maintains that the presence of bias in favor of respondent is possible. Finally,
complainant contends that to refer the matter to IBP Marawi City would only entail a duplication of the
process which had already been completed by IBP Cotabato Chapter.

In an Order dated 15 October 1999,[23] Commissioner Fernandez directed IBP Cotabato Chapter to
submit proofs that notices for the hearings conducted by the investigating panel as well as for the
submission of the position paper were duly received by respondent. On 21 February 2000, Atty. Jabido,
a member of the IBP Cotabato Chapter investigating panel, furnished Commissioner Fernandez with a
copy of the panels order dated 4 August 1997.[24] Attached to said order was Registry Receipt No. 3663
issued by the local post office. On the lower portion of the registry receipt was a handwritten notation
reading Atty. Mosib A. Bubong.

On 20 April 2001, Commissioner Fernandez ordered Atty. Pedro S. Castillo, Chairman of the Commission
on Bar Discipline for Mindanao, to reevaluate the report and recommendation submitted by IBP
Cotabato Chapter. This directive had the approval of the IBP Board of Governors through its Resolution
No. XIV-2001-271 issued on 30 June 2001, to wit:

RESOLVED to APPROVE the recommendation of Director Victor C. Fernandez for the Transfer of Venue
of the above-entitled case and direct the CBD Mindanao to conduct an investigation, re-evaluation,
report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of notice.[25]

Meanwhile, Bainar A. Ali, informed the CBD Mindanao of the death of her father, Omar P. Ali,
complainant in this case. According to her, her father passed away on 12 June 2002 and that in interest
of peace and Islamic brotherhood, she was requesting the withdrawal of this case.[26]

Subsequently, respondent filed another motion, this time, asking the IBP CBD to direct the chairman of
the Commission on Bar Discipline for Mindanao to designate and authorize the IBP Marawi City-Lanao
del Sur Chapter to conduct an investigation of this case.[27] This motion was effectively denied by Atty.
Pedro S. Castillo in an Order dated 19 July 2002.[28] According to Atty. Castillo

After going over the voluminous records of the case, with special attention made on the report of the
IBP Cotabato City Chapter, the Complaint and the Counter-Affidavit of respondent, the undersigned sees
no need for any further investigation, to be able to make a re-evaluation and recommendation on the
Report of the IBP Chapter of Cotabato City.

WHEREFORE, the Motion to authorize the IBP-Chpater of Marawi City, Zamboanga del Norte is hereby
denied. The undersigned will submit his Report to the Commission on Bar Discipline, IBP National Office
within ten (10) days from date hereof.
In his Report and Recommendation, Atty. Castillo adopted in toto the findings and conclusion of IBP
Cotabato Chapter ratiocinating as follows:

The Complaint for Disbarment is primarily based on the Decision by the Office of the President in
Administrative Case No. 41 dated February 26, 1993, wherein herein respondent was found guilty of
Grave Misconduct in:

a) The imprudent issuance of T.C.T. No. T-2821; and,

b) Manipulating the criminal complaint for violation of the anti-squatting law.

And penalized with dismissal from the service, as Register of Deeds of Marawi City. In the Comment filed
by respondent in the instant Adminsitrative Case, his defense is good faith in the issuance of T.C.T. No.
T-2821 and a denial of the charge of manipulating the criminal complaint for violation of the anti-
squatting law, which by the way, was filed against respondents relatives. Going over the Decision of the
Office of the President in Administrative Case No. 41, the undersigned finds substantial evidence were
taken into account and fully explained, before the Decision therein was rendered. In other words, the
finding of Grave Misconduct on the part of respondent by the Office of the President was fully
supported by evidence and as such carries a very strong weight in considering the professional
misconduct of respondent in the present case.

In the light of the foregoing, the undersigned sees no reason for amending or disturbing the Report and
Recommendation of the IBP Chapter of South Cotabato.[29]

In a resolution passed on 19 October 2002, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved, with
modification, the afore-quoted Report and Recommendation of Atty. Castillo. The modification
pertained solely to the period of suspension from the practice of law which should be imposed on
respondent whereas Atty. Castillo concurred in the earlier recommendation of IBP Cotabato Chapter for
a five-year suspension, the IBP Board of Governors found a two-year suspension to be proper.

On 17 January 2003, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the IBP which the latter denied
as by that time, the matter had already been endorsed to this Court.[30]
The issue thus posed for this Courts resolution is whether respondent may be disbarred for grave
misconduct committed while he was in the employ of the government. We resolve this question in the
affirmative.

The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply because he has
joined the government service. In fact, by the express provision of Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing
the conduct of lawyers shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official
tasks. Thus, where a lawyers misconduct as a government official is of such nature as to affect his
qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the
bar on such grounds.[31] Although the general rule is that a lawyer who holds a government office may
not be disciplined as a member of the bar for infractions he committed as a government official, he may,
however, be disciplined as a lawyer if his misconduct constitutes a violation of his oath a member of the
legal profession.[32]

Indeed, in the case of Collantes v. Atty. Vicente C. Renomeron,[33] we ordered the disbarment of
respondent on the ground of his dismissal from government service because of grave misconduct.
Quoting the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, we declared

[A] person takes an oath when he is admitted to the bar which is designed to impress upon him his
responsibilities. He thereby becomes an officer of the court on whose shoulders rests the grave
responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper, fair, speedy and efficient administration of justice. As
an officer of the court he is subject to a rigid discipline that demands that in his every exertion the only
criterion be that truth and justice triumph. This discipline is what has given the law profession its
nobility, its prestige, its exalted place. From a lawyer, to paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are
expected those qualities of truth-speaking, a high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty, and
the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility all of which, throughout the centuries, have been
compendiously described as moral character.[34]

Similarly, in Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo, et al. v. Atty. Felina Dasig,[35] this Court found sufficient basis to
disbar respondent therein for gross misconduct perpetrated while she was the Officer-in-Charge of Legal
Services of the Commission on Higher Education. As we had explained in that case
[A] lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to
lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also uphold the dignity of the
legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a
lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social
responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice.[36] (Emphasis supplied)

In the case at bar, respondents grave misconduct, as established by the Office of the President and
subsequently affirmed by this Court, deals with his qualification as a lawyer. By taking advantage of his
office as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City and employing his knowledge of the rules governing land
registration for the benefit of his relatives, respondent had clearly demonstrated his unfitness not only
to perform the functions of a civil servant but also to retain his membership in the bar. Rule 6.02 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility is explicit on this matter. It reads:

Rule 6.02 A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his
private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.

Respondents conduct manifestly undermined the peoples confidence in the public office he used to
occupy and cast doubt on the integrity of the legal profession. The ill-conceived use of his knowledge of
the intricacies of the law calls for nothing less than the withdrawal of his privilege to practice law.

As for the letter sent by Bainar Ali, the deceased complainants daughter, requesting for the withdrawal
of this case, we cannot possibly favorably act on the same as proceedings of this nature cannot be
interrupted or terminated by reason of desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of
the charges or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same.[37] As we have previously explained in
the case of Irene Rayos-Ombac v. Atty. Orlando A. Rayos:[38]

A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of
deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven. This rule is premised on the nature of
disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action
where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings
involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and
prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of
justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer
to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the
attention of the court to the attorneys alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no
interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administrative of justice.[39]

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Mosib A. Bubong is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the respondents record as
a member of the Bar, and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on
the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.