Landmark case on Psychological Incapacity

From the pages of Pinoylaw.com Forum:

http://p082.ezboard.com/fpinoylaw74510lawstudents.showNextMessage?topicID=902.topic

Thanks to Atty Zodiac

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NOTE: This is a landmark case on Psychological Incapacity which proclaims, under certain
circumstances,

habitual lying as constitutive of psychological incapacity

which may lead to nullity of marriage.NOTE: This is a landmark case on Psychological Incapacity
which proclaims, under certain circumstances, habitual lying as constitutive of psychological
incapacity which may lead to nullity of marriage.

G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006

TINGA, J.

The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
dated 29 November 2001 and 24 October 2002. The Court of Appeals had reversed the judgment
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati declaring the marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio
(petitioner) and Marie Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent), null and void. After careful consideration, we
reverse and affirm instead the trial court.

Antecedent Facts

Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and respondent
was 36 years of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married before a minister of
the Gospel at the Manila City Hall, and through a subsequent church wedding at the Sta. Rosa de
Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6 December 1990. Out of their union, a child
was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months later.

On 8 March 1993, petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null and
void. He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. He asserted that respondent’s incapacity existed at the time their marriage was
celebrated and still subsists up to the present.

As manifestations of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that

respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income,
educational attainment and other events or things, to wit:
(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son, and instead
introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of her family. She only confessed the truth
about the boy’s parentage when petitioner learned about it from other sources after their
marriage.

(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill her
when in fact, no such incident occurred.

(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and
told some of her friends that she graduated with a degree in psychology, when she was neither.

(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold Recording
Company (Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her family ever witnessed her alleged singing
activities with the group. In the same vein, she postulated that a luncheon show was held at the
Philippine Village Hotel in her honor and even presented an invitation to that effect but petitioner
discovered per certification by the Director of Sales of said hotel that no such occasion had taken
place.

(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those names, sent
lengthy letters to petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her as the “number one
moneymaker” in the commercial industry worth P2 million. Petitioner later found out that
respondent herself was the one who wrote and sent the letters to him when she admitted the truth
in one of their quarrels. He likewise realized that Babes Santos and Via Marquez were only
figments of her imagination when he discovered they were not known in or connected with
Blackgold.

(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her payslip to make it
appear that she earned a higher income. She bought a sala set from a public market but told
petitioner that she acquired it from a famous furniture dealer. She spent lavishly on unnecessary
items and ended up borrowing money from other people on false pretexts.

(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his officemates to
monitor his whereabouts. When he could no longer take her unusual behavior, he separated from
her in August 1991. He tried to attempt a reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he
finally left her for good in November 1991.

In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a
psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V. Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on
the tests they conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal, introspective, shy and
conservative type of person. On the other hand, they observed that respondent’s persistent and
constant lying to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that
should be based on love, trust and respect. They further asserted that respondent’s extreme
jealousy was also pathological. It reached the point of paranoia since there was no actual basis for
her to suspect that petitioner was having an affair with another woman. They concluded based on
the foregoing that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital
obligations.

In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her marital obligations by
attending to all the needs of her husband. She asserted that there was no truth to the allegation that
she fabricated stories, told lies and invented personalities. She presented her version, thus:

(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because she was afraid of losing her
husband.

(2) She told petitioner about David’s attempt to rape and kill her because she surmised such
intent from David’s act of touching her back and ogling her from head to foot.

(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been teaching psychology at the
Pasig Catholic School for two (2) years.

(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive producer of Channel 9 and
she had done three (3) commercials with McCann Erickson for the advertisement of Coca-cola,
Johnson & Johnson, and Traders Royal Bank. She told petitioner she was a Blackgold recording
artist although she was not under contract with the company, yet she reported to the Blackgold
office after office hours. She claimed that a luncheon show was indeed held in her honor at the
Philippine Village Hotel on 8 December 1979.

(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her and the writers thereof
were not fictitious. Bea Marquez Recto of the Recto political clan was a resident of the United
States while Babes Santos was employed with Saniwares.

(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but averred that she merely asked
the latter in a diplomatic matter if she was the one asking for chocolates from petitioner, and not to
monitor her husband’s whereabouts.

(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported almost ten people from her
monthly budget of P7,000.00.

In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child prior to their marriage, the
other lies attributed to her by petitioner were mostly hearsay and unconvincing. Her stance was
that the totality of the evidence presented is not sufficient for a finding of psychological incapacity
on her part.

In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a psychiatrist, to refute the
allegations anent her psychological condition. Dr. Reyes testified that the series of tests conducted
by his assistant, together with the screening procedures and the Comprehensive Psycho-
Pathological Rating Scale (CPRS) he himself conducted, led him to conclude that respondent was
not psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. He postulated that
regressive behavior, gross neuroticism, psychotic tendencies, and poor control of impulses, which
are signs that might point to the presence of disabling trends, were not elicited from respondent.

In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes
as (i) he was not the one who administered and interpreted respondent’s psychological
evaluation, and (ii) he made use of only one instrument called CPRS which was not reliable
because a good liar can fake the results of such test.

After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioner’s evidence and held that respondent’s
propensity to lying about almost anything−her occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her
income, among others−had been duly established. According to the trial court, respondent’s
fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of
make-believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving
meaning and significance to her marriage. The trial court thus declared the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void.

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Still, the appellate court reversed the RTC’s judgment. While conceding that respondent may not
have been completely honest with petitioner, the Court of Appeals nevertheless held that the
totality of the evidence presented was insufficient to establish respondent’s psychological
incapacity. It declared that the requirements in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals governing
the application and interpretation of psychological incapacity had not been satisfied.

Taking exception to the appellate court’s pronouncement, petitioner elevated the case to this
Court. He contends herein that the evidence conclusively establish respondent’s psychological
incapacity.

In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily influenced by the credence accorded
by the RTC to the factual allegations of petitioner. It is a settled principle of civil procedure that
the conclusions of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect
from the appellate courts because the trial court had an opportunity to observe the demeanor of
witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate their candor or lack thereof. The Court is
likewise guided by the fact that the Court of Appeals did not dispute the veracity of the evidence
presented by petitioner. Instead, the appellate court concluded that such evidence was not
sufficient to establish the psychological incapacity of respondent.

Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of petitioner as the operative facts. Still,
the crucial question remains as to whether the state of facts as presented by petitioner sufficiently
meets the standards set for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code. These standards were definitively laid down in the Court’s 1997 ruling in Republic v.
Court of Appeals (also known as the Molina case), and indeed the Court of Appeals cited the
Molina guidelines in reversing the RTC in the case at bar. Since Molina was decided in 1997, the
Supreme Court has yet to squarely affirm the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code. In fact, even before Molina was handed down, there was only one case, Chi
Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, wherein the Court definitively concluded that a spouse was
psychologically incapacitated under Article 36.

This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the misperception that the remedy afforded by
Article 36 of the Family Code is hollow, insofar as the Supreme Court is concerned. Yet what
Molina and the succeeding cases did ordain was a set of guidelines which, while undoubtedly
onerous on the petitioner seeking the declaration of nullity, still leave room for a decree of nullity
under the proper circumstances. Molina did not foreclose the grant of a decree of nullity under
Article 36, even as it raised the bar for its allowance.

LEGAL GUIDELINES to Understanding Article 36

Article 36 of the Family Code states that “[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after
its solemnization.” The concept of psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage is
novel in our body of laws, although mental incapacity has long been recognized as a ground for
the dissolution of a marriage.
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The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of
marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them, was further affirmed in the Molina
case. Therein, the Court, through then Justice (now Chief Justice) Panganiban observed that
“[t]he evidence [to establish psychological incapacity] must convince the court that the parties,
or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereto.” Jurisprudence since then has recognized that psychological incapacity “is a malady so
grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume.”

It might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity deviates from the literal
wording of Article 36, with its central phase reading “psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage.” At the same time, it has been consistently
recognized by this Court that the intent of the Family Code committee was to design the law as to
allow some resiliency in its application, by avoiding specific examples that would limit the
applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the preference of the
revision committee was for “the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided
by experience, in the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law.”

We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:

Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a
marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case
must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but
according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of
marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on “all fours” with another case. The trial judge must
take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.
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These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the present petition.

Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case

As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently recognized in the judicial disposition
of petitions for nullity under Article 36. The Court has consistently applied Molina since its
promulgation in 1997, and the guidelines therein operate as the general rules. They warrant
citation in full:

1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on
the Family, recognizing it “as the foundation of the nation.” It decrees marriage as legally
“inviolable,” thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family
and marriage are to be “protected”’ by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological–not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them,
could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.

3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage.
The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their “I
do’s.” The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness
itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in
the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated
in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is
clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the
New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

“The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.”

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Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor General issue a certification
stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition to the petition. This requirement however was
dispensed with following the implementation of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Still,
Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
assigned be on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take
care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Obviously, collusion is not an issue in this case,
considering the consistent vigorous opposition of respondent to the petition for declaration of
nullity. In any event, the fiscal’s participation in the hearings before the trial court is extant from
the records of this case.
As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding on this Court, owing to
the great weight accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court
of Appeals to dispute the veracity of these facts. As such, it must be considered that respondent
had consistently lied about many material aspects as to her character and personality. The question
remains whether her pattern of fabrication sufficiently establishes her psychological incapacity,
consistent with Article 36 and generally, the Molina guidelines.

We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina.

First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of
his spouse. Apart from his own testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations
on his wife’s behavior, and certifications from Blackgold Records and the Philippine Village
Hotel Pavillon which disputed respondent’s claims pertinent to her alleged singing career. He
also presented two (2) expert witnesses from the field of psychology who testified that the
aberrant behavior of respondent was tantamount to psychological incapacity. In any event, both
courts below considered petitioner’s evidence as credible enough. Even the appellate court
acknowledged that respondent was not totally honest with petitioner.

As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 must be
able to establish the cause of action with a preponderance of evidence. However, since the action
cannot be considered as a non-public matter between private parties, but is impressed with State
interest, the Family Code likewise requires the participation of the State, through the prosecuting
attorney, fiscal, or Solicitor General, to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to
take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Thus, even if the petitioner is able establish
the psychological incapacity of respondent with preponderant evidence, any finding of collusion
among the parties would necessarily negate such proofs.

Second. The root cause of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically
identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the
trial court’s decision. The initiatory complaint alleged that respondent, from the start, had
exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior “of peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous
stories, and inventing personalities and situations,” of writing letters to petitioner using fictitious
names, and of lying about her actual occupation, income, educational attainment, and family
background, among others.

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Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial court explicated its finding of
psychological incapacity in its decision in this wise:

To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage. It has been shown clearly from her
actuations that respondent has that propensity for telling lies about almost anything, be it her
occupation, her state of health, her singing abilities, her income, etc. She has this fantastic ability
to invent and fabricate stories and personalities. She practically lived in a world of make believe
making her therefore not in a position to give meaning and significance to her marriage to
petitioner. In persistently and constantly lying to petitioner, respondent undermined the basic
tenets of relationship between spouses that is based on love, trust and respect. As concluded by the
psychiatrist presented by petitioner, such repeated lying is abnormal and pathological and amounts
to psychological incapacity.

Third. Respondent’s psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time
of and even before the celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from
fictitious characters well before she married petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark
about her natural child’s real parentage as she only confessed when the latter had found out the
truth after their marriage.

Fourth. The gravity of respondent’s psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability
to assume the essential obligations of marriage. It is immediately discernible that the parties had
shared only a little over a year of cohabitation before the exasperated petitioner left his wife.
Whatever such circumstance speaks of the degree of tolerance of petitioner, it likewise supports
the belief that respondent’s psychological incapacity, as borne by the record, was so grave in
extent that any prolonged marital life was dubitable.

It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false pretenses in order
to induce petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of
respondent to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least abide by the truth. Petitioner’s witnesses
and the trial court were emphatic on respondent’s inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the
pathologic nature of her mistruths, which according to them, were revelatory of respondent’s
inability to understand and perform the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable
to distinguish between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal
nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations
attached to marriage, including parenting. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to
adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments.

The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent allegedly tried her best to effect a
reconciliation, she had amply exhibited her ability to perform her marital obligations. We are not
convinced. Given the nature of her psychological condition, her willingness to remain in the
marriage hardly banishes nay extenuates her lack of capacity to fulfill the essential marital
obligations. Respondent’s ability to even comprehend what the essential marital obligations are
is impaired at best. Considering that the evidence convincingly disputes respondent’s ability to
adhere to the truth, her avowals as to her commitment to the marriage cannot be accorded much
credence.

At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code which states that a marriage
may be annulled if the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which
enumerates the circumstances constituting fraud under the previous article, clarifies that “no
other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute
such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage.” It would be improper
to draw linkages between misrepresentations made by respondent and the misrepresentations
under Articles 45 (3) and 46. The fraud under Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of the spouse who
is lied to, and does not allude to vitiated consent of the lying spouse. In this case, the
misrepresentations of respondent point to her own inadequacy to cope with her marital
obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity under Article 36.

Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as embraced
by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. As noted
by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit
to the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect.

Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the
marriage of the parties was annulled by the Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently
deemed this detail totally inconsequential as no reference was made to it anywhere in the assailed
decision despite petitioner’s efforts to bring the matter to its attention. Such deliberate ignorance
is in contravention of Molina, which held that interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts.

As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila decreed the invalidity of
the marriage in question in a Conclusion dated 30 March 1995, citing the “lack of due
discretion” on the part of respondent. Such decree of nullity was affirmed by both the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, and the Roman Rota of the Vatican. In fact, respondent’s
psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause was appended to the
sentence of nullity prohibiting respondent from contracting another marriage without the
Tribunal’s consent.

In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal pronounced:

The JURISPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial consent is considered

ontologically defective and wherefore judicially ineffective when elicited by a Part Contractant in
possession and employ of a discretionary judgment faculty with a perceptive vigor markedly
inadequate for the practical understanding of the conjugal Covenant or serious impaired from the
correct appreciation of the integral significance and implications of the marriage vows.

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Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such psychological
incapacity be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It was on this score that
the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court, the appellate court noting that it did
not appear certain that respondent’s condition was incurable and that Dr. Abcede did not testify
to such effect.
Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated, he returned to her,
desiring to make their marriage work. However, respondent’s aberrant behavior remained
unchanged, as she continued to lie, fabricate stories, and maintained her excessive jealousy. From
this fact, he draws the conclusion that respondent’s condition is incurable.

From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that respondent’s condition is
incurable? It would seem, at least, that respondent’s psychosis is quite grave, and a cure thereof
a remarkable feat. Certainly, it would have been easier had petitioner’s expert witnesses
characterized respondent’s condition as incurable. Instead, they remained silent on whether the
psychological incapacity was curable or incurable.

But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts’ taciturnity on this point.

The petitioner’s expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial court rendered its
decision on 10 August 1995. These events transpired well before Molina was promulgated in 1997
and made explicit the requirement that the psychological incapacity must be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such requirement was not expressly stated in
Article 36 or any other provision of the Family Code.

On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in January 1995, began its discussion
by first citing the deliberations of the Family Code committee, then the opinion of canonical
scholars, before arriving at its formulation of the doctrinal definition of psychological incapacity.
Santos did refer to Justice Caguioa’s opinion expressed during the deliberations that
“psychological incapacity is incurable,” and the view of a former presiding judge of the
Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila that psychological incapacity must
be characterized “by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.” However, in
formulating the doctrinal rule on psychological incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any
reference to incurability as a characteristic of psychological incapacity.

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All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity
under Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in
reversing the trial court.

There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it does the marital bond as
having been inexistent in the first place. It is possible that respondent, despite her psychological
state, remains in love with petitioner, as exhibited by her persistent challenge to the petition for
nullity. In fact, the appellate court placed undue emphasis on respondent’s avowed commitment
to remain in the marriage. Yet the Court decides these cases on legal reasons and not vapid
sentimentality. Marriage, in legal contemplation, is more than the legitimatization of a desire of
people in love to live together.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10 August 1995,
declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of
the Family Code, is REINSTATED. No costs.

12 RESPONSES TO “LANDMARK CASE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY”

horseradishUSA Says:

July 5, 2008 at 6:22 am

Here’s what I see as having happened in this “final” decision.

1) Events transpired before, during, after the marriage showing the Respondent had serious
“truth-telling” problems.

2) The marriage was Vowed and consumated.

3) Tragically: the Child conceived died.

4) The Petitioner decided to “make claim” for a “money-back guarantee” (rather than try to
work to “free” his spouse of her compulsive lying.) The Petitioner filed for “marital
bankruptcy”.

5) Nothing in the law existing at the time the Marriage was Vowed required “proof that
‘psychological incapacity is incurable’ ” in the Respondent (wife).

6) The Judges “feel sorry” for the “deal” the Petitioner contracted with his (defective)
Respondent (wife). [More importantly: What about what he/she Vowed before God?]

7) Because of the LETTER OF THE LAW, granting an annulment is both “possible” and
“socio-culturally-affectively-correct”.

(Thus:) An annulment was granted.

Was the validity of the Marriage upheld? Was justice served? Was “truth” found?

Consider Pope John Paul II’s intruction:

[Pope John Paul II says that undermining the family (ie. divorce) introduces — multiple — grave
— disorders — into both the family, and, thereby: into society (the world)!

Divorce fundamentally denies the value, dignity, social-interconnectivity, identity, peace of society
itself!, unity, integrity, Divine Grace, unselfishness, protection, uniqueness, love (of), and
membership in a family.]
[quote begins]
15. The fourth commandment of the Decalogue deals with the family and its interior unity—its
solidarity, we could say…

The Fathers of the Church, in the Christian tradition, have spoken of the family as a “domestic
church”, a “little church”. They thus referred to the civilization of love as a possible system of
human life and coexistence: “to be together” as a family, to be for one another, to make room in
a community for affirming each person as such, for affirming “this” individual person. At times
it is a matter of people with physical or psychological handicaps, of whom the so-called
“progressive” society would prefer to be free. Even the family can end up like this kind of
society. It does so when it hastily rids itself of people who are aged, disabled or sick. This happens
when there is a loss of faith in that God for whom “all live” (cf. Lk 20:38) and are called to the
fullness of Life.

– Pope John Paul II; LETTER TO FAMILIES: GRATISSIMAM SANE; 02/02/1994; “Year of
the Family”; Section 15. [end-of-quote]

Canon 1095 provides a near-fool-proof guarantee-of-invalidity. All that remains is the choice (ie.
the right of every Spouse) to put the “wheels of canonical adjudication in-motion”. (Thereby:)
Is the Truth what is really being sought? Or rather: Is what is being sought merely an “official
excuse” to give “divine-approval” to what the human will (the Petitioner) desires?

Is Marriage a “WalMart covenant: Money-back guaranteed”?

Or, does the Marriage Covenant supercede a subsequent declaration of emotional/ psychological
“bankruptcy” (ie. must the spouses actually trust in the “bounty of Graces” supplied by the
“Cana-God” and live the “acceptance” of one-another exhibited by the Good Samaritan and
by the father of the Prodigal Son?

Must spouses ACTUALLY EXHIBIT the love of Christ for His Church, as St. Paul describes it?

Or are they eligible for a “deferment” once-having Vowed their love and acceptance of each
other for life?)