G.R. No.

143276             July 20, 2004 "WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,  1. Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners, the spouses Dr. Vicente Banal and
vs. Leonidas Arenas-Banal, for the 5.4730 hectares of coconut land the sum of SIX HUNDRED
SPOUSES VICENTE BANAL and LEONIDAS ARENAS-BANAL, respondents. FIFTY-SEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-SEVEN PESOS (P657,137.00) in
cash and in bonds in the proportion provided by law;
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
2. Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners for the .7600 hectares of riceland the
sum of FORTY-SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P46,000.00) in cash and in bonds in the
Spouses Vicente and Leonidas Banal, respondents, are the registered owners of 19.3422 hectares of
proportion provided by law; and
agricultural land situated in San Felipe, Basud, Camarines Norte covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-6296. A portion of the land consisting of 6.2330 hectares (5.4730 of which is planted to coconut
and 0.7600 planted to palay) was compulsorily acquired by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) 3. Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners the sum of SEVENTY-NINE
pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657,1 as amended, otherwise known as the Comprehensive THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED THIRTY-TWO PESOS (P79,732.00) as the compounded
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. interest in cash.

In accordance with the formula prescribed in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1992,2 as IT IS SO ORDERED."7 
amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11, Series of 1994,3 the Land Bank of the
Philippines4 (Landbank), petitioner, made the following valuation of the property:
In determining the valuation of the land, the trial court based the same on the facts established in another
case pending before it (Civil Case No. 6679, "Luz Rodriguez vs. DAR, et al."), using the following
formula:
Acquired property Area in hectares

For the coconut land

Coconut land 5.4730

1. Average Gross Production (AGP) x .70 x 9.70 (price per kilo of coconut) = Net
Riceland 0.7600 Income (NI)

2. NI / 6% = Price Per Hectare (PPH) (applying the capitalization formula

Respondents rejected the above valuation. Thus, pursuant to Section 16(d) of R.A. 6657, as amended, a
under Republic Act No. 38448 )
summary administrative proceeding was conducted before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(PARAD) to determine the valuation of the land. Eventually, the PARAD rendered its Decision affirming
the Landbank's valuation. For the riceland

Dissatisfied with the Decision of the PARAD, respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), 1. 2.5 x AGP x Government Support Price (GSP) = Land Value (LV) or PPH
Branch 40, Daet, Camarines Norte, designated as a Special Agrarian Court, a petition for determination (using the formula under Executive Order No. 2289 )
of just compensation, docketed as Civil Case No. 6806. Impleaded as respondents were the DAR and the
Landbank. Petitioners therein prayed for a compensation of P100,000.00 per hectare for both coconut
2. AGP x 6% compounded annually for 26 years x GSP = Interest (pursuant to
land and riceland, or an aggregate amount of P623,000.00.
DAR AO No. 13, Series of 1994)

During the pre-trial on September 23, 1998, the parties submitted to the RTC the following admissions of
Forthwith, the Landbank filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review, docketed as CA-G.R. SP
facts: (1) the subject property is governed by the provisions of R.A. 6657, as amended; (2) it was
No. 52163.
distributed to the farmers-beneficiaries; and (3) the Landbank deposited the provisional compensation
based on the valuation made by the DAR.5 
On March 20, 2000, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision10 affirming in toto the judgment of the trial
court. The Landbank's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.11 
On the same day after the pre-trial, the court issued an Order dispensing with the hearing and directing
the parties to submit their respective memoranda.6 
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
In its Decision dated February 5, 1999, the trial court computed the just compensation for the coconut
land at P657,137.00 and for the riceland at P46,000.00, or a total of P703,137.00, which is beyond The fundamental issue for our resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial
respondents' valuation of P623,000.00. The court further awarded compounded interest at P79,732.00 in court's valuation of the land. As earlier mentioned, there was no trial on the merits.
cash. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
To begin with, under Section 1 of Executive Order No. 405 (1990), the Landbank is charged "primarily" LV = (CS x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
with "the determination of the land valuation and compensation for all private lands suitable for A.3 When both the CS and CNI are not present and only MV is applicable, the formula shall
agriculture under the Voluntary Offer to Sell or Compulsory Acquisition arrangement…" For its part, the be:
DAR relies on the determination of the land valuation and compensation by the Landbank.12  LV = MV x 2"

Based on the Landbank's valuation of the land, the DAR makes an offer to the landowner.13 If the Here, the RTC failed to observe the basic rules of procedure and the fundamental requirements in
landowner accepts the offer, the Landbank shall pay him the purchase price of the land after he executes determining just compensation for the property. Firstly, it dispensed with the hearing and merely ordered
and delivers a deed of transfer and surrenders the certificate of title in favor of the government.14 In case the parties to submit their respective memoranda. Such action is grossly erroneous since the
the landowner rejects the offer or fails to reply thereto, the DAR adjudicator15 conducts summary determination of just compensation involves the examination of the following factors specified in Section
administrative proceedings to determine the compensation for the land by requiring the landowner, the 17 of R.A. 6657, as amended:
Landbank and other interested parties to submit evidence as to the just compensation for the land.16 These
functions by the DAR are in accordance with its quasi-judicial powers under Section 50 of R.A. 6657, as
1. the cost of the acquisition of the land;
amended, which provides:

2. the current value of like properties;

"SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. – The DAR is hereby vested with primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except 3. its nature, actual use and income;
those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
4. the sworn valuation by the owner; the tax declarations;

x x x."
5. the assessment made by government assessors;

A party who disagrees with the decision of the DAR adjudicator may bring the matter to the RTC
6. the social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by
designated as a Special Agrarian Court17 "for final determination of just compensation."18 
the government to the property; and

In the proceedings before the RTC, it is mandated to apply the Rules of Court19 and, on its own initiative
7. the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on
or at the instance of any of the parties, "appoint one or more commissioners to examine, investigate and
the said land, if any.
ascertain facts relevant to the dispute, including the valuation of properties, and to file a written report
thereof x x x."20 In determining just compensation, the RTC is required to consider several factors
enumerated in Section 17 of R.A. 6657, as amended, thus: Obviously, these factors involve factual matters which can be established only during a hearing wherein
the contending parties present their respective evidence. In fact, to underscore the intricate nature of
determining the valuation of the land, Section 58 of the same law even authorizes the Special Agrarian
"Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. – In determining just compensation, the cost
Courts to appoint commissioners for such purpose.
of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and
income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by
government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by Secondly, the RTC, in concluding that the valuation of respondents' property is P703,137.00, merely
the farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government to the property, as well as the non- took judicial notice of the average production figures in the Rodriguez case pending before it and
payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land, applied the same to this case without conducting a hearing and worse, without the knowledge or consent
shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation." of the parties, thus:

These factors have been translated into a basic formula in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of
1992, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11, Series of 1994, issued pursuant to the DAR's
rule-making power to carry out the object and purposes of R.A. 6657, as amended.21 

The formula stated in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, as amended, is as follows:

"LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1)
LV = Land Value
CNI = Capitalized Net Income
CS = Comparable Sales
MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration

The above formula shall be used if all the three factors are present, relevant and applicable.
A.1 When the CS factor is not present and CNI and MV are applicable, the formula shall be:
LV = (CNI x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
A.2 When the CNI factor is not present, and CS and MV are applicable, the formula shall be:
 "x x x. In the case x x x of the coconut portion of the land 5.4730 hectares, defendants "SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. – During the trial, the court, on its own
determined the average gross production per year at 506.95 kilos only, but in the very recent initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any
case of Luz Rodriguez vs. DAR, et al., filed and decided by this court in Civil Case No. matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.
6679 also for just compensation for coconut lands and Riceland situated at Basud, Camarines
Norte wherein also the lands in the above-entitled case are situated, the value fixed therein
"After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on
was 1,061.52 kilos per annum per hectare for coconut land and the price per kilo
request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard
is P8.82, but in the instant case the price per kilo is P9.70. In the present case, we consider
thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case." (emphasis added)
506.95 kilos average gross production per year per hectare to be very low considering that
farm practice for coconut lands is harvest every forty-five days. We cannot also
comprehended why in the Rodriguez case and in this case there is a great variance in average The RTC failed to observe the above provisions.
production per year when in the two cases the lands are both coconut lands and in the same
place of Basud, Camarines Norte. We believe that it is more fair to adapt the 1,061.52 kilos
Lastly, the RTC erred in applying the formula prescribed under Executive Order (EO) No. 22826 and
per hectare per year as average gross production. In the Rodriguezcase, the defendants fixed
R.A. No. 3844,27 as amended, in determining the valuation of the property; and in granting compounded
the average gross production of palay at 3,000 kilos or 60 cavans per year. The court is also
interest pursuant to DAR Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1994.28 It must be stressed that EO No.
constrained to apply this yearly palay production in the Rodriguez case to the case at
228 covers private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn, while R.A. 3844
bar.
governs agricultural leasehold relation between "the person who furnishes the landholding, either as
owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor, and the person who personally cultivates the
xxx   xxx   xxx same."29 Here, the land is planted to coconut and rice and does not involve agricultural leasehold relation.
What the trial court should have applied is the formula in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, as amended
by DAR Administrative Order No. 11 discussed earlier.
"As shown in the Memorandum of Landbank in this case, the area of the coconut land taken
under CARP is 5.4730 hectares. But as already noted, the average gross production a year
of 506.96 kilos per hectare fixed by Landbank is too low as compared to the Rodriguez As regards the award of compounded interest, suffice it to state that DAR Administrative Order No. 13,
case which was 1,061 kilos when the coconut land in both cases are in the same town of Series of 1994 does not apply to the subject land but to those lands taken under Presidential Decree No.
Basud, Camarines Norte, compelling this court then to adapt 1,061 kilos as the average 2730 and Executive Order No. 228 whose owners have not been compensated. In this case, the property is
gross production a year of the coconut land in this case. We have to apply also the price covered by R.A. 6657, as amended, and respondents have been paid the provisional compensation
of P9.70 per kilo as this is the value that Landbank fixed for this case. thereof, as stipulated during the pre-trial.

"The net income of the coconut land is equal to 70% of the gross income. So, the net income While the determination of just compensation involves the exercise of judicial discretion, however, such
of the coconut land is 1,061 x .70 x 9.70 equals P7,204.19 per hectare. Applying the discretion must be discharged within the bounds of the law. Here, the RTC wantonly disregarded R.A.
capitalization formula of R.A. 3844 to the net income of P7,204.19 divided by 6%, the legal 6657, as amended, and its implementing rules and regulations. (DAR Administrative Order No. 6, as
rate of interest, equals P120,069.00 per hectare. Therefore, the just compensation for the amended by DAR Administrative Order No.11).
5.4730 hectares is P657,137.00.
In sum, we find that the Court of Appeals and the RTC erred in determining the valuation of the subject
"The Riceland taken under Presidential Decree No. 27 as of October 21, 1972 has an area land. Thus, we deem it proper to remand this case to the RTC for trial on the merits wherein the parties
of .7600 hectare. If in the Rodriguez case the Landbank fixed the average gross production of may present their respective evidence. In determining the valuation of the subject property, the trial court
3000 kilos or 60 cavans of palay per year, then the .7600 hectare in this case would be 46 shall consider the factors provided under Section 17 of R.A. 6657, as amended, mentioned earlier. The
cavans. The value of the riceland therefore in this case is 46 cavans x 2.5 x P400.00 formula prescribed by the DAR in Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1992, as amended by DAR
equals P46,000.00.22  Administrative Order No. 11, Series of 1994, shall be used in the valuation of the land. Furthermore,
upon its own initiative, or at the instance of any of the parties, the trial court may appoint one or more
commissioners to examine, investigate and ascertain facts relevant to the dispute.
"PARC Resolution 94-24-1 of 25 October 1994, implemented by DAR AO 13, granted
interest on the compensation at 6% compounded annually. The compounded interest on the 46
cavans for 26 years is 199.33 cavans. At P400.00 per cavan, the value of the compounded WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March
interest is P79,732.00."23 (emphasis added) 20, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 52163 is REVERSED. Civil Case No. 6806 is REMANDED to the RTC,
Branch 40, Daet, Camarines Norte, for trial on the merits with dispatch. The trial judge is directed to
observe strictly the procedures specified above in determining the proper valuation of the subject
Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records
property.
of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same
judge.24 They may only do so "in the absence of objection" and "with the knowledge of the opposing
party,"25 which are not obtaining here. SO ORDERED.

Furthermore, as earlier stated, the Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special
Agrarian Courts. In this regard, Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence is explicit on the
necessity of a hearing before a court takes judicial notice of a certain matter, thus:
 of person, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously KIDNAP, take and drag away and
detain the person of MONICO SAAVEDRA Y LIMEN [Criminal Case No. 10065] 7 a male public
officer of the City Government of Zamboanga, against his will, there being present an aggravating
G.R. No. 100901 July 16, 1998
circumstance in that the aforecited offense was committed with the aid of armed men or persons who
insure or afford impunity.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAILON KULAIS, CARLOS
FALCASANTOS @ "Commander Falcasantos," AWALON KAMLON HASSAN @ "Commander
Of the twelve accused, only nine were apprehended, namely, Jailon Julais, Jumatiya Amlani, Norma
Kamlon," MAJID SAMSON @ "Commander Bungi," JUMATIYA AMLANI DE
Sahiddan de Kulais, Salvador Mamaril Hadjirul Plasin, Jainuddin Hassan, Imam Taruk Alah, Jalina
FALCASANTOS, NORMA SAHIDDAN DE KULAIS, SALVADOR MAMARIL y MENDOZA,
Hassan and Freddie Manuel. 8
HADJIRUL PLASIN y ALIH, JAINUDDIN HASSAN y AHMAD, IMAM TARUK ALAH y
SALIH, JALINA HASSAN DE KAMMING, FREDDIE MANUEL @ "Ajid" and several JOHN
and JANE DOES, accused, JAILON KULAIS, appellant. On their arraignment on September 13, 1990, all the accused pleaded not guilty. Joint trial on the merits
ensued. On April 8, 1991, Judge Pelagio S. Mandi rendered the assailed 36-page Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
 

WHEREFORE, above premises and discussion taken into consideration, this Court renders its judgment,
PANGANIBAN, J.:
ordering and finding:

The trial court's erroneous taking of judicial notice of a witness' testimony in another case, also pending
1. FREDDIE MANUEL, alias "AJID" and IMAM TARUK ALAH y SALIH [n]ot [g]uilty of the eight
before it, does not affect the conviction of the appellant, whose guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt
charges of [k]idnapping for [r]ansom and for [k]idnapping, their guilt not having been proved beyond
by other clear, convincing and overwhelming evidence, both testimonial and documentary. The Court
reasonable doubt.
takes this occasion also to remind the bench and the bar that reclusion perpetua is not synonymous with
life imprisonment.
Their immediate release from the City Jail, Zamboanga City is ordered, unless detained for some other
offense besides these 8 cases (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10067).
The Case

2. JAINUDDIN HASSAN y AHMAD, JAILON KULAIS, SALVADOR MAMARIL y MENDOZA and

On August 22, 1990, five Informations for kidnapping for ransom (Crim. Case Nos. 10060, 10061,
HADJIRUL PLASIN y ALIH [g]uilty as principals by conspiracy in all these 8 cases for [k]idnapping
10062, 10063 and 10064) and three Informations for kidnapping (Crim Case Nos. 10065, 10066 and
for [r]ansom and for [k]idnapping (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10067).
10067), all dated August 14, 1990, were filed 1 before the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City
against Carlos Falcasantos, Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais, Jalina Hassan de
Kamming, 2 Salvador Mamaril, Hadjirul Plasin, Jaimuddin Hassan, Imam 3 Taruk Alah, Freddie Manuel Their guilt is aggravated in that they committed the 8 offenses with the aid of armed men who insured
alias "Ajid," and several John and Jane Does. The Informations for kidnapping for ransom, which set impunity. Therefore, the penalties imposed on them shall be at their maximum period.
forth identical allegations save for the names of the victims, read as follows:
WHEREFORE, for the five charges of [k]idnapping for [r]ansom, and pursuant to Art. 267 of the
That on or about the 12th day of December, 1988, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the Revised Penal Code, five life imprisonments are imposed on Jainuddin Hassan y Ahmad, Jailon Kulais,
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being all private individuals, conspiring Salvador Mamaril y Mendoza and Kadjirul Plasin y Alih (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10064).
and confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting one another, with threats to kill the person of
FELIX ROSARIO [in Criminal Case No. 10060] 4 and for the purpose of extorting ransom from the said
For kidnapping Mrs. Virginia San Agustin-Gara, a female and public officer and pursuant to Art. 267,
Felix Rosario or his families or employer, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
Revised Penal Code (par. 4.), another life imprisonment is imposed on Jainuddin Hassan y Ahmad, Jailon
KIDNAP the person of said Felix Rosario, 5 a male public officer of the City Government of Zamboanga,
Kulais, Salvador Mamaril y Mendoza and Hadjirul Plasin y Alih (Crim. Case No. 10066)
who was then aboard a Cimarron vehicle with plate No. SBZ-976 which was being ambushed by the
herein accused at the highway of Sitio Tigbao Lisomo, Zamboanga City, and brought said Felix
Rosario 6 to different mountainous places of Zamboanga City and Zamboanga del Sur, where he was For kidnapping Monico Saavedra y Limen, and Calixto Francisco y Gaspar, and their kidnapping not
detained, held hostage and deprived of his liberty until February 2, 1989, the day when he was released having lasted more than five days, pursuant to Art. 268, Revised Penal Code, and the Indeterminate
only after payment of the ransom was made to herein accused, to the damage and prejudice of said Sentence Law, the same four accused - Jainuddin Hassan y Ahmad, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril y
victim; there being present an aggravating circumstance in that the aforecited offense was committed Mendoza and Hadjirul Plasin y Alih - are sentenced to serve two (2) jail terms ranging from ten (10)
with the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity. years of  prision mayor as minimum, to eighteen (18) years of reclusion temporal as maximum (Crim.
Cases Nos. 10065 and 10067).
The three Informations for kidnapping, also under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, likewise
alleged identical facts and circumstances, except the names of the victims: 3. JAMATIYA AMLANI DE FALCASANTOS [n]ot [g]uilty in the three charges of [k]idnapping and
she is acquitted of these charges. (Crim. Cases Nos. 10065, 10066 and 10067).
That on or about the 12th day of December, 1988, in the City of Zamboanga and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being all private individuals, conspiring and But Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos is [g]uilty as accomplice in the five charges of [k]idnapping for
confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting one another, by means of threats and intimidation [r]ansom.
WHEREFORE, Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos is sentenced to serve five (5) imprisonments, ranging
from TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor as minimum to EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS of reclusion To Edilberto S. Perez:
temporal as maximum (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-1 0064).
One (1) Rayban P 1,000.00
4. NORMA SAHIDDAN DE KULAIS, 18 years old, and JALIHA HUSSIN (charged as Jalina Hassan
de Kamming), 15 years old, [n]ot [g]uilty in the three charges for [k]idnapping and are, therefore, One Wrist WatchP P 1,800.00
ACQUITTED of these three charges. (Crim. Cases Nos. 10065, 10066 & 10067).

Cash P 300.00
But Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jalina Hussin are found [g]uilty as accomplices in the five charges
for [k]idnapping for [r]ansom. Being miners, they are entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance
of minority which lowers the penalty imposable on them by one degree. To Virginia San Agustin-Gara:

WHEREFORE, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jalina Hussin are sentenced to serve five imprisonments One (1)Wrist Watch P 850.00
ranging from SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional as minimum to TEN YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY
 
OF prision mayor as maximum (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10064).

The benefit of Art. 29, Revised Penal Code, on preventive suspension, shall be extended to those
Due to the removal of the suspension of sentences of youthful offenders "convicted of an offense
sentenced.
punishable by death or life" by Presidential Decree No. 1179 and Presidential Decree No. 1210 (of which
[k]idnapping for [r]ansom is such an offense) the sentences on Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jaliha
Hussin de Kamming are NOT suspended but must be served by them. The cases against Majid Samson, alias "Commander Bungi" Awalon Kamlon a.k.a. "Commander
Kamlon" Carlos Falcasantos and several "John Does" and Jane "Does" are ARCHIVED until their arrest.
Januddin Hassan, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril and Hadjirul Plasin are sentenced further to return the
following personal effects taken on December 12, 1988, the day of the kidnapping, or their value in Costs against the accused convicted.
money, their liability being solidary.
SO ORDERED. 9
To Jessica Calunod:
On May 7, 1991, Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jaliha
Hussin filed their joint Notice of Appeal. 10 In a letter dated February 6, 1997, the same appellants, except
One (1) Seiko wrist watchP P 250.00
Jailon Kulais, withdrew their appeal because of their application for "amnesty." In our March 19, 1997
Resolution, we granted their motion. Hence, only the appeal of Kulais remains for the consideration of
One Bracelet this Court. 11
P 2,400.00

One Shoulder Bag P 200.00 The Facts

Cash P 200.00 The Version of the Prosecution

To Armado C. Bacarro: The solicitor general summarized, in this wise, the facts as viewed by the People:

One (1) wrist watch On December 12, 1988, a group of public officials from various government agencies, organized
P 800.00
themselves as a monitoring team to inspect government projects in Zamboanga City. The group was
composed of Virginia Gara, as the head of the team; Armando Bacarro, representing the Commission on
One Necklace P 300.00
Audit; Felix del Rosario, representing the non-government: Edilberto Perez, representing the City
Assessor's Office; Jessica Calunod and Allan Basa of the City Budget Office and Monico Saavedra, the
One Calculator driver from the City Engineer's Office. (p. 3, TSN, October 22, 1990.)
P 295.00

Eyeglasses On that particular day, the group headed to the Lincomo Elementary School to check on two of its
P 500.00
classrooms. After inspecting the same, they proceeded to the Talaga Footbridge. The group was not able
to reach the place because on their way, they were stopped by nine (9) armed men who pointed their guns
One Steel Tape P 250.00
at them (p. 4, TSN, ibid.).
The group alighted from their Cimarron jeep where they were divested of their personal belongings. Daing Kamming and brought to the mountains where he slept with her. She stayed with him for less than
They were then ordered to walk to the mountain by the leader of the armed men who introduced himself a month sleeping on forest ground and otherwise performing housekeeping errands for Kamming and his
as Commander Falcasantos (p. 5, TSN, ibid.). men. She made good her escape during an encounter between the group of Kamming and military troops.
She hid in the bushes and came out at Ligui-an where she took a "bachelor" bus in going back to her
mother's house at Pudos, Guiligan, Tungawan, Zamboanga del Sur. One day, at around 2:00 o'clock in
While the group was walking in the mountain, they encountered government troops which caused their
the afternoon, while she was harvesting palay at the neighboring village of Tigbalangao, military men
group to be divided. Finally, they were able to regroup themselves. Commander Kamlon with his men
picked her up to Ticbanuang where there was an army battalion detachment. From Ticbawuang, she was
joined the others. (pp. 7-8, TSN, ibid.).
brought to Vitali, then to Metrodiscom, Zamboanga City, where on her arrival, she met all the other
accused for the first time except Freddie Manuel. (Ibid., pp. 16-21)
The kidnappers held their captives for fifty-four (54) days in the forest. During their captivity, the victims
were able to recognize their captors who were at all times armed with guns. The wives of the kidnappers
Another female accused is appellant Norma Sahiddan, a native of Sinaburan, Tungawan, Zamboanga del
performed the basic chores like cooking. (pp. 9-10. TSN, ibid.)
Sur. At about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of a day in May, while she and her husband were in their
farm, soldiers arrested them. The soldiers did not tell them why they were being arrested, neither were
Commander Falcasantos also ordered their victims to sign the ransom notes which demanded a ransom of they shown any papers. The two of them were just made to board a six by six truck. There were no other
P100,000.00 and P14,000.00 in exchange for twenty (20) sets of uniform. (p. 15, TSN, ibid.) civilians in the truck. The truck brought the spouses to the army battalion and placed them inside the
building where there were civilians and soldiers. Among the civilians present were her six co-accused
Hadjirul Plasin, Salvador Mamaril, Jaimuddin Hassan, Ima[m] Taruk Alah, Freddie Manuel and
On February 3, 1989, at around 12:00 o'clock noontime, the victims were informed that they would be Jumatiya Amlani. That night, the eight of them were brought to Tictapul, Zamboanga City; then to Vitali;
released. They started walking until around 7:00 o'clock in the evening of that day. At around 12:00 and, finally, to the Metrodiscom, Zamboanga City where they stayed for six days and six nights. On the
o'clock midnight, the victims were released after Commander Falcasantos and Kamlon received the seventh day, the accused were brought to the City Jail, Zamboanga City. (TSN, January 30, 1991, pp. 6-
ransom money. (p. 19, TSN, ibid.) The total amount paid was P122,000.00. The same was reached after 11)
several negotiations between Mayor Vitaliano Agan of Zamboanga City and the representatives of the
kidnappers. (pp. 2, 6, TSN, Nov. 11, 1990)
The husband of Norma Sahiddan is Jailon Kulais who, as heretofore narrated, was arrested with his wife
the day the soldiers came to their farm on May 28, 1990. He has shared with his wife the ordeals that
. . . 12 followed in the wake of their arrest and in the duration of their confinement up to the present. (TSN,
January 22, 1991 pp. 2-4).
The prosecution presented fifteen witnesses, including some of the kidnap victims themselves: Jessica
Calunod, Armando Bacarro, Edilberto Perez, Virginia San Agustin-Gara, Calixto Francisco, and Monico The Trial Court's Ruling
Saavedra.

The trial court found Appellant Kulais guilty of five counts of kidnapping for ransom and one count of
The Version of the Defense kidnapping a woman and public officer, for which offenses it imposed upon him six terms of "life
imprisonment." It also found him guilty of two counts of slight illegal detention for the kidnapping of
The facts of the case, according to the defense, are as follows: 13 Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco. The trial court ratiocinated as follows:

On May 28, 1990, at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning, while weeding their farm in Sinaburan, Principally, the issue here is one of credibility - both of the witnesses and their version of what had
Zamboanga del Sur, accused-appellant Jumatiya Amlani was picked up by soldiers and brought to a happened on December 12, 1988, to February 3, 1989. On this pivotal issue, the Court gives credence to
place where one army battalion was stationed. Thereat, her five (5) co-accused, namely Salvador [p]rosecution witnesses and their testimonies. Prosecution evidence is positive, clear and convincing. No
Mamaril, Hadjirul Plasin, Jainuddin Hassin, Imam Taruk Alah and Freddie Manuel were already taint of evil or dishonest motive was imputed or imputable to [p]rosecution witnesses. To this Court, who
detained. In the afternoon of the same day, appellants spouses Jailon Kulais and Norma Sahiddan were saw all the witnesses testify, [p]rosecution witnesses testified only because they were impelled by [a]
brought to the battalion station and likewise detained thereat. On May 30, 1990, the eight (8) accused sense of justice, of duty and of truth.
were transported to Metrodiscom, Zamboanga City. Here on the same date, they were joined by accused-
appellant Jaliha Hussin. Contrarily, [d]efense evidence is weak, uncorroborated and consisted only of alibis. The individual
testimonies of the nine accused dwel[t] principally on what happened to each of them on May 27, 28 and
At the time Amlani was picked up by the military, she had just escaped from the captivity of Carlos 29, 1990. None of the accused explained where he or she was on and from December 12, 1988, to
Falcasantos and company who in 1988 kidnapped and brought her to the mountains. Against their will, February 3, 1989, when [p]rosecution evidence show[ed] positively seven of the nine accused were
she stayed with Falcasantos and his two wives for two months, during which she slept with Falcasantos keeping the five or six hostages named by [p]rosecution evidence.
as aide of the wives and was made to cook food, wash clothes, fetch water and run other errands for
everybody. An armed guard was assigned to watch her, so that, for sometime, she had to bear the ill- The seven accused positively identified to have been present during the course of the captivity of the five
treatment of Falcasantos' other wives one of whom was armed. After about two months, while she was kidnap-victims-complainants are: (1) Jumatiya Amlani; (2) Jaliha Hussin; (3) Norma Sahiddan; (4) Jailon
cooking and Falcasantos and his two wives were bathing in the river, and while her guard was not Kulais; (5) Hadjirul Plasin; (6) Salvador Mamaril and (7) Jainuddin Hassan.
looking, she took her chance and made a successful dash for freedom. (TSN, January 29, 1992, pp. 2-15)

The two accused not positively identified are: Freddie Manuel alias "Ajid", and Imam Taruk Alah. These
Likewise a kidnap victim herself is accused-appellant Jaliha Hussin, who was thirteen years old at the two must, therefore, be declared acquitted based on reasonable doubt.
time (she was fifteen years old when the trial of the instant cases commenced). She was kidnapped by
The next important issue to be examined is: Are these seven accused guilty as conspirators as charged in The trial court erred in denying to accused-appellant Jaliha Hussin and Norma Sahiddan the benefits of
the eight Informations; or only as accomplices? Prosecution evidence shows that the kidnapping group to suspension of sentence given to youth offenders considering that they were minors at the time of the
which the seven accused belonged had formed themselves into an armed band for the purpose of commission of the offense. 15
kidnapping for ransom. This armed band had cut themselves off from established communities, lived in As earlier noted, Jumatiya Amlani, Jaliha Hussin and Norma Sahiddan had withdrawn their appeal, and
the mountains and forests, moved from place to place in order to hide their hostages. The wives of these as such, the third and fourth assigned errors, which pertain to them only, will no longer be dealt with.
armed band moved along with their husbands, attending to their needs, giving them material and moral Only the following issues pertaining to Appellant Jailon Kulais will be discussed: (1) judicial notice of
support. These wives also attended to the needs of the kidnap victims, sleeping with them or comforting other pending cases, (2) sufficiency of the prosecution evidence, and (3) denial as a defense. In addition,
them. the Court will pass upon the propriety of the penalty imposed by the trial court.

The Court's Ruling

xxx xxx xxx
The appeal is bereft of merit.
First Issue:
II The guilt of Jainuddin Hassan, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril and Hadjirul Plasin. The Court holds
these four men guilty as conspirators in the 8 cases of kidnapping. Unlike the three women-accused,
Judicial Notice and Denial of Due Process
these male accused were armed. They actively participated in keeping their hostages by fighting off the
military and CAFGUS, in transferring their hostages from place to place, and in guarding the kidnap
hostages. Salvador Mamaril and Jailon Kulais were positively identified as among the nine armed men Appellant Kulais argues that he was denied due process when the trial court took judicial notice of the
who had kidnapped the eight kidnap victims on December 12, 1988. testimony given in another case by one Lt. Melquiades Feliciano, who was the team leader of the
government troops that captured him and his purported cohorts. 16 Because he was allegedly deprived of
his right to cross-examine a material witness in the person of Lieutenant Feliciano, he contends that the
The higher degree of participation found by the Court of the four accused is supported by the rulings of
latter's testimony should not be used against him. 17
our Supreme Court quoted below.

True, as a general rule, courts should not take judicial notice of the evidence presented in other
(1) The time-honored jurisprudence is that direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy. It may be
proceedings, even if these have been tried or are pending in the same court, or have been heard and are
shown by a number of infinite acts, conditions and circumstances which may vary according to the
actually pending before the same judge. 18 This is especially true in criminal cases, where the accused has
purposes to be accomplished and from which may logically be inferred that there was a common design,
the constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him.
understanding or agreement among the conspirators to commit the offense charged. (People vs. Cabrera,
43 Phil 64; People vs. Carbonel, 48 Phil. 868.)
Having said that, we note, however, that even if the court a quo did take judicial notice of the testimony
of Lieutenant Feliciano, it did not use such testimony in deciding the cases against the appellant. Hence,
(2) The crime must, therefore, in view of the solidarity of the act and intent which existed between the
Appellant Kulais was not denied due process. His conviction was based mainly on the positive
sixteen accused, be regarded as the act of the band or party created by them, and they are all equally
identification made by some of the kidnap victims, namely, Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro and
responsible for the murder in question. (U.S. vs. Bundal, et. al. 3 Phil 89, 98.)
Edilberto Perez. These witnesses were subjected to meticulous cross-examinations conducted by
appellant's counsel. At best, then, the trial court's mention of Lieutenant Feliciano's testimony is a
(3) When two or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether through the physical decisional surplusage which neither affected the outcome of the case nor substantially prejudiced
volition of one, or all, proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose evil will actively Appellant Kulais.
contribute to the wrongdoing is in law responsible for the whole, the same as though performed by
himself alone. (People vs. Peralta, et. al. 25 SCRA 759, 772 (1968).) 14
Second Issue:
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
The Assigned Errors Appellant was positively identified by Calunod, as shown by the latter's testimony:
CP CAJAYON D MS:
Q And how long were you in the custody of these persons?
The trial court is faulted with the following errors, viz: A We stayed with them for fifty-four days.
I Q And during those days did you come to know any of the persons who were with the group?
The trial court erred in taking judicial notice of a material testimony given in another case by Lt. A We came to know almost all of them considering we stayed there for fifty-four days.
Melquiades Feliciano, who allegedly was the team leader of the government troops which allegedly Q And can you please name to us some of them or how you know them?
captured the accused-appellants in an encounter; thereby, depriving the accused-appellants their right to A For example, aside from Commander Falcasantos and Commander Kamlon we came to know first our
cross-examine him. foster parents, those who were assigned to give us some food.
II Q You mean to say that the captors assigned you some men who will take care of you?
On the assumption that Lt. Feliciano's testimony could be validly taken judicial notice of, the trial court, A Yes.
nevertheless, erred in not disregarding the same for being highly improbable and contradictory. Q And to whom were you assigned?
III A To Ila Abdurasa.
The trial court erred in finding that accused-appellants Jumatiya Amlani, Jaliha Hussin and Norma Q And other than your foster [parents] or the parents whom you are assigned to, who else did you come
Sahiddan provided Carlos Falcasantos, et. al., with material and moral comfort, hence, are guilty as to know?
accomplices in all the kidnapping for ransom cases. A Pagal and his wife; Tangkong and his wife Nana; the two (2) wives of Commander Falcasantos -
IV Mating and Janira - another brother in-law of Commander Kamlon, Usman, the wife of Kamlon, Tira.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, you said that you were with these men for fifty-four days and you really came to know them. A The last man.
Will you still be able to recognize these persons if you will see the[m] again? Q Did you come to know his name?
A Yes, ma'am. A Only his nickname, Tangkong.  (Witness pointed to a man in Court who identified himself as Jailon
Q Now will you look around this Honorable Court and see if any of those you mentioned are here? Kulais.)
A Yes, they are here. Q And what was Tangkong doing in the mountain?
Q Some of them are here? A The same, guarding us.
A Some of them are here. CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ATTY. SAHAK.
xxx xxx xxx Q Engr. Perez, you stated that you were ambushed by nine armed men on your way from [the] Licomo to
Q Where is Tangkong? What is he wearing? [the] Talaga Foot Bridge. [W]hat do you mean by ambushed?
A White t-shirt with orange collar. (witness pointing.) He was one of those nine armed men who took us A I mean that they blocked our way and stopped.
from the highway. Q They did not fire any shots?
RTC INTERPRETER: A But they were pointing their guns at us.
Witness pointed to a man sitting in court and when asked of his name, he gave his name as JAILON Q And among the 9 armed men who held you on your way to [the] Talaga Footbridge, you stated [that]
KULAIS. one of them [was] Commander Falcasantos?
CP CAJAYON D MS: A Yes.
Q Aside from being with the armed men who stopped the vehicle and made you alight, what else was he Q Could you also recognize anyone of the accused in that group?
doing while you were in their captivity? A Yes.
A He was the foster parent of Armando Bacarro and the husband of Nana. Q Will you please identify?
COURT: A That one, Tangkong.  (The witness pointed to a man sitting in court who identified himself as Jailon
Q Who? Kulais.)
A Tangkong. xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx 19 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ATTY. FABIAN.
Likewise clear and straightforward was Bacarro's testimony pointing to appellant as one of the culprits: Q You said Jailon Kulais was among those who guarded the camp?
FISCAL CAJAYON: FISCAL CAJAYON:
xxx xxx xxx Your Honor, please, he does not know the name of Julais, he used the word Tangkong.
Q And what happened then? ATTY. FABIAN
A Some of the armed men assigned who will be the host or who will be the one [to] g[i]ve food to us. Q You said Tangkong guarded you[. W]hat do you mean?
Q [To] whom were you assigned? A He guarded us like prisoners[. A]fter guarding us they have their time two hours another will be on
A I was assigned to a certain Tangkong and [his] wife Nana. duty guarding us.
xxx xxx xxx Q Where did you meet Tangkong?
Q Now, you said you were assigned to Tangkong and his wife. [D]o you remember how he looks like? A He was one of the armed men who kidnapped us.
A Yes. xxx xxx xxx 21
Q Now, will you please look around this Court and tell us if that said Tangkong and his wife are here? It is evident from the foregoing testimonies of Calunod, Bacarro and Perez that kidnapping or detention
A Yes, ma'am. did take place: the five victims were held, against their will, for fifty-three days from December 12, 1988
Q Could you please point this Tangkong to us? to February 2, 1989. It is also evident that Appellant Kulais was a member of the group of armed men
A Witness pointed to a person in Court. [W]hen asked his name he identified [himself] as Jailon Kulais. who staged the kidnapping, and that he was one of those who guarded the victims during the entire
Q Why did you say his name is Tangkong? Where did you get that name? period of their captivity. His participation gives credence to the conclusion of the trial court that he was a
A Well, that is the name [by which he is] usually called in the camp. conspirator.
xxx xxx xxx Kidnapping
ATTY. FABIAN (counsel for accused Kulais) for Ransom
Q When did you first meet Tangkong? That the kidnapping of the five was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom is also apparent from
A That was on December 11, because I remember he was the one who took us. the testimony of Calunod, who was quite emphatic in identifying the accused and narrating the
Q When you were questioned by the fiscal a while ago, you stated that Mr. Mamaril was one of those circumstances surrounding the writing of the ransom letters.
who stopped the bus and took you to the hill and you did not mention Tangkong? CP CAJAYON D MS:
A I did not mention but I can remember his face. Q Now, you were in their captivity for 54 days and you said there were these meetings for possible
xxx xxx xxx negotiation with the City Government. What do you mean by this? What were you supposed to
Q And because Tangkong was always with you as your host even if he did not tell you that he [was] one negotiate?
of those who stopped you, you would not recognize him? A Because they told us that they will be releasing us only after the terms. 22
A No, I can recognize him because he was the one who took my shoes. Q And what were the terms? Did you come to know the terms?
COURT: A I came to know the terms because I was the one ordered by Commander Falcasantos to write the
Q Who? letter, the ransom letter.
A Tangkong, your Honor. Q At this point of time, you remember how many letters were you asked to write for your ransom?
xxx xxx xxx  A I could not remember as to how many, but I can identify them.
Q Why will you able to identify the same?
Also straightforward was Ernesto Perez' candid narration: A Because I was the one who wrote it.
FISCAL CAJAYON: Q And you are familiar, of course, with your penmanship?
xxx xxx xxx A Yes.
Q Who else?
Q Now we have here some letters which were turned over to us by the Honorable City Mayor Vitaliano They like the P100,000.00 and an addition of 20 sets of complete uniform (7 colors, marine-type not
Agan. 1,2,3,4,5 - there are five letters all handwritten. including the shoes), one half medium, one half large.
COURT:
Original?
xxx xxx xxx
CP CAJAYON D MS:
Original, your Honor.
Q And we would like you to go over these and say, tell us if any of these were the ones you were asked Q After having written these letters, did you come to know after [they were] signed by your companions
to write. and all of you, do you know if these letters were sent? If you know only.
A (Witness going over [letters])
This one - 2 pages. This one - 2 pages. No more.
A I would like to make it clear. The first letter was ordered to me by Falcasantos to inform the City
Q Aside from the fact that you identified your penmanship in these letters, what else will make you
Mayor that initial as P500,000.00, and when we were already - I was asked again to write, we were
remember that these are really the ones you wrote while there?
ordered to affix our signature to serve as proof that all of us are alive. 26 [sic]
A The signature is there.
Q There is a printed name here[,] Jessica Calunod.
A And over it is a signature. Calunod's testimony was substantially corroborated by both Armando Bacarro 27 and Edilberto
Q That is your signature? Perez. 28 The receipt of the ransom letters, the efforts made to raise and deliver the ransom, and the
A Yes, ma'am. release of the hostages upon payment of the money were testified to by Zamboanga City Mayor Vitaliano
Q How about in the other letter, did you sign it also? Agan 29 and Teddy Mejia. 30
A Yes, there is the other signature.
Q There are names - other names here - Eddie Perez, Allan Basa, Armando Bacarro, Felix Rosario, Jojie
Ortuoste and there are signatures above the same. Did you come up to know who signed this one? The elements of kidnapping for ransom, as embodied in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, 31 having
A Those whose signatures there were signed by the persons. [sic]. been sufficiently proven, and the appellant, a private individual, having been clearly identified by the
Q And we have here at the bottom, Commander Kamlon Hassan, and there is the signature above the kidnap victims, this Court thus affirms the trial court's finding of appellant's guilt on five counts of
same. Did you come to know who signed it? kidnapping for ransom.
A [It was] Commander Kamlon Hassan who signed that.
xxx xxx xxx Kidnapping of Public Officers
Q Jessica, I am going over this letter . . . Could you please read to us the portion here which says the
terms? . . .
A (Witness reading) "Mao ilang gusto nga andamun na ninyo ang kantidad nga P100,000 ug P14,000 Victims Virginia San Agustin-Gara, Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco were members of the
baylo sa 20 sets nga uniforms sa Biyernes (Pebrero 3, 1989). 23 government monitoring team abducted by appellant's group. The three testified to the fact of kidnapping;
xxx xxx xxx however, they were not able to identify the appellant. Even so, appellant's identity as one of the
INTERPRETER (Translation): kidnappers was sufficiently established by Calunod, Bacarro and Perez, who were with Gara, Saavedra
This is what they like you to prepare[:] the amount of P100,000.00 and P14,000.00 in exchange [for] 20 and Francisco when the abduction occurred.
sets of uniform on Friday, February 3, 1989.
xxx xxx xxx That Gara, Saavedra and Francisco were detained for only three hours 32 does nor matter. In People vs.
Q Now you also earlier identified this other letter and this is dated January 21, 1988. 24 Now, could you Domasian, 33 the victim was similarly held for three hours, and was released even before his parents
please explain to us why it is dated January 21, 1988 and the other one Enero 31, 1989 or January 31, received the ransom note. The accused therein argued that they could not be held guilty of kidnapping as
1989? no enclosure was involved, and that only grave coercion was committed, if at all. 34 Convicting appellants
A I did not realize that I placed 1989, 1988, but it was 1989. of kidnapping or serious illegal detention under Art. 267 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, the Court found
Q January 21, 1989? that the victim, an eight-year-old boy, was deprived of his liberty when he was restrained from going
A Yes. home. The Court justified the conviction by holding that the offense consisted not only in placing a
xxx xxx xxx person in an enclosure, but also in detaining or depriving him, in any manner, of his liberty. 35Likewise,
Q Now, in this letter, were the terms also mentioned? in People vs. Santos, 36 the Court held that since the appellant was charged and convicted under Article
Please go over this. 267, paragraph 4, it was not the duration of the deprivation of liberty which was important, but the fact
A (Going over the letter) that the victim, a minor, was locked up.
Yes, ma'am.
Q Could you please read it aloud to us?
A (Witness reading) Thus, in the present case, the detention of Gara, Saavedra and Francisco for only a few hours is
Gusto nila and P100,000.00 ng kapinan nu ug 20 sets nga completong uniformer (7 colors marine type immaterial. The clear fact is that the victims were public officers 37 - Gara was a fiscal analyst for the
wala nay labot ang sapatos), tunga medium ug tunga large size. 25 City of Zamboanga, Saavedra worked at the City Engineer's Office, and Francisco was a barangay
councilman at the time the kidnapping occurred. Appellant Kulais should be punished, therefore, under
Article 267, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, and not Art, 268, as the trial court held.
xxx xxx xxx
The present case is different from People vs. Astorga, 38 which held that the crime committed was not
INTERPRETER: kidnapping under Article 267, paragraph 4, but only grave coercion. The appellant in that case had
tricked his seven-year-old victim into going with him to a place he alone knew. His plans, however, were
foiled when a group of people became suspicious and rescued the girl from him. The Court noted that the
victim's testimony and the other pieces of evidence did not indicate that the appellant wanted to detain
her, or that he actually detained her.

In the present case, the evidence presented by the prosecution indubitably established that the victims
were detained, albeit for a few hours. There is proof beyond reasonable doubt that kidnapping took place,
and that appellant was a member of the armed group which abducted the victims.

Third Issue:

Denial and Alibi

The appellant's bare denial is a weak defense that becomes even weaker in the face of the prosecution
witnesses' positive identification of him. Jurisprudence gives greater weight to the positive narration of
prosecution witnesses than to the negative testimonies of the defense. 39 Between positive and categorical
testimony which has a ring of truth to it on the one hand, and a bare denial on the other, the former
generally prevails. 40 Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro and Edilberto Perez testified in a clear,
straightforward and frank manner; and their testimonies were compatible on material points. Moreover,
no ill motive was attributed to the kidnap victims and none was found by this Court.

We agree with the trial court's observation that the appellant did not meet the charges against him head
on. His testimony dwelt on what happened to him on the day he was arrested and on subsequent days
thereafter. Appellant did not explain where he was during the questioned dates (December 12, 1988 to
February 3, 1989); neither did he rebut Calunod, Bacarro and Perez, when they identified him as one of
their kidnappers.

Reclusion Perpetua, Not Life Imprisonment

The trial court erred when it sentenced the appellant to six terms of life imprisonment. The penalty for
kidnapping with ransom, under the Revised Penal Code, is reclusion perpetua to death. Since the crimes
happened in 1988, when the capital penalty was proscribed by the Constitution, the maximum penalty
that could have been imposed was reclusion perpetua. Life imprisonment is not synonymous
with reclusion perpetua. Unlike life imprisonment, reclusion perpetua carries with it accessory penalties
provided in the Revised Penal Code and has a definite extent or duration. Life imprisonment is invariably
imposed for serious offenses penalized by special laws, while reclusion perpetua is prescribed in
accordance with the Revised Penal Code. 41

WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Jailon Kulais as principal in five counts of kidnapping for G. R. No. 114776 - February 2, 2000
ransom and in three counts of kidnapping is AFFIRMED, but the penalty imposed is hereby MODIFIED
as follows: Appellant is sentenced to five terms of reclusion perpetua, one for each of his five
convictions for kidnapping for ransom; and to three terms of reclusion perpetua, one each for the MENANDRO B. LAUREANO, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS AND SINGAPORE
kidnapping of Public Officers Virginia Gara, Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco. Like the other AIRLINES LIMITED, Respondents.
accused who withdrew their appeals, he is REQUIRED to return the personal effects, or their monetary
value, taken from the kidnap victims. Additionally, he is ORDERED to pay the amount of P122,000 QUISUMBING, J.:
representing the ransom money paid to the kidnappers. Costs against appellant.

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to reverse the Decision
SO ORDERED. of the Court of Appeals, dated October 29, 1993, in C.A. G.R. No. CV 34476, as well as its Resolution
dated February 28, 1994, which denied the motion for reconsideration.

The facts of the case as summarized by the respondent appellate court are as follows:
Sometime in 1978, plaintiff [Menandro B. Laureano, herein petitioner], then Director of Flight claim arising out of and in the course of plaintiffs employment "thus it is the Labor Arbiter and the
Operations and Chief Pilot of Air Manila, applied for employment with defendant company [herein NLRC who have the jurisdiction pursuant to Article 217 of the Labor Code" and that, since plaintiff was
private respondent] through its Area Manager in Manila. employed in Singapore, all other aspects of his employment contract and/or documents executed in
Singapore. Thus, defendant postulates that Singapore laws should apply and courts thereat shall have
jurisdiction. (pp. 50-69, Rec.).
On September 30, 1978, after the usual personal interview, defendant wrote to plaintiff, offering a
contract of employment as an expatriate B-707 captain for an original period of two (2) years
commencing on January 21, 1978. Plaintiff accepted the offer and commenced working on January 20, In traversing defendant's arguments, plaintiff claimed that: (1) where the items demanded in a complaint
1979. After passing the six-month probation period, plaintiffs appointment was confirmed effective July are the natural consequences flowing from a breach of an obligation and not labor benefits, the case is
21, 1979. (Annex "B", p. 30, Rollo). intrinsically a civil dispute; (2) the case involves a question that is beyond the field of specialization of
labor arbiters; and (3) if the complaint is grounded not on the employee's dismissal per se but on the
manner of said dismissal and the consequence thereof, the case falls under the jurisdiction of the civil
On July 21, 1979, defendant offered plaintiff an extension of his two-year contract to five (5) years
courts. (pp. 70-73, Rec.)
effective January 21, 1979 to January 20, 1984 subject to the terms and conditions set forth in the
contract of employment, which the latter accepted (Annex "C" p. 31, Rec.).
On March 23, 1987, the court a quo denied defendant's motion to dismiss (pp. 82-84, Ibid). The motion
for reconsideration was likewise denied. (p. 95 ibid.)
During his service as B-707 captain, plaintiff on August 24, 1980, while in command of a flight,
committed a noise violation offense at the Zurich Airport, for which plaintiff apologized.(Exh. "3", p.
307, Rec.). On September 16, 1987, defendant filed its answer reiterating the grounds relied upon in its motion to
dismiss and further arguing that plaintiff is barred by laches, waiver, and estoppel from instituting the
complaint and that he has no cause of action . (pp. 102-115)1
Sometime in 1980, plaintiff featured in a tail scraping incident wherein the tail of the aircraft scraped or
touched the runway during landing. He was suspended for a few days until he was investigated by board
headed by Capt. Choy. He was reprimanded. On April 10, 1991, the trial court handed down its decision in favor of plaintiff. The dispositive portion
of which reads:
On September 25, 1981, plaintiff was invited to take a course of A-300 conversion training at
Aeroformacion, Toulouse, France at dependant's expense. Having successfully completed and passed the WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Menandro Laureano and against
training course, plaintiff was cleared on April 7, 1981, for solo duty as captain of the Airbus A-300 and defendant Singapore Airlines Limited, ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the amounts of 
subsequently appointed as captain of the A-300 fleet commanding an Airbus A-300 in flights over
Southeast Asia. (Annexes "D", "E" and "F", pp. 34-38, Rec.).
SIN$396,104.00, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the current rate of exchange at the time of
payment, as and for unearned compensation with legal interest from the filing of the complaint until fully
Sometime in 1982, defendant, hit by a recession, initiated cost-cutting measures. Seventeen (17) paid;
expatriate captains in the Airbus fleet were found in excess of the defendant's requirement (t.s.n., July 6,
1988. p. 11). Consequently, defendant informed its expatriate pilots including plaintiff of the situation
SIN$154,742.00, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the current rate of exchange at the time of
and advised them to take advance leaves. (Exh. "15", p. 466, Rec.)
payment; and the further amounts of P67,500.00 as consequential damages with legal interest from the
filing of the complaint until fully paid;
Realizing that the recession would not be for a short time, defendant decided to terminate its excess
personnel (t.s.n., July 6, 1988, p. 17). It did not, however, immediately terminate it's A-300 pilots. It
P1,000,000.00 as and for moral damages; P1,000,000.00 as and for exemplary damages; and
reviewed their qualifications for possible promotion to the B-747 fleet. Among the 17 excess Airbus
P100,000.00 as and for attorney's fees.
pilots reviewed, twelve were found qualified. Unfortunately, plaintiff was not one of the twelve.

Costs against defendant.

On October 5, 1982, defendant informed plaintiff of his termination effective November 1, 1982 and that
he will be paid three (3) months salary in lieu of three months notice (Annex "I", pp. 41-42, Rec.).
Because he could not uproot his family on such short notice, plaintiff requested a three-month notice to SO ORDERED.2
afford him time to exhaust all possible avenues for reconsideration and retention. Defendant gave only
two (2) months notice and one (1) month salary. (t.s.n., Nov. 12, 1987. p. 25).
Singapore Airlines timely appealed before the respondent court and raised the issues of jurisdiction,
validity of termination, estoppel, and damages.
Aggrieved, plaintiff on June 29, 1983, instituted a case for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter.
Defendant moved to dismiss on jurisdiction grounds. Before said motion was resolved, the complaint
On October 29, 1993, the appellate court set aside the decision of the trial court, thus,
was withdrawn. Thereafter, plaintiff filed the instant case for damages due to illegal termination of
contract of services before the court a quo (Complaint, pp. 1-10, Rec.).
. . . In the instant case, the action for damages due to illegal termination was filed by plaintiff-appellee
only on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4) years after the effectivity date of his dismissal on
Again, defendant on February 11, 1987 filed a motion to dismiss alleging inter alia: (1) that the court has
November 1, 1982. Clearly, plaintiff-appellee's action has already prescribed.
no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, and (2) that Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over
the instant case. Defendant contends that the complaint is for illegal dismissal together with a money
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint is hereby What rules on prescription should apply in cases like this one has long been decided by this Court. In
dismissed. illegal dismissal, it is settled, that the ten-year prescriptive period fixed in Article 1144 of the Civil
Code may not  be invoked by petitioners, for the Civil Code is a law of general application, while the
prescriptive period fixed in Article 292 of the Labor Code [now Article 291] is a SPECIAL LAW
SO ORDERED.3
applicable to claims arising from employee-employer relations.9

Petitioner's and Singapore Airlines' respective motions for reconsideration were denied.
More recently in De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals,10 where the money claim was based on a written
contract, the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the Court held:
Now, before the Court, petitioner poses the following queries:
. . . The language of Art. 291 of the Labor Code does not limit its application only to "money claims
1. IS THE PRESENT ACTION ONE BASED ON CONTRACT WHICH PRESCRIBES IN TEN specifically recoverable under said Code" but covers all money claims arising from an employee-
YEARS UNDER ARTICLE 1144 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE OR ONE FOR DAMAGES ARISING employer relations" (Citing Cadalin v. POEA Administrator, 238 SCRA 721, 764 [1994]; and Uy v.
FROM AN INJURY TO THE RIGHTS OF THE PLAINTIFF WHICH PRESCRIBES IN FOUR National Labor Relations Commission, 261 SCRA 505, 515 [1996]). . . .
YEARS UNDER ARTICLE 1146 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE?
It should be noted further that Article 291 of the Labor Code is a special law applicable to money claims
2. CAN AN EMPLOYEE WITH A FIXED PERIOD OF EMPLOYMENT BE RETRENCHED BY HIS arising from employer-employee relations; thus, it necessarily prevails over Article 1144 of the Civil
EMPLOYER? Code, a general law. Basic is the rule in statutory construction that "where two statutes are of equal
theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed therefore should prevail." (Citing Leveriza v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 157 SCRA 282, 294.) Generalia specialibus non derogant.11
3. CAN THERE BE VALID RETRENCHMENT IF AN EMPLOYER MERELY FAILS TO REALIZE
THE EXPECTED PROFITS EVEN IF IT WERE NOT, IN FACT, INCURRING LOSSES?
In the light of Article 291, aforecited, we agree with the appellate court's conclusion that petitioner's
action for damages due to illegal termination filed again on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4) years
At the outset, we find it necessary to state our concurrence on the assumption of jurisdiction by the after the effective date of his dismissal on November 1, 1982 has already prescribed.
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9. The trial court rightly ruled on the application of Philippine
law, thus:
In the instant case, the action for damages due to illegal termination was filed by plaintiff-appelle only on
January 8, 1987 or more than four (4) years after the effectivity date of his dismissal on November 1,
Neither can the Court determine whether the termination of the plaintiff is legal under the Singapore 1982. Clearly, plaintiff-appellee's action has already prescribed.
Laws because of the defendant's failure to show which specific laws of Singapore Laws apply to this
case. As substantially discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the Philippine Courts do not take judicial
notice of the laws of Singapore. The defendant that claims the applicability of the Singapore Laws to this We base our conclusion not on Article 1144 of the Civil Code but on which sets the prescription period at
case has the burden of proof. The defendant has failed to do so. Therefore, the Philippine law should be three (3) years and which governs under this jurisdiction.
applied.4
Petitioner claims that the running of the prescriptive period was tolled when he filed his complaint for
Respondent Court of Appeals acquired jurisdiction when defendant filed its appeal before said court.5 On illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter of the National Labor Relations Commission. However, this
this matter, respondent court was correct when it barred defendant-appellant below from raising further claim deserves scant consideration; it has no legal leg to stand on. In Olympia International,
the issue of jurisdiction.6 Inc., v. , Court of Appeals, we held that "although the commencement of a civil action stops the running
of the statute of prescription or limitations, its dismissal or voluntary abandonment by the plaintiff leaves
in exactly the same position as though no action had been commenced at all."12
Petitioner now raises the issue of whether his action is one based on Article 1144 or on Article 1146 of
the Civil Code. According to him, his termination of employment effective November 1, 1982, was based
on an employment contract which is under Article 1144, so his action should prescribe in 10 years as Now, as to whether petitioner's separation from the company due to retrenchment was valid, the appellate
provided for in said article. Thus he claims the ruling of the appellate court based on Article 1146 where court found that the employment contract of petitioner allowed for pre-termination of employment. We
prescription is only four (4) years, is an error. The appellate court concluded that the action for illegal agree with the Court of Appeals when it said,
dismissal originally filed before the Labor Arbiter on June 29, 1983, but which was withdrawn, then filed
again in 1987 before the Regional Trial Court, had already prescribed.
It is a settled rule that contracts have the force of law between the parties. From the moment the same is
perfected, the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also
In our view, neither Article 11447 nor Article 11468 of the Civil Code is here pertinent. What is to all consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law.
applicable is Article 291 of the Labor Code, viz: Thus, when plaintiff-appellee accepted the offer of employment, he was bound by the terms and
conditions set forth in the contract, among others, the right of mutual termination by giving three months
written notice or by payment of three months salary. Such provision is clear and readily understandable,
Art. 291. Money claims. All money claims arising from employee-employer relations accruing during the hence, there is no room for interpretation.
effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the cause of action accrued;
otherwise they shall be forever barred.
xxx-xxx-xxx
xxx-xxx-xxx
Further, plaintiff-appellee's contention that he is not bound by the provisions of the Agreement, as he is Local Government Code while the Resolution2 of the COMELEC En Banc dated 2 February 2011 is
not a signatory thereto, deserves no merit. It must be noted that when plaintiff-appellee's employment being questioned for finding that respondent Rommel Arnado y Cagoco (respondent Arnado/Arnado) is
was confirmed, he applied for membership with the Singapore Airlines Limited (Pilots) Association, the solely a Filipino citizen qualified to run for public office despite his continued use of a U.S. passport.
signatory to the aforementioned Agreement. As such, plaintiff-appellee is estopped from questioning the
legality of the said agreement or any proviso contained therein.13
FACTS

Moreover, the records of the present case clearly show that respondent court's decision is amply
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen.3 However, as a consequence of his subsequent
supported by evidence and it did not err in its findings, including the reason for the retrenchment:
naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado
applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the
When defendant-appellant was faced with the world-wide recession of the airline industry resulting in a Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on
slow down in the company's growth particularly in the regional operation (Asian Area) where the Airbus 10 July 2008.4 On the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition
300 operates. It had no choice but to adopt cost cutting measures, such as cutting down services, number was issued in his favor.5
of frequencies of flights, and reduction of the number of flying points for the A-300 fleet (t.s.n., July 6,
1988, pp. 17-18). As a result, defendant-appellant had to lay off A-300 pilots, including plaintiff-
The aforementioned Oath of Allegiance states:
appellee, which it found to be in excess of what is reasonably needed.14

I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the
All these considered, we find sufficient factual and legal basis to conclude that petitioner's termination
Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted
from employment was for an authorized cause, for which he was given ample notice and opportunity to
authorities of the Philippines and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of
be heard, by respondent company. No error nor grave abuse of discretion, therefore, could be attributed
the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon
to respondent appellate court.
myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.6

ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. CV
On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit of
No. 34476 is AFFIRMED.
Renunciation of his foreign citizenship, which states:

SO ORDERED.
I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, do solemnly swear that I absolutely and perpetually renounce all allegiance
and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA of which I am a citizen, and I divest myself of full
employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the United States of America.

I solemnly swear that all the foregoing statement is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and
belief.7

On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte, which contains, among others, the following statements:

G.R. No. 195649               April 16, 2013 I am a natural born Filipino citizen / naturalized Filipino citizen.

CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, Petitioner,  I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country.
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G.
I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected to.
BALUA, Respondents.

I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true faith
DECISION
and allegiance thereto. I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted
authorities.
SERENO, CJ.:
I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.8
THE CASE
On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to
This is a Petition for Certiorari ender Rule 64 in conjunction with Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to review disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan,
the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The Resolution1 in SPA No. 10-1 09(DC) Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national elections.9
of the COMELEC First Division dated 5 October 201 0 is being assailed for applying Section 44 of the
Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION
a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010
indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-American."10To further bolster his claim of Arnado’s US
Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy based on
citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum a computer-generated travel record11 dated 03
misrepresentation,15 the COMELEC First Division considered it as one for disqualification. Balua’s
December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and
contention that Arnado is a resident of the United States was dismissed upon the finding that "Balua
departing the Philippines. The said record shows that Arnado left the country on 14 April 2009 and
failed to present any evidence to support his contention,"16 whereas the First Division still could "not
returned on 25 June 2009, and again departed on 29 July 2009, arriving back in the Philippines on 24
conclude that Arnado failed to meet the one-year residency requirement under the Local Government
November 2009.
Code."17

Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010, certifying
In the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the First Division disagreed with Arnado’s claim that
that the name "Arnado, Rommel Cagoco" appears in the available Computer Database/Passenger
he is a Filipino citizen.18
manifest/IBM listing on file as of 21 April 2010, with the following pertinent travel records:

We find that although Arnado appears to have substantially complied with the requirements of R.A. No.
DATE OF Arrival : 01/12/2010
9225, Arnado’s act of consistently using his US passport after renouncing his US citizenship on 03 April
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
2009 effectively negated his Affidavit of Renunciation.
PASSPORT : 057782700
DATE OF Arrival : 03/23/2010
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN xxxx
PASSPORT : 05778270012
Arnado’s continued use of his US passport is a strong indication that Arnado had no real intention to
On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an Order13 requiring the respondent to renounce his US citizenship and that he only executed an Affidavit of Renunciation to enable him to run
personally file his answer and memorandum within three (3) days from receipt thereof. for office. We cannot turn a blind eye to the glaring inconsistency between Arnado’s unexplained use of
a US passport six times and his claim that he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship and renounced his US
citizenship. As noted by the Supreme Court in the Yu case, "a passport is defined as an official document
After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in default and to present evidence
of identity and nationality issued to a person intending to travel or sojourn in foreign countries." Surely,
ex-parte.
one who truly divested himself of US citizenship would not continue to avail of privileges reserved
solely for US nationals.19
Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections where Arnado garnered the
highest number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor of
The dispositive portion of the Resolution rendered by the COMELEC
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.

First Division reads:

It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his verified answer, submitting the following
documents as evidence:14
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for disqualification and/or to cancel the certificate
of candidacy of Rommel C. Arnado is hereby GRANTED. Rommel C. Arnado’s proclamation as the
1. Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines dated
winning candidate for Municipal Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Nore is hereby ANNULLED. Let the
03 April 2009;
order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code of 1991 take effect.20

2. Joint-Affidavit dated 31 May 2010 of Engr. Virgil Seno, Virginia Branzuela, Leoncio
The Motion for Reconsideration and
Daligdig, and Jessy Corpin, all neighbors of Arnado, attesting that Arnado is a long-time
the Motion for Intervention
resident of Kauswagan and that he has been conspicuously and continuously residing in his
family’s ancestral house in Kauswagan;
Arnado sought reconsideration of the resolution before the COMELEC En Banc on the ground that "the
evidence is insufficient to justify the Resolution and that the said Resolution is contrary to law."21 He
3. Certification from the Punong Barangay of Poblacion, Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte dated
raised the following contentions:22
03 June 2010 stating that Arnado is a bona fide resident of his barangay and that Arnado went
to the United States in 1985 to work and returned to the Philippines in 2009;
1. The finding that he is not a Filipino citizen is not supported by the evidence consisting of
his Oath of Allegiance and the Affidavit of Renunciation, which show that he has
4. Certification dated 31 May 2010 from the Municipal Local Government Operations Office
substantially complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225;
of Kauswagan stating that Dr. Maximo P. Arnado, Sr. served as Mayor of Kauswagan, from
January 1964 to June 1974 and from 15 February 1979 to 15 April 1986; and
2. The use of his US passport subsequent to his renunciation of his American citizenship is
not tantamount to a repudiation of his Filipino citizenship, as he did not perform any act to
5. Voter Certification issued by the Election Officer of Kauswagan certifying that Arnado has
swear allegiance to a country other than the Philippines;
been a registered voter of Kauswagan since 03 April 2009.
 3. He used his US passport only because he was not informed of the issuance of his Philippine By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No. 9225, the respondent embraced his Philippine
passport, and that he used his Philippine passport after he obtained it; citizenship as though he never became a citizen of another country. It was at that time, April 3, 2009, that
the respondent became a pure Philippine Citizen again.
4. Balua’s petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Arnado was filed out of time, and
the First Division’s treatment of the petition as one for disqualification constitutes grave abuse xxxx
of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction;23
The use of a US passport … does not operate to revert back his status as a dual citizen prior to his
5. He is undoubtedly the people’s choice as indicated by his winning the elections; renunciation as there is no law saying such. More succinctly, the use of a US passport does not operate to
"un-renounce" what he has earlier on renounced. The First Division’s reliance in the case of In Re:
Petition for Habeas Corpus of Willy Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, et al. is misplaced. The petitioner in the
6. His proclamation as the winning candidate ousted the COMELEC from jurisdiction over
said case is a naturalized citizen who, after taking his oath as a naturalized Filipino, applied for the
the case; and
renewal of his Portuguese passport. Strict policy is maintained in the conduct of citizens who are not
natural born, who acquire their citizenship by choice, thus discarding their original citizenship. The
7. The proper remedy to question his citizenship is through a petition for quo warranto, which Philippine State expects strict conduct of allegiance to those who choose to be its citizens. In the present
should have been filed within ten days from his proclamation. case, respondent is not a naturalized citizen but a natural born citizen who chose greener pastures by
working abroad and then decided to repatriate to supposedly help in the progress of Kauswagan. He did
not apply for a US passport after his renunciation. Thus the mentioned case is not on all fours with the
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and who case at bar.
garnered the second highest number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the case and filed before
the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for Reconsideration together with an Opposition to Arnado’s
Amended Motion for Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while the First Division correctly xxxx
disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code is not
applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that the cancellation of Arnado’s candidacy and the
The respondent presented a plausible explanation as to the use of his US passport. Although he applied
nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate who obtained the highest number
for a Philippine passport, the passport was only issued on June 18, 2009. However, he was not notified of
of lawful votes, should be proclaimed as the winner.
the issuance of his Philippine passport so that he was actually able to get it about three (3) months later.
Yet as soon as he was in possession of his Philippine passport, the respondent already used the same in
Maquiling simultaneously filed his Memorandum with his Motion for Intervention and his Motion for his subsequent travels abroad. This fact is proven by the respondent’s submission of a certified true copy
Reconsideration. Arnado opposed all motions filed by Maquiling, claiming that intervention is prohibited of his passport showing that he used the same for his travels on the following dates: January 31, 2010,
after a decision has already been rendered, and that as a second-placer, Maquiling undoubtedly lost the April 16, 2010, May 20, 2010, January 12, 2010, March 31, 2010 and June 4, 2010. This then shows that
elections and thus does not stand to be prejudiced or benefitted by the final adjudication of the case. the use of the US passport was because to his knowledge, his Philippine passport was not yet issued to
him for his use. As probably pressing needs might be undertaken, the respondent used whatever is within
his control during that time.25
RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC

In his Separate Concurring Opinion, COMELEC Chairman Sixto Brillantes cited that the use of foreign
In its Resolution of 02 February 2011, the COMELEC En Banc held that under Section 6 of Republic passport is not one of the grounds provided for under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63 through
Act No. 6646, the Commission "shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest which Philippine citizenship may be lost.
even after the proclamation of the candidate whose qualifications for office is questioned."

"The application of the more assimilative principle of continuity of citizenship is more appropriate in this
As to Maquiling’s intervention, the COMELEC En Banc also cited Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 which case. Under said principle, once a person becomes a citizen, either by birth or naturalization, it is
allows intervention in proceedings for disqualification even after elections if no final judgment has been assumed that he desires to continue to be a citizen, and this assumption stands until he voluntarily
rendered, but went on further to say that Maquiling, as the second placer, would not be prejudiced by the denationalizes or expatriates himself. Thus, in the instant case respondent after reacquiring his Philippine
outcome of the case as it agrees with the dispositive portion of the Resolution of the First Division citizenship should be presumed to have remained a Filipino despite his use of his American passport in
allowing the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code to take effect. the absence of clear, unequivocal and competent proof of expatriation. Accordingly, all doubts should be
resolved in favor of retention of citizenship."26
The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the treatment by the First Division of the petition as one for
disqualification, and ruled that the petition was filed well within the period prescribed by law,24 having On the other hand, Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented, thus:
been filed on 28 April 2010, which is not later than 11 May 2010, the date of proclamation.

Respondent evidently failed to prove that he truly and wholeheartedly abandoned his allegiance to the
However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of the First Division and granted
United States. The latter’s continued use of his US passport and enjoyment of all the privileges of a US
Arnado’s Motion for Reconsideration, on the following premises: citizen despite his previous renunciation of the afore-mentioned citizenship runs contrary to his
declaration that he chose to retain only his Philippine citizenship. Respondent’s submission with the twin
First: requirements was obviously only for the purpose of complying with the requirements for running for the
mayoralty post in connection with the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local Elections.
Qualifications for elective office, such as citizenship, are continuing requirements; once any of them is Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling intervened at the stage when respondent Arnado filed a Motion for
lost during his incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. If a candidate is not a citizen at Reconsideration of the First Division Resolution before the COMELEC En Banc. As the candidate who
the time he ran for office or if he lost his citizenship after his election to office, he is disqualified to serve garnered the second highest number of votes, Maquiling contends that he has an interest in the
as such. Neither does the fact that respondent obtained the plurality of votes for the mayoralty post cure disqualification case filed against Arnado, considering that in the event the latter is disqualified, the votes
the latter’s failure to comply with the qualification requirements regarding his citizenship. cast for him should be considered stray and the second-placer should be proclaimed as the winner in the
elections.
Since a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the eyes of the law, his having received the highest
number of votes does not validate his election. It has been held that where a petition for disqualification It must be emphasized that while the original petition before the COMELEC is one for cancellation of the
was filed before election against a candidate but was adversely resolved against him after election, his certificate of candidacy and / or disqualification, the COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC En
having obtained the highest number of votes did not make his election valid. His ouster from office does Banc correctly treated the petition as one for disqualification.
not violate the principle of vox populi suprema est lex because the application of the constitutional and
statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity. To apply it is to breath[e] life to the
The effect of a disqualification case is enunciated in Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646:
sovereign will of the people who expressed it when they ratified the Constitution and when they elected
their representatives who enacted the law.27
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
THE PETITION BEFORE THE COURT
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the
Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to run for trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor,
public office despite his continued use of a US passport, and praying that Maquiling be proclaimed as the may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever
winner in the 2010 mayoralty race in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. the evidence of his guilt is strong.

Ascribing both grave abuse of discretion and reversible error on the part of the COMELEC En Banc for Mercado v. Manzano28
ruling that Arnado is a Filipino citizen despite his continued use of a US passport, Maquiling now seeks
to reverse the finding of the COMELEC En Banc that Arnado is qualified to run for public office.
clarified the right of intervention in a disqualification case. In that case, the Court said:

Corollary to his plea to reverse the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc or to affirm the First Division’s
That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against
disqualification of Arnado, Maquiling also seeks the review of the applicability of Section 44 of the
private respondent is clear from Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms
Local Government Code, claiming that the COMELEC committed reversible error in ruling that "the
Law of 1987, which provides: Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified
succession of the vice mayor in case the respondent is disqualified is in order."
shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the
There are three questions posed by the parties before this Court which will be addressed seriatim as the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and
subsequent questions hinge on the result of the first. hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of guilt is strong. Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for
The first question is whether or not intervention is allowed in a disqualification case.
disqualification even after election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.29

The second question is whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship
Clearly then, Maquiling has the right to intervene in the case. The fact that the COMELEC En Banc has
amounts to undoing a renunciation earlier made.
already ruled that Maquiling has not shown that the requisites for the exemption to the second-placer rule
set forth in Sinsuat v. COMELEC30 are present and therefore would not be prejudiced by the outcome of
A better framing of the question though should be whether or not the use of a foreign passport after the case, does not deprive Maquiling of the right to elevate the matter before this Court.
renouncing foreign citizenship affects one’s qualifications to run for public office.
Arnado’s claim that the main case has attained finality as the original petitioner and respondents therein
The third question is whether or not the rule on succession in the Local Government Code is applicable have not appealed the decision of the COMELEC En Banc, cannot be sustained. The elevation of the
to this case. case by the intervenor prevents it from attaining finality. It is only after this Court has ruled upon the
issues raised in this instant petition that the disqualification case originally filed by Balua against Arnado
will attain finality.
OUR RULING

The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act
Intervention of a rival candidate in a of representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship
disqualification case is proper when regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an
there has not yet been any elective position.
proclamation of the winner.
Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 provides: citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country which
granted the citizenship.
Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political
rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines Mercado v. Manzano34 already hinted at this situation when the Court declared:
and the following conditions:
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should
xxxx he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through
expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, we sustained the denial of entry into
the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for
(2)Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public
the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he
office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of
was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against anyone who, in electing Philippine
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign before any public officer
citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation
authorized to administer an oath.
of his Philippine citizenship.

x x x31
While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63
constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship,35 it is nevertheless an act which repudiates
Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office. He took the Oath of the very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another
Allegiance and renounced his foreign citizenship. There is no question that after performing these twin country to be qualified to run for a local elective position.
requirements required under Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003, he became eligible to run for public office.
When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven days after he renounced his
American citizenship, he recanted his Oath of Renunciation36 that he "absolutely and perpetually
Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once but twice: first, on 10 July 2008 when he renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA"37 and that he "divest(s)
applied for repatriation before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Francisco, USA, and again himself of full employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the United States of
on 03 April 2009 simultaneous with the execution of his Affidavit of Renunciation. By taking the Oath of America."38
Allegiance to the Republic, Arnado re-acquired his Philippine citizenship. At the time, however, he
likewise possessed American citizenship. Arnado had therefore become a dual citizen.
We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado
of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself as an
After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his American citizenship by executing an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such
Affidavit of Renunciation, thus completing the requirements for eligibility to run for public office. reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented himself as an American citizen
by using his US passport.
By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of the
effect of such renunciation under the laws of the foreign country.32 This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s bid for
public office, as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position.
However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack when, after
renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his continued possession of Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is acquired through a positive
a foreign citizenship.33 act of applying for naturalization. This is distinct from those considered dual citizens by virtue of birth,
who are not required by law to take the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of
candidacy already carries with it an implied renunciation of foreign citizenship.39 Dual citizens by
Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after renouncing his foreign naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of
citizenship, he continued to use his US passport to travel in and out of the country before filing his the Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a candidate for
certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009. The pivotal question to determine is whether he was public office.
solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, thereby rendering
him eligible to run for public office.
By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009, Arnado was a dual citizen
enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but by
Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date the express disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code,40 he was not qualified to
he filed his COC, he used his US passport four times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of run for a local elective position.
renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily
represented himself as an American, in effect declaring before immigration authorities of both countries
that he is an American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges granted by the United States of In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen only for a period of eleven days, or from 3
America. April 2009 until 14 April 2009, on which date he first used his American passport after renouncing his
American citizenship.
The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any time,
only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign This Court has previously ruled that:
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of We now resolve the next issue.
appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the
required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. x x x.41
Resolving the third issue necessitates revisiting Topacio v. Paredes45 which is the jurisprudential spring
of the principle that a second-placer cannot be proclaimed as the winner in an election contest. This
The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be possessed not just at doctrine must be re-examined and its soundness once again put to the test to address the ever-recurring
the time of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act which violates the oath issue that a second-placer who loses to an ineligible candidate cannot be proclaimed as the winner in the
of renunciation opens the citizenship issue to attack. elections.

We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division that "Arnado’s act of consistently The Facts of the case are as follows:
using his US passport effectively negated his "Affidavit of Renunciation."42 This does not mean, that he
failed to comply with the twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225, for he in fact did.
On June 4, 1912, a general election was held in the town of Imus, Province of Cavite, to fill the office of
municipal president. The petitioner, Felipe Topacio, and the respondent, Maximo Abad, were opposing
It was after complying with the requirements that he performed positive acts which effectively candidates for that office. Topacio received 430 votes, and Abad 281. Abad contested the election upon
disqualified him from running for an elective public office pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local the sole ground that Topacio was ineligible in that he was reelected the second time to the office of the
Government Code of 1991. municipal president on June 4, 1912, without the four years required by Act No. 2045 having
intervened.46
The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual citizens from running for any elective
public office would be thwarted if we were to allow a person who has earlier renounced his foreign Abad thus questioned the eligibility of To p a c i o on the basis of a statutory prohibition for seeking a
citizenship, but who subsequently represents himself as a foreign citizen, to hold any public office. second re-election absent the four year interruption.

Arnado justifies the continued use of his US passport with the explanation that he was not notified of the The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that "the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from
issuance of his Philippine passport on 18 June 2009, as a result of which he was only able to obtain his an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving
Philippine passport three (3) months later.43 a plurality of the legally cast ballots."47

The COMELEC En Banc differentiated Arnado from Willy Yu, the Portuguese national who sought This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere obiter dictum. The Court was comparing "the
naturalization as a Filipino citizen and later applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport. That effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or irregularities in the
Arnado did not apply for a US passport after his renunciation does not make his use of a US passport less elections x x x with that produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office."
of an act that violated the Oath of Renunciation he took. It was still a positive act of representation as a
US citizen before the immigration officials of this country.
The complete sentence where the phrase is found is part of a comparison and contrast between the two
situations, thus:
The COMELEC, in ruling favorably for Arnado, stated "Yet, as soon as he was in possession of his
Philippine passport, the respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels abroad."44 We cannot
Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or
agree with the COMELEC. Three months from June is September. If indeed, Arnado used his Philippine
irregularities in the elections is quite different from that produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold
passport as soon as he was in possession of it, he would not have used his US passport on 24 November
such an office. In the former case the court, after an examination of the ballots may find that some other
2009.
person than the candidate declared to have received a plurality by the board of canvassers actually
received the greater number of votes, in which case the court issues its mandamus to the board of
Besides, Arnado’s subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not correct the fact that after he canvassers to correct the returns accordingly; or it may find that the manner of holding the election and
renounced his foreign citizenship and prior to filing his certificate of candidacy, he used his US passport. the returns are so tainted with fraud or illegality that it cannot be determined who received a plurality of
In the same way that the use of his foreign passport does not undo his Oath of Renunciation, his the legally cast ballots. In the latter case, no question as to the correctness of the returns or the manner of
subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not undo his earlier use of his US passport. casting and counting the ballots is before the deciding power, and generally the only result can be that the
election fails entirely. In the former, we have a contest in the strict sense of the word, because of the
opposing parties are striving for supremacy. If it be found that the successful candidate (according to the
Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with attendant civil and
board of canvassers) obtained a plurality in an illegal manner, and that another candidate was the real
political rights accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty to maintain
victor, the former must retire in favor of the latter. In the other case, there is not, strictly speaking, a
allegiance to one’s flag and country. While those who acquire dual citizenship by choice are afforded the
contest, as the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate
right of suffrage, those who seek election or appointment to public office are required to renounce their
when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots. In the
foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public trust. Holding public office demands full and undivided
one case the question is as to who received a plurality of the legally cast ballots; in the other, the question
allegiance to the Republic and to no other.
is confined to the personal character and circumstances of a single individual.48 (Emphasis supplied)

We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his American citizenship, has
Note that the sentence where the phrase is found starts with "In the other case, there is not, strictly
recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code applies to
speaking, a contest" in contrast to the earlier statement, "In the former, we have a contest in the strict
his situation. He is disqualified not only from holding the public office but even from becoming a
sense of the word, because of the opposing parties are striving for supremacy."
candidate in the May 2010 elections.
The Court in Topacio v. Paredes cannot be said to have held that "the wreath of victory cannot be The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and
transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of disqualifications of candidates. When the law requires certain qualifications to be possessed or that
the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots." certain disqualifications be not possessed by persons desiring to serve as elective public officials, those
qualifications must be met before one even becomes a candidate. When a person who is not qualified is
voted for and eventually garners the highest number of votes, even the will of the electorate expressed
A proper reading of the case reveals that the ruling therein is that since the Court of First Instance is
through the ballot cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of the candidate. To rule otherwise is to
without jurisdiction to try a disqualification case based on the eligibility of the person who obtained the
trample upon and rent asunder the very law that sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of
highest number of votes in the election, its jurisdiction being confined "to determine which of the
candidates. We might as well write off our election laws if the voice of the electorate is the sole
contestants has been duly elected" the judge exceeded his jurisdiction when he "declared that no one had
determinant of who should be proclaimed worthy to occupy elective positions in our republic.
been legally elected president of the municipality of Imus at the general election held in that town on 4
June 1912" where "the only question raised was whether or not Topacio was eligible to be elected and to
hold the office of municipal president." This has been, in fact, already laid down by the Court in Frivaldo v. COMELEC50 when we pronounced:

The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and that Abad as the second placer cannot be x x x. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the
proclaimed in his stead. The Court therein ruled: salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The
qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone.
For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion and so hold that the respondent judge exceeded his
jurisdiction in declaring in those proceedings that no one was elected municipal president of the The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if
municipality of Imus at the last general election; and that said order and all subsequent proceedings based they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires
thereon are null and void and of no effect; and, although this decision is rendered on respondents' answer strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of
to the order to show cause, unless respondents raised some new and additional issues, let judgment be the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and
entered accordingly in 5 days, without costs. So ordered.49 fidelity to any other state.51 (Emphasis supplied)

On closer scrutiny, the phrase relied upon by a host of decisions does not even have a legal basis to stand This issue has also been jurisprudentially clarified in Velasco v. COMELEC52 where the Court ruled that
on. It was a mere pronouncement of the Court comparing one process with another and explaining the the ruling in Quizon and Saya-ang cannot be interpreted without qualifications lest "Election victory x x
effects thereof. As an independent statement, it is even illogical. x becomes a magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements."53

Let us examine the statement: We have ruled in the past that a candidate’s victory in the election may be considered a sufficient basis to
rule in favor of the candidate sought to be disqualified if the main issue involves defects in the
candidate’s certificate of candidacy. We said that while provisions relating to certificates of candidacy
"x x x the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate
are mandatory in terms, it is an established rule of interpretation as regards election laws, that mandatory
when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."
provisions requiring certain steps before elections will be construed as directory after the elections, to
give effect to the will of the people. We so ruled in Quizon v. COMELEC and Saya-ang v. COMELEC:
What prevents the transfer of the wreath of victory from the ineligible candidate to another candidate?
The present case perhaps presents the proper time and opportunity to fine-tune our above ruling. We say
When the issue being decided upon by the Court is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the this with the realization that a blanket and unqualified reading and application of this ruling can be
legally cast ballots and ineligibility is thereafter established, what stops the Court from adjudging another fraught with dangerous significance for the rule of law and the integrity of our elections. For one, such
eligible candidate who received the next highest number of votes as the winner and bestowing upon him blanket/unqualified reading may provide a way around the law that effectively negates election
that "wreath?" requirements aimed at providing the electorate with the basic information to make an informed choice
about a candidate’s eligibility and fitness for office.
An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of votes is a wrongful winner. By express legal
mandate, he could not even have been a candidate in the first place, but by virtue of the lack of material The first requirement that may fall when an unqualified reading is made is Section 39 of the LGC which
time or any other intervening circumstances, his ineligibility might not have been passed upon prior to specifies the basic qualifications of local government officials. Equally susceptive of being rendered
election date. Consequently, he may have had the opportunity to hold himself out to the electorate as a toothless is Section 74 of the OEC that sets out what should be stated in a COC. Section 78 may likewise
legitimate and duly qualified candidate. However, notwithstanding the outcome of the elections, his be emasculated as mere delay in the resolution of the petition to cancel or deny due course to a COC can
ineligibility as a candidate remains unchanged. Ineligibility does not only pertain to his qualifications as render a Section 78 petition useless if a candidate with false COC data wins. To state the obvious,
a candidate but necessarily affects his right to hold public office. The number of ballots cast in his favor candidates may risk falsifying their COC qualifications if they know that an election victory will cure
cannot cure the defect of failure to qualify with the substantive legal requirements of eligibility to run for any defect that their COCs may have. Election victory then becomes a magic formula to bypass election
public office. eligibility requirements. (Citations omitted)

The popular vote does not cure the What will stop an otherwise disqualified individual from filing a seemingly valid COC, concealing any
ineligibility of a candidate. disqualification, and employing every strategy to delay any disqualification case filed against him so he
can submit himself to the electorate and win, if winning the election will guarantee a disregard of
constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of candidates?
It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign voice through the ballot by ensuring that its receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the
exercise respects the rule of law. To allow the sovereign voice spoken through the ballot to trump trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor,
constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of candidates is not may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever
democracy or republicanism. It is electoral anarchy. When set rules are disregarded and only the the evidence of his guilt is strong.
electorate’s voice spoken through the ballot is made to matter in the end, it precisely serves as an open
invitation for electoral anarchy to set in.1âwphi1
There was no chance for Arnado’s proclamation to be suspended under this rule because Arnado failed to
file his answer to the petition seeking his disqualification. Arnado only filed his Answer on 15 June 2010,
Maquiling is not a second-placer as long after the elections and after he was already proclaimed as the winner.
he obtained the highest number of
votes from among the qualified
The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado’s candidacy involves his citizenship. It does not
candidates.
involve the commission of election offenses as provided for in the first sentence of Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code, the effect of which is to disqualify the individual from continuing as a
With Arnado’s disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election as he obtained the candidate, or if he has already been elected, from holding the office.
highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates.
The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. As earlier discussed, Arnado was
We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC54 and Jalosjos v. COMELEC55 that a void both a Filipino and an American citizen when he filed his certificate of candidacy. He was a dual citizen
COC cannot produce any legal effect. disqualified to run for public office based on Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.

Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determining the Section 40 starts with the statement "The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective
winner of an election. local position." The prohibition serves as a bar against the individuals who fall under any of the
enumeration from participating as candidates in the election.
Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the electorate is still
respected, and even more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the sole With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus rendered
and total expression of the sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate candidates void from the beginning. It could not have produced any other legal effect except that Arnado rendered it
form part of that voice and must also be respected. impossible to effect his disqualification prior to the elections because he filed his answer to the petition
when the elections were conducted already and he was already proclaimed the winner.
As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the qualifications and disqualifications
of those who are allowed to participate as players. When there are participants who turn out to be To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the prohibitory character of the disqualification
ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is awarded to the next in rank who does not possess any which Arnado possessed even prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. The affirmation of
of the disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as candidates. Arnado's disqualification, although made long after the elections, reaches back to the filing of the
certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared to be not a candidate at all in the May 201 0 elections.
There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC56 that when the voters are well aware
within the realm of notoriety of a candidate’s disqualification and still cast their votes in favor said Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This leaves
candidate, then the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected. Maquiling as the qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule on
That rule is also a mere obiter that further complicated the rules affecting qualified candidates who succession under the Local Government Code will not apply.
placed second to ineligible ones.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the COMELEC En
The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s disqualification is not a prerequisite for the disqualification Bane dated 2 February 2011 is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent ROMMEL ARNADO
to attach to the candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying circumstance makes the candidate y CAGOCO is disqualified from running for any local elective position. CASAN MACODE
ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of a candidate’s disqualification is not necessary before a MAQUILING is hereby DECLARED the duly elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the 10
qualified candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can be proclaimed as the winner. The May 2010 elections.
second-placer in the vote count is actually the first-placer among the qualified candidates.
This Decision is immediately executory.
That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed office is of no moment.
The subsequent disqualification based on a substantive ground that existed prior to the filing of the
Let a copy of this Decision be served personally upon the parties and the Commission on Elections.
certificate of candidacy voids not only the COC but also the proclamation.

No pronouncement as to costs.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides:

SO ORDERED.
Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to
be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
 because a Makati ordinance prohibited unloading anywhere except at designated bus stops. Eventually,
the bus driver gave in and allowed the two passengers to alight. The two immediately got off the bus and
ran towards Ayala Avenue. Moments after, Andales felt an explosion. He then saw fire quickly engulfing
G.R. No. 188314               January 10, 2011
the bus. He ran out of the bus towards a nearby mall. After a while, he went back to where the bus was.
He saw their bus passengers either lying on the ground or looking traumatized. A few hours after, he
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,  made a statement before the Makati Police Station narrating the whole incident.
vs.
KHADDAFY JANJALANI, GAMAL B. BAHARAN a.k.a. Tapay, ANGELO TRINIDAD a.k.a.
The prosecution presented documents furnished by the Department of Justice, confirming that shortly
Abu Khalil, GAPPAL BANNAH ASALI a.k.a. Maidan or Negro, JAINAL SALI a.k.a. Abu
before the explosion, the spokesperson of the Abu Sayyaf Group – Abu Solaiman – announced over radio
Solaiman, ROHMAT ABDURROHIM a.k.a. Jackie or Zaky, and other JOHN and JANE
station DZBB that the group had a Valentine’s Day "gift" for former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
DOES, Accused,
After the bombing, he again went on radio and warned of more bomb attacks.
GAMAL B. BAHARAN a.k.a. Tapay, ANGELO TRINIDAD a.k.a. Abu Khalil, and ROHMAT
ABDURROHIM a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky, Accused-Appellants.
As stipulated during pretrial, accused Trinidad gave ABS-CBN News Network an exclusive interview
some time after the incident, confessing his participation in the Valentine’s Day bombing incident. In
DECISION
another exclusive interview on the network, accused Baharan likewise admitted his role in the bombing
incident. Finally, accused Asali gave a television interview, confessing that he had supplied the explosive
SERENO, J.: devices for the 14 February 2005 bombing. The bus conductor identified the accused Baharan and
Trinidad, and confirmed that they were the two men who had entered the RRCG bus on the evening of 14
February.
Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 30 June 2008, which
affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City in Criminal Case Nos. 05-476 and 05-
4777 dated 18 October 2005. The latter Decision convicted the three accused-appellants – namely, Gamal Members of the Abu Sayyaf Group – namely Khaddafy Janjalani, Gamal B. Baharan, Angelo Trinidad,
B. Baharan a.k.a. Tapay, Angelo Trinidad a.k.a. Abu Khalil, and Rohmat Abdurrohim a.k.a. Abu Jackie Gappal Bannah Asali, Jainal Asali, Rohmat Abdurrohim a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky, and other "John" and
or Zaky – of the complex crime of multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder, and sentenced them "Jane Does" – were then charged with multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder. Only Baharan,
to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection. The CA modified the sentence to reclusion perpetua as Trinidad, Asali, and Rohmat were arrested, while the other accused remain at-large.
required by Republic Act No. 9346 (Act Abolishing the Imposition of Death Penalty).
On their arraignment for the multiple murder charge (Crim. Case No. 05-476), Baharan, Trinidad, and
Statement of Facts Asali all entered a plea of guilty. On the other hand, upon arraignment for the multiple frustrated murder
charge (Crim. Case No. 05-477), accused Asali pled guilty. Accused Trinidad and Baharan pled not
guilty. Rohmat pled not guilty to both charges. During the pretrial hearing, the parties stipulated the
The pertinent facts, as determined by the trial court, are as follows: following:

On 14 February 2005, an RRCG bus was plying its usual southbound route, from its Navotas bus 1.) The jurisdiction of this court over the offenses charged.
terminal towards its Alabang bus terminal via Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA). Around 6:30 to
7:30 in the evening, while they were about to move out of the Guadalupe-EDSA southbound bus stop,
the bus conductor noticed two men running after the bus. The two insisted on getting on the bus, so the 2.) That all three accused namely alias Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali admitted knowing one
conductor obliged and let them in. another before February 14, 2005.

According to Elmer Andales, the bus conductor, he immediately became wary of the two men, because, 3.) All the same three accused likewise admitted that a bomb exploded in the RRCG bus
even if they got on the bus together, the two sat away from each other – one sat two seats behind the while the bus was plying the EDSA route fronting the MRT terminal which is in front of the
driver, while the other sat at the back of the bus. At the time, there were only 15 passengers inside the Makati Commercial Center.
bus. He also noticed that the eyes of one of the men were reddish. When he approached the person near
the driver and asked him whether he was paying for two passengers, the latter looked dumb struck by the
4.) Accused Asali admitted knowing the other accused alias Rohmat whom he claims taught
question. He then stuttered and said he was paying for two and gave PhP20. Andales grew more
him how to make explosive devices.
concerned when the other man seated at the back also paid for both passengers. At this point, Andales
said he became more certain that the two were up to no good, and that there might be a holdup.
5.) The accused Trinidad also admitted knowing Rohmat before the February 14 bombing
incident.
Afterwards, Andales said he became more suspicious because both men kept on asking him if the bus
was going to stop at Ayala Avenue. The witness also noticed that the man at the back appeared to be
slouching, with his legs stretched out in front of him and his arms hanging out and hidden from view as if 6.) The accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali all admitted to causing the bomb explosion
he was tinkering with something. When Andales would get near the man, the latter would glare at him. inside the RRCG bus which left four people dead and more or less forty persons injured.
Andales admitted, however, that he did not report the suspicious characters to the police.
7.) Both Baharan and Trinidad agreed to stipulate that within the period March 20-24 each
As soon as the bus reached the stoplight at the corner of Ayala Avenue and EDSA, the two men insisted gave separate interviews to the ABS-CBN news network admitting their participation in the
on getting off the bus. According to Andales, the bus driver initially did not want to let them off the bus, commission of the said crimes, subject of these cases.
 8.) Accused Trinidad and Baharan also admitted to pleading guilty to these crimes, because Accused-appellants Baharan and Trinidad argue that the trial court did not conduct a searching inquiry
they were guilt-stricken after seeing a man carrying a child in the first bus that they had after they had changed their plea from "not guilty" to "guilty." The transcript of stenographic notes
entered. during the 18 April 2005 re-arraignment before the Makati Regional Trial Court is reproduced below:

9.) Accused Asali likewise admitted that in the middle of March 2005 he gave a television Court : Anyway, I think what we should have to do, considering the stipulations that were agreed upon
news interview in which he admitted that he supplied the explosive devices which resulted in during the last hearing, is to address this matter of pleas of not guilty entered for the frustrated murder
this explosion inside the RRCG bus and which resulted in the filing of these charges. charges by the two accused, Mr. Trinidad and Mr. Baharan, because if you will recall they entered pleas
of guilty to the multiple murder charges, but then earlier pleas of not guilty for the frustrated multiple
murder charges remain… [I]s that not inconsistent considering the stipulations that were entered into
10.) Finally, accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali admitted that they are members of the Abu
during the initial pretrial of this case? [If] you will recall, they admitted to have caused the bomb
Sayyaf.1
explosion that led to the death of at least four people and injury of about forty other persons and so under
the circumstances, Atty Peña, have you discussed this matter with your clients?
In the light of the pretrial stipulations, the trial court asked whether accused Baharan and Trinidad were
amenable to changing their "not guilty" pleas to the charge of multiple frustrated murder, considering that
………
they pled "guilty" to the heavier charge of multiple murder, creating an apparent inconsistency in their
pleas. Defense counsel conferred with accused Baharan and Trinidad and explained to them the
consequences of the pleas. The two accused acknowledged the inconsistencies and manifested their Atty. Peña : Then we should be given enough time to talk with them. I haven’t conferred with them about
readiness for re-arraignment. After the Information was read to them, Baharan and Trinidad pled guilty to this with regard to the multiple murder case.
the charge of multiple frustrated murder.2
………
After being discharged as state witness, accused Asali testified that while under training with the Abu
Sayyaf in 2004, Rohmat, a.k.a Abu Jackie or Zaky, and two other persons taught him how to make
Court : Okay. So let us proceed now. Atty. Peña, can you assist the two accused because if they are
bombs and explosives. The trainees were told that they were to wage battles against the government in
interested in withdrawing their [pleas], I want to hear it from your lips.
the city, and that their first mission was to plant bombs in malls, the Light Railway Transit (LRT), and
other parts of Metro Manila.
Atty. Peña : Yes, your Honor.
As found by the trial court, Asali, after his training, was required by the Abu Sayyaf leadership,
specifically Abu Solaiman and Rohmat, to secure eight kilos of TNT, a soldering gun, aluminum powder, (At this juncture, Atty. Peña confers with the two accused, namely Trinidad and Baharan)
a tester, and Christmas lights, all of which he knew would be used to make a bomb. He then recalled that
sometime in November to December 2004, Trinidad asked him for a total of 4 kilos of TNT – that is, 2
I have talked to them, your Honor, and I have explained to them the consequence of their pleas, your
kilos on two separate occasions. Rohmat allegedly called Asali to confirm that Trinidad would get TNT
Honor, and that the plea of guilt to the murder case and plea of not guilty to the frustrated multiple
from Asali and use it for their first mission. The TNT was allegedly placed in two buses sometime in
murder actually are inconsistent with their pleas.
December 2004, but neither one of them exploded.

Court : With matters that they stipulated upon?

Asali then testified that the night before the Valentine’s Day bombing, Trinidad and Baharan got another
two kilos of TNT from him. Late in the evening of 14 February, he received a call from Abu Solaiman.
The latter told Asali not to leave home or go to crowded areas, since the TNT taken by Baharan and Atty. Peña : Yes, your Honor. So, they are now, since they already plead guilt to the murder case, then
Trinidad had already been exploded in Makati. Thirty minutes later, Trinidad called Asali, repeating the they are now changing their pleas, your Honor, from not guilty to the one of guilt. They are now ready,
warning of Abu Solaiman. The next day, Asali allegedly received a call from accused Rohmat, your Honor, for re-arraignment.
congratulating the former on the success of the mission.3 According to Asali, Abu Zaky specifically said,
"Sa wakas nag success din yung tinuro ko sayo."
………

Assignment of Errors
INTERPRETER: (Read again that portion [of the information] and translated it in Filipino in a clearer
way and asked both accused what their pleas are).
Accused-appellants raise the following assignment of errors:
Your Honor, both accused are entering separate pleas of guilt to the crime charged.
I. The trial court gravely erred in accepting accused-appellants’ plea of guilt despite insufficiency of
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the said plea.
COURT : All right. So after the information was re-read to the accused, they have withdrawn their pleas
of not guilty and changed it to the pleas of guilty to the charge of frustrated murder. Thank you. Are there
II. The trial court gravely erred in finding that the guilt of accused-appellants for the crimes charged had any matters you need to address at pretrial now? If there are none, then I will terminate pretrial and
been proven beyond reasonable doubt.4 accommodate…5

First Assignment of Error

As early as in People v. Apduhan, the Supreme Court has ruled that "all trial judges … must refrain from conviction must be sustained, because then it is predicated not merely on the guilty plea of the accused
accepting with alacrity an accused's plea of guilty, for while justice demands a speedy administration, but on evidence proving his commission of the offense charged.14 (Emphasis supplied.)
judges are duty bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty, he
understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable conviction."6 Thus, trial court
In their second assignment of error, accused-appellants assert that guilt was not proven beyond
judges are required to observe the following procedure under Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court:
reasonable doubt. They pointed out that the testimony of the conductor was merely circumstantial, while
that of Asali as to the conspiracy was insufficient.
SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. — When the accused pleads guilty to a
capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension
Insofar as accused-appellants Baharan and Trinidad are concerned, the evidence for the prosecution, in
of the consequences of his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree
addition to that which can be drawn from the stipulation of facts, primarily consisted of the testimonies
of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf. (Emphasis supplied)
of the bus conductor, Elmer Andales, and of the accused-turned-state-witness, Asali. Andales positively
identified accused Baharan and Trinidad as the two men who had acted suspiciously while inside the bus;
The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry applies more so in cases of re-arraignment. In People v. who had insisted on getting off the bus in violation of a Makati ordinance; and who had scampered away
Galvez, the Court noted that since accused-appellant's original plea was "not guilty," the trial court from the bus moments before the bomb exploded. On the other hand, Asali testified that he had given
should have exerted careful effort in inquiring into why he changed his plea to "guilty."7 According to the accused Baharan and Trinidad the TNT used in the bombing incident in Makati City. The guilt of the
Court: accused Baharan and Trinidad was sufficiently established by these corroborating testimonies, coupled
with their respective judicial admissions (pretrial stipulations) and extrajudicial confessions (exclusive
television interviews, as they both stipulated during pretrial) that they were indeed the perpetrators of the
The stringent procedure governing the reception of a plea of guilt, especially in a case involving the death
Valentine’s Day bombing.15 Accordingly, the Court upholds the findings of guilt made by the trial court
penalty, is imposed upon the trial judge in order to leave no room for doubt on the possibility that the
as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
accused might have misunderstood the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea.8

Anent accused Rohmat, the evidence for the prosecution consisted of the testimony of accused-turned-
Likewise, the requirement to conduct a searching inquiry should not be deemed satisfied in cases in
state-witness Asali. Below is a reproduction of the transcript of stenographic notes on the state
which it was the defense counsel who explained the consequences of a "guilty" plea to the accused, as it
prosecutor’s direct examination of state-witness Asali during the 26 May 2005 trial:
appears in this case. In People v. Alborida, this Court found that there was still an improvident plea of
guilty, even if the accused had already signified in open court that his counsel had explained the
consequences of the guilty plea; that he understood the explanation of his counsel; that the accused Q : You stated that Zaky trained you and Trinidad. Under what circumstances did he train
understood that the penalty of death would still be meted out to him; and that he had not been you, Mr. Witness, to assemble those explosives, you and Trinidad?
intimidated, bribed, or threatened.9
A : Abu Zaky, Abu Solaiman, Khadaffy Janjalani, the three of them, that Angelo Trinidad and
We have reiterated in a long line of cases that the conduct of a searching inquiry remains the duty of myself be the one to be trained to make an explosive, sir.
judges, as they are mandated by the rules to satisfy themselves that the accused had not been under
coercion or duress; mistaken impressions; or a misunderstanding of the significance, effects, and
Q : Mr. witness, how long that training, or how long did it take that training?
consequences of their guilty plea.10 This requirement is stringent and mandatory.11

A : If I am not mistaken, we were thought to make bomb about one month and two weeks.
Nevertheless, we are not unmindful of the context under which the re-arraignment was conducted or of
the factual milieu surrounding the finding of guilt against the accused. The Court observes that accused
Baharan and Trinidad previously pled guilty to another charge – multiple murder – based on the same act ………
relied upon in the multiple frustrated murder charge. The Court further notes that prior to the change of
plea to one of guilt, accused Baharan and Trinidad made two other confessions of guilt – one through an
Q : Now, speaking of that mission, Mr. witness, while you were still in training at Mr.
extrajudicial confession (exclusive television interviews, as stipulated by both accused during pretrial),
Cararao, is there any mission that you undertook, if any, with respect to that mission?
and the other via judicial admission (pretrial stipulation). Considering the foregoing circumstances, we
deem it unnecessary to rule on the sufficiency of the "searching inquiry" in this instance. Remanding the
case for re-arraignment is not warranted, as the accused’s plea of guilt was not the sole basis of the ………
condemnatory judgment under consideration.12
A : Our first mission was to plant a bomb in the malls, LRT, and other parts of Metro Manila,
Second Assignment of Error sir.16

In People v. Oden, the Court declared that even if the requirement of conducting a searching inquiry was The witness then testified that he kept eight kilos of TNT for accused Baharan and Trinidad.
not complied with, "[t]he manner by which the plea of guilt is made … loses much of great significance
where the conviction can be based on independent evidence proving the commission by the person
accused of the offense charged."13 Thus, in People v. Nadera, the Court stated: Q : Now, going back to the bomb. Mr. witness, did you know what happened to the 2 kilos of
bomb that Trinidad and Tapay took from you sometime in November 2004?

Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of the
judgment. If the trial court relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused, the A : That was the explosive that he planted in the G-liner, which did not explode.
Q : How did you know, Mr. witness? ………

A : He was the one who told me, Mr. Angelo Trinidad, sir. A : If I am not mistaken, sir, on February 13, 2005 at 6:30 p.m.

……… Q : Who got from you the explosive Mr. witness?

Q : What happened next, Mr. witness, when the bomb did not explode, as told to you by A : It’s Angelo Trinidad and Tapay, sir.
Trinidad?
………
A : On December 29, Angelo Trinidad got 2 more kilos of TNT bombs.
Q : How many explosives did they get from you, Mr. witness, at that time?
………
A : They got 2 kilos TNT bomb, sir.
Q : Did Trinidad tell you why he needed another amount of explosive on that date, December
29, 2004? Will you kindly tell us the reason why?
Q : Did they tell you, Mr. witness, where are they going to use that explosive?

………
A : No, sir.

A : He told me that Abu Solaiman instructed me to get the TNT so that he could detonate a
Q : Do you know, Mr. witness, what happened to the third batch of explosives, which were
bomb
taken from you by Trinidad and Tapay?

………
………

Q : Were there any other person, besides Abu Solaiman, who called you up, with respect to
A : That is the bomb that exploded in Makati, sir.
the taking of the explosives from you?

Q : Why did you know, Mr. witness?

A : There is, sir… Abu Zaky, sir, called up also.

A : Because I was called in the evening of February 14 by Abu Solaiman. He told me not to
Q : What did Abu Zaky tell you when he called you up?
leave the house because the explosive that were taken by Tapay and Angelo Trinidad
exploded.
A : He told me that "this is your first mission."
………
Q : Please enlighten the Honorable Court. What is that mission you are referring to?
Q : Was there any other call during that time, Mr. Witness?
A : That is the first mission where we can show our anger towards the Christians.
………
………
A : I was told by Angelo Trinidad not to leave the house because the explosive that he took
Q : The second time that he got a bomb from you, Mr. witness, do you know if the bomb exploded already, sir.
explode?
Q : How sure were you, Mr. witness, at that time, that indeed, the bomb exploded at Makati,
A : I did not know what happened to the next 2 kilos taken by Angelo Trinidad from me until beside the call of Abu Solaiman and Trinidad?
after I was caught, because I was told by the policeman that interviewed me after I was
arrested that the 2 kilos were planted in a bus, which also did not explode.
A : It was told by Abu Solaiman that the bombing in Makati should coincide with the
bombing in General Santos.
Q : So besides these two incidents, were there any other incidents that Angelo Trinidad and
Tapay get an explosive for you, Mr. witness?
………
 A : He told it to me, sir… I cannot remember the date anymore, but I know it was sometime In the light of the foregoing evidence, the Court upholds the finding of guilt against Rohmat. Article 17
in February 2005. of the Revised Penal Code reads:

Q : Any other call, Mr. witness, from Abu Solaiman and Trinidad after the bombing exploded Art. 17. Principals. — The following are considered principals:
in Makati, any other call?
1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act
………
2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it
A : There is, sir… The call came from Abu Zaky.
3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have
Q : What did Abu Zaky tell you, Mr. witness? been accomplished

A : He just greeted us congratulations, because we have a successful mission. Accused Rohmat is criminally responsible under the second paragraph, or the provision on "principal by
inducement." The instructions and training he had given Asali on how to make bombs – coupled with
their careful planning and persistent attempts to bomb different areas in Metro Manila and Rohmat’s
………
confirmation that Trinidad would be getting TNT from Asali as part of their mission – prove the finding
that Rohmat’s co-inducement was the determining cause of the commission of the crime.21 Such
A : He told me that "sa wakas, nag success din yung tinuro ko sayo." "command or advice [was] of such nature that, without it, the crime would not have
materialized."22lawphi1
………
Further, the inducement was "so influential in producing the criminal act that without it, the act would
not have been performed."23 In People v. Sanchez, et al., the Court ruled that, notwithstanding the fact
Q : By the way, Mr. witness, I would just like to clarify this. You stated that Abu Zaky called that Mayor Sanchez was not at the crime scene, evidence proved that he was the mastermind of the
you up the following day, that was February 15, and congratulating you for the success of the criminal act or the principal by inducement. Thus, because Mayor Sanchez was a co-principal and co-
mission. My question to you, Mr. witness, if you know what is the relation of that mission, conspirator, and because the act of one conspirator is the act of all, the mayor was rendered liable for all
wherein you were congratulated by Abu Zaky, to the mission, which have been indoctrinated the resulting crimes.24 The same finding must be applied to the case at bar.
to you, while you were in Mt. Cararao, Mr. witness?

The Court also affirms the finding of the existence of conspiracy involving accused Baharan, Trinidad,
A : They are connected, sir. and Rohmat. Conspiracy was clearly established from the "collective acts of the accused-appellants
before, during and after the commission of the crime." As correctly declared by the trial court in its
Q : Connected in what sense, Mr. witness? Omnibus Decision:

A : Because when we were undergoing training, we were told that the Abu Sayyaf should not Asali’s clear and categorical testimony, which remains unrebutted on its major points, coupled with the
wage war to the forest, but also wage our battles in the city. judicial admissions freely and voluntarily given by the two other accused, are sufficient to prove the
existence of a conspiracy hatched between and among the four accused, all members of the terrorist
group Abu Sayyaf, to wreak chaos and mayhem in the metropolis by indiscriminately killing and injuring
Q : Wage the battle against who, Mr. witness? civilian victims by utilizing bombs and other similar destructive explosive devices.

A : The government, sir.17 While said conspiracy involving the four malefactors has not been expressly admitted by accused
Baharan, Angelo Trinidad, and Rohmat, more specifically with respect to the latter’s participation in the
What can be culled from the testimony of Asali is that the Abu Sayyaf Group was determined to sow commission of the crimes, nonetheless it has been established by virtue of the aforementioned evidence,
terror in Metro Manila, so that they could show their "anger towards the Christians."18 It can also be seen which established the existence of the conspiracy itself and the indispensable participation of accused
that Rohmat, together with Janjalani and Abu Solaiman, had carefully planned the Valentine’s Day Rohmat in seeing to it that the conspirators’ criminal design would be realized.
bombing incident, months before it happened. Rohmat had trained Asali and Trinidad to make bombs
and explosives. While in training, Asali and others were told that their mission was to plant bombs in It is well-established that conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused, which clearly
malls, the LRT, and other parts of Metro Manila. According to Asali, Rohmat called him on 29 manifests a concurrence of wills, a common intent or design to commit a crime (People v. Lenantud, 352
December 2004 to confirm that Trinidad would get two kilos of TNT from Asali, as they were "about to SCRA 544). Hence, where acts of the accused collectively and individually demonstrate the existence of
commence" their "first mission."19 They made two separate attempts to bomb a bus in Metro Manila, but a common design towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose, conspiracy is evident and
to no avail. The day before the Valentine’s Day bombing, Trinidad got another two kilos of TNT from all the perpetrators will be held liable as principals (People v. Ellado, 353 SCRA 643).25
Asali. On Valentine’s Day, the Abu Sayyaf Group announced that they had a gift for the former
President, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. On their third try, their plan finally succeeded. Right after the bomb
exploded, the Abu Sayyaf Group declared that there would be more bombings in the future. Asali then In People v. Geronimo, the Court pronounced that it would be justified in concluding that the defendants
received a call from Rohmat, praising the former: "Sa wakas nag success din yung tinuro ko sayo."20 therein were engaged in a conspiracy "when the defendants by their acts aimed at the same object, one
performing one part and the other performing another part so as to complete it, with a view to the in Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI), which shareholdings respondents Jose Africa
attainment of the same object; and their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact concerted and and Manuel Nieto, Jr. held for themselves and, through their holdings and the corporations they
cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association, concerted action and concurrence of organized, beneficially for respondents Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos.4
sentiments."26
Civil Case No. 0009 is the main case subject of the present petition. Victor Africa (Africa), son of the
Accused contend that the testimony of Asali is inadmissible pursuant to Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of late Jose L. Africa, was not impleaded in and so is plainly not a party to Civil Case No. 0009.5
Court. It is true that under the rule, statements made by a conspirator against a co-conspirator are
admissible only when made during the existence of the conspiracy. However, as the Court ruled in
Civil Case No. 0009 spawned numerous incidental cases,6 among them, Civil Case No. 0130.7 The
People v. Buntag, if the declarant repeats the statement in court, his extrajudicial confession becomes a
present respondents were not made parties either in Civil Case No. 0130.
judicial admission, making the testimony admissible as to both conspirators.27 Thus, in People v. Palijon,
the Court held the following:
I. Civil Case No. 0130
… [W]e must make a distinction between extrajudicial and judicial confessions. An extrajudicial
confession may be given in evidence against the confessant but not against his co-accused as they are In the August 7, 1991 PCGG-conducted ETPI stockholders meeting, a PCGG-controlled board of
deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine him. A judicial confession is admissible against the directors was elected. Later, the registered ETPI stockholders convened a special stockholders meeting
declarant’s co-accused since the latter are afforded opportunity to cross-examine the former. Section 30, wherein another set of board of directors was elected. As a result, two sets of ETPI board and officers
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court applies only to extrajudicial acts or admissions and not to testimony at were elected.8
trial where the party adversely affected has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Mercene’s
admission implicating his co-accused was given on the witness stand. It is admissible in evidence against
Thereafter, Africa, as an ETPI stockholder, filed a petition for certiorari, with prayer for a temporary
appellant Palijon. Moreover, where several accused are tried together for the same offense, the testimony
restraining order/preliminary injunction with the Sandiganbayan (docketed as Civil Case No. 0130),
of a co-accused implicating his co-accused is competent evidence against the latter.28
seeking to nullify the August 5, 1991 and August 9, 1991 Orders of the PCGG. These Orders directed
Africa:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, as affirmed
with modification by the Court of Appeals, is hereby AFFIRMED.
[T]o account for his sequestered shares in ETPI and to cease and desist from exercising voting rights on
the sequestered shares in the special stockholders’ meeting to be held on August 12, 1991, from
SO ORDERED. representing himself as a director, officer, employee or agent of ETPI, and from participating, directly or
indirectly[,] in the management of ETPI.9
G.R. No. 152375               December 16, 2011
During the pendency of Africa’s petition, Civil Case No. 0130, Africa filed a motion with the
Sandiganbayan, alleging that since January 29, 1988 the PCGG had been "illegally ‘exercising’ the rights
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, 
of stockholders of ETPI,"10especially in the election of the members of the board of directors. Africa
vs.
prayed for the issuance of an order for the "calling and holding of [ETPI] annual stockholders meeting
SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION), JOSE L. AFRICA (substituted by his heirs),
for 1992 under the [c]ourt’s control and supervision and prescribed guidelines."11
MANUEL H. NIETO, JR., FERDINAND E. MARCOS (substituted by his heirs), IMELDA R.
MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., JUAN PONCE ENRILE, and POTENCIANO
ILUSORIO (substituted by his heirs), Respondents. In its November 13, 1992 resolution, the Sandiganbayan favored Africa’s motion in this wise:

DECISION WHEREFORE, it is ordered that an annual stockholders meeting of the [ETPI], for 1992 be held on
Friday, November 27, 1992, at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon, at the ETPI Board Room, Telecoms Plaza,
7th Floor, 316 Gil J. Puyat Avenue, Makati, Metro Manila. x x x The stockholders meeting shall be
BRION, J.:
conducted under the supervision and control of this Court, through Mr. Justice Sabino R. de Leon, Jr.
[O]nly the registered owners, their duly authorized representatives or their proxies may vote their
Before us is the petition for certiorari1 filed by the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) to set aside corresponding shares.
the February 7, 2002 resolution (2002 resolution)2 of the Sandiganbayan3 denying the petitioner’s Motion
to Admit Supplemental Offer of Evidence (Re: Deposition of Maurice V. Bane) (3rd motion).
The following minimum safeguards must be set in place and carefully maintained until final judicial
resolution of the question of whether or not the sequestered shares of stock (or in a proper case the
THE ANTECEDENTS underlying assets of the corporation concerned) constitute ill-gotten wealth[.]12

On July 22, 1987, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on The PCGG assailed this resolution before this Court via a petition for certiorari docketed as G.R. No.
Good Government (PCGG), filed a complaint (docketed as Civil Case No. 0009) against Jose L. Africa, 10778913(PCGG’s petition), imputing grave abuse of discretion on the Sandiganbayan for holding, inter
Manuel H. Nieto, Jr., Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Juan Ponce alia, that the registered stockholders of ETPI had the right to vote.14 In our November 26, 1992
Enrile, and Potenciano Ilusorio (collectively,  the respondents) for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, Resolution, we enjoined the Sandiganbayan from implementing its assailed resolution.
restitution, and damages before the Sandiganbayan. The petitioner alleged, inter alia, that the
respondents illegally manipulated the purchase of the major shareholdings of Cable and Wireless Limited
In the meantime, in an April 12, 1993 resolution, the Sandiganbayan ordered the consolidation of Civil II. Civil Case No. 0009
Case No. 0130, among others, with Civil Case No. 0009, with the latter as the main case and the former
merely an incident.15
Although Civil Case No. 0009 was filed on July 22, 1987, it was only on November 29, 1996 and March
17, 1997 that the first pre-trial conference was scheduled and concluded.25
During the pendency of PCGG’s petition (G.R. No. 107789), the PCGG filed with this Court a "Very
Urgent Petition for Authority to Hold Special Stockholders’ Meeting for [the] Sole Purpose of Increasing
In its Pre-Trial Brief26 dated August 30, 1996, the petitioner offered to present the following witnesses:
[ETPI’s] Authorized Capital Stock" (Urgent Petition). In our May 7, 1996 Resolution, we referred this
Urgent Petition to the Sandiganbayan for reception of evidence and immediate resolution.16 The
Sandiganbayan included the Urgent Petition in Civil Case No. 0130.17 WITNESSES TO BE PRESENTED AND A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THEIR TESTIMONIES 

In the proceedings to resolve the Urgent Petition, the testimony of Mr. Maurice V. Bane (former director (1) Maurice V. Bane – representative of Cable and Wireless Limited (C & W) at the time
and treasurer-in-trust of ETPI) was taken– at the petitioner’s instance and after serving notice of the ETPI was organized.
deposition-taking on the respondents18 – on October 23 and 24, 1996 by way of deposition upon oral
examination (Bane deposition) before Consul General Ernesto Castro of the Philippine Embassy in
xxxx
London, England.

(2) Mr. Manuel H. Nieto – x x x

Invoking Section 1, Rule 24 (of the old Rules of Court), purportedly allowing the petitioner to depose
Bane without leave of court, i.e., as a matter of right after the defendants have filed their answer, the
notice stated that "[t]he purpose of the deposition is for [Bane] to identify and testify on the facts set forth (3) Ms. Evelyn Singson – x x x
in his affidavit19 x x x so as to prove the ownership issue in favor of [the petitioner] and/or establish
the prima facie factual foundation for sequestration of [ETPI’s] Class A stock in support of the [Urgent
Petition]."20 The notice also states that the petitioner shall use the Bane deposition "in evidence… in the (4) Mr. Severino P. Buan, Jr. – x x x
main case of Civil Case No. 0009."21 On the scheduled deposition date, only Africa was present and he
cross-examined Bane. (5) Mr. Apolinario K. Medina - x x x

On December 13, 1996, the Sandiganbayan resolved the Urgent Petition by granting authority to the (6) Mr. Potenciano A. Roque – x x x
PCGG (i) "to cause the holding of a special stockholders’ meeting of ETPI for the sole purpose of
increasing ETPI’s authorized capital stock" and (ii) "to vote therein the sequestered Class ‘A’ shares of
stock."22 Thus, a special stockholders meeting was held, as previously scheduled, on March 17, 1997 and (7) Caesar Parlade - x x x
the increase in ETPI’s authorized capital stock was "unanimously approved."23 From this ruling, Africa
went to this Court via a petition for certiorari24 docketed as G.R. No. 147214 (Africa’s petition). IIa. Motion to Admit the Bane Deposition 

We jointly resolved the PCGG’s and Africa’s petitions, and ruled: At the trial of Civil Case No. 0009, the petitioner filed a Motion27 (1st motion), stating that –

This Court notes that, like in Africa’s motion to hold a stockholders meeting (to elect a board of 1. In the hearings of the incidents of [Civil Case No. 0009], i.e., Civil Case Nos. 0048, 0050,
directors), the Sandiganbayan, in the PCGG’s petition to hold a stockholders meeting (to amend the 0130, 014628 the following witnesses were presented therein:
articles of incorporation to increase the authorized capital stock), again failed to apply the two-tiered test.
On such determination hinges the validity of the votes cast by the PCGG in the stockholders meeting of
March 17, 1997. This lapse by the Sandiganbayan leaves this Court with no other choice but to remand a. Cesar O.V. Parlade
these questions to it for proper determination.
b. Maurice Bane
xxxx
c. Evelyn Singson
WHEREFORE, this Court Resolved to REFER the petitions at bar to the Sandiganbayan for reception of
evidence to determine whether there is a prima facie evidence showing that the sequestered shares in d. Leonorio Martinez
question are ill-gotten and there is an imminent danger of dissipation to entitle the PCGG to vote them in
a stockholders meeting to elect the ETPI Board of Directors and to amend the ETPI Articles of
Incorporation for the sole purpose of increasing the authorized capital stock of ETPI. e. Ricardo Castro; and

The Sandiganbayan shall render a decision thereon within sixty (60) days from receipt of this Resolution f. Rolando Gapud
and in conformity herewith.
2. [The petitioner] wishes to adopt in [Civil Case No. 0009] their testimonies and the
documentary exhibits presented and identified by them, since their testimonies and the said
 documentary exhibits are very relevant to prove the case of the [petitioner] in [Civil Case No. Judicial notice is found under Rule 129 which is titled "What Need Not Be Proved." Apparently, this
0009]. provision refers to the Court’s duty to consider admissions made by the parties in the pleadings, or in the
course of the trial or other proceedings in resolving cases before it. The duty of the Court is mandatory
and in those cases where it is discretionary, the initiative is upon the Court. Such being the case, the
3. The adverse parties in the aforementioned incidents had the opportunity to cross-examine
Court finds the Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice as something which need not be acted
them.
upon as the same is considered redundant.

The respondents filed their respective Oppositions to the 1st motion;29 in turn, the petitioner filed a
On the matter of the [Bane deposition], [its] admission is done through the ordinary formal offer of
Common Reply30 to these Oppositions.
exhibits wherein the defendant is given ample opportunity to raise objection on grounds provided by law.
Definitely, it is not under Article (sic) 129 on judicial notice. [Emphasis ours]
On April 1, 1998, the Sandiganbayan31 promulgated a resolution32 (1998 resolution) denying the
petitioner’s 1st motion, as follows:
On November 6, 2000 and on several dates thereafter, the respondents separately filed their respective
demurrers to evidence.36 On the other hand, the petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the 2000
Wherefore, the [petitioner’s] Motion x x x is – resolution, but was rebuffed by the Sandiganbayan in its April 3, 2001 resolution37 (2001 resolution).

1. partly denied insofar as [the petitioner] prays therein to adopt the testimonies on oral IIc. Motion to Admit Supplemental Offer of
deposition of Maurice V. Bane and Rolando Gapud as part of its evidence in Civil Case No. Evidence (Re: Deposition of Maurice Bane)
0009 for the reason that said deponents according to the [petitioner] are not available
for cross-examination in this Court by the [respondents]. (emphasis added)
On November 16, 2001, the petitioner filed its 3rd Motion, seeking once more the admission of the Bane
deposition.38 On February 7, 2002 (pending resolution of the respondents’ demurrers to evidence),39 the
2. partly Granted, in the interest of speedy disposition of this long pending case, insofar as Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed 2002 resolution,40 denying the petitioner’s 3rd motion. The
plaintiff prays therein to adopt certain/particular testimonies of Cesar O. Parlade, Evelyn Sandiganbayan ruled:
Singson, Leoncio Martinez, and Ricardo Castro and documentary exhibits which said
witnesses have identified in incident Civil Case Nos. xxx 0130 xxx, subject to the following
But in the court’s view, it is not really a question of whether or not plaintiff has already rested its case as
conditions :
to obviate the further presentation of evidence. It is not even a question of whether the non-appearing
defendants are deemed to have waived their right to cross-examine Bane as to qualify the admission of
1. xxx the deposition sans such cross-examination. Indeed, We do not see any need to dwell on these matters in
view of this Court’s Resolution rendered on April 1, 1998 which already denied the introduction in
evidence of Bane’s deposition and which has become final in view of plaintiff’s failure to file any
2. xxx motion for reconsideration or appeal within the 15-day reglementary period. Rightly or wrongly, the
resolution stands and for this court to grant plaintiff’s motion at this point in time would in effect
3. That the said witnesses be presented in this Court so that they can be cross- sanction plaintiff’s disregard for the rules of procedure. Plaintiff has slept on its rights for almost two
examined on their particular testimonies in incident Civil Cases xxx [by the years and it was only in February of 2000 that it sought to rectify its ineptitude by filing a motion to
respondents]. reopen its case as to enable it to introduce and offer Bane’s deposition as additional evidence, or in the
alternative for the court to take judicial notice of the allegations of the deposition. But how can such a
motion be granted when it has been resolved as early as 1998 that the deposition is inadmissible. Without
IIb. Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice plaintiff having moved for reconsideration within the reglementary period, the resolution has attained
finality and its effect cannot be undone by the simple expedient of filing a motion, which though
The petitioner did not in any way question the 1998 resolution, and instead made its Formal Offer of purporting to be a novel motion, is in reality a motion for reconsideration of this court’s 1998 ruling.
Evidence on December 14, 1999.33 Significantly, the Bane deposition was not included as part of its [emphases ours]
offered exhibits. Rectifying the omission, the petitioner filed an Urgent Motion and/or Request for
Judicial Notice34 (2nd motion) dated February 21, 2000, with the alternative prayer that: The resolution triggered the filing of the present petition.

1. An order forthwith be issued re-opening the plaintiff’s case and setting the same for trial THE PETITION 
any day in April 2000 for the sole purpose of introducing additional evidence and limited only
to the marking and offering of the [Bane deposition] which already forms part of the records
and used in Civil Case No. 0130 x x x; The petitioner filed the present petition claiming that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion:
2. In the alternative, x x x the [Sandiganbayan] to take judicial notice of the facts established
by the [Bane deposition], together with the marked exhibits appended thereto. [emphasis ours] I.

On August 21, 2000, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a resolution35 (2000 resolution) denying the x x x IN HOLDING THAT ITS INTERLOCUTORY ORDER IN 1998 HAD BECOME
petitioner’s 2nd motion: FINAL.
 II. The respondents further claim that after a party has rested its case, the admission of a supplemental offer
of evidence requires the reopening of the case at the discretion of the trial court; the Sandiganbayan
simply exercised its sound discretion in refusing to reopen the case since the evidence sought to be
x x x IN x x x REFUSING TO ADMIT THE BANE DEPOSITION –WHICH WAS
admitted was "within the knowledge of the [petitioner] and available to [it] before [it] rested its
ALREADY ADMITTED AS EVIDENCE IN AN INCIDENT CASE (CIVIL CASE NO.
case."48 The respondents also advert to the belated filing of the petitioner’s 3rd motion – i.e., after the
0130) – AS PART OF PETITIONER’S EVIDENCE IN THE MAIN x x x CASE (CIVIL
respondents had filed their respective demurrers to evidence.
CASE NO. 0009).

On the petitioner’s claim of waiver, the respondents assert that they have not waived their right to cross-
III.
examine the deponent; the Sandiganbayan recognized this right in its 1998 resolution and the petitioner
never questioned this recognition. They also assert that the allegations in the Bane deposition cannot be a
x x x IN REFUSING TO ADMIT A HIGHLY RELEVANT AND IMPORTANT PIECE proper subject of judicial notice under Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. The respondents lastly submit that
OF EVIDENCE FOR THE PETITIONER ON THE BASIS OF FLIMSY AND the Bane deposition is inadmissible in evidence because the petitioner failed to comply with the
TENUOUS TECHNICAL GROUNDS.  requisites for admission under Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

The petitioner41 argues that the 1998 resolution of the Sandiganbayan is merely an interlocutory order; In its Reply,49 the petitioner defends the timeliness of the present petition by arguing that a party may opt
thus, the petitioner’s failure to question this 1998 resolution could not have given it a character of to wait out and collect a pattern of questionable acts before resorting to the extraordinary remedy
"finality" so long as the main case remains pending.42 On this basis, the petitioner concludes that the of certiorari. The petitioner stresses that it filed the 3rd motion precisely because of the Sandiganbayan’s
Sandiganbayan’s denial of its 3rd motion was plainly tainted with grave abuse of discretion. 2000 resolution, which held that the admission of the Bane deposition should be done through the
ordinary formal offer of evidence. Thus, the Sandiganbayan seriously erred in considering the
petitioner’s 3rd motion as a proscribed motion for reconsideration. The petitioner generally submits that
On the issue of the Sandiganbayan’s refusal (in its 2002 resolution) either to take judicial notice of or to the dictates of substantial justice should have guided the Sandiganbayan to rule otherwise.
admit the Bane deposition as part of its evidence, the petitioner asserts that Civil Case No. 0130 (where
the Bane deposition was originally taken, introduced and admitted in evidence) is but a "child" of the
"parent" case, Civil Case No. 0009; under this relationship, evidence offered and admitted in any of the The petitioner also clarifies that it has not yet rested its case although it has filed a formal offer of
"children" cases should be considered as evidence in the "parent" case. evidence. A party normally rests his case only after the admission of the pieces of evidence he formally
offered; before then, he still has the opportunity to present further evidence to substantiate his theory of
the case should the court reject any piece of the offered evidence.50
Lastly, the petitioner claims that given the crucial importance of the Bane deposition, the Sandiganbayan
should not have denied its admission on "flimsy grounds," considering that:
The petitioner further maintains that the mere reasonable opportunity to cross-examine the deponent is
sufficient for the admission of the Bane deposition considering that the deponent is not an ordinary
1. It was also already stated in the notice (of the taking of the Bane deposition) that it would witness who can be easily summoned by our courts in light of his foreign residence, his citizenship, and
be used as evidence in Civil Case No. 0009. Notices having been duly served on all the parties his advanced age. The petitioner asserts that Rule 24 (now Rule 23), and not Section 47, Rule 130, of the
concerned, they must accordingly be deemed to have waived their right to cross-examine the Rules of Court should apply to the present case, as explicitly stated in the notice of the deposition-taking.
witness when they failed to show up.

To date, respondents Imelda Marcos and the heirs of Potenciano Ilusorio have yet to file their respective
2. The Bane deposition was a very vital cog in the case of the petitioner relative to its comments on the petition. Given the time that had lapsed since we required their comments, we resolve
allegation that the respondents’ interest in ETPI and related firms properly belongs to the to dispense with the filing of these comments and to consider this petition submitted for decision.
government.

THE ISSUES
3. The non-inclusion of the Bane deposition in the petitioner’s formal offer of evidence was
obviously excusable considering the period that had lapsed from the time the case was filed
and the voluminous records that the present case has generated.43 On the basis of the pleadings, we summarize the pivotal issues for our resolution, as follows:

THE RESPONDENTS’ COMMENTS 1. Whether the petition was filed within the required period.
and THE PETITIONER’S REPLY
2. Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion –
In the respondents’ Comments44 (filed in compliance with our Resolution of April 10, 200245 ), they
claim that the present petition was filed out of time - i.e., beyond the 60-day reglementary period
i. In holding that the 1998 resolution has already attained finality;
prescribed under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.46 This assertion proceeds from the view that
the petitioner’s 3rd motion, being a mere rehash of similar motions earlier filed by the petitioner,
likewise simply assails the Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution. Along the same line, they posit that the ii. In holding that the petitioner’s 3rd motion partakes of a prohibited motion for
petitioner’s 3rd motion actually partakes of a proscribed third motion for reconsideration of the reconsideration;
Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution.47 They likewise assert, on the assumption that the 1998 resolution is
interlocutory in character, that the petitioner’s failure to contest the resolution by way
of certiorari within the proper period gave the 1998 resolution a character of "finality."
 iii. In refusing to re-open the case given the critical importance of the Bane We clarify, too, that an interlocutory order remains under the control of the court until the case is finally
deposition to the petitioner’s cause; and resolved on the merits. The court may therefore modify or rescind the order upon sufficient grounds
shown at any time before final judgment.55 In this light, the Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution – which
merely denied the adoption of the Bane deposition as part of the evidence in Civil Case No. 0009 – could
iv. In refusing to admit the Bane deposition notwithstanding the prior
not have attained finality (in the manner that a decision or final order resolving the case on the merits
consolidation of Civil Case No. 0009 and Civil Case No. 0130.
does) despite the petitioner’s failure to move for its reconsideration or to appeal.56

3. Whether the Bane deposition is admissible under -

I (b). The 3rd motion was not prohibited by the Rules.

i. Rule 23, Section 4, par. (c) alone or in relation to Section 47, Rule 130 of the
We also agree with the petitioner that its 3rd motion cannot be considered as a proscribed third (actually
Rules of Court; and
second) motion for reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution. As Section 5, Rule 37 of the
Rules of Court clearly provides, the proscription against a second motion for reconsideration is directed
ii. The principle of judicial notice. against "a judgment or final order." Although a second motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory
order can be denied on the ground that it is a mere "rehash" of the arguments already passed upon and
resolved by the court, it cannot be rejected on the ground that it is forbidden by the law or by the rules as
THE COURT’S RULING a prohibited motion.57

We deny the petition for lack of merit. I (c). The 1998 resolution was not ripe for a petition for certiorari.

I. Preliminary Considerations  Under Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an aggrieved party may appeal from a judgment or final
order which completely disposes of a case or from an order that the Rules of Court declares to be
I (a). The interlocutory nature of the Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution.  appealable. While this provision prohibits an appeal from an interlocutory order, the aggrieved party is
afforded the chance to question an interlocutory order through a special civil action of certiorari under
Rule 65; the petition must be filed within sixty days from notice of the assailed judgment, order,
In determining the appropriate remedy or remedies available, a party aggrieved by a court order, resolution, or denial of a motion for reconsideration.
resolution or decision must first correctly identify the nature of the order, resolution or decision he
intends to assail.51 In this case, we must preliminarily determine whether the 1998 resolution is "final" or
"interlocutory" in nature. On the premise that the 1998 resolution is interlocutory in nature, the respondents insist that the 60-day
period for filing a petition for certiorari should be reckoned from the petitioner’s notice of the
Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution. They argue that since this ruling had long been rendered by the court,
Case law has conveniently demarcated the line between a final judgment or order and an interlocutory the petitioner’s subsequent filing of similar motions was actually a devious attempt to resuscitate the
one on the basis of the disposition made.52 A judgment or order is considered final if the order disposes of long-denied admission of the Bane deposition.
the action or proceeding completely, or terminates a particular stage of the same action; in such case, the
remedy available to an aggrieved party is appeal. If the order or resolution, however, merely resolves
incidental matters and leaves something more to be done to resolve the merits of the case, the order is We do not find the respondents’ submission meritorious. While the 1998 resolution is an interlocutory
interlocutory53 and the aggrieved party’s remedy is a petition for certiorari  under Rule 65. Jurisprudence order, as correctly argued by the petitioner and impliedly conceded by the respondents, the claim that the
pointedly holds that: 1998 resolution should have been immediately questioned by the petitioner on certiorari is not totally
correct as a petition for certiorari is not grounded solely on the issuance of a disputed interlocutory
ruling.58 For a petition for certiorari to prosper, Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court requires, among
As distinguished from a final order which disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a others, that neither an appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law is
particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has available to the aggrieved party. As a matter of exception, the writ of certiorari may issue
been determined by the court, an interlocutory order does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves notwithstanding the existence of an available alternative remedy, if such remedy is inadequate or
something more to be adjudicated upon. The term "final" judgment or order signifies a judgment or an insufficient in relieving the aggrieved party of the injurious effects of the order complained of.59
order which disposes of the case as to all the parties, reserving no further questions or directions for
future determination.
We note that at the time of its 1st motion in Civil Case No. 0009, the petitioner had not yet concluded the
presentation of its evidence, much less made any formal offer of evidence. At this stage of the case, the
On the other hand, a court order is merely interlocutory in character if it leaves substantial proceedings prematurity of using the extraordinary remedy of certiorari to question the admission of the Bane
yet to be had in connection with the controversy. It does not end the task of the court in adjudicating the deposition is obvious. After the denial of the 1st motion, the plain remedy available to the petitioner was
parties’ contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as against each other. In this sense, it is to move for a reconsideration to assert and even clarify its position on the admission of the Bane
basically provisional in its application.54 (emphasis supplied) deposition. The petitioner could introduce60 anew the Bane deposition and include this as evidence in its
formal offer61 – as the petitioner presumably did in Civil Case No. 0130.
Under these guidelines, we agree with the petitioner that the 1998 resolution is interlocutory. The
Sandiganbayan’s denial of the petitioner’s 1st motion through the 1998 Resolution came at a time when Thus, at that point, the case was not yet ripe for the filing of a petition for certiorari, and the denial of the
the petitioner had not even concluded the presentation of its evidence. Plainly, the denial of the motion 1st motion could not have been the reckoning point for the period of filing such a petition.
did not resolve the merits of the case, as something still had to be done to achieve this end.
II. The Sandiganbayan’s ruling on the finality of its 1998 resolution was legally erroneous but did not the Sandiganbayan already denied the petitioner’s attempt to adopt the Bane deposition as evidence in
constitute grave abuse of discretion  Civil Case No. 0009 for the deponent cannot be cross-examined in court). Nevertheless, the
Sandiganbayan ultimately denied the petitioner’s motion to reopen the case. Having judicially admitted
the resting of its case, the petitioner should have already questioned the denial of its 2nd motion by way
In light of the above discussions and conclusions, the Sandiganbayan undoubtedly erred on a question
of certiorari, since the denial of its attempt to reopen the case effectively foreclosed all avenues available
of law in its ruling, but this legal error did not necessarily amount to a grave abuse of discretion in the
to it for the consideration of the Bane deposition. Instead of doing so, however, the petitioner allowed
absence of a clear showing that its action was a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment affecting
the 60-day reglementary period, under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to lapse, and
its exercise of jurisdiction.62Without this showing, the Sandiganbayan’s erroneous legal conclusion was
proceeded to file its 3rd motion.
only an error of judgment, or, at best, an abuse of discretion but not a grave one. For this reason alone,
the petition should be dismissed.
Significantly, the petitioner changed its legal position in its 3rd motion by denying having rested its case
and insisting on the introduction of the Bane deposition. Rebuffed once more, the petitioner filed the
Despite this conclusion, however, we opt not to immediately dismiss the petition in light of the unique
present petition, inviting our attention to the Sandiganbayan’s resolutions,72 which allegedly gave it
circumstances of this case where the petitioner cannot entirely be faulted for not availing of the remedy at
"mixed signals."73 By pointing to these resolutions, ironically, even the petitioner impliedly recognized
the opportune time, and where the case, by its nature, is undoubtedly endowed with public interest and
that they were then already ripe for review on certiorari. What the petitioner should have realized was
has become a matter of public concern.63 In other words, we opt to resolve the petition on the merits to
that its 2nd motion unequivocally aimed to reopen the case for the introduction of further evidence
lay the issues raised to rest and to avoid their recurrence in the course of completely resolving the merits
consisting of the Bane deposition. Having been ultimately denied by the court, the petitioner could not
of Civil Case No. 0009.
have been prevented from taking the proper remedy notwithstanding any perceived ambiguity in the
resolutions.
Although the word "rested" nowhere appears in the Rules of Court, ordinary court procedure has inferred
it from an overview of trial sequence under Section 5, Rule 30 (which capsulizes the order of
On the other end, though, there was nothing intrinsically objectionable in the petitioner’s motion to
presentation of a
reopen its case before the court ruled on its formal offer of evidence. The Rules of Court does not
prohibit a party from requesting the court to allow it to present additional evidence even after it has
party’s evidence during trial), read in relation to Rule 18 on Pre-Trial,64 both of the Rules of Court. Under rested its case. Any such opportunity, however, for the ultimate purpose of the admission of additional
Section 5, Rule 30, after a party has adduced his direct evidence in the course of discharging the burden evidence is already addressed to the sound discretion of the court. It is from the prism of the exercise of
of proof,65 he is considered to have rested his case, and is thereafter allowed to offer rebutting evidence this discretion that the Sandiganbayan’s refusal to reopen the case (for the purpose of introducing,
only.66 Whether a party has rested his case in some measure depends on his manifestation in court on "marking and offering" additional evidence) should be viewed. We can declare this Sandiganbayan
whether he has concluded his presentation of evidence.67 action invalid if it had acted with grave abuse of discretion.

In its second and third motions, respectively, the petitioner expressly admitted that "due to oversight, [the III. The Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in ultimately refusing to reopen the case for the
petitioner] closed and rested its case";68 and that it "had terminated the presentation of its evidence in x x purpose of introducing and admitting in evidence the Bane deposition
x Civil Case No. 0009."69 In the face of these categorical judicial admissions,70 the petitioner cannot
suddenly make an about-face and insist on the introduction of evidence out of the usual order. Contrary
The basis for a motion to reopen a case to introduce further evidence is Section 5, Rule 30 of the Rules of
to the petitioner’s assertion, the resting of its case could not have been conditioned on the admission of
Court, which reads:
the evidence it formally offered. To begin with, the Bane deposition, which is the lone piece of evidence
subject of this present petition, was not among the pieces of evidence included in its formal offer of
evidence and thus could not have been admitted or rejected by the trial court. Sec. 5. Order of trial. – Subject to the provisions of section 2 of Rule 31, and unless the court for special
reasons otherwise directs, the trial shall be limited to the issues stated in the pre-trial order and shall
proceed as follows:
The Court observes with interest that it was only in this present petition for certiorari that the petitioner
had firmly denied having rested its case.71 Before then, the petitioner never found it appropriate to
question on certiorari the Sandiganbayan’s denial of its 2nd motion which prayed, inter alia, for xxxx
the reopening of the case. This is a fatal defect in the petitioner’s case.
(f) The parties may then respectively adduce rebutting evidence only, unless the court, for good reasons
Although the denial of the petitioner’s first motion did not necessitate an immediate recourse to the and in the furtherance of justice, permits them to adduce evidence upon their original case[.]
corrective writ of certiorari, the denial of the 2nd motion dictated a different course of action. The [emphases ours]
petitioner’s non-observance of the proper procedure for the admission of the Bane deposition, while
seemingly innocuous, carried fatal implications for its case. Having been rebuffed on its first attempt to
Under this rule, a party who has the burden of proof must introduce, at the first instance, all the evidence
have the Bane deposition adopted in Civil Case No. 0009, and without seeking reconsideration of the
he relies upon74 and such evidence cannot be given piecemeal.75 The obvious rationale of the requirement
denial, the petitioner presented its other pieces of evidence and eventually rested its case. This time, the
is to avoid injurious surprises to the other party and the consequent delay in the administration of
petitioner forgot about the Bane deposition and so failed to include that piece of evidence in its formal
justice.76
offer of evidence.

A party’s declaration of the completion of the presentation of his evidence prevents him from introducing
More than two years later, the petitioner again tried to squeeze in the Bane deposition into its case. In
further evidence;77 but where the evidence is rebuttal in character, whose necessity, for instance, arose
resolving the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan’s 2000 resolution, the
from the shifting of the burden of evidence from one party to the other;78 or where the evidence sought to
Sandiganbayan held that the Bane deposition has "become part and parcel" of Civil Case No. 0009. This
pronouncement has obscured the real status of the Bane deposition as evidence (considering that, earlier,
be presented is in the nature of newly discovered evidence,79 the party’s right to introduce further Under these guidelines, we hold that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in refusing to
evidence must be recognized. Otherwise, the aggrieved party may avail of the remedy of certiorari. reopen the case. Instead of squarely ruling on the petitioner’s 2nd motion to avoid any uncertainty on the
evidentiary status of the Bane deposition, the Sandiganbayan’s action actually left the petitioner’s
concern in limbo by considering the petitioner’s motion "redundant." This is tantamount to a refusal to
Largely, the exercise of the court’s discretion80 under the exception of Section 5(f), Rule 30 of the Rules
undertake a positive duty as mandated by the circumstances and is equivalent to an act outside the
of Court depends on the attendant facts – i.e., on whether the evidence would qualify as a "good reason"
contemplation of law.
and be in furtherance of "the interest of justice." For a reviewing court to properly interfere with the
lower court’s exercise of discretion, the petitioner must show that the lower court’s action was attended
by grave abuse of discretion. Settled jurisprudence has defined this term as the capricious and whimsical It has not escaped our notice that at the time the petitioner moved to re-open its case, the respondents had
exercise of judgment, equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or, the exercise of power in an arbitrary manner not yet even presented their evidence in chief. The respondents, therefore, would not have been
by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a prejudiced by allowing the petitioner’s introduction of the Bane deposition, which was concededly
positive duty, to a virtual refusal to perform the mandated duty, or to act at all in contemplation of the omitted "through oversight."88 The higher interest of substantial justice, of course, is another
law.81 Grave abuse of discretion goes beyond the bare and unsupported imputation of caprice, consideration that cannot be taken lightly.89
whimsicality or arbitrariness, and beyond allegations that merely constitute errors of judgment82 or mere
abuse of discretion.83
In light of these circumstances, the Sandiganbayan should not have perfunctorily applied Section 5, Rule
30 of the Rules of Court on the petitioner’s request to reopen the case for the submission of the Bane
In Lopez v. Liboro,84 we had occasion to make the following pronouncement: deposition.

After the parties have produced their respective direct proofs, they are allowed to offer rebutting evidence On the basis of this conclusion, a remand of this case should follow as a matter of course. The state of the
only, but, it has been held, the court, for good reasons, in the furtherance of justice, may permit them to parties’ submissions and the delay that has already attended this aspect of Civil Case No. 0009, however,
offer evidence upon their original case, and its ruling will not be disturbed in the appellate court where no dictate against this obvious course of action. At this point, the parties have more than extensively argued
abuse of discretion appears. So, generally, additional evidence is allowed when it is newly discovered, for or against the admission of the Bane deposition. Civil Case No. 0009 is a 25-year old sequestration
or where it has been omitted through inadvertence or mistake, or where the purpose of the evidence case that is now crying out for complete resolution. Admissibility, too, is an issue that would have again
is to correct evidence previously offered. The omission to present evidence on the testator's knowledge of been raised on remand and would surely stare us in the face after remand.90 We are thus left with no
Spanish had not been deliberate. It was due to a misapprehension or oversight. (citations omitted; choice but to resolve the issue of admissibility of the Bane deposition here and now.
emphases ours)
IV. The admissibility of the Bane deposition
Likewise, in Director of Lands v. Roman Archbishop of Manila,85 we ruled:
IV (a). The consolidation of Civil Case No. 0009 and Civil Case No. 0130 did not dispense with the
The strict rule is that the plaintiff must try his case out when he commences. Nevertheless, a relaxation of usual requisites of admissibility
the rule is permitted in the sound discretion of the court. "The proper rule for the exercise of this
discretion," it has been said by an eminent author, "is, that material testimony should not be excluded
In support of its 3rd motion, the petitioner argues that the Bane deposition can be admitted in evidence
because offered by the plaintiff after the defendant has rested, although not in rebuttal, unless it
without observing the provisions of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.91 The petitioner claims
has been kept back by a trick, and for the purpose of deceiving the defendant and affecting his case
that in light of the prior consolidation of Civil Case No. 0009 and Civil Case No. 0130, among
injuriously."
others,92 the "former case or proceeding" that Section 47, Rule 130 speaks of no longer exists.

These principles find their echo in Philippine remedial law. While the general rule is rightly recognized,
Rule 31 of the old Rules of Court93 – the rule in effect at the time Civil Case Nos. 0009 and 0130 were
the Code of Civil Procedure authorizes the judge "for special reasons," to change the order of the trial,
consolidated – provided that:
and "for good reason, in the furtherance of justice," to permit the parties "to offer evidence upon their
original case." These exceptions are made stronger when one considers the character of registration
proceedings and the fact that where so many parties are involved, and action is taken quickly and Rule 31
abruptly, conformity with precise legal rules should not always be expected. Even at the risk of Consolidation or Severance
violating legal formulæ, an opportunity should be given to parties to submit additional
corroborative evidence in support of their claims of title, if the ends of justice so require. (emphases
Section 1. Consolidation. – When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before
ours)
the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order
all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to
In his commentaries, Chief Justice Moran had this to say: avoid unnecessary costs or delay.94 (emphases ours)

However, the court for good reasons, may, in the furtherance of justice, permit the parties to offer Consolidation is a procedural device granted to the court as an aid in deciding how cases in its docket are
evidence upon their original case, and its ruling will not be disturbed where no abuse of discretion to be tried so that the business of the court may be dispatched expeditiously and with economy while
appears, Generally, additional evidence is allowed when x x x; but it may be properly disallowed providing justice to the parties. To promote this end, the rule permits the consolidation and a single trial
where it was withheld deliberately and without justification.86 of several cases in the court’s docket, or the consolidation of issues within those cases.95

The weight of the exception is also recognized in foreign jurisprudence.87

A reading of Rule 31 of the Rules of Court easily lends itself to two observations. First, Rule 31 is These considerations run counter to the conclusion that the Sandiganbayan’s order of consolidation had
completely silent on the effect/s of consolidation on the cases consolidated; on the parties and the causes actually resulted in the complete merger of the incident cases with the main case, in the sense of actual
of action involved; and on the evidence presented in the consolidated cases. Second, while Rule 31 gives consolidation, and that the parties in these consolidated cases had (at least constructively) been aware of
the court the discretion either to order a joint hearing or trial, or to order the actions consolidated, and had allowed actual consolidation without objection.104
jurisprudence will show that the term "consolidation" is used generically and even synonymously with
joint hearing or trial of several causes.96 In fact, the title "consolidation" of Rule 31 covers all the
Considering, too, that the consolidated actions were originally independent of one another and the fact
different senses of consolidation, as discussed below.
that in the present case the party respondents to Civil Case No. 0009 (an action for reconveyance,
accounting, restitution and damages) are not parties to Civil Case No. 0130 (a special civil action filed by
These observations are not without practical reason. Considering that consolidation is basically a an ETPI stockholder involving a corporate squabble within ETPI), the conclusion that the Sandiganbayan
function given to the court, the latter is in the best position to determine for itself (given the nature of the in fact intended an actual consolidationand, together with the parties affected,105 acted towards that end -
cases, the complexity of the issues involved, the parties affected, and the court’s capability and resources where the actions become fused and unidentifiable from one another and where the evidence appreciated
vis-à-vis all the official business pending before it, among other things) what "consolidation" will bring, in one action is also appreciated in another action – must find support in the proceedings held below.
bearing in mind the rights of the parties appearing before it. This is particularly true in a case with the magnitude and complexity of the present case. Otherwise, to
impose upon the respondents the effects of an actual consolidation (which find no clear support in the
provisions of the Rules of Court, jurisprudence,106 and even in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan
To disregard the kind of consolidation effected by the Sandiganbayan on the simple and convenient
itself and despite the aforementioned considerations) results in an outright deprivation of the petitioner’s
premise that the deposition-taking took place after the Sandiganbayan ordered the consolidation is to beg
right to due process. We reach this conclusion especially where the evidence sought to be admitted is not
the question. It is precisely the silence of our Rules of Procedure and the dearth of applicable case law on
simply a testimony taken in one of the several cases, but a deposition upon oral examination taken in
the effect of "consolidation" that strongly compel this Court to determine the kind of "consolidation"
another jurisdiction and whose admission is governed by specific provisions on our rules on evidence.
effected to directly resolve the very issue of admissibility in this case.

We stress on this point, too, that while the Sandiganbayan ordered the consolidation in 1993 (that is,
In the context of legal procedure, the term "consolidation" is used in three different senses:97
before the deposition was taken), neither does the Pre-Trial Order107 issued by the Sandiganbayan in 1997
in Civil Case No. 0009 contain any reference, formal or substantive, to Civil Case No.
(1) Where all except one of several actions are stayed until one is tried, in which case the 0130.108 Interestingly, in its Pre-Trial Brief dated August 30, 1996,109 the petitioner even made a
judgment in the one trial is conclusive as to the others. This is not actually consolidation but is representation to present Bane as one of its witnesses.
referred to as such. (quasi-consolidation)98
IV (b). Use of deposition under Section 4, Rule 23 and as a former testimony under Section 47, Rule
(2) Where several actions are combined into one, lose their separate identity, and become a 130
single action in which a single judgment is rendered. This is illustrated by a situation where
several actions are pending between the same parties stating claims which might have been
Since the present consolidation did not affect Civil Case No. 0130 as an original, albeit incidental, case,
set out originally in one complaint. (actual consolidation)99
the admissibility of the Bane deposition cannot avoid being measured against the requirements of Section
47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court – the rule on the admissibility of testimonies or deposition taken in a
(3) Where several actions are ordered to be tried together but each retains its separate different proceeding. In this regard, the petitioner argues that Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court
character and requires the entry of a separate judgment. This type of consolidation does not (then Rule 24)110 must, at any rate, prevail over Section 47, Rule 130111 of the same Rules.
merge the suits into a single action, or cause the parties to one action to be parties to the other.
(consolidation for trial)100
At the outset, we note that when the petitioner’s motion to adopt the testimonies taken in the incident
cases drew individual oppositions from the respondents, the petitioner represented to the Sandiganbayan
Considering that the Sandiganbayan’s order101 to consolidate several incident cases does not at all provide its willingness to comply with the provisions of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,112 and, in
a hint on the extent of the court’s exercise of its discretion as to the effects of the consolidation it ordered fact, again presented some of the witnesses. The petitioner’s about-face two years thereafter even
– in view of the function of this procedural device to principally aid the court itself in dealing with its contributed to the Sandiganbayan’s own inconsistency on how to treat the Bane deposition, in particular,
official business – we are compelled to look deeper into the voluminous records of the proceedings as evidence.
conducted below. We note that there is nothing that would even suggest that the Sandiganbayan in fact
intended a merger of causes of action, parties and evidence.102 To be sure, there would have been no need
Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court on "Deposition Pending Action" (deposition de bene esse)
for a motion to adopt (which did not remain unopposed) the testimonies in the incident cases had a
provides for the circumstances when depositions may be used in the trial, or at the hearing of a motion or
merger actually resulted from the order of consolidation, for in that case, the Sandiganbayan can already
an interlocutory proceeding.
take judicial notice of the same.

SEC. 4. Use of depositions. — At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory
Significantly, even the petitioner itself viewed consolidation, at most, to be merely a consolidation for
proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence, may be
trial.103Accordingly, despite the consolidation in 1993, the petitioner acceded to the Sandiganbayan’s
used against any party who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had due
1998 Resolution (which denied the petitioner’s 1st Motion on the ground that the witnesses, whose
notice thereof, in accordance with any one of the following provisions:
testimony in the incident cases is sought to be adopted, "are not available for cross-examination in" the
Sandiganbayan) by presenting these other witnesses again in the main case, so that the respondents can
cross-examine them. xxxx
(c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any purpose if the of a case.116 However, under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes laid down in Section 4,
court finds: (1) that the witness is dead; or (2) that the witness resides at a distance more than one Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, the deposition may be used without the deponent being actually called to
hundred (100) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears the witness stand.117
that his absence was procured by the party offering the deposition; or (3) that the witness is unable to
attend or testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment; or (4) that the party offering the
Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is an entirely different provision. While a former testimony or
deposition has been unable to procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena; or (5) upon application
depositionappears under the Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule, the classification of former testimony or
and notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of justice and
deposition as an admissible hearsay is not universally conceded.118 A fundamental characteristic of
with due regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow
hearsay evidence is the adverse party’s lack of opportunity to cross-examine the out-of-court declarant.
the deposition to be used[.] [emphasis ours]
However, Section 47, Rule 130 explicitly requires, inter alia, for the admissibility of a former testimony
or deposition that the adverse party must have had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness or the
On the other hand, Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides: deponent in the prior proceeding.

SEC. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding.  – The testimony or deposition of a witness This opportunity to cross-examine though is not the ordinary cross-examination119 afforded an adverse
deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving party in usual trials regarding "matters stated in the direct examination or connected therewith." Section
the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party who had the 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court contemplates a different kind of cross-examination, whether actual or
opportunity to cross-examine him. a mere opportunity, whose adequacy depends on the requisite identity of issues in the former case or
proceeding and in the present case where the former testimony or deposition is sought to be introduced.
A plain reading of Rule 23 of the Rules of Court readily rejects the petitioner’s position that the Bane
deposition can be admitted into evidence without observing the requirements of Section 47, Rule 130 of Section 47, Rule 130 requires that the issues involved in both cases must, at least, be substantially the
the Rules of Court. same; otherwise, there is no basis in saying that the former statement was - or would have been -
sufficiently tested by cross-examination or by an opportunity to do so.120 (The requirement of similarity
though does not mean that all the issues in the two proceedings should be the same.121 Although some
Before a party can make use of the deposition taken at the trial of a pending action, Section 4, Rule 23 of
issues may not be the same in the two actions, the admissibility of a former testimony on an issue which
the Rules of Court does not only require due observance of its sub-paragraphs (a) to (d); it also requires,
is similar in both actions cannot be questioned.122)
as a condition for admissibility, compliance with "the rules on evidence." Thus, even Section 4, Rule 23
of the Rules of Court makes an implied reference to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court before
the deposition may be used in evidence. By reading Rule 23 in isolation, the petitioner failed to These considerations, among others, make Section 47, Rule 130 a distinct rule on evidence and therefore
recognize that the principle conceding admissibility to a deposition under Rule 23 should be consistent should not be confused with the general provisions on deposition under Rule 23 of the Rules of Court. In
with the rules on evidence under Section 47, Rule 130.113 In determining the admissibility of the Bane other words, even if the petitioner complies with Rule 23 of the Rules of Court on the use of depositions,
deposition, therefore, reliance cannot be given on one provision to the exclusion of the the observance of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court cannot simply be avoided or disregarded.
other; both provisions must be considered. This is particularly true in this case where the evidence in
the prior proceeding does not simply refer to a witness’ testimony in open court but to a deposition taken
Undisputably, the Sandiganbayan relied on the Bane deposition, taken in Civil Case No. 0130, for
under another and farther jurisdiction.
purposes of this very same case. Thus, what the petitioner established and what the Sandiganbayan
found, for purposes of using the Bane deposition, refer only to the circumstances laid down under
A common thread that runs from Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court and Section 47, Rule 130 of Section 4(c), Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, not necessarily to those of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules
the same Rules is their mutual reference to depositions. of Court, as a distinct rule on evidence that imposes further requirements in the use of depositions in
a different case or proceeding. In other words, the prior use of the deposition under Section 4(c), Rule 23
cannot be taken as compliance with Section 47, Rule 130 which considers the same deposition as
A deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery whose primary function is to supplement the pleadings for
hearsay, unless the requisites for its admission under this rule are observed. The aching question is
the purpose of disclosing the real points of dispute between the parties and affording an adequate factual
whether the petitioner complied with the latter rule.
basis during the preparation for trial.114 Since depositions are principally made available to the parties as
a means of informing themselves of all the relevant facts, depositions are not meant as substitute for the
actual testimony in open court of a party or witness. Generally, the deponent must be presented for oral Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court lays down the following requisites for the admission of a
examination in open court at the trial or hearing. This is a requirement of the rules on evidence under testimony or deposition given at a former case or proceeding.
Section 1, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.115
1. The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or otherwise unable to testify;
Examination to be done in open court. — The examination of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing
shall be done in open court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak,
2. The testimony was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative;
or the question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be given orally.

3. Involving the same parties;

Indeed, any deposition offered to prove the facts set forth therein, in lieu of the actual oral testimony of
the deponent in open court, may be opposed by the adverse party and excluded under the hearsay rule –
i.e., that the adverse party had or has no opportunity to cross-examine the deponent at the time that his 4. Relating to the same matter;
testimony is offered. That opportunity for cross-examination was afforded during the taking of the
deposition alone is no argument, as the opportunity for cross-examination must normally be accorded a
5. The adverse party having had the opportunity to cross-examine him.123
party at the time that the testimonial evidence is actually presented against him during the trial or hearing
The reasons for the admissibility of testimony or deposition taken at a former trial or proceeding are the the opportunity to cross-examine, is based on the premise that the opportunity of cross-examination is an
necessity for the testimony and its trustworthiness.124 However, before the former testimony or essential safeguard135 against falsehoods and frauds.
deposition can be introduced in evidence, the proponent must first lay the proper
predicate therefor,125 i.e., the party must establish the basis for the admission of the Bane deposition in
In resolving the question of whether the requirement of opportunity to cross-examine has been satisfied,
the realm of admissible evidence. This basis is the prior issue that we must now examine and resolve.
we have to consider first the required identity of parties as the present opponent to the admission of the
Bane deposition to whom the opportunity to cross-examine the deponent is imputed may not after all be
IV (c). Unavailability of witness the same "adverse party" who actually had such opportunity.

For the admission of a former testimony or deposition, Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court simply To render the testimony of a witness admissible at a later trial or action, the parties to the first proceeding
requires, inter alia, that the witness or deponent be "deceased or unable to testify." On the other hand, in must be the same as the parties to the later proceeding. Physical identity, however, is not required;
using a deposition that was taken during the pendency of an action, Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of substantial identity136 or identity of interests137 suffices, as where the subsequent proceeding is between
Court provides several grounds that will justify dispensing with the actual testimony of the deponent in persons who represent the parties to the prior proceeding by privity in law, in blood, or in estate. The
open court and specifies, inter alia, the circumstances of the deponent’s inability to attend or testify, as term "privity" denotes mutual or successive relationships to the same rights of property.138
follows:
In the present case, the petitioner failed to impute, much less establish, the identity of interest or privity
(3) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment[.] between the then opponent, Africa, and the present opponents, the respondents. While Africa is the son
[emphases ours]126 of the late respondent Jose Africa, at most, the deposition should be admissible only against him as an
ETPI stockholder who filed the certiorari petition docketed as Civil Case No. 0130 (and, unavoidably, as
successor-in-interest of the late respondent Jose Africa). While Africa and the respondents are all ETPI
The phrase "unable to testify" appearing in both Rule 23 and Rule 130 of the Rules of Court refers to a
stockholders, this commonality does not establish at all any privity between them for purposes of binding
physical inability to appear at the witness stand and to give a testimony.127 Hence notwithstanding the
the latter to the acts or omissions of the former respecting the cross-examination of the deponent. The
deletion of the phrase "out of the Philippines," which previously appeared in Section 47, Rule 130 of the
sequestration of their shares does not result in the integration of their rights and obligations as
Rules of Court, absence from jurisdiction128 - the petitioner’s excuse for the non-presentation of Bane in
stockholders which remain distinct and personal to them, vis-a-vis other stockholders.139
open court -  may still constitute inability to testify under the same rule. This is not to say, however, that
resort to deposition on this instance of unavailability will always be upheld. Where the deposition is
taken not for discovery purposes, but to accommodate the deponent, then the deposition should be IV (d1). The respondents’ notice of taking of Bane deposition is insufficient evidence of waiver
rejected in evidence.129
The petitioner staunchly asserts that the respondents have waived their right to cross-examine the
Although the testimony of a witness has been given in the course of a former proceeding between the deponent for their failure to appear at the deposition-taking despite individual notices previously sent to
parties to a case on trial, this testimony alone is not a ground for its admission in evidence. The witness them.140
himself, if available, must be produced in court as if he were testifying de novo since his testimony given
at the former trial is mere hearsay.130 The deposition of a witness, otherwise available, is also
In its first Notice to Take Oral Deposition of Mr. Maurice V. Bane dated August 30, 1996,141 the
inadmissible for the same reason.
petitioner originally intended to depose Mr. Bane on September 25-26 1996. Because it failed to specify
in the notice the purpose for taking Mr. Bane’s deposition, the petitioner sent a Second Amended Notice
Indeed, the Sandiganbayan’s reliance on the Bane deposition in the other  case (Civil Case No. 0130) is to Take Deposition of Mr. Maurice V. Bane Upon Oral Examination where it likewise moved the
an argument in favor of the requisite unavailability of the witness. For purposes of the present case (Civil scheduled deposition-taking to October 23-26, 1996.
Case No. 0009), however, the Sandiganbayan would have no basis to presume, and neither can or should
we, that the previous condition, which previously allowed the use of the deposition, remains and would
The records show that Africa moved several times for protective orders against the intended deposition of
thereby justify the use of the same deposition in another case or proceeding, even if the other case or
Maurice Bane.142 On the other hand, among the respondents, only respondent Enrile appears to have filed
proceeding is before the same court. Since the basis for the admission of the Bane deposition, in
an Opposition143to the petitioner’s first notice, where he squarely raised the issue of reasonability of the
principle, being necessity,131 the burden of establishing its existence rests on the party who seeks the
petitioner’s nineteen-day first notice. While the Sandiganbayan denied Africa’s motion for protective
admission of the evidence. This burden cannot be supplanted by assuming the continuity of the previous
orders,144 it strikes us that no ruling was ever handed down on respondent Enrile’s Opposition.145
condition or conditions in light of the general rule against the non-presentation of the deponent in
court.132
It must be emphasized that even under Rule 23, the admission of the deposition upon oral examination is
not simply based on the fact of prior notice on the individual sought to be bound thereby. In Northwest
IV (d). The requirement of opportunity of the adverse party to cross-examine; identity of parties; and
Airlines v. Cruz, 146 we ruled that -
identity of subject matter

The provision explicitly vesting in the court the power to order that the deposition shall not be taken
The function of cross-examination is to test the truthfulness of the statements of a witness made on direct
connotes the authority to exercise discretion on the matter. However, the discretion conferred by law is
examination.133 The opportunity of cross-examination has been regarded as an essential safeguard of the
not unlimited. It must be exercised, not arbitrarily or oppressively, but in a reasonable manner and in
accuracy and completeness of a testimony. In civil cases, the right of cross-examination is absolute, and
consonance with the spirit of he law. The courts should always see to it that the safeguards for the
is not a mere privilege of the party against whom a witness may be called.134 This right is available, of
protection of the parties and deponents are firmly maintained. As aptly stated by Chief Justice Moran:
course, at the taking of depositions, as well as on the examination of witnesses at the trial. The principal
justification for the general exclusion of hearsay statements and for the admission, as an exception to the
hearsay rule, of reported testimony taken at a former hearing where the present adversary was afforded
. . . . (T)his provision affords the adverse party, as well as the deponent, sufficient protection against to forewarn the notified persons that their inexcusable failure to appear at the deposition taking would
abuses that may be committed by a party in the exercise of his unlimited right to discovery. As a writer amount to a waiver of their right of cross-examination, without prejudice to the right of the respondents
said: "Any discovery involves a prying into another person's affairs — prying that is quite justified if it is to raise their objections at the appropriate time.149 We would be treading on dangerous grounds indeed
to be a legitimate aid to litigation, but not justified if it is not to be such an aid." For this reason, courts were we to hold that one not a party to an action, and neither in privity nor in substantial identity of
are given ample powers to forbid discovery which is intended not as an aid to litigation, but merely to interest with any of the parties in the same action, can be bound by the action or omission of the
annoy, embarrass or oppress either the deponent or the adverse party, or both. (emphasis ours) latter, by the mere expedient of a notice. Thus, we cannot simply deduce a resultant waiver from the
respondents’ mere failure to attend the deposition-taking despite notice sent by the petitioner.
In the present case, not only did the Sandiganbayan fail to rule on respondent Enrile’s Opposition (which
is equally applicable to his co-respondents), it also failed to provide even the bare minimum "safeguards Lastly, we see no reason why the Bane deposition could not have been taken earlier in Civil Case No.
for the protection of," (more so) non-parties,147 and to ensure that these safeguards are firmly maintained. 0009 – the principal action where it was sought to be introduced – while Bane was still here in the
Instead, the Sandiganbayan simply bought the petitioner’s assertion (that the taking of Bane deposition is Philippines. We note in this regard that the Philippines was no longer under the Marcos administration
a matter of right) and treated the lingering concerns – e.g., reasonability of the notice; and the non-party and had returned to normal democratic processes when Civil Case No. 0009 was filed. In fact, the
status of the respondents in Civil Case No. 0130 - at whose incident (docketed as G.R. No. 107789) the petitioner’s notice itself states that the "purpose of the deposition is for Mr. Maurice Bane to identify and
Bane deposition was taken - rather perfunctorily to the prejudice of the respondents. testify on the facts set forth in his Affidavit," which Mr. Bane had long executed in 1991 in Makati,
Metro Manila.150 Clearly, a deposition could then have been taken - without compromising the
respondents’ right to cross-examine a witness against them - considering that the principal purpose of the
In conjunction with the order of consolidation, the petitioner’s reliance on the prior notice on the
deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery. These, to our mind, are avoidable omissions that, when added
respondents, as adequate opportunity for cross-examination, cannot override the non-party status of the
to the deficient handling of the present matter, add up to the gross deficiencies of the petitioner in the
respondents in Civil Case No. 0130 – the effect of consolidation being merely for trial. As non-parties,
handling of Civil Case No. 0009.
they cannot be bound by proceedings in that case. Specifically, they cannot be bound by the taking of the
Bane deposition without the consequent impairment of their right of cross-examination.148 Opportunity
for cross-examination, too, even assuming its presence, cannot be singled out as basis for the After failing to take Bane’s deposition in 1991 and in view of the peculiar circumstances of this case, the
admissibility of a former testimony or deposition since such admissibility is also anchored on the least that the petitioner could have done was to move for the taking of the Bane deposition and proceed
requisite identity of parties. To reiterate, although the Sandiganbayan considered the Bane deposition in with the deposition immediately upon securing a favorable ruling thereon. On that occasion, where the
resolving Civil Case No. 0130, its action was premised on Africa’s status as a party in that case where the respondents would have a chance to be heard, the respondents cannot avoid a resultant waiver of their
Bane deposition was taken. right of cross-examination if they still fail to appear at the deposition-taking. Fundamental fairness
dictates this course of action. It must be stressed that not only were the respondents non-parties to Civil
Case No. 0130, they likewise have no interest in Africa’s certiorari petition asserting his right as an ETPI
Corollarily, the idea of privity also permeates Rule 23 of the Rules of Court through its Section 5 which
stockholder.
provides:

Setting aside the petitioner’s flip-flopping on its own representations,151 this Court can only express
Effect of substitution of parties.  — Substitution of parties does not affect the right to use depositions
dismay on why the petitioner had to let Bane leave the Philippines before taking his deposition despite
previously taken; and, when an action has been dismissed and another action involving the same subject
having knowledge already of the substance of what he would testify on. Considering that the testimony
is afterward brought between the same parties or their representatives or successors in interest, all
of Bane is allegedly a "vital cog" in the petitioner’s case against the respondents, the Court is left to
depositions lawfully taken and duly filed in the former action may be used in the latter as if originally
wonder why the petitioner had to take the deposition in an incident case (instead of the main case) at a
taken therefor. [italics and underscoring ours]
time when it became the technical right of the petitioner to do so.

In light of these considerations, we reject the petitioner’s claim that the respondents waived their right to
V. The petitioner cannot rely on principle of judicial notice
cross-examination when they failed to attend the taking of the Bane deposition. Incidentally, the
respondents’ vigorous insistence on their right to cross-examine the deponent speaks loudly that they
never intended any waiver of this right. The petitioner also claims that since the Bane deposition had already been previously introduced and
admitted in Civil Case No. 0130, then the Sandiganbayan should have taken judicial notice of the Bane
deposition as part of its evidence.
Interestingly, the petitioner’s notice of the deposition-taking relied on Rule 23 of the Rules of Court.
Section 15 of this rule reads:
Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts that judges may properly take and act on without proof
because these facts are already known to them.152 Put differently, it is the assumption by a court of a fact
Deposition upon oral examination; notice; time and place. — A party desiring to take the deposition of
without need of further traditional evidentiary support. The principle is based on convenience and
any person upon oral examination shall give reasonable notice in writing to every other  party to the
expediency in securing and introducing evidence on matters which are not ordinarily capable of dispute
action. The notice shall state the time and place for taking the deposition and the name and address of
and are not bona fide disputed.153
each person to be examined, if known, and if the name is not known, a general description sufficient to
identify him or the particular class or group to which he belongs. On motion of any party upon whom the
notice is served, the court may for cause shown enlarge or shorten the time. The foundation for judicial notice may be traced to the civil and canon law maxim, manifesta (or
notoria) non indigent probatione.154 The taking of judicial notice means that the court will dispense with
the traditional form of presentation of evidence. In so doing, the court assumes that the matter is so
Under this provision, we do not believe that the petitioner could reasonably expect that the individual
notorious that it would not be disputed.
notices it sent to the respondents would be sufficient to bind them to the conduct of the then opponent’s
(Africa’s) cross-examination since, to begin with, they were not even parties to the action. Additionally,
we observe that in the notice of the deposition taking, conspicuously absent was any indication sufficient
The concept of judicial notice is embodied in Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. Rule 129 To recapitulate, we hold that: (1) the Sandiganbayan’s denial of the petitioner’s 3rd motion – the Motion
either requires the court to take judicial notice, inter alia, of "the official acts of the x x x judicial to Admit Supplemental Offer of Evidence (Re: Deposition of Maurice Bane) – was a legal error that did
departments of the Philippines,"155or gives the court the discretion to take judicial notice of matters not amount to grave abuse of discretion; (2) the Sandiganbayan’s refusal to reopen the case at the
"ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions."156 On the other hand, a party-litigant petitioner’s instance was tainted with grave abuse of discretion; and (3) notwithstanding the grave abuse
may ask the court to take judicial notice of any matter and the court may allow the parties to be heard on of discretion, the petition must ultimately fail as the Bane deposition is not admissible under the rules of
the propriety of taking judicial notice of the matter involved.157 In the present case, after the petitioner evidence.165
filed its Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice, the respondents were also heard through their
corresponding oppositions.
VII. Refutation of Justice Carpio’s Last Minute Modified Dissent

In adjudicating a case on trial, generally, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents
At the last minute, Justice Carpio circulated a modified dissent, quoting the Bane deposition. His
of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and
covering note states:
notwithstanding that both cases may have been tried or are actually pending before the same
judge.158 This rule though admits of exceptions.
I have revised my dissenting opinion to include the Bane deposition so that the Court and the public will
understand what the Bane deposition is all about. (underlining added)
As a matter of convenience to all the parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the original
record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending before it, when, with the
knowledge of, andabsent an objection from, the adverse party, reference is made to it for that In light of this thrust, a discussion refuting the modified dissent is in order.
purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated; or when
the original record of the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives at the
First: Contents of the Bane deposition not an Issue. The dissent perfectly identified what is at issue in this
court's direction, at the request or with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record
case – i.e., the admissibility of the Bane deposition. Admissibility is concerned with the competence and
of the case then pending.159
relevance166 of the evidence, whose admission is sought. While the dissent quoted at length the Bane
deposition, it may not be amiss to point out that the relevance of the Bane deposition (or, to adopt the
Courts must also take judicial notice of the records of another case or cases, where sufficient basis exists dissent’s characterization, whether "Maurice V. Bane is a vital witness") is not an issue here unless it can
in the records of the case before it, warranting the dismissal of the latter case.160 be established first that the Bane deposition is a competent evidence.

The issue before us does not involve the applicability of the rule on mandatory taking of judicial notice; Second: Misrepresentation of Cited Authority. The dissent insists that "in Philippine Jurisprudence, the
neither is the applicability of the rule on discretionary taking of judicial notice seriously pursued. Rather, consolidation of cases merges the different actions into one and the rights of the parties are adjudicated in
the petitioner approaches the concept of judicial notice from a genealogical perspective of treating a single judgment," citing Vicente J. Francisco. In our discussion on consolidation, we footnoted the
whatever evidence offered in any of the "children" cases – Civil Case 0130 – as evidence in the "parent" following in response to the dissent’s position, which we will restate here for emphasis:
case – Civil Case 0009 - or "of the whole family of cases."161 To the petitioner, the supposed relationship
of these cases warrants the taking of judicial notice.
In the 1966 edition of Vicente J. Francisco’s Revised Rules of Court, Francisco wrote:
162
We strongly disagree. First, the supporting cases  the petitioner cited are inapplicable either because
The effect of consolidation of actions is to unite and merge all of the different actions consolidated into a
these cases involve only a single proceeding or an exception to the rule, which proscribes the courts from
single action, in the same manner as if the different causes of actions involved had originally been joined
taking judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases.163 Second, the petitioner’s proposition
in a single action, and the order of consolidation, if made by a court of competent jurisdiction, is binding
is obviously obnoxious to a system of orderly procedure. The petitioner itself admits that the present case
upon all the parties to the different actions until it is vacated or set aside. After the consolidation there
has generated a lot of cases, which, in all likelihood, involve issues of varying complexity. If we follow
can be no further proceedings in the separate actions, which are by virtue of the consolidation
the logic of the petitioner’s argument, we would be espousing judicial confusion by indiscriminately
discontinued and superseded by a single action, which should be entitled in such manner as the court may
allowing the admission of evidence in one case, which was presumably found competent and relevant in
direct, and all subsequent proceedings therein be conducted and the rights of the parties adjudicated in a
another case, simply based on the supposed lineage of the cases. It is the duty of the petitioner, as a party-
single action (1 C.J.S., 113, pp. 1371-1372).
litigant, to properly lay before the court the evidence it relies upon in support of the relief it seeks, instead
of imposing that same duty on the court. We invite the petitioner’s attention to our prefatory
pronouncement in Lopez v. Sandiganbayan:164 At the very beginning of the discussion on consolidation of actions in the Corpus Juris Secundum, the
following caveat appears:
Down the oft-trodden path in our judicial system, by common sense, tradition and the law, the Judge in
trying a case sees only with judicial eyes as he ought to know nothing about the facts of the case, except The term consolidation is used in three different senses. First, where several actions are combined into
those which have been adduced judicially in evidence. Thus, when the case is up for trial, the judicial one and lose their separate identity and become a single action in which a single judgment is rendered;
head is empty as to facts involved and it is incumbent upon the litigants to the action to establish by second, where all except one of several actions are stayed until one is tried, in which case the judgment in
evidence the facts upon which they rely. (emphasis ours) the one is conclusive as to the others; third, where several actions are ordered to be tried together but
each retains its separate character and requires the entry of a separate judgment. The failure to distinguish
between these methods of procedure, which are entirely distinct, the two latter, strictly speaking, not
We therefore refuse, in the strongest terms, to entertain the petitioner’s argument that we should take
being consolidation, a fact which has not always been noted, has caused some confusion and conflict in
judicial notice of the Bane deposition.
the cases. (1 C.J.S., 107, pp. 1341-1342) (Emphasis added).

VI. Summation
In defining the term "consolidation of actions," Francisco provided a colatilla that the term are founded and which we cannot disregard without flirting with the violation of guaranteed substantive
"consolidation" is used in three different senses, citing 1 C.J.S. 1341 and 1 Am. Jur. 477 (Francisco, rights and without risking the disorder that these rules have sought to avert in the course of their
Revised Rules of Court, p. 348). evolution.

From the foregoing, it is clear that the dissent appears to have quoted Francisco’s statement out of In the Court En Banc deliberations of December 6, 2011, the Court failed to arrive at a conclusive
context. As it is, the issue of the effect of consolidation on evidence is at most an unsettled matter that decision because of a tie vote (7-7, with one Justice taking no part). The same vote resulted in the re-
requires the approach we did in the majority’s discussion on consolidation.167 voting of December 13, 2011. In this light, the ponencia is deemed sustained.

Third: Misappreciation of the Purpose of Consolidation. The dissent then turns to the purpose of WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit. No costs.
consolidation – to "expeditiously settle the interwoven issues involved in the consolidated cases" and
"the simplification of the proceedings." It argues that this can only be achieved if the repetition of the
SO ORDERED.
same evidence is dispensed with.

It is unfortunate that the dissent refuses to recognize the fact that since consolidation is primarily
addressed to the court concerned to aid it in dispatching its official business, it would be in keeping with
the orderly trial procedure if the court should have a say on what consolidation would actually
bring168 (especially where several cases are involved which have become relatively complex). In the
present case, there is nothing in the proceedings below that would suggest that the Sandiganbayan or the
parties themselves (the petitioner and the respondents) had in mind a consolidation beyond joint hearing
or trial. Why should this Court – which is not a trial court – impose a purported effect that has no factual
or legal grounds?

Fourth: The Due Process Consideration. The dissent argues that even if the consolidation only resulted in
a joint hearing or trial, the "respondents are still bound by the Bane deposition considering that they were
given notice of the deposition-taking." The issue here boils down to one of due process – the fundamental
reason why a hearsay statement (not subjected to the rigor of cross-examination) is generally excluded in G.R. No. 200751, August 17, 2015
the realm of admissible evidence – especially when read in light of the general rule that depositions are
not meant as substitute for the actual testimony, in open court, of a party or witness. MONICO LIGTAS, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Respondent Enrile had a pending Opposition to the notice of deposition-taking (questioning the DECISION
reasonableness thereof – an issue applicable to the rest of the respondents) which the Sandiganbayan
failed to rule on. To make the Sandiganbayan’s omission worse, the Sandiganbayan blindly relied on the
petitioner’s assertion that the deposition-taking was a matter of right and, thus, failed to address the LEONEN, J.:
consequences and/or issues that may arise from the apparently innocuous statement of the petitioner (that
it intends to use the Bane deposition in Civil Case No. 0009, where only the respondents, and not Africa, "Bakit niya babawiin ang aking saka?" tanong ni Tata Selo. "Dinaya ko na ba siya sa partihan? Tinuso
are the parties).169 There is simply the absence of "due" in due process. ko na ba siya? Siya ang may-ari ng lupa at kasama lang niya ako. Hindi ba't kaya maraming nagagalit
sa akin ay dahil sa ayaw kong magpamigay ng kahit isang pinangko kung anihan?"
Fifth: Misstatement of the Sandiganbayan’s Action. The dissent repeatedly misstates that the
Sandiganbayan "granted" the request for the deposition-taking. For emphasis, the Sandiganbayan did not Hindi pa rin umaalis sa harap ng istaked si Tata Selo. Nakahawak pa rin siya sa rehas. Nakatingin siya
"grant" the request since the petitioner staunchly asserted that the deposition-taking was a matter of right. sa labas ngunit wala siyang sino mang tinitingnan.
No one can deny the complexity of the issues that these consolidated cases have reached. Considering the
consolidation of cases of this nature, the most minimum of fairness demands upon the petitioner to move "Binabawi po niya ang aking saka," sumbong ni Tata Selo. "Saan papo ako pupunta kung wala na akong
for the taking of the Bane deposition and for the Sandiganbayan to make a ruling thereon (including the saka?"
opposition filed by respondent Enrile which equally applies to his co-respondents). The burgeoning
omission and failures that have prevailed in this case cannot be cured by this Court without itself being Habang nakakapit sa rehas at nakatingin sa labas, sinasabi niyang lahat ay kinuha na sa kanila, lahat,
guilty of violating the constitutional guarantee of due process. ay! ang lahat ay kinuha na sa kanila. 

- "TataSelo" (1963) by Rogelio R. Sikat

Sixth: Issues Posed and Resolved Go Beyond Technicalities. The above conclusions, contrary to the The uncontested declaration of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board that Monico
petitioner’s claim, are not only matters of technicality. Admittedly, rules of procedure involve Ligtas was a tenant negates a finding of theft beyond reasonable doubt. Tenants having rights to the
technicality, to which we have applied the liberality that technical rules deserve. But the resolution of the harvest cannot be deemed to have taken their own produce.
issues raised goes beyond pure or mere technicalities as the preceding discussions show. They involve
issues of due process and basic unfairness to the respondents, particularly to respondent Enrile, who is This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Court of
portrayed in the Bane deposition to be acting in behalf of the Marcoses so that these shares should be Appeals Decision2dated March 16, 2010 and the Resolution3 dated February 2, 2012.4 The Court of
deemed to be those of the Marcoses. They involved, too, principles upon which our rules of procedure Appeals affirmed the Decision5 of the Regional Trial Court finding Monico Ligtas (Ligtas) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of theft.6
In the Decision dated August 16, 2006, the Regional Trial Court held that "the prosecution was able to
Ligtas was charged with the crime of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.7 The prove the elements of theft[.]"30 Ligtas' "defense of tenancy was not supported by concrete and
Information provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary substantial evidence nor was his claim of harvest sharing between him and [Anecita Pacate] duly
That on or about the 29th day of June 2000 at Sitio Lamak, Barangay San Juan, Municipality of Sogod, corroborated by any witness."31 His "defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification ... by
Province of Southern Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- prosecution witnesses."32
named accused, with intent of gain, entered into the abaca plantation belonging to one Anecita Pacate,
and once inside the plantation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously harvested 1,000 The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
kilos of abaca fibers, valued at Php29,000.00 at Php29.00 per kilo, without the consent of said owner, WHEREFORE, finding the accused Monico Ligtas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Theft,
Anecita Pacate, to her damage and prejudice in the aforestated amount of Twenty Nine Thousand Pesos this court hereby renders judgment, sentencing him:
(Php29,000.00), Philippine currency.
1. To suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days as
CONTRARY TO LAW.8ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
minimum to eight (8) years and eight (8) months as maximum;cralawlawlibrary
Ligtas pleaded not guilty.9

The prosecution presented five (5) witnesses during trial: Efren Cabero (Cabero), Modesto Cipres 2. To indemnify the offende[d] party:
(Cipres), Anecita Pacate, SPO2 Enrique Villaruel, and Ernesto Pacate.10 a. The amount of P29,000.00 for the value of the abaca stole[n];cralawlawlibrary

According to the prosecution witnesses, Anecita Pacate was the owner of an abaca plantation situated at b. The amount of P5000.00 as moral damages;cralawlawlibrary
Sitio Lamak, Barangay San Juan, Sogod, Southern Leyte. On June 29, 2000, Cabero, the plantation's
administrator, and several men, including Cipres, went to the plantation to harvest abaca upon Anecita c. The amount of P10,000.00 as litigation expenses/attorney's fees;cralawlawlibrary
Pacate's instructions. At about 10:00 a.m., Cabero and his men were surprised to find Ligtas harvesting
abaca at the plantation. Ligtas was accompanied by three (3) unidentified men. Allegedly, Ligtas
threatened that there would be loss of life if they persisted in harvesting the abaca. Cabero reported the
incident to Anecita Pacate and the police.11
3. To pay the costs.
On July 2, 2000, Cabero and Cipres went back to the plantation and conducted a survey on the condition
of the plantation. They found that 1,000 kilos of abaca, valued at P28.00 per kilo, were harvested by
Ligtas.12 SO ORDERED.33ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On July 3, 2000, Ligtas and Anecita Pacate confronted each other before the Sogod Police I
Station.13 Ligtas admitted to harvesting the abaca but claimed that he was the plantation owner.14
The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court.34 According to it, "the burden to prove the
The defense presented three (3) witnesses during trial: Ligtas; Pablo Palo, his neighbor; and Delia Ligtas, existence of the tenancy relationship"35 belonged to Ligtas. He was not able to establish all the essential
his wife.15According to Ligtas, he had been a tenant of Anecita Pacate and her late husband, Andres elements of a tenancy agreement.36
Pacate since 1993.16 Andres Pacate installed him as tenant of the 1.5 to two hectares of land involved in
the criminal case.17 The Court of Appeals declared that Ligtas' reliance on the DARAB Decision "declaring him as a
bonafide tenant of the . . . land is irrelevant in the case at bar":37
Ligtas allegedly "made his first harvest in 1997."18 He then gave Anecita Pacate her share to the Jurisprudence is replete with cases declaring that "findings of or certifications issued by the Secretary of
harvest.19 However, he could not remember the exact amount anymore.20 Previously, Ligtas and Pablo Agrarian Reform, or his authorized representative, in a given locality concerning the presence or absence
Palo were workers in another land, around 15 hectares, owned by Anecita Pacate and Andres Pacate.21 of a tenancy relationship between the contending parties, are merely preliminary or provisional and are
not binding upon the courts.["]38ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Ligtas alleged that on June 28, 2000, Anecita Pacate sent workers to harvest abaca from the land he As to the ownership of the land, the Court of Appeals held that Ligtas had taken conflicting positions.
cultivated. Ligtas prevented the men from harvesting the abaca since he was the rightful tenant of the While he claimed to be a legitimate tenant, Ligtas also assailed Anecita Pacate's title over the land. Under
land.22 Rule 131, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, a tenant cannot deny the title of his or her landlord at the time
of the commencement of the tenancy relation.39
Furthermore, Ligtas denied harvesting abaca at the plantation on June 29, 2000. He claimed that he was
with Cabero and Cipres attending a barangay fiesta at Sitio Hubasan, San Juan, Sogod, Southern Leyte, The Court of Appeals remained unconvinced as to Ligtas' allegations on ownership. "He claims that the
when the alleged harvesting happened.23 parcel of land owned by [Anecita Pacate] is different from the subject abaca land. However, such
assertion was based merely on the testimony of the municipal assessor, not an expert competent to
Meanwhile, Ligtas filed a Complaint before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board identify parcels of land."40
(DARAB) of Sogod, Southern Leyte for Maintenance of Peaceful Possession on November 21,
2000.24 On January 22, 2002, the DARAB rendered the Decision25 ruling that Ligtas was a bona fide More importantly, the Court of Appeals ruled that Ligtas committed theft by harvesting abaca from
tenant of the land.26 Anecita Pacate's plantation.41 Ligtas had constructive possession of the subject of the theft without the
owner's consent.42 "The subject of the crime need not be carried away or actually taken out from the land
While records are bereft as to when the DARAB Decision was formally offered as evidence before the in order to consummate the crime of theft."43
trial court, records are clear that the DARAB Decision was considered by both the trial court27 and Court
of Appeals28 and without any objection on the part of the People of the Philippines.29 Furthermore, Ligtas' argument that the abaca did not constitute as personal property under the meaning of
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code was erroneous.44 Following the definition of personal property, the when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites
abaca hemp was "capable of appropriation [and] [could] be sold and carried away from one place to calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and
another."45 The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's finding that about 1,000 kilos of abaca were relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to the whole,
already harvested.46 Hence, all the elements of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code were and the probability of the situation.61 (Emphasis supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
sufficiently established by the prosecution. Petitioner admits that the Petition raises substantially factual issues that are beyond the scope of the Rule
he seeks redress from.62 However, there are exceptions to the rule that only questions of law should be
The Court of Appeals ruled that Ligtas' defense of alibi could not excuse him from criminal the subject of a petition for review under Rule 45:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
liability.47 His alibi was doubtfully established. "[W]here an accused's alibi is established only by (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures, (2) when the
himself, his relatives and friends, his denial of culpability should be accorded the strictest scrutiny."48 inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible, (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion,
(4) when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts, (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting,
Ligtas' attack on the credibility of the witnesses did not prosper.49 He failed to show that the case was (6) when in making its findings, the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to
initiated only through Anecita Pacate's quest for revenge or to ensure that Ligtas would be evicted from the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee, (7) when the CA's findings are contrary to those by
the land.50 the trial court, (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they
are based, (9) when the acts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are
The Court of Appeals dismissed Ligtas' appeal and affirmed the trial court's Decision finding Ligtas not disputed by the respondent, (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.51 The dispositive evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record, or (11) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain
portion of the Decision reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different
WHEREFORE, the instant Appeal is DISMISSED. Accordingly, the assailed Decision dated . . . conclusion.63 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
August 16, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Sogod, Southern Leyte, Branch 39, in Criminal Case No. This court has held before that a re-examination of the facts of the case is justified "when certain material
R-225, finding accused-appellant Monico Ligtas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Theft under Article facts and circumstances had been overlooked by the trial court which, if taken into account, would alter
308 of the Revised Penal Code, is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects. the result of the case in that they would introduce an element of reasonable doubt which would entitle the
accused to acquittal."64
SO ORDERED.52ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Ligtas filed a Motion for Reconsideration,53 which the Court of Appeals denied on February 2, 2012.54 The issue of tenancy, in that whether a person is an agricultural tenant or not, is generally a question of
fact.65 To be precise, however, the existence of a tenancy relationship is a legal conclusion based on facts
II presented corresponding to the statutory elements of tenancy.66

On April 4, 2012, Ligtas filed this Petition assailing the Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution.55 This The Court of Appeals committed reversible error in its assailed Decision when it held that all the
court required People of the Philippines to file its Comment on the Petition within 10 days from notice.56 essential elements of the crime of theft were duly proven by the prosecution despite petitioner having
been pronounced a bona fide tenant of the land from which he allegedly stole.67 A review of the records
The issues for consideration of this court are: of the case is, thus, proper to arrive at a just and equitable resolution.

First, whether questions of fact may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the IV
Rules of Court;cralawlawlibrary
Petitioner claims that private complainant's filing of criminal charges was motivated by ill will and
Second, whether the DARAB Decision, finding petitioner Monico Ligtas as tenant of the land owned by revenge.68 The charges were designed to remove petitioner from the land he has legitimately occupied as
private complainant Anecita Pacate and located at Sitio Lamak, Barangay San Juan, Sogod, Southern tenant.69 Telling is the fact that petitioner filed his Complaint before the DARAB on November 21, 2000,
Leyte is conclusive or can be taken judicial notice of in a criminal case for theft; and while the Information for Theft was filed on December 8, 2000.70

Third, whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when it upheld the conviction of Petitioner argues that he has sufficiently established his status as private complainant's tenant.71 The
petitioner Monico Ligtas for theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. DARAB Decision is entitled to respect, even finality, as the Department of Agrarian Reform is the
administrative agency vested with primary jurisdiction and has acquired expertise on matters relating to
The Petition is meritorious. tenancy relationship.72

III The findings of the DARAB were also supported by substantial evidence.73 To require petitioner to prove
tenancy relationship through evidence other than the DARAB Decision and the testimonies of the
Petitioner argues that the findings of fact of both the trial court and Court of Appeals must be revisited witnesses is absurd and goes beyond the required quantum of evidence, which is substantial evidence.74
for being "conclusions without citation of specific evidence on record and premised on the supposed
absence of evidence on the claim of petitioner [as] tenant."57 Also, according to petitioner, the DARAB Decision has attained finality since private complainant did
not file an appeal. The DARAB's finding as to the parties' tenancy relationship constitutes as res
Only questions of law are allowed in a petition for review under Rule 4558 of the Rules of Court.59 Factual judicata.75
findings of the Regional Trial Court are conclusive and binding on this court when affirmed by the Court
of Appeals.60 This court has differentiated between a question of law and question of On the other hand, respondent argues that the Court of Appeals correctly disregarded the DARAB
fact:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary Decision.76 The trial court could not have taken judicial notice of the DARAB
A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or Decision:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative While the DARAB . . . ruled that petitioner is a bonafide tenant of Pacate, courts are not authorized to
value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact exists take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases even when such cases have been tried or
are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are 3. Ordering the respondent to pay plaintiff the amount of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos
actually pending before the same judge.77 (Citation omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary representing the expenses incurred by plaintiff in vindicating his right and other actual
Moreover, according to respondent, petitioner invokes conflicting defenses: that there is a legitimate expenses incurred in this litigation.
tenancy relationship between him and private complainant and that he did not take the abaca
hemp.78 Nevertheless, respondent maintains that petitioner failed to prove all the essential elements of a
Other relief sought are hereby ordered dismissed for lack of evidence.
tenancy relationship between him and private complainant.79Private complainant did not consent to the
alleged tenancy relationship.80 Petitioner also failed to provide evidence as to any sharing of harvest
No cost. 
between the parties.81
SO DECIDED.84ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
We hold that a DARAB decision on the existence of a tenancy relationship is conclusive and binding on
Private complainant did not appeal the DARAB's findings.
courts if supported by substantial evidence.
Findings of fact of administrative agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial powers are entitled to
Generally, decisions in administrative cases are not binding on criminal proceedings. This court has ruled
respect if supported by substantial evidence.85 This court is not tasked to weigh again "the evidence
in a number of cases that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
submitted before the administrative body and to substitute its own judgment [as to] the sufficiency of
It is indeed a fundamental principle of administrative law that administrative cases are independent from
evidence."86
criminal actions for the same act or omission. Thus, an absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to
an administrative prosecution, or vice versa. One thing is administrative liability; quite another thing is
the criminal liability for the same act. V

.... The DARAB is the quasi-judicial tribunal that has the primary jurisdiction to determine whether there is
a tenancy relationship between adverse parties.87 This court has held that "judicial determinations [of the
Thus, considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the procedure followed and the a DARAB] have the same binding effect as judgments and orders of a regular judicial body."88 Disputes
sanctions imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one should under the jurisdiction of the DARAB include controversies relating to:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
not necessarily be binding on the other. Notably, the evidence presented in the administrative case may tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to
not necessarily be the same evidence to be presented in the criminal cases.82 (Emphasis supplied, citations agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in
omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial
However, this case does not involve an administrative charge stemming from the same set of facts arrangements.89ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
involved in a criminal proceeding. This is not a case where one act results in both criminal and In Salazar v. De Leon,90 this court upheld the Department of Agrarian Reform's primary jurisdiction over
administrative liability. DARAB Case No. VIII-319-SL-2000 involves a determination of whether there agrarian disputes, which includes the relationship between landowners and tenants.91 The DARAB
exists a tenancy relationship between petitioner and private complainant, while Criminal Case No. R-225 Decision is conclusive and binding on courts when supported by substantial evidence.92 This court ruled
involves determination of whether petitioner committed theft. However, the tenancy relationship is a that administrative res judicata exists in that case:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
factor in determining whether all the elements of theft were proven by the prosecution. Significantly, respondent did not appeal the Decision dated 17 November 1995 of the DARAB in
DARAB Case # II-380-ISA'94; consequently, the same has attained finality and constitutes res
In its Decision dated January 22, 2002, the DARAB found:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary judicata on the issue of petitioner's status as a tenant of respondent.
All the necessary requisites in order to establish tenancy relationship as required in the above-quoted
Supreme Court ruling, has been established by the evidence submitted by plaintiff; And these evidences Res judicata is a concept applied in the review of lower court decisions in accordance with the hierarchy
were not controverted by any evidence submitted by the respondent. of courts. But jurisprudence has also recognized the rule of administrative res judicata: "The rule which
forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the
In fine, this board found plaintiff a bonafide tenant of the land in question and as such is entitled to a judicial and quasi-judicial facts of public, executive or administrative officers and boards acting within
security of tenure, in which case he shall not be dispossessed of his holdings by the landowner except for their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers. It has been declared that
any of the causes provided by law and only after the same has been proved before, and the dispossession whenever final adjudication of persons invested with power to decide on the property and rights of the
is authorized by the Court and in the judgment that is final and executory[.]83 (Citations citizen is examinable by the Supreme Court, upon a writ of error or a certiorari , such final adjudication
omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary may be pleaded as res judicata." To be sure, early jurisprudence was already mindful that the doctrine
The dispositive portion of the DARAB Decision provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary of  res judicata cannot be said to apply exclusively to decisions rendered by what are usually understood
WHEREFORE, premises being considered, judgment is hereby rendered, finding Monico Ligtas a as courts without unreasonably circumscribing the scope thereof; and that the more equitable attitude is
bonafide tenant of the land subject in this case and well described in paragraph three (3) in the complaint, to allow extension of the defense to decisions of bodies upon whom judicial powers have been
and ordering as follows, to wit: conferred.93 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Encinas v. Agustin, Jr.,94 this court clarified that res judicata applies only to decisions rendered by
agencies in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to purely administrative
1. The respondent and all other persons acting for and in her behalf to maintain plaintiff in the proceedings:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
peaceful possession of the land in dispute;cralawlawlibrary The CA was correct in ruling that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial
proceedings, and not to the exercise of administrative powers. Administrative powers here refer to those
2. The MARO of Sogod, Southern Leyte, and concurrently the cluster Manager of Sogod Bay purely administrative in nature, as opposed to administrative proceedings that take on a quasi-judicial
DAR Cluster to call the parties and assist them in the execution of a leasehold contract character.
covering the land in dispute, and for the parties to respect and obey such call of the said
MARO in compliance with the legal mandate. In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves (a) taking and evaluating evidence; (b)
determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision supported by
the facts proved. The exercise of quasi-judicial functions involves a determination, with respect to the
matter in controversy, of what the law is; what the legal rights and obligations of the contending parties case, i.e., DARAB Case No. 062-Bul '89, which have been resolved with finality, may not be litigated
are; and based thereon and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of the respective rights and obligations of anew.
the parties.95 (Citations omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
We find it necessary to clarify the two concepts of res judicata: bar by prior judgment and The instant case is complicated by the failure of the complainant to include Martillano as party-defendant
conclusiveness of judgment. In Social Security Commission v. Rizal Poultry and Livestock Association, in the case before the adjudication board and the DARAB, although he was finally impleaded on appeal
Inc., et al.,96 this court discussed and differentiated the two concepts of res before the Court of Appeals.
judicata:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Res judicata embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment as enunciated in Rule 39, Section 47(b) of The belated inclusion of Martillano as respondent in the petition will not affect the applicability of the
the Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) conclusiveness of judgment in Rule 39, Section 47(c). doctrine of bar by prior judgment. What is decisive is that the issues which have already been litigated in
a final and executory judgment precludes, by the principle of bar by prior judgment, an aspect of the
There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first case where the judgment was rendered and doctrine of res judicata, and even under the doctrine of "law of the case," the re-litigation of the same
the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of issue in another action. It is well established that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and
action. In this instance, the judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the second action. determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive
upon the parties and those in privity with them. The dictum therein laid down became the law of the case
But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no identity of causes of action, the and what was once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision, continues to be
first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined binding between the same parties as long as the facts on which the decision was predicated, continue to
and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is the concept of res judicata known as be the facts of the case before the court.Hence, the binding effect and enforceability of that dictum can no
"conclusiveness of judgment." Stated differently, any right, fact or matter in issue directly adjudicated or longer be resurrected anew since said issue had already been resolved and finally laid to rest, if not by the
necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is principle of res judicata, at least by conclusiveness of judgment.102 (Emphasis supplied, citations
rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
between the parties and their privies, whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the In Co v. People, et al.,103 this court held that "the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment also applies in
two actions is the same. criminal cases."104Petitioner in that case was charged with the violation of Republic Act No. 1161, as
amended, for the alleged non-remittance of Social Security System contributions.105 This court upheld the
Thus, if a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on findings of the National Labor Relations Commission in a separate case, which declared the absence of
the determination of that particular point or question, a former judgment between the same parties or an employer-employee relationship and had attained finality.106 This court held
their privies will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
adjudicated in the first suit. Identity of cause of action is not required but merely identity of issue. The reasons for establishing the principle of "collusiveness of judgment" are founded on sound public
policy. ... It is allowable to reason back from a judgment to the basis on which it stands, upon the obvious
The elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the principle that where a conclusion is indisputable, and could have been drawn only from certain premises,
decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; the premises are equally indisputable with the conclusion. When a fact has been once determined in the
(3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be as between the course of a judicial proceeding, and a final judgment has been rendered in accordance therewith, it cannot
first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. Should identity of parties, be again litigated between the same parties without virtually impeaching the correctness of the former
subject matter, and causes of action be shown in the two cases, then res judicata  in its aspect as a "bar decision, which, from motives of public policy, the law does not permit to be done.
by prior judgment" would apply. If as between the two cases, only identity of parties can be shown, but
not identical causes of action, then res judicata as "conclusiveness of judgment" applies.97 (Emphasis Res judicata has two concepts. The first is bar by prior judgment under Rule 39, Section 47 (b), and the
supplied, citations omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary second is conclusiveness of judgment under Rule 39, Section 47 (c). Both concepts are founded on the
In Martillano v. Court of Appeals,98 the DARAB Decision finding for the existence of a tenancy principle of estoppel, and are based on the salutary public policy against unnecessary multiplicity of
relationship between the parties was declared by this court as conclusive on the parties.99 As in this case, suits. Like the splitting of causes of action, res judicata is in pursuance of such policy. Matters settled by
the DARAB Decision100 in Martillano attained finality when the landowner did not appeal the a Court's final judgment should not be litigated upon or invoked again. Relitigation of issues already
Decision.101 This court ruled that the doctrine of res judicataapplies:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary settled merely burdens the Courts and the taxpayers, creates uneasiness and confusion, and wastes
Under the afore-cited sections of RA 6657, the Department of Agrarian Reform is empowered, through valuable time and energy that could be devoted to worthier cases.107 (Citations
its adjudicating arm the regional and provincial adjudication boards, to resolve agrarian disputes and omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
controversies on all matters pertaining to the implementation of the agrarian law. Section 51 thereof In VHJ Construction and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,108 this court ruled that tenancy
provides that the decision of the DARAB attains finality after the lapse of fifteen (15) days and no appeal relationship must be duly proven:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
was interposed therefrom by any of the parties. [A] tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. There must be evidence to prove this allegation. The
principal factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent. Tenancy is not a purely
In the instant case, the determination of the DARAB in DARAB Case No. 062-Bul '89, there being no factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal
appeal interposed therefrom, attained finality. Accordingly, the matter regarding the status of Martillano relationship.109(Citation omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
as a tenant farmer and the validity of the CLT and Emancipation Patents issued in his favor are settled The DARAB, in DARAB Case No. VIII-319-SL-2000, held that all the essential elements of a tenancy
and no longer open to doubt and controversy. relationship were proven by petitioner.110 It found that there was substantial evidence to support
petitioner's claim as tenant of the land.111 In rendering the Decision, the DARAB examined pleadings and
.... affidavits of both petitioner and private complainant.112 It was convinced by petitioner's evidence, which
consisted of sworn statements of petitioner's witnesses that petitioner was installed as tenant by Andres
We recall that DARAB Case 062-Bul '89 was for the cancellation of petitioner's CLT and Emancipation Pacate sometime in 1993.113 Petitioner and Andres Pacate had an agreement to share the produce after
patents. The same effect is sought with the institution of DARAB Case No. 512-Bul '94, which is an harvest.114 However, Andres Pacate had died before the first harvest.115 Petitioner then gave the
action to withdraw and/or cancel administratively the CLT and Emancipation Patents issued to petitioner. landowner's share to private complainant, and had done so every harvest until he was disturbed in his
Considering that DARAB Case 062-Bul '89 has attained finality prior to the filing of DARAB Case No. cultivation of the land on June 29, 2000.116
512-Bul '94, no strenuous legal interpretation is necessary to understand that the issues raised in the prior
We emphasize that after filing her Answer before the DARAB, private complainant failed to heed the which he bases his claim, the respondent is under no obligation to prove his exception or defense....
Notices sent to her and refused to attend the scheduled hearings.117 The DARAB even quoted in its
Decision the reason offered by private complainant's counsel in his Motion to Withdraw as Neither was it shown to the satisfaction of this Court that there existed a sharing of harvests in the
counsel:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary context of a tenancy relationship between petitioners and/or their predecessors-in-interest and
That as early as the preliminary hearings of the case, the respondent has already shown her intention not JOSEFINA. Jurisprudence is illuminating to the effect that to prove such sharing of harvests, a receipt or
to participate the proceedings of the case for reasons known only to her;cralawlawlibrary any other evidence must be presented. None was shown. No receipts were presented as testaments to the
claimed sharing of harvests. The only evidence submitted to establish the purported sharing of harvests
That despite the advi[c]e of the undersigned, respondent stood pat with her decision not to participate in was the testimony of petitioner Rodolfo Rollo. The sharing arrangement cannot be deemed to have
the proceedings of the case;cralawlawlibrary existed on the basis alone of petitioner Rodolfo Rollo's claim. It is self-serving and is without evidentiary
value. Self-serving statements are deemed inadequate; competent proof must be adduced. If at all, the
That in view of this predicament, the undersigned can do nothing except to withdraw as he is now fact alone of sharing is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship.
withdrawing as counsel for the respondent of the above-entitled casef.]118ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
It is true that trial courts are not mandated to take judicial notice of decisions of other courts or even We also sustain the conclusion reached by the Provincial Adjudicator and the Court of Appeals that the
records of other cases that have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge.119 In testimony of Araceli Pascua, an employee of the DAR in Victoria, Tarlac, that the subject landholding
declaring that the DARAB's findings on the tenancy relationship between petitioner and private was tenanted cannot overcome substantial evidence to the contrary. To prove the alleged tenancy no
complainant are immaterial to the criminal case for theft, the Court of Appeals120 relied on Rollo, et al. v. reliance may be made upon the said public officer's testimony. What cannot be ignored is the precedent
Leal Realty Centrum Co., Inc., et al.121 ruling of this Court that the findings of or certifications issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, or
his authorized representative, in a given locality concerning the presence or absence of a tenancy
In Rollo, petitioners, who were farmers of a 21-hectare agricultural land in Tarlac that was principally relationship between the contending parties, are merely preliminary or provisional and are not binding
devoted to sugar and rice and who claim the rights of their predecessors-in-interest, filed separate upon the courts. This ruling holds with greater effect in the instant case in light of the fact that
Complaints before the Provincial Adjudication Board of Region III in Tarlac, Tarlac. They claimed that petitioners, as herein shown, were not able to prove the presence of all the indispensable elements of
when the registered owner of the land, Josefina Roxas Omaña, sold the land to respondents, respondents tenancy.130 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
were aware of the tenancy relationship between petitioners and Josefina Roxas Omaña.122 Thus, in Rollo, this court did not categorically hold that the DARAB's findings were merely provisional
and, thus, not binding on courts. What was deemed as a preliminary determination of tenancy was the
Respondents offered a compensation package to petitioners in exchange for the renunciation of their testimony of the Department of Agrarian Reform employee stating that the land involved was tenanted.
tenancy rights under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. However, they failed to comply with Further, the tribunals had conflicting findings on whether petitioners were bona fide tenants.
their obligations under the terms of the compensation package.123 Petitioners then filed a series of
Complaints before the DARAB. The cases were consolidated and resolved by the Provincial In this case, records are bereft as to whether private complainant appealed the DARAB Decision. Thus, it
Adjudicator.124 is presumed that the Decision has long lapsed into finality.131 It is also established that private
complainant participated in the initial stages of the DARAB proceedings.132 Therefore, the issue of the
The Provincial Adjudicator ruled, among other things, that "there was no tenancy relationship [that] existence of a tenancy relationship is final as between the parties. We cannot collaterally review the
existed between the parties."125 He found that petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest were mere DARAB's findings at this stage. The existence of the final Decision that tenancy exists creates serious
hired laborers, not tenants. Tenancy cannot be presumed from respondents' offer of a compensation doubts as to the guilt of the accused.
package.126
VI
On appeal, the DARAB reversed the Decision of the Provincial Adjudicator. It found that there was an
implied tenancy between the parties. Petitioners were deemed tenants of the land for more than 30 years. According to petitioner, the elements of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code were not
They were entitled to security of tenure.127 established since he was a bona fide tenant of the land.133 The DARAB's recognition of petitioner as a
legitimate tenant necessarily "implie[d] that he ha[d] the authority to harvest the abaca hemp from
The Court of Appeals reversed the DARAB Decision and reinstated the Provincial Adjudicator's [private complainant's land]."134 This shows that petitioner had no criminal intent.
Decision. It held that there was no substantial evidence to prove that all the requisites of tenancy
relationship existed. However, despite the lack of tenancy relationship, the compensation package As to the existence of another element of theft—that the taking was done without the consent of the
agreement must be upheld.128 owner—petitioner argues that this, too, was negated by his status as private complainant's
tenant:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
This court affirmed the Court of Appeals Decision.129 It held that petitioners failed to overcome the The purported lack of consent on the part of the private complainant as alleged by the prosecution, is
burden of proving the existence of a tenancy relationship:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary misplaced. In fact, it was even improper for Anecita Pacate to stop or prevent petitioner from harvesting
At the outset, the parties do not appear to be the landowner and the tenants. While it appears that there the produce of the landholding because as tenant, petitioner is entitled to security of tenure. This right
was personal cultivation by petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest of the subject landholding, what entitled him to continue working on his landholding until the leasehold relation is terminated or until his
was established was that petitioners' claim of tenancy was founded on the self-serving testimony of eviction is authorized by the DARAB in a judgment that is final and executory.135 (Citation
petitioner Rodolfo Rollo that his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the landholding for omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
more than 30 years and had engaged in a "50-50" sharing scheme with JOSEFINA and JOSEFINA's Petitioner argues that the constitutional presumption of innocence must be
grandmother, the previous owner thereof. Self-serving statements in pleadings are inadequate; proof must upheld:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
be adduced. Such claims do not suffice absent concrete evidence to support them. The burden rests on the Well-settled is the rule that where "inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
shoulders of petitioners to prove their affirmative allegation of tenancy, which burden they failed to explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with
discharge with substantial evidence. Such a juridical tie must be aptly shown. Simply put, he who alleges his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a
the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and from the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of conviction." In acquitting an appellant, we are not saying that he is lily-white, or pure as driven snow.
proof never parts. The same rule applies to administrative cases. In fact, if the complainant, upon whom Rather, we are declaring his innocence because the prosecution's evidence failed to show his guilt beyond
rests the burden of proving his cause of action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon
reasonable doubt. For that is what the basic law requires. Where the evidence is insufficient to overcome proven guilty.145 "[I]t is better to acquit ten guilty individuals than to convict one innocent
the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, then his "acquittal must follow in faithful person."146 Thus, courts must consider "[e]very circumstance against guilt and in favor of
obeisance to the fundamental law."136 (Citations omitted) innocence[.]"147 Equally settled is that "[w]here the evidence admits of two interpretations, one of which
The Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the findings of the trial court finding petitioner guilty is consistent with guilt, and the other with innocence, the accused must be given the benefit of doubt and
beyond reasonable doubt of theft. should be acquitted."148

Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary In view of petitioner's acquittal based on reasonable doubt, we find it unnecessary to discuss further the
ARTICLE. 308. Who are Liable for Theft. — Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain other errors raised by petitioner.
but without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal
property of another without the latter's consent. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated March 16, 2010 and
the Resolution dated February 2, 2012 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Monico Ligtas
Theft is likewise committed by: is ACQUITTED of the crime of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. If detained, he is
ordered immediately RELEASED, unless he is confined for any other lawful cause. Any amount paid by
way of a bailbond is ordered RETURNED.
1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same to the local
authorities or to its owner;cralawlawlibrary
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of another, shall remove or
make use of the fruits or object of the damage caused by him; and

3. Any person who shall enter an enclosed estate or a field where trespass is forbidden or which
belongs to another and without the consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish upon the same or
shall gather fruits, cereals, or other forest or farm products.

The essential elements of theft are: (1) taking of personal property; (2) the property taken belongs to
another; (3) the taking was done without the owner's consent; (4) there was intent to gain; and (5) the
taking was done without violence against or intimidation of the person or force upon things.137

Tenants have been defined as:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

persons who — in themselves and with the aid available from within their immediate farm households —
cultivate the land belonging to or possessed by another, with the latter's consent, for purposes of
production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the
landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce or money or both under the leasehold tenancy
system.138 (Citation omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Under this definition, a tenant is entitled to the products of the land he or she cultivates. The landowner's
share in the produce depends on the agreement between the parties. Hence, the harvesting done by the
tenant is with the landowner's consent.

The existence of the DARAB Decision adjudicating the issue of tenancy between petitioner and private
complainant negates the existence of the element that the taking was done without the owner's consent.
The DARAB Decision implies that petitioner had legitimate authority to harvest the abaca. The
prosecution, therefore, failed to establish all the elements of theft.

In Pit-og v. People,139 this court acquitted petitioner of theft of sugarcane and banana crops on the basis
of reasonable doubt.140 The prosecution failed to prove lack of criminal intent on petitioner's part.141 It
failed to clearly identify "the person who, as a result of a criminal act, without his knowledge and
consent, was wrongfully deprived of a thing belonging to him."142 There were doubts as to whether the
plants taken by petitioner were indeed planted on private complainant's lot when petitioner had planted
her own plants adjacent to it.143 Thus, it was not proven beyond reasonable doubt that the property
belonged to private complainant. This court found that petitioner "took the sugarcane and bananas
believing them to be her own. That being the case, she could not have had a criminal intent."144

In this case, petitioner harvested the abaca, believing that he was entitled to the produce as a legitimate
tenant cultivating the land owned by private complainant. Personal property may have been taken, but it
is with the consent of the owner.

No less than the Constitution provides that the accused shall be presumed innocent of the crime until