FLT OPS BOEING

Emirates COLD WEATHER Briefing 2006/2007

NOTE; FOM, FCOM and OM-C
(as amended by FCI or NOTAM)
remain primary references In this year’s issue;
• Do You Make These Mistakes?
• Potential Strategy for Avoiding
Welcome to the Cold Weather Briefing package Significant Departure Delays
for 06/07. The information contained in this • Emirates De / Anti-Icing Quiz
document is provided as background information • FCOM 2 Contaminated Runway
for Emirates pilots operating in the coming winter
season. Guidance and Examples [Airbus]
• Report; Engines-On De-Icing Accident
• De / Anti-Icing Quiz Answers
‘Partial De-Icing’ Treatment /
‘Local Wing Frost Removal’
Do You Make These Mistakes
Last season, some of you may have experienced When De/Anti-Icing?
reluctance on the part of service providers to de-
ice small areas of wing frost that had formed due
De/Anti-icing with engines running,
to cold-soaked fuel. Despite communication of
our requirements, certain service providers would
at a non- approved station
Due to safety and legal requirements, we are only
not conform to our request. Significant fluid
allowed to conduct engines-running de/anti-icing
wastage and delays occurred.
where specifically mentioned in Company
documents (OM-C). The risks of getting something
wrong with people on the ground that don’t have the
This season, we’re glad to report, you should not
necessary training are too great. Don’t be fooled by
have a repeat experience. The Association of
ground crew telling you special authorization isn’t
European Airlines (AEA), which publishes the
required.
fluid application guidelines most service providers
in Europe follow, has clearly stated this is an
approved procedure. If you request ‘local wing
When no precipitation is occurring or
frost removal’ (and we recommend you use that forecast, applying an anti-icing layer
term) and encounter refusal by a service provider, (undiluted Type II or IV fluid)
please mention it on the Voyage Report and Flt If there’s no snow or ice contaminant falling, and
Ops will look into the matter. none remotely likely to occur before takeoff, there’s
no reason to apply anti-icing fluid. If it’s a clear day
and you just need to remove snow that accumulated
while parked a few hours ago, why waste money and
cause delay while ground crew apply an expensive
layer of protection you don’t need? All that’s
required in this case is de-icing, rather than anti-icing.
Don’t be fooled by protection you don’t need, on a
cold but sunny day.
The Emirates Cold Weather Briefing is
777 arrives on a significantly wet runway produced by Emirates Flight Operations.

Questions or comments may be directed to;

Fleet Technical Pilots
 2006, Emirates Flight Operations1
Do You Make These Mistakes When shortest time in the Holdover Time in
De/Anti-Icing? …continued the range has been reached
If precipitation has occurred, Emirates
Not ensuring all people and equipment procedure is to perform a Pre-takeoff
are clear, before taxi Contamination Inspection (PCI) after the
A notorious industry event occurred in shortest time in the holdover table cell has
Montreal, Canada - January 1995 (see article in been reached. Some operators allow crew to
this package). A 747 began to move from the guess their own ‘estimated’ time based on the
de-icing facility while a de-icing crew were still crew judgement of precipitation type, intensity
spraying the tail of the aircraft. Three of the de- and other conditions. Because of the large
icing crew were killed when they hit the ground, number of variables including the diverse
after falling from vehicle de-icing buckets. This nature of our crews, we don’t believe this to
is one example showing how critical it is to be be appropriate. Emirates provides crews with
absolutely sure all people and equipment are holdover tables that have published times for
clear before you start to taxi. And why EK light snow and moderate snow, relieving
guidance is so specific in this regard. Don’t be crews of the burden to interpolate or guess.
fooled by a clearance to taxi from ATC. It’s Don’t be fooled by procedures at other
not the same thing as clearance from the de- operators.
icing crew themselves.
Returning for re-treatment, solely
Not understanding what Holdover because the longest time in the
Time means Holdover Table cell has expired.
Here’s the definition from the FOM; “the Imagine you’ve had your aircraft de-iced and
estimated time period after application of de- anti-iced. Very light snow is falling. The
icing/anti-icing fluid which will prevent ice, ground crew started anti-icing treatment at
snow and/or frost from forming or 12:00. Your published holdover time range is,
accumulating on the treated surfaces of an say, 0:30 – 0:55. You are in a long line-up for
airplane, which is influenced by wind humidity takeoff.
and skin temperature. This time is calculated as
beginning at the start of the final application of We know that if precipitation has occurred, a
de-icing/anti-icing fluid and as expiring when PCI must be performed if you’re going to
the fluid is no longer effective.” takeoff more than 30 minutes after treatment
commenced. In our imaginary scenario, you
Two important things to remember; will not be able to takeoff until 13:10 (more
than the 12:00 start time + 0:55 period from
• holdover time is an estimate only. the holdover range). Can you still depart,
without returning for treatment?
• fluid expiry is when the fluid is no
longer effective – not necessarily at the
Yes. As long as a PCI is conducted within 5
end of a particular time period. Fluid is minutes before takeoff and this inspection
no longer effective when it can’t absorb indicates the fluid has not failed, you may
any more moisture; when snow and ice
depart.
starts to appear on top of the fluid.
If you’re confused, it helps to imagine a
How do you tell whether fluid has failed or not? scenario where after treatment, only 1
Perform a visual inspection.
snowflake falls on your aircraft and then the
snow stops completely. Clearly, it’s very
Don’t be fooled by the clock.
unlikely this scenario would require return for
removal of existing fluid and re-treatment,
purely because a published time has expired.
If precipitation has occurred, Don’t be fooled by freezing rain.
forgetting to perform a PCI after the

2
 worried about the fuel you’ve burned with this
Potential Strategy for delay. Now you’re well below flight planned
Avoiding Significant departure fuel. We’ll isolate the issue of fluid
holdover time and say for the purposes of this
Departure Delays example, holdover time is not an issue. This is
now a fuel concern only.
An event similar to what’s described on this
page actually happened at New York JFK, You’re faced with two options;
with an Emirates A345 aircraft. In that event, • returning to stand, refuelling, de-
unforeseen departure delays occurred due to icing, anti-icing and getting in line
poor winter weather. After a number of hours again (which likely means you’re out
de-icing, anti-icing and taxiing, the flight was of crew day and the flight will have to
cancelled because significantly more fuel had be cancelled), or
been burned on the ground than had been • another option.
planned for.
What could that other option be?
But there may have been a way the aircraft
could have departed, even though takeoff fuel FOM Fuel Requirements
would have been significantly below flight
plan. Thus, a 22 hour delay and the associated Here’s what the FOM says regarding pre-
major disruption to passengers, company flight fuel requirements;
operations and crew may have been avoided.
See if you can come up with your own 11.1.2 Standard Fuel Planning
solution to this; Pre-flight fuel requirements of this section
only exist until completion of refueling.
Delay Scenario Thereafter minimum fuel required is as per
the requirements of section 11.3.
Imagine you are operating a flight out of JFK.
It’s the middle of winter. And it’s snowing FOM 11.3 provides a number of ways to
heavily. manage your flight to allow continuing toward
your destination when you depart with less
As you prepare for departure at the gate, the than planned fuel.
station agent advises you that significant
delays are being experienced awaiting de/anti- But what if it’s absolutely clear before
icing treatment. Clearly, you’ll have to accept departure there’s no way you’ll be able to land
this delay, as your aircraft needs fluid at Dubai with absolute-minimum fuel
treatment. You decide to load a certain requirements? The introduction to that FOM
amount of extra fuel to allow for the section states that useable fuel remaining in
anticipated delay. flight must not be less that the fuel required to
proceed to an airport where a safe landing can
After waiting your turn, the aircraft is treated be made, with final reserve fuel remaining. It’s
with fluid and you receive confirmation from up to you to decide which airport.
the de-icing service provider that all
equipment is clear. You still have a little more In this case, in co-ordination with the SMNC,
fuel than flight plan, so it doesn’t appear there you might want to depart with the intent of
will be too much difficulty departing. You landing at an airport significantly short of
start engines, obtain taxi clearance and get in Dubai.
line for departure.
For example, you could consider departing
However, after taxiing half-way around the JFK planning to land-short for refueling in
airport you find you have to wait in line for Istanbul, Larnaca or some other intermediate
nearly an hour. You’re getting more and more destination. You have more than enough fuel

3
for such places. And you would be away from
the nightmare of severe blizzards, cold and
ice.

If it’s been arranged a long time before with

the SMNC (after all, you would have 10 hours
or more before you would arrive at such an
intermediate destination) a crew-change, with
a fresh crew flown from Dubai or elsewhere
may be possible at your revised destination.
Your duty will be over - but that can be dealt
with as a separate issue. This solution would
likely be much better for passengers, company
and crew than returning to the terminal at
JFK and relocating passengers in hotels until
you can try again tomorrow.

When winter weather in New York is bad, it’s

often bad for days at a time. So even if you do
return to stand and then try again 20 hours
later, the weather could be as bad - or worse.
And you’ll have to go through the same
difficulties the next day.

The idea, in a situation described above, is to

consider all possible solutions before you
decide to return. And involve the SMNC in
your decision. With a little ‘outside-the-box’
thinking, you may save your passengers and
crew a big delay and avoid significant
operational disruption.

4
 c. Allowed, but only when OAT is below
Emirates minus 10 degC, or icing is minimal
De/Anti-Icing Quiz
Winter Season 2006/07 4. True, False or other? Company and
other regulations provide that a light
coating of frost is permissible on the top
The answer reference for these questions is the FOM,
of the fuselage, and up to 3mm (1/8 inch)
except questions 18 & 20; where the answers may be thickness of frost is permitted on the
found in OM-C. Quiz answers on page 16. under surface of the wing due to fuel cold
soaking.
1. What is the FOM definition of a. True
Holdover time ? b. False
a. The demonstrated time period after c. Depends on temperature and type of the
application of de-icing/anti-icing fluid fuel
which will prevent ice, snow and/or frost
from forming or accumulating on the treated
d. False, unless departing from a non-ICAO
member state
surfaces of an airplane, which is influenced
by wind, humidity and skin temperature.
5. Contamination, in the context of icing,
is understood to be ;
b. The actual, JAR/FAA certified time
period after application of de-icing/anti-
a. Any frost, ice or snow that adheres to the
icing fluid which will prevent ice, snow aircraft’s Critical Surfaces
and/or frost from forming or accumulating b. De/Anti-icing fluid, in anti-cryogenic
on the treated surfaces of an airplane, which liquid form
is influenced by wind, humidity and skin c. Liquid moisture, but particularly water at
temperature. temperatures closer to 0 degC

c. The estimated time period after 6. Take-off is permitted in light freezing

application of de-icing/anti-icing fluid rain but is not permitted;
which will prevent ice, snow and/or frost a. in moderate or heavy freezing rain.
from forming or accumulating on the treated b. in heavy falls of WET snow
surfaces of an airplane, which is influenced (temperatures around 0 degC).
by wind, humidity and skin temperature. c. if snow, ice or frost has accumulated on
the aircraft’s Critical Surfaces during taxi.
2. Who shares the responsibility for d. all of the above
ensuring that no Emirates aircraft is
dispatched unless it is completely clear of 7. Which of the following statements is
ice, snow or frost? correct?
a. Air Traffic Control & at certain times, the a. Communication with the passengers and
ground handler Cabin Crew regarding de-icing is optional.
b. De-icing contractor unless otherwise It is a courtesy to advise the Cabin Crew
advised by FCI during preflight briefing and the passengers
c. All Emirates personnel prior to engine start that de-icing may be
d. The Captain alone taking place.

3. The Emirates company policy with b. Communication with the passengers and
respect to operations in ground icing Cabin Crew regarding de-icing is
conditions is; mandatory. It is Emirates policy to advise
a. Operations not authorized the Cabin Crew during preflight briefing
b. ‘Make It Clean and Keep It Clean’ and the passengers prior to engine start that
de-icing will be taking place.

5
 content is present. No Holdover Time
c. Communication with the passengers and Guidelines exist for these conditions.
Cabin Crew regarding de-icing is not a. True
required. It is b. ATC or ground handler will advise
not necessary to advise the Cabin Crew c. False
during preflight briefing and the passengers
prior to engine start that de-icing will be 11. True, False or other? Ice with a
taking place. roughness of medium to coarse sandpaper
covering the full span of the wing leading
8. What is correct regarding the following edge can cause a significant increase in
statement regarding Company policy? stall speed, leading to the possibility of a
Flights may be dispatched when it is stall prior to activation of the stall
agreed by the Captain and the Qualified warning system.
Person that the snow on the surfaces is a. True
light, not adhering to the wing surface b. False
and is of such consistency that it will
c. Depends on where the sandpaper was
blow off during taxi or the immediate
made
start of the take-off roll.
a. True 12. Emirates permits de/anti-icing with
b. False engines-on at specifically designated
c. Depends on the Captain stations. Information regarding the
d. Not applicable at certain Emirates stations currently approved for engines-
outstations listed in the Route Manual on treatment is contained in the Emirates
Route Manual. Which of the following is
9. During periods of falling snow or true regarding other stations?
freezing precipitation, holdover time is a. Engines-on de/anti-icing may be
critical. Holdover time is dependent performed at Captain’s discretion
upon;
a. Temperature and type of de-icing fluid b. Engines-on treatment is strictly
only - although this varies somewhat, prohibited at any other station
depending on airport elevation and ISA
temperature deviation.
c. Currently, no Company guidance exists
on this subject
b. Temperature, rate and type of
precipitation falling, the type of de- 13. True or False? There has been at least
icing/anti-icing fluid used and other factors. one fatal accident involving ground crew,
where the aircraft taxied without
c. Rate and type of precipitation only and at communicating with the de-icing
times, type of de-icing fluid. contractor. This resulted in a collision
with the de-icing vehicles and three
10. True, False or other? Under certain fatalities resulted. Therefore, considerable
meteorological conditions de-icing and/or care must be taken when de-icing with
anti-icing procedures may be ineffective engines-on.
in providing sufficient protection for a. True
continued operations. Examples of these b. False
conditions are freezing rain, ice pellets
and hail, heavy snow, high wind velocity, 14. According to the FOM, if precipitation
fast dropping OAT or any time when has occurred at any time since the final
freezing precipitation with high water fluid layer was applied to the aircraft, a
PCI is mandatory once the;

6
 with removal of all wing residues from the
a. Longest time in the applicable holdover previous treatment is performed prior to any
time table cell is exceeded further anti-icing treatment being applied
b. Shortest time in the applicable holdover
time table cell is exceeded c. A complete de-icing using heated fluid,
c. Flight Crew estimated time, taken from with removal of all residues from the
the applicable holdover time table cell is previous treatment is performed prior to any
exceeded further anti-icing treatment being applied

15. Flight Crew and Qualified Persons Refer to the Route Manual and other
must be aware that even with ambient documents as required, to answer the
temperatures up to __ degrees C, ice or following;
frost can form on a wing that contains
18. You are in Moscow and preparing for a
cold-soaked fuel. In precipitation on the
daylight departure during reported Snow.
ground, clear icing – which can be very
Temperature is -5 degC and ‘Octagon
difficult to observe – may occur on top of
Max-Flight’ fluid will be used for anti-
the wing. A tactile (by touch) inspection
icing at a concentration of 100%.
may be required.
Reported visibility is 800 metres. The
a. 0 degrees C final fluid layer started to be sprayed at
b. +15 degrees C 1215 UTC. When will your minimum
c. +5 degrees C holdover time expire?
a. 1300 UTC
16. When does holdover protection b. 1247 UTC
expire?
c. 1240 UTC
a. When the minimum Holdover time from d. Not determinable
the table has expired, unless notified
19. Following the expiry of this time,
otherwise by Air Traffic Control or ATIS
what must be achieved before takeoff?
a. CBC check – only by the Captain (unless
b. When frozen deposits start to form or
the First Officer objects)
accumulate on treated aircraft surfaces, or at
the commencement of take-off roll (due to
b. Quality Service Inspection (QSI)
aerodynamic shedding of fluid) c. Visual Inspection by an Accredited
Observer
c. Only if the aircraft returns for re- d. PCI
treatment
20. Is an Emirates aircraft allowed to
perform an Engines-On de/anti-icing
17. If a CSI or PCI indicates that the fluid
has failed, the Commander must ensure procedure at New York - JFK?
that; a. Yes
b. No
a. A partial de-icing using heated fluid, with c. Depends on authorisation from SMNC or
removal of frozen residues from the Emirates Engineering
previous treatment is performed prior to any d. Handler will advise
further anti-icing treatment being applied
Answers on Page 16
b. A wing-only de-icing using heated fluid,

7
 Application of Supplementary Procedure
SP.16.6 – SP.16.9, Adverse Weather
The following text explains a performance technique approved by Boeing.

Feedback from Line pilots and Training department indicates a requirement for further
clarification/re-confirmation related to the application of our contaminated runway policy.

The Boeing FCOM Supplementary Procedure – Adverse Weather is presently under review by
Flight Operations Engineering and a revision will be issued shortly.

History

Mar 2005 Flt Ops decided to apply a new Runway Categorization based on the type and
depth of water based materials (FOM Chap 18.13, Adverse Runway conditions
Takeoff and Landing).

Dec 2005 Introduction of the new Boeing Crosswind and Contaminated Runway Policy.
Compatibility of the Boeing contaminated runway policy and the FOM
categorization was achieved together with a simplified Crosswind policy based
on the same categorization ‘Dry’, ‘Slippery’ and ‘Contaminated’.

Background

Our policy of applying a Wet OPT performance basis for the lower depth contaminant range of
‘Slush’, ‘Dry Snow’ and ‘Wet Snow’ is an industry standard. Although adapted by Boeing the
present OPT software version does not reflect/convert the lower contaminant range into Wet
performance basis.

Solution

1. Always apply the Correlation Table presented in the Boeing FCOM (FCOM Vol.1,
SP.16.9) before OPT calculation.
2. The OPT User’s Manual has been adjusted (OPT User’s Manual, Page 11) and covers
now partly the low contaminant range.
3. Increase your cross wind category awareness by always applying the Correlation Table.

It is however of importance to realize that any information found in the Boeing FCOM SP 16.6-
16.9 is of advisory nature. Situational awareness and good operational judgment is as always
required to operate safely and efficiently.

Additional information

The maximum FOM ‘Wet Snow’ depth of 25 mm has been brought in line with the existing ‘Wet
Snow’ depth under FCOM SP 16.9.

The introduction of the 25% coverage definition under FOM Chap 18.13, Adverse Runway
conditions Takeoff and Landing, supports the decision making process for flight crews on a
particular winter day.

8
Example

A6-EBA, LSZH, Rwy 28, Dry Snow/Wet, 0 Wind, 0°C, STD , Optimum Flaps, Packs Auto,
Eng/Wing Auto, Full CG

Note

The above graph for dry snow allows Wet performance until a contaminant depth of 15 mm.
Thereafter the curve follows the OPT algorithm (program) until the maximum dry snow
contaminant depth of 100 mm.

Examples

Example 1 covers a take off under wet snow condition in the higher contaminant range.
Example 2 covers a landing under icy conditions (B777-300).

Example 1
The departure runway is reported to be covered with 10mm of wet snow and there is a 15 knot
crosswind.
crosswind

1. Enter the Correlation of Runway Category, Runway Condition and Performance Basis
table with 10mm of Wet Snow to determine the Runway Category for the X-wind

9
 limits, in this case Contaminated. The resulting Performance Basis for OPT use is
Standing Water. Read Note 2.

2. Enter the Takeoff Crosswind limitations table with the Category Contaminated to find
the crosswind limit of 20 knots. The reported crosswind is within the takeoff limit.

3. Enter the Equivalence of Water Based Materials table with 10mm of wet snow to find
the standing water equivalent of 5mm.

4. Calculate the OPT performance using the 5mm of Standing Water determined from the
table.

Example 2
B777-300: The arrival runway is reported to be covered with ice and there is a 10 knot
crosswind.
crosswind

10
1. Enter the Correlation of Runway Category, Runway Condition and Performance Basis
table with Ice to determine the Runway Category for the X-wind limits, in this case
Ice. The resulting Performance Basis (QRH) for the Normal Configuration Landing
Distance is Ice as well.

2. Enter the Landing Crosswind limitations table with the Category Ice to find the
crosswind limit of 15 knots. The reported crosswind is within the landing limit.

3. Find the Advisory Information page for Normal Configuration Landing Distance in the
QRH. Enter the correct table for the performance basis Ice and determine the landing
distance guidance information for Runway: Ice.

11
 Accident Report
Engines-On De/Anti-Icing Accident with 3 Fatalities
The following is an extract from a safety report by the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB).
It highlights the critical requirement to ensure an engines-on procedure is only carried out at
specifically authorised stations (refer Emirates OM-C).

The TSB investigated this occurrence for the purpose of advancing transportation safety.

Collision with Vehicle Royal Air Maroc

Boeing 747-400 CN-RGA
Montreal (Mirabel) International Airport, Quebec
21 January 1995

Report Number A95Q0015

Synopsis

The Royal Air Maroc Boeing 747-400 was parked in the de-icing centre of Montreal (Mirabel)
International Airport, Quebec. The aircraft was being prepared for a scheduled flight from Mirabel to
Casablanca, Morocco, with a stop at New York, New York. The four engines were running during
the de-icing operation. The crew heard "dégivrage terminé" (de-icing completed), and the captain
asked the co-pilot to inform the apron controller that the aircraft was ready to taxi. Taxi instructions
were issued. The aircraft started to move forward and overturned the two de-icing vehicles that were
still in front of the aircraft's horizontal stabilizers. The two vehicle drivers sustained minor injuries;
the three occupants of the cherry-pickers received fatal injuries.

The Board determined that the flight crew started to taxi the aircraft before its perimeter was clear,
following confusion in the radio communications. The following factors contributed to the accident:
a lack of de-icing procedures within Royal Air Maroc; non-compliance with procedures on the part
of the Canadian Airlines International Ltd. de-icing crew; inadequate or inappropriate
communications equipment; incomplete training of Snowman 1 (the chief de-icing attendant); a
regulatory framework less demanding of foreign air carriers than of Canadian carriers; a lack of
operational supervision; and a lack of adherence to radio protocol.

2.2 Decision to Taxi

The flight crew did not realize that 130.775 MHz was the CAIL working frequency. They mistakenly
concluded that this frequency was reserved for de-icing. In addition, the pilots assumed that 130.775
MHz was a communication system analogous to the interphone, although the frequencies used for
air-ground communications are in the VHF band, 118-136 MHz. Consequently, the pilots presumed
that the Iceman's message about the completion of de-icing came from Snowman 1, that the message
was intended for them, and that it indicated that de-icing was completed.

The pilots heard the words "dégivrage terminé" (de-icing completed). Although this message was not
preceded by the flight call-sign or the de-icing crew call-sign, the pilot read back "de-icing
completed" twice. As the duration of the operation up to that point matched the time usually
required for this type of de-icing, and as they received no acknowledgement from Snowman 1, the
flight crew thought the de-icing crew had left the frequency and departed the area. The co-pilot then

12
advised the apron controller that the aircraft was ready to taxi, and, in doing so, the co-pilot
conveyed to the apron controller that de-icing was completed and the aircraft was clear. Relying on
that information, the controller indicated to the co-pilot his assigned route for taxiing from his
current parking spot to Kilo turn-off. The pilot mistakenly interpreted the issuance of taxi
instructions as confirmation that the aircraft was clear.

According to the rules of standard phraseology, to avoid confusion, radio messages must be
preceded by the receiving station call-sign, followed by the sending station call-sign. While these rules
may not apply to interphone communications, the "open" nature of VHF radio communications
requires that the international rules of radio procedure be followed. In this case, the pilot heard the
words "dégivrage terminé" and made a number of erroneous assumptions: that the radio
transmission was directed to him; that the de-icing operation was completed; and that all equipment
and personnel were clear of the aircraft's taxi path.

2.5 Training in Engines-On De-icing

Examination of the electronic mail between the Manager, System Aircraft De-icing, the Manager of
Client Services at Mirabel, and the instructor/developer prior to 03 January 1995 revealed that the
need for the engines-on de-icing course was somewhat urgent in order to satisfy client demand and
to compete against other de-icing companies. The course given on 03 January 1995 was different
from that given by CAIL for engines-on de-icing of the Boeing 737 and Airbus 320. The test on the
theoretical portion, which is normally required, had not been devised for the course given on
03 January 1995, and the procedures for the Boeing 727 and Lockheed 1011 had not been developed.

The practical engines-on exercise was not conducted on the aircraft covered in the classroom;
instead, an Airbus 310 was used, an aircraft on which the employees had not been trained, and which
they were not authorized to de-ice with the engines running. It is possible that the course created
some confusion for the employees as to which aircraft they were required to de-ice with engines off
and which they could de-ice with engines running. Some employees mistakenly thought they were
authorized to de-ice Boeing 747 aircraft with the engines running.

Contradictory testimony regarding the conduct of the course precluded a determination as to

whether the employees had been told that they could de-ice Boeing 747s with the engines running.
But correspondence between the instructor/developer and the System De-icing Program Manager
indicates that the employees were not qualified to de-ice Boeing 747s with the engines on. Further,
Snowman 1 had attended a de-icing course supported by an appropriate manual in which it was
stated that de-icing an aircraft while its engines were running was not authorized unless the employee
was trained to do so. As he had not attended any "engines-on" de-icing course, he had no reason to
believe he was authorized by CAIL to de-ice an aircraft with its engines running.

2.6 Competition Between De-icing Contractors

Seven companies were authorized by ADM to de-ice aircraft according to their practices in the
Mirabel airport de-icing centre. Rivalry was especially fierce between the employees of CAIL and
those of other private contractors. Several de-icing contractors de-iced all aircraft types with the
engines running. As private de-icing contractors were not regulated, they were able to respond
quickly to client demands. The regulatory requirements applicable to CAIL, with the attendant
requirement to develop procedures and provide training, meant that CAIL, working within the rules,
could not provide as fast and ready a service as could the private contractors. This undoubtedly
heightened competition between CAIL and private de-icing contractors in their desire for de-icing
contracts, and this competition might have led some CAIL employees to take liberties with the
established safety standards.

13
When the Royal Air Maroc captain indicated that there would be a delay in starting the de-icing if he
had to shut down the engines and start the APU, Snowman 1 decided to de-ice the aircraft with the
engines running, though he had not taken the necessary "engines-on" training. He was also aware,
having taken the initial de-icing course, that he was not supposed to de-ice an aircraft with its engines
running. Some factors that could have influenced his decision were a normal desire to improve the
speed and efficiency of de-icing operations and to maximize the use of hold-over times for the de-
icing fluid. It is probable that a significant additional factor was the competition between de-icing
contractors.

2.7 Control of De-icing Area

The apron controller performed his tasks in accordance with established procedures and his assigned
responsibilities. He guided the aircraft until it was stopped at the south station. The aircraft came
fully under the responsibility of the captain after it was stopped for de-icing. Before issuing taxi
instructions to the aircraft, the controller verified that the taxiway was clear. It was not his
responsibility to consult the flight crew and de-icing personnel to determine whether the aircraft was
clear and ready to taxi. That responsibility was assumed by the captain when the co-pilot declared the
aircraft ready to taxi.

That the apron controller issued taxi instructions when de-icing was not completed indicates that he
was not aware that de-icing was in progress. Although he fully discharged his responsibilities, the
controller probably did not have enough information or sufficient tools to accurately assess the
situation in the de-icing centre. ADM had recognized the value of video coverage of the
manoeuvring area which the apron controller could not see from his work station. The cargo ramp
was covered by a panning video camera and the same installation was being considered for the de-
icing area.

2.11 Communications
Analysis of the communications recordings indicates that, on some occasions, standard aeronautical
phraseology and terminology were not used. For example, the co-pilot and de-icing attendants did
not always state their own call-sign and the receiving station call-sign when communicating with the
apron controller, and the captain read back "de-icing completed" twice without stating his call-sign.

3.0 Conclusions

3.1 Findings
1. All communications equipment functioned normally before and after the accident.

2. Engine noise probably prevented the de-icing crew from hearing the pilot and the Iceman when
they tried to communicate with the de-icing crew.

3. CAIL communication equipment was neither adequate for nor designed to be used in engines-on
de-icing operations, as it did not block out engine noise.

4. The pilot and de-icing crew did not use standard aeronautical terminology and phraseology on
some occasions.

5. The pilots thought that the Iceman's message to Snowman 1 was addressed to them and that it
meant that the de-icing was completed.

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6. Following confusion in the radio communications, the flight crew started to taxi the aircraft before
its perimeter was clear.

7. Snowman 1 suggested that the pilot keep the engines running during the de-icing operation and
the pilot agreed. The flight crew was not familiar with the de-icing procedures and methods approved
by CAIL.

8. At the time of the accident, the cherry-picker operators were not wearing the protective equipment
required for the de-icing.

9. Snowman 1 was not in a position to prevent the aircraft from advancing, given that he was behind
the aircraft where he could not be seen by the flight crew and where the noise of the aircraft engines
prevented his hearing the radio transmissions of the pilot and the Iceman.

10. As a signatory to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), Canada accepts the
certification of other ICAO signatories to ICAO standards. As a foreign air carrier, Royal Air Maroc
was not required to develop a set of procedures regarding de-icing of aircraft on the ground.

11. Royal Air Maroc did not have a copy of CAIL's de-icing procedures in its possession and had not
asked CAIL for a copy of the procedures.

12. Royal Air Maroc did not have personnel at Mirabel capable of evaluating the de-icing procedural
requirements.

13. CAIL had not developed procedures for de-icing a B747 with the engines running, and the de-
icing crew was not authorized by CAIL to de-ice B747s with the engines running.

14. The CAIL engines-on de-icing course held in Mirabel on 03 January 1995 was presented in a
manner that left some employees unsure as to which aircraft they were permitted to de-ice with
engines running.

15. Several air carriers favour having a marshaller in front of the aircraft and using the interphone for
ground communications during de-icing. CAIL recommends the use of VHF radio to communicate
with the pilot and to guide aircraft on the ground.

16. The apron controller performed his tasks in accordance with established procedures and his
assigned responsibilities.

17. The apron controller did not have enough information or sufficient tools to accurately evaluate
the situation in the de-icing centre, which he could not see from his work station.

18. Transport Canada did not monitor the quality or compliance of the de-icing procedures
developed by the air carriers.

19. Private de-icing contractors are not regulated by Transport Canada, whereas air carriers such as
CAIL must follow regulatory requirements set out by Transport Canada.

20. It is possible that competition between the de-icing companies and a concern for
efficiency influenced Snowman 1's decision to de-ice the aircraft with engines running
despite the fact that he had not had the formal training.

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Answers; 9. b
10. a
De/Anti-Icing Quiz 11. a
12. b
References are the FOM, except 13. a
questions 18 & 20, where the OM-C must 14. b
be consulted. 15. b
16. b
1. c 17. c
2. c 18. c; Use ‘Visibility in Snow vs Snowfall Intensity
3. b Chart’ to find snow intensity is Moderate. Then, use the
4. a special Brand table for Octagon brand fluid, found in
5. a OM-C.
6. d 19. d
7. b 20. b
8. a

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