Case Digests:

Case 1: Montemayor v. Bermejo jr. [A.M. No. MTJ-04-1535. March 12, 2004.]

FACTS:

Complainants filed a detainer case against Lolita. The case was raffled to MTC Judge Bermejo, Jr., respondent.

Complainant asserts that: (1) Respondent Judge failed to decide the case within the period provided under the Rules
of Court; (2) he "did not bother to check defendant's preposterous claim that she received a copy of the Judgment
only on December 5, 2002, even if it was released more than 45 days earlier on October 16, 2002;" (3)He prevented
the transmittal of the records of the case to the appellate court within 15 days from the perfection of the appeal in
violation of Section 6, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court.

Respondent denies the allegations.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent is guilty as charged.

Held:

Yes, the judge is guilty of delay in the rendition of judgment in violation of Rules 1.02 and 3.05 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct.

In this case, “by countenancing, permitting, creating the many delays in obvious disregard of the letter and the spirit
of the Rules of Court and the Rule on Summary Procedure, respondent has put in question his partiality.”

“It bears reminding him that a judge must at all times not only be impartial but maintain the appearance of
impartiality XXX XXX. The appearance of bias or prejudice can be as damaging to public confidence and the
administration of justice as actual bias or prejudice.”

Case 2 Fernandez v. Presbiterio [A.M. No. 486-MJ. September 13, 1977.]

Facts:

There was a stabbing incident at 9:00 p.m., the suspect is the son of the incumbent Municipal. The criminal agents
together with the witnesses went to MTC to file a complaint for attempted murder against the suspect. The
respondent Judge was not in his office as he was then hearing a case. The respondent judge went to the house of the
relative of the political opponent of suspect's father at about 6:30 p.m., together with his clerk, bringing with him the
Criminal Docket and Seal.

Even though affidavits have been previously subscribed and sworn to before fiscal, the respondent judge personally
took anew the sworn statements of Francisco Bescaser and his witnesses. He issued a warrant for the arrest of the
complainant and the complainant was arrested on Maundy Thursday of the Holy Week, and detained. Knowing that
on following days are holidays, government offices are closed, thus precluding the seasonal filing of a bail bond.

The respondent judge testifies he intended to conduct the preliminary examination in the courtroom during regular
office hours, but there were no lights in the courtroom, and considered the urgency of the need for the warrant of
arrest to be issued that night in order to discontinue the harassment of the witnesses by the Mayor.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge is impartial.

HELD:

No, he is not acting impartial.

“[J]udges should not only be impartial but should also appear impartial. For 'impartiality is not a technical
conception. It is a state of mind' and, consequently, the 'appearance of impartiality is an essential manifestation of its
reality.' XXX XXX while judges should possess proficiency in law in order that they can competently construe and
enforce the law, it is more important that they should act and behave in such a manner that the parties before them
should have confidence in their impartiality."

Case 3 Ty v. Banco Filipino Savings & Mortgage Bank [G.R. Nos. 149797-98. February 13, 2004.]

Facts:

Respondent Banco Filipino filed with the RTC presided by respondent Judge an action for reconveyance of real
property against petitioner Ty, together with Tala Realty Services Corporation, et.al.

Banco Filipino moved for an order directing Tala, et al. to produce or make available books, documents and other
papers relevant to the case. Notwithstanding Tala, et al.'s opposition thereto, the trial court directed Tala, et al. to
produce certain documents within a specified period of time, despite failure by Banco Filipino to tender the costs for
such production and inspection.

Banco Filipino formally offered its exhibits, all of which were admitted by the trial court. Tala, et al.'s motion for
reconsideration of the order admitting the said exhibits was denied. Banco Filipino's motion to withdraw certain
exhibits was granted.

Tala, et al. filed a motion for the voluntary inhibition and/or disqualification of respondent judge on the grounds of
manifest pre-judgment and partiality, “by selectively appreciating some, and not all, of the orders of respondent
judge cited as "badges of hostility, bias and pre-judgment".

Petitioner contends that Order dated June 3, 1996 was not Tala, et al. but Banco Filipino, which was duty bound to
establish the date of actual receipt of its motion for reconsideration. She complains that respondent judge
contravened the express provisions of the Rules of Court when he "unilaterally relieved Banco Filipino of its
statutory obligation to prove service of its motion for reconsideration and, instead, applied . . . a so called safe
assumption in determining when petitioner and her co-defendants should have received the same."

In Order dated November 20, 1996, respondent judge's manifest partiality when he granted the motion for
production of documents despite failure by Banco Filipino to advance the cost for such production and inspection.

Issue: Whether or not respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion for voluntary
inhibition.

Held:

Yes.

There is undue interference if the judge orders the presentation of specific documentary evidence without a
corresponding motion from any party, or directs a party when and who to present as a witness and what matters such
witness will testify on. The respondent judge transgressed the boundaries of impartiality when he suggested to
Banco Filipino what evidence to present to prove its case. While the trial court may interfere in the manner of
presenting evidence in order to promote the orderly conduct of the trial, the final determination of what evidence to
adduce is the sole prerogative of the contending parties.

Case 4 Valdez v. Aquilizan [G.R. Nos. 67422-24. October 31, 1984.]

Facts:
The petitioner is accused of rape in three cases, with the same private complainant, committed on different dates,
filed in the court presided by the respondent judge.

The petition seeks to annul the proceedings which were conducted by the respondent judge and to disqualify him
from the case; as the verified petition imputed serious irregularities.

XXX Without any request from the parties, the respondent judge decided to hold the hearing in his chamber "due to
delicadeza." Present in the chamber were counsel for the accused, the fiscal and the stenographer only; the accused
was not allowed to go inside.

In the hearing of the three criminal cases, the private complainant was to be cross-examined at the previous hearing
but he private prosecutor was absent. During the last hearing of this case, the Honorable Court reserved its right to
cross examine you on your testimony." And the respondent judge examined the witness but the examination is better
described as direct rather than cross.

"COURT:

. . . After going over the records of the cases and the supposed exhibits, you mentioned about a pair of scissors used
to intimidate you, coerced and forced by the accused, by pressing the same at your left side?

A. Yes, your Honor.

XXX XXX

COURT:

Q Is this the very scissors that you saw when he pressed it?

A Yes, your Honor.

Q When was this used by the accused Wilson Valdez?

A On February 10, 1982, your Honor.

XXX XXX

COURT:

Mark it.

Q: Please demonstrate to the Court how this Exh "F" was used by the accused in intimidating you?

A: (Witness demonstrating to the Court) The witness demonstrating to the supposed victim the pressing of the
pointed scissors at the left side abdomen.

Q: Did he also use that during the accord rape he committed?

A: Yes, your Honor.

Q: About the third time, he use also?

A Yes, your Honor."

ISSUES: Whether or not the respondent judge is impartial, when it ask searching questions.

HELD:

Yes.

[A] trial judge has the right, nay even the duty, to address questions to witnesses. But the questions should be
clarificatory; they should not build the case for any of the adversaries.
The accused was entitled of right to be inside the room because it was his liberty and honor which were at stake.

Case 5 Garcia v. Valdez [A.M. No. MTJ-98-1156. July 13, 1998.]

Even though not a party, Judge Valdez appeared during office hours in the three DARAB cases and in a conference
before Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer. They are apprehensive that they might lose these cases and,
consequently, their land, with the tremendous influence wielded by Judge Valdez and his alleged promises to those
who helped his relatives.

The complainants filed a Joint affidavit-complaint against respondent Judge who allegedly interfered in DARAB
Cases and a land case.

He argued that he was present in said hearings and conference for different reasons. He went with Atty. Yolanda
Castro, counsel for the Valdezes, supposedly to attend a hearing on a motion for contempt of court. He "did not
address the Board, (but) only talked to the persons cited for contempt (and) why they sabotage(d) the
implementation of the Writ of Execution issued by the Board." During the conference before PARO Inocencio, he
merely requested a review of the land coverage considering that there was already a land valuation, but this was
denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the presence of respondent judge in the proceeding is an act of interference.

Held:

Yes. The acts constitute interference in the proceedings before the DARAB. The respondent judge was not a counsel
with the appropriate authorization, a party or a witness in the cases involving the Valdezes being handled by the
DARAB.

As a member of the bench, the respondent judge should realize that his presence, opinion and participation in any
proceeding could slant the evaluation and resolution of the case in favor of (the) party he identi fies 'himself with. A
judge need not utter any word for his sheer presence — as a member of the Judiciary — would be su fficient
suggestion of persuasion and influence. In this case, the respondent judge's presence and participation in the
proceedings were to the advantage of his relatives, the heirs.

Case 6: Law Firm of Tungcol & Tibayan [G.R. No. 169298. July 9, 2008.]

Private respondents Ingcos hired the services of petitioner law firm to enforce delivery of a land title. In behalf of
the former, the latter filed a Complaint against Villa Crista before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. The
complaint alleged that the Ingcos had paid the contract price of P5.1 million for the lot, but Villa Crista did not
deliver the title to the Ingcos and refused to execute the final deed of sale in their favor.

After a series of negotiations, Villa Crista entered into a compromise agreement with the Ingcos, supported by the
writ of execution issued by HLURB. The ex-officio sheriff levied and auctioned ten lots belonging to Villa Crista, in
which among others P1,350,000 attorney's fees and other expenses.

Ingcos terminated the law firm's services allegedly to avoid paying the atty’s fees.

The law firm eventually also filed with the HLURB a Motion and Statement of Claim for Attorney's Lien and a
Motion to Enforce the Attorney's Lien. It also filed a damage suit 15 against its former clients before the RTC.

In an Order, HLURB Arbiter Balasolla granted the firm's Motion to Enforce Attorney's Lien, and ordered the
spouses to pay the firm. It was reversed by the HLURB Board.

The firm appealed to the Office of the President and granted the same.

The spouses appealed before the CA, in which it denies the petitioners/ law firm’s motion for reconsideration with
inhibition.
The law firm argues the CA erred when it concluded that since the subject of the contract was only the lot worth
P5.1 million, and it was only the delivery of title or refund of its value which petitioner committed to enforce, these
should be the only basis for attorney's fees.

The CA faced a situation where there were opposing interpretations of the parties as to the meaning and application
of the disputed contract.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals justices err in refusing to inhibit themselves from the case?

HELD:

No, since the atty’s fees was already paid by that said refund, the case is moot and academic.

While bias and partiality are recognized as valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of a judge under Rule 137,
Section 1, par. 2, 41 of the Rules of Court, mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. As long as the judge's
opinions were formed in the course of judicial proceedings based on the evidence presented, and on the conduct of
the parties as observed by the magistrate in court, such opinions — even if later found to be erroneous — will not
prove personal bias or prejudice on the part of the judge.

In this case, the law firm has failed to present concrete proof that any or all members of the Court of Appeals'
Second Division had a personal interest in the case, or that their opinions on the case have stemmed from an
extrajudicial source.

There is no sufficient basis or reason to doubt their fairness and ability to decide this case with the "cold neutrality
of an impartial judge."

Case 7: Garcia v. Dela Pena [A.M. No. MTJ-92-687. February 9, 1994.]

FACTS:

The brother of respondent Judge filed a Criminal Case for grave oral defamation against the wife of the complainant.

The complainant claimed that respondent judge took cognizance of the criminal case without the requisite
certification from the Lupon Tagapayapa; that he should have inhibited himself from acting on the case because
private complainant Dr. de la Peña is his brother.

After the preliminary examination was conducted, respondent Judge issued a warrant for the arrest of the accused
and the latter was arrested by the policeman.

ISSUE: Whether or not the judge should inhibit himself from the case.

HELD:

Yes.

The rule on compulsory disqualification of a judge to hear a case where, as in the instant case, the respondent judge
is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity rests on the salutary principle that no
judge should preside in a case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent.

A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from
suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity. The law conclusively presumes that a judge cannot objectively or
impartially sit in such a case and, for that reason, prohibits him and strikes at his authority to hear and decide it, in
the absence of written consent of all parties concerned.

The purpose is to preserve the people's faith and confidence in the courts of justice.