Rudder Travel Limit function failure

Reference: 27.23.00.008 Issue date: 03-JUL-2020 Last check date: 03-JUL-2020 Status: Open
A/C type/serie: A318, A319, A320, A321 ATA: 27-23
Engine manufacturer: Supplier: ARTUS SAS
Purpose / Reason for revision: technical update
Engineering Support Status: Open

Description / Operational Impact

The faults of the Rudder Travel Limit (RTL) function are reported as a fleet
concern by many A320FAM operators.

The fault symptoms on aircraft are

 The alert “AUTO FLT RUD TRV LIM 1 (2) FAULT” associated to fault
message AFS: FAC1 (2)/RTL ACTR 4CC when one channel is inop.
 The alert “AUTO FLT RUD TRV LIM SYS” associated to both messages
AFS: FAC1/RTL ACTR 4CC and AFS: FAC2 /RTL ACTR 4CC when both
channels are inop.

The failure of both channels if NO GO.

Failures of one or both channels are regularly causing OI and RTLU or

RTLU electronic modules removals.

Mitigation / Interim Action

Root Cause / Investigation
RTL failures must be troubleshot as per:
In 2019, one could identify three major causes of operational and
 TSM TASK 22-61-00-810-803-A Loss of the Rudder Travel Limiting
maintenance burden associated to the RTL function failure in service: Function on the FAC 1
 TSM TASK 22-61-00-810-804-A Loss of the Rudder Travel Limiting
 Scenario 1: the RTL failure occurring at power up on aircraft fitted Function on the FAC 2
with FAC CA09 or following. Ref. ISI 22.60.00010.
Terminating Action
 Scenario 2: the RTL failure occurring at high speed on aircraft fitted  Scenario 1: FAC standard CAA12 is expected to address scenario 1.
with FAC B621 or following or FAC C. Ref. ISI 22.60.00008. FAC CAA12 (MOD 163880) standard was certified on 8 April 2020.
 Introduction in service will be done via embodiment of SB 22-
1736 or SB 22-1737. Both SB were dispatched to the
 Scenario 3: the RTL failure due to a failure of the RTLU or its
operators on 03 July 2020.
electronic module and not linked to scenario 1 or 2.

 Scenario 2: The feasibility of a FAC software solution is currently

under analysis by Design Office Specialists. Status on feasibility is
expected Q4 2020 at the earliest (activity delayed due to
COVID pandemic).

 Scenario 3: The rootcause is under investigation with Artus-Meggitt.

Applicability:

A320FAM CEO&NEO

Reference / Documentation:

Ref[1]: TFU 27.23.51.004 RUDDER TRAVEL LIMIT RELIABILITY

Ref[2]: TFU 27.23.00.004 RTLU FAULT
Ref[3]: Artus / Meggitt VSIL F1549-27-23-05
Ref[4]: ISI 22.60.00008: FAC - Rudder Travel Limitation (RTL) failures after FAC upgrade to standard B621 or higher.
Ref[5]: ISI 22.60.00010 Nuisance RTL faults at power-up
Ref[6]: TFU 27.23.00.007 RTLU MECHANICAL STOP DAMAGED

1. Description

The faults of the Rudder Travel Limit (RTL) function are regularly reported as a fleet concern by many A320FAM operators.

On aircraft, the main fault symptoms are:

 When one channel only is affected: ECAM alert “AUTO FLT RUD TRV LIM 1 (2) FAULT” associated to fault message AFS: FAC1 (2)/RTL ACTR 4CC.
 When both channels are affected: ECAM alert “AUTO FLT RUD TRV LIM SYS” associated to both messages AFS: FAC1/RTL ACTR 4CC and AFS: FAC2
/RTL ACTR 4CC.

The replacement of the Rudder Travel Limit Unit (RTLU) or its electronic module fixes the fault on aircraft most of the time.

2. Repercussions on A/C Operations

“AUTO FLT RUD TRV LIM 1 (2) FAULT” is GO IF as per MMEL 27-23-01 (One may be inoperative).

“AUTO FLT RUD TRV LIM SYS” is NO DISPATCH.

 3. Technical information

Rudder Travel Limit (RTL) function purpose is to limit the rudder deflection depending on the aircraft speed.

Figure 1: Rudder Travel Limit law A320

It is achieved by the Rudder Travel Limit Unit (RTLU), FIN 4CC.

The RTLU is an electrical actuator, separated in two channels controlled and monitored individually by FAC1 and FAC2 computers.
In normal condition, FAC1 has the control on RTLU channel 1. In case of failure, FAC2 takes over with RTLU channel 2.

The RTLU is part of the rudder mechanical control architecture.

 Figure 2: Rudder mechanical control A320

The RTLU is localized in a non-pressurized area in the vertical tail plane.

Figure 3: RTLU localization on aircraft

The RTLU is fitted an electronic module that is a Line Replacable Unit (LRU). In 2019, all the RTLUs in service have PN DV8456701-5 and are fitted with
electronic module PN S005-4.

4. Background and previous studies on RTLU:

In the 200X, the RTLU suffered from a low reliability with a MTBUR figure confirmed below the guaranteed value (GMTBUR 12100FH). Investigations were
conducted with the RTLU manufacturer Artus-Meggitt and concluded that RTLU electronic boards’ failures (solder crack) and improper repair were the main
causes of RTLU low reliability. See Ref[1] TFU 27.23.00.004 and Ref[2] TFU 27.23.51.004). Some solutions were therefore introduced in service:

In 2001: the repair of the electronic boards was no longer allowed as per CMM 27-23-51.
In 2006: Artus / Meggitt SIL F1549-27-23-05 is issued to recommend the systematic replacement of both electronics boards in shop even on the NFF
failure.

In 2008: Thanks to the above measures, the RTLU MTBUR got back above the guaranteed value and has maintained above since then.

Figure 4: MTBUR of RTLU PN DV8456701-5

 5. In service situation in 2018

Although the MTBUR of the RTLU has maintained above the GMBUR for years, the impact of Rudder Travel Limit function failure on the operations and the
maintenance is still reported in 2018 as significant by many operators.

Therefore Airbus decided to launch a new assessment of the impact in-service of the Rudder Travel Limit function failures, using Skywise data collected between
1st Oct 2018 – 30 Sep 2019. The outcomes are:

 The Rudder Travel Limit function failures regularly cause operational interruptions (OI) - such as tech delays and out of service days for troubleshooting.

 The Rudder Travel Limit function failures regularly cause equipment removals - such as RTLU, RTLU electronic module or FAC computers.

The failure of Rudder Travel Limit function is confirmed to be a major issue in service and a new RFW is open in 2018 to tackle this issue as per Airbus
internal process ‘Resolve Fleet Issues’.

6. Investigations status

In 2019, one could identify three major causes of operational and maintenance burden associated to the RTL function failure in service:

a. Scenario 1: the RTL failure occurring at power up on aircraft fitted with FAC CA09 or following.

Further information on the rootcause and maintenance advices are available in Ref[5]: ISI 22.60.00010.

b. Scenario 2: the RTL failure occurring at high speed on aircraft fitted with FAC B621 or following or FAC C.

Further information on the rootcause are available Ref[4]: ISI 22.60.00008.

c. Scenario 3: the RTL failure due to a failure of the RTLU or its electronic module and not linked to scenario 1 or 2.

Analysis of the tests outcome done on the RTLU received in manufacturer Artus/Meggitt repair shop in 2018 shows the following failure breakdown:
 Figure 5: RTLU failure breakdown (source: OEM)

 NFF rate is significant (45%).

 Electronic board failure is the first cause of RTLU failure (21%).
 RTLU position transducer (RVDT) misadjustment is regularly identified in shop but analysis showed that the deviation recorded during shop test is
marginal and far below FAC monitoring threshold. Therefore this is not considered today as a cause of failure on aircraft.
 Mechanical adjustment / alignment: this finding is being clarified with Artus/Meggitt but is a priori considered as a side finding.
 Mechanical stop damages is considered as a cause of fault on aircraft and is addressed in TFU 27.23.00.007 (solution available).
 Motor ball bearing wear is also a recurring finding in shop in particular on old units. As per the information provided by Artus, this finding is recorded
when a rolling noise is detected during manual actuation of the motor shaft during inspection phases. This is not considered as a cause of actuator
failure and is not supposed to affect RTLU operations and performance.

Artus-Meggitt and Airbus recently agreed to launch new investigations to clarify the main causes of the electronic boards failure and understand the NFF high
ratio. A workshop with Artus-Meggitt and Airbus specialists is planned early 2020 to agree on the appropriate actions plan.

7. Mitigation / Interim Plan

Detailed review of RTL failure history as per Airman database reveals that repetitive failures of the RTL function are regularly observed on the A320Fam fleet
aircraft with sometimes more than one hundred occurrences of the same fault in a year on some particular aircraft.
Please find below reminded the TSM instructions applicable to the troubleshooting of intermittent failure. They are extracted from TSM Introduction, paragraph
7. Philosophy and Use, Part 2, Intermittent fault:

Intermittent fault
The fault is not confirmed on the ground by performing the test given in the fault confirmation paragraph.
If the confirmation test result is "TEST OK" or equivalent, the aircraft may be dispatched providing recording in logbook and monitoring of the subject fault.
(…)
The TSM has been designed to isolate/troubleshoot permanent faults. However depending on the airlines organization, the following can be applied for
intermittent fault indications:
If the test result is "TEST OK" (fault not confirmed), dispatch the aircraft, then monitor the reported symptom on the following flights by checking:
* The previous leg reports
* The PFR/Previous PFRs (if available)
* The logbook of the previous flights.

After three occurrences of the same fault indication, (even though the test is still OK), the fault isolation procedure must be applied.

8. Maintenance Information

RTL failures must be troubleshot as per:

- TSM TASK 22-61-00-810-803-A Loss of the Rudder Travel Limiting Function on the FAC 1
- TSM TASK 22-61-00-810-804-A Loss of the Rudder Travel Limiting Function on the FAC 2

Above tasks were updated in 2018 and 2019 to better cover the scenario 1 and 2.

9. Permanent Solution

a. Scenario 1: the RTL failure occurring at power up on aircraft fitted with FAC CA09 or following. Ref[5]: ISI 22.60.00010.
 FAC standard CAA12 is expected to address this issue. FAC CAA12 (MOD 163880) standard was certified on 8 April 2020. Introduction in service will
be done via embodiment of SB 22-1736 or SB 22-1737. Both SB were dispatched to the operators on 03 July 2020.

b. Scenario 2: the RTL failure occurring in flight at high speed on aircraft fitted with FAC B621 or following or FAC C. Ref[4]: ISI 22.60.00008.

The feasibility of a FAC software solution is currently under analysis by Design Office Specialists. Status on feasibility initially expected mid of 2020 is
delayed to Q4 2020 at the earliest due to limited resources in specific COVID pandemic context.

c. Scenario 3: the RTL failure due to a failure of the RTLU or its electronic module and not linked to scenario 1 or 2.

The rootcause is under investigation with Artus-Meggitt. See paragraph 6.

Survey for the Engineering Support section

 Annex

General Information
Potential impact: Operational Reliability
Key information:
Solution benefit:
First issue date: 28-DEC-2019 Issue date: 03-JUL-2020 Last check date: 03-JUL-2020

Technical parameters
ATA: 27-23
A/C type/serie: A318, A319, A320, A321
Engine:
Engine manufacturer:
Fault code/ECAM AFS: FAC1/RTL ACTR 4CC, AFS: FAC2/RTL ACTR 4CC, AUTO FLT RUD TRV LIM 1, AUTO FLT RUD TRV LIM 2, AUTO FLT RUD TRV
warning: LIM SYS
FIN: 4CC
Part Number: DV8456701-5
Supplier: ARTUS SAS

Attachments
General:
- TFU_27.23.00.008_Summary.pptx

Links
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