ON WAR, ITS NATURE AND GENERATIONAL SHIFTS : A COUNTER VIEW

War alone permits and demands the commitment of all man’s faculties, the highest as
well as the lowest.
- Martin Von Creveld in ‘On Future war’ (1991)

Introduction

1. Ever since the age of internet dawned on us and we gained access to a wide
body of literature relating to strategic studies from across the world, we have imbibed an
unwelcome habit of mindlessly copying Western (read American) military concepts,
doctrines and terminologies without subjecting the concept/ doctrine to contextual
scrutiny. In some instances, we have displayed such alacrity that we have internalized
and institutionalized certain American concepts even before the American did
themselves !

2. This article is an attempt to counter the concepts and terminologies that are
employed in our organisation in everyday military parlance to analyse the evolution of
warfare. The author seeks to emphasise that we, as an organisation, need to analyse
Western (read American) concepts in an Indian context before internalizing them. The
author wishes to raise a few (pertinent ?) queries questioning what is by now
established and one daresay, borrowed wisdom within our military academia.

3. USMC Col William Lind propounded the Generational Shift theory and concept of
th
„4 Generation Warfare (4GW)‟ in 1989, just at the time when US had decisively won
the Cold War and its adversary (USSR) was facing imminent disintegration. Around the
same time Francis Fukuyama wrote the controversial “End of History” theory (1989) and
Huntington propounded the “Clash of Civilizations” (1992). It is almost as if the US,
having run out of enemies, was trying to look out for new threats. Having stated so,
American military literature abounds with critiques on the concept of generational shifts
in warfare, the idea of the Fourth Generation of warfare, Unrestricted Warfare etc. It is
pertinent to note that the concept of Generational Shifts & the advent of 4 GW, which
was propounded by Lind, has still not been institutionally approved by the American
military academic establishment. In that context, it is curious to note that there is not
one critique on the subject in any of the leading military think tank publications in our
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country. We have so thoroughly and readily embraced the concept without bothering to
place the concept in context.

4. In this article, we would also try to contextualise the concepts as applicable to the
sub continental scenario and attempt to validate if the American understanding of armed
conflict matches ours. After all, as Ashley Tellis tells us, cultural attributes shape
strategic decisions and that security behaviour of states is deeply shaped by their
culture. Similarly, as Robert Kaplan asserts in his book “Revenge of Geography” (2012),
geography exerts a profound influence on the flow of history and consequently shapes
the strategic behaviour and strategic culture of modern states. All the more the reason
to view concepts and ideas in context. Contextually speaking, there is a clear difference
between fighting wars by expeditionary forces away from the frontiers of the home
country and fighting to defend one‟s own frontiers or for that matter fighting one‟s own
citizens (notwithstanding that they may be separatists or anti-nationals) and to maintain
the unity and integrity of the nation from centrifugal forces. Thus, one-size-fits-all apch
to theorizing about the nature of war needs to be desisted from because each nation
fights its own wars, each for a different reason, a different cause with different end
states in mind.

5. It is instructive to re-visit some basic concepts and queries :-

(a) What is a state ?

(b) What is war ?

(c) Who has monopoly over organized armed violence ?

(d) Has the state lost its relevance ?

(e) Is anarchic violence without defining & constraining parameters, the future
of warfare ?

(f) How is the future war likely to be waged ?

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The Concept of Sovereign State

6. Before we try to delve into war, let us try to understand the idea of sovereignty.
Lassa Oppenheim, an authority on International Law asserts, “There exists perhaps no
conception the meaning of which is more controversial than that of sovereignty. It is an
indisputable fact that this conception….has never had a meaning which was universally
agreed upon”. Nevertheless, for practical purposes, the current notion of state
sovereignty contains four aspects – territory, population, authority and recognition.

7. Is Westphalia really the start point of the idea of a nation state? Well Britain,
France & Spain were nation states 200 years before the Treaty of Westphalia. Even so,
Westphalia established the concept of sovereignty for the western world (read
Europeans), because they had an overarching allegiance to the Holy Roman Empire.
Were we Indians bound by such an allegiance to a central religious authority ? The
Mauryans, Gupta, Kushana, Mughal & Maratha were sovereign empires in their own
right. So were the Qin, Tang & Qing empires in China.

The Concept of War

8. War takes place when the sovereignty of a particular state or a kingdom is

threatened or when the interests of the state or the kingdom (which we now know as
„national interests) are threatened. The threat to sovereignty necessarily has to emanate
from a trans-national entity – be it another state or non state actors acting on behalf of
another state or acting independently with the aim of overthrowing the extant regime.
Thus the act by non state actors necessarily has to entail the capture of power at the
target state or overthrow of the incumbent regime.

9. War is defined as a state of armed conflict between societies. It is characterized

by extreme aggression, destruction and mortality, using regular or irregular military
forces. War is necessarily violent. And the violent needs to be attributable. Non-
attributable violence cannot be classified as an act of war. Similarly, non-attributable
non-violent acts such as cyber attacks cannot be classified as acts of war. Actions such
as cyber hacks, power grid locks and data thefts, need to have a violent component or
outcome in order to be construed as an act of war. If an act of war is non-attributable,
say such as a cyber attack, then it may well be „not considered as an act of war’.
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10. Hybrid Warfare. The ARTRAC pamphlet on „Hybrid Warfare‟ describes it as

one which “covers the full spectrum of warfare and includes conventional capabilities,
irregular tactics, terrorism and acts of criminal disorder and warfare in cyberspace and
informational domains.” It goes on to emphasise that Hybrid warfare requires a „Whole
of Nation‟ approach. The counter query is, haven‟t wars always been whole-of-nation
affairs, especially in the modern era commencing with the Napoleonic wars when the
concept of levee en masse was adopted ? Wasn‟t the entire population of Europe at
arms during the Second World War ? Wasn‟t the role of the Partisans crucial to the
defeat of the German Army during the invasion of Russia ? Weren‟t new frontiers in
technology breached during this period with the endeavour of tilting the war in one‟s
own favour ? Wasn‟t the informational domain used to great effect by both sides, be it
for propaganda or for deception ? In our context, didn‟t Pakistan use their irregulars
thrice (‟47, ‟65 and ‟99) against us in conventional conflicts ? Warfare right through the
ages has always involved subterfuge and deception – be it idea of the Trojan Horse or
the many deceptions engineered by Lord Krishna during the Kurukshetra war. War has
always been an all subsuming and an all consuming experience. By according it new
labels such as Hybrid or Unrestricted Warfares, one is actually belittling war as it was
waged in the earlier times.

Is Anarchic Violence War ?

11. The ‘Art’ of War. Warfare in the Indian context was always a nuanced affair –
sama (diplomacy), dana (appeasement), bheda (sanctions), danda (punitive action).
Bismarck once said, “war is one of the most beautiful things in the world.” The concepts
of operational art and manouvre theory call for high levels of erudition in the art of
warfare. After elevating warfare to an art form, how can one accept downright terrorism
as the next step in the evolution of warfare ? War is supposed to be waged under
certain parameters, circumscribed by rules/ laws of armed conflict. The extant
parameters as enshrined in Laws of Armed Conflict, Geneva Conventions and
numerous treaties and agreements on how armed conflict is to be conducted, have not
only „humanised‟ war to a certain extent, but have impelled mankind to upgrade
technological means to wage battle. Dissident members and disgruntled elements have
existed from times immemorial. The actions by non state actors against the state most
often do not conform to laid down rules, laws & norms. Thus it a travesty of justice to
elevate brutal acts of terrorism to the exalted status of warfare. At the same time, Von
Creveld offers a sobering counterpoint that while “ …„civilized‟ 20th century warfare may
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have forbidden individual soldiers to loot and rape, (but) went right ahead when it was a
question of destroying entire cities from the air”. He goes on to say that “ as old war
conventions fade away, new one will take its place”. But he also warns that “its
establishment will be accompanied by many outrages, accidental as well as deliberate”.

12. Insurgency and War. Insurgents and insurgency are post colonial
phenomena borne of artificial and arbitrary borders drawn by departing imperial powers.
Insurgencies are waged by disaffected groups against the local government or a foreign
occupation force. When the local government battles the insurgents, as it is in our
context, the insurgency should rightly be deemed an issue of internal security. When the
insurgents fight an occupation force, as it was the case in Afghanistan and Iraq for the
ISAF or the US forces, it was no different from the French Resistance Force or the
Polish Underground or the Russian Partisans fighting the Germans. Insurgency is just
what it is. It ought not to be confused with war !

13. Legality of 4 GW Method of Fighting. If 4 GW measures can indeed be

deemed as „warfare‟, then can they be codified the way we have codified the Laws of
Armed Conflict ? Is it acceptable for two states to fight the 4 GW way ? Can a state fight
the 4 GW way with the insurgents. If one cannot codify it, then it obviously means that
such measures are beyond the pale of law, in other words, they are illegal, maybe even
criminal. If you do codify it, there is a very real danger of rogue states and maniacal
dictators justifying genocide and war crimes. Martin Von Creveld warns that since war is
among the most imitative of all human activities, the very process of combating low-
intensity conflict will cause both sides to become alike, unless it can be brought to a
quick end.

14. Willingness of the State to Employ Violence. Martin Von Creveld, in his
book „On Future War‟ (1991), makes an interesting point that if states become too
reticent in resorting to force to resolve conflicts and protect the interests of its citizens, it
may lead to the loss of loyalty or allegiance of the citizens to the state. This, in turn,
would lead to the slow demise of the state as we know it. He offers some interesting
predictions on the shape of future war :-

(a) Conventional war will be replaced by low intensity conflicts often waged by
non state actors. Such conflicts will be protracted, bloody and horrible.
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(b) Legal monopoly of armed force will be wrested from the state. Existing
distinctions between war and crime will break down. Often crime will be disguised
as war.

(c) The demise of conventional war will cause strategy in the Clausewitzian
sense to disappear.

(d) The need to combat low intensity conflicts will cause regular forces to
degenerate into police forces, or in case the struggle lasts for very long, mere
armed gangs.

(e) National frontiers may become meaningless.

(f) As frontiers go, so will territorial states.

(g) Old conventions will be replaced by new.

(h) Weaponry will become less sophisticated. Major military technological

research and development will grind to a halt.

15. Many of Von Creveld‟s predictions sound alarmingly true when one witnesses the
nature of conflicts in Africa, Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. However, human nature craves
for order. True to the adage „Power abhors vacuum‟, sooner or later one of the
competing groups will re-establish order in the conflict zone. We witnessed this
phenomenon when the Taliban re-established a sense of order in Afghanistan, albeit
briefly, after quelling the reign of multiple warlords. The Taliban became „the state‟ for a
brief period. As to the reticence of the state to employ violence to protect the interests of
its citizens, one only needs to look at the examples of US response to the 9/11 terror
strikes, the willingness of Israel to escalate violence in retaliation to the capture of its
soldier in 2014 by Hamas and even the operations being carried out by the Iraqi state
forces to re-take the territories captured by ISIS. The surgical strikes executed by us in
retaliation to cross border terrorist activities, is a case in point in Indian context. A
democratically elected government has to cater to its electorate, while an authoritarian
state would always feels compelled to showcase its decisiveness.
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Is the Relevance of State Diminishing ?

16. “The most important political distinction among countries," Huntington writes in
his book Political Order in Changing Societies (1968), "concerns not their form of
government but their degree of government." In other words, strong democracies and
strong dictatorships have more in common than strong democracies and weak
democracies. American journalist, Walter Lippmann says, "There is no greater necessity
for men who live in communities than that they be governed, self-governed if possible,
well-governed if they are fortunate, but in any event, governed." Huntington makes the
point that stability precedes freedom. Members of a community look for order first and
freedom, development etc as follow-on benefits. When the Taliban established their rule
in the mid nineties quelling the warlords, many Afghans actually welcomed the order,
stability and predictability that they brought about, at least initially. Such order and
stability could only be brought about by a political entity that is able to exercise
administrative power over for the betterment of the community. So, two inferences could
be drawn from these assertions :-

(a) The Mauryan „state‟ under Emperor Ashoka or the Mughal „state‟ under
Emperor Akbar or the Chola „state‟ under Rajendra Chola were as well governed
and, one daresay, as sovereign as any of the post Westphalian nation state, in
that particular period of time.

(b) To imagine that the relevance or the existence of the state is likely to be
threatened by non state actors who can peddle only violence and ideology goes
against the grain of basic human nature.

17. Alvin Toffler in his book “War and Anti War (1992)” postulated that concepts such
as patriotism, nationalism etc are typical of „Second Wave Civilizations‟, that is nations
whose economy is based on mass production and mass labour. He said that „Third
Wave Civilizations‟ whose economy is based on knowledge and information were more
likely to transcend the binds of nationalism. But his theory flies in the face of Donald
Trump‟s ascent to Presidency riding on the tide of American nationalism and anti-
immigrant rhetoric. The hardened stance that many European countries took against
refugee influx is indicative of the fact that national borders are here to stay. By
extension, the relevance of the state will continue atleast in the foreseeable future.
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18. Lind talks about the monopoly over armed violence passing over from the state
to Non state actors. But, of late we have been witness to a rather peculiar development.
The Non state actors have been trying to assume the trappings and legitimacy of a
state. Islamic „State‟, Taliban etc are some of the examples. Here again, Huntington
offers a counter postulate. He says that the states or communities that are governed
well, wage war well too. He states the examples of Sparta, Rome, Britain and US to
amplify his point. One might counter that there are several non state actors too who
wage war equally well – Hezbollah, LTTE & IRA to name a few. In such cases one
might concede that the ability for organization that these entities display actually
indicates that they may, at a later point in time, may morph into a political entity that
may stand for a „conventional state‟. Thus it is not unsafe to assert that that the priority
right for organized armed violence continues to remain with the state.

Prospects of a Conventional War

19. It is true that large scale conventional wars between two or more major nations
are becoming lesser and lesser likely as the sanctity of international borders get
solidified with every passing year. It is equally true that more people have been killed
due to terrorist strikes than have been killed in conventional conflicts since the end of
WW II. But extending such comparisons, in India, more people die of malnutrition and
water borne diseases every year than all the war and terrorist/ insurgency related
deaths since 1947 put together. When viewed in context, conventional forces are the
insurance policy for a nation, especially for a country like ours with unsettled borders
living in a troubled neighbourhood. It is pertinent to recall Nehru‟s (doomed) assertion
that India needed not a standing army but only a police force. How tragically wrong was
he proved in his own lifetime. Cut to the recent face-offs that we have had with the PLA
at Depsang, Chumar and most recently at Doklam. Is our standing up to the Chinese
military and diplomatic brinkmanship even imaginable if our principled stance had not
been backed by capability?

Should We Consider ‘4th Generation Warfare’ a Doctrinal Evolution ?

20. When is a doctrine considered new or even revolutionary? Is it one when it leads
to new forms and methods of doing things ? Or does one use the „doctrine‟ to make
sense of what is already happening around us ? For example, the Blitzkrieg was a new
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doctrine since it wasn‟t practiced in that form before it was propounded. The concepts of
Massive Retaliation (1954), Flexible Response (1967), Active Defence (1976), Air Land
Battle (1982), our own Cold Start (2004), Pakistan‟s NCWF (2011) conform to the idea
of doctrinal evolution leading to a different manner of war fighting. Does the 4 GW
„doctrine‟ stands true of this examination ? Wren‟t there terrorists and terrorism battling
the state before the „doctrine‟ was propounded ?

21. Generational shifts from first through the third generations are characterized by a
key technological development that impacted upon the manner in which war was
prosecuted, the doctrinal precepts that incorporated the technology and changes to the
organizational structure that integrated and internalized both technology and the
doctrine. It is moot to query as to what is that key technological development and
organizational adaptation, which didn‟t form part of the third generation but which now
drives the doctrine behind the fourth generation of warfare.

22. It is necessary for the conscious application of a doctrine to call that applicant a
practitioner or even an expert of that doctrine. Does 4 GW or their so called practitioners
stand up to scrutiny in this respect ? Doctrine is based on a theoretical foundation.
Russian Deep Operations theory was a doctrine developed in the 1920‟s & 30‟s by
Tukachevskii & Triandafilov. The Russian Field Service Regulations of 1937 was the
outcome of this doctrine to solve the stalemate of WWI, through systems theory and
was developed after much churning and debates. Are we amenable to according
terrorism the exalted status of intellectual evolution ?

Relevance of Individual Vs the Team in Contemporary Warfare

23. The spate of lone wolf attacks that have proliferated in the recent past have
prompted many an observer to comment that warfare has been „de-massified‟. Indeed,
the concept of de-massification of war finds mention in Alvin Toffler‟s “War and Anti
war”. But here again, one has to be cautious enough not to confuse random acts of
terrorism with warfare. Small teams of Special Forces operatives executing high impact,
high risk missions do symbolify „de-massification‟ of warfare, but then, these SOF
operatives are organs of the state and thus are legal practitioners of violence. One
should be careful before according the status of a „warrior‟ to individual hackers and
nerds who operate in the non-attributable cyber domain, especially in peacetime, since
anything non-attributable cannot be deemed an act of war. However, attributable cyber
attacks to jam or hack into the adversary‟s networks are indeed military in nature and
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need to be acknowledged as such. However, it may also be appreciated that hacks and
attacks of such dimensions call for resources that are well beyond the capability of the
individual.

24. If attributable violence is what is to characterize war, then one has to have
people who will be willing to put themselves in the line of danger to get the mission
accomplished for the sake of his team, howsoever big or small it might be. The tactics of
line and column may be a thing of past, but one cannot discount the importance of
training, discipline or team spirit for a warrior.

25. Yuval Noah Harari in his book “Sapiens : A History of Mankind” says that
concepts such as money, religion, nation, patriotism and ideologies of all kinds are
nothing but very compelling fiction. It is such fiction which makes a man a communal
being. Man has risen to the top of the food chain by being a team player. So as long as
man buys into any of the above mentioned fictions, he has to be a team man, with the
attendant demands of being part of the team – team spirit, sacrifice (fictional concepts
themselves!). The day man stops being part of a team, he ceases to be the master of
the world !

Conclusion

26. The world is yet to stabilize from the post colonial experience. South Asia, Middle
East and Africa have been scarred by the manner in which arbitrary boundaries have
created nations which do not have ethnological or geographical logic to sustain them.
Since some of these trouble spots are so resource rich that the powers of the day have
not been able to resist the temptation of fishing in troubled waters. Ethnic pride and
cultural identities have had a powerful and everlasting appeal right through the ages.
Standing up to the oppressor has always been the mark of heroes through the
millennia. What the US is facing in its many battle grounds are resistance movements to
what is perceived to be the illegal occupation of their (insurgents‟) home country. This
experience is peculiar to the US and does not necessarily apply to the rest of the world,
and definitely not to us. What we face in our context inside the country is a mix of
insurgency led by disaffected groups caused by faulty governance and cross border
terrorism. These cannot be confused with war. The threat of conventional war may not
confront US, but in our context, the likelihood of an Indo - Pak war is a real possibility.
Our Western and Northern borders have not yet been settled and therefore remain a
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live issue to contend with. In such a situation, it would do us well to contextualize

academic issues before internalizing them. Countries with real enemies fight them; the
ones with imagined enemies, theorise !!

Bibliography

1. Revenge of Geography, Robert D Kaplan (2012).

2. On Future War, Martin Von Creveld (1991).

3. War and Anti War, Alvin and Heidi Toffler (1992).

4. Political Order in Changing Societies, Samuel Huntington (1968).

5. Sapiens : A History of Human Kind, Yuval Noah Harari (2013).

6. Developing a Concept for Hybrid Warfare, ARTRAC (REDFOR) Publicaation

(2013).

7. Recent Trends in Thinking about Warfare, Albert A Nofi (2006).

8. From Fourth Generation Warfare to Hybrid War, Strategic Research Project by

Col Steven C Williamson, US Army (2009).

9. Evolution of War into the Fourth Generation: A Historical Perspective, Col CJ

Jayachandran (CLAWS Journal, Winter 2009)