RULE 72

Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules

Section 1. Subject matter of special proceedings. — Rules of special proceedings are

provided for in the following cases:

(a) Settlement of estate of deceased persons;

(b) Escheat;

(c) Guardianship and custody of children;

(d) Trustees;

(e) Adoption;

(f) Rescission and revocation of adoption;

(g) Hospitalization of insane persons;

(h) Habeas corpus;

(i) Change of name;

(j) Voluntary dissolution of corporations;

(k) Judicial approval of voluntary recognition of minor natural children;

(l) Constitution of family home;

(m) Declaration of absence and death;

(n) Cancellation of correction of entries in the civil registry.

Section 2. Applicability of rules of civil actions. — In the absence of special provisions, the
rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special
proceedings.

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 1. G.R. No. 133000           October 2, 2001

PATRICIA NATCHER, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OFAPPEALS AND THE HEIR OF GRACIANO DEL ROSARIO – LETICIA
DEL ROSARIO, EMILIA DEL RESORIO – MANANGAN, ROSALINDA FUENTES LLANA,
RODOLFO FUENTES, ALBERTO FUENTES, EVELYN DEL ROSARIO, and EDUARDO DEL
ROSARIO, respondent..

BUENA, J.:

May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an action for
reconveyance annulment of title with damages, adjudicate matters relating to the
settlement of the estate of a deceased person particularly on questions as to advancement
of property made by the decedent to any of the heirs?

Sought to be reversed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the

decision1 of public respondent Court of Appeals, the decretal portion of which declares:

"Wherefore in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment appealed from is

reversed and set aside and another one entered annulling the Deed of Sale executed
by Graciano Del Rosario in favor of defendant-appellee Patricia Natcher, and ordering
the Register of Deeds to Cancel TCT No. 186059 and reinstate TCT No. 107443
without prejudice to the filing of a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate
of Graciano Del Rosario in a proper court. No costs.

"So ordered."

Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a parcel of
land with an area of 9,322 square meters located in Manila and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 11889. Upon the death of Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with
his six children, namely: Bayani, Ricardo, Rafael, Leticia, Emiliana and Nieves, entered into
an extrajudicial settlement of Graciana's estate on 09 February 1954 adjudicating and
dividing among themselves the real property subject of TCT No. 11889. Under the
agreement, Graciano received 8/14 share while each of the six children received 1/14 share
of the said property. Accordingly, TCT No. 11889 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, TCT No.
35980 was issued in the name of Graciano and the Six children.1âwphi1.nêt

Further, on 09 February 1954, said heirs executed and forged an "Agreement of

Consolidation-Subdivision of Real Property with Waiver of Rights" where they subdivided
among themselves the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 35980 into several lots. Graciano
then donated to his children, share and share alike, a portion of his interest in the land
amounting to 4,849.38 square meters leaving only 447.60 square meters registered under
Graciano's name, as covered by TCT No. 35988. Subsequently, the land subject of TCT No.
35988 was further subdivided into two separate lots where the first lot with a land area of
80.90 square meter was registered under TCT No. 107442 and the second lot with a land
area of 396.70 square meters was registered under TCT No. 107443. Eventually, Graciano
sold the first lot2 to a third person but retained ownership over the second lot. 3

On 20 March 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher. During their
marriage, Graciano sold the land covered by TCT No. 107443 to his wife Patricia as a result

2
of which TCT No. 1860594 was issued in the latter's name. On 07 October 1985,Graciano
died leaving his second wife Patricia and his six children by his first marriage, as heirs.

In a complaint5 filed in Civil Case No. 71075 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 55, herein private respondents alleged that upon Graciano's death, petitioner
Natcher, through the employment of fraud, misrepresentation and forgery, acquired TCT
No. 107443, by making it appear that Graciano executed a Deed of Sale dated 25 June
19876 in favor herein petitioner resulting in the cancellation of TCT No. 107443 and the
issuance of TCT no. 186059 in the name of Patricia Natcher. Similarly, herein private
respondents alleged in said complaint that as a consequence of such fraudulent sale, their
legitimes have been impaired.

In her answer7 dated 19 August 1994, herein petitioner Natcher averred that she was legally
married to Graciano in 20 March 1980 and thus, under the law, she was likewise considered
a compulsory heir of the latter. Petitioner further alleged that during Graciano's lifetime,
Graciano already distributed, in advance, properties to his children, hence, herein private
respondents may not anymore claim against Graciano's estate or against herein petitioner's
property.

After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, rendered a decision dated 26
January 1996 holding:8

"1) The deed of sale executed by the late Graciano del Rosario in favor of Patricia
Natcher is prohibited by law and thus a complete nullity. There being no evidence
that a separation of property was agreed upon in the marriage settlements or that
there has been decreed a judicial separation of property between them, the spouses
are prohibited from entering (into) a contract of sale;

"2) The deed as sale cannot be likewise regarded as a valid donation as it was
equally prohibited by law under Article 133 of the New Civil Code;

"3) Although the deed of sale cannot be regarded as such or as a donation, it may
however be regarded as an extension of advance inheritance of Patricia Natcher
being a compulsory heir of the deceased."

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the lower court's decision
ratiocinating, inter alia:

"It is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal
distribution of the estate. The court a quo, trying an ordinary action for
reconveyance / annulment of title, went beyond its jurisdiction when it performed
the acts proper only in a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a
deceased person. XXX

"X X X Thus the court a quo erred in regarding the subject property as advance
inheritance. What the court should have done was merely to rule on the validity of
(the) sale and leave the issue on advancement to be resolved in a separate
proceeding instituted for that purpose. XXX"

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Aggrieved, herein petitioner seeks refuge under our protective mantle through the
expediency of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and assails the appellate court's decision "for
being contrary to law and the facts of the case."

We concur with the Court of Appeals and find no merit in the instant petition.

Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action and special
proceedings, in this wise:

"XXX a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.

"A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are government by the rules
for ordinary civil actions, subject to specific rules prescribed for a special civil action.

"XXX

"c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a

right or a particular fact."

As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked distinction between an action
and a special proceeding. An action is a formal demand of one's right in a court of justice in
the manner prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the method of applying legal
remedies according to definite established rules. The term "special proceeding" may be
defined as an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a
particular fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are required unless the
statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings, the remedy is granted generally upon
an application or motion."9

Citing American Jurisprudence, a noted authority in Remedial Law expounds further:

"It may accordingly be stated generally that actions include those proceedings which
are instituted and prosecuted according to the ordinary rules and provisions relating
to actions at law or suits in equity, and that special proceedings include those
proceedings which are not ordinary in this sense, but is instituted and prosecuted
according to some special mode as in the case of proceedings commenced without
summons and prosecuted without regular pleadings, which are characteristics of
ordinary actions. XXX A special proceeding must therefore be in the nature of a
distinct and independent proceeding for particular relief, such as may be instituted
independently of a pending action, by petition or motion upon notice." 10

Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages
is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person
such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special
proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as provided for in
the Rules of Court.

Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall
within the exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.

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Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to advancement made or
alleged to have been made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by
the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court
thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir.

While it may be true that the Rules used the word "may", it is nevertheless clear that the
same provision11 contemplates a probate court when it speaks of the "court having
jurisdiction of the estate proceedings".

Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction, is
devoid of authority to render an adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the
real property in favor of herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 471075 for
reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is not, to our mind, the proper vehicle to
thresh out said question. Moreover, under the present circumstances, the RTC of Manila,
Branch 55 was not properly constituted as a probate court so as to validly pass upon the
question of advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his wife, herein
petitioner Natcher.

At this point, the appellate court's disquisition is elucidating:

"Before a court can make a partition and distribution of the estate of a deceased, it
must first settle the estate in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose. In the
case at hand, the court a quo determined the respective legitimes of the plaintiffs-
appellants and assigned the subject property owned by the estate of the deceased to
defendant-appellee without observing the proper proceedings provided (for) by the
Rules of Court. From the aforecited discussions, it is clear that trial courts trying an
ordinary action cannot resolve to perform acts pertaining to a special proceeding
because it is subject to specific prescribed rules. Thus, the court a quo erred in
regarding the subject property as an advance inheritance." 12

In resolving the case at bench, this Court is not unaware of our pronouncement in Coca vs.
Borromeo13 and Mendoza vs. Teh14 that whether a particular matter should be resolved
by the Regional Trial Court (then Court of First Instance) in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction or its limited probate jurisdiction is not a jurisdictional issue but a mere question
of procedure. In essence, it is procedural question involving a mode of practice "which may
be waived".15

Notwithstanding, we do not see any waiver on the part of herein private respondents
inasmuch as the six children of the decedent even assailed the authority of the trail court,
acting in its general jurisdiction, to rule on this specific issue of advancement made by the
decedent to petitioner.

Analogously, in a train of decisions, this Court has consistently enunciated the long standing
principle that although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or
ownership, yet if the interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one of collation
or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate
court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to
decide the question of ownership.16

Similarly in Mendoza vs. Teh, we had occasion to hold:

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 "In the present suit, no settlement of estate is involved, but merely an allegation
seeking appointment as estate administratrix which does not necessarily involve
settlement of estate that would have invited the exercise of the limited
jurisdiction of a probate court.17 (emphasis supplied)

Of equal importance is that before any conclusion about the legal share due to a compulsory
heir may be reached, it is necessary that certain steps be taken first.18 The net estate of the
decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all payable obligations and charges from the
value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations
subject to collation would be added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, the
legitime of the compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and only thereafter can it be
ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes. 19

A perusal of the records, specifically the antecedents and proceedings in the present case,
reveals that the trial court failed to observe established rules of procedure governing the
settlement of the estate of Graciano Del Rosario. This Court sees no cogent reason to
sanction the non-observance of these well-entrenched rules and hereby holds that under
the prevailing circumstances, a probate court, in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction, is
indeed the best forum to ventilate and adjudge the issue of advancement as well as other
related matters involving the settlement of Graciano Del Rosario's estate.1âwphi1.nêt

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is

hereby AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing, De Leon, Jr., Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

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 2. G.R. No. 174975               January 20, 2009

LUISA KHO MONTAÑER, ALEJANDRO MONTAÑER, JR., LILLIBETH MONTAÑER-

BARRIOS, AND RHODORA ELEANOR MONTAÑER-DALUPAN, Petitioners,
vs.
SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT, FOURTH SHARI'A JUDICIAL DISTRICT, MARAWI CITY,
LILING DISANGCOPAN, AND ALMAHLEEN LILING S. MONTAÑER, Respondents.

DECISION

PUNO, C.J.:

This Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeks to set aside the Orders of the Shari’a
District Court, Fourth Shari’a Judicial District, Marawi City, dated August 22, 2006 1 and
September 21, 2006.2

On August 17, 1956, petitioner Luisa Kho Montañer, a Roman Catholic, married Alejandro
Montañer, Sr. at the Immaculate Conception Parish in Cubao, Quezon City. 3 Petitioners
Alejandro Montañer, Jr., Lillibeth Montañer-Barrios, and Rhodora Eleanor Montañer-Dalupan
are their children.4 On May 26, 1995, Alejandro Montañer, Sr. died.5

On August 19, 2005, private respondents Liling Disangcopan and her daughter, Almahleen
Liling S. Montañer, both Muslims, filed a "Complaint" for the judicial partition of properties
before the Shari’a District Court.6 The said complaint was entitled "Almahleen Liling S.
Montañer and Liling M. Disangcopan v. the Estates and Properties of Late Alejandro
Montañer, Sr., Luisa Kho Montañer, Lillibeth K. Montañer, Alejandro Kho Montañer, Jr., and
Rhodora Eleanor K. Montañer," and docketed as "Special Civil Action No. 7-05."7 In the said
complaint, private respondents made the following allegations: (1) in May 1995, Alejandro
Montañer, Sr. died; (2) the late Alejandro Montañer, Sr. is a Muslim; (3) petitioners are the
first family of the decedent; (4) Liling Disangcopan is the widow of the decedent; (5)
Almahleen Liling S. Montañer is the daughter of the decedent; and (6) the estimated value
of and a list of the properties comprising the estate of the decedent.8 Private respondents
prayed for the Shari’a District Court to order, among others, the following: (1) the partition
of the estate of the decedent; and (2) the appointment of an administrator for the estate of
the decedent.9

Petitioners filed an Answer with a Motion to Dismiss mainly on the following grounds: (1)
the Shari’a District Court has no jurisdiction over the estate of the late Alejandro Montañer,
Sr., because he was a Roman Catholic; (2) private respondents failed to pay the correct
amount of docket fees; and (3) private respondents’ complaint is barred by prescription, as
it seeks to establish filiation between Almahleen Liling S. Montañer and the decedent,
pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code.10

On November 22, 2005, the Shari’a District Court dismissed the private respondents’
complaint. The district court held that Alejandro Montañer, Sr. was not a Muslim, and its
jurisdiction extends only to the settlement and distribution of the estate of deceased
Muslims.11

On December 12, 2005, private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration. 12 On
December 28, 2005, petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration,
alleging that the motion for reconsideration lacked a notice of hearing. 13 On January 17,

7
2006, the Shari’a District Court denied petitioners’ opposition. 14 Despite finding that the said
motion for reconsideration "lacked notice of hearing," the district court held that such defect
was cured as petitioners "were notified of the existence of the pleading," and it took
cognizance of the said motion.15 The Shari’a District Court also reset the hearing for the
motion for reconsideration.16

In its first assailed order dated August 22, 2006, the Shari’a District Court reconsidered its
order of dismissal dated November 22, 2005.17 The district court allowed private
respondents to adduce further evidence.18 In its second assailed order dated September 21,
2006, the Shari’a District Court ordered the continuation of trial, trial on the merits,
adducement of further evidence, and pre-trial conference.19

Seeking recourse before this Court, petitioners raise the following issues:

I.

RESPONDENT SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT – MARAWI CITY LACKS JURISDICTION OVER

PETITIONERS WHO ARE ROMAN CATHOLICS AND NON-MUSLIMS.

II.

RESPONDENT SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT – MARAWI CITY DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION
OVER "THE ESTATES AND PROPERTIES OF THE LATE ALEJANDRO MONTAÑER, SR." WHICH
IS NOT A NATURAL OR JURIDICAL PERSON WITH CAPACITY TO BE SUED.

III.

RESPONDENT SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE
COMPLAINT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AGAINST PETITIONERS DUE TO NON-PAYMENT OF
THE FILING AND DOCKETING FEES.

IV.

RESPONDENT SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT—MARAWI CITY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DENIED THE OPPOSITION
OF PETITIONERS AND THEN GRANTED THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF
RESPONDENTS LILING DISANGCOPAN, ET AL. WHICH WAS FATALLY DEFECTIVE FOR LACK
OF A "NOTICE OF HEARING."

V.

RESPONDENT SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT—MARAWI CITY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT SET SPL. CIVIL ACTION 7-
05 FOR TRIAL EVEN IF THE COMPLAINT PLAINLY REVEALS THAT RESPONDENT ALMAHLEEN
LILING S. MONTAÑER SEEKS RECOGNITION FROM ALEJANDRO MONTAÑER, SR. WHICH
CAUSE OF ACTION PRESCRIBED UPON THE DEATH OF ALEJANDRO MONTAÑER, SR. ON MAY
26, 1995.

In their Comment to the Petition for Certiorari, private respondents stress that the Shari’a
District Court must be given the opportunity to hear and decide the question of whether the
decedent is a Muslim in order to determine whether it has jurisdiction. 20

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Jurisdiction: Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Muslims

Petitioners’ first argument, regarding the Shari’a District Court’s jurisdiction, is dependent
on a question of fact, whether the late Alejandro Montañer, Sr. is a Muslim. Inherent in this
argument is the premise that there has already been a determination resolving such a
question of fact. It bears emphasis, however, that the assailed orders did not determine
whether the decedent is a Muslim. The assailed orders did, however, set a hearing for the
purpose of resolving this issue.

Article 143(b) of Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines, provides that the Shari’a District Courts have exclusive
original jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims:

ARTICLE 143. Original jurisdiction. — (1) The Shari'a District Court shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction over:

xxxx

(b) All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of deceased
Muslims, probate of wills, issuance of letters of administration or appointment of
administrators or executors regardless of the nature or the aggregate value of the property.

The determination of the nature of an action or proceeding is controlled by the averments

and character of the relief sought in the complaint or petition. 21 The designation given by
parties to their own pleadings does not necessarily bind the courts to treat it according to
the said designation. Rather than rely on "a falsa descriptio or defective caption," courts are
"guided by the substantive averments of the pleadings." 22

Although private respondents designated the pleading filed before the Shari’a District Court
as a "Complaint" for judicial partition of properties, it is a petition for the issuance of letters
of administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the decedent. It contains
sufficient jurisdictional facts required for the settlement of the estate of a deceased
Muslim,23 such as the fact of Alejandro Montañer, Sr.’s death as well as the allegation that
he is a Muslim. The said petition also contains an enumeration of the names of his legal
heirs, so far as known to the private respondents, and a probable list of the properties left
by the decedent, which are the very properties sought to be settled before a probate court.
Furthermore, the reliefs prayed for reveal that it is the intention of the private respondents
to seek judicial settlement of the estate of the decedent.24 These include the following: (1)
the prayer for the partition of the estate of the decedent; and (2) the prayer for the
appointment of an administrator of the said estate.

We cannot agree with the contention of the petitioners that the district court does not have
jurisdiction over the case because of an allegation in their answer with a motion to dismiss
that Montañer, Sr. is not a Muslim. Jurisdiction of a court over the nature of the action and
its subject matter does not depend upon the defenses set forth in an answer25 or a motion
to dismiss.26 Otherwise, jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the defendant 27 or
result in having "a case either thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly delayed by
simple stratagem.28 Indeed, the "defense of lack of jurisdiction which is dependent on a
question of fact does not render the court to lose or be deprived of its jurisdiction." 29

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The same rationale applies to an answer with a motion to dismiss.30 In the case at bar, the
Shari’a District Court is not deprived of jurisdiction simply because petitioners raised as a
defense the allegation that the deceased is not a Muslim. The Shari’a District Court has the
authority to hear and receive evidence to determine whether it has jurisdiction, which
requires an a priori determination that the deceased is a Muslim. If after hearing, the
Shari’a District Court determines that the deceased was not in fact a Muslim, the district
court should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.

Special Proceedings

The underlying assumption in petitioners’ second argument, that the proceeding before the
Shari’a District Court is an ordinary civil action against a deceased person, rests on an
erroneous understanding of the proceeding before the court a quo. Part of the confusion
may be attributed to the proceeding before the Shari’a District Court, where the parties
were designated either as plaintiffs or defendants and the case was denominated as a
special civil action. We reiterate that the proceedings before the court a quo are for the
issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the
deceased, which is a special proceeding. Section 3(c) of the Rules of Court (Rules) defines a
special proceeding as "a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a
particular fact." This Court has applied the Rules, particularly the rules on special
proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim.31 In a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of estate, the applicants
seek to establish the fact of death of the decedent and later to be duly recognized as among
the decedent’s heirs, which would allow them to exercise their right to participate in the
settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent.32 Here, the respondents seek to
establish the fact of Alejandro Montañer, Sr.’s death and, subsequently, for private
respondent Almahleen Liling S. Montañer to be recognized as among his heirs, if such is the
case in fact.

Petitioners’ argument, that the prohibition against a decedent or his estate from being a
party defendant in a civil action33 applies to a special proceeding such as the settlement of
the estate of the deceased, is misplaced. Unlike a civil action which has definite adverse
parties, a special proceeding has no definite adverse party. The definitions of a civil action
and a special proceeding, respectively, in the Rules illustrate this difference. A civil action, in
which "a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention
or redress of a wrong"34 necessarily has definite adverse parties, who are either the plaintiff
or defendant.35 On the other hand, a special proceeding, "by which a party seeks to
establish a status, right, or a particular fact,"36 has one definite party, who petitions or
applies for a declaration of a status, right, or particular fact, but no definite adverse party.
In the case at bar, it bears emphasis that the estate of the decedent is not being sued for
any cause of action. As a special proceeding, the purpose of the settlement of the estate of
the decedent is to determine all the assets of the estate,37 pay its liabilities,38 and to
distribute the residual to those entitled to the same.39

Docket Fees

Petitioners’ third argument, that jurisdiction was not validly acquired for non-payment of
docket fees, is untenable. Petitioners point to private respondents’ petition in the proceeding
before the court a quo, which contains an allegation estimating the decedent’s estate as the
basis for the conclusion that what private respondents paid as docket fees was insufficient.
Petitioners’ argument essentially involves two aspects: (1) whether the clerk of court

10
correctly assessed the docket fees; and (2) whether private respondents paid the correct
assessment of the docket fees.

Filing the appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket fees vest
a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter.40 If the party filing the case paid less
than the correct amount for the docket fees because that was the amount assessed by the
clerk of court, the responsibility of making a deficiency assessment lies with the same clerk
of court.41 In such a case, the lower court concerned will not automatically lose jurisdiction,
because of a party’s reliance on the clerk of court’s insufficient assessment of the docket
fees.42 As "every citizen has the right to assume and trust that a public officer charged by
law with certain duties knows his duties and performs them in accordance with law," the
party filing the case cannot be penalized with the clerk of court’s insufficient
assessment.43 However, the party concerned will be required to pay the deficiency. 44

In the case at bar, petitioners did not present the clerk of court’s assessment of the docket
fees. Moreover, the records do not include this assessment. There can be no determination
of whether private respondents correctly paid the docket fees without the clerk of court’s
assessment.

Exception to Notice of Hearing

Petitioners’ fourth argument, that private respondents’ motion for reconsideration before the
Shari’a District Court is defective for lack of a notice of hearing, must fail as the unique
circumstances in the present case constitute an exception to this requirement. The Rules
require every written motion to be set for hearing by the applicant and to address the notice
of hearing to all parties concerned.45 The Rules also provide that "no written motion set for
hearing shall be acted upon by the court without proof of service thereof." 46 However, the
Rules allow a liberal construction of its provisions "in order to promote [the] objective of
securing a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding."47 Moreover, this Court has upheld a liberal construction specifically of the rules
of notice of hearing in cases where "a rigid application will result in a manifest failure or
miscarriage of justice especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged defect in the
questioned final and executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the recitals
contained therein."48 In these exceptional cases, the Court considers that "no party can
even claim a vested right in technicalities," and for this reason, cases should, as much as
possible, be decided on the merits rather than on technicalities. 49

The case at bar falls under this exception. To deny the Shari’a District Court of an
opportunity to determine whether it has jurisdiction over a petition for the settlement of the
estate of a decedent alleged to be a Muslim would also deny its inherent power as a court to
control its process to ensure conformity with the law and justice. To sanction such a
situation simply because of a lapse in fulfilling the notice requirement will result in a
miscarriage of justice.

In addition, the present case calls for a liberal construction of the rules on notice of hearing,
because the rights of the petitioners were not affected. This Court has held that an
exception to the rules on notice of hearing is where it appears that the rights of the adverse
party were not affected.50 The purpose for the notice of hearing coincides with procedural
due process,51 for the court to determine whether the adverse party agrees or objects to the
motion, as the Rules do not fix any period within which to file a reply or opposition. 52 In
probate proceedings, "what the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice, but the
absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard." 53 In the case at bar, as

11
evident from the Shari’a District Court’s order dated January 17, 2006, petitioners’ counsel
received a copy of the motion for reconsideration in question. Petitioners were certainly not
denied an opportunity to study the arguments in the said motion as they filed an opposition
to the same. Since the Shari’a District Court reset the hearing for the motion for
reconsideration in the same order, petitioners were not denied the opportunity to object to
the said motion in a hearing. Taken together, these circumstances show that the purpose
for the rules of notice of hearing, procedural process, was duly observed.

Prescription and Filiation

Petitioners’ fifth argument is premature. Again, the Shari’a District Court has not yet
determined whether it has jurisdiction to settle the estate of the decedent. In the event that
a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a decedent is pending, questions
regarding heirship, including prescription in relation to recognition and filiation, should be
raised and settled in the said proceeding.54 The court, in its capacity as a probate court, has
jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of the decedent.55 In the case at bar, the
determination of the heirs of the decedent depends on an affirmative answer to the question
of whether the Shari’a District Court has jurisdiction over the estate of the decedent.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The Orders of the Shari’a District Court, dated
August 22, 2006 and September 21, 2006 respectively, are AFFIRMED. Cost against
petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

12
 3. G.R. No. 230751, April 25, 2018

ESTRELLITA TADEO-MATIAS, Petitioner
vs
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

This is an appeal1 assailing the Decision2 dated November 28, 2016 and Resolution 3 dated
March 20, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 129467.

The facts are as follows:

On April 10, 2012, petitioner Estrellita Tadco-Matias filed before the Regional Trail Court
(RTC) of Tarlac City a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of her husband,
Wifredo N. Matias (Wilfredo).4 The allegations of the petition read:

1. [Petitioner] is of legal age, married to [Wilfredo], Filipino and curr[e]ntly a residnet of

106 Molave street, Zone B. San Miguel Tarlac City;

2. [Wifredo] is of legal age, a member of the Philippine Constabulary and was assigned in
Araya, Pampanga since August 24, 1967[;]

3. The[p]etitioner and [Wilfredo] entered into a lawful marriage on January 7, 1968 in

Imbo, Anda, Pangasinan x x x;

4. After the solemnization of their marriage vows, the couple put up their conjugal home at
106 Molave street, Zone B. San Miguel, Tarlac City;

5. [Wilfredo] continued to serve the Philippines and on September 15, 1979, he set out from
their conjugal home to again serve as a member of the Philippine Constabulary;

6. [Wilfredo] never came back from his tour of duty in Arayat, Pampanga since 1979 and he
never made contact or communicated with the [p]etitioner nor to his relatives;

7. That according to the service record of [Wilfredo] issued by the National Police
Commission, [Wilfredo] was already declared missing since 1979 x x x;

8. Petitioner constantly pestered the then Philippine Constabulary for any news regarding
[her] beloved husband [Wilfredo], but the Philippine Constabulary had no answer to his
whereabouts, [neither] did they have any news of him going AWOL, all they know was he
was assigned to a place frequented by the New People's Army;

9. [W]eeks became years and years became decades, but the [p]etitioner never gave up
hope, and after more than three (3) decades of awaiting, the [p]etitioner is still hopeful, but
the times had been tough on her, specially with a meager source of income coupled with her
age, it is now necessary for her to request for the benefits that rightfully belong to her in
order to survive;

13
10. [T]hat one of the requirements to attain the claim of benefits is for a proof of death or
at least declaration of presumptive death by the Honorable Court;

11. That this petition is being filed not for any other purpose but solely to claim for the
benefit under P.D. No. 1638 as amended.

The petition was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 4850 and was raffled to Branch 65 of the
Tarlac City RTC. A copy of the petition was then furnished to the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG)_.

Subsequently, the OSG filed its notice of appearance on behalf of herein respondent
Republic of the Philippines (Republic).5

On January 15, 2012, the RTC issued a Decision6 in Spec. Proc. No. 4850 granting the
petition. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:7

WHEREFORE in view of the foregoing the Court hereby declared (sic) WILFREDO N. MATIAS
absent or presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family Code of the
Philippines for purpose of claiming financial benefits due to him as former military officer.

xxxx

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)

The Republic questioned the decision of the RTC via a petition for certiotrari.8

On November 28, 2012, the CA rendered a decision granting the certiorari petition of the

Republic and setting aside the decision of the RTC. It accordingly disposed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision

dated January 15, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court, branch 65, Tarlac City, in Special
Proceeding no. 4850 is ANNULED and SET ASIDE, and the petition is DISMISSED.

The CA premised its decision on the following ratiocinations:

1. The RTC erred when it declared Wilfredo presumptively dead on the basis of Article 41 of
the Family Code (FC). Article 41 of the FC does not seek to remarry. If anything, the
petition was invoking the presumption of death established under Articles 390 and 391 of
the Civil Code, and not that provided for under Article 41 of the FC.

2. Be that it may, the petition to declare Wilfredo presumptively dead should have been
dismissed by the RTC. The RTC is without authority to take cognizance of a petition whose
sole purpose is to have a person declared presumptively dead under either Article 390 or
Article 391 of the Civil Code. As been held by jurisprudence, Articles 390 and 391 of the
Civil Code merely express rules of evidence that allow a court or a tribunal to presume that
a person is dead-which presumption may be invoked in any action or proceeding, but itself
cannot be the subject of an independent action or proceeding.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the CA remained steadfast. Hence,this appeal.

14
 Our Ruling

We deny the appeal

The CA was correct. The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by the
petitioner is not an authorized suit and should have been dismissed by the RTC. The RTC's
decision must, therefore, be set aside.

RTC Erred I Declaring the

Presumptive Death of Wilfredo under
Article 41 of the FC; Petitioner's
Petition for the Declaration of
Presumptive Death is Not Based on
Article 41 of the FC, but on the Civil
Code

A conspicuous error in the decision of the RTC must first be addressed.

It can be recalled that the RTC, in fallo of its January 15, 2012 Decision, granted the
petitioner's petition by declaring Wilfredo presumptively dead "under Article 41 of the
FC." By doing so, RTC gave the impression that the petition for the declaration of
presumptive death filed by petitioner was likewise filed pursuant to Article 41 of the
FC.9 This is wrong.

The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by petitioner is not an action that
would have warranted the application of Article 41 of the FC shows that the presumption of
death established therein is only applicable for the purpose of contracting a valid
subsequent marriage under the said law. Thus:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage
shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where
there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of
the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.

Here, petitioner was forthright that she was not seeking the declaration of the presumptive
death Wilfredo as a prerequisite for remarriage. In her petition for the declaration of
presumptive death, petitioner categorically stated that the same was filed "not for any other
purpose but solely to claim for the benefit under P.D. No. 1638 a amended. 10

Given that her petition for the declaration of presumptive death was not filed for the
purpose of remarriage, petitioner was clearly relying on the presumption of death
under either Article 390 or Article 391 of the Civil Code11 as the basis of her

15
petition. Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code express the general rule regarding
presumption s of death for any civil purpose, to wit:

Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absence
still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes except for those of succession.

The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after
an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.

Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of
the estate among the heirs:

(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing,
who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;

(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four
years;

(3) a person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence
has not been known for four years.

Verily, the RTC's use of Article 41 of the FC as its basis in declaring the presumptive death
of Wilfredo was misleading and grossly improper.The petition for the declaration of
presumptive death filed by the petitioner was based on the Civil Code, and not on
Article 41 of the FC.

Petitioner's Petition for Declaration of

Presumptive Death Ought to Have Been
Dismissed; A Petition Whose Sole Objective is
To Declare a Person Presumptively Dead Under
the CivilCode, Like that Filed by the Petitioner
Before the RTC, Is Not a Viable Suit in Our
Jurisdiction

The true fault in the RTC's decision, however, goes beyond its misleading fallo. The
decision itself is objectionable.

Since the petition filed by the petitioner merely seeks the declaration of presumptive death
of Wilfredo under the Civil Code, the RTC should have dismissed such petition outright. This
is because, in our jurisdiction, a petition whose sole objective is to have a person declared
presumptively dead under the Civil Code is not regarded as a valid suit and no court has
any authority to take cognizance of the same.

The above norm had its conceptual roots in the 1948 case of In re: Petition for the
Presumption of Death of Nicolai Szatraw.12 In the said case, we held that a rule creating a
presumption of death13 is merely one of the evidence that-while may be invoked in any
action or proceeding-cannot be the lone subject of an independent action or
proceeding. Szatraw explained:

The rule invoked by the latter is merely one of the evidence which permits the court to
presume that a person had been unheard from in seven years had been established. This

16
presumption may arise and be invoked and made in a case, either in an action or in a
special proceeding, which is tried or heard by, and submitted for decision to, a competent
court. Independently of such an action or special proceeding, the presumption of
death cannot be invoked, nor can it be made the subject of an action or special
proceeding. In this case, there is no right ti be enforced nor is there a remedy
prayed for by the petitioner against her absent husband. Neither is there a prayer for
the final determination of his right or status or for the ascertainment of particular fact, for
the petition does not pray for the declaration that the petitioner 's husband us dead, but
merely asks for a declaration that he be presumed dead because he had been unheard from
in seven years. If there is any pretense at securing a declaration that the petitioner's
husband os dead, such a pretension cannot be granted because it is unauthorized. The
petition is for a declaration, even if judicially made, would not improve the
petitioner's situation, because such a presumption is already established by law. A
judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executory, would be
a prima facie presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason that it
cannot be the subject of judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is tha only
question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a competent court has to
pass. The latter must decide finally the controversy between the parties, or determine
finally the right or status of a party or establish finally a particular fact, out of which certain
rights and obligations arise or may arise; and once such controversy is decided by a final
decree, then the judgement on the subject of the controversy, or the decree upon the right
or status of a party or upon the existence of a particular fact, becomes res judicata, subject
to no collateral attack, except in a few rare instances especially provided by law. It is,
therefore, clear that judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he
had been unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to
contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become final. (Citations omitted and
emphasis supplied)

The above ruling in Szatraw has since been ussed by the subsequent cases of Lukban v.
Republic14 and Gue v. Republic15 in disallowing petitions for declaration of presumptive death
based on Article 390 of the Civil Code (and, implicity, also those based on the Civil based on
Article 391 of the Civil Code).

Dissecting the rulings of Szatraw, Gue and Lukban collectively, we are able to ascertain the

considerations why a petition for declaration of presumptive death based on the Civil Code
was disallowed in our jurisdiction, viz:16

1. Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of evidence that only allow a
court or a tribunal to presume that a person is dead upon the establishment of certain facts.

2. Since Articles 390 an d 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of evidence, an action
brought exclusively to declare a person presumptively dead under either of the
said articles actually presents

no actual controversy that a court could decide. In such action, there would be no
actual rights to be enforces, no wrong to be remedied nor any status to be established.

3. A judicial pronouncement declaring a person presumptively dead under Article 390 or

Article 391 of the Civil Code, in an action exclusively based thereon, would never really
become "final" as the same only confirms tha existence of a prima facie or disputable
presumption. The function of a court to render decisions that is supposed to
be final and binding between litigants is thereby compromised.

17
4. Moreove, a court action to declare a person presumptively dead under Articles 390 and
391 of the Civil Code would be unnecessary. The presumption in the said articles is
already established by law.

Verily, under prevailing case law, courts are without any authority to take cognizance of a
petition that-like the one filed by the petitioner in the case at bench-only seeks to have a
person declared presumptively dead under the Civil Code. Such a petition is not authorized
by law.17 Hence, by acting upon and eventually granting the petitioner's petition for the
declaration of presumptive death, the RTC violated prevailing jurisprudence and thereby
committed grave abuse of discretion. The CA, therefore, was only correct in setting aside
the RTC's decision.

II

Before bringing this case to its logical conclusion, however, there are a few points the Court
is minded to make.

It is not lost on this Court that much of the present controversy stemmed from the
misconception that a court declaration is required in order to establish a person is
presumptively dead for purposes of claiming his death benefits as a military serviceman
under pertinent laws.18 This misconception is what moved petitioner to file her misguided
petition for the declaration of presumptive death of Wilfredo and what ultimately exposed
her to unnecessary difficulties in prosecuting an otherwise simple claim for death benefits
either before the Philippine Veterans' Affair Office (PVAO) of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP).

What the Court finds deeply disconnecting, however, is the possibility that such
misconception may have been peddles by no less than the PVAO and the AFP themselves;
that such agencies, as a matter of practice, had been requiring claimants, such as the
petitioner, to first secure a court declaration of presumptive death before processing the
death before processing the death benefits of missing serviceman.

In view of the foregoing circumstances, the Court deems it necessary to issue the following
guidelines-culled from relevant law and jurisprudential pronouncements-to aid the public,
PVAO and the AFP in making or dealing with claims of death benefits which are similar to
that of the petitioner:

1. The PVAO and the AFP can decide claims of death benefits of a missing soldier
without requiring the claimant to first produce a court declaration of the
presumptive death of such soldier. In such claims, the PVAO and the AFP can make
their own determination, on the basis of the evidence presented by the claimant, whether
the presumption of death under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code may be applied or
not.

It must be stressed that the presumption of death under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil
Code arises by operation of law, without need of a court declaration, once the factual
conditions mentioned in the said articles are established. 19 Hence, requiring the claimant to
further secure a court declaration in order to establish the presumptive death of a missing
soldier is not proper and contravenes established jurisprudence on the matter. 20

18
2. In order to avail of the presumption, therefore, the claimant need only present before the
PVAO or the appropriate office of the AFP, as the case may be, any "evidence"21 which
shows that the concerned soldier had been missing for such number of years and or under
the circumstances prescribed under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. Obviously,
the "evidence" referred to here excludes a court declaration of presumptive death.

3. The PVAO or the AFP, as the case may be, may then weigh the evidence submitted by
the claimant and determine their sufficiency to establish the requisite factual conditions
specified under Article 390 or 391 of the Civil Code in order for the presumption of death to
arise. If the PVAO or the AFP determines that the evidence submitted by the
claimant is sufficient, they should not hesitate to apply the presumption of death
and pay the latter's claim.

4. If the PVAO or the AFP determines that the evidence submitted by the claimant is not
sufficient to invoke the presumption of death under the Civil Code and denies the latter's
claim by reason thereof, the claimant may file an appeal with the Office of the President
(OP) pursuant to the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

If the OP denies the appeal, the claimant may next seek recourse via a petition for review
with the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of the Court.1avvphi1 And finally, shold such
recourse still fail, the claimant may file an appeal by certiorari with the Supreme Court.

While we are constrained by case law to deny the instant petition, the Court is hopeful that,
by the foregoing guidelines, the unfortunate experience of the petitioner would no longer be
replicated in the future.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated November 28, 2016 and
Resolution dated March 20, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 129467
are AFFIRMED. The Court declares that a judicial decision of a court of law that a person is
presumptively dead is not requirement before the Philippine Veterans' Affairs Office and the
Armed Forces of the Philippines for their consideration.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

19
 4. G.R. No. 198680               July 8, 2013

HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON, NAMELY, ALVARO YPON, ERUDITA Y. BARON,

CICERO YPON, WILSON YPON, VICTOR YPON, AND HINIDINO Y.
PEÑALOSA, PETITIONERS,
vs.
GAUDIOSO PONTERAS RICAFORTE A.K.A. "GAUDIOSO E. YPON," AND THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF TOLEDO CITY, RESPONDENTS.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This is a direct recourse to the Court from the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Branch 59
(RTC), through a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
raising a pure question of law. In particular, petitioners assail the July 27, 2011 2 and August
31, 20113 Orders of the RTC, dismissing Civil Case No. T-2246 for lack of cause of action.

The Facts

On July 29, 2010, petitioners, together with some of their cousins, 4 filed a complaint for
Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance with Damages (subject complaint) against
respondent Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte a.k.a. "Gaudioso E. Ypon" (Gaudioso), docketed as
Civil Case No. T-2246.5 In their complaint, they alleged that Magdaleno Ypon (Magdaleno)
died intestate and childless on June 28, 1968, leaving behind Lot Nos. 2-AA, 2-C, 2-F, and
2-J which were then covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-44 and T-77-
A.6 Claiming to be the sole heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication and caused the cancellation of the aforementioned certificates of title, leading
to their subsequent transfer in his name under TCT Nos. T-2637 and T-2638,7 to the
prejudice of petitioners who are Magdaleno’s collateral relatives and successors-in-interest. 8

In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno as evidenced by: (a)
his certificate of Live Birth; (b) two (2) letters from Polytechnic School; and (c) a certified
true copy of his passport.9 Further, by way of affirmative defense, he claimed that: (a)
petitioners have no cause of action against him; (b) the complaint fails to state a cause of
action; and (c) the case is not prosecuted by the real parties-in-interest, as there is no
showing that the petitioners have been judicially declared as Magdaleno’s lawful heirs. 10

The RTC Ruling

On July 27, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed July 27, 2011 Order,11 finding that the subject
complaint failed to state a cause of action against Gaudioso. It observed that while the
plaintiffs therein had established their relationship with Magdaleno in a previous special
proceeding for the issuance of letters of administration,12 this did not mean that they could
already be considered as the decedent’s compulsory heirs. Quite the contrary, Gaudioso
satisfactorily established the fact that he is Magdaleno’s son – and hence, his compulsory
heir – through the documentary evidence he submitted which consisted of: (a) a marriage
contract between Magdaleno and Epegenia Evangelista; (b) a Certificate of Live Birth; (c) a
Letter dated February 19, 1960; and (d) a passport.13

20
The plaintiffs therein filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied on
August 31, 2011 due to the counsel’s failure to state the date on which his Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education Certificate of Compliance was issued.14

Aggrieved, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. T-2246, 15 sought
direct recourse to the Court through the instant petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The core of the present controversy revolves around the issue of whether or not the RTC’s
dismissal of the case on the ground that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of
action was proper.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition has no merit.

Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of
another.16 It is well-settled that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the
allegations in the complaint.17 In this relation, a complaint is said to assert a sufficient cause
of action if, admitting what appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be
entitled to the relief prayed for.18Accordingly, if the allegations furnish sufficient basis by
which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed, regardless of the
defenses that may be averred by the defendants.19

As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs therein,
alleged that they are the lawful heirs of Magdaleno and based on the same, prayed that the
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Gaudioso be declared null and void and that the
transfer certificates of title issued in the latter’s favor be cancelled. While the foregoing
allegations, if admitted to be true, would consequently warrant the reliefs sought for in the
said complaint, the rule that the determination of a decedent’s lawful heirs should be made
in the corresponding special proceeding20 precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action for
cancellation of title and reconveyance, from granting the same. In the case of Heirs of
Teofilo Gabatan v. CA,21 the Court, citing several other precedents, held that the
determination of who are the decedent’s lawful heirs must be made in the proper special
proceeding for such purpose, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and/or
possession, as in this case:

Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased
must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for
recovery of ownership and possession of property.1âwphi1 This must take precedence over
the action for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that
the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that
such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the
1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues another
for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a
special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a
particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in
a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a
status or right.

21
In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera, this Court ruled that the declaration of heirship
must be made in a special proceeding, and not in an independent civil action. This doctrine
was reiterated in Solivio v. Court of Appeals x x x:

In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes, the Court reiterated its
ruling that matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the
proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of
determining such rights. Citing the case of Agapay v. Palang, this Court held that the status
of an illegitimate child who claimed to be an heir to a decedent's estate could not be
adjudicated in an ordinary civil action which, as in this case, was for the recovery of
property.22 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the
determination of heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when the
parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and already
presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently
rendered judgment thereon,23 or when a special proceeding had been instituted but had
been finally closed and terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened.24

In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear to exist.
Hence, there lies the need to institute the proper special proceeding in order to determine
the heirship of the parties involved, ultimately resulting to the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-
2246.

Verily, while a court usually focuses on the complaint in determining whether the same fails
to state a cause of action, a court cannot disregard decisions material to the proper
appreciation of the questions before it.25 Thus, concordant with applicable jurisprudence,
since a determination of heirship cannot be made in an ordinary action for recovery of
ownership and/or possession, the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 was altogether proper.
In this light, it must be pointed out that the RTC erred in ruling on Gaudioso’s heirship
which should, as herein discussed, be threshed out and determined in the proper special
proceeding. As such, the foregoing pronouncement should therefore be devoid of any legal
effect.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 is hereby
AFFIRMED, without prejudice to any subsequent proceeding to determine the lawful heirs of
the late Magdaleno Ypon and the rights concomitant therewith.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Perez, and Mendoza,* JJ., concur.

22
 5. G.R. No. 150206               March 13, 2009

Heirs of TEOFILO GABATAN, namely: LOLITA GABATAN, POMPEYO GABATAN,

PEREGRINO GABATAN, REYNALDO GABATAN, NILA GABATAN AND JESUS JABINIS,
RIORITA GABATAN TUMALA and FREIRA GABATAN, Petitioners,
vs.
Hon. COURT OF APPEALS and LOURDES EVERO PACANA, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Assailed and sought to be set aside in the instant petition for review on certiorari are the
Decision1 dated April 28, 2000, and Resolution 2 dated September 12, 2001 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), in CA G.R. CV No. 52273. The challenged Decision affirmed the decision 3 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 19, dated October 20, 1995
in Civil Case No. 89-092, an action for Recovery of Property and Ownership and Possession,
thereat commenced by respondent Lourdes Evero Pacana against petitioners, heirs of
Teofilo Gabatan, Jesus Jabinis and Catalino Acantilado.

Subject of the present controversy is a 1.1062 hectare parcel of land, identified as Lot 3095
C-5 and situated at Calinugan, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City. This lot was declared for
taxation in the name of Juan Gabatan. In the complaint before the RTC, respondent alleged
that she is the sole owner of Lot 3095 C-5, having inherited the same from her deceased
mother, Hermogena Gabatan Evero (Hermogena). Respondent further claimed that her
mother, Hermogena, is the only child of Juan Gabatan and his wife, Laureana Clarito.
Respondent alleged that upon the death of Juan Gabatan, Lot 3095 C-5 was entrusted to his
brother, Teofilo Gabatan (Teofilo), and Teofilo’s wife, Rita Gabatan, for administration. It
was also claimed that prior to her death Hermogena demanded for the return of the land
but to no avail. After Hermogena’s death, respondent also did the same but petitioners
refused to heed the numerous demands to surrender the subject property. According to
respondent, when Teofilo and his wife died, petitioners Jesus Jabinis and Catalino Acantilado
took possession of the disputed land despite respondent’s demands for them to vacate the
same.

In their answer, petitioners denied that respondent’s mother Hermogena was the daughter
of Juan Gabatan with Laureana Clarito and that Hermogena or respondent is the rightful heir
of Juan Gabatan. Petitioners maintained that Juan Gabatan died single in 1934 and without
any issue and that Juan was survived by one brother and two sisters, namely: Teofilo
(petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest), Macaria and Justa. These siblings and/or their heirs,
inherited the subject land from Juan Gabatan and have been in actual, physical, open,
public, adverse, continuous and uninterrupted possession thereof in the concept of owners
for more than fifty (50) years and enjoyed the fruits of the improvements thereon, to the
exclusion of the whole world including respondent. Petitioners clarified that Jesus Jabinis
and Catalino Acantilado have no interest in the subject land; the former is merely the
husband of Teofilo’s daughter while the latter is just a caretaker. Petitioners added that a
similar case was previously filed by respondent against Teofilo’s wife, Rita Vda. de Gabatan,
on February 21, 1978, docketed as Civil Case No. 5840 but the case was dismissed on May
3, 1983 for lack of interest. Finally, petitioners contended that the complaint lacks or states
no cause of action or, if there was any, the same has long prescribed and/or has been
barred by laches.

23
On June 20, 1989, the complaint was amended wherein the heirs of Teofilo were individually
named, to wit: Lolita Gabatan, Pompeyo Gabatan, Peregrino Gabatan, Reynaldo Gabatan,
Nila Gabatan and Jesus Jabinis, Riorita Gabatan Tumal and Freira Gabatan.

On July 30, 1990, petitioners filed an amended answer, additionally alleging that the
disputed land was already covered by OCT No. P-3316 in the name of the heirs of Juan
Gabatan represented by petitioner Riorita Gabatan (Teofilo’s daughter).

On October 20, 1995, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants, declaring the plaintiff the owner of Lot No. 3095 C-5 situated at Calinugan,
Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City; and ordering the defendants represented by Riorita Gabatan
Tumala to RECONVEY Original Certificate of Title No. P-3316 in favor of plaintiff Lourdes
Evero Pacana, free of any encumbrance; ordering the defendants to pay ₱10,000.00 by way
of moral damages; ₱10,000.00 as Attorney’s fees; and ₱2,000.00 for litigation expenses.

SO ORDERED.4

Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the CA whereat their recourse was docketed as CA-G.R.
CV No. 52273.

On April 28, 2000, the CA rendered the herein challenged Decision affirming that of the
RTC. Dispositively, the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the questioned decision of the lower court dated October
20, 1995 is hereby AFFIRMED. With costs against appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Discounting petitioners’ argument that respondent is not related to Juan Gabatan, the CA
declared that respondent’s claim of filiation with Juan Gabatan was sufficiently established
during trial. Thus, the CA echoed a long line of jurisprudence that findings of fact of the trial
court are entitled to great weight and are not disturbed except for cogent reasons, such as
when the findings of fact are not supported by evidence.

The CA likewise gave weight to the Deed of Absolute Sale5 executed by Macaria Gabatan de
Abrogar, Teofilo, Hermogena and heirs of Justa Gabatan, wherein Hermogena was identified
as an heir of Juan Gabatan:

x x x HERMOGENA GABATAN, of legal age, married, Filipino citizen and presently residing at
Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte, Philippines, as Heir of the deceased, JUAN GABATAN; x x x.

To the CA, the Deed of Absolute Sale on July 30, 1966 containing such declaration which
was signed by Teofilo and the latter’s nearest relatives by consanguinity, is a tangible proof
that they acknowledged Hermogena’s status as the daughter of Juan Gabatan. Applying
Section 38, Rule 1306 of the Rules of Court on the declaration against interest, the CA ruled
that petitioners could not deny that even their very own father, Teofilo formally recognized
Hermogena’s right to heirship from Juan Gabatan which ultimately passed on to respondent.

24
As to the issue of prescription, the CA ruled that petitioners’ possession of the disputed
property could not ripen into acquisitive prescription because their predecessor-in-interest,
Teofilo, never held the property in the concept of an owner.lawphil.net

Aggrieved, petitioners are now with this Court via the present recourse principally
contending that the CA committed the following reversible errors:

FIRST ERROR: The lower court erred in not declaring that Juan Gabatan died single
and without issue;

SECOND ERROR: The lower court erred in declaring the plaintiff-appellee

(respondent) as the sole and surviving heir of Juan Gabatan, the only child of a
certain Hermogena Clareto "GABATAN";

THIRD ERROR: The lower court erred in declaring that a certain Hermogena Clareto
"GABATAN" is the child and sole heir of Juan Gabatan;

FOURTH ERROR: The lower court erred in failing to appreciate by preponderance of

evidence in favor of the defendants-appellants (petitioners) claim that they and the
heirs of Justa and Macaria both surnamed Gabatan are the sole and surviving heirs
of Juan Gabatan and, therefore, entitled to inherit the land subject matter hereof;

FIFTH ERROR: The lower court erred in not declaring that the cause of action of
plaintiff-appellee (respondent) if any, has been barred by laches and/or prescription. 7

Before proceeding to the merits of the case, we must pass upon certain preliminary
matters.

In general, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Questions of fact cannot be the subject of this particular
mode of appeal, for this Court is not a trier of facts.8 It is not our function to examine and
evaluate the probative value of the evidence presented before the concerned tribunal upon
which its impugned decision or resolution is based.91avvphi1

However, there are established exceptions to the rule on conclusiveness of the findings of
fact by the lower courts, such as (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken;
(3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making
its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are
contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are
contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in
the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the
findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion.10

Moreover, our rules recognize the broad discretionary power of an appellate court to waive
the lack of proper assignment of errors and to consider errors not assigned. Thus, the Court

25
is clothed with ample authority to review rulings even if they are not assigned as errors in
the appeal in these instances: (a) grounds not assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction
over the subject matter; (b) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently
plain or clerical errors within contemplation of law; (c) matters not assigned as errors on
appeal but consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete
resolution of the case or to serve the interests of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal
justice; (d) matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court
and are matters of record having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties
failed to raise or which the lower court ignored; (e) matters not assigned as errors on
appeal but closely related to an error assigned; and (f) matters not assigned as errors on
appeal but upon which the determination of a question properly assigned, is dependent. 11

In the light of the foregoing established doctrines, we now proceed to resolve the merits of
the case.

The respondent’s main cause of action in the court a quo is the recovery of ownership and
possession of property. It is undisputed that the subject property, Lot 3095 C-5, was owned
by the deceased Juan Gabatan, during his lifetime. 12 Before us are two contending parties,
both insisting to be the legal heir(s) of the decedent.

Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased
must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for
recovery of ownership and possession of property. This must take precedence over the
action for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the
trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a
declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular
fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special
proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or
right.13

In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera,14 this Court ruled that the declaration of heirship
must be made in a special proceeding, and not in an independent civil action. This doctrine
was reiterated in Solivio v. Court of Appeals15 where the Court held:

xxx where despite the pendency of the special proceedings for the settlement of the
intestate estate of the deceased Rafael Litam, the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil action in
which they claimed that they were the children by a previous marriage of the deceased to a
Chinese woman, hence, entitled to inherit his one-half share of the conjugal properties
acquired during his marriage to Marcosa Rivera, the trial court in the civil case declared that
the plaintiffs-appellants were not children of the deceased, that the properties in question
were paraphernal properties of his wife, Marcosa Rivera, and that the latter was his only
heir. On appeal to this Court, we ruled that ‘such declarations (that Marcosa Rivera was the
only heir of the decedent) is improper, in Civil Case No. 2071, it being within the exclusive
competence of the court in Special Proceedings No. 1537, in which it is not as yet, in issue,
and, will not be, ordinarily, in issue until the presentation of the project of partition.

In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes,16 the Court reiterated its
ruling that matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the
proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of

26
determining such rights. Citing the case of Agapay v. Palang, 17 this Court held that the
status of an illegitimate child who claimed to be an heir to a decedent’s estate could not be
adjudicated in an ordinary civil action which, as in this case, was for the recovery of
property.

However, we are not unmindful of our decision in Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran, 18 where the
Court relaxed its rule and allowed the trial court in a proceeding for annulment of title to
determine the status of the party therein as heirs, to wit:

It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of
Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of the
case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish
the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with
the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the
fact that the parties to the civil case – subject of the present case, could and had already in
fact presented evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon
the issues it defined during pre-trial.

In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to
still subject Portugal’s estate to administration proceedings since a determination of
petitioners’ status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners
(Vide Pereira v. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 154 [1989]; Intestate Estate of Mercado v.
Magtibay, 96 Phil. 383 [1955]), the trial court should proceed to evaluate the evidence
presented by the parties during the trial and render a decision thereon upon the issues it
defined during pre-trial, x x x. (emphasis supplied)

Similarly, in the present case, there appears to be only one parcel of land being claimed by
the contending parties as their inheritance from Juan Gabatan. It would be more practical to
dispense with a separate special proceeding for the determination of the status of
respondent as the sole heir of Juan Gabatan, specially in light of the fact that the parties to
Civil Case No. 89-092, had voluntarily submitted the issue to the RTC and already presented
their evidence regarding the issue of heirship in these proceeding. Also the RTC assumed
jurisdiction over the same and consequently rendered judgment thereon.

We GRANT the petition.

After a meticulous review of the records of this case, we find insufficient and questionable
the basis of the RTC in conferring upon respondent the status of sole heir of Juan Gabatan.

Respondent, in asserting to be entitled to possession and ownership of the property, pinned

her claim entirely on her alleged status as sole heir of Juan Gabatan. It was incumbent upon
her to present preponderant evidence in support of her complaint.

Under the Civil Code, the filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:

ART. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record of birth appearing in
the Civil Register, or by an authentic document or a final judgment.

ART. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article, the filiation shall be
proved by the continuous possession of status of a legitimate child.

27
ART. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or
possession of status, legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and special laws.

Here, two conflicting birth certificates19 of respondent were presented at the RTC.
Respondent, during her direct testimony, presented and identified a purported certified true
copy of her typewritten birth certificate which indicated that her mother’s maiden name was
"Hermogena Clarito Gabatan." Petitioners, on the other hand, presented a certified true
copy of respondent’s handwritten birth certificate which differed from the copy presented by
respondent. Among the differences was respondent’s mother’s full maiden name which was
indicated as "Hermogena Calarito" in the handwritten birth certificate.

In resolving this particular issue, the trial court ruled in this wise:

The parties are trying to outdo with (sic) each other by presenting two conflicting Certificate
(sic) of Live Birth of plaintiff herein, Lourdes Evero Pacana, which are Exhibit "A" for the
plaintiff and Exhibit "1" for the defendants. Which of this (sic) is genuine, and which is
falsified. These (sic) issue is crucial and requires serious scrutiny. The Court is of the
observation that Exhibit "A" for the plaintiff which is a certified true copy is in due form and
bears the "as is and where is" rule. It has the impression of the original certificate. The
forms (sic) is an old one used in the 1950’s. Her mother’s maiden name appearing thereof is
Hermogina (sic) Clarito Gabatan. While Exhibit "1", the entries found thereof (sic) is
handwritten which is very unusual and of dubious source. The form used is of latest vintage.
The entry on the space for mother’s maiden name is Hermogena Calarito. There seems to
be an apparent attempt to thwart plaintiff’s mother filiation with the omission of the
surname Gabatan. Considering these circumstances alone the Court is inclined to believe
that Exhibit "A" for the plaintiff is far more genuine and authentic certificate of live birth. 20

Having carefully examined the questioned birth certificates, we simply cannot agree with the
above-quoted findings of the trial court. To begin with, Exhibit A, as the trial court noted,
was an original typewritten document, not a mere photocopy or facsimile. It uses a form of
1950’s vintage21 but this Court is unable to concur in the trial court’s finding that Exhibit
122 was of a later vintage than Exhibit A which was one of the trial court’s bases for doubting
the authenticity of Exhibit 1. On the contrary, the printed notation on the upper left hand
corner of Exhibit 1 states "Municipal Form No. 102 – (Revised, January 1945)" which makes
it an older form than Exhibit A. Thus, the trial court’s finding regarding which form was of
more recent vintage was manifestly contradicted by the evidence on record. No actual
signature appears on Exhibit A except that of a certain Maximo P. Noriga, Deputy Local Civil
Registrar of the Office of the Local Civil Registrar, Cagayan de Oro City, who purportedly
certified on July 6, 1977 that Exhibit A was a true copy of respondent’s birth certificate. The
names of the attendant at birth (Petra Sambaan) and the local civil registrar (J.L. Rivera) in
1950 were typewritten with the notation "(Sgd.)" also merely typewritten beside their
names. The words "A certified true copy: July 6, 1977" above the signature of Maximo P.
Noriga on Exhibit A appear to be inscribed by the same typewriter as the very entries in
Exhibit A. It would seem that Exhibit A and the information stated therein were prepared
and entered only in 1977. Significantly, Maximo P. Noriga was never presented as a witness
to identify Exhibit A. Said document and the signature of Maximo P. Noriga therein were
identified by respondent herself whose self-serving testimony cannot be deemed sufficient
authentication of her birth certificate.

We cannot subscribe to the trial court’s view that since the entries in Exhibit 1 were
handwritten, Exhibit 1 was the one of dubious credibility. Verily, the certified true copies of

28
the handwritten birth certificate of respondent (petitioners’ Exhibits 1 and 8) were duly
authenticated by two competent witnesses; namely, Rosita Vidal (Ms. Vidal), Assistant
Registration Officer of the Office of the City Civil Registrar, Cagayan de Oro City and
Maribeth E. Cacho (Ms. Cacho), Archivist of the National Statistics Office (NSO), Sta. Mesa,
Manila. Both witnesses testified that: (a) as part of their official duties they have custody of
birth records in their respective offices,23 and (b) the certified true copy of respondent’s
handwritten birth certificate is a faithful reproduction of the original birth certificate
registered in their respective offices.24 Ms. Vidal, during her testimony, even brought the
original of the handwritten birth certificate before the trial court and respondent’s counsel
confirmed that the certified true copy (which was eventually marked as Exhibit 1) was a
faithful reproduction of the original.25 Ms. Vidal likewise categorically testified that no other
copy of respondent’s birth certificate exists in their records except the handwritten birth
certificate.26 Ms. Cacho, in turn, testified that the original of respondent’s handwritten birth
certificate found in the records of the NSO Manila (from which Exhibit 8 was photocopied)
was the one officially transmitted to their office by the Local Civil Registry Office of Cagayan
de Oro.27 Both Ms. Vidal and Ms. Cacho testified and brought their respective offices’ copies
of respondent’s birth certificate in compliance with subpoenas issued by the trial court and
there is no showing that they were motivated by ill will or bias in giving their testimonies.
Thus, between respondent’s Exhibit A and petitioners’ Exhibits 1 and 8, the latter
documents deserve to be given greater probative weight.

Even assuming purely for the sake of argument that the birth certificate presented by
respondent (Exhibit A) is a reliable document, the same on its face is insufficient to prove
respondent’s filiation to her alleged grandfather, Juan Gabatan. All that Exhibit A, if it had
been credible and authentic, would have proven was that respondent’s mother was a certain
"Hermogena Clarito Gabatan." It does not prove that same "Hermogena Clarito Gabatan" is
the daughter of Juan Gabatan. Even the CA held that the conflicting certificates of live birth
of respondent submitted by the parties only proved the filiation of respondent to
Hermogena.28

It was absolutely crucial to respondent’s cause of action that she convincingly proves the
filiation of her mother to Juan Gabatan. To reiterate, to prove the relationship of
respondent’s mother to Juan Gabatan, our laws dictate that the best evidence of such
familial tie was the record of birth appearing in the Civil Register, or an authentic document
or a final judgment. In the absence of these, respondent should have presented proof that
her mother enjoyed the continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. Only in the
absence of these two classes of evidence is the respondent allowed to present other proof
admissible under the Rules of Court of her mother’s relationship to Juan Gabatan.

However, respondent’s mother’s (Hermogena’s) birth certificate, which would have been the
best evidence of Hermogena’s relationship to Juan Gabatan, was never offered as evidence
at the RTC. Neither did respondent present any authentic document or final judgment
categorically evidencing Hermogena’s relationship to Juan Gabatan.

Respondent relied on the testimony of her witnesses, Frisco Lawan, Felicisima Nagac Pacana
and Cecilia Nagac Villareal who testified that they personally knew Hermogena
(respondent’s mother) and/or Juan Gabatan, that they knew Juan Gabatan was married to
Laureana Clarito and that Hermogena was the child of Juan and Laureana. However, none of
these witnesses had personal knowledge of the fact of marriage of Juan to Laureana or the
fact of birth of Hermogena to Juan and Laureana. They were not yet born or were very
young when Juan supposedly married Laureana or when Hermogena was born and they all
admitted that none of them were present at Juan and Laureana’s wedding or Hermogena’s

29
birth. These witnesses based their testimony on what they had been told by, or heard from,
others as young children. Their testimonies were, in a word, hearsay.

Other circumstances prevent us from giving full faith to respondent’s witnesses’ testimonies.
The records would show that they cannot be said to be credible and impartial witnesses.
Frisco Lawan testified that he was the son of Laureana by a man other than Juan Gabatan
and was admittedly not at all related to Juan Gabatan.29 His testimony regarding the
relationships within the Gabatan family is hardly reliable. As for Felicisima Nagac Pacana
and Cecilia Nagac Villareal who are children of Justa Gabatan Nagac,30 this Court is wary of
according probative weight to their testimonies since respondent admitted during her cross-
examination that her (respondent’s) husband is the son of Felicisima Nagac Pacana.31 In
other words, although these witnesses are indeed blood relatives of petitioners, they are
also the mother and the aunt of respondent’s husband. They cannot be said to be entirely
disinterested in the outcome of the case.

Aside from the testimonies of respondent’s witnesses, both the RTC and the CA relied
heavily on a photocopy of a Deed of Absolute Sale32 (Exhibit H) presented by respondent
and which appeared to be signed by the siblings and the heirs of the siblings of Juan
Gabatan. In this document involving the sale of a lot different from Lot 3095 C-5,
"Hermogena Gabatan as heir of the deceased Juan Gabatan" was indicated as one of the
vendors. The RTC deemed the statement therein as an affirmation or recognition by Teofilo
Gabatan, petitioners’ predecessor in interest, that Hermogena Gabatan was the heir of Juan
Gabatan.33 The CA considered the same statement as a declaration against interest on the
part of Teofilo Gabatan.34

However, the admission of this Deed of Absolute Sale, including its contents and the
signatures therein, as competent evidence was vigorously and repeatedly objected to by
petitioners’ counsel for being a mere photocopy and not being properly
authenticated.35 After a close scrutiny of the said photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale,
this Court cannot uphold the admissibility of the same.

Under the best evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself.36 Although the best
evidence rule admits of exceptions and there are instances where the presentation of
secondary evidence would be allowed, such as when the original is lost or the original is a
public record, the basis for the presentation of secondary evidence must still be established.
Thus, in Department of Education Culture and Sports v. Del Rosario,37 we held that a party
must first satisfactorily explain the loss of the best or primary evidence before he can resort
to secondary evidence. A party must first present to the court proof of loss or other
satisfactory explanation for non-production of the original instrument.

In the case at bar, a perusal of the transcript of the testimony of Felicisima Nagac Pacana
(who identified the photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale) plainly shows that she gave no
testimony regarding the whereabouts of the original, whether it was lost or whether it was
recorded in any public office.

There is an ostensible attempt to pass off Exhibit H as an admissible public document. For
this, respondent relied on the stamped notation on the photocopy of the deed that it is a
certified true xerox copy and said notation was signed by a certain Honesto P. Velez, Sr.,
Assessment Officer, who seems to be an officer in the local assessor’s office. Regarding the
authentication of public documents, the Rules of Court38 provide that the record of public
documents, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication

30
thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy.39 The attestation of the certifying officer must state, in substance, that the copy is a
correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. 40

To begin with, no proof whatsoever was presented by respondent that an original of Exhibit
H was registered or exists in the records of the local assessor’s office. Furthermore, the
stamped certification of Honesto P. Velez is insufficient authentication of Exhibit H since
Velez’s certification did not state that Exhibit H was a true copy from the original. Even
worse, Velez was not presented as a witness to attest that Exhibit H was a true copy from
the original. Indeed, it is highly doubtful that Velez could have made such an attestation
since the assessor’s office is not the official repository of original notarized deeds of sale and
could not have been the legal custodian contemplated in the rules.

It is the notary public who is mandated by law to keep an original of the Deed of Absolute
Sale in his notarial register and to forward the same to the proper court. It is the notary
public or the proper court that has custody of his notarial register that could have produced
the original or a certified true copy thereof. Instead, the Deed of Absolute Sale was
identified by Felicisima Nagac Pacana who, despite appearing to be a signatory thereto, is
not a disinterested witness and as can be gleaned from her testimony, she had no personal
knowledge of the preparation of the alleged certified true copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale.
She did not even know who secured a copy of Exhibit H from the assessor’s office. 41 To be
sure, the roundabout and defective manner of authentication of Exhibit H renders it
inadmissible for the purpose it was offered, i.e. as proof that Teofilo Gabatan acknowledged
or admitted the status of Hermogena Gabatan as heir of Juan Gabatan.

Even if we are to overlook the lack of proper authentication of Exhibit H and consider the
same admissible, it still nonetheless would have only provided proof that a certain
Hermogena Gabatan was the heir of Juan Gabatan. Exhibit H does not show the filiation of
respondent to either Hermogena Gabatan or Juan Gabatan. As discussed above, the only
document that respondent produced to demonstrate her filiation to "Hermogena Gabatan"
(respondent’s Exhibit A) was successfully put in doubt by contrary evidence presented by
petitioners.

As for the issue of laches, we are inclined to likewise rule against respondent. According to
respondent’s own testimony,42 Juan Gabatan died sometime in 1933 and thus, the cause of
action of the heirs of Juan Gabatan to recover the decedent’s property from third parties or
to quiet title to their inheritance accrued in 1933. Yet, respondent and/or her mother
Hermogena, if they were truly the legal heirs of Juan Gabatan, did not assert their rights as
such. It is only in 1978 that respondent filed her first complaint to recover the subject
property, docketed as Civil Case No. 5840, against Rita Gabatan, the widow of Teofilo
Gabatan.43 However, that case was dismissed without prejudice for failure to
prosecute.44 Again, respondent waited until 1989 to refile her cause of action, i.e. the
present case.45 She claimed that she waited until the death of Rita Gabatan to refile her
case out of respect because Rita was then already old.46

We cannot accept respondent’s flimsy reason. It is precisely because Rita Gabatan and her
contemporaries (who might have personal knowledge of the matters litigated in this case)
were advancing in age and might soon expire that respondent should have exerted every
effort to preserve valuable evidence and speedily litigate her claim. As we held in Republic
of the Philippines v. Agunoy: "Vigilantibus, sed non dormientibus, jura subveniunt, the law
aids the vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights…[O]ne may not sleep on a right while
expecting to preserve it in its pristine purity." 47

31
All in all, this Court finds that respondent dismally failed to substantiate, with convincing,
credible and independently verifiable proof, her assertion that she is the sole heir of Juan
Gabatan and thus, entitled to the property under litigation. Aggravating the weakness of her
evidence were the circumstances that (a) she did not come to court with clean hands for
she presented a tampered/altered, if not outright spurious, copy of her certificate of live
birth and (b) she unreasonably delayed the prosecution of her own cause of action. If the
Court cannot now affirm her claim, respondent has her own self to blame.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals’ Decision in CA-G.R. CV No.
52273, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 89-092, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint and amended complaint in Civil Case No. 89-092
are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

6. G.R. No. 157912               December 13, 2007

32
ALAN JOSEPH A. SHEKER, Petitioner,
vs.
ESTATE OF ALICE O. SHEKER, VICTORIA S. MEDINA-Administratrix, Respondent.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the reversal of the Order1 of the
Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6 (RTC) dated January 15, 2003 and its Omnibus
Order dated April 9, 2003.

The undisputed facts are as follows.

The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice O. Sheker and thereafter issued
an order for all the creditors to file their respective claims against the estate. In compliance
therewith, petitioner filed on October 7, 2002 a contingent claim for agent's commission due
him amounting to approximately ₱206,250.00 in the event of the sale of certain parcels of
land belonging to the estate, and the amount of ₱275,000.00, as reimbursement for
expenses incurred and/or to be incurred by petitioner in the course of negotiating the sale
of said realties.

The executrix of the Estate of Alice O. Sheker (respondent) moved for the dismissal of said
money claim against the estate on the grounds that (1) the requisite docket fee, as
prescribed in Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, had not been paid; (2) petitioner
failed to attach a certification against non-forum shopping; and (3) petitioner failed to
attach a written explanation why the money claim was not filed and served personally.

On January 15, 2003, the RTC issued the assailed Order dismissing without prejudice the
money claim based on the grounds advanced by respondent. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied per Omnibus Order dated April 9, 2003.

Petitioner then filed the present petition for review on certiorari, raising the following
questions:

(a) must a contingent claim filed in the probate proceeding contain a certification
against non-forum shopping, failing which such claim should be dismissed?

(b) must a contingent claim filed against an estate in a probate proceeding be

dismissed for failing to pay the docket fees at the time of its filing thereat?

(c) must a contingent claim filed in a probate proceeding be dismissed because of its
failure to contain a written explanation on the service and filing by registered mail? 2

Petitioner maintains that the RTC erred in strictly applying to a probate proceeding the rules
requiring a certification of non-forum shopping, a written explanation for non-personal filing,
and the payment of docket fees upon filing of the claim. He insists that Section 2, Rule 72 of
the Rules of Court provides that rules in ordinary actions are applicable to special
proceedings only in a suppletory manner.

33
The Court gave due course to the petition for review on certiorari although directly filed with
this Court, pursuant to Section 2(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. 3

The petition is imbued with merit.

However, it must be emphasized that petitioner's contention that rules in ordinary actions
are only supplementary to rules in special proceedings is not entirely correct.

Section 2, Rule 72, Part II of the same Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of Civil Actions. - In the absence of special provisions, the
rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special
proceedings.

Stated differently, special provisions under Part II of the Rules of Court govern special
proceedings; but in the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in Part I of the
Rules governing ordinary civil actions shall be applicable to special proceedings, as far as
practicable.

The word "practicable" is defined as: possible to practice or perform; capable of being put
into practice, done or accomplished.4 This means that in the absence of special provisions,
rules in ordinary actions may be applied in special proceedings as much as possible and
where doing so would not pose an obstacle to said proceedings. Nowhere in the Rules of
Court does it categorically say that rules in ordinary actions are inapplicable or merely
suppletory to special proceedings. Provisions of the Rules of Court requiring a certification of
non-forum shopping for complaints and initiatory pleadings, a written explanation for
non-personal service and filing, and the payment of filing fees for money claims against an
estate would not in any way obstruct probate proceedings, thus, they are applicable to
special proceedings such as the settlement of the estate of a deceased person as in the
present case.

Thus, the principal question in the present case is: did the RTC err in dismissing petitioner's
contingent money claim against respondent estate for failure of petitioner to attach to his
motion a certification against non-forum shopping?

The Court rules in the affirmative.

The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints and other
initiatory pleadings. The RTC erred in ruling that a contingent money claim against the
estate of a decedent is an initiatory pleading. In the present case, the whole probate
proceeding was initiated upon the filing of the petition for allowance of the
decedent's will. Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, after granting
letters of testamentary or of administration, all persons having money claims against the
decedent are mandated to file or notify the court and the estate administrator of their
respective money claims; otherwise, they would be barred, subject to certain exceptions. 5

Such being the case, a money claim against an estate is more akin to a motion for creditors'
claims to be recognized and taken into consideration in the proper disposition of the
properties of the estate. In Arquiza v. Court of Appeals,6 the Court explained thus:

34
x x x The office of a motion is not to initiate new litigation, but to bring a material
but incidental matter arising in the progress of the case in which the motion is
filed. A motion is not an independent right or remedy, but is confined to incidental
matters in the progress of a cause. It relates to some question that is collateral to the
main object of the action and is connected with and dependent upon the principal
remedy.7 (Emphasis supplied)

A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the settlement of the
decedent's estate; more so if the claim is contingent since the claimant cannot even
institute a separate action for a mere contingent claim. Hence, herein petitioner's
contingent money claim, not being an initiatory pleading, does not require a
certification against non-forum shopping.

On the issue of filing fees, the Court ruled in Pascual v. Court of Appeals,8 that the trial
court has jurisdiction to act on a money claim (attorney's fees) against an estate for
services rendered by a lawyer to the administratrix to assist her in fulfilling her duties to the
estate even without payment of separate docket fees because the filing fees shall constitute
a lien on the judgment pursuant to Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, or the trial
court may order the payment of such filing fees within a reasonable time. 9 After all, the trial
court had already assumed jurisdiction over the action for settlement of the estate. Clearly,
therefore, non-payment of filing fees for a money claim against the estate is not one of the
grounds for dismissing a money claim against the estate.

With regard to the requirement of a written explanation, Maceda v. De Guzman Vda. de

Macatangay10 is squarely in point. Therein, the Court held thus:

In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort, this Court, passing upon Section 11 of Rule
13 of the Rules of Court, held that a court has the discretion to consider a pleading or paper
as not filed if said rule is not complied with.

Personal service and filing are preferred for obvious reasons. Plainly, such should expedite
action or resolution on a pleading, motion or other paper; and conversely, minimize, if not
eliminate, delays likely to be incurred if service or filing is done by mail, considering the
inefficiency of the postal service. Likewise, personal service will do away with the practice of
some lawyers who, wanting to appear clever, resort to the following less than ethical
practices: (1) serving or filing pleadings by mail to catch opposing counsel off-guard, thus
leaving the latter with little or no time to prepare, for instance, responsive pleadings or an
opposition; or (2) upon receiving notice from the post office that the registered mail
containing the pleading of or other paper from the adverse party may be claimed, unduly
procrastinating before claiming the parcel, or, worse, not claiming it at all, thereby causing
undue delay in the disposition of such pleading or other papers.

If only to underscore the mandatory nature of this innovation to our set of adjective rules
requiring personal service whenever practicable, Section 11 of Rule 13 then gives the court
the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if the other modes of service or
filing were not resorted to and no written explanation was made as to why personal service
was not done in the first place. The exercise of discretion must, necessarily consider the
practicability of personal service, for Section 11 itself begins with the clause "whenever
practicable".

We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes of

35
service and filing, the exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is
practicable, in the light of the circumstances of time, place and person, personal service or
filing is mandatory. Only when personal service or filing is not practicable may resort to
other modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a written explanation as to why
personal service or filing was not practicable to begin with. In adjudging the plausibility of
an explanation, a court shall likewise consider the importance of the subject matter of the
case or the issues involved therein, and the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be
expunged for violation of Section 11. (Emphasis and italics supplied)

In Musa v. Amor, this Court, on noting the impracticality of personal service, exercised its
discretion and liberally applied Section 11 of Rule 13:

"As [Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court] requires, service and filing of pleadings must
be done personally whenever practicable. The court notes that in the present case, personal
service would not be practicable. Considering the distance between the Court of Appeals
and Donsol, Sorsogon where the petition was posted, clearly, service by registered mail
[sic] would have entailed considerable time, effort and expense. A written explanation why
service was not done personally might have been superfluous. In any case, as the rule is
so worded with the use of "may", signifying permissiveness, a violation thereof
gives the court discretion whether or not to consider the paper as not filed. While
it is true that procedural rules are necessary to secure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice, rigid application of Section 11, Rule 13 may be relaxed in this
case in the interest of substantial justice. (Emphasis and italics supplied)1âwphi1

In the case at bar, the address of respondent’s counsel is Lopez, Quezon, while petitioner
Sonia’s counsel’s is Lucena City. Lopez, Quezon is 83 kilometers away from Lucena City.
Such distance makes personal service impracticable. As in Musa v. Amor, a written
explanation why service was not done personally "might have been superfluous."

As this Court held in Tan v. Court of Appeals, liberal construction of a rule of procedure has
been allowed where, among other cases, "the injustice to the adverse party is not
commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure
prescribed."11 (Emphasis supplied)

In the present case, petitioner holds office in Salcedo Village, Makati City, while counsel for
respondent and the RTC which rendered the assailed orders are both in Iligan City. The
lower court should have taken judicial notice of the great distance between said cities and
realized that it is indeed not practicable to serve and file the money claim personally. Thus,
following Medina v. Court of Appeals,12 the failure of petitioner to submit a written
explanation why service has not been done personally, may be considered as superfluous
and the RTC should have exercised its discretion under Section 11, Rule 13, not to dismiss
the money claim of petitioner, in the interest of substantial justice.

The ruling spirit of the probate law is the speedy settlement of estates of deceased persons
for the benefit of creditors and those entitled to residue by way of inheritance or legacy
after the debts and expenses of administration have been paid.13 The ultimate purpose for
the rule on money claims was further explained in Union Bank of the Phil. v.
Santibañez,14 thus:

The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate court is mandatory.
As we held in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera:

36
x x x This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased
by informing the executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling
him to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which should be
allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of
the deceased and the early delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or
heirs. The law strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition of the
claims against the decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as
soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue.15 (Emphasis supplied)

The RTC should have relaxed and liberally construed the procedural rule on the requirement
of a written explanation for non-personal service, again in the interest of substantial justice.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan
City, Branch 6 dated January 15, 2003 and April 9, 2003, respectively,
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6, is
hereby DIRECTED to give due course and take appropriate action on petitioner's money
claim in accordance with Rule 82 of the Rules of Court.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

37
 7. G.R. No. 164108               May 8, 2009

ALFREDO HILADO, LOPEZ SUGAR CORPORATION, FIRST FARMERS HOLDING

CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE AMOR A. REYES, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 and ADMINISTRATRIX JULITA
CAMPOS BENEDICTO, Respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15 May 2000. He
was survived by his wife, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto (administratrix
Benedicto), and his only daughter, Francisca Benedicto-Paulino. 1 At the time of his death,
there were two pending civil cases against Benedicto involving the petitioners. The first,
Civil Case No. 95-9137, was then pending with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod
City, Branch 44, with petitioner Alfredo Hilado as one of the plaintiffs therein. The second,
Civil Case No. 11178, was then pending with the RTC of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with
petitioners Lopez Sugar Corporation and First Farmers Holding Corporation as one of the
plaintiffs therein.2

On 25 May 2000, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed with the RTC of Manila a
petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor, pursuant to Section 6, Rule
78 of the Revised Rules of Court. The petition was raffled to Branch 21, presided by
respondent Judge Amor A. Reyes. Said petition acknowledged the value of the assets of the
decedent to be ₱5 Million, "net of liabilities."3 On 2 August 2000, the Manila RTC issued an
order appointing private respondent as administrator of the estate of her deceased
husband, and issuing letters of administration in her favor.4 In January 2001, private
respondent submitted an Inventory of the Estate, Lists of Personal and Real Properties, and
Liabilities of the Estate of her deceased husband. 5 In the List of Liabilities attached to the
inventory, private respondent included as among the liabilities, the above-mentioned two
pending claims then being litigated before the Bacolod City courts.6 Private respondent
stated that the amounts of liability corresponding to the two cases as ₱136,045,772.50 for
Civil Case No. 95-9137 and ₱35,198,697.40 for Civil Case No. 11178.7 Thereafter, the
Manila RTC required private respondent to submit a complete and updated inventory and
appraisal report pertaining to the estate.8

On 24 September 2001, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a Manifestation/Motion Ex

Abundanti Cautela,9 praying that they be furnished with copies of all processes and orders
pertaining to the intestate proceedings. Private respondent opposed the
manifestation/motion, disputing the personality of petitioners to intervene in the intestate
proceedings of her husband. Even before the Manila RTC acted on the manifestation/motion,
petitioners filed an omnibus motion praying that the Manila RTC set a deadline for the
submission by private respondent of the required inventory of the decedent’s
estate.10 Petitioners also filed other pleadings or motions with the Manila RTC, alleging
lapses on the part of private respondent in her administration of the estate, and assailing
the inventory that had been submitted thus far as unverified, incomplete and inaccurate.

On 2 January 2002, the Manila RTC issued an order denying the manifestation/motion, on
the ground that petitioners are not interested parties within the contemplation of the Rules

38
of Court to intervene in the intestate proceedings.11 After the Manila RTC had denied
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, a petition for certiorari was filed with the Court of
Appeals. The petition argued in general that petitioners had the right to intervene in the
intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the latter being the defendant in the civil cases
they lodged with the Bacolod RTC.

On 27 February 2004, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision12 dismissing the petition

and declaring that the Manila RTC did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow petitioners
to intervene in the intestate proceedings. The allowance or disallowance of a motion to
intervene, according to the appellate court, is addressed to the sound discretion of the
court. The Court of Appeals cited the fact that the claims of petitioners against the decedent
were in fact contingent or expectant, as these were still pending litigation in separate
proceedings before other courts.

Hence, the present petition. In essence, petitioners argue that the lower courts erred in
denying them the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of the estate of Roberto
Benedicto. Interestingly, the rules of procedure they cite in support of their argument is not
the rule on intervention, but rather various other provisions of the Rules on Special
Proceedings.13

To recall, petitioners had sought three specific reliefs that were denied by the courts a quo.
First, they prayed that they be henceforth furnished "copies of all processes and orders
issued" by the intestate court as well as the pleadings filed by administratrix Benedicto with
the said court.14 Second, they prayed that the intestate court set a deadline for the
submission by administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified and complete inventory of the
estate, and upon submission thereof, order the inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue to assist in the appraisal of the fair market value of the same. 15 Third,
petitioners moved that the intestate court set a deadline for the submission by the
administrator of her verified annual account, and, upon submission thereof, set the date for
her examination under oath with respect thereto, with due notice to them and other parties
interested in the collation, preservation and disposition of the estate. 16

The Court of Appeals chose to view the matter from a perspective solely informed by the
rule on intervention. We can readily agree with the Court of Appeals on that point. Section 1
of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an intervenor "has a legal
interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest
against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court x x x" While the language of Section 1,
Rule 19 does not literally preclude petitioners from intervening in the intestate proceedings,
case law has consistently held that the legal interest required of an intervenor "must be
actual and material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent and expectant." 17

Nonetheless, it is not immediately evident that intervention under the Rules of Civil
Procedure necessarily comes into operation in special proceedings. The settlement of
estates of deceased persons fall within the rules of special proceedings under the Rules of
Court,18 not the Rules on Civil Procedure. Section 2, Rule 72 further provides that "[i]n the
absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as
practicable, applicable to special proceedings."

We can readily conclude that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set forth
under Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a decedent whose credit is based on a

39
contingent claim. The definition of "intervention" under Rule 19 simply does not
accommodate contingent claims.

Yet, even as petitioners now contend before us that they have the right to intervene in the
intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the reliefs they had sought then before the
RTC, and also now before us, do not square with their recognition as intervenors. In short,
even if it were declared that petitioners have no right to intervene in accordance with Rule
19, it would not necessarily mean the disallowance of the reliefs they had sought before the
RTC since the right to intervene is not one of those reliefs.

To better put across what the ultimate disposition of this petition should be, let us now turn
our focus to the Rules on Special Proceedings.

In several instances, the Rules on Special Proceedings entitle "any interested persons" or
"any persons interested in the estate" to participate in varying capacities in the testate or
intestate proceedings. Petitioners cite these provisions before us, namely: (1) Section 1,
Rule 79, which recognizes the right of "any person interested" to oppose the issuance of
letters testamentary and to file a petition for administration;" (2) Section 3, Rule 79, which
mandates the giving of notice of hearing on the petition for letters of administration to the
known heirs, creditors, and "to any other persons believed to have interest in the estate;"
(3) Section 1, Rule 76, which allows a "person interested in the estate" to petition for the
allowance of a will; (4) Section 6 of Rule 87, which allows an individual interested in the
estate of the deceased "to complain to the court of the concealment, embezzlement, or
conveyance of any asset of the decedent, or of evidence of the decedent’s title or interest
therein;" (5) Section 10 of Rule 85, which requires notice of the time and place of the
examination and allowance of the Administrator’s account "to persons interested;" (6)
Section 7(b) of Rule 89, which requires the court to give notice "to the persons interested"
before it may hear and grant a petition seeking the disposition or encumbrance of the
properties of the estate; and (7) Section 1, Rule 90, which allows "any person interested in
the estate" to petition for an order for the distribution of the residue of the estate of the
decedent, after all obligations are either satisfied or provided for.

Had the claims of petitioners against Benedicto been based on contract, whether express or
implied, then they should have filed their claim, even if contingent, under the aegis of the
notice to creditors to be issued by the court immediately after granting letters of
administration and published by the administrator immediately after the issuance of such
notice.19 However, it appears that the claims against Benedicto were based on tort, as they
arose from his actions in connection with Philsucom, Nasutra and Traders Royal Bank. Civil
actions for tort or quasi-delict do not fall within the class of claims to be filed under the
notice to creditors required under Rule 86.20 These actions, being as they are civil, survive
the death of the decedent and may be commenced against the administrator pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 87. Indeed, the records indicate that the intestate estate of Benedicto, as
represented by its administrator, was successfully impleaded in Civil Case No. 11178,
whereas the other civil case21 was already pending review before this Court at the time of
Benedicto’s death.

Evidently, the merits of petitioners’ claims against Benedicto are to be settled in the civil
cases where they were raised, and not in the intestate proceedings. In the event the claims
for damages of petitioners are granted, they would have the right to enforce the judgment
against the estate. Yet until such time, to what extent may they be allowed to participate in
the intestate proceedings?

40
Petitioners place heavy reliance on our ruling in Dinglasan v. Ang Chia,22 and it does provide
us with guidance on how to proceed. A brief narration of the facts therein is in order.
Dinglasan had filed an action for reconveyance and damages against respondents, and
during a hearing of the case, learned that the same trial court was hearing the intestate
proceedings of Lee Liong to whom Dinglasan had sold the property years earlier. Dinglasan
thus amended his complaint to implead Ang Chia, administrator of the estate of her late
husband. He likewise filed a verified claim-in-intervention, manifesting the pendency of the
civil case, praying that a co-administrator be appointed, the bond of the administrator be
increased, and that the intestate proceedings not be closed until the civil case had been
terminated. When the trial court ordered the increase of the bond and took cognizance of
the pending civil case, the administrator moved to close the intestate proceedings, on the
ground that the heirs had already entered into an extrajudicial partition of the estate. The
trial court refused to close the intestate proceedings pending the termination of the civil
case, and the Court affirmed such action.

If the appellants filed a claim in intervention in the intestate proceedings it was only
pursuant to their desire to protect their interests it appearing that the property in litigation
is involved in said proceedings and in fact is the only property of the estate left subject of
administration and distribution; and the court is justified in taking cognizance of said civil
case because of the unavoidable fact that whatever is determined in said civil case will
necessarily reflect and have a far reaching consequence in the determination and
distribution of the estate. In so taking cognizance of civil case No. V-331 the court does not
assume general jurisdiction over the case but merely makes of record its existence because
of the close interrelation of the two cases and cannot therefore be branded as having acted
in excess of its jurisdiction.

Appellants' claim that the lower court erred in holding in abeyance the closing of the
intestate proceedings pending determination of the separate civil action for the reason that
there is no rule or authority justifying the extension of administration proceedings until after
the separate action pertaining to its general jurisdiction has been terminated, cannot be
entertained. Section 1, Rule 88, of the Rules of Court, expressly provides that "action to
recover real or personal property from the estate or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to
recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced
against the executor or administrator." What practical value would this provision have if the
action against the administrator cannot be prosecuted to its termination simply because the
heirs desire to close the intestate proceedings without first taking any step to settle the
ordinary civil case? This rule is but a corollary to the ruling which declares that questions
concerning ownership of property alleged to be part of the estate but claimed by another
person should be determined in a separate action and should be submitted to the court in
the exercise of its general jurisdiction. These rules would be rendered nugatory if we are to
hold that an intestate proceedings can be closed by any time at the whim and caprice of the
heirs x x x23 (Emphasis supplied) [Citations omitted]

It is not clear whether the claim-in-intervention filed by Dinglasan conformed to an action-

in-intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure, but we can partake of the spirit behind
such pronouncement. Indeed, a few years later, the Court, citing Dinglasan, stated: "[t]he
rulings of this court have always been to the effect that in the special proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of a deceased person, persons not heirs, intervening therein to
protect their interests are allowed to do so to protect the same, but not for a decision on
their action."24

41
Petitioners’ interests in the estate of Benedicto may be inchoate interests, but they are
viable interests nonetheless. We are mindful that the Rules of Special Proceedings allows
not just creditors, but also "any person interested" or "persons interested in the estate"
various specified capacities to protect their respective interests in the estate. Anybody with
a contingent claim based on a pending action for quasi-delict against a decedent may be
reasonably concerned that by the time judgment is rendered in their favor, the estate of the
decedent would have already been distributed, or diminished to the extent that the
judgment could no longer be enforced against it.

In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do not provide a creditor or any
person interested in the estate, the right to participate in every aspect of the testate or
intestate proceedings, but instead provides for specific instances when such persons may
accordingly act in those proceedings, we deem that while there is no general right to
intervene on the part of the petitioners, they may be allowed to seek certain prayers or
reliefs from the intestate court not explicitly provided for under the Rules, if the prayer or
relief sought is necessary to protect their interest in the estate, and there is no other
modality under the Rules by which such interests can be protected. It is under this standard
that we assess the three prayers sought by petitioners.

The first is that petitioners be furnished with copies of all processes and orders issued in
connection with the intestate proceedings, as well as the pleadings filed by the
administrator of the estate. There is no questioning as to the utility of such relief for the
petitioners. They would be duly alerted of the developments in the intestate proceedings,
including the status of the assets of the estate. Such a running account would allow them to
pursue the appropriate remedies should their interests be compromised, such as the right,
under Section 6, Rule 87, to complain to the intestate court if property of the estate
concealed, embezzled, or fraudulently conveyed.

At the same time, the fact that petitioners’ interests remain inchoate and contingent
counterbalances their ability to participate in the intestate proceedings. We are mindful of
respondent’s submission that if the Court were to entitle petitioners with service of all
processes and pleadings of the intestate court, then anybody claiming to be a creditor,
whether contingent or otherwise, would have the right to be furnished such pleadings, no
matter how wanting of merit the claim may be. Indeed, to impose a precedent that would
mandate the service of all court processes and pleadings to anybody posing a claim to the
estate, much less contingent claims, would unduly complicate and burden the intestate
proceedings, and would ultimately offend the guiding principle of speedy and orderly
disposition of cases.

Fortunately, there is a median that not only exists, but also has been recognized by this
Court, with respect to the petitioners herein, that addresses the core concern of petitioners
to be apprised of developments in the intestate proceedings. In Hilado v. Judge Reyes,25 the
Court heard a petition for mandamus filed by the same petitioners herein against the RTC
judge, praying that they be allowed access to the records of the intestate proceedings,
which the respondent judge had denied from them. Section 2 of Rule 135 came to fore, the
provision stating that "the records of every court of justice shall be public records and shall
be available for the inspection of any interested person x x x." The Court ruled that
petitioners were "interested persons" entitled to access the court records in the intestate
proceedings. We said:

Petitioners' stated main purpose for accessing the records to—monitor prompt compliance
with the Rules governing the preservation and proper disposition of the assets of the

42
estate, e.g., the completion and appraisal of the Inventory and the submission by the
Administratrix of an annual accounting—appears legitimate, for, as the plaintiffs in the
complaints for sum of money against Roberto Benedicto, et al., they have an interest over
the outcome of the settlement of his estate. They are in fact "interested persons" under
Rule 135, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court x x x26

Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the records of the intestate

proceedings is an eminently preferable precedent than mandating the service of court
processes and pleadings upon them. In either case, the interest of the creditor in seeing to
it that the assets are being preserved and disposed of in accordance with the rules will be
duly satisfied. Acknowledging their right to access the records, rather than entitling them to
the service of every court order or pleading no matter how relevant to their individual claim,
will be less cumbersome on the intestate court, the administrator and the heirs of the
decedent, while providing a viable means by which the interests of the creditors in the
estate are preserved.1awphi1

Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special Proceedings do require notice to any
or all "interested parties" the petitioners as "interested parties" will be entitled to such
notice. The instances when notice has to be given to interested parties are provided in: (1)
Sec. 10, Rule 85 in reference to the time and place of examining and allowing the account
of the executor or administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b) of Rule 89 concerning the petition to
authorize the executor or administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage or
otherwise encumber real estates; and; (3) Sec. 1, Rule 90 regarding the hearing for the
application for an order for distribution of the estate residue. After all, even the
administratrix has acknowledged in her submitted inventory, the existence of the pending
cases filed by the petitioners.

We now turn to the remaining reliefs sought by petitioners; that a deadline be set for the
submission by administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified and complete inventory of the
estate, and upon submission thereof: the inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue be required to assist in the appraisal of the fair market value of the same;
and that the intestate court set a deadline for the submission by the administratrix of her
verified annual account, and, upon submission thereof, set the date for her examination
under oath with respect thereto, with due notice to them and other parties interested in the
collation, preservation and disposition of the estate. We cannot grant said reliefs.

Section 1 of Rule 83 requires the administrator to return to the court a true inventory and
appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased within three (3) months from
appointment, while Section 8 of Rule 85 requires the administrator to render an account of
his administration within one (1) year from receipt of the letters testamentary or of
administration. We do not doubt that there are reliefs available to compel an administrator
to perform either duty, but a person whose claim against the estate is still contingent is not
the party entitled to do so. Still, even if the administrator did delay in the performance of
these duties in the context of dissipating the assets of the estate, there are protections
enforced and available under Rule 88 to protect the interests of those with contingent claims
against the estate.

Concerning complaints against the general competence of the administrator, the proper
remedy is to seek the removal of the administrator in accordance with Section 2, Rule 82.
While the provision is silent as to who may seek with the court the removal of the
administrator, we do not doubt that a creditor, even a contingent one, would have the
personality to seek such relief. After all, the interest of the creditor in the estate relates to

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the preservation of sufficient assets to answer for the debt, and the general competence or
good faith of the administrator is necessary to fulfill such purpose.

All told, the ultimate disposition of the RTC and the Court of Appeals is correct. Nonetheless,
as we have explained, petitioners should not be deprived of their prerogatives under the
Rules on Special Proceedings as enunciated in this decision.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, subject to the qualification that petitioners, as persons
interested in the intestate estate of Roberto Benedicto, are entitled to such notices and
rights as provided for such interested persons in the Rules on Settlement of Estates of
Deceased Persons under the Rules on Special Proceedings. No pronouncements as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

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